On October 9, fighters from two jihadist groups clashed near Gonadaouri, in Burkina Faso’s Oudalan province, not far from the Malian border. One side belonged to Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), al-Qaeda’s Sahel affiliate. The other belonged to the Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP), known until 2022 as the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara. The two […]
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Since Russia launched the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Starlink, and later Starshield, have become vital for Ukraine’s defense and even offensive capabilities.
Amid ongoing tussle over Starshield restrictions, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy announced on October 20, 2026, that he had positive talks with the United States to resolve the issues.
“I spoke with Marco Rubio, and it was a substantive conversation – focused on the issues that matter. I am grateful for his readiness to help and his clear position. First, ballistic missile interceptors, which are needed to protect lives. Second, early warning of Russian ballistic missile attacks, which is vital.
Third, we need to restore the Starlink/Starshield situation. Of course, all of this comes against the backdrop of our diplomatic efforts to end this horrific war and the constant killing of people. We agreed to get in touch again soon for an update.
Thank you, Marco, for the constructive discussion! Thank you to everyone in America who supports fair approaches!” Zelenskyy said in a post on X.
However, the restrictions have highlighted Ukraine’s heavy military dependence on US-linked satellite systems amid political friction with the Trump administration, including mounting pressure over Ukrainian strikes on Russian energy infrastructure and related disputes over intelligence sharing and sanctions policy, even as Moscow intensifies attacks.
To understand Starshield and its utility for Ukraine, one must understand Starlink.
Starlink is a satellite internet service developed and operated by SpaceX. It operates a constellation of thousands of smaller satellites at around 550 kilometers above Earth.
Notably, traditional terrestrial and satellite communication (SATCOM) networks cannot match Starlink’s bandwidth. Most conventional SATCOM systems also rely on geostationary (geostationary orbit) satellites, which introduce higher latency and limit the effectiveness of real-time applications such as remote piloting of UAVs, as the EurAsian Times explained earlier.
However, Starlink’s low-earth orbit (LEO) satellite architecture makes it more resilient to jamming and provides a more secure communication channel.
Starshield is SpaceX’s satellite program focused on government and national security. While Starlink is built for consumers, businesses, and general connectivity, delivering high-speed internet via a massive constellation of low-Earth-orbit satellites, Starshield is purpose-built for government customers—primarily the US Department of Defense, intelligence agencies, the US Space Force, and allied countries and their military, like Ukraine.
Ukraine has used both: commercial Starlink terminals widely for communications and logistics, and Starshield for higher-security military needs where available.
When Russia launched its full-scale invasion in February 2022, it systematically targeted fiber-optic cables, cell towers, and power grids, destroying all traditional internet and jamming military radios. This is when Starlink stepped in.
Ukraine wanted Starlink terminals because they don’t rely on ground infrastructure and operate in blacked-out or contested areas. Starlink and Starshield provide connectivity even when the enemy damages or destroys traditional telecommunications infrastructure.
Ukrainian troops currently rely on Starshield for long-distance video transmission for military operations, information gathering, and communication. It serves as the backbone for encrypted voice, messaging, and data links between units, headquarters, and isolated positions. This includes real-time situational awareness systems.
Satellite internet connectivity is especially important for drone operations, which are central to Ukraine’s offensive and defensive strategies. These unmanned Ukrainian systems rely on satellite connectivity because current operations frequently require constant contact between controllers and aircraft.
Starshield enables long-range control and live video feeds from reconnaissance and attack drones far beyond the reach of normal radio links. It also supports interceptor drones that pursue fast Russian jet-powered drones, including the notorious Shahed class.
Ukrainian officials recently alleged that Starshield receptors stopped working in Ukraine when mounted on fast-moving objects, impairing drones that depend on them for onboard guidance over Ukrainian territory.
In fact, a Ukrainian Defense Ministry official said the sensors worked when moving, but only up to 100 miles per hour (160 kph), meaning drones had to slow down significantly. Some units reported disruptions at even lower speeds.
When connectivity is sketchy or slows, missions slow, lose accuracy, and sometimes become impossible. In fact, military officers quoted in media reports alleged that connections were lost during operations and missions were canceled when connectivity failed. These constraints may have been especially painful because Ukraine increasingly uses drones for long-range strikes, as well as air defense and interception.
Ukraine also uses Starshield to launch strikes from ground-based systems. It allows targeting data to flow quickly from sensors and drones to guns and HIMARS, closing the sensor-to-shooter loop and improving precision.
Additionally, Starlink/Starshield are crucial to Ukrainian forces receiving intelligence from allies. Western partners provide Ukraine with surveillance data regarding Russian air strikes, missile launches, troop movements, anti-aircraft positions, and escape routes.
Put succinctly, Ukrainian forces rely heavily on Starlink for battlefield management, Secure communications, Drone operations, artillery coordination and precision strikes, cybersecurity and intelligence sharing, and logistics and command networks.
At the same time, Starlink has significant civilian applications. It has also been crucial for hospitals, emergency services, local administrations, journalists, and ordinary citizens in frontline or occupied areas, who use it to stay connected when conventional networks fail.
By 2025, roughly 50,000 Starlink/Starshield terminals were operating in Ukraine, according to analysis from the Center for Security Studies at ETH Zurich. As of now, Ukraine has no equivalent resilient, high-bandwidth LEO alternative available at comparable scale and speed of deployment.
Shortly after Russia invaded Ukraine, Ukraine’s former Vice Prime Minister and Minister of Digital Transformation, Mykhailo Fedorov, asked SpaceX owner Elon Musk on X to activate SpaceX’s Starlink satellites.
Musk complied almost immediately and shipped user terminals to Ukraine.
SpaceX’s satellite internet service has since provided resilient communications when ground networks were jammed or destroyed, supported drone operations, logistics, and reconnaissance, and helped maintain connectivity for civilians and the military. In fact, it has become the cornerstone of Ukraine’s offensive and defensive operations throughout the grinding war.
Earlier this month, Ukrainian forces were jolted by connectivity problems with Starshield terminals. The Ukrainian government alleged that the Trump administration and SpaceX had unilaterally restricted its access.
Serhiy Beskrestnov, a presidential adviser on defense technologies and well-known military blogger, stated: “Our armed forces did not receive a warning about these restrictions, and this led to the failure of a number of missions… It’s clear that this action cannot be a coincidence and is connected to the current political situation.”
President Zelenskyy said Russian forces appeared to exploit the disruption, noting that interceptor drones hunting jet-powered Shahed-type munitions depend on the connection.
“It is clear that the Russians are trying to take advantage of the problems with Starlink in Ukraine, as our interceptor drones depend on this connection among other things,” Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy posted to X.
Responding to the claims, Musk wrote on X that the US government owns and controls the Starshield systems, and that the US military and president control any limits on its speed or use. Starlink “cannot be used for offensive military action, as doing so would be inappropriate for a commercial company,” Musk highlighted in his post.
Citing sources, Reuters reported that the White House had ordered the Department of Defense to slow down Starshield services for Ukraine.
This sparked speculation that the crucial communications system was briefly restricted to add more pressure on Ukraine to stop its strikes on Russian refineries, which US President Donald Trump has repeatedly blamed for skyrocketing fuel costs that are hurting his Republican Party’s chances in the upcoming November midterm elections.
The Trump administration did not confirm these allegations.
However, the sudden Starshield outage coincided with massive Russian ballistic missile attacks for which Ukraine did not receive any warning from the US, just days after the Trump administration warned Kyiv to stop its attacks on Russian refineries or face suspension of intelligence sharing.
Another twist in this grueling tale came when The Telegraph reported that Musk approached Trump about slowing down Starshield in Ukraine.
However, Trump later said he did not believe that either he or Musk was responsible for Ukraine losing access to Starshield.
Over the weekend, Marco Rubio went on record saying Starshield is currently unavailable to Ukraine, adding that a request from Kyiv to use the system for attacks deep inside Russia was “under discussion.”
“Starlink is a commercial product, okay? And so it’s regulated and handled as a commercial product. Starshield is a defense product, a military product,” said Rubio in comments published by the Pentagon. “They’ve asked for access to it in order to conduct deep strikes inside of Russia. They don’t have access to it at the moment. That’s under discussion,” he added.
Ukrainian officials say the restrictions affected Starshield terminals they use for military operations. Secretary Rubio has stated that Starshield itself is not currently available to Ukraine and that Ukraine’s drone operations have relied on commercial Starlink. The two sides do not agree on which system was restricted.
The post Starshield vs. Starlink: The Satellite Fight Complicating the Ukraine-Russia War and Kyiv’s Ties with the U.S. appeared first on EURASIAN TIMES.
Russia’s Tupolev Tu-160M, the world’s largest, heaviest, and fastest strategic bomber, has become even more formidable.
Its manufacturer, United Aircraft Corporation (UAC), says it has modernized roughly 80% of the aircraft’s onboard systems and equipment, keeping the nuclear-capable bomber relevant amid rapidly evolving battlefield demands.
The upgraded onboard systems include modern avionics, navigation technology, weapons-control systems, and a complete renewal of onboard radio-electronic equipment and upgrades to the aircraft-control system.
The company has also changed the strategic bomber’s propulsion system, introducing the new NK-32-02 engines, also described as the NK-32 Series 02.
The upgrades provide Russia with a modernized long-range strike platform, capable of delivering nuclear warheads as well as conventional military missions.
The Tu-160M ‘White Swan’ is also a key part of Russia’s nuclear triad, alongside land-based and submarine-launched missiles.
However, although the company has modernized and upgraded 80% of the onboard systems and equipment, it has not tinkered with the aircraft’s airframe, which remains unchanged. This means that the Tu-160M, known by its NATO reporting name Blackjack, retains the distinctive variable-sweep wings and overall appearance of the original Tu-160.
The Tu-160M’s variable-sweep wings can adjust from about 20° fully forward to 65° fully swept back for high-speed flight.
The forward-swept wings maximize lift and wingspan, allowing the massive aircraft to take off with its heavy payload, while the fully swept wings sharply reduce drag, enabling the Tu-160M to reach about Mach 2.05 and making it the fastest operational strategic bomber.
In short, variable-sweep wings let a large strategic bomber combine heavy-lift capability, long endurance, and genuine supersonic performance, a combination fixed-wing designs struggle to match.
More importantly, Russia has rebuilt the engineering and industrial capacity to produce a strategic, nuclear-capable, long-range bomber nearly three decades after Moscow lost this crucial capability.
Tupolev head Yuri Abrosimov discussed the Tu-160M’s modernization efforts in an article published by the United Aircraft Corporation (UAC), which includes Tupolev.
Highlighting the Tu-160’s unique characteristics, Abrosimov said, “The Tu-160 strategic missile carrier is still the best supersonic aircraft in the world, surpassing in its characteristics a similar aircraft complex available in the United States.”
“46 official world records have been set on the Tu-160, including the record for flight duration and range. The resumption of mass production of the legendary ‘White Swan’ is the development of unique competencies and industrial and technological sovereignty of our country,” he added.
Abrosimov underlined that, in addition to modernizing 80% of the onboard systems, including a new powerplant, the company has refurbished several assembly lines from scratch using modern technologies.
The company has also upgraded workshop equipment and its flight-test facilities, and introduced electron-beam welding and vacuum annealing systems for titanium assemblies.
Tupolev has also rebuilt supply lines for producing the upgraded Tu-160M bombers.
“One of the main difficulties we are facing is the restoration of production cooperation, starting with suppliers of materials and semi-finished products. We have actually rebuilt the technological chains for a number of units, taking into account the use of modern technologies,” Abrosimov said.
He also highlighted the difficulties Russia faced in restarting Tu-160M production, and the use of modern digital technologies in the process.
“The implementation of the Tu-160 reproduction program required the creation of a fundamentally new unified digital environment for working on the project. The design bureaus of Sukhoi, Mikoyan, and Ilyushin participated in the preparation of digital documentation.”
He further said that the upgradation of onboard systems was done in a way that newer systems can be integrated without requiring modernization of the entire complex.
“When upgrading on-board systems, modern approaches have been applied, which make it possible, if necessary, to further increase the functionality of the systems and the aircraft as a whole, as an aviation complex, without significant improvements.”
“The approaches used in building the architecture of the avionics complex will allow installing new systems to replace those that become obsolete over time, without modernizing the entire complex. This makes it possible to constantly provide a response to the emerging demands of time,” he said.
Notably, Russia has localized the upgrade of the Tu-160M bomber and refurbished its assembly units while under crippling Western sanctions that specifically target the Russian military-industrial and aerospace complex, including the UAC, Rostec, Tupolev, and the Kazan manufacturing plant that produces the Tu-160.
Earlier, the UAC disclosed that it digitized the complete design documentation for the Tu-160M and modernized over 40% of equipment at the Kazan Aviation Plant to restart bomber production.
In the 1980s, during the Soviet era, the Kazan Aircraft Production Plant produced the Tu-160.
Production continued until 1992, when Russian President Boris Yeltsin ordered an end to serial production after the Soviet Union dissolved in December 1991.
During this time, the Kazan plant built nearly 35 Tu-160M bombers.
Notably, when the Soviet Union disintegrated in 1991, 19 of the nearly 35 Tu-160M bombers were in Ukraine, which announced their integration into the Ukrainian Air Force.
However, in the following years, Ukraine transferred eight Tu-160 bombers to Russia under a debt-relief program and dismantled the remaining bombers under a Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program with the US.
Russia decided to restart Tu-160M production in 2016 and again chose the same plant, the Kazan Aviation Plant (KAZ), for the job.
The facility required substantial modernization, including new equipment, rebuilding workshops, and restoring titanium-welding capability.
However, sanctions slowed the program. The first round of sanctions was imposed on Russia in 2014, following the occupation of Crimea.
Following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, much stronger sanctions were imposed on Russia, especially on its military-industrial complex.
In June 2024, UAC announced it had completed modernization at three workshops for producing new Tu-160 bombers. Overall, from 2016 to 2024, Russia modernized about 10 production facilities for the strategic bomber.
Despite crippling sanctions, Russia restarted production of the Tu-160M bomber and even achieved 80% modernization of its onboard systems, no small feat.
However, the 80% figure comes from internal company claims and has not been independently verified.
Russia has signed a contract to produce 10 Tu-160M bombers.
The first newly built Tu-160M2 made its maiden flight in Kazan on January 12, 2022, becoming the first new Tu-160 built since 1992.
However, the program has missed repeated deadlines.
Russia was supposed to receive four Tu-160M bombers by 2023: two newly built Tu-160M2 and two upgraded Tu-160Ms.
The deadline was then extended first to 2024, and then to 2025.
By the end of 2025, Russia had received only two Tu-160M strategic bombers. It remains unclear whether the two are new or upgraded.
Still, restarting Tu-160 production, digitizing its engineering design documentation, and upgrading 80% of its onboard systems, including a new engine, despite crippling Western sanctions, remain major achievements for Russian military aviation.
The Tu-160M is not only a nuclear delivery platform but also a strategic conventional military platform, and it has been used in both the Syrian War and the Ukraine War.
It remains the largest combat aircraft in the world; it could carry 45,000 kg of ordnance across its two internal bays, or up to twelve nuclear-armed cruise missiles, and fly 14,000 km without refueling. Its supersonic speed of 2,300 km/h and variable-sweep wings made it a standout in aviation history.
Russia is slowly restarting production and upgrading its Tu-160M bomber, while the US and China are already working on next-generation strategic bombers, the B-21 Raider and H-20.
The Northrop Grumman B-21 stealth bomber remains on track to enter operational service in 2027, and China’s Xi’an H-20 is also in production, though its current status is unknown.
While the Tu-160 is unmatched in payload capacity and can exceed Mach 2, it isn’t stealthy, unlike the B-2 Spirit or the under-development B-21 Raider, which can penetrate contested airspace.
The post Russia’s Nuclear Blackjack Returns: Tupolev Says 80% of Systems Renewed on Tu-160M Bomber appeared first on EURASIAN TIMES.
As Ukraine battles near-daily Russian bombardment, Kyiv must be rueing the fateful decisions made by its leadership in the 1990s, which agreed to voluntarily degrade its military and nuclear capabilities.
Ironically, it was none other than the US and Russia that encouraged Kyiv to transfer/destroy its nuclear bombs, and other critical military assets like ballistic and surface-to-air missiles, and strategic bombers.
As fate would have it, some of the same nuclear-capable bombers that Kyiv transferred to Russia are believed to have been used by Moscow to attack Ukraine.
As the US pressures Ukraine to accept a ceasefire on Russia’s terms, including crippling limits on Ukrainian military size and power, Kyiv would think a million times before any commitment, which could degrade its military.
On December 8, 1991, Boris Yeltsin – President of the Russian Federation in the Soviet Union, Leonid Kravchuk – President of Ukraine, and Stanislav Shushkevich – Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Belarus, met at a hunting lodge in Belarus and signed an agreement declaring that the Soviet Union “as a subject of international law and a geopolitical reality” had ceased to exist and created the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in its place.
Nearly two weeks later, on December 25, the Kremlin lowered the Soviet Sickle and Hammer flag for the last time, and the Soviet Union became history, fragmenting into 15 new independent states.
At that time, the Soviet Union (USSR) was one of the world’s two superpowers.
It had the world’s largest arsenal of nuclear bombs, thousands of nuclear delivery platforms, including launchers and strategic bombers, and Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs).
The 15 independent states did not divide these military assets orderly, and the country hosting the nuclear warheads and delivery platforms often became their de facto owner.
Ukraine, the second-most populous and economically powerful republic in the Soviet Union, inherited approximately 1900 strategic nuclear warheads, between 2,650 and 4,200 Soviet tactical nuclear weapons, 176 ICBMs (130 SS-19 and 46 SS-24) and associated launchers, nearly 600 nuclear-capable KH-55 cruise missiles, and approximately 102 strategic bombers: 23 Tu-95MS, 19 Tu-160, and more than 60 Tu-22M3.
This large nuclear arsenal would have made Ukraine the world’s third-largest nuclear power, after Russia and the US. Worryingly, Ukraine inherited not only nuclear warheads, but also delivery platforms, such as nuclear-capable missiles, launchers, and nuclear-capable strategic bombers.
The situation was a non-proliferation nightmare for the world, and the US and Russia, the long-time Cold War adversaries, soon found a common cause to come together and take away these new countries’ nuclear assets, in the process robbing them of their deterrence against external aggression.
However, the disarmament process forced Ukraine to transfer not only its nuclear assets but also its conventional military platforms, such as ICBMs, cruise missiles, and strategic bombers, assets that could have been crucial for Kyiv in defending its territory from Russian aggression.
On December 5, 1994, leaders of the US, the UK, and the Russian Federation met in Budapest, Hungary, and signed the Budapest Memorandum, under which the three countries gave security assurances to Ukraine in return for its accession to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as a non-nuclear-weapons state.
Under the agreement, Ukraine agreed to transfer its nuclear warheads to Russia.
Further, under the 1992 Lisbon Protocol to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) and the US-funded Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program (1993), Ukraine committed to dismantling all strategic nuclear delivery systems by December 5, 2001. This deadline was later extended to 2006.
Ever since the war in Ukraine started in February 2022, Russia has routinely used its strategic bombers to launch missiles at Ukraine.
In 1991, Ukraine inherited approximately 102 strategic bombers: 25 Tu-95MS, 19 Tu-160, and more than 60 Tu-22M3.
According to the Eurasian security think tank Jamestown Foundation, when the Soviet Union collapsed, Ukraine hosted two of its most important strategic air bases.
At Uzin, 70 kilometers south of Kyiv, the Soviets stationed 25 Tu-95MS turboprop nuclear missile carriers. At Pryluky, 130 kilometers east of the capital, the Soviet Union stationed its only operational unit of 19 new, supersonic Tu-160 Blackjack bombers.
In February 1992, the unit at Uzin declared allegiance to Ukraine. In May 1992, just one week after Russia announced it was forming its own national armed forces, Ukraine announced it was taking command of all long-range aviation units on its territory. This included the Tu-160 base at Pryluky.
The Tu-160s were particularly lethal. It was designed to match the American B-1B bomber, but was significantly larger and faster.
It remains the largest combat aircraft in the world; it could carry 45,000 kg of ordnance across its two internal bays, or up to twelve nuclear-armed cruise missiles, and fly 14,000 km without refueling. Its supersonic speed of 2,300 km/h and variable-sweep wings made it a standout in aviation history.
However, under the START-1 treaty and CTR agreement, Ukraine agreed to dismantle all of these strategic bombers.
Thus began the consensual elimination of Ukraine’s strategic aviation.
Under the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program, the United States funded the destruction of some strategic bombers and missiles, including the extraction of valuable metals.
However, some bombers were not destroyed.
At the time, the newly independent Ukraine was struggling with debt. For decades, as part of the Soviet Union, Ukraine got access to heavily subsidized fuel and gas. When the Soviet Union dissolved abruptly in 1991, Moscow suddenly cut off this subsidized gas.
Struggling with mounting debt, Ukraine agreed to transfer eight Tu-160 and three Tu-95MS bombers to Moscow in exchange for US$285 million in debt relief. This decision remains controversial, as the estimated value of a single Tu-160 was between US$250 and US$300 million.
Between 1999 and 2000, Kyiv transferred Tu-95s and Tu-160s as partial payments on natural-gas debts, along with 575 Kh-55 missiles.
This fateful decision not only degraded Ukraine’s air power and deterrence, but it also multiplied Russia’s air power, creating a military imbalance that Moscow is exploiting in the current war.
In 2024, an investigation by Ukrainian investigative news site Skhemy found that six of the eight Tu-160 bombers transferred to Russia were still active in military operations against Ukraine.
The remaining strategic bombers in Ukraine were dismantled, often with technical and financial assistance from the US.
In March 2007, the US State Department reported that Ukraine had dismantled 57 Tu-22 bombers, 27 Tu-95s, six Tu-142s, 11 Tu-160s, for bomber trainers, 346 Kh-22 ASMs, and 483 Kh-ALCMs (air-launched cruise missiles).
While these platforms were nuclear-capable and theoretically could have been used to launch nukes, they also had conventional military capabilities.
By dismantling and transferring these military assets to Russia, Kyiv delivered a double blow to itself – degrading its own capabilities while multiplying its adversary’s.
In the annals of military history, few decisions have proven as fateful – or as irreversible.
The post The Bombers U.S. Paid to Scrap Weakened Ukraine, Helped Russia. Why Did Kyiv Clip Its Own Wings? appeared first on EURASIAN TIMES.
Ukrainian forces have liberated more territory since the beginning of the fall than Russian troops have captured during the same period. This trend has persisted throughout 2026, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said in his 18 October address. He also reported that Dobropillia, Kostiantynivka, and five other settlements remain under Ukrainian control.
Russia systematically exaggerates its battlefield gains. A recent briefing by Valery Gerasimov, chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, in which he claimed that Russian forces had captured 92 settlements since the beginning of September, as well as Kostiantynivka and Dobropillia, and advanced to within 5 kilometers of Zaporizhzhia, was based on “outright lies, manipulation, and exaggerations,” Ukrainian General Staff spokesperson Andrii Kovaliov said.
Ukraine also continues to defend areas near Kramatorsk, Zelenskyy said. He dismissed Russian claims about Zaporizhzhia.
“We are destroying Russians 20 kilometers from Zaporizhzhia, not five, as someone in Russia is fantasizing to Putin,” Zelenskyy said.
Ukrainian forces continue to hold back Russian assaults and destroy groups of occupying troops attempting to infiltrate Dobropillia, the president said. The Defense Forces are also defending positions elsewhere in Donetsk Oblast and in Kharkiv and Zaporizhzhia oblasts.
Russia seeks to advance on the Zaporizhzhia axis to bring the regional capital within range of its tube artillery, hold forward positions, and protect rear areas from Ukrainian strikes, the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) said on 18 October.
Maksym Kravchuk, spokesperson for Ukraine's Southern Group of Forces, refuted Gerasimov’s claims that Russian forces had captured Malokaterynivka, located south of Zaporizhzhia, stressing that the settlement remains under Ukrainian control, the Center for Countering Disinformation said on 18 October. Ukrainian troops recorded a video directly from Malokaterynivka to confirm this.
As of 18 October, Russian forces had advanced or infiltrated to within 24 kilometers of Zaporizhzhia, ISW said.
Dobropillia is now a fortress anchoring Ukrainian positions along the highway leading northeast toward Kramatorsk. Russia first tried to take Dobropillia in August 2025 and is now trying again.
Russia is redeploying reinforcements to the Dobropillia axis and continues to send assault infantry through the village of Nove Shakhove despite heavy losses. Russian command will likely try to encircle or at least envelop Dobropillia and cut off Ukrainian supply routes from the direction of Bilozerske, Ukrainian military analyst Kostiantyn Mashovets wrote on 9 October.
Mashovets sees the push as the southern flank of a Russian effort to envelop the whole Sloviansk–Kramatorsk urban area.
Dobropillia remains under Ukrainian control, Zelenskyy said. On 18 October, footage located by analysts showed a Russian soldier hoisting a flag in the town's southeast after an infiltration, yet ISW has found no sign that Russian troops have dug in there.
Ukrainian troops in and around Kostiantynivka are stopping Russia from locking in its gains in the city or pushing on toward Druzhkivka and Kramatorsk, ISW said on 17 October.
Russian officials claimed that capturing Kostiantynivka was an important step toward establishing control over the Sloviansk–Druzhkivka–Kramatorsk urban agglomeration and the entire Donetsk Oblast, ISW said in August. The Kremlin also claimed that Russian forces had captured the city as early as 5 July, the institute added.
A Russian military blogger claimed that Russian forces had full control over Kostiantynivka, but ISW found no evidence to support this claim, the institute said in its 16 October assessment. Russian troops had only infiltrated parts of southern and central Kostiantynivka without consolidating positions, and there was no evidence of their presence in its northern part, ISW added.
The world’s first supersonic passenger airliner—the Soviet Tu-144—may have become history after a brief but troubled stint that ended in commercial failure. However, some Russian volunteers refuse to let it vanish into oblivion and are reportedly advancing efforts to restore the aircraft for static display.
At the height of the Cold War, the Tu-144 “Concordski” was seen as an answer to the Anglo-French supersonic aircraft, Concorde.
The Russian airliner beat the Concorde in the skies twice: first with its maiden flight on December 31, 1968, two months before Concorde, and second with its first supersonic flight in June 1969, about four months before Concorde.
To preserve this legacy, a group of Russian volunteers has spent years coaxing life back into a Tu-144 airframe on the shared grounds of the Gromov Flight Research Institute and Zhukovsky Airport.
Interestingly, though, these volunteers are neither engineers from Russia’s state design bureau nor museum-paid technicians, but enthusiasts with limited resources aiming to restore a retired Tupolev Tu-144D.
The aircraft, registered CCCP-77115, is parked on the shared grounds of the Gromov Flight Research Institute and Zhukovsky Airport outside Moscow. It served as a static exhibit at the MAKS air show for several years, but its fate remains unclear, as the air show has been suspended since 2021 due to the war in Ukraine.
Passionate volunteers have carried out extensive external and internal restoration work on the aircraft. One volunteer involved, Pavel Efter, has posted videos of the work on both airplanes on his YouTube channel, “Restorer144,” since 2023.
In the videos, volunteers can be seen turning on the electrical power supply and batteries, testing the fuel gauge, fuel pump, and fuel pressure indicator in the cockpit, checking the landing gear lights and inflating the tires, testing the cabin lighting, repairing the analog navigation system, examining the electrical schematics, cleaning the outside of the aircraft, inspecting the SSP-2A fire detection system and smoke sensors, raising and lowering the nose, testing the retractable canards, testing the APU’s bay doors beneath the aircraft, and actually installing the TA-6A Auxiliary Power Unit (APU).
In Instagram comments, Efter told enthusiasts and followers that the Tu-144D is being refurbished only for static exhibition and will not return to flight.
Notably, the TA-6A and other mechanical and electrical modifications to the Tu-144D (as seen in the video above) have recently been made, sparking rumors that the volunteers may be preparing the aircraft for another static exhibition at MAKS, probably in 2027.
Nonetheless, the volunteers have been working on restoring the aircraft for several months. In July 2026, media reports noted that the volunteers had already started the electrical system and connected a ground power source, adding that even the well-known nose-lowering mechanism had become operational.
Another Russian state-funded news website, Mir24, provided more details on the volunteers. “There is a problem with such glass fuses now. They aren’t used anywhere; you can’t always find them in old stock. We throw out a cry on the Internet: who has something, who can help with what,” Sergey Chechetkin told the publication at the time. Sergey is a former aviation engineer who devotes all his free time to the Tu-144.
The report also noted that volunteers have completely recreated the plane’s cabin. Volunteers collected the missing devices from across the country and began restoring the aircraft by tidying the service panels and lamps and installing the original chairs. Initially, the 77115 board wasn’t a passenger deck; it served as an experimental testbed. “We find it in different places. Old blocks are transmitted at the bases; you can find something here. Here we are installing the blocks on the mounts,” a volunteer named Alexey told Mir24.
Russia’s Nuclear Blackjack Returns: Tupolev Says 80% of Systems Renewed on Tu-160M Bomber
The project carries no grand political statement. The volunteers do not frame their work as resistance or protest. Instead, they speak of history. “This is not just a museum exhibit, but a legend that we should be proud of. You can still learn a lot from it; many developments aren’t available on other planes yet. It is still ahead of its time,” said Alexey Amelushkin, an engineer at the training and methodological center of PJSC Tupolev, earlier.
Needless to say, returning this legendary airframe to flight is widely regarded as impractical, especially since Kolesov RD-36-51 engines are long out of production, spare parts are scarce, and certification requirements would be formidable.
Therefore, Efter and his colleagues are only restoring the aircraft’s ability to present itself: nose down in the classic pose, canards extended, cabin lights on, systems powered by its own APU.
The Tupolev Tu-144 was the world’s first supersonic passenger airliner.
Designed by the Tupolev Design Bureau, the aircraft was rushed into development after the then-Soviet leader, Nikita Khrushchev, demanded a supersonic transport that would fly before its Western counterpart.
The prototype made its maiden flight on 31 December 1968 near Moscow, beating Concorde into the air by more than two months. Subsequently, the aircraft went supersonic for the first time in June 1969 and became the first commercial aircraft to reach Mach 2 in May 1970.
The Tu-144 was built to be larger and faster than Concorde, and featured a distinctive double-delta wing and a drooping nose for better landing visibility. Later models also added retractable canards to improve low-speed handling.
However, Western experts and officials claimed the Soviets stole the Concorde plans, which may have helped them build the Tupolev Tu-144 before the Concorde.
These claims reportedly stemmed (at least in part) from the uncanny design similarities between the world’s first two supersonic passenger aircraft.
Despite its early successes over the Concorde, the airplane faced technical issues.
For example, Tu-144’s early Kuznetsov NK-144 engines required constant afterburner use to sustain supersonic cruise, making it extremely noisy, fuel-thirsty, and shorter-range than Concorde, which could supercruise without afterburners. Moreover, reliability problems emerged during testing and maintenance, and the cabin was very noisy and vibrated a lot.
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On June 3, 1973, during a demonstration flight at the Paris Air Show, a production Tu-144 broke apart in midair and crashed into the French village of Goussainville, killing all six crew members along with eight additional people on the ground.
Although the most widely accepted explanation is that the crew overstressed the airframe during fast maneuvers, the precise cause of this disaster remains uncertain.
The Tu-144 entered limited commercial service with Aeroflot in 1975, initially carrying mail and cargo on the Moscow–Almaty route, followed by passenger flights in Nov 1977.
However, the aircraft flew only about 55 passenger services before a second major incident. In May 1978, a fuel-line rupture and fire during a test flight claimed the lives of two crew members and formally ended passenger operations.
After this debacle, the aircraft continued brief cargo and experimental work even as its rival program—the Concorde—struggled with its own set of issues.
Both programs were eventually canceled because of poor safety records and concerns about economic viability. However, Concorde was far more successful than the Tu-144 and wasn’t discontinued until 2003.
The Soviet Union, for its part, built only 16 airframes before operations ceased in 1983. A few surviving examples later trained pilots for the Soviet Buran space shuttle, and one modified aircraft served as a flying laboratory in a joint NASA–Russian research program from 1996 to 1999, conducting its final flights in support of future supersonic transport studies, as earlier explained in detail by the EurAsian Times.
Though neither the Tu-144 nor the Concorde survived, both programs have inspired people worldwide to make supersonic commercial travel a reality. Earlier this year, United Aircraft Corporation (UAC) CEO Vadim Badekha confirmed that the Zhukovsky National Research Center is working on a supersonic airliner prototype. He said the effort had moved beyond paper studies into “hardware,” with UAC providing active support, and expressed confidence that the center would complete the work.
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“Yes, such work is underway at the Zhukovsky Research Center, and we are actively assisting. The work is no longer confined to paper – it is already being carried out in hardware. A prototype of such an aircraft is under development, and we believe the Zhukovsky Research Center will successfully complete this work,” he told TASS.
Meanwhile, NASA is advancing work on the X-59, an experimental aircraft in the agency’s Quiet Supersonic Technology (Quesst) program that could go supersonic without generating a sonic boom or a loud, thunder-like sound when it exceeds the speed of sound. In addition, China is developing a supersonic passenger aircraft that could make its maiden flight by 2027. Last year, reports noted that the Chinese commercial aerospace company leading the project conducted the first test flight of a detonation ramjet engine.
As for the Tu-144, this aircraft is remembered as a bold but ultimately unsuccessful engineering achievement. It is, perhaps, for this reason that the volunteers outside the state machinery of Russia are doing everything they can to ensure that the supersonic airliner does not get lost in pages of history.
The post Russia’s ‘Concorde’ is Back: World’s 1st Supersonic Passenger Airliner Lives On as Volunteers Fix Tu-144 appeared first on EURASIAN TIMES.
There is now a growing debate over what constitutes war and whether it should include strikes on data centers. They represent a new front in warfare, in which facilities powering the technology behind many critical industries have become targets.
As it is, the definition of a military attack seems to be changing over time.
Conventionally, it was understood to occur when tanks or fighter planes crossed a border. Then it was expanded to include the use of missiles that were fired without crossing the border but hitting a city and causing physical destruction of “vital infrastructure and death”.
Such attacks justified a country retaliating under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, which legitimizes a war under “Right to Self Defense” if an “armed attack occurs.”
Now there is a growing school of thought that “vital infrastructure” must include any disruptive attack on data centers, whether kinetic or non-kinetic, amounting to significant loss of function. It should be treated as a use of force and trigger the affected country’s right to self-defense under Article 51, the argument goes.
Apparently, vulnerabilities in modern digital infrastructure have turned data centers into primary targets in contemporary warfare. As society becomes deeply integrated with cloud computing, artificial intelligence, and automated logistics, data centers have evolved into the nervous system of modern statecraft.
Attacks on digital infrastructure are no longer limited to cyberattacks (non-kinetic) that cause banking collapses and disrupt vital systems like power grids and hospitals by cutting off Internet access; they now include kinetic strikes on data hubs that affect nations’ military capabilities and expose financial vulnerabilities.
After all, modern defense systems rely heavily on cloud-based logistics. Data centers process satellite imagery, coordinate drone operations, run predictive maintenance algorithms for fighter jets, and host classified communication networks. Thus, taking down these nodes effectively blinds an adversary’s command structure.
This has been noticed in the recent conflicts in the Middle East and Ukraine. For instance, on September 23, Russian Geran-5 jet drones hit the Inkom Business Center in Kyiv, housing Datagroup’s data center. Four people died, and internet service for 100,000 households was down for hours.
On September 27, Kyivstar — Ukraine’s central mobile operator — and Vodafone Ukraine’s data centers were hit. Russia’s Defense Ministry justified this by saying that “Data centers were being used for the benefit of the Ukrainian military.”
Two weeks later, Ukraine returned the favor. It launched highly targeted long-range drone strikes hitting major data hubs across Russia, inflicting significant disruption on the country’s digital economy.
Between October 8 and October 14, 2026, Ukrainian forces carried out a series of “symmetrical responses” to counter earlier Russian attacks on Ukrainian internet and telecommunications assets. The strikes specifically crippled infrastructure belonging to Yandex (often called “Russia’s Google”) and Sberbank, Russia’s largest banking and technology conglomerate.
Similarly, in February-March 2026, during US-Israeli strikes on Iran, the latter hit back not only at oil but at data centers — Google, Microsoft, and Oracle cloud infrastructure in the Gulf, particularly those located in Bahrain, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE.
Apparently, when Amazon Web Services’ Bahrain facility suffered “physical damage to cooling infrastructure from debris”, it became the first known case of an AWS data center damaged in an interstate war.
Iranian missiles near Al Udeid Air Base damaged an Oracle Cloud data center in Doha. Microsoft also confirmed “connectivity issues” in the Qatar Central region.
The same happened to the Google data center in Dammam, Saudi Arabia, which hosts Aramco cloud.
G42 [UAE AI company backed by Microsoft] data center in Abu Dhabi was also affected, forcing it into blackout mode.
In other words, from Kyiv to Bahrain, a pattern is clearly apparent — belligerents no longer distinguish between cloud and command. Data centers that host banks and brigades are treated as brigades. They have officially transitioned from commercial tech infrastructures to critical national security assets.
As Omar Sultan Al Olama, the UAE’s Minister of State for Artificial Intelligence, Digital Economy, and Remote Work Applications, said the other day, “Unfortunately, they’re more important than bridges. They’re more important than roads. They’re more important than tunnels because our whole lives are on these devices that we’re using”.
Incidentally, the UAE is revising plans for a 5-gigawatt AI data center project following the Iranian strikes. The original plan envisioned a 10-square-mile campus in Abu Dhabi, to be built in partnership with American tech companies like Oracle, Nvidia, and Cisco. Now the data centers will likely be spread out across the UAE. Sultan Al Olama said, “ The UAE will change its data centre rules and stop promoting where they are”.
According to Kirk Cameron, founding director of the Institute for Advanced Computing at Virginia Tech, “Data centers are now on the critical path for modern digital infrastructure. The loss of key data centers could collapse economies, disrupt public and private transportation with loss of GPS, and affect government essential services for health, emergency dispatch, and power grids.”
Many agree with him when he argues that “Data centers are competitive advantages in warfare. Knocking out capabilities means potentially crippling combat operations for an adversary. It’s also a form of economic warfare and could lead to longer-term competitive challenges for the target.”
All this brings the question of whether bombing a data center constitutes an act of war. Does the definition of war need to change?
The main challenge to this question lies in what is called the “Gray Zone” of conflict, particularly in non-kinetic attacks. Unlike a missile launch, which leaves clear radar signatures and identifiable points of origin, cyber operations offer plausible deniability.
Under International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, attacking a dual-use target is governed by the principles of distinction and proportionality. Here, attacking a dual-use target is legal only if the military advantage gained outweighs the civilian collateral damage.
If an attack on a data center shuts down military communications but also disables the life-support monitoring systems of dozens of regional hospitals, the strike violates proportionality. Such an operation can be classified as a war crime, reinforcing the argument that major cyber infrastructure operations carry the same legal weight and consequences as traditional warfare.
But any clear distinction in such cases is neither easy nor free from contention. For instance, when Russia attacked data centers in Ukraine, it claimed that these were being used by Ukrainian intelligence and military. However, Ukraine denied the charge.
As Kasia Klonowska, an authority on international law, says, “Due to a lack of a definition of the treaty- terms weapons, means or methods of warfare, it is unclear whether non-weaponized AI decision-support systems should be subjected to a legal review prescribed by Article 36 of the Additional Protocol I. It remains a challenge to determine exactly what should be subjected to review beyond weapons.
“You have very limited situations in which they would actually qualify as lawful targets when they’re used by the military, and even then, it’s very difficult for the attacker to know whether that’s happening or not. If they are purely processing military data, they could be legitimate targets. But many, if not most, are dual-use.”
To address the legal ambiguity surrounding digital warfare, Prof. Ben Hines has proposed what he calls a “Substantive Necessity” framework, reinterpreting international law under Article 51 of the UN Charter.
Under this framework, a non-kinetic cyber attack amounts to an armed attack when the victim state, based on clear and convincing evidence, apprehends a hostile act that has fundamentally compromised, or is imminently poised to compromise, the functioning or security of infrastructure crucial to the state’s ability to function.
The framework argues that traditional international legal thresholds for “force” and “gravity” do not inherently require physical destruction or kinetic weaponry. Under this test, taking down a country’s primary data center cluster that hosts banking, health, emergency dispatch, GPS — even without an explosion — is an armed attack. Because effects equal or exceed kinetic.
Viewed thus, it is not surprising that Western nations like the US, the Netherlands, and France are clearly asserting that a disruptive attack on data centers that causes significant loss of function will be treated as a use of force and may trigger the right to self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter.
In sum, as the line between the physical and digital worlds disappears, international law is adapting to treat high-consequence infrastructure attacks as equivalent to an armed attack.
Data centers are now firmly on the front lines of global conflict, where a single breach can serve as the definitive catalyst for war. The lines between civilian infrastructure and military assets are dangerously blurring.
The post Iran Hit Amazon. Russia Struck Kyiv’s Data Centers. Ukraine Hit Yandex. Can Such Attacks Trigger Article 51? appeared first on EURASIAN TIMES.
Russia is prepared to halt attacks on Ukraine for a single day to allow presidential elections but will not agree to a longer ceasefire, the Kremlin said on Monday.
But had the Russian attack on Ukraine, as planned, succeeded in the initial days, the Ukraine-Russia war would not have dragged into the fifth year, and there would have been no talks of changes in leadership.
Dmitry Peskov said President Vladimir Putin would order Russian forces not to strike Ukraine on polling day if elections were held. “If they truly want to hold elections in Kyiv, then the president of Russia, the commander-in-chief, will be ready to give an order not to launch strikes on Ukraine on election day, specifically on election day,” Peskov told reporters.
He rejected Zelenskiy’s call for a 60-day ceasefire, saying Russia seeks a lasting peace agreement rather than a temporary halt.
“In the Kremlin, both President Putin and officials at other levels have repeatedly stated that we do not want a ceasefire,” Peskov said. “We want long-term peace and are prepared to do everything possible to achieve it.”
Zelenskiy made the 60-day offer on Sunday in an ABC News interview. He said Ukraine would organize elections if Russia agreed to a full ceasefire lasting two months.
“Please tell Putin, give us two months, 60 days of total ceasefire, 60 days, and we will organize elections,” Zelenskiy said.
His comments came a day after U.S. President Donald Trump said Ukraine should replace its President. Trump told reporters that Zelenskiy had failed to reach a deal with Russia and that it was time for a change.
“I think it’s time for Ukraine to get a new president,” Trump said. He criticized Ukraine’s strikes on Russian oil refineries, which followed a U.S. agreement to ease restrictions on Russian diesel exports.
Russia had a clear plan to capture Kyiv and force a surrender.
On 24 February 2022, Russia’s Airborne Forces launched an operation toward Kyiv, supported by missile strikes and air cover, using attack and transport helicopters.
The objective of this blitzkrieg-style maneuver was to seize Antonov Airport in Hostomel, north of Kyiv, establish a bridgehead, create a secure air corridor for additional airborne troops, and then rapidly advance toward Kyiv.
The plan was to quickly deploy Russian Special Forces and military equipment at Hostomel and then overwhelm Ukrainian resistance after a couple of hard strikes.
If successful, Russian troops, armor, artillery, and supplies could be flown into the airport, allowing them to deploy into Kyiv and overthrow the Ukrainian government.
To execute this mission, Russia tasked its elite Airborne Forces (VDV), particularly the 31st Guards Air Assault Brigade, a unit with extensive combat experience from operations in Chechnya, Crimea, and Donbas.
The operation began on February 24 with a coordinated attack involving numerous Russian Ka-52 “Alligator” attack helicopters, which used low-flying tactics to avoid radar detection.
These helicopters fired guided missiles and cannons at the airport’s defenses to suppress Ukrainian forces. Despite intense resistance that cost Russia several helicopters, the assault continued for several hours.
Russian forces seized Hostomel Airport on February 25, 2022. Afterward, the Russian Army and its Airborne Forces tried to turn the airport into a critical forward operating base for their planned push toward Kyiv.
However, Russia’s offensive soon faced considerable setbacks. Russia’s failure to clear the area around the airport quickly led to catastrophe. Ukrainian forces, including special operations units from Ukraine’s Ministry of Defense Main Intelligence Directorate, launched a counteroffensive.
Local fighters and Ukrainian forces on the ground inflicted heavy damage on the Russian troops. In one of the most noteworthy junctures of the battle, a sniper killed Major General Andrei Sukhovetsky, the commanding general of the Russian 7th Airborne Division, by the end of February 2022.
The invasion’s initial momentum slowed, leading to the infamous 40-mile-long convoy and entire units of Russian troops stalling due to fuel shortages.
By March 4, Russian state television aired footage showing large numbers of destroyed Russian military equipment, struck by Ukrainian artillery, scattered across the base. Russian forces became immobilized without clear orders to advance or retreat.
The situation remained dire until March 29, when Russian commanders finally ordered a retreat from Kyiv Oblast. This marked the beginning of the Russian withdrawal from Hostomel, with damaged equipment that could not be evacuated. Ukrainian artillery fire targeted the retreating forces, further complicating their situation.
Among the equipment left behind were 16 modern BMD-4M armored fighting vehicles and a 1L262E Rtut-BM electronic warfare system. These items were either destroyed during the retreat preparation or intentionally blown up by Russian forces.
When Ukrainian troops reentered Hostomel, they found evidence of the hastily abandoned Russian positions, with remnants of daily life scattered around.
These included unopened food packages, personal items like passports and bank cards, and even Ukrainian armored vehicles that had been captured by Russian forces but could not be taken with them.
The loss of surprise, the inability to clear surrounding areas, and the vulnerability of airborne operations to counterattacks demonstrated how quickly airborne missions can go wrong.
The Russian failure to capture Hostomel Airport proved fatal for Moscow’s overall military strategy in Ukraine. After the Hostomel disaster, Russia withdrew from Kyiv oblast and then regrouped in Ukraine’s southern and eastern provinces to stabilize the frontlines.
This initial failure to seize Hostomel and then proceed to Kyiv also allowed Western countries to mobilize support for Ukraine and resume supplying Kyiv with critical military and humanitarian aid.
The post Putin’s 2022 Plan to Seize Kyiv Failed — Now Trump Wants a New President & Moscow Offers One Day Solace appeared first on EURASIAN TIMES.
Pour bien des manifestants, la figure du préfet évoque la répression qu'ils subissent dans la rue — alors même que la fonction est censée garantir l'intérêt général et l'égalité de tous devant la loi, au nom de la République. À mesure que les réformes affaiblissent l'institution préfectorale, ou la politisent, ses missions s'éloignent des préoccupations de la population.
« Des manquements graves et persistants des services. » En février 2024, un collectif d'associations écrivait au préfet d'Indre-et-Loire pour lui reprocher la mise au rebut sans justification de plus de cinq cents demandes de titre de séjour au cours des dix-huit mois précédents. De son côté, la préfecture niait toute « pratique administrative abusive envers les usagers étrangers ». Dans un communiqué daté d'avril, elle plaidait un simple allongement des délais de traitement (1). Pourtant, à Tours comme ailleurs, la maltraitance des étrangers s'institutionnalise. Par la volonté politique de limiter l'immigration, mais également à la suite d'importantes restructurations qui dégradent l'exercice de l'État.
Longtemps, des files d'individus contraints d'attendre dans la nuit l'ouverture matinale des guichets ont symbolisé l'encombrement des services destinés aux immigrés (2). Depuis 2021, la dématérialisation des procédures doit les décharger. Le portail de l'administration numérique pour les étrangers en France (ANEF) a vocation à traiter leurs demandes. Mais, en pratique, les dysfonctionnements se multiplient. « Modules de prise de rendez-vous en ligne saturés (…), téléservices mis en place hors de tout cadre légal et réglementaire, déploiement de l'ANEF assorti de nombreux bugs… » : en juin 2024, un rapport de la défenseure des droits dénonçait une inégalité d'accès aux services publics et recommandait d'accroître les effectifs des préfectures les moins diligentes (3).
Au sein de cette administration territoriale, seuls les services des étrangers restent ouverts au public. Le plan « Préfecture nouvelle génération » (PPNG) de 2016 a dématérialisé puis externalisé la délivrance des titres d'identité et des cartes grises. Désormais, les particuliers doivent accomplir toutes les démarches sur des plates-formes. Des conseillers des espaces France services, ouverts dans les mairies — voire des sociétés privées contre rétribution —, peuvent les accompagner. Mais « le service de proximité que constituaient les préfectures, c'est fini, constate un peu amère une ancienne préfète. Ce sera difficile d'y revenir car les effectifs ont fondu depuis quinze ans ».
Dès lors que « les préfectures sont privées de contacts avec les citoyens, plus personne ne connaît leurs missions », regrette l'ancien préfet du Loir-et-Cher Yves Rousset. Plus personne, ou presque. Car nombre de sans-papiers mais aussi de « gilets jaunes » ou de manifestants contre la réforme des retraites, d'agriculteurs ou d'écologistes savent l'implication des préfets dans le maintien de l'ordre public, voire social. Pourquoi, si souvent, l'exercice de l'État au niveau local paraît n'être plus que l'exercice de la force, ou du passage en force, de Sainte-Soline au chantier de l'A69 ?
« Je veux que les Français datent leur bonheur de l'institution préfectorale. » Le 28 pluviôse an VIII (17 février 1800), Napoléon Bonaparte, alors premier consul, fait adopter la loi qui crée la fonction de préfet — du latin praefectus : « homme qui est la tête d'une chose ; gouverneur, intendant, administrateur, chef » (selon le dictionnaire Gaffiot) — nommé par lui et chargé d'administrer un département, assisté dans chaque arrondissement par un sous-préfet. Une fois couronné, Bonaparte considère ces « empereurs aux petits pieds » comme de véritables courroies de transmission de son pouvoir sur l'ensemble du territoire national. Ils assurent la conscription, la perception des impôts et le maintien de l'ordre. Sous le Second Empire, leur pouvoir est renforcé par un décret du 25 mars 1852. « On peut gouverner de loin mais on n'administre que de près », affirment ses attendus. Les préfets se voient chargés de missions comme l'urbanisme avec, à Paris, les figures de Georges-Eugène Haussmann (1853-1870) ou, sous la IIIe République, d'Eugène Poubelle (1883-1896).
Serviteurs de l'État, les préfets doivent obéissance au gouvernement. Sans toujours échapper aux cas de conscience. Nombre d'entre eux et de leurs agents exécutent les ordres de Vichy, qui étatise la police — jusqu'alors municipale — en 1941. Le secrétaire général de la préfecture de Gironde Maurice Papon organise les rafles de citoyens juifs. Mais trente-neuf préfets et sous-préfets meurent au combat, fusillés ou en déportation. Jean Moulin, préfet d'Eure-et-Loir, tient tête à la Wehrmacht lorsqu'elle arrive à Chartres, en juin 1940 (4). À la Libération, la formation et le recrutement des hauts fonctionnaires — en particulier de ceux de la préfectorale — sont néanmoins érigés en « priorité absolue » dans l'exposé des motifs de l'ordonnance du 9 octobre 1945 tant « le procès [des] administrations publiques est ouvert depuis nombre d'années ».
Ce texte est à l'origine de la création de l'École nationale de l'administration (ENA) qui va former une large part des préfets et sous-préfets. En 1950, un décret instaure un statut du corps préfectoral. Ses membres sont placés sous l'autorité directe du ministre de l'intérieur, nommés et révoqués par le président de la République. « Dans les collectivités territoriales de la République, affirme la Constitution de 1958 à son article 72, le représentant de l'État, représentant chacun des membres du gouvernement, a la charge des intérêts nationaux, du contrôle administratif et du respect des lois. » Pendant plusieurs décennies, l'institution donne satisfaction au pouvoir. « Ce qui tient bon dans les coups durs, assure le général de Gaulle à Alain Peyrefitte, c'est le réseau des préfets et des sous-préfets. C'est l'État (5)… »
En janvier 1981, sous l'influence de la « deuxième gauche » représentée par Michel Rocard — et du socialisme municipal (6) —, le congrès extraordinaire du Parti socialiste (PS) réuni à Créteil retient, parmi ses « 110 propositions pour la France », la priorité donnée à la décentralisation : « La fonction d'autorité des préfets sur l'administration des collectivités locales sera supprimée. » Comme le rappelle le juriste Vincent Malapert, depuis la loi dite « municipale » de 1884, « le représentant de l'État [exerçait] une tutelle à la fois sur le maire et sur les actes de la commune. Cette tutelle, élargie aux départements et aux régions, se traduisait par un contrôle a priori : le préfet [était] libre, en opportunité, de contrôler la légalité des actes des collectivités avant que ceux-ci ne soient exécutoires. Il s'agissait de la principale entrave à la libre administration des collectivités (7) ».
De nombreux élus locaux militaient contre cette emprise, notamment Gaston Defferre, maire de Marseille depuis 1953. Nommé au ministère de l'intérieur après l'élection de François Mitterrand en 1981, il fait voter les lois de décentralisation. L'article 2 de celle du 2 mars 1982 dispose que « les délibérations, arrêtés et actes des autorités communales ainsi que les conventions qu'elles passent sont exécutoires de plein droit ». Dès lors, explique Malapert, si le préfet reste le principal garant de l'ordre public, avec autorité sur les forces de police et de gendarmerie, il « se voit dépossédé de son principal instrument de domination sur les collectivités : il ne sera plus en charge [que] du contrôle de légalité exercé a posteriori ». En outre, seul le juge administratif a le pouvoir d'annuler une décision des collectivités locales.
Le premier acte de la décentralisation s'accompagne d'une réforme de l'État au niveau local. Un décret du 10 mai 1982 prévoit que son représentant dans le département porte désormais « le titre de commissaire de la République. (…) Il est le représentant direct du premier ministre et de chacun des ministres. Il dirige sous leur autorité les services des administrations civiles de l'État ». Pour le gouvernement, le changement de titre ne relève pas que du symbole. Le transfert de compétences aux collectivités doit s'accompagner d'un renforcement de l'État sur le « terrain » : les directions départementales — de l'agriculture et des forêts (DDAF), des affaires sanitaires et sociales (DDASS), de l'équipement (DDE), de la jeunesse et des sports (DDJS)… — se voient placées sous la « direction » d'un commissaire de la République — quand le préfet jusqu'alors, aux termes d'un décret de 1964, se contentait de « coordonner » leurs actions décidées par chaque ministère compétent, depuis Paris.
Dans les années 1980 et 1990, la gauche au pouvoir peine cependant à préciser les contours exacts de ce qu'on appelle dès lors la « déconcentration » et, surtout, à doter celle-ci de moyens à la hauteur de son ambition politique, qu'il s'agisse des ressources en crédits et en effectifs ou des prérogatives accordées au préfet (l'intitulé revient en 1988) pour asseoir sa tutelle sur les autres services territoriaux de l'État. Dans les années 2000, la droite accélère la décentralisation. Son « acte II » attribue de nouvelles compétences aux collectivités et leur transfère des dizaines de milliers d'agents. Puis les gouvernements de M. Nicolas Sarkozy affaiblissent les administrations déconcentrées en les fusionnant, pour réaliser des économies.
La manie de tout regrouper caractérise la période. Désormais, le préfet de département doit non seulement composer avec l'ascendant du préfet de région (décret du 29 avril 2004, au titre de la régionalisation de l'action de l'État) mais aussi, à la suite des réformes engagées sous le quinquennat de M. François Hollande, avec le poids politique des élus à la tête de métropoles ou de grandes régions (8). L'ancien préfet de Haute-Loire Yves Rousset raconte dans La préfecture est en feu (Abatos, 2021) l'incessante hostilité du président d'Auvergne-Rhône-Alpes Laurent Wauquiez de 2017 à 2019.
« Comment peut-on être à la fois le représentant neutre de l'État et le serviteur d'un gouvernement ? C'est toute la complexité de notre métier, nous signalait en 2024 M. Christophe Mirmand, alors préfet de la région Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur et président de l'Association du corps préfectoral et des hauts fonctionnaires du ministère de l'intérieur (ACPHFMI). L'administration préfectorale a dû s'adapter aux vagues de déconcentration successives et à la nouvelle organisation territoriale… » En pratique, le préfet tend surtout à devenir une sorte de « conciliateur », selon l'expression de l'historien François Burdeau (9). Hors son rôle de garant de l'ordre public et son autorité sur les forces de police et de gendarmerie, il ne peut, pour le reste, que recourir au dialogue ou à la contractualisation afin d'influencer des politiques publiques dont l'initiative lui échappe : contrats de ville, de plan État-région (CPER), de développement territorial (CDT), de relance et de transition écologique (CRTE)…
« À la recherche de l'État dans les territoires » : sous ce titre, en 2022, un rapport du Sénat dressait un bilan très critique de ces évolutions. « Les réformes s'empilent sans tentative d'en dégager de manière objective et documentée des enseignements pour la prochaine étape ni encore moins d'en estimer les conséquences (10). » Dans un avis portant sur le projet de loi de finances pour 2019, la commission des lois de cette même institution critiquait vertement le plan « Préfecture nouvelle génération » (PPNG) : « 1 300 emplois ont ainsi été supprimés et 700 réaffectés à quatre missions prioritaires : sécurité et ordre public, coordination des politiques publiques, contrôle de la légalité et lutte contre la fraude documentaire. À l'usage, on constate que les besoins techniques et en termes de relations avec les usagers ont été largement sous-évalués, d'où des dysfonctionnements majeurs (11). »
Ils affectent en particulier le contrôle de légalité des dizaines de milliers d'actes adoptés par les collectivités territoriales. « Cette mission contribue à faire de la France un État unitaire. Or elle n'est plus exercée dans de bonnes conditions, observe le professeur de droit Olivier Renaudie. À cause de moyens en personnel insuffisants — qui conduisent certaines préfectures à tirer au sort les actes à contrôler — et d'un manque d'expertise : le contrôle porte sur des actes complexes, notamment dans le domaine de l'urbanisme et de l'environnement, et les agents des préfectures ne sont pas toujours suffisamment formés. » Tandis qu'en 2012, déjà, un rapport parlementaire décrivait les services préfectoraux comme « une véritable passoire » (12), un préfet à la retraite évoque « les grandes métropoles ou les grandes régions, qui ont désormais à leurs services des cabinets juridiques puissants. En cas de contentieux, les préfectures n'ont plus la capacité de faire face ».
La Cour des comptes observe une diminution des effectifs dans l'ensemble des préfectures et des sous-préfectures entre 2010 et 2020 de l'ordre de 14 %, de près de 28 000 à moins de 24 000, avec une contribution importante des sous-préfectures (- 24 % au cours de la même période) (13). En 2020, selon ce rapport, les sous-préfectures de La Châtre (Indre) ou Nérac-Marmande (Lot-et-Garonne) comptaient ainsi moins de quatre agents (en équivalent temps plein), sous-préfet inclus, « ce qui rend ces structures très fragiles en cas de vacance de poste prolongée ». Alors qu'elles doivent contribuer au contrôle de légalité ou au conseil aux collectivités, plusieurs sous-préfectures ont connu des suppressions (par exemple, Guebwiller et Ribeauvillé dans le Haut-Rhin), des fusions (Ancenis et Châteaubriant en Loire-Atlantique) ou des jumelages. Et le ministère de l'intérieur peut confier la direction de certains arrondissements à un cadre administratif plutôt qu'à un sous-préfet issu de la haute fonction publique.
L'exercice de ces mêmes fonctions tend aussi à se féminiser (35 % de sous-préfètes en 2021), tout comme celles de préfet (38 femmes sur 132, soit 29 %) — la première sous-préfète n'a été nommée qu'en 1974 et la première préfète en 1981 (14). Ces dernières années, les gouvernements successifs ont aussi entendu rajeunir le corps et même, en 2022, rouvrir certaines sous-préfectures — Clamecy (Nièvre), Château-Gontier (Mayenne)… Mais cela ne saurait suffire à revigorer un corps « affaibli », selon l'expression de l'ancienne préfète des Pays de la Loire Nicole Klein lors d'un colloque en 2022 : « Quand le citoyen passe devant la préfecture, surtout dans une grande ville, il ne voit que des migrants qui viennent demander l'asile, ce qui amplifie ce phénomène plus qu'il ne le mérite. (…) Les préfets sont cantonnés depuis plusieurs années à des missions d'ordre public (les “gilets jaunes”, le Covid…). Leur mission consiste à signer des arrêtés pour interdire aux gens de se réunir et de danser dans les bals populaires (là où ils existent encore) (15)… »
Nombre de préfets ou de sous-préfets déplorent la dégradation de l'exercice de leurs fonctions. Elle conduit certains d'entre eux à se rapprocher de l'extrême droite, par exemple au sein du club Les Horaces (16). En 2011, déjà, Mme Marine Le Pen écrivait dans un courrier à la corporation : « Vos éminentes fonctions vous placent directement face aux ravages d'une politique d'amoindrissement de l'État, de découragement de ses personnels et d'inefficacité de sa gouvernance (17). » En mai 2021, dans une autre lettre, c'est aux sept mille plus éminents cadres de l'État que la présidente du Rassemblement national (RN) promettait de revenir sur la réforme de la haute fonction publique supprimant l'ENA ainsi que les corps diplomatique et préfectoral (18).
À la sortie de l'Institut national du service public (INSP), qui remplace l'ENA, les élèves intègrent en effet un corps unique, celui des administrateurs de l'État. Tandis que le corps préfectoral est mis en extinction, M. Emmanuel Macron entend nommer dans les préfectures et les arrondissements des administrateurs d'autres fonctions publiques — territoriale et hospitalière —, mais aussi des cadres d'entreprises. « C'est une réforme de management public qui repose sur la croyance que les pratiques de la fonction publique doivent désormais reposer sur la notion de mission, commente Renaudie. La préfectorale ne sera plus qu'une simple étape dans la carrière d'un cadre parmi d'autres fonctions dans le public ou dans le secteur privé. Certains préfets craignent que ne soient nommés à des postes importants de décision des personnes totalement inexpérimentées. La fonction pourrait être alors menacée par un manque de professionnalisme. »
« Je ne vois pas l'utilité de cette réforme, avoue M. Jean-François Carenco, ancien préfet de la région Île-de-France. Il faut faire attention à ne pas nommer des personnes sans expérience préalable, sans carrure, et qui n'auront pas assez d'indépendance d'esprit par rapport au gouvernement ou aux puissantes collectivités locales. Être préfet, cela ne s'improvise pas. Le danger, c'est que le pouvoir choisisse des amis ou des utilitaires. » Pour apaiser ces craintes, l'ACPHFMI a négocié des garanties. Un décret du 6 avril 2022 relatif aux emplois de préfet et de sous-préfet prévoit, entre autres, que les deux tiers des emplois soient occupés par des hauts fonctionnaires ayant cinq années d'expérience dans les services territoriaux de l'État. Le même texte précise néanmoins qu'un tiers des préfets et des sous-préfets pourront bien être recrutés en dehors de ces critères.
La culture du résultat doit désormais prévaloir. Le 12 mars 2024, le président de la République convoquait sept cents hauts cadres de la fonction publique à une convention managériale pour leur reprocher leur manque de célérité dans la conduite des politiques publiques. « Bien qu'il ait fait un stage en préfecture durant sa scolarité à l'ENA, M. Macron n'a pas de culture administrative, souligne M. Laurent Bigot, ancien sous-préfet devenu “gilet jaune”. Les préfets et les hauts fonctionnaires en général sont payés pour donner leur point de vue et éventuellement mettre en garde en amont d'une décision politique. Ensuite, ils exécutent les ordres. M. Macron ne comprend pas cela. Il pense que les préfets lui résistent, et il ne le supporte pas. » « Les préfets avaient jusqu'à présent une logique de corps avec une idée de la défense des intérêts de l'État qui n'étaient pas forcément ceux du gouvernement, rappelle le professeur de droit Serge Slama. Aujourd'hui, on ne leur demande plus d'être fidèles à l'État et au gouvernement, mais d'être fidèles au prince. »
Son collègue Olivier Cahn s'inquiète : « Ne va-t-on pas se retrouver avec un spoil system comme aux États-Unis, où les hauts fonctionnaires sont remplacés à chaque alternance ? » Si, jusqu'à présent, M. Macron continue à puiser surtout dans l'ancien corps les préfets et les sous-préfets, d'ores et déjà quelques nominations symbolisent la diversification du recrutement. En juillet 2020, la directrice commerciale de Suez Salima Saa devient préfète de la Corrèze. En mars 2021, Mme Régine Engström, ancienne responsable des partenariats stratégiques chez le promoteur Nexity, prend le poste de préfète de région, en Centre-Val de Loire. En août 2023, M. Thibault Lanxade, ancien vice-président du Mouvement des entreprises de France (Medef), est nommé à Châteauroux, dans l'Indre.
Le rapport sénatorial de 2022 insistait sur la « nécessité impérieuse de préserver les préfets d'une politisation qui nuirait à leur crédit dans leur circonscription et, partant, à l'efficacité de l'action de l'État ». Au cours de son histoire, l'institution préfectorale a conquis une forme d'autonomie relative : son autorité (rationnelle-légale) pouvait contrebalancer la légitimité, locale ou nationale, tirée des élections. Il paraît loin le temps où les préfets avaient vocation à les truquer sur ordre du gouvernement, comme dans Lucien Leuwen de Stendhal. Mais, fin 2022, le ministre de l'intérieur a démis Mme Marie Lajus de ses fonctions de préfète d'Indre-et-Loire après qu'elle s'était opposée à la création d'une pépinière de start-up en zone protégée que portaient des élus locaux proches du pouvoir macroniste. Dans la Vienne, de 2022 à 2024, le préfet Jean-Marie Girier — directeur de la première campagne présidentielle de M. Macron — n'a, lui, cessé de contester les décisions de la maire écologiste de Poitiers Léonore Moncond'huy — l'attribution d'une subvention à l'association Alternatiba, l'entrée de la ville au capital d'une coopérative ou encore la nomination d'une directrice générale des services…
La nostalgie d'une administration puissante, sur laquelle l'extrême droite tente de capitaliser, n'empêche pas le corps préfectoral — ou ce qu'il en reste — de concourir à l'exercice managérialisé de l'État. Quand bien même il revêt des formes toujours plus autoritaires. Comme l'explique la politiste Vanessa Codaccioni, avec le renforcement du « paradigme antiterroriste » depuis 2015, les préfectures obtiennent « des pouvoirs renforcés et des prérogatives exorbitantes du droit commun », notamment « faire procéder à des visites domiciliaires, décider de périmètres de sécurité ou prendre des arrêtés d'expulsion », faisant advenir « une justice administrative et policière dont l'objectif est de punir par des voies extrajudiciaires » toute forme d'activisme oppositionnel (19).
Voire par des voies extralégales. « Les manifestations propalestiniennes, parce qu'elles sont susceptibles de générer des troubles à l'ordre public, doivent être interdites. » Le 12 octobre 2023, M. Gérald Darmanin adresse dans un télégramme ces mots aux préfets. La plupart d'entre eux obéissent. « Le ministre de l'intérieur leur demandait pourtant de violer le droit, observe Cahn, car la liberté de manifester est consacrée par le Conseil constitutionnel. » Le plus souvent, les tribunaux administratifs (TA) suspendent d'ailleurs les arrêtés d'interdiction. Le 18 octobre, le Conseil d'État saisi par le comité Action Palestine rappelle qu'il appartient aux seuls préfets d'apprécier s'il y a lieu d'interdire une manifestation localement, et qu'aucune manifestation ne peut être interdite du seul fait de son soutien au peuple palestinien. Mais le préfet des Alpes-Maritimes Hugues Moutouh s'acharne à interdire chaque manifestation hebdomadaire en défense de Gaza, quand bien même à chaque fois le TA de Nice le désavoue. Il n'y renoncera que début janvier 2024.
« Certains préfets font du zèle et se retrouvent en contradiction avec les lois de la République, se désole M. Slama. Le problème c'est qu'ils sont couverts par leur ministre et qu'ils ne risquent aucune sanction. » En mars 2023, M. Laurent Nuñez, préfet de police (20) à Paris, avait pris l'habitude de publier tous les soirs des arrêtés d'interdiction des manifestations spontanées contre l'utilisation du « 49-3 » pour l'adoption de la réforme des retraites. Ces décisions intervenaient la veille du rassemblement ou le jour même alors qu'ils doivent l'être au moins quarante-huit heures avant, pour permettre un recours. « Le préfet neutralisait ainsi l'action du juge, ce qui suggère qu'il était bien conscient de l'illégalité de ses propres arrêtés, constate Henri Bouillon, maître de conférences en droit public. Celui qui était censé faire respecter la loi prenait des libertés avec elle. »
Le 24 septembre dernier, à peine nommé Place Beauvau, M. Bruno Retailleau annonçait sur TF1 la convocation des dix préfets des départements où « il y a le plus de désordre migratoire pour leur demander d'expulser plus et régulariser moins ». Toutefois, comment appliquer cet ordre ? « Les préfets passent leur temps à prendre des arrêtés de reconduite à la frontière, mais, le problème, c'est qu'il faut des accords avec les pays de provenance qui doivent délivrer des laissez-passer consulaires, et beaucoup refusent, remarque un ancien préfet. Donner l'ordre d'expulser, cela n'a pas de sens. C'est de la pure communication. » Afin de complaire au pouvoir politique ou de satisfaire aux impératifs de performance, les préfets devront-ils désormais se positionner systématiquement à la frontière du droit et passer en force ? La recherche de nouvelles économies a en tout cas amené le premier ministre François Bayrou à proclamer le 8 juillet dernier un renforcement de leurs prérogatives sur ce qu'il reste des services de l'État dans chaque département. À cette occasion, il a aussi annoncé l'extension de leur pouvoir de dérogation aux normes — sociales, environnementales… —, présentées par M. Bayrou comme « stupides ».
(1) Patrick Ferret, « Migrants : les associations de Tours accusent la préfecture de “manquements graves” et de “maltraitance institutionnalisée” à l'encontre des usagers étrangers », 18 avril 2024.
(2) Lire Alexis Spire, « La vie de l'immigré débute au guichet », Manière de voir, no 122, « Où se cachent les pouvoirs ? », avril-mai 2012 ; lire aussi Simon Arambourou, « Les déshumanisateurs », Le Monde diplomatique, avril 2024.
(3) « Droits des usagers des services publics : de la médiation aux propositions de réforme », défenseur des droits, Paris, juin 2024.
(4) Jean Moulin, Premier Combat, Minuit, Paris, 1947.
(5) Alain Peyrefitte, C'était de Gaulle, Gallimard, Paris, 1994.
(6) Lire Fabien Desage et David Guéranger, « Rendez-vous manqué de la gauche et de la politique locale », Le Monde diplomatique, janvier 2014.
(7) Cité par Vincent Malapert, « Décentralisation, déconcentration : le renouveau du préfet depuis les lois Defferre », mémoire de master, Sciences Po, Paris, mai 2020, dans ses développements sur les effets de décentralisation sur l'institution préfectorale.
(8) Lire Benoît Bréville, « “Vos régions, on n'en veut pas !” », Le Monde diplomatique, juillet 2021.
(9) François Burdeau, Histoire de l'administration française. Du 18e au 20e siècle, Montchrestien, Paris, 1998.
(10) Agnès Canayer et Éric Kerrouche, « À la recherche de l'État dans les territoires », rapport d'information fait au nom de la délégation aux collectivités territoriales, Sénat, Paris, 29 septembre 2022.
(11) Pierre-Yves Collombat, « Projet de loi de finances pour 2019 : Administration générale et territoriale de l'État », avis no 153, Sénat, Paris, 22 novembre 2018.
(12) Jacques Mézard, rapport d'information fait au nom de la délégation aux collectivités territoriales et à la décentralisation des contrôles de l'État sur les collectivités territoriales, Sénat, Paris, 25 janvier 2012.
(13) « Les effectifs de l'administration territoriale de l'État », Cour des comptes, Paris, 31 mai 2022.
(14) Benoît Floc'h, « La laborieuse féminisation de la préfectorale », Le Monde, 4 août 2021.
(15) Nicole Klein, « Un préfet donc un État affaiblis » dans La République et ses régions, Fondation Res Publica, cahiers imprimés des colloques, no 145, Paris, 2023.
(16) Lire François Denord et Paul Lagneau-Ymonet, « L'élite de l'extrême droite », Le Monde diplomatique, juillet 2024.
(17) Cité par Patrick Roger, « L'opération séduction de Marine Le Pen auprès du corps préfectoral », Le Monde, 20 avril 2011.
(18) Lire Simon Arambourou et Grégory Rzepski, « La réforme dévore ses enfants », Le Monde diplomatique, décembre 2022.
(19) Vanessa Codaccioni, Comment les États répriment. Une courte histoire du pouvoir de punir, Éditions Divergences, Quimperlé, 2025.
(20) La sécurité de l'agglomération parisienne relève d'un préfet, du fait des singularités de la capitale. Il a le titre de préfet de police.
Lire aussi le courrier des lecteurs dans notre édition d'octobre 2025.
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