Brussels (Brussels Morning Newspaper) October 24, 2026 – The European Parliament has definitively adopted legislation providing cosmetics manufacturers with extended timelines to withdraw products containing hazardous substances from the market, following a plenary vote in Strasbourg that establishes … Read more
The European Parliament has called for the possible deployment of an EU naval operation in the Black Sea following a series of deadly attacks on civilian merchant vessels near the Romanian and Bulgarian coasts. The resolution, adopted on 22 October 2026 by 432 votes to 52, with 88 abstentions, reflects mounting concern over the expansion of maritime threats towards NATO’s south-eastern flank.
The parliamentary resolution urges EU member states to consider establishing a naval mission to protect commercial shipping, while calling on NATO to examine a complementary regional initiative, provisionally described as Black Sea Sentry.
On 23 October, a drone struck the Comoros-flagged cargo vessel Khoryv, approximately 13 nautical miles from Romania’s port of Constanța. The vessel caught fire and sank, leaving one sailor confirmed dead and three missing. Nine crew members were rescued. The ship was carrying 13 Ukrainian and Azerbaijani sailors. According to information attributed to Romanian maritime authorities, difficult weather complicated rescue efforts.
Romanian President Nicușor Dan blamed Russia for the attack, which followed at least seven other strikes on commercial vessels during October. Across the incidents, approximately 30 sailors have been reported dead or missing, although the confirmed death toll is considerably lower.
The escalation began on 5 October when the Royad Mammadov, a Turkish-owned grain carrier sailing under the flag of Saint Kitts and Nevis, sank in Romania’s exclusive economic zone. Two sailors died and eleven were rescued. The vessel had departed the Ukrainian Danube port of Izmail carrying corn destined for Ravenna, Italy. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy attributed the sinking to Russian drones, although Romanian authorities did not initially establish responsibility.
The following day, two merchant ships were attacked approximately 70 nautical miles east of the Bulgarian coastal town of Byala. As EU Today reported, the Togo-flagged Alfa Watan sank after sustaining severe damage, while the Palau-flagged Able caught fire. All 18 sailors aboard the latter vessel were rescued, but the crew of the Alfa Watan remained unaccounted for.
The Bulgarian authorities confirmed that both aerial and maritime drones had been involved. Further attacks followed on 13 October, when the HS Dignity sank near Shabla, leaving eleven sailors missing, while the Chelsea-3 was struck near Byala. All 15 crew members of the latter vessel were evacuated.
Two chemical tankers, the Yara J and Wine Trader, were subsequently attacked near the Sulina Canal, a strategically important route connecting the Danube with the Black Sea. The incidents exposed the vulnerability of shipping corridors connecting Ukraine with international markets.
Romania has responded by strengthening surveillance and authorising direct military action against drones entering its airspace. On 17 October, two Romanian F-16 fighter aircraft intercepted and destroyed hostile drones over Romanian territorial waters.
According to the Romanian Ministry of National Defence, the aircraft were scrambled from Borcea Air Base after radar systems detected aerial targets approaching from the direction of Snake Island. The drones, identified as jet-powered Geran-family attack aircraft, entered Romanian airspace before being destroyed southeast and east of Sulina.
The ministry disclosed that, during the preceding week, its radar systems had detected eight separate incidents involving aerial targets near the Romanian border, including four brief incursions into national airspace. On 14 October, Spanish F-18 aircraft operating under NATO air-policing arrangements were scrambled after drones approached Romanian airspace.
Bulgaria has taken a more reserved position concerning responsibility for the attacks. Although Prime Minister Rumen Radev acknowledged their seriousness, his government maintained that investigations must establish the origin of the drones before definitive conclusions could be drawn. Sofia nevertheless strengthened maritime surveillance, deployed rescue resources and requested assistance from European and NATO partners.
In August, a drone crossed into Bulgarian airspace from Romania and exploded near infrastructure associated with the Trans-Balkan Gas Pipeline. According to the Bulgarian government’s account, the aircraft was not detected by either national radar systems or NATO’s Combined Air Operations Centre in Torrejón, Spain. The European Parliament has now urged Sofia to accelerate participation in NATO’s counter-drone initiatives.
The European Parliament’s proposals include establishing an EU naval operation, improving early detection of hostile drones, accelerating the development of a Black Sea Maritime Security Hub and providing additional defence funding to Romania and Bulgaria. MEPs have proposed using resources under the EU’s SAFE defence financing instrument to support regional capabilities.
The proposed hub would facilitate intelligence-sharing, maritime surveillance and protection of critical infrastructure. Romania and Bulgaria have requested EU satellite imagery to improve their awareness of maritime threats, while the European Maritime Safety Agency has offered additional support.
At their October summit, EU leaders condemned attacks on civilian shipping and called for safe passage for vessels transporting agricultural products. The European Council’s conclusions addressed Black Sea and Danube shipping routes. However, the parliamentary resolution does not authorise a naval deployment: such an operation would require agreement among EU governments on its mandate, resources and rules of engagement.
NATO has responded by examining additional maritime surveillance and defensive measures, including patrol aircraft, radar systems and unmanned platforms. Romania has proposed stronger regional command arrangements involving NATO’s Black Sea members.
An existing framework provides a basis for cooperation. In July, Romania, Bulgaria and Türkiye agreed to expand the responsibilities of their joint mine countermeasures task group to include protection of critical underwater infrastructure. The agreement announced by Romania’s Defence Ministry extended cooperation beyond detecting and neutralising drifting mines.
Protecting commercial vessels against aerial and maritime drones would require broader capabilities. NATO must also operate within the restrictions of the 1936 Montreux Convention, which regulates passage of warships through the Turkish Straits and limits deployments by non-Black Sea countries. Romania, Bulgaria and Türkiye would therefore play central roles in any sustained maritime security operation.
Ukraine’s maritime export corridors remain essential to agricultural shipments following repeated Russian strikes on ports and logistics infrastructure. Attacks on commercial vessels can increase insurance costs, discourage shipping companies and disrupt trade even when port facilities remain functional.
The sinking of merchant vessels near allied territory, combined with repeated drone incursions into Romanian airspace, increases the possibility of military confrontation arising from an individual incident. The legal and military circumstances differ depending on whether an attack occurs in territorial waters, an exclusive economic zone or international waters.
The European Parliament’s proposal raises questions extending beyond maritime patrols: how civilian shipping can be protected, what military responses are authorised and how responsibility for attacks will be established. The sinking of the Khoryv on 23 October illustrates how the western Black Sea has become an increasingly exposed part of Europe’s security frontier.
The parliamentary position was approved by 454 votes to 34, with 93 abstentions, following negotiations over the future of the EU’s principal education, training and student mobility programme.
MEPs are seeking approximately €6.56 billion more than the Commission’s proposed €40.83 billion allocation, arguing that existing financial support does not adequately reflect rising living costs and the expense of studying abroad.
The decision establishes Parliament’s negotiating position but does not represent final approval of the funding. The programme remains subject to negotiations with national governments and agreement on the EU’s next seven-year budget.
Erasmus+ allows students, apprentices, teachers and other participants to study, train or gain professional experience in another participating country.
Although widely associated with university exchanges, the programme also supports vocational education, schools, adult learning, youth organisations and sporting activities.
Participation often involves substantial personal expenditure, particularly for accommodation, transport and everyday living expenses.
These costs vary considerably between European destinations, creating financial difficulties for students whose Erasmus grants cover only part of their expenses.
The European Parliament is consequently calling for support mechanisms that account for differences in housing and living costs between host countries, regions and cities.
The proposal is intended to make participation more accessible to people who cannot rely on additional financial assistance from their families.
The European Parliament’s research service has identified unequal access, financial limitations and administrative complexity among the challenges facing the programme.
The proposed legislation would also establish a target under which at least 20 per cent of participants in mobility activities would be people facing fewer educational or economic opportunities.
The parliamentary proposal provides for approximately €47.39 billion in current prices over seven years.
The Commission originally proposed approximately €40.83 billion, combining funding for Erasmus+ with activities currently administered through the European Solidarity Corps.
According to the report prepared by Parliament’s Committee on Culture and Education, the revised programme would include more explicit financial allocations for different activities.
Education and training would account for approximately 74.6 per cent of the proposed financial envelope, while youth and volunteering would receive around 15 per cent. Sport would receive approximately 4.1 per cent.
The proposed allocation structure is intended to provide greater certainty for organisations planning longer-term educational projects and cross-border partnerships.
Polish MEP Bogdan Andrzej Zdrojewski, of the European People’s Party, is Parliament’s rapporteur on the legislation. His report calls for greater transparency over expenditure and more predictable funding arrangements.
The programme would continue supporting European university alliances, international educational cooperation and initiatives intended to improve professional skills.
One proposed change concerns the integration of the European Solidarity Corps into the wider Erasmus+ framework.
The Solidarity Corps currently offers young people opportunities to participate in volunteering and community activities, including projects addressing social and humanitarian needs.
The Commission has proposed bringing these activities within the new programme in an attempt to simplify administration.
However, parliamentarians want safeguards to ensure that volunteering remains identifiable and accessible within the broader funding structure.
The parliamentary position also seeks to extend mobility opportunities across vocational training, adult education and sport.
These activities would allow a wider range of participants to benefit from international placements, including people outside conventional university education.
Additional attention is being given to the financial circumstances of participants and the administrative requirements faced by smaller educational organisations.
The Erasmus+ negotiations are taking place against the background of a wider dispute over the European Union’s 2028–2034 financial framework.
Member states are debating the overall size of the budget and the competing demands of agricultural policy, regional development, defence, research and education.
As EU Today recently examined, the negotiations have exposed disagreements over whether the EU should expand its financial commitments or constrain expenditure during a period of pressure on national finances.
Parliament’s Erasmus+ proposal will therefore depend not only on agreement over educational priorities but also on the final distribution of resources across the wider EU budget.
Some governments may support broader participation while resisting the full increase requested by MEPs.
Negotiations must establish the programme’s final budget, eligibility rules and the arrangements governing grants after 2027.
The Council has already developed a negotiating position on aspects of the programme, although financial questions remain connected to the broader budget settlement.
Erasmus+ will mark its 40th anniversary in 2027, shortly before the new framework is scheduled to begin.
More than 17 million people have participated in the programme and its related activities since its establishment.
The outcome of the current negotiations will determine whether the next generation of participants receives more financial support and whether the programme can expand without increasing the proportion of costs borne by students and their families.
The decision follows pressure from European governments, energy companies and the United States, which have warned that implementing the regulations under the existing timetable could complicate fossil fuel supplies to the European market.
MEPs approved the amendments by 341 votes to 225, with six abstentions. The revised deadlines must now be negotiated with EU governments before they can become legally binding.
The parliamentary position also extends some postponements to European oil and gas producers, going beyond the Commission’s original proposal.
The EU Methane Regulation, adopted in 2024, established requirements intended to reduce methane emissions associated with fossil fuel production, transportation and imports.
Methane is a greenhouse gas with a considerably greater warming effect than carbon dioxide over shorter periods. Emissions occur throughout the oil and gas supply chain, particularly through leaks, venting and incomplete combustion.
Under the existing legislation, new monitoring, reporting and verification requirements for imported fossil fuels were scheduled to begin on 1 January 2027.
However, the Commission proposed amendments on 14 October 2026 to give companies additional time to comply.
The European Parliament has now supported a longer postponement than the Commission requested.
Under the parliamentary amendments, importers of crude oil, natural gas and coal would have until 31 May 2031 to demonstrate equivalent monitoring, reporting and verification arrangements for relevant supplies delivered in 2030.
The requirements would cover supply contracts concluded or renewed since 4 August 2024. Older contracts would remain subject to separate reporting requirements concerning efforts to obtain compliance.
Energy security concerns have been central to the debate. The United States has become Europe’s largest supplier of liquefied natural gas, particularly following the reduction of Russian pipeline gas deliveries after Moscow’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
American officials have argued that certain provisions of the methane legislation could create substantial compliance difficulties for exporters and potentially disrupt gas deliveries.
France, Italy and the Czech Republic have also supported adjustments to the timetable, reflecting concerns about energy costs, administrative burdens and the availability of alternative supplies.
European industrial consumers remain sensitive to fluctuations in natural gas prices, while the continuing conflict in the Middle East has increased uncertainty in international energy markets.
For importers, the principal concern is obtaining reliable information about emissions generated by suppliers operating outside EU jurisdiction.
European companies must demonstrate compliance using data collected throughout production and transportation networks that they do not necessarily control.
Parliament’s position includes extensions for certain reporting obligations affecting oil and gas operators within the European Union.
Verified reports combining measurements of methane emissions at individual sources and production sites would be subject to revised deadlines.
For assets operated directly by reporting companies, the proposed deadline would move to February 2030. Certain non-operated assets would be covered by a later deadline in August 2031.
The amendments would also permit continuous monitoring systems to replace separate measurement campaigns where the equipment meets the required technical standards.
Independent verification would remain necessary. Romanian MEP Virgil Popescu, a former energy minister, supported the longer timetable, arguing that companies require additional time to make investments in monitoring infrastructure.
Environmental organisations have opposed further postponements, arguing that delays could prolong avoidable emissions and weaken the regulatory framework established in 2024.
Parliament also supported an exception preventing fossil fuel supplies covered by relevant EU import sanctions from benefiting from the extended deadlines.
Importers would be required to identify the affected volumes, including where restricted-origin fuels form part of mixed shipments.
The exemption would not authorise trade already prohibited by EU sanctions.
A further amendment would require the European Commission to review implementation readiness by July 2029, including the availability of accredited verifiers and potential risks to energy supplies.
The Commission would then be able to propose additional legislative changes if substantial implementation problems remained.
Thursday’s vote does not repeal the methane legislation or automatically postpone its requirements.
The adopted amendments represent the European Parliament’s negotiating position. The Council of the European Union must agree to any changes before the revised legislation can enter into force.
The outcome forms part of a broader debate over European industrial competitiveness and the economic consequences of environmental regulation.
As EU Today recently reported, Brussels is already adjusting parts of its climate-policy framework in response to pressure from energy-intensive industries.
Negotiations over methane reporting will now determine how far those adjustments extend into Europe’s international energy supply chains and whether the EU can preserve the regulation’s emissions objectives under a longer implementation timetable.
The resolution, adopted on Thursday, 22nd October, received 414 votes in favour, 79 against and 90 abstentions.
It seeks greater financial assistance for regions bordering Russia, Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova, as well as territories along the Black Sea, under the EU’s 2028–2034 financial framework.
The proposals include higher EU contributions towards infrastructure projects, additional investment in local economies and targeted assistance for communities experiencing declining investment, population losses and increased security costs.
However, the resolution is not binding legislation and does not itself allocate new funding. Its provisions must be incorporated into future budget agreements and individual EU spending programmes.
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has significantly changed economic conditions across the EU’s eastern frontier.
Border restrictions, disrupted trade routes, increased defence activity and uncertainty over regional security have affected investment and commercial activity.
The pressures are particularly apparent in Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria.
According to a European Parliament research briefing published in September, these regions face overlapping challenges involving economic decline, depopulation, inadequate infrastructure and higher expenditure on security.
Some communities previously depended on cross-border trade with Russia or Belarus, much of which has declined sharply following sanctions and restrictions introduced since 2022.
Other regions have experienced increased transport demand linked to Ukrainian refugees, military logistics and the movement of goods towards Ukraine.
The European Commission has recognised that conventional regional development programmes may not adequately address the combination of economic and security pressures.
The resolution calls for up to 10 per cent of funding within relevant EU instruments to be earmarked for eligible eastern border regions.
This does not mean that 10 per cent of the entire EU budget would automatically be transferred to those areas.
Instead, Parliament wants targeted allocations within programmes covering regional development, agricultural policy, transport, industrial competitiveness and infrastructure.
MEPs also propose significantly higher EU contributions towards eligible projects.
Under the parliamentary position, certain projects could receive up to 95 per cent EU co-financing, reducing the amount that national or local authorities would have to contribute.
Projects connected with security, resilience or critical infrastructure could potentially receive funding covering 100 per cent of eligible costs.
Additional pre-financing would help local administrations begin projects without having to provide substantial initial expenditure.
The proposals are particularly relevant to municipalities with limited budgets and regions where private investment has declined.
Parliament has also proposed broadening the geographical criteria used to identify eligible territories.
The resolution covers regions bordering Russia, Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova, as well as regions with access to the Black Sea.
The proposed framework would use the EU’s NUTS 2 regional statistical classification.
For borders with Russia and Belarus, the parliamentary proposal includes geographical thresholds concerning the length of land or maritime frontiers.
For Romania, the revised approach could extend support to regions connected with Moldova, Ukraine and the Black Sea.
The proposals would also have implications for transport corridors linking Ukraine with the EU, including railways, ports, roads and border-crossing facilities.
Such infrastructure serves both civilian trade and military mobility requirements.
The Commission has already introduced measures intended to support Europe’s eastern regions.
Its February 2026 strategy identified security, economic growth, connectivity, local industries and demographic resilience as principal areas requiring action.
A proposed investment initiative, EastInvest, is intended to facilitate financing through European and national financial institutions, with the potential to mobilise up to €28 billion by the end of 2027.
This would principally involve lending and investment support, rather than direct grants equivalent to the total facility value.
The Commission has also identified approximately €5.6 billion in cohesion funding redirected towards eastern border regions under the current financial framework.
Those reallocations form part of approximately €34.6 billion redirected towards new priorities across participating member states.
Parliament’s latest demands concern the period after 2027 and would operate separately from these existing arrangements.
The proposal places additional pressure on governments negotiating the EU’s next long-term budget.
Agricultural policy, regional development and industrial investment are already competing for funding alongside increased European defence expenditure.
As EU Today reported in its coverage of the agricultural budget negotiations, member states remain divided over the allocation of resources under the next financial framework.
Eastern border governments are likely to argue that infrastructure and economic development in their territories contribute directly to the EU’s wider security.
Other member states may resist dedicated allocations if these require reductions in existing regional development programmes elsewhere.
Parliament has proposed that additional assistance should not come at the expense of support for other less-developed regions.
The negotiations will determine whether that position is financially achievable.
The next stage will involve discussions over the overall EU budget and the individual programmes through which eastern border assistance could be delivered.
For now, Thursday’s vote establishes Parliament’s demand for a larger and more clearly defined financial commitment to Europe’s eastern frontier, without creating an immediate entitlement to additional EU funding.
On Thursday, the European Parliament called on the European Union (EU) to define a timetable to progressively abandon fossil fuels and assume a leading role in the COP31 negotiations, which will be held in November in Turkey.
RELATED: Europeans Rise Up in Resistance to Austerity Measures
The resolution was approved after the 27 member states adopted a common position for the climate summit, in which they recognize that the goal of limiting global warming to 1.5 degrees faces increasing difficulties.
MEPs called for more ambitious action to reduce emissions and avoid further increases in temperature, insisting on the need to accelerate the energy transition.
The text urges the EU to promote an international treaty on the non-proliferation of fossil fuels and to establish concrete timetables to gradually eliminate subsidies and production of oil, gas and coal.
The European Parliament also requested that the EU itself adopt a clear strategy to abandon these energy sources in all sectors of the economy and serve as an international reference.
Ahead of COP31 climate talks in Türkiye, Parliament calls for speeding up the global exit from fossil fuels, increasing climate financing and making it fairer for vulnerable countries, and delivering on adaptation and loss-and-damage pledges.
— European Parliament (@Europarl_EN) October 22, 2026
Learn more➡️ https://t.co/vfWVJhvC8G pic.twitter.com/IaRuSAQ8Om
The parliamentarians stressed that dependence on fossil fuels represents a risk in a context of geopolitical tension and considered that decarbonization strengthens European strategic autonomy.
The resolution warns that Europe is the continent that is warming the fastest, which is why it considers it essential to maintain climate commitments and avoid a setback in environmental policies.
In addition, the European Parliament called for increasing international financing for climate adaptation, compensation for loss and damage, and support for the most vulnerable countries against the effects of climate change.
A delegation of fifteen MEPs will participate in COP31 to champion these priorities, which include strengthening climate finance and promoting greater protection of ecosystems and biodiversity.
From Greece to France: Education Protests Sweep Europe
— teleSUR English (@telesurenglish) October 21, 2026
Thousands of students, teachers, and public-sector workers marched through Athens and across Greece on Wednesday, demanding urgent funding for public education, filling teaching vacancies, and relief from a mounting housing… pic.twitter.com/ti3ovtByO3
teleSUR: JP
Source: EFE
The European Parliament overwhelmingly supported an increased budget and scope for the Erasmus+ student-exchange programme under the new EU budget on Thursday (22 October).
The plenary in Strasbourg opted for a €7bn increase in Erasmus+’s budget compared to the commission’s proposal, by 454 votes, with 34 abstentions, against 93, mostly from right-wing parties.
And it was an audacious move, seeing as ‘frugal’ EU capitals are pushing for €150bn of cuts to the commission’s draft.
But even a “slight increase” in Erasmus+ funds would mean more opportunities for thousands of people, said Bogdan Zdrojewski, a Polish centre-right MEP, who was the rapporteur on the file, during a parliamentary debate earlier on Wednesday.
Celebrating its 40th anniversary in 2027, Erasmus+ enables young people to study, live, and work in foreign countries both inside the 27 EU states and the programme’s 160 “associate” states worldwide.
Some 17 million people have taken part since it began, with an estimated 1 million babies also born to couples who met on exchange, in what the commission has long used as a flagship PR project for creating a feel-good factor about the EU.
Meanwhile, the UK will rejoin the programme in 2027, which means EU students will once more have the opportunity to also spend a semester in Britain, which hosts some of Europe’s and the world’s top universities.
And the parliament would also welcome Canada’s full participation in a few years’ time, Zdrojewski told press on Wednesday.
The EU Parliament would like to expand Erasmus+ to more vocational training. “Erasmus+ will be a programme for Europeans no matter what age, what stage of life,” Zdrojewski said.
And students from poorer homes should get more support to live in pricey cities abroad, he added.
The share of Erasmus+ participants who had fewer opportunities to travel under the present structure stood at 15 percent in 2023 – up from 10 percent only two years earlier, according to a commission evaluation.
“Far too often, it is still the parents’ financial situation that determines who can take part in Erasmus+ and who cannot,” said Sabrina Repp, a German socialist MEP, in Wednesday’s debate in Strasbourg.
Working students often cannot afford to quit their current job to go abroad, she added: “That is precisely what we must change.”
The EU budget talks are to be finalised early next year.
Some 83 percent of Erasmus+ participants say they gained professional skills that helped them in the labour market.
But in order for those opportunities to be available more widely, “we need more funding for this programme,” also said Lucia Yar, a Slovak liberal MEP in the Strasbourg debate.
Brussels (Brussels Morning Newspaper) October 22, 2026 – A newly adopted European Parliament resolution criticising the Bulgarian government’s handling of regional security and its response to Russian threats in the Black Sea has drawn sharp dissatisfaction from President … Read more
In its latest statement, Parliament condemns Houthi missile and drone attacks against Saudi Arabia and the movement’s military offensive in Yemen. Its demand for a terrorist designation signals pressure for a tougher European response. But the distance between a parliamentary declaration and an effective security policy remains considerable. europarl.europa.eu
The underlying case extends beyond disrupted trade. Civilian seafarers have paid with their lives. EU Today’s reporting on the fatal attack against the True Confidence documented how the maritime campaign crossed a deadly threshold in March 2024. Merchant crews became targets in a conflict over which they had no control. That history gives Parliament’s initiative a compelling human dimension.
Yet a terrorist listing is a specific legal instrument. Parliament’s demand does not itself impose one. Under the EU’s counterterrorism sanctions framework, listing requires an earlier decision by a competent national authority. The Council determines additions to the list, with measures including asset freezes and restrictions on making funds or economic resources available. Political resolve must therefore become a defensible legal case.
If adopted, designation could strengthen pressure on financial intermediaries and commercial networks supporting the movement. Its practical value would depend on identifying assets, tracing transactions and coordinating enforcement across jurisdictions. A designation that changes compliance procedures without materially constraining procurement would deliver less than its advocates expect.
The operational problem is equally demanding. Financial restrictions cannot intercept an incoming missile or accompany a vulnerable tanker. Europe must sustain protection at sea while pursuing disruption ashore through sanctions enforcement, intelligence cooperation and diplomacy.
As Defence Matters examined in its analysis of Operation Aspides reinforcement, additional warships bring requirements for trained crews, weapons, aviation, maintenance and replacement deployments. The mission’s defensive mandate protects civilian shipping, but effective coverage depends on what deployed vessels can sustain. Fleet totals alone offer an incomplete measure of European capacity.
This exposes the strategic imbalance. Attackers can impose uncertainty across a shipping corridor without controlling every mile of it. Defenders must reassure commercial operators repeatedly. Even successful interceptions may leave insurers and shipowners questioning whether the next voyage is worth the risk.
The threat also reaches beyond the immediate approaches to Yemen. EU Global’s coverage of the tanker incident west of Yanbu explained the potential implications for Saudi Arabia’s alternative oil-export route. The Houthis claimed responsibility, while the maritime warning did not identify the attacker. That distinction matters: sound policy requires separating verified incidents from claims designed to amplify a movement’s apparent reach.
For Europe, the implication is broader than naval security. Pressure on shipping and energy infrastructure can transmit regional instability into freight costs, delivery schedules and business confidence. Protecting maritime access is an economic responsibility as well as a defence commitment.
There is also a humanitarian test. Measures intended to constrain Houthi leadership must preserve legitimate assistance to civilians living under its authority. The EU framework already contains humanitarian exceptions allowing specified organisations to undertake necessary transactions. Implementation must give banks and aid agencies sufficient clarity to use them.
Otherwise, excessive caution by intermediaries could obstruct permitted activity. European governments should anticipate that risk through clear guidance and working arrangements with humanitarian organisations, while maintaining scrutiny against diversion.
Parliament has raised the political stakes. Governments now face a more demanding task: combining legal pressure with resources and measurable objectives. Success should mean fewer attacks, safer crews, disrupted support networks and reliable humanitarian access.
A terrorist designation could contribute to those outcomes. Its credibility will ultimately depend on whether Europe can turn a forceful institutional statement into sustained action across finance, diplomacy and the sea.
Announcing the decision in Strasbourg on Thursday, 22 October, European Parliament President Roberta Metsola said the award reflected the European Union’s commitment to multilateralism and international institutions.
Metsola praised the Court for its work in upholding international law and justice. The announcement was met with a standing ovation in the parliamentary chamber.
The decision comes amid an escalating confrontation between the European Union and the administration of US President Donald Trump over the ICC’s jurisdiction and independence.
On 9 October, the United States imposed sanctions on the ICC as an institution, extending measures previously directed against individual judges and prosecutors.
The restrictions place the Court under the US Treasury’s sanctions regime, limiting financial transactions involving American individuals, businesses and institutions. Washington has issued several temporary and limited exemptions intended to allow specified operations to continue.
The measures followed earlier sanctions against senior ICC officials, including Court President Tomoko Akane, and form part of Washington’s campaign to prevent the tribunal from exercising jurisdiction over American personnel.
US Secretary of State Marco Rubio has argued that the ICC threatens American sovereignty by asserting authority over nationals of countries that have not accepted its founding treaty.
The Court rejected the latest restrictions, describing them as an attempt to obstruct the administration of international justice.
Established under the Rome Statute, the ICC operates independently of national governments and investigates serious international crimes where its jurisdictional requirements are satisfied.
Neither the United States nor Israel is a party to the Rome Statute.
The dispute with Washington has intensified since the ICC issued arrest warrants in November 2024 for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former Defence Minister Yoav Gallant over alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity connected with military operations in Gaza.
Israel rejects the Court’s jurisdiction and disputes the allegations. Washington has similarly opposed the proceedings against Israeli officials.
The ICC has also pursued investigations into Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. In March 2023, its judges issued arrest warrants for Russian President Vladimir Putin and Maria Lvova-Belova, Russia’s commissioner for children’s rights, over the alleged unlawful deportation and transfer of Ukrainian children.
Further warrants followed in 2024 against senior Russian military commanders and officials in connection with attacks on Ukraine’s civilian infrastructure.
The proceedings demonstrate the geographical scope of the Court’s investigations, although its ability to secure arrests depends heavily on cooperation from individual states.
The ICC has no independent police force and relies on national authorities to execute its warrants.
The ICC’s nomination for the Sakharov Prize was submitted by the Socialists and Democrats group in the European Parliament.
Its selection comes as European lawmakers examine how the EU should respond to American sanctions affecting the Court and organisations supporting its activities.
The October restrictions have raised practical questions about access to banking, technology services and other infrastructure required by the tribunal.
European governments must also consider how to support an institution established through an international treaty while maintaining relations with Washington.
The Sakharov Prize carries no legal authority to reverse American sanctions or compel governments to cooperate with ICC investigations. Nevertheless, the award represents an explicit institutional endorsement of the tribunal at a time when its operations face increasing external pressure.
The ICC was selected from three finalists announced earlier this month.
The other nominees were Tanzanian opposition leader Tundu Lissu and Iranian sisters Taraneh and Romina Rahimi, whose cases have attracted international attention over political persecution and judicial proceedings.
The Sakharov Prize, established by the European Parliament in 1988, is named after Soviet physicist, dissident and Nobel Peace Prize laureate Andrei Sakharov.
It recognises individuals and organisations defending human rights, freedom of expression and fundamental liberties. The award includes €50,000.
Previous recipients include Nelson Mandela, Malala Yousafzai and imprisoned journalists.
In 2025, the prize was awarded jointly to Belarusian journalist Andrzej Poczobut and Georgian journalist Mzia Amaglobeli.
The formal presentation of the 2026 prize is scheduled for 16 December at the European Parliament in Strasbourg.
The award places the ICC alongside previous Sakharov laureates while drawing further attention to the unresolved dispute between Washington and European governments over international criminal jurisdiction.
The International Criminal Court (ICC) has received the EU’s Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought.
Reacting to EU Parliament president Roberta Metsola’s announcement of the prize winner on Thursday (22 October), the Hague-based court said it is “thankful” for the recognition of the court and its officials.
“This award comes at a time when the court and its officials face unprecedented challenges, including sanctions aimed at disrupting the court’s judicial mandate,” ICC president judge Tomoko Akane told EUobserver in a statement.
The parliament’s recognition “underscores the importance of […] support to enable the Court to carry out its mandate independently and impartially, in the service of justice and the victims of the gravest crimes,” said the Japanese judge.
The court’s win comes after US president Donald Trump put his weight behind Israeli efforts to discredit the international judicial body by extending sanctions against it.
The ICC investigates and tries individuals charged with war and human-rights related crimes. When it issued an arrest warrant in 2024 for Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu for alleged war crimes, the US responded by sanctioning its judges.
EU Commission president Ursula von der Leyen welcomed the win, saying:
“For victims of the world’s gravest crimes, justice means a voice. The ICC must be free to pursue its mission, independently, and without pressure or intimidation. Europe stands firmly behind president Tomoko Akane, the Court’s judges and officials, and their vital work for a world governed by rules.”
New sanctions against the court were announced by the Trump administration this month after the Nobel Peace Prize went to Navi Pillay, a former ICC judge who concluded in a UN report that Israel is committing genocide in Gaza.
Tomoka said: “While this prize recognises the work of the court in combating impunity and ensuring fair trials, it is also an important recognition of the role of international justice as a cornerstone of lasting peace. In a world marked by rising conflicts, there is no peace without justice and no security without law.”
French MEP Chloé Ridel initiated the ICC’s nomination for the Sakharov Prize on behalf of the Socialists & Democrats parliament group.
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Bills relating to animal welfare tabled by the PAN and CHEGA Parties have been approved at the first reading and vote by the Portuguese parliament and referred to the committee
The post Parliament approves draft bills on animal welfare from PAN and CHEGA appeared first on Portugal Resident.
The Council of the European Union adopted its negotiating position on Wednesday, 21st October, clearing the way for negotiations with the European Parliament once MEPs establish their position.
The measures form part of the European Commission’s Digital Omnibus package, introduced in November 2025, and represent one of Brussels’ most substantial attempts to simplify the regulatory obligations imposed on businesses operating across the single market.
The proposed reforms would modify several provisions of the GDPR, which has governed the processing of personal data across the EU since May 2018.
Rather than replacing the legislation, the Council wants to clarify existing obligations, particularly those concerning pseudonymised information, requests for access to personal data and the use of information in scientific research.
The agreed position retains the existing definition of personal data while introducing provisions intended to clarify when pseudonymised information can be linked to an identifiable individual.
Companies would also benefit from simplified procedures for handling manifestly unfounded or excessive data requests and from reduced information requirements in certain low-risk circumstances.
Another proposed change would extend the deadline for notifying authorities of personal data breaches, while establishing more consistent reporting templates across the EU.
For multinational companies, which currently navigate different interpretations of data protection obligations by national authorities, these provisions could reduce compliance costs and administrative duplication.
However, the changes have raised concerns among European privacy regulators.
In a joint opinion published in February, the European Data Protection Board and European Data Protection Supervisor warned that parts of the Commission’s original proposal could create legal uncertainty and undermine existing protections.
They were particularly concerned about proposals affecting the definition of personal data and the Commission’s potential role in determining when pseudonymised information falls outside GDPR requirements.
The Council’s decision to retain the existing definition addresses part of that debate, although the final legislative text remains subject to negotiations.
One of the most visible changes would affect the consent notices encountered by Europeans when visiting websites.
Under the Council’s proposal, additional categories of cookies and similar tracking technologies could be used without obtaining explicit consent, provided the relevant legal conditions are satisfied.
The proposed exemptions include technologies necessary to deliver a service, maintain device security or conduct audience measurement.
For website operators, publishers and online businesses, the changes could reduce the number of consent requests displayed to visitors and simplify technical compliance.
The current system has generated extensive legal disputes over whether consent is genuinely voluntary and whether tracking technologies collect information beyond what users have authorised.
EU Today has previously examined the enforcement of these obligations, including a Belgian court ruling concerning the legality of the advertising industry’s consent framework.
The latest proposal would not abolish consent requirements for commercial tracking or behavioural advertising. Technologies falling outside the permitted exemptions would remain subject to the applicable privacy rules.
The package also addresses the growing number of reporting obligations imposed on European businesses under overlapping cybersecurity legislation.
The Commission originally proposed a single European reporting mechanism for certain data and cybersecurity incidents.
Member states have instead agreed to establish national entry points, supported by an EU-level information system and provisions for coordinating cross-border notifications.
The Council’s position would also clarify the legal grounds for certain uses of personal data in artificial intelligence systems and introduce safeguards for processing sensitive information in specified circumstances.
These provisions follow increasingly complicated disputes over the application of European privacy legislation to AI development and automated decision-making.
As EU Today reported in its coverage of a major GDPR enforcement case involving Uber, automated processing already presents substantial compliance risks for companies operating within the bloc.
The Commission estimates that its wider digital simplification initiative could save European businesses up to €5 billion in administrative costs by 2029.
The initiative reflects pressure from European governments and business organisations to reduce the regulatory fragmentation that makes operating across multiple EU jurisdictions more expensive.
The Digital Omnibus is part of a broader legislative programme influenced by the competitiveness reports produced by former Italian prime ministers Enrico Letta and Mario Draghi.
Under the Council’s negotiating mandate, several existing data-related rules would also be consolidated, while provisions governing the protection of trade secrets would be strengthened.
The European Parliament must now determine its negotiating position before formal discussions between the institutions can begin. Until the legislation is agreed and adopted, existing GDPR, cookie consent and cybersecurity requirements remain in force.
The European Commission has called on Malta to accelerate judicial reforms and strengthen safeguards for journalists, nine years after the assassination of investigative reporter Daphne Caruana Galizia, as the European Parliament revisited concerns over corruption and institutional accountability on Wednesday, 21 October.
European Commissioner for Democracy, Justice, the Rule of Law and Consumer Protection Michael McGrath told MEPs in Strasbourg that Malta had made progress in certain areas but had yet to implement several outstanding recommendations concerning judicial independence, high-level corruption and media freedom.
The debate followed the controversial acquittal of businessman Yorgen Fenech, who had been accused of involvement in Caruana Galizia’s murder. Maltese prosecutors appealed the verdict in September, leaving the criminal proceedings subject to further judicial consideration.
The European Commission’s 2026 Rule of Law Report, published in July, assessed Malta’s progress in reforming its justice system, anti-corruption institutions and protections for the media.
The report acknowledged certain improvements, including additional resources allocated to judicial and prosecutorial authorities.
However, it found that progress remained limited on several recommendations.
These include reducing delays in judicial proceedings, improving the investigation and prosecution of high-level corruption and ensuring greater judicial involvement in the appointment of the Chief Justice.
The Commission has also expressed concern about the effectiveness of existing anti-corruption arrangements.
Although investigations and prosecutions have increased in some areas, Brussels continues to seek a stronger record of final judgments in major corruption cases.
Court delays and pressure on judicial resources remain significant difficulties.
McGrath told Parliament that the Maltese authorities must continue implementing reforms to address these shortcomings.
Caruana Galizia was killed by a car bomb near her home in Bidnija on 16 October 2017.
The 53-year-old journalist had investigated corruption, money laundering and political connections involving prominent figures in Malta’s business and political establishment.
Her assassination prompted international condemnation, widespread demonstrations and investigations into the circumstances surrounding the killing.
Several men have subsequently been convicted for participating in the murder or supplying the explosives.
However, the criminal proceedings concerning the alleged commissioning of the assassination have remained contentious.
On 2 September 2026, a nine-member jury acquitted businessman Yorgen Fenech of complicity in the murder and criminal association. The verdict was reached by eight votes to one.
Fenech had denied ordering or financing the killing.
The acquittal prompted criticism from Caruana Galizia’s family and organisations campaigning for press freedom.
On 22 September, Malta’s Attorney General formally appealed the verdict, challenging legal decisions made during the trial.
The appeal does not overturn Fenech’s acquittal or establish criminal responsibility.
The Court of Criminal Appeal must determine whether the legal grounds presented justify further proceedings, potentially including a retrial.
The criminal case remains separate from the broader political debate over Malta’s institutional reforms.
Wednesday’s parliamentary debate exposed sharp disagreements between representatives of Malta’s opposition Nationalist Party and governing Labour Party.
Nationalist MEPs Peter Agius and David Casa criticised the authorities’ record on corruption and institutional accountability.
Agius argued that repeated European Commission assessments had failed to produce sufficient improvements and questioned whether Malta’s institutions were effectively addressing allegations of wrongdoing.
Casa referred to the findings of the independent public inquiry into Caruana Galizia’s assassination, which concluded in 2021 that the state had contributed to circumstances in which a climate of impunity enabled the killing.
He argued that significant recommendations arising from that inquiry remained outstanding.
Labour MEP Alex Agius Saliba rejected the criticism, maintaining that Malta had implemented reforms and that its judicial institutions should be allowed to perform their functions independently.
He pointed to the prosecution’s appeal against Fenech’s acquittal as evidence that the judicial process was continuing.
Labour MEP Thomas Bajada concentrated on the protection of journalists and the need to counter misinformation while preserving independent reporting.
The disagreements subsequently prompted a response from Maltese Prime Minister Robert Abela, who accused opposition MEPs of damaging Malta’s reputation through their interventions.
Media freedom featured prominently in the Commission’s concerns.
Malta has introduced legislation addressing certain abusive legal proceedings against journalists, including transposing EU protections against strategic lawsuits intended to discourage public participation.
However, the existing measures principally concern civil proceedings with cross-border implications.
The Commission has urged Malta to extend comparable protections to domestic cases.
Other concerns include journalists’ access to official information, protection from intimidation and the need for more comprehensive legislative safeguards.
McGrath indicated that the Maltese government intended to present additional media legislation in the coming weeks.
The Commission has called for consultations with journalists, media organisations and civil society before the measures are adopted.
European institutions are also examining Malta’s implementation of wider EU requirements under the European Media Freedom Act.
The European Parliament’s proceedings form part of the continued scrutiny of Malta’s institutional record following Caruana Galizia’s assassination.
The Commission’s annual rule-of-law assessments provide a mechanism for identifying outstanding problems and monitoring governments’ responses.
However, the implementation of many recommendations remains the responsibility of national authorities.
For Malta, the immediate issues concern the government’s promised media legislation, outstanding judicial reforms and the progression of the appeal in the Fenech case.
The Commission has made clear that further improvements are required, while the Maltese government maintains that substantial institutional changes have already been introduced.
The next assessment will depend on legislative measures actually adopted, their implementation and progress through the relevant judicial proceedings.
The European Parliament approved €489.15 million in financial assistance for Portugal, Spain, Italy and Malta on Wednesday, 21 October, following severe storms and flooding that damaged infrastructure and disrupted communities across southern Europe during the opening months of 2026.
The allocation from the European Union Solidarity Fund was approved by 651 votes to 17, with three abstentions. Portugal will receive the largest share, approximately €261.5 million, followed by Spain with €149.1 million, Italy with €74.9 million and Malta with €3.7 million.
The funding is intended to support recovery operations and help national authorities meet the costs of restoring essential public infrastructure and services damaged by the disasters.
Portugal’s €261.5 million allocation follows flooding and storms that affected the country during January and February.
The Portuguese authorities applied for assistance from the EU Solidarity Fund after assessing the extent of the damage and the associated costs of emergency operations and infrastructure recovery.
The funds will contribute to eligible public expenditure arising from the disasters, potentially including the restoration of transport links, damaged public facilities and other essential infrastructure.
Portugal has already received approximately €65.37 million in advance funding, according to the figures accompanying the parliamentary decision.
Spain will receive €149.1 million following destructive weather during the same period, including severe flooding in February.
The Spanish government had also requested European assistance to cover part of the expenditure associated with recovery operations.
Approximately €37.26 million of Spain’s allocation has already been paid in advance.
The two countries together account for the substantial majority of the assistance approved on Wednesday, reflecting the scale of their eligible recovery costs.
Italy and Malta will receive assistance following Storm Harry, which struck parts of the central Mediterranean in January 2026.
Italy’s allocation amounts to €74.9 million, while Malta will receive €3.7 million.
The storm caused significant disruption in affected Mediterranean areas, with heavy rainfall, strong winds and damaging sea conditions placing pressure on local infrastructure.
Italian authorities sought European support for recovery operations in the affected territories, while Malta submitted its own request following the damage sustained during the storm.
The Maltese allocation includes approximately €931,000 already made available through an advance payment.
The final assistance amounts were proposed by the European Commission after examining the applications submitted by the four governments.
The Commission’s September proposal to mobilise the EU Solidarity Fund set out the amount of assistance required for each country.
The total proposed mobilisation was €489,148,220.
The European Union established the Solidarity Fund in 2002 to assist member states and certain countries participating in the EU accession process following major natural disasters.
The mechanism provides financial support for public emergency and recovery expenditure rather than operating as a general insurance scheme for individuals or businesses.
Eligible expenditure can include emergency accommodation, restoring essential infrastructure, securing protective infrastructure, cleaning disaster-affected areas and protecting cultural heritage.
National authorities submit applications to the Commission, which evaluates them against the relevant eligibility requirements and financial thresholds.
Assistance depends on the assessed disaster damage and applicable regulatory criteria, rather than simply reimbursing every euro of economic loss.
The fund is financed through EU budgetary arrangements and is mobilised following the required institutional approvals.
Payments are made to the countries concerned, which remain responsible for ensuring that assistance is used in accordance with EU financial rules.
The Solidarity Fund can therefore help governments manage exceptional recovery costs, but it does not replace national budgets, private insurance or other financial arrangements.
The latest allocation comes against a background of increasingly frequent demands on European disaster-response mechanisms.
Southern European countries have experienced damaging floods, storms, heatwaves and wildfires in recent years, leading to repeated requests for assistance.
Recovery expenditure extends beyond immediate emergency operations. Damaged roads, bridges, coastal defences, water systems and public buildings can require prolonged reconstruction.
These costs can place considerable pressure on local authorities, particularly where a disaster affects tourism, transport or economic activity.
The EU faces the additional challenge of maintaining sufficient funds to respond to major disasters affecting several countries within a relatively short period.
Extreme weather events can also expose weaknesses in existing infrastructure, prompting governments to consider whether reconstruction should incorporate additional protection against future disasters.
However, such investments must be assessed against the eligible spending categories of the Solidarity Fund and the availability of other EU financing programmes.
Wednesday’s vote represents parliamentary approval of the mobilisation proposed by the European Commission.
The decision concerns disasters that occurred earlier in 2026 and does not constitute a new emergency response operation.
The funds will support eligible recovery measures carried out by the national authorities in the four countries.
The payments already made to Portugal, Spain and Malta will be taken into account when the remaining assistance is disbursed.
EU authorities will retain responsibility for monitoring compliance with the relevant financial and reporting requirements.
The substantial parliamentary majority indicates broad support for assistance to the affected countries, although future disaster-funding arrangements will continue to depend on the resources available in the European budget.
For the four governments, the immediate task is to use the approved assistance to meet eligible recovery costs and restore damaged public infrastructure following the storms earlier this year.
European prosecutors carried out searches at the European Parliament’s offices in Brussels and Strasbourg on Wednesday, 21 October, as part of an investigation into alleged financial irregularities involving the former Identity and Democracy (ID) parliamentary group.
The investigation concerns approximately €4.33 million in European Union funds that were allegedly improperly spent during the 2019–2024 parliamentary term. The European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) confirmed that searches had taken place in connection with an ongoing inquiry into the use of EU funds by a former parliamentary group.
The premises searched are now occupied by Patriots for Europe, the European Parliament’s third-largest political group, which includes France’s National Rally, Hungary’s Fidesz, Italy’s Lega and Spain’s Vox. Patriots for Europe insists that it has no legal continuity with Identity and Democracy and denies being involved in the investigation.
The European Public Prosecutor’s Office opened its investigation in July 2025 following concerns identified by the European Parliament’s financial administration about expenditure incurred by Identity and Democracy.
The former group, which dissolved following the 2024 European elections, included representatives of France’s National Rally, Italy’s Lega and Germany’s Alternative for Germany.
According to details of the parliamentary financial examination subsequently reported in France, investigators are examining approximately €3.6 million in contracts awarded to external service providers, including businesses with political connections to parties represented within the former group.
The financial examination also identified more than €700,000 in donations to organisations whose activities were allegedly unrelated to the parliamentary group’s official functions.
The authorities are examining whether parliamentary resources were used in accordance with EU financial rules, including restrictions on using public money for national party-political activities.
These are allegations under investigation, not criminal findings. The EPPO has not announced convictions arising from the current inquiry, and the individuals and organisations concerned retain the presumption of innocence.
Earlier investigative measures were conducted in France, Belgium, Spain and Italy in June 2026. Wednesday’s searches mark a further stage in the proceedings.
The investigation has opened a separate dispute over whether Patriots for Europe could be required to repay money allegedly misspent by its predecessor.
Identity and Democracy ceased to exist after the 2024 elections. Several parties previously represented in the group subsequently joined Patriots for Europe, a new parliamentary formation that also brought together Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz and Spain’s Vox.
Patriots for Europe maintains that the two groups are legally separate. Its representatives argue that the dissolution of Identity and Democracy ended that group’s institutional existence and that the present parliamentary organisation is not responsible for its predecessor’s financial affairs.
However, the European Parliament’s budgetary authorities have examined whether responsibility for outstanding liabilities can pass to a successor group.
An opinion approved by the Parliament’s Budgetary Control Committee in September considered the circumstances in which continuity between parliamentary groups might establish financial responsibility.
Such an assessment may consider whether members, administrative personnel, operational resources and other assets were transferred from one organisation to another.
The outcome could determine whether the current group is exposed to potential repayment demands, irrespective of whether its present members were personally involved in the expenditure under investigation.
No final determination of such liability has been established through Wednesday’s searches.
The searches come at a time when Patriots for Europe has become a major political force within the European Parliament.
Its member parties have challenged EU policy on immigration, economic regulation and the distribution of powers between Brussels and national governments. National Rally and Fidesz are also influential actors in the domestic politics of France and Hungary respectively.
An investigation involving their parliamentary organisation is therefore likely to attract scrutiny beyond the immediate financial questions.
Nevertheless, the political influence of the group and the criminal investigation must be considered separately. The presence of prosecutors at parliamentary premises does not establish wrongdoing by the current group’s MEPs.
The case also raises broader questions about financial accountability within the Parliament, particularly when a political group dissolves following an election and its members establish a new organisation.
Unlike national political parties, European parliamentary groups receive funding specifically to support their legislative, administrative and political work inside the institution.
Those resources are subject to financial controls intended to prevent their diversion into activities that should be funded by national parties or other organisations.
The EPPO is responsible for investigating and prosecuting offences affecting the European Union’s financial interests. It operates independently of national governments and EU political institutions.
The European Parliament has confirmed its cooperation with the authorities but has declined to comment on the substance of the continuing investigation.
Prosecutors must now assess the evidence obtained during the searches alongside financial records and material collected during previous investigative measures.
Any decision to bring criminal proceedings would depend on the evidence available and the relevant national and European legal requirements.
Separately, the Parliament will have to establish whether any recoverable funds are owed by the former group and, if so, which organisation is legally responsible for repayment.
For Patriots for Europe, the immediate issue is not only the progress of the criminal inquiry but whether the financial arrangements of a dissolved parliamentary group can create obligations for its successor.
Offices of staff in the Patriots for Europe (PfE) group were raided in France and Belgium on Wednesday (21 October).
The European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) told EUobserver that searches were carried out “as part of an ongoing investigation into the use of European funds by a former political group in the European Parliament”.
But the law enforcement body said it would not release details of the investigation for now, to avoid jeopardising the integrity of the case.
The far-right PfE group in the European Parliament, led by Jordan Bardella of the French National Rally (RN) party, posted a statement on social media claiming that on Wednesday morning, the EPPO carried out searches in administrative offices at the European Parliament premises in Brussels and Strasbourg.
“It would appear that these searches are linked to the complaint lodged against the Identity and Democracy Group (ID) dissolved in 2024,” said PfE’s X post.
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The housing crisis was debated in parliament this afternoon after the opposition joined forces to overturn the decision of the president of the Assembly of the Republic who rejected two
The post Precedent created as opposition forces emergency debate on housing crisis appeared first on Portugal Resident.
Wednesday’s European Parliament debate on the October EU summit brought that contradiction into focus. The dispute over the 2028–2034 Multiannual Financial Framework is becoming a test of whether Europe can translate geopolitical urgency into durable financial commitments.
According to Parliament’s account of the debate, European Council President António Costa wants agreement before the year’s end. He advocated an ambitious budget while keeping national contributions reasonable, alongside progress on new EU revenue sources.
Those objectives are politically attractive. Reconciling them will require difficult choices over spending, taxation and the distribution of authority.
MEPs challenged the assumption that the Union can keep expanding its responsibilities without providing additional resources. Speakers identified support for Ukraine, industrial competitiveness, agriculture, regional development and household living costs among competing priorities.
Their argument has force. A budget negotiated around yesterday’s compromises risks leaving Europe poorly equipped for tomorrow’s threats. Yet calls for ambition become less persuasive when they avoid specifying which programmes deliver measurable European benefits.
The emerging distribution of cuts illustrates the problem. As EU Today previously reported, the Irish presidency’s compromise proposed reducing the Commission’s plans by approximately €141 billion, with competitiveness and security facing proportionately deeper reductions than agriculture and cohesion spending.
That creates an uncomfortable possibility: the policies most closely associated with Europe’s strategic renewal could become bargaining chips in negotiations dominated by established beneficiaries.
Protecting farmers and poorer regions has clear economic and political justification. Nevertheless, preserving familiar allocations while squeezing newer priorities would undermine leaders’ repeated promises to strengthen European independence.
Energy offers perhaps the clearest example of why spending decisions and structural reform must advance together.
Commission President Ursula von der Leyen told MEPs that dependence on imported fossil fuels and the absence of a genuine European energy union were weakening Europe. Costa emphasised affordable production and modernised electricity grids.
The implication is significant. Industrial subsidies cannot indefinitely compensate for an energy system that leaves European manufacturers facing persistently high costs. Cross-border connections, infrastructure investment and better market integration therefore belong at the centre of competitiveness policy.
Von der Leyen also pressed governments to complete the single market and avoid making European rules more complicated through national implementation. Her argument highlights a limitation of the budget debate: additional money cannot, by itself, remove regulatory fragmentation.
The same distinction applies to China. The Commission president described heavily subsidised Chinese competitors and promised action on dependencies, supply chains and market access. Such measures require coherent enforcement and political resolve alongside investment.
Ukraine adds a security imperative that cannot readily be postponed. Costa linked Ukrainian and European security, while MEPs warned about the consequences of weakening support. Long-term commitments require predictable financing rather than recurring emergency bargains.
But the budget dispute also concerns who controls the money.
As EU Today’s reporting on regional concerns explained, local leaders fear that restructuring could concentrate investment decisions in national capitals, weakening regional influence and potentially widening disparities.
That warning deserves attention. A larger European budget would not automatically produce more balanced development. Allocation rules, accountability and local participation will help determine whether spending strengthens cohesion or reinforces existing advantages.
New revenue sources could ease pressure on national contributions, but they cannot make financing politically painless. Costs ultimately fall somewhere, and governments must explain the distribution honestly.
The central challenge is therefore broader than securing agreement on a headline figure. Europe needs a settlement that protects essential commitments, finances credible common priorities and demonstrates results.
MEPs are right to demand resources consistent with Europe’s responsibilities. Governments are entitled to demand discipline. The failure would be a compromise that satisfies neither requirement: expensive enough to provoke domestic opposition, yet too fragmented to provide the strategic capacity Europe’s leaders insist is indispensable.
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