Rothschild & Co assume privatização dos maiores bancos ucranianos. Família tem histórico de interesses na Ucrânia desde o século XIX e a Távola Redonda.
Essa semana, o Ministério da Finança da Ucrânia, liderado por Sergey Marchenko assinou um acordo com o grupo financeiro Rothschild & Co para fins de consultoria preparatória para a privatização dos bancos estatais ucranianos Ukrgasbank e Sense Bank, dois dos maiores bancos do sistema financeiro ucraniano. Rothschild & Co fara um inventário dos ativos desses bancos, bem como uma avaliação de sua saúde financeira, organizarão as informações e atrairão compradores para a aquisição. Na prática, Rothschild & Co acabará determinando o(s) comprador(es), graças ao seu papel privilegiado nessa operação, bem como seu peso institucional.
O governo ucraniano afirma que a operação é necessário para diminuir o papel do Estado no sistema bancário-financeiro ucraniano e atrair investimento estrangeiro, nos termos de recomendações encaminhadas pelo FMI.
Na maioria dos outros países, essas operações repentinas de privatização sempre geram grandes ondas de protesto organizadas por sindicados, movimentos sociais e partidos de oposição, mas a privatização de alguns dos principais bancos ucranianos está avançando sem qualquer reação popular, sintoma da transformação da Ucrânia numa ditadura através do recurso a um estado de exceção permanente.
Não é a primeira operação Rothschild na Ucrânia.
Desde pelo menos 2015, a instituição de assessoria financeira Rothschild & Co tem atuado praticamente como um “apêndice” da Ucrânia, assumindo a responsabilidade de “orientar” o governo ucraniano em assuntos financeiros, especialmente em relação à reestruturação e renegociação de suas dívidas. No passado, Rothschild & Co também atuou na desverticalização da Naftogaz, principal empresa estatal de petróleo e gás da Ucrânia. Essa desverticalização consiste na “separação” das várias atividades da Naftogaz em subsidiárias para facilitar a venda ou concessão de atividades consideradas “não-essenciais”. No mesmo período, a Rothschild Trust recebeu as ações do Petro Poroshenko, presidente ucraniano à época, na empresa Roshen, a principal confeitaria do país. “Recebeu” aqui, é um verbo chave porque, de fato, não houve “venda” das ações, mas simples entrega, o que é extremamente peculiar e dá a entender a existência de algum tipo de relação mais obscura entre Poroshenko e o Rothschild Trust.
Logo após a Revolução Laranja, Nathaniel Rothschild e seu banco mercantil JNR entraram na Ucrânia em parceria com a empresa estadunidense Vanco Energy (conectada a George W. Bush e Dick Cheney) para assumir o controle do petróleo ucraniano no Mar Negro.
Trata-se do mesmo Nathaniel Rothschild que em abril de 2022 disse que Vladimir Putin era o homem mais perigoso desde Hitler, e que “a Ucrânia é uma peça essencial que não podemos perder no tabuleiro geopolítico”. Ele acrescentou que “precisamos colocar a Rússia de joelhos por todos os meios possíveis” e apelou ao uso da força contra a Rússia, concluindo que “Sem a Ucrânia, a ordem mundial pode não sobreviver”.
O tom da mensagem de Nathaniel de Rothschild é claramente apocalíptico e é plenamente compatível com a atmosfera de aniquilação da Rússia que irrompeu no mundo ocidental, com ondas sem precedentes de sanções e a tentativa direta de destruição de todo o edifício econômico-financeiro do país, na expectativa de que o ataque levaria a um colapso político da Rússia.
Por que a Ucrânia é tão importante para Nathaniel de Rothschild? Trata-se de um mistério de difícil resolução.
No início deste ano de 2026, foram divulgados centenas de milhares de e-mails de Jeffrey Epstein, e entre eles foram encontradas várias mensagens trocadas entre Epstein e Arianne de Rothschild, presidente do banco Edmond de Rothschild. Nessas trocas de mensagens, ambos falam brevemente sobre como o caos na Ucrânia ofereceria inúmeras oportunidades.
O interesse Rothschild pela Ucrânia parece bem mais antigo, porém. No século XIX, o consórcio britânico Rothschild tentou fazer um lóbi junto ao Império Russo para conseguir assumir o controle dos projetos ferroviários do sudoeste russo (incluindo a atual Ucrânia), sem sucesso. Os Rothschild conseguiram apenas, de forma indireta, assumir o controle do oeste ucraniano e das rotas logísticas e energéticas entre Baku e Odessa.
Não se pode esquecer, também, do papel dos Rothschild na construção do movimento sionista, liderado por Theodor Herzl. Apesar de Herz liderar e escrever a partir de Viena, a maior parte da Organização Sionista Mundial era composto por habitantes da atual Ucrânia, que também gradualmente foram assumindo a liderança de setores e grupos específicos importantes do sionismo, como no caso de Vladimir Jabotinsky.
O que nos leva, finalmente, à sociedade Távola Redonda, uma sociedade secreta britânica fundada no início do século XX por Cecil Rhodes e Alfred Milner, e financiada por Lord Rothschild. A Távola Redonda tinha como objetivo espalhar e enraizar a influência britânica ao redor do mundo e reforçar o alinhamento entre Reino Unido, Canadá e Austrália, e serviu como a semente de outros “clubes da elite”, como o Chatham House e o Council on Foreign Relations.
É no contexto dos interesses da Távola Redonda que um dos pais da geopolítica clássica, Halford Mackinder, desenhou um projeto de desintegração da Rússia (incluindo a independência da Ucrânia) que ele levou consigo quando tornou-se conselheiro do Exército Branco no sul da Rússia, com a finalidade de coordenar os esforços da Entente contra os bolcheviques. O esforço de Mackinder fracassou em 1920.
Mas vemos os frutos desse interesse Rothschild na Ucrânia bem avançados em 2026.
The very public execution of my professorship and reputation continues in Norway. Today’s media article about me makes three claims that are misleading and/or false.
1) The article dismisses my claim that my research is being criminalized as the journalists merely cite the dismissive comments from the university – no arguments are apparently required.
It is not possible for an academic anymore to analyse the policies of rival powers by assessing their security concerns, as it will be smeared by the government, the government’s NGOs and the media as “legitimizing” the enemy and supporting their narratives. The current Defence Minister singled me out with the accusation of spreading propaganda and criticised two podcasters for even speaking with me (as I have already been cancelled by the media in Norway). How was this accusation by the Defence Minister substantiated? I had argued that NATO expansion triggered the war in Ukraine, which the Defence Minister denounce as dangerous “Russian propaganda”, with no need to substantiate his vile accusation. I can cite a sea of evidence and also refer to statements by American and European political leaders, ambassadors, intelligence chiefs, and others to make my case. However, the purpose is not to engage in debate, but to smear, censor, and cancel. By going after an individual academic for challenging official truths, the government has already claimed a monopoly on the truth. Academics should have their arguments scrutinised and criticised, but these are severe personal attacks from the government without the possibility of even defending myself. How is this not criminalising the research of an academic?
I cannot even speak at any events in Norway without the event being cancelled. The last event I agreed to speak at was because I shared the stage with the former CIA officer John Kiriakou. A newspaper had the event at a church cancelled, and when the backup location did not also cancel, the journalist simply printed in the paper that it had been cancelled so people would not show up. Is this normal? I must use my allotted holiday days to attend conferences because any event I attend can be presented as “controversial,” and then the NGOs and journalists will go after the reputation of the university. Is this normal? Every newspaper article about me merely refers to me as “controversial” or “pro-Russian” without ever assigning meaning to these labels or presenting my argument.
I have argued, much like former CIA director Burns, that if the West attempts to pull Ukraine into the NATO orbit, then there would be war and Ukraine would be destroyed. This is considered a “pro-Russian” argument. Arguing that we should respect the will of most Ukrainians who want negotiations to end the war is also considered a “pro-Russian” argument, while in contrast, boycotting diplomacy, deporting Ukrainian refugees, and calling for the conscription of Ukrainian women is “pro-Ukrainian”.
2) To avoid addressing any of my arguments, the journalists go on to uncritically cite personal attacks against me, pointing out that I have been called a propagandist by the Norwegian Helsinki Committee. This is a “non-governmental organisation” financed by the government and the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), which was set up by Reagan and the CIA director in 1983 to manipulate the civil society of other states. The Norwegian Helsinki Committee has been relentless in its smears on social media to have me fired, writing hit pieces in the media, pushing to cancel my speaking events, writing a letter to my university, and even posting a picture of my house on social media. This is a governmental “human rights organisation” that cites human rights concerns to build the case for war.
3) Lastly, to further avoid addressing my actual arguments, they simply cite the fact that arguments I made at a debate last year have been “wholly or partially debunked” by a fact-check. The state-run media (NRK) invited the state-run military defence institute (FFI) to fact-check three of my claims. What claims did they “debunk”?
My first claim was that only 20% of Ukrainians wanted NATO membership between 1991 and the regime change in February 2014. The fact-checker argued that the number went up by the middle of 2014 (after Russia responded by seizing Crimea), which is a completely meaningless comment intended to muddy the waters, as my argument was about the previous era.
My second claim was that Zelensky had argued in an interview with The Economist in March 2022 that there were some Western countries that would like a long war with Russia to weaken a strategic rival, even if it would result in the destruction of Ukraine. The fact-checker argued that not all Western countries wanted a long war and that it was not an official policy. I never claimed it was an official policy, as it was primarily the US and UK pushing for a long war.
My third claim was that the US and UK sabotaged the Istanbul peace agreement in April 2022. The fact-checker claimed this was incorrect and suggested that it could only be based on one statement by David Arakhamia. The fact-checker did not want to mention that both mediators also confirmed it: Turkey’s foreign minister and the former Israeli prime minister both said that Russia and Ukraine were close to a deal, but the US and UK saw an opportunity to weaken Russia by fighting with Ukrainians. Zelensky’s former adviser Arestovych confirmed it, and the Ukrainian ambassador Chaly, who participated in the negotiations, confirmed that Putin was willing to do almost anything to end the war. The former head of the German armed forces confirmed that Boris Johnson sabotaged it, and Boris Johnson himself wrote articles warning about a “bad peace” and arguing for “strategic patience.” I am being fact-checked by war propagandists.
Unfortunately, none of my arguments matter because in Norway there is no debate and no interest in any arguments. Reality means nothing anymore as war narratives must be defended against inconvenient truths. I used to be naïve and think that the endless smears were caused by misunderstanding, as I had simply not been able to convey my arguments properly. However, the endless articles with smears and labels are deliberate lies and deceptions.
British Prime Minister Andy Burnham has found a novel way of solving Britain’s cost-of-living crisis. By bombing Yemen.
Yes, you read that correctly. This week, Burnham authorized the deployment of British Typhoon fighter jets to Saudi Arabia for its war with Yemen.
Downing Street assured the British public that the deployment was for “defensive” operations only. The BBC and other British media outlets indulged this fantasy by repeating over and over that the Royal Air Force was being deployed for “defensive actions”. The RAF would not be engaging in attacking Yemen, it was claimed, and the British fighter jets were being sent to “protect” Saudi Arabia from “escalating” Houthi aggression.
Britain’s Minister of Defense Wes Streeting (a former health minister, please note) framed the RAF mission as necessary to counter instability in the Middle East and soaring energy prices. As if Britain was not the cause of instability and higher fuel costs by backing Trump’s aggression on Iran.
The Guardian reported: “The [British] military intervention [in Yemen] was partly justified because instability in the Middle East was driving up energy prices and affecting the cost of living.”
This logic is as absurd as it is gross deception.
Recall that Burnham was ushered into Downing Street in July to replace the hapless Keir Starmer as Labour prime minister. Burnham, formerly the Mayor of Manchester and posing with his working-class credentials, made a big public pitch that he would prioritize easing the cost-of-living crisis ravaging Britain.
However, since entering office, his most notable forays have been in foreign policy. For example, he has received the Ukrainian dictator Vladimir Zelensky in Downing Street with promises of more military aid in addition to the $20 billion that Britain has already provided (the second largest source of aid in Europe after Germany). Burnham has pledged to provide Ukraine with British blueprints for manufacturing cruise missiles.
Last month, Burnham announced that Britain was deploying an RAF in-air refuelling plane to “help” Saudi Arabia’s air strikes on Yemen. To allay public concerns about that move, Downing Street and the British media assured that the deployment was “defensive only” and for a limited period.
Ironically, Burnham made that announcement while travelling to address the United Nations General Assembly in New York, where he hailed Britain for offering world leadership for peace and security.
Now, again this week, the RAF deployment is extended to sending Typhoon fighter jets to Saudi Arabia. London is also providing a RAF A400M transport plane for troops and up to 100 military advisers.
This sounds like classic mission creep. Downing Street is aware of the exposure to public criticism. The prime minister’s office denied Britain was being dragged into the conflict. It said: “Our support for Saudi Arabia is considered, proportionate and focused on helping them defend themselves from relentless Houthi attacks.”
The British government and media are distorting the conflict between Saudi Arabia and Yemen as one of “aggression” by the Yemeni forces of Ansar Allah, referred to as “the Iran-backed Houthis”. That description makes the Yemenis sound like crazy terrorists who are being directed by Iran.
Here’s the BBC’s creative reporting: “The UK will deploy RAF Typhoon jets to defend Saudi Arabia in response to escalating Houthi missile and drone attacks, the government has said.”
The BBC goes on: “The defensive mission will help defend Saudi cities and infrastructure – a move authorised by Prime Minister Andy Burnham – against aerial attacks by the Iran-backed group… Since September, Saudi Arabia has been struggling to defend its skies from Houthi attacks after a ceasefire of sorts in Yemen broke down.”
This is reality inversion by the British state-owned media outlet.
The ceasefire in Yemen was violated in mid-July when Saudi Arabia launched air strikes on the international airport in Sanaa, the Yemeni capital, to target a delegation attending the state funeral of Iran’s Ayatollah Khamenei, who was murdered in a U.S.-Israeli air strike on his family home in Tehran on February 28.
That ceasefire was called in 2022 to end a seven-year war of aggression by Saudi Arabia against Yemen. The war began in 2015 to reinstate a Saudi puppet regime that the Ansar Allah-led Yemenis ousted in 2014. The Saudis bombed Yemen relentlessly for seven years with support of the United States, Britain, and France. An estimated 20,000 Yemenis were killed in air strikes, and around 300,000 died from a humanitarian blockade that the Western-backed Saudi coalition imposed on the country.
Britain’s military minister Wes Streeting referred to recent Yemeni strikes on Saudi Arabia as “despicable”. He mentioned a ballistic missile attack on October 10 on King Khalid international airport in the Saudi capital, Riyadh. At least 13 people were killed in the strike, and over 300 were injured.
The Ansar Allah-led Yemeni Armed Forces have also hit several other Saudi airports and key oil industry installations. The number of Saudi civilians killed in these attacks is relatively small, around 20, whereas Saudi warplanes have killed hundreds of Yemeni civilians since it broke the ceasefire in July. This week, eight Yemeni fishermen were killed in Saudi strikes. What Yemen is doing to Saudi Arabia is self-defense, not aggression.
London and its media propaganda are making out that Britain is “defending” Saudi Arabia. The reality is London is assisting Saudi aggression and war crimes.
Significantly, Streeting flew to Washington, DC, last week, where he met the war secretary, Pete Hegseth. Their agenda was about how to respond to “Houthi escalation.” Obviously, the junior partner got the memo: send warplanes to Yemen; we’re too busy with Iran.
Meanwhile, in Britain, an unprecedented social crisis is unfolding from poverty and a crippling cost of living. Charities report that four million families are having to go without adequate food or home heating because of soaring bills. Oxfam estimates that 13.5 million Britons, or a fifth of the population, are suffering from poverty. More than six million people rely on food charities for a modicum of sustenance.
It tells you everything about a state whose government does nothing about its own people’s dire needs but finds the resources to send warplanes to distant countries to bomb other poor people.
Andy Burnham is just another puppet who is assigned to put on a show in Downing Street for public appeasement. The imperial deep state has its hand up his rear. That’s mission creep in Downing Street.
Who could have predicted that age-gating large sections of the internet in a crusade to shield children's eyeballs from vaguely defined "harmful content" would have disastrous consequences and wouldn't ultimately protect kids? Apparently, the United Kingdom's online regulator, Ofcom, couldn't.
On Thursday, Ofcom released a report assessing whether the government should make changes to the content categories of the 2023 Online Safety Act, a set of laws which require companies operating in the U.K. to prevent children from "accessing harmful and age-inappropriate content and provide parents and children with clear and accessible ways to report problems online when they do arise." The act's "child safety regime" (Ofcom's words) went fully into effect in 2025, when porn websites in the country began checking IDs. Unfortunately, as Reason's Elizabeth Nolan Brown has pointed out, the age-verification rule has impacted far more than adult websites. Already, the Online Safety Act has age-gated a wide range of content, including war news, the "NoFap" subreddit, and a historic art image, creating a mass chilling effect online.
Ofcom's report, however, says little about these age-gating concerns for adults, and its own findings highlight the act's underwhelming results. In the report, Ofcom notes that "Most children in the UK say they have encountered at least one piece of harmful content online in a four-week period." It adds that "at a total level there was no significant change in the proportion of children encountering harmful content over the first nine months after the children's safety duties came into force in July 2025." So, it appears the act is requiring adults to fork over their IDs to access a wide range of content, some of which is innocuous, while playing a never-ending and unsuccessful game of whack-a-mole trying to eliminate "harmful" online content from kids' feeds.
Instead of suggesting to repeal the Online Safety Act because it does not seem to be working or because it imperils online freedom, Ofcom's report proposes to broaden the law's scope. The regulator recommends adding "body stigma content and depression content, currently identified by Ofcom as kinds of non-designated content, to the category of priority content that is harmful to children." Priority content is defined as "content that services must protect/minimise the risk of children in age groups judged to be at risk of harm from encountering." In other words, online platforms could have more reasons to potentially age-gate, block, or avoid publishing out of fear of violating the law.
The report does not address the U.K. government's plans to ban children under the age of 16 from accessing social media, and Ofcom says it will soon publish an assessment of "what highly effective age assurance looks like" for determining whether someone is 16 or older. But if the social media ban unfolds anything like it did in Australia, where kids are easily circumventing it, it is likely to flop, just as the Online Safety Act has.
Still the preposterous “Russians are coming” narrative is being pushed in the UK. And yet this time it’s not from top military figures or those in the intelligence community, but the PM himself – albeit in a subtle way, days ahead of a first-ever UK-EU Summit. Andy Burnham, a man who you might think would be more at home on a used car lot than in the political arena, dropped a bombshell recently when he announced that he was told by the security services that Russia had in fact “sought to interfere” with the UK’s Brexit referendum of 2016. Remarkably, 10 years after the event, Britain’s own secret service have come up with such a conclusion when almost every single year previous to this announcement they have said the opposite. So what is really going on?
Burnham has a major challenge ahead. How does he stay in power and succeed at the polls against the Conservatives, who are growing, and Reform UK, which still holds an impressive support base, when he doesn’t actually have any policies himself to fix anything in broken Britain? His answer is to look backwards at the past and try to win voters’ hearts and minds by fixing it. Even if it doesn’t need fixing. One of the policy areas is Britain’s relationship with the EU and the possibility of another referendum to rejoin it, despite his promises to the contrary – which is, in part, where the statement about Russia is coming from. There is actually no evidence at all to suggest Russia interfered with the Brexit referendum, and even opposition MPs have asked him in recent days to provide it, to back up his sensational claims. Burnham is building a case to move the UK back to Brussels, and the lie about Russian interference is one component of that case. But it’s an important one.
On another parallel, he is aligned completely with the EU idea that all European member states should be spending much more on defence in preparation for a war with Russia. Like Merz and Macron, though, he too doesn’t mention to the British public that the impending war with Russia is one which is going to be manufactured entirely by him, Merz and Macron as part of a political renaissance to keep them and their support bases in power. The rationale isn’t very complicated. Successive governments have done terrible jobs on the economy, energy and investing in longer-term projects to create jobs. They have sold off everything that was worth selling and are now running their countries on an impossibly high borrowing model which even the most stupid know cannot continue. They also cannot afford the fallout of NATO collapsing and a scandal of Western officials exposed at skimming off billions from the Ukraine war racket when it ends – and so the Ukraine war must go on at all costs. They have, more or less, boxed themselves into the ‘Russia war’ plan.
Rather than wait for the economic meltdown and tyranny to take over most towns in the UK, in particular in the north, the elites like Burnham believe that a war – or as close to the imminent threat of one – will serve its purpose from distracting the angry crowds away from burning and looting and focus them on supposedly fighting for their own country. It’s a scam. And sadly, it’s one which seems to be working, as it is supported by the billionaires who own the media in the UK, so, broadly speaking, the working classes have swallowed the ‘war with Russia’ ruse.
Furthermore, the industrial military complex also gets a massively needed shot in the arm of public money which under normal circumstances would not be possible. Most of this is U.S. money, of course, but the UK has also a defence industry of its own which is in need of new cash. And as we have seen with Boris Johnson, it also works on the same ‘gratuity’ basis for paying off politicians huge amounts for helping with their orders. Part of the sweetener of getting the country to prepare for war with Russia is that the huge contracts that have to be given to the defence business also come with the same brown envelopes for those who presided over them. It beggars belief how our politicians in the UK have resisted so far not to bang on the Russian war drum more when the rewards are considerable.
There is nothing remarkable about our leaders any more – only that they are no longer leaders. Burnham has the on-screen charisma of a provincial school teacher whom you meet in a train compartment and instantly regret engaging in conversation, as he really has nothing to say. No new ideas. No new plans. He is stuck in the past and has no choice but to remain there while apparently fixing Britain. His problem is that the country and the world have changed and are rapidly changing. The EU that Britain left is not the same EU today. The economies of France and Germany are in tatters due to years of poor governance, atrocious foreign policy stunts like Ukraine, and too many poor domestic policy decisions that have backfired, like energy. The EU itself under von der Leyen has turned into an Orwellian superstate, corrupt to the core, which also has exactly the same scam to save their own political necks: war with Russia. The U.S. is in rapid decline, BRICS nations are emerging as the new global economic powerhouse to balance the old world order. All Burnham has is old ideas which belong in the past. And lies. Even his own ministers have admitted that there is no truth whatsoever in the Russian interference hoax, and yet he is peddling it, like an old comedian recycling someone else’s old jokes. The truth is that while Burnham is under some pressure from, in particular, Germany’s leader Merz, to push this narrative that the far right is funded by Russia (which of course works for Burnham in the UK as well), in reality the only ‘foreign interference’ is the dark power of the Israeli lobby and its cash in Westminster. And why doesn’t even one single UK journalist or commentator point out the patent hypocrisy of this election meddling accusation which all superpowers indulge in anyway? In 2014, the Americans boasted that they had spent $5bn USD on social media influencing in Ukraine to install a Westernised leader in power. Was that not “meddling”?
Portugal’s foreign minister, Paulo Rangel, has said that Portugal would “obviously” back the United Kingdom’s possible return to the European Union, but it is still too soon to discuss this
Successful tech companies are being punished—for being successful.
Last week, Britain's Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) proposed designating Microsoft as having strategic market status, which would give the government regulator enormous powers to regulate Microsoft and impose specific conduct requirements on product design. A consultation process has begun, with a decision on whether Microsoft will be given strategic market status expected in February 2027.
If the CMA decides to designate Microsoft as having strategic market status, it could intervene in product bundling (how Microsoft packages Teams, Word, Excel, and Copilot together), interoperability (whether Microsoft should make it easier for competing software and AI developers to integrate with its products), cloud licensing (whether Microsoft's licensing arrangements disadvantage rival cloud providers), and customer switching (whether businesses face unreasonable barriers to leaving Microsoft's ecosystem) in the United Kingdom.
Bizarrely, the CMA's fundamental gripe with Microsoft is that it has made its software so interconnected, convenient, and commercially attractive to buy together that competitors struggle to persuade businesses to use anything else. For example, the CMA says that Microsoft offers customers "technology that is useful, secure, easy to deploy and manage, and available at an attractive overall price." According to its own customer research, Microsoft is seen as "relatively good value for money," and its bundles are "seen as more cost-effective than buying and managing separate licences." Because commercial bundling "makes customers less likely to adopt products from alternative providers," the CMA thinks it must intervene.
Microsoft is not the first tech giant to feel the CMA's wrath for creating products people like. In 2025, the CMA decided Google had strategic market status in general search and search advertising, giving the regulator the power to impose legally binding requirements on how the company operates. Since then, the CMA has ordered Google to use government-mandated standards for ranking organic search results, provide competitors with tools to access users' search data, and give publishers greater control over how their content is used in AI-powered search. (These requirements were imposed without finding that Google had violated competition law.)
"Products working well together at an attractive price used to be called a selling point," but is now "attracting intervention pushed by an overzealous regulator," Matthew Lesh, public policy fellow at the Institute of Economic Affairs, a London-based free market think tank, tells Reason. Lesh is the co-author of Digital Overload, a 2023 report that warns against giving the CMA "extensive, discretionary powers" amounting to the regulator "telling some of the most successful and popular platforms on the planet how to run their businesses."
Lesh argues that including Copilot, Microsoft's AI chatbot, in the designation is "particularly outrageous." Last year, when Google was designated as having strategic market status, the CMA excluded Gemini because the "AI assistant sector is relatively small, nascent, and highly dynamic." Lesh argues that, with Google, the CMA acknowledged "uncertainty about the market's development," but now "proposes sweeping Microsoft's workplace AI into a designation requiring an assessment looking at least five years ahead."
"Five years ago, ChatGPT didn't exist. Anyone confident about who will lead workplace AI in 2031 should be running a hedge fund, not a regulator," he tells Reason.
While European countries have taken a far more interventionist approach to technology, the United States has, at least comparatively, celebrated competition and innovation. But American lawmakers are increasingly flirting with importing similar restrictions on Big Tech.
In June, Sens. Chuck Grassley (R–Iowa) and Amy Klobuchar (D–Minn.) reintroduced the American Innovation and Choice Online Act, which would allow federal and state antitrust enforcers to challenge certain practices by dominant online platforms, including favoring their own products and disadvantaging competitors. Jack Nicastro described the bill in Reason as an "atrocious importation of European-style competition policy," arguing that it would undermine innovation and choice. The following month, Sen. Mark Warner (D–Va.) introduced the AI AGENT Act, which would impose new requirements on major online platforms to accommodate competing AI agents.
These proposals are intended to address similar concerns to those of the CMA in Britain. The idea is that established companies outperforming their competitors is somehow evidence of "market failure," undermining the very innovations that made them successful.
Technological progress has always been driven by entrepreneurs and the companies they've built competing to win over consumers. Britain seems to have forgotten this. If the United States wants to remain a world leader in tech, it should avoid the British approach like the plague.
Andy Burnham’s government is rolling out a new “Centre for Information Defence”. But the outside actors most aggressively undermining what little remains of British democracy are nowhere in its sights
Russia “interfered” in the 2016 Brexit vote by running some “anti-EU” articles on its RT channel and promoting a few internet trolls. Even MI5 has to admit that this activity had no tangible impact on the referendum campaign.
No matter. British prime minister Andy Burnham has once again revived the incendiary claim that Russian disinformation is an especial threat to British democracy. At the United Nations a few weeks ago he announced plans for a National Centre for Information Defence “to detect, attribute and disrupt these kinds of hostile state information attacks”.
For the new British prime minister, as for his predecessors, this is all about Moscow and the UK’s favourite bogeyman, Vladimir Putin. At the UN, Burnham promised British expertise to other European nations to protect them from Kremlin disinformation.
Meanwhile, evidence continues to mount that another foreign actor is meddling even more aggressively in British politics – and neither Burnham nor MI5 have a word to say about it.
Any evidence of Russia disinformation-peddling in the UK pales in comparison to Israeli influence operations – and that’s just the ones we know about. The head of MI5, Ken McCallum, noted that Russian disinformation was neither sophisticated nor successful. The same cannot be said for Israel’s handiwork.
Israel has been using “hasbara” trolls on social media platforms to manipulate public debates in Britain for years – the thrust of the accusation against Russia. But in Israel’s case, it goes much further than that.
This year the Israeli state massively increased its public diplomacy budget to $730 million to expand its influence operations. That includes flying even more politicians, clergy, academics and influencers to bombard them with pro-Israel propaganda they are then likely to spread back home. According to foreign minister Gideon Saar, Israeli advocacy should be treated “like investing in jets, bombs, and missile interceptors”.
There was already plenty of evidence through the late 2010s, as I reported at the time, that Israel was helping to organise, stoke and amplify a campaign to smear its arch-critic, Jeremy Corbyn, as an antisemite, in order to prevent him from reaching No 10 Downing Street.
Not least, Israel did so by advancing a new, bogus definition of Jew hatred through the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA). Usefully, for Israel, that definition largely ignores hatred of Jews to focus instead on criticism of Israel.
That was the most blatant meddling possible in what remains of Britain’s democratic processes. UK politicians and media not only failed to oppose it, but actively sought to amplify the smears.
Civil war
This week the fanatically pro-Israel US lobby group the Anti-Defamation League revealed that it had been working with leading AI firms, which are increasingly being integrated into social media platforms, to suppress what it calls “antisemitism” – or what the rest of us would refer to as criticism of Israel.
Chris Menahan 🇺🇸@infolibnews
🚨 ADL CEO Jonathan Greenblatt reveals in Israel that he’s been working with all the top AI Frontier Labs to push them to suppress “anti-Semitism.” “We’ve been working with the Frontier Labs—OpenAI, Anthropic, Alphabet, the company that runs Gemini, Google, Meta, who runs Muse, …
10:32 PM · Oct 13, 2026 · 447 ТЫС. Views
CEO Jonathan Greenblatt observed: “We’ve had excellent collaboration with Silicon Valley.” The platforms, he said, would tackle content the ADL doesn’t like “right in the source code” – that is, before users can see it.
That is likely not only to remove criticism of Israeli atrocities and criticism of western governments, such as the UK’s, for colluding in Israel’s genocide but turn social media into a playground for bots and Israel apologists, giving them free reign to spread their propaganda without challenge.
We also know, thanks to the work of the French security services – maybe MI5 was too busy chasing Russian bots to notice – that an Israeli cyber agency called Blackcore targeted the SNP in May’s Scottish elections, as well as meddling in elections in France and New York.
Israeli tech firms, especially those dealing in spyware, intelligence and influence operations, are typically closely aligned with the Israeli state and its military. Most of the founders of tech start-ups are alumnae of the Israeli army’s 8200 intelligence unit.
Alongside the SNP, New York mayoral candidate Zohran Mamdani and a leftwing French party headed by Jean-Luc Melenchon were targeted. Why? Because, unlike their political rivals, all had dared to speak out against Israel’s genocide in Gaza.
With echoes of what happened to Corbyn, Blackcore’s campaigns were designed to smear candidates. In the case of the French elections, fake accounts were created to accuse one candidate of rape and another of paedophilia.
A new documentary, NAZA, shows how Israel has paved the way in using AI in pioneering new ways to kill on a mass scale in Gaza. It selected banks of targets for assassination, often by murdering those “suspects” when they are in family compounds, slaughtering large numbers of bystanders in the process.
It is therefore hardly surprising that tech firms in Israel have been caught using AI in similarly innovative and indiscriminate ways online, to target western publics with disinformation.
In the summer it emerged that the Israeli government had created a website for a fake “scholarly” think-tank. In a short period of time, it produced prodigious quantities of AI-generated content on Israel, optimised for common search terms, that promoted Israeli talking points and constantly suggested criticism of Israel risked fuelling antisemitism.
It was set up not only to influence internet chatbots into echoing its pro-Israel disinformation but also to integrate its content into what experts call the “underlying training data”: that is, the unquestioned assumptions on which chatbots operate.
Back in May 2024 Meta identified fake Israel-based accounts, “posing as Jewish students, African Americans and other concerned citizens”, peddling pro-Israel content in the US and Canada in support of Israel’s slaughter of Palestinians in Gaza.
Two months ago, Meta again found the same kind of dirty tricks emanating from Israel, this time targeting Britain, France and Australia among other countries. The AI-generated accounts posed “as local, civically-engaged brands, news sources, religious organizations, and political activists”.
Notably in the case of the UK and France, the influence campaigns were designed to stoke “anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim” sentiment. Israel has been critically involved in advancing Islamophobic content, fuelling fears of a supposed “Muslim takeover” of Europe to mobilise support for Israel as a bulwark in the Middle East against Islam, and thereby encourage sympathy for its genocidal attacks on Gaza.
As a consequence, the political landscape in Britain has been disfigured. Support for the far-right has been artificially inflated, polarising British society. The path is being paved towards deeper authoritarianism and the possibility of civil war.
Death knell
None of these dire outcomes, the death knell for what little remains of British democracy, is attracting even the mildest interest from the Burnham government or MI5. Instead, they are chasing what so far appears to have been far more marginal Russian output.
But it isn’t just the influence of Israel we should be worried about. The problem runs much deeper, with a host of other noxious outside actors trying to warp and disfigure British politics in ways that closely accord with Israel’s malign intent. Burnham’s Centre for Information Defence will do precisely nothing to tackle any of it.
Here are two other powerful external actors aligned with Israel in distorting British politics.
The billionaire class, a transnational elite that has no loyalty to Britain, interfere in our politics by making our political parties dependent on their donations. They use their money to buy influence with the main parties – which is why for decades it has made little difference whether we vote for the Conservatives or Labour. We get austerity either way, while the billionaires get permission for their forever wars, directing public wealth away from public services into the arms industries and resource grabs.
Jeremy Corbyn tried to break with this model by funding Labour with small donations from ordinary people instead of the billionaires. As a result, he was destroyed by a confected campaign run by the billionaires, in association with Israel and its trolls, to smear him as an antisemite.
Sir Keir Starmer, Corbyn’s successor, went right back to begging for money from Big Business, got the billionaires behind him, and rolled on with the austerity programme.
Is Nigel Farage’s Reform different? Of course, not. Even before reaching power, he’s dependent on crypto-billionaires living in Thailand and Hong Kong.
Meanwhile, the sometime US trillionaire Elon Musk is busy rallying Britain’s new blackshirts, led by serial fraudster Tommy Robinson, to chase after a few “illegal” migrants rather than identifying the real criminals tearing apart Britain: the super-rich like Musk.
The billionaires both wield and conceal their influence through their ownership of the corporate media. They use the media to aggressively promote their own causes – political and economic policies ensuring their further enrichment – by normalising the extreme ideology of neoliberal capitalism, with its promotion of endless resource extraction through forever wars and the fuelling of needless consumption.
The consequence is the destruction of the conditions for human life on the planet. The billionaires hope they can ride out the catastrophe in their bunkers, or cryogenically freeze their bodies until a point in the future when they can be uploaded to the cloud.
One of the media’s most important jobs is to use smear campaigns to destroy anyone, such as Corbyn and now Zack Polanski, who threatens the billionaires’ privileged position by offering a mildly socialist programme of wealth redistribution.
Vassal state
If the UK media wasn’t entirely captured by the billionaire class – serving as its PR division – then we might know more about the role of the United States in meddling in our politics.
The recent claims of a supposed “terrorist plot” outside RAF Fairford – really a US airforce base pretending to be a British base and one from which the US has waged an illegal war of aggression against Iran – should have reminded us that the Pentagon is largely in charge of UK foreign policy.
The US has some 15 major military bases on British soil, plus half a dozen smaller intelligence sites. As the rightwing US podcaster Tucker Carlson recently observed, the fact that Britain has foreign troops crawling all over it makes us little more than an occupied “vassal state”.
The US recently announced a $4 billion upgrade of its UK bases, including establishing storage sites for its nuclear arsenal. The plan caused barely a ripple of interest among British politicians or the media .
Although our political and media class pretend the UK is an equal partner in a western defence alliance, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, the reality is very different. Nato takes its orders from the US, doing Washington’s bidding. That’s why Nato has been pivoting towards America’s biggest economic rival, China, which is, of course, nowhere near the North Atlantic.
When the US snaps its fingers, Britain stands to attention and hikes its spending on the war industries. Along with European governments, the UK is willing to drain its national coffers and scythe through public spending with yet more austerity cuts to support Washington’s military agenda for “full-spectrum global dominance”.
Hidden influence
Much of the US influence on British politics is carefully concealed from view, operating behind closed doors.
In the early 2010s, the US was desperately seeking a pretext to extradite Julian Assange from the UK and lock him up in a super-max jail, hiding him out of sight after his organisation Wikileaks revealed US and British war crimes in Afghanistan and Iraq. It was during this period that Starmer, as the director of public prosecutions, repeatedly jetted off to Washington for secret meetings with US officials.
We will never know what was discussed. Freedom of information requests discovered that his own officials destroyed all records of those meetings.
Once he became a politician, Starmer was recruited to the shadowy Trilateral Commission, originally founded in the 1970s by officials in Jimmy Carter’s administration to deal with the supposed problem of “an excess of democracy” in the US. The commission’s view was that voters were becoming dangerously less passive, at that time over the Vietnam war, and ways needed to be found to return them to docility.
A similar British-American Project cements ties between rising stars in British politics, business and journalism and Washington elites. The power imbalance between the two sides ensures up-and-coming British leaders are readily groomed into an Atlanticist worldview in which the UK is very much the junior partner.
There are a plethora of other “respected’ think-tanks and organisations whose chief role is to embed US policy ideas, especially those relating to foreign policy, in the thinking of British elites. They include the Bilderberg Group, Chatham House, the Council on Foreign Relations, the Atlantic Council, The British-American Parliamentary Group, and BritishAmerican Business.
The US uses its financial muscle through these organisations and many others to manufacture consent for its extreme neoliberal and neoconservative ideologies. The latest example are massive grants to organisations willing to export Trump’s MAGA ideology to the UK, masquerading as a “public education” initiative.
There is plenty of evidence to show that it was pressure from the Trump administration that led to the unprecedented decision by Starmer’s government to proscribe a civil disobedience group, Palestine Action, for the first time in Britain’s history as a terrorist organisation.
Palestine Action had incensed Israel by targeting its weapons factories on UK soil, highlighting another aspect of British collusion in the Gaza genocide, and had infuriated Trump personally by spraying one of his golf courses in Scotland with the words “Gaza is not 4 sale”.
In truth, the ways that the US meddles directly in British politics are so numerous it is virtually impossible to quantify them. Britain is little more than a colony of the US, receiving diktats on important foreign policy issues – especially regarding US and Israeli interests – that the UK is invariably too frightened to oppose.
Burnham is already rolling over to reverse the UK’s decision to honour a ruling from the International Court of Justice and other international tribunals that Britain has no claim to sovereignty over the Chagos Islands and must return them to Mauritius. The UK has faced a temper tantrum from Trump on the matter because the US operates an illegal military base on one of the islands.
Disobedience by the UK is the exception, not the rule. Which makes Burnham’s exclusive focus on Russian influence almost laughably beside the point. This furious finger-pointing at the Kremlin is designed with one purpose in mind only: to distract the British public from where the real external meddling in our politics is coming from.
In November 1983, the Soviet Union came to believe that NATO might be preparing a nuclear attack. The trigger was a war game. The alliance’s annual exercise, Able Archer 83, ran from 7 to 11 November and rehearsed what would happen if a conflict in Europe escalated until nuclear weapons were released. It even simulated […]
Three days of silence ended in London. Volodymyr Zelenskyy used a Financial Times interview to announce that Ukraine would resume strikes on Russian oil refineries, and the message was aimed as much at Washington as was at Moscow.
The ban on refinery strikes is lifted, Zelenskyy declared. “Enough,” he added, in a statement that amounted to an open rejection of the White House moratorium. The timing is notable. Until the trip to London, Kyiv had avoided a direct confrontation with Donald Trump. Only after arriving in the British capital, where political backing for Ukraine remains strongest, did the tone harden. The episode points to a widening split inside the Western bloc. Over the coming month, tension may grow between those pushing for a settlement and those committed to continuing the war.
While politics heats up, the strikes on Ukraine’s rear continue without pause.
Overnight on October 16, Russian drones hit the western regions in a massive attack. In Lutsk, an energy facility was struck, leaving parts of the city without power and halting electric transport. As the blackout spread, residents began stocking water. In Khmelnytskyi, an oil depot was attacked. Kovel reported interruptions to both water and electricity, while in Ternopil a foreign-owned enterprise was hit.
The situation in the capital is worse. According to the Ukrainian outlet Ekonomichna Pravda, three Kyiv thermal power plants – TEC-5, TEC-6, and the Darnytsia plant – have stopped generating electricity. Those facilities provided the bulk of the capital’s power. Media reports say 600,000 people have already left Kyiv, a city that had nearly three million residents before the conflict.
Meanwhile, a technological shift is emerging on the battlefield. Russian forces have begun using Molniya drones fitted with satellite antennas, bearing a logo strikingly similar to that of Bureau 1440. That company develops Rassvet, a Russian low-orbit satellite network widely seen as a counterpart to Elon Musk’s Starlink. Such a network offers jam-resistant control for mid-range strike drones operating 100 to 150 kilometers from the front line. Satellite guidance is also expected to improve the accuracy of long-range Geran drones. If Russia can quickly scale up terminal production, the consequences could be dramatic. Ukraine’s rear could come to resemble the land corridor to Crimea, where roads are effectively blocked by constantly loitering drones.
Kyiv has lifted its own ban on refinery strikes just as its capital loses the ability to keep itself warm and lit. Russia, meanwhile, is building a satellite-guided drone fleet that no foreign company can switch off. Defiance in London is easy to announce. Defiance in a city without power, with roughly one in five residents gone, is far harder to sustain.
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Britain is clamping down even harder on critics who consider Western foreign policy to have been a catastrophic failure. We are fast approaching the point where expressing an alternative opinion can land you in jail.
On the night of October 2, while exiting a flight from Moscow via Istanbul, I was detained by UK counter-terrorism police for three hours under the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2026. I had no right to remain silent, my person and possessions were thoroughly searched, I provided fingerprints and a DNA sample, and was required to give up my electronic devices and provide my passwords or face arrest.
This was a “suspicionless” detention. I was not suspected of anything, yet police officers were empowered to subject me to an intrusive examination to assess whether I was planning a “hostile act” against the United Kingdom.
An officer approached me and immediately took me into custody after I informed him that I had been to a conference in Russia to discuss geopolitics. I was not told why I was being detained, except that he wanted to ask me “a few questions.” Bizarrely, he pointed out that the “counter-terrorism” powers he was using “aren’t as scary as they sound.”
I had attended the International Valdai Discussion Club Conference in Moscow Region from September 27 to October 1, including attending President Vladimir Putin’s keynote address. I participated at the invitation of the Valdai Club, which provided my flight and accommodations, as is standard practice for foreign guest attendees at such international conferences.
The Valdai Club, founded in 2004, is primarily a meeting of academics from all over the world. Before the Russian invasion of Ukraine, it was attended by a former Head of MI6, former British Ambassador to Russia Sir Tony Brenton, and Fiona Hill.
Valdai has found itself in the British government’s crosshairs. Throughout September, a host of journalists and academics have received letters from the UK Home Office inviting them to register with the Foreign Influence Registration Scheme, if they are “being directed to carry out relevant activities in the UK as part of an arrangement with a foreign power.”’ Non-compliance with the scheme is considered a criminal offense.
British journalist Mary Dejevsky, who was The Times Bureau Chief in Moscow in the 1990s, is the latest to receive such a letter as a publicly listed contributor to the Valdai Discussion Club, though she has not attended since the war began. The idea that if you attend an academic conference you are being directed by a foreign power is patently absurd. Nevertheless, and given the obvious risks, I wrestled with the dilemma of whether I should accept the invitation from Valdai and make my first visit to Russia since I drove out of that country in February 2019 at the end of my four-and-a-half year diplomatic posting there.
My primary role then was as the Economic Counsellor responsible among other things for sanctions policy. After my return to the UK, I authorized around 1000 sanctions against Russians, including after the war broke out.
I had some concerns that my role in sanctions may cause me problems once inside Russia (indeed, I was subjected to an extremely stressful four-and-a-half-hour detention and interrogation by the FSB upon arrival in Moscow).
Sir Tony Brenton, with whom I had consulted, suggested that I should attend, saying that Valdai was an “excellent event.” Upon his advice, I notified the UK Foreign Office, underscoring my commitment to abide by my obligations under the Official Secrets Act before I left for Moscow. This included confirmation that while Valdai had paid for my flights, I had not received any payment for my attendance.
I served as a British diplomat for 24 years and I take seriously my ongoing commitments to preserve the secrets that I had access to during that time. The suggestion that I might plan a hostile act against Britain is offensive and wrong. However, since my retirement in 2023, I have been an outspoken critic of the direction of UK foreign policy towards Russia, notably the departure from diplomacy in favor of war.
The important and necessary precautions that I had taken were insufficient to prevent me from being detained with fewer rights than had I been formally arrested and cautioned. I am of the view that security figures in London had authorized the action against me ahead of time. Indeed, Russia commentator Mark Galeotti suggested on his podcast that the system was “making a statement” by acting in this way.
(Editor’s Note: A request by RS to the UK’s Counter Terrorism Policing for comment about the author’s detention — for which he provided RS with documentation – went unanswered as of this writing.)
My detention marks the latest escalation in the British state’s war on free speech. Increasingly, people who speak out publicly against forever wars — not only in Ukraine, but also in the Middle East and elsewhere — are seen as a threat to national security that must be quashed.
Airport detentions are one step short of full-blown imprisonment, of course, but this pattern of intimidation has been spreading over the past four years.
British conservative academic and author John Laughland was detained at an airport for one hour in 2022. The late Robert Skidelsky, a member of the House of Lords and esteemed British economist, and investigative reporter Kit Klarenberg were subject to more lengthy and rigorous detentions in 2023. Klarenberg still has not received back an SD memory card that was confiscated at the time.
Professor Richard Sakwa, Emeritus at Kent University, was detained for three hours at Heathrow in 2025; he has only been able to return to Russia since that time following an intervention by his lawyer. George Szamuely, a Hungarian-born British political analyst, was detained in March 2026.
In 2023, Craig Murray, former British ambassador to Uzbekistan, was detained for an hour at Glasgow Airport under the tougher provisions of the Terrorism Act 2000, which is concerned with activity related to the commission, preparation and instigation of acts of terrorism. His phone was not returned to him afterwards.
Investigative journalist Richard Medhurst was arrested for making statements in support of a proscribed pro-Palestine organization and held for 24 hours before his release. His home and office in Austria were subsequently raided in February 2025 and he was accused of membership of Hamas. To date, no charges have been laid against him.
More broadly, in Britain, the group Palestine Action has been proscribed as a terrorist organization following widespread protests against the gross violations of international humanitarian law by the Israeli state in Gaza. Elderly people, including Holocaust survivors, have been arrested at Palestine Action protests for the crime of holding cardboard placards.
The practice of suspicionless airport detention is uncommon in European states, although alternative, more insidious forms of repression of free speech are employed. Former Swiss military intelligence officer and author Jacques Baud remains in Brussels, de-banked and unable to travel home, having been sanctioned by the European Union for “pro-Russian propaganda.”
This past week, Russian-born journalist and former BBC reporter Leonid Ragozin was declared persona non grata by Latvia, where he has lived since the onset of the Ukraine crisis. Having criticized the direction of Western foreign policy toward the war in Ukraine, he has also been a regular Putin critic and described the 2022 invasion of Ukraine as “criminal and irrational.”
This pattern of repressing free speech in Britain and more broadly in Europe is growing. I fear that the more obvious it becomes that the war in Ukraine cannot be won by the West and that Israel cannot remain insulated from international censure over its actions in Palestine, actions by the British state may become even harsher.
We are reaching the point where offering an opinion on the perilous state of Western foreign wars can land you in prison.
I thought I had been careful in notifying the British government before my sole visit to Russia since 2019. If the UK is at the point where former diplomats can be detained and have their property temporarily confiscated, then no one is safe from the long arm of lawfare.
Upon my return from Valdai, I wrote again to the Foreign Office, offering to brief them in full on the insights I gained while I was in Russia. To date, they have not replied.
Mercedes-Benz chief executive Ola Källenius has warned that excluding British manufacturers from European industrial preference rules would damage automotive production on both sides of the Channel, increasing pressure on Brussels ahead of negotiations over its proposed Industrial Accelerator Act.
The head of Mercedes-Benz has warned that excluding British manufacturers from the European Union’s proposed industrial preference rules would damage the competitiveness of carmakers across Europe, challenging Brussels over legislation intended to protect European production from growing international competition.
Ola Källenius, chief executive of Mercedes-Benz and president of the European Automobile Manufacturers’ Association (ACEA), criticised the prospect of restricting British participation in the forthcoming “Made in Europe” framework during discussions in Brussels on Wednesday, 14 October.
His intervention comes as European governments negotiate the Industrial Accelerator Act, which would introduce European-content requirements affecting public procurement and certain forms of industrial support.
The proposed legislation is intended to strengthen manufacturing within the EU, but its treatment of production in neighbouring countries has become contentious, particularly in an automotive industry whose factories and suppliers operate across national borders.
European production extends beyond the EU
British manufacturing remains closely integrated with continental European automotive production despite the United Kingdom’s departure from the single market.
Components manufactured in Britain are incorporated into vehicles assembled in EU member states, while British factories depend on engines, batteries, electronics and other parts produced in continental Europe.
The value of this integrated manufacturing system depends on companies being able to source components across borders without unnecessary restrictions.
Källenius warned that excluding the UK from the proposed rules would weaken manufacturers operating on both sides of the Channel.
His position reflects industry concerns that a narrowly defined European-content regime could impose additional costs on companies already facing pressure from Chinese competition, slowing demand and substantial investment requirements.
As EU Today reported in September, British Prime Minister Andy Burnham has been pressing Brussels to recognise the UK as a trusted industrial partner under the emerging framework.
Germany has also supported a broader approach that would allow selected trading partners to qualify under European-content rules where reciprocal conditions are met.
France has favoured stronger preferences for production within the EU itself, reflecting differences among member states over how far European industrial policy should extend beyond the Union’s borders.
Its provisions address public procurement and industrial incentives affecting products including vehicles, steel, aluminium and clean technologies.
The Commission wants European public spending to support local industrial capacity rather than reinforce dependence on imports from major international competitors.
China has become the principal focus of those concerns because of its expanding manufacturing capacity, particularly in electric vehicles and batteries.
However, measures designed to counter Chinese industrial competition could also affect established trading partners whose manufacturers form part of European supply chains.
The United Kingdom, Norway, Switzerland and Turkey occupy different legal positions in their economic relations with the EU, but all maintain important industrial connections with member states.
An approach that treats their production as equivalent to imports from countries with substantially different market conditions could require European companies to reorganise existing supplier relationships.
For manufacturers, replacing a supplier may involve more than simply ordering components from another factory. Production standards, technical certification, logistics and long-term investment arrangements can make changes expensive and difficult.
Industry demands regulatory certainty
Following an ACEA board meeting on Wednesday, European manufacturers called for faster progress on the wider automotive legislative package.
In its 14 October statement, ACEA urged EU institutions to advance negotiations so that the package could be finalised early next year.
The association argues that manufacturers require a predictable regulatory framework to plan investments in electric vehicles, production facilities and new technologies.
Källenius linked the industry’s transition towards zero-emission mobility with the need to preserve employment and strengthen economic security.
European manufacturers are simultaneously investing heavily in electrification while competing against Chinese companies with established battery supply chains and significant production capacity.
The resulting financial pressures are particularly serious for manufacturers that must develop new vehicle platforms while maintaining existing factories and dealer networks.
Additional restrictions on component sourcing could complicate those decisions at a time when companies are seeking to reduce costs.
Britain refuses to follow EU tariffs automatically
The dispute has acquired a further dimension following remarks by British Business Secretary Jonathan Reynolds.
Speaking on Wednesday, Reynolds indicated that Britain would not automatically follow the European Union in imposing tariffs on Chinese vehicles.
The UK government maintains that trade measures must be determined according to British economic interests rather than adopted simply to align with Brussels.
That position complicates London’s attempt to secure favourable treatment under European industrial rules.
EU policymakers have argued that closer alignment on trade defences could support Britain’s claim to be treated as a trusted partner.
British ministers, however, must consider whether restrictions on Chinese imports would benefit domestic manufacturers and consumers.
The disagreement will form part of the broader economic relationship being discussed ahead of the next UK–EU summit, scheduled for 20 November.
The wider implications for EU–UK relations
The automotive dispute follows earlier negotiations over British participation in European defence procurement and other industrial programmes.
In both cases, London wants access to initiatives designed to strengthen European production while remaining outside the EU’s institutional framework.
Brussels must determine how far preferential treatment can extend to non-member countries without undermining the objectives of its industrial policy.
The Commission’s proposals have already revealed disagreements between governments favouring a tightly defined European manufacturing base and those seeking to preserve wider commercial partnerships.
Källenius’s intervention strengthens the argument that industrial protection cannot be considered separately from the supply chains on which European manufacturers depend.
The final legislation will influence investment decisions, procurement arrangements and the position of British suppliers within the continental automotive industry.
The outcome will also provide an indication of how far the EU is prepared to accommodate its closest trading partners as it attempts to strengthen European manufacturing against growing competition from China.
Quando si torna indietro e si osserva davvero la rappresentazione storica delle «realtà russe» nei media di lingua inglese, si nota che Putin è sull’orlo della destituzione dal 2000 e da allora anche l’economia russa è sull’orlo del collasso. Tutto ciò che viene scritto sulla Russia in inglese in Occidente è una menzogna.
Parleremo dei vari aspetti della presunta “epidemia” in Russia, ma emerge una tendenza più ampia quando si esamina l’interpretazione data dai media a questo evento, che sia reale, falso o una sorta di enigma. Chiunque abbia familiarità con il mio lavoro mi avrà sentito affermare qualcosa del tipo: «Tutto ciò che sapete sulla Russia, scritto in inglese, è una menzogna», e continuo a credere in questa affermazione. Quando i politici occidentali dichiarano che «la Russia ha il potenziale economico della Spagna» o che «la Russia è la Nigeria con la neve», o fanno altre affermazioni simili, non stanno mentendo in modo diretto e consapevole.
Sulla base di tutti i dati e le informazioni di cui dispongono «laggiù» riguardo all’economia russa, questa visione era logicamente «vera». Se si analizzano i numeri basandosi sui dati occidentali, immagino che la Russia sia semplicemente un’economia enigmatica avvolta nel mistero, delle dimensioni di una nazione dell’UE di secondo piano, ma ovviamente nella realtà non è così. La Russia è terribilmente draconiana e repressiva, perché ovunque si legge che è proprio così. I calcoli secondo cui la Russia avrebbe ceduto immediatamente e il «rublo sarebbe crollato» dopo l’inizio dell’Operazione Militare Speciale non erano falsi, erano semplicemente basati su dati errati. Se si esaminano le informazioni occidentali sulla Russia, sembrerebbe davvero che l’economia del Paese poggi esclusivamente sui prezzi del petrolio, che la popolazione attenda una sola scintilla per ribellarsi al tiranno e che, nel complesso, il castello di carte sia pronto a crollare da un momento all’altro. Ma, come hanno dimostrato gli anni di guerra, non è stato così; tuttavia, le stime iniziali erano «corrette» sulla base dei dati su cui si fondavano.
Persino la famosa citazione di Lenin secondo cui «una menzogna ripetuta abbastanza spesso diventa verità» – ironia della sorte – potrebbe non essere mai stata pronunciata da lui, ma questa pseudo-affermazione getta un’ombra negativa sulla Russia, per cui l’Occidente continua a ripeterla. In Russia, poiché alcune persone sono state arrestate per attività online dall’inizio dell’Operazione Militare Speciale – tra cui l’organizzazione di atti terroristici – ciò viene considerato «negativo»; tuttavia, il fatto che nel Regno Unito vi siano 70 volte più persone dietro le sbarre per ciò che hanno espresso online non viene preso in considerazione, poiché si tratta di una situazione diversa e non è mai stata nemmeno presa in esame da un giornalista britannico. Gli arresti per dichiarazioni e azioni online si applicano solo a coloro che sono considerati «cattivi», a riprova della loro cattiveria.
Se l’esercito russo è forte, si tratta di militarismo; se l’esercito russo è debole, è prova di corruzione e inettitudine. Se vi sono processi per corruzione, ciò dimostra che il regime autoritario di Putin sta eliminando i propri nemici; se invece non vi fossero processi per corruzione, ciò costituirebbe prova della corruzione e del controllo totalitario del regime. Non esiste alcuna possibilità di vittoria per la Russia nella stampa occidentale; persino durante il presunto trattamento mediatico favorevole riservato a Eltsin nei «bei vecchi tempi», l’intero establishment si è abbandonato a un’orgia di schadenfreude per la caduta dell’URSS e per lo stato di umiliazione della Russia degli anni ’90.
Per dirla senza mezzi termini: se accade qualcosa o si dice che sia accaduto qualcosa in relazione alla Russia:
– Se i media russi lo avallano, ciò è prova che la Russia è cattiva
– Se i media russi si oppongono, ciò è prova di un insabbiamento del misfatto che dimostra che la Russia è cattiva
– In definitiva, qualsiasi azione o inazione da parte della Russia è negativa e costituisce prova della sua malvagità.
La posizione della CNN su questa questione è la classica russofobia
E, puntuale come un orologio, ecco che la CNN interviene per sostenere questa narrativa sulla peste che sembra essere fondamentalmente falsa. Parleremo di ciò che sta realmente accadendo con questa «epidemia» un po’ più avanti, ma per ora concentriamoci sull’aspetto mediatico della questione. Già nel titolo dell’articolo della CNN in questione «Liste di controllo, mascherine e mistero: cosa sappiamo sull’allarme peste in Russia» si nota chiaramente come la propaganda stia prendendo piede.
«Le autorità russe hanno cercato di placare le preoccupazioni globali in merito alla morte di una giovane donna che lavorava in un laboratorio siberiano specializzato nella lotta alla peste. Tuttavia, le misure adottate per isolare i suoi contatti e introdurre nuove misure di controllo della malattia negli ospedali locali hanno suscitato preoccupazioni tra le persone che temono di non essere informate su tutta la verità.»
Per quanto riguarda il paragrafo precedente, come potete vedere, la parte russa è vista in modo negativo perché presenta una versione dei fatti diversa e ha l’audacia di condividerla con il mondo. Tuttavia, se i media russi avessero taciuto su questa vicenda, ciò sarebbe stato ugualmente negativo, in quanto avrebbe costituito una prova di colpevolezza per omissione. Il fatto che le autorità russe stiano adottando alcune misure per cercare di fermare un’epidemia è negativo perché tali misure generano paura o qualcosa del genere, ma quantomeno ciò è sufficiente per giustificare una condanna. Tuttavia, se il governo adottasse misure estreme, queste sarebbero «draconiane», mentre se non adottasse alcuna misura, ciò sarebbe «terribilmente irresponsabile». Pertanto, adottare misure di livello medio «induce paura» o qualcosa del genere e, naturalmente, ciò è negativo e assolutamente inaccettabile.
«Ulyana Gavryunina, una blogger ventinovenne di Angarsk, città della regione di Irkutsk, ha dichiarato alla CNN di aver dovuto cambiare ospedale ostetrico alla quarantesima settimana di gravidanza, poiché le restrizioni di quarantena appena imposte impedivano a suo marito di stare con lei durante il travaglio.»
Pertanto, poiché l’amministrazione locale dispone di strutture limitate, purtroppo questa donna ha dovuto partorire in condizioni tutt’altro che ideali. È una situazione spiacevole per lei e sono certo che sia stata piuttosto frustrante, ma ancora una volta la CNN sostiene che l’intervento delle autorità russe sia negativo perché ha avuto ripercussioni negative sulle persone; tuttavia, se non avessero fatto nulla, sarebbe stato altrettanto grave. Se le persone non fossero state messe in quarantena in quella struttura, ciò sarebbe stato «pericoloso e irresponsabile» o qualcosa del genere.
«Mercoledì l’autorità sanitaria russa ha affermato che non sussiste alcun rischio epidemico a seguito della morte della donna e che sta riducendo gradualmente l’intervento. Rospotrebnadzor ha dichiarato che il monitoraggio medico è stato completato per “oltre il 90%” dei contatti della ricercatrice deceduta e che non sono stati rilevati agenti patogeni “pericolosi”. Tuttavia, permangono alcune domande senza risposta».
L’espressione «ma rimangono domande senza risposta» è stata utilizzata in questo contesto per negare l’opinione del governo russo. Se questo paragrafo si fosse concluso senza queste parole, avrebbe fatto apparire pienamente legittime le opinioni delle autorità locali. Quando «rimangono domande», si allude a una cospirazione, al fatto che la versione ufficiale non corrisponda alla realtà. Ancora una volta, indipendentemente da ciò che le autorità russe avrebbero dichiarato pubblicamente, la reazione sarebbe stata negativa perché la CNN le considera nemiche. Il nemico non può fare nulla di giusto. E le azioni della Russia sono quelle di un nemico e, pertanto, sono universalmente negative agli occhi di qualsiasi giornalista che si rispetti.
“Secondo il proprio sito web, l’Istituto Antipeste impiega circa 95 ricercatori ed è un’importante struttura sanitaria pubblica responsabile del monitoraggio e della prevenzione dei focolai di infezioni batteriche e virali ad alto rischio in tutta la Siberia e nell’Estremo Oriente russo.
L’istituto è stato fondato nel 1934 per combattere la peste e continua a studiare la malattia poiché la Yersinia pestis, il batterio che causa la peste, circola ancora naturalmente nella fauna selvatica in alcune zone della Siberia e nelle regioni limitrofe».
Sorprendentemente, la CNN non ha definito la struttura di ricerca in cui lavorava la signora Shipilova come un «laboratorio biologico» né ha utilizzato altri termini infamanti. In realtà, si è limitata a «crederle sulla parola» e a riportare semplicemente le informazioni presenti sul sito web. Ciò è risultato veritiero e piacevole da leggere.
Cosa è realmente accaduto, quindi?
Passiamo ora ad analizzare la situazione reale relativa a una potenziale epidemia di peste e alla misteriosa morte della ricercatrice che stava lavorando per combatterla. Esiste un video realizzato da una donna americana anonima residente a Irkutsk (nome del canale: American in the Motherland) sull’intera vicenda che, in meno di 15 minuti, analizza l’intera storia con fonti, fatti e filmati provenienti direttamente dalla regione. Per brevità, condividerò i punti salienti delle sue argomentazioni. Come potete vedere, ancora una volta una sola giornalista cittadina smonta punto per punto la versione dei media mainstream. L’immagine qui sotto è tratta dal video e mostra la «genialità» della stampa internazionale e le sue reazioni affrettate su questo tema.
I punti chiave del video erano:
Non vi sono lockdown di massa a Irkutsk né in nessun’altra parte della Russia; le uniche persone sottoposte a quarantena hanno avuto contatto diretto con la donna deceduta (Daria Shipilova) e il loro numero è inferiore a 200.
La Shipilova non lavorava in un laboratorio biologico militare, bensì in un istituto di ricerca sulle epidemie e sulle malattie, progettato per combattere le patologie. La sua ubicazione e la sua attività non erano né segrete né di natura militare.
La signora Shipilova è stata ricoverata in un ospedale fuori da Irkutsk perché in quella sede era presente una struttura progettata per gestire questo tipo di focolai epidemici dell’era Covid, e non nell’ambito di una qualche cospirazione.
Non si è verificato nessun altro decesso per la stessa causa di quello della signora Shipilova.
La causa della morte di Daria Shipilova è stata una «polmonite di origine sconosciuta».
La storia della «provetta rotta» è un mito, poiché è stata inventata da un blogger russo. Quando si lavora con malattie gravi, non si va in giro in un ambiente simile a un ufficio con provette fragili. La Russia non opera secondo la stessa metodologia della Umbrella Corporation, agitando a casaccio fiale fragili contenenti agenti patogeni.
La parte russa non ha trovato alcuna prova di un incidente presso la struttura di ricerca.
La ricercatrice non si era recata in Buriazia prima della sua morte. Pertanto, non ha contratto la malattia da marmotte locali o da altri tipi di roditori.
Al momento della stesura di questo articolo o della realizzazione del video collegato sopra, non si sono verificati altri casi simili a quello che ha causato la morte della signora Shipilova.
La peste è curabile, poiché è causata da un batterio che continua a esistere in tutto il mondo. Ogni anno, negli Stati Uniti e in altri paesi, una manciata di persone la contrae ancora. Gli antibiotici rappresentano una contromisura efficace contro questa malattia; pertanto, ciò non sembra costituire motivo di panico internazionale.
Perché la peste si diffuse nella Russia medievale?
Un aspetto importante da sottolineare a questo proposito è che, storicamente, sebbene la peste bubbonica abbia mietuto vittime anche al di fuori dell’Europa occidentale, ha avuto effetti devastanti solo all’interno di quest’ultima. I russi continuano ancora oggi ad andare fieri di possedere un elevato livello di igiene culturale che risale al Medioevo. I russi del Medioevo e altri popoli al di fuori dell’Occidente sembravano aver «capito da soli» la necessità di lavarsi regolarmente e di lavarsi le mani. Si ritiene che questa cultura igienica sia la ragione per cui la Russia, nel XIX secolo, vantasse una popolazione così numerosa rispetto alle nazioni circostanti. Molti in Russia ritengono che, se non fosse stato per errori madornali quali la Prima guerra mondiale, la Rivoluzione, la Seconda guerra mondiale e gli anni ’90, la popolazione attuale sarebbe molto più vicina a quella della Cina o dell’India.
Pertanto, da un punto di vista culturale russo, ciò appare chiaramente come un’altra campagna di proiezione: un terzo della popolazione inglese morì a causa della peste, mentre in Russia ne morirono solo pochi. Di conseguenza, la peste nera non ebbe in realtà alcun impatto culturale sulla Russia e, a giudicare dagli scritti del XIX secolo, la tubercolosi sembra essere stata un problema molto più persistente e fastidioso per questa società, che ancora oggi riveste una certa rilevanza. In tutta la Russia esistono strutture antitubercolari e non è possibile immigrare nel Paese se si presentano sintomi della malattia. L’intera questione del «vivere con i parassiti» non era una realtà quotidiana per i russi né nel Medioevo né in epoca moderna; tale primato spetta all’Occidente liberale e illuminato.
I media sono il vero problema.Abbiamo esaminato solo un particolare articolo su questo tema, ma vi sono numerose riflessioni assurde da parte della stampa occidentale che seguono la formula «maledetti i russi se lo fanno, maledetti se non lo fanno». Titoli come questo del Daily Mail ne sono l’esempio perfetto:
«Trump offre a Putin un’ancora di salvezza mentre la Russia si affanna a contenere una mortale epidemia trasmessa per via aerea dopo la morte di un ricercatore di laboratorio».
Ancora una volta, se «Putin» non facesse nulla sarebbe cattivo, ma sta facendo qualcosa, quindi si sta «affannando» in preda al panico, il che è altrettanto negativo. Il fatto che Trump gli offra un «ancora di salvezza» implica che Putin non abbia altra scelta se non quella di accettare questo aiuto, qualunque esso sia, altrimenti sarebbe cattivo. Ma indovinate un po’? Se accetta l’ancora di salvezza, ciò significa sicuramente che è debole o qualcosa del genere, il che significa che è cattivo.
Quando si torna indietro e si osserva davvero la rappresentazione storica delle «realtà russe» nei media di lingua inglese, si nota ovunque questa manipolazione narrativa isterica e nietzschiana da «untermensch». Putin è sull’orlo della destituzione dal 2000 e da allora anche l’economia russa è sull’orlo del collasso. Tutto ciò che viene scritto sulla Russia in inglese in Occidente è una menzogna.
Prime Minister Andy Burnham has acknowledged that Russia interfered in Britain’s 2016 referendum on European Union membership, ending a decade in which successive governments avoided making a definitive public assessment of Moscow’s involvement.
British Prime Minister Andy Burnham has confirmed that Russia interfered in the 2016 Brexit referendum, marking a significant change in the government’s position on foreign involvement in one of the country’s most consequential political decisions. The acknowledgement comes more than ten years after Britain voted to leave the European Union and six years after a parliamentary intelligence investigation criticised the failure to examine Russian activities surrounding the vote.
Speaking on The Rest Is Politics podcast, Burnham said he had requested an assessment of Russian interference after becoming prime minister in July. He subsequently received confirmation that Moscow had attempted to influence the referendum, although he declined to disclose the intelligence underpinning that conclusion or explain the methods employed.
The statement establishes an important distinction between Russian interference and the referendum’s outcome. The former is now publicly acknowledged by the British government; the latter remains a separate question. No evidence has been presented demonstrating that Russian activities determined the result, which saw 51.9 per cent vote to leave the EU.
The committee examined Russian activities targeting British political institutions, including attempts to exploit social divisions through state-controlled information channels and online networks. It found that the British government had failed to conduct a comprehensive assessment of potential Russian interference in the Brexit referendum.
That failure was particularly striking when compared with the United States, where intelligence agencies investigated Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election and published conclusions identifying a coordinated campaign.
In Britain, by contrast, responsibility for examining foreign interference had been divided between departments and intelligence agencies. The parliamentary committee found that no organisation had assumed responsibility for assessing the threat to the referendum comprehensively.
The distinction was politically convenient for successive governments. Without a formal investigation, ministers could maintain that there was insufficient evidence to establish interference while avoiding the question of whether the evidence had ever been properly examined.
Burnham’s acknowledgement changes that position, although it does not resolve every question raised by the original inquiry.
What Russia sought to achieve
Russian information operations have repeatedly targeted political divisions within European societies, particularly disagreements over immigration, national sovereignty, NATO and relations with Brussels.
Research into online activity surrounding the Brexit campaign identified networks of accounts associated with Russian influence operations that circulated divisive political messages. Establishing their precise reach, coordination and effect on individual voters remains considerably more difficult.
Moscow had an identifiable strategic interest in weakening European political cohesion. Britain’s departure from the EU removed one of the bloc’s largest economies, a permanent member of the UN Security Council and an important supporter of sanctions against Russia.
That geopolitical consequence does not establish that Brexit was engineered by Moscow. Britain’s referendum reflected longstanding domestic political divisions, disagreements over European integration and dissatisfaction with successive governments.
Russian interference, however, need not create political divisions to exploit them. Amplifying existing disputes, discrediting institutions and encouraging distrust between political opponents can serve strategic objectives without requiring direct control over a campaign.
Consequences for relations with Europe
The timing of Burnham’s intervention is significant. His government has begun reconsidering Britain’s relationship with the EU, while European governments are confronting increasingly aggressive Russian hybrid operations.
Burnham has also suggested that Britain should be prepared to reconsider EU membership in the future, although such a decision would require a separate political mandate and negotiations with the bloc’s 27 members.
The prime minister’s comments place Russian interference within a broader European security debate. France and Germany are among the countries confronting allegations of foreign information operations, covert political influence and attempts to undermine electoral confidence.
The European Council’s forthcoming October summit will include discussions of Russian-linked hybrid attacks, demonstrating that the problem extends beyond conventional espionage and cyber-security.
For Britain, the outstanding question concerns the intelligence assessment itself. Burnham has not indicated whether further evidence will be published, whether Parliament will receive a classified briefing or whether the government intends to examine failures by previous administrations.
A public acknowledgement without supporting details may establish the government’s position, but it cannot by itself provide a complete historical account.
Ten years after the referendum, Britain is therefore confronting two separate matters: the extent of Russia’s activities during the campaign and the reasons its own institutions took so long to acknowledge them.
The first concerns foreign interference. The second concerns the accountability of the British state.
As part of the largest U.K. Commando Force exercise in 15 years, British special operators conducted a submarine insertion off Scotland, making use of a German Navy Type 212A — a boat you can read about in detail here. The maneuvers are the first time since the war in Afghanistan that all of the Commando Force’s specialist elements have operated together. The submarine insertion, conducted at Cape Wrath on September 29, is part of Exercise Strike Warrior, a major NATO drill intended to rehearse allied crisis-response and warfighting operations across the North Atlantic and High North.
The U.K. Royal Navy-led Commando Force specializes in amphibious, littoral, and expeditionary operations. It brings together Royal Marines commandos with specialist elements including reconnaissance, intelligence, targeting, artillery, logistics, and medical capabilities. The force is increasingly focused on smaller, dispersed teams operating across contested littoral environments.
Including elements of the Commando Force, more than 2,000 personnel from the United Kingdom, United States, Germany, Netherlands, Canada, and Norway are currently participating in Strike Warrior, with eight warships and 19 aircraft involved in activity spanning Scotland, the Western Isles, the North-West Approaches, Galloway, the Borders and the North Sea.
The submarine insertion underscores the type of maritime special operations the British Commando Force is now increasingly training to conduct. Personnel from 148 (Meiktila) Commando Forward Observation Battery, Royal Artillery, boarded the unnamed German attack submarine off Scotland before being infiltrated toward the coast. The sub provided intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) support as the force approached the target area, after which the commandos conducted a discreet small-boat insertion using inflatable raiding craft.
British Commandos board the German U-boat off the north coast of Scotland during Strike Warrior 26. Crown Copyright
Once ashore, the commandos moved onto the cliffs and established an extemporized observation post. From there, they confirmed the simulated target and coordinated live naval surface fires against a simulated enemy position. Here, firepower was provided by the Portuguese Karel Doorman class frigate Dom Francisco de Almeida, presumably using its Oto Melara 76mm deck gun. Following the engagement, the team was extracted. The complete sequence incorporated submarine infiltration, small-boat insertion, covert reconnaissance and targeting, live naval gunfire, and withdrawal into a single mission profile.
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The German submarine involved is particularly well suited to this kind of mission. Conventional diesel-electric attack submarines (SSK) lack the nuclear-powered endurance and sustained high speed of an SSN, but those characteristics are not necessarily what a short-range clandestine insertion mission requires. Modern SSKs such as Germany’s Type 212A are designed around extremely low acoustic signatures and can remain submerged for extended periods using air-independent propulsion, making them difficult to detect while operating in relatively shallow and constrained waters.
That combination is hugely valuable for special operations. An SSK can approach a coastline covertly, conduct ISR, release a small team and its boats, and withdraw without exposing a large surface vessel or maintaining the high-speed transit capability associated with a nuclear submarine. Its comparatively small size can also be advantageous when operating closer to shore, where depth, seabed conditions and the presence of coastal sensors can constrain larger submarines. Conventionally powered boats are also far cheaper to procure and operate and have smaller crews.
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An SSN offers major advantages for longer-range deployments: far greater endurance, sustained speed, and the ability to carry and support larger payloads over intercontinental distances. These payloads can include dry deck shelters and swimmer delivery vehicles, allowing divers easy exit and entrance while the boat is submerged and at a standoff distance from the coast.
But for a mission whose essential requirement is to quietly loiter near a coast, put a small team ashore and leave, an SSK remains a highly relevant platform. Conventional submarines are particularly valuable to the kind of distributed littoral operations NATO is rehearsing in northern European waters.
The Upholders were also particularly suited to inshore operations, reconnaissance, and other missions demanding extreme quietness and maneuverability.
The Royal Canadian Navy long-range patrol submarine HMCS Victoria arrives at Naval Base Kitsap-Bangor for a port call and routine maintenance. This boat was formerly HMS Unseen with the U.K. Royal Navy. U.S. Navy photo by Lt. Ed Early/Released
With this in mind, TWZ has, in the past, examined whether the U.S. Navy should complement its all-nuclear submarine fleet with advanced conventional boats. Sweden’s Gotlanddemonstrated the value of these kinds of boats when it was leased to the U.S. Navy for adversary training and proved exceptionally difficult for American ASW forces to detect.
Swedish submarine HMS Gotland, left, HNLMS Tromp, center, and HMS Portland steam in formation with other NATO and partner nation ships during maneuvering drills as a part of exercise Dynamic Mongoose in 2015. U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Amanda S. Kitchner/Released
Returning to the Cape Wrath drill, the 148 Battery operations officer involved explained that “This level of complexity and coordination of live assets has not been achieved by 148 for nearly 30 years.”
“We wanted to demonstrate to our partners across the United Kingdom Commando Force, wider U.K. Defense and NATO SOF community the type of missions we are prepared to execute against future threats,” the officer added.
148 Battery secures a remote beach in Cape Wrath during Exercise Strike Warrior 26. Crown CopyrightCrown Copyright
Multinational integration is central to the exercise. Strike Warrior is testing the ability of the British Commando Force to plug into a much larger allied force in which submarines, surface combatants, aircraft, drones, and small specialist teams can contribute to different parts of the same operation.
Earlier in Strike Warrior, 148 Battery also directed fires from the Dutch Karel Doorman class frigate HNLMS Van Amstel and Royal Canadian Navy Halifax class frigate HMCS St. John’s after establishing observation posts. Those ships were operating as part of Standing NATO Maritime Group One.
HNLMS Van Amstel from the Royal Netherlands Navy during Exercise Strike Warrior. Crown Copyright
The exercise also provides a snapshot of how Britain’s commandos have evolved since their intensive employment in Afghanistan. The Royal Marines’ Future Commando Force concept emphasizes smaller, more dispersed formations capable of operating in contested littoral environments, with greater reliance on maritime mobility, uncrewed systems, long-range fires, and allied capabilities.
Strike Warrior combines those elements, with the exercise including amphibious landings, boarding operations, intelligence and surveillance missions, maritime security, and anti-submarine warfare, alongside drone missions involving strikes and combat resupply. Other elements have practiced establishing protected medical facilities.
The geography of Strike Warrior is equally significant. The exercise extends across Scotland and its surrounding waters, including the Western Isles and out into the North Sea, placing the Commando Force in the maritime environment connecting the highly strategic North Atlantic, Norwegian Sea, and northern European approaches.
That region has become increasingly important to NATO planning because of the difficulty of monitoring and controlling such a large maritime battlespace. Submarines, maritime patrol aircraft, surface combatants, drones, and long-range weapons all have roles to play, while the geography provides numerous opportunities for small forces to operate from the coast and islands.
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The United Kingdom has been repeatedly using the region and the wider High North as a training ground for this type of activity. Earlier this year, British commandos conducted a submarine insertion during Exercise Cold Response in Norway using the German Navy’s Type 212A submarine U-35. That also involved submarine infiltration, small-boat deployment, establishment of an observation post, and the direction of allied naval fires.
Royal Marines on Exercise Cold Response in North Norway training in extreme cold conditions while exercising boat drills within the fjords of Norway. Crown Copyright
Strike Warrior expands that concept considerably and across a much larger battlespace, providing an opportunity to test not simply individual capabilities but the ability to combine them during a sustained NATO exercise.
The exercise began September 28 and concludes October 9.
For the British Commando Force, the significance extends beyond the dramatic imagery of troops emerging from a German submarine at Cape Wrath. After years in which British commandos were heavily committed to land-based counterinsurgency operations, the exercise is intended to put them firmly back in a maritime and high-end warfighting context.
This is the kind of operation that the U.K. Commando Force is now preparing to conduct alongside NATO partners in the increasingly contested waters of the North Atlantic and High North.
Before the hasty and unexpected departure of the bombers on Sunday, B-1s had been deployed to RAF Fairford continuously since March, initially in support of Operation Epic Fury against Iran. A contingent of B-52s had also conducted strikes on Iran from Fairford, but left back in July. The base is a major operational hub for the U.S. military in the United Kingdom, and regularly hosts strategic aircraft, including bombers and U-2 spy planes.
Dan Rivers, U.S. correspondent for ITV News in the United Kingdom, was among the first to report on Monday that the B-1’s quick departure had been prompted by concerns about a potential Spiderweb-like drone attack ordered by Iran, citing an unnamed source. Other outlets have subsequently reported similar details, all sourced to anonymous U.S. and British officials.
“They didn’t fly out by accident,” U.S. President Donald Trump told reporters during a gaggle at the White House on Monday when asked about why the B-1s had left Fairford. “There were some threats.”
“I can’t tell you that, but if they did, they’ll suffer greatly,” Trump added in response to a separate question about whether Iran might have managed to get weaponized drones into the United Kingdom.
“What you saw there was the Secretary of War [Pete Hegseth], out of an abundance of caution, trying to protect our guys,” U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance said during a separate press engagement on Monday. “We do feel, with some confidence, that the Iranians are – they’re trying to do what the Iranian state has done for 49 years, which is engage in acts of terrorism against the United States, and a lot of other people, as well. So, we are being extremely cautious.”
Another satellite image offering an overall view of RAF Fairford. Google Earth
“We’ve documented what happened [near Fairford] last week. I wouldn’t just directly tie that to the move that was made,” U.S. Secretary of State and National Security Advisor Marco Rubio also told members of the press on Monday. “The only reason why you guys are focused on how many planes are at Fairford is because of the threat that happened last week.”
“We have confidence in the security of all of our bases, because all of our bases are [sic] theoretically could be threatened at any moment,” he added.
Rubio’s comments notwithstanding, the remarks from Trump and Vance make clear that there was some recent threat intelligence that contributed to the decision to pull the bombers from Fairford. There are still many questions about the exact nature of the potential attacks, and how imminent, or not, the danger may have been.
Regardless, as mentioned, the prospect of a near-field drone attack on a base like Fairford carried out by actors in close proximity is extremely plausible, and the barrier to entry to such an operation is relatively low. Spiderweb may have thrust this reality into the public consciousness in dramatic fashion, but the danger well predates that operation, and even the start of Russia’s all-out invasion of Ukraine in 2022.
TWZ has been highlighting exactly these kinds of threats in the course of a decade or so now of regular reporting on drone incursions over U.S. and foreign military facilities and critical infrastructure, as well as American naval vessels operating offshore. Langley Air Force Base in Virginia and Barksdale Air Force Base in Louisiana, some of America’s most strategic airbases domestically, are among the facilities that have had to grapple with this in the past. After the Langley incident, in particular, it had become clear to the larger public what we had been reporting for many years, that the United States does not control the airspace over even its most critical military installations.
New footage of yet another act of Russian terrorism on EU soil, showing the drone loaded with explosives on the tarmac at Leipzig/Halle Airport, just meters from a Ukrainian Antonov An-124 cargo aircraft.
— SPRAVDI — Stratcom Centre (@StratcomCentre) August 5, 2026
A drone attack on Fairford would also not necessarily have had to come from somewhere very close by. Longer-range one-way attack drones are steadily proliferating, and can be launched using a variety of methods from positions on the ground, as well as vessels at sea. TWZ explored the very real threat of sea-based drone attacks, including ones conducted covertly, and Iran’s specific ability to carry them out globally, following the leak of an FBI alert back in March.
The proliferation of lower-end one-way-attack drones has ‘democratized’ precision-guided attacks, even for non-state actors. The fielding of automated targeting capabilities, driven by developments in artificial intelligence and machine learning, is also becoming more and more widespread. That technology will soon enable these weapons to find and strike even moving targets on their own. Even without anyone at the controls and without the drone putting out any detectable radio emissions, very effective precision attacks can still be launched at static targets, like known parking areas for aircraft at airbases, just by using basic map coordinates or Google Earth. It’s also worth pointing out here that the definition of a stand-off attack is becoming increasingly blurry, with even quadcopter-type drones capable of flying miles away to conduct a kamikaze attack on a target based on a set of GPS coordinates.
Ukrainian Saker UAV with AI capabilities. The video shows the process of target recognition. It has reportedly already been put to use several times against Russian targets. pic.twitter.com/NVNJyxUjGP
Overall, it is an indisputable fact that aircraft sitting exposed on a flightline are particularly vulnerable to drone attacks, as well as other threats. This is something U.S. military officials have acknowledged themselves. Fairford, where B-1s and other bombers have no option but to park out in the open in well-established areas that are plainly visible from outside the base’s immediate perimeter, is indicative of how American military aircraft are generally positioned on the ground abroad and at home.
As we wrote all the way back in 2017:
“Similar swarming strikes could be unleashed behind the front lines as well, with hugely expensive and low density/high demand combat aircraft being especially vulnerable to this sort of tactic—something General James Holmes alluded to inadvertently while speaking to the Air Force Association, stating:
‘Imagine a world where somebody flies a couple hundred of those and flies one down the intake of my F-22s with just a small weapon on it.’
Actually, it would be even easier to just strike the jets as they sit idle and vulnerable on the flight line. One swarm could see a whole squadron of tightly packed fighters destroyed without even having a chance to fight back.”
This picture of a B-1 at Fairford on March 7 shows how bombers and other aircraft are typically parked at the base. The line of photographers along the fence line also underscores how close those parking spots are to the base’s immediate perimeter. JUSTIN TALLIS / AFP via Getty Images
“I’m not a big fan of hardening infrastructure,” Gen. Kenneth Wilsbach said at a roundtable at the Air and Space Forces Association’s main annual symposium in 2023, offering a prime example of this viewpoint. “The reason is because of the advent of precision-guided weapons … you saw what we did to the Iraqi Air Force and their hardened aircraft shelters. They’re not so hard when you put a 2,000-pound bomb right through the roof.”
Wilsbach was commander of Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) at the time. He subsequently became head of ACC and is now Chief of Staff of the Air Force, the service’s top officer.
“I think that I don’t want to spend a lot of money on hardening shelters. Unless you’re going to send something 100 feet or more underground, we can blow it up, and so can they,” Wilsbach said in an interview with Breaking Defense in July of this year when asked explicitly if his position changed. “So, the economics of building a shelter that is impervious to a strike doesn’t work.”
U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Ken Wilsbach speaks during an all-call with personnel at RAF Mildenhall, another base in the United Kingdom, on July 13, 2026. USAF
“I think the economics favor defending your airspace, defending your ground space with systems that can defeat the incoming rounds, versus building a shelter,” he added. “Some people would argue, well, you should do both. Well, that’s even more expensive. And the other thing is, the shelter doesn’t go anywhere.”
It is fair to point out that typical above-ground hardened aircraft shelters are not invulnerable, especially to attacks involving ballistic, cruise, and certain air-launched threats. There are also substantial cost and other factors to consider when it comes to any major military construction effort.
That being said, having more hardened infrastructure also imposes costs and complexities on opponents, who have to dedicate more advanced and costly munitions and other resources to ensure targets are neutralized. Shelters have the knock-on benefit of complicating the targeting process for an enemy by obscuring where aircraft are or are not positioned, to begin with. An opponent has to treat shelters like they are full even if they are empty.
When thinking about hardened aircraft shelters, stereotypical Cold War-era reinforced concrete structures typically come to mind. However, they do not all have to be built to a one-size-fits-all standard with the same degree of hardening across the board to be useful. Shorter-range drone attacks are typically carried out by platforms carrying small explosive charges or that are designed to drop small bomblets. Even longer-range one-way-attack drones generally have smaller warheads than traditional missiles, they also hit with less kinetic energy.
A US Air Force F-16 fighter sits inside a traditional hardened aircraft shelter. USAF
A structure that shields against smaller blasts and shrapnel, also including from cluster munitions that can be readily scattered across wide areas, is one that then has to be addressed by more capable weapons. This could even include mobile or otherwise temporary shelters that offer sufficient concealment and protection.
This picture shows what the Air Force described as a “prototype portable camouflage, concealment, and deception hangar” in use during Exercise Hoodoo Sea in 2023. Air National Guard The prototype portable hangar intended to support camouflage, concealment, and deception efforts in use during an Air National Guard-led exercise in 2023. Air National Guard
Eliminating, or at least substantially mitigating, the lowest rung of threats creates a dilemma for opponents, who then have to decide whether it is even worthwhile to attempt certain types of attacks. There is clear value in narrowing the available options for the enemy and pushing them toward having to expend higher-end, more expensive munitions, that are available in smaller quantities, and that traditional active defenses may be better optimized to handle. As an example, it may be more viable to shoot down a small barrage of incoming cruise missiles than a swarm of dozens of drones.
There are magazine and stockpile depth issues at play here, too. This is something that has also been brought front and center by the conflict with Iran, which has fueled already long-standing concerns about the sufficiency of stockpiles of air defense interceptors, other critical munitions, and the capacity to replenish them quickly. This is something the British government, among others, is also grappling with, as you can read more about in our separate reporting here.
Furthermore, losses of aircraft on the ground are not without their own costs, which are even more lopsided if an opponent can simply use lower-cost weaponized drones. U.S. bombers are particularly expensive and prized assets that are in short supply compared to the level of demand, as seen during the height of combat operations earlier this year against Iran. When it comes to B-1s, specifically, there are only 45 of them left in service today. A dozen of them being knocked out in one go would have major repercussions strategically. Losing even one would also be a propaganda coup for whoever might be responsible.
How many shelters can we build for the upgrade cost of one Zumwalt class DDG that will probably be parted out in 10 years anyway?
On top of all this, the U.S. military simply will not always have the luxury of being able to rapidly relocate aircraft in response to threats. Moving a dozen bombers on short notice takes massive resources. It is not just aircraft that have to be repositioned, but supporting personnel and assets, as well as weapons and fuel. Having to shift to alternate locations could easily have negative impacts on tempo and other aspects of operations, especially in the midst of actual conflict. RAF Fairford is one of only a few bases globally that can support bomber operations for a prolonged period.
“There is value in some light protection against small, unmanned threats,” Gen. Wilsbach also told Breaking Defense in July. “Some of them — just nets that are up that keep a small, few-$100 drone from getting next to a $2 billion aircraft. That actually works, [and is] really cheap.”
A graphic included a contracting notice put out by authorities at Langley Air Force Base in 2024 showing how sunshade-type shelters at the base might be equipped with anti-drone nets. USAF
“It’s not either or,” Wilsbach said in a separate interview with Air & Space Forces Magazine in July. “The net keeps the small UAS [uncrewed aerial system] from getting close to an aircraft that you’re trying to protect… That’s a very inexpensive way to give you some modicum of protection without killing your checkbook on really exquisite defensive systems.”
In spite of these institutional developments, action to implement such recommendations on a broad basis has continued to lag. There still does not appear to be any major department-wide push to build new hardened aircraft shelters or other fortified structures at facilities globally. The U.S. Air Force does have a certain number of hardened aircraft shelters at bases now, especially in the Pacific and Europe.
This is all despite a very visible trend in the construction of new aircraft shelters and other hardened infrastructure elsewhere around the globe, including in China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran. Even before Operation Spiderweb, Russia had already initiated a large-scale effort to build new hardened shelters at various bases, especially on the occupied Crimean Peninsula, in the face of expanding Ukrainian drone and missile attacks. This effort has now extended to building the huge hardened shelters for the country’s bomber force, something the country has never done before.
“It is inappropriate to discuss matters of intelligence, and we will not discuss specific force protection measures,” a U.S. Air Force spokesperson told TWZ yesterday when asked about the reports that Iranian drone threats prompted the recent removal of the B-1s from Fairford. “The Department will continue to assess the threat environment surrounding our installations and take appropriate actions to protect our people, our platforms and the bases where our forces operate from.”
We still do not know exactly how serious or imminent any recent threat to the B-1s at Fairford was that contributed to their hasty departure. Regardless, the reports of concerns about potential drone attacks remain very plausible. The reality here is that a dozen bombers were yanked from a forward operating location in Europe without an adversary ever having to fire a shot. This is a problem set that is only growing, especially as lessons and expertise on low-end weaponized drones from the war in Ukraine are spreading around the globe.
A B-1 bomber seen parked out in the open at RAF Fairford on March 15, 2026. Matthew Horwood/Getty Images
Erecting new aircraft shelters and other hardened infrastructure would not be a full solution to those threats by themselves. At the same time, they would be a valuable added layer of defense, and a passive one that would have a huge logistical footprint to operate once the initial investment is made. The lack of movement to better fortify American airbases globally is only becoming more and more glaring, and it remains to be seen if real action will not occur until lessons are learned in a most unfortunate way.
The United Kingdom could be heading toward its most significant expansion of ground-based air defense in generations, under a plan announced by the Conservative Party. For now, however, with the Conservatives in opposition, the proposed £10 billion (about $13.3 billion) “Britannia Shield” exists only as a policy commitment rather than an approved government program. At the same time, it highlights the seriousness of U.K. military deficiencies in this area, as the threat from the air continues to grow.
Today the @Conservatives are announcing ‘Britannia Shield’ – our £10bn plan to protect the UK from drone & missile attack. This is only possible because @KemiBadenoch is willing to take tough decisions to fund 3% on Defence. pic.twitter.com/tLrF2KSOHw
The proposal will move into the U.K. Ministry of Defense acquisition system if the party returns to government following the next general election and then follows through on the funding and procurement decisions required to turn the pledge into an operational capability. The party has proposed spreading the investment over a decade, with an initial capability intended to emerge during the first term of a future Conservative government and the wider network established after that.
Britannia Shield comes with the character of the air threat facing Europe having changed dramatically over the last decade. Russia’s war in Ukraine has demonstrated the scale at which relatively inexpensive drones can be employed alongside cruise and ballistic missiles, while recent fighting in the Middle East has clearly shown the costs involved in maintaining a sophisticated, layered air defense system under sustained attack. At the same time, the threat is no longer confined to weapons fielded by major state militaries. Small, widely available drone technologies can be weaponized with relative ease by non-state actors, providing a cheap and potentially highly scalable means of attack.
Operating in the Red Sea in 2024, the Type 45 destroyer HMS Diamond uses its Sea Viper missile system to shoot down a missile fired by the Iranian-backed Houthis from Yemen. Crown Copyright
For Britain, which has traditionally relied heavily on fighter aircraft, naval air defense, and the protection provided by geography and NATO, it is increasingly doubtful whether those capabilities provide enough coverage for the infrastructure that would be most important to keep functioning during a major conflict.
While a party press release refers to it directly, Conservative leader Kemi Badenoch has made efforts to distinguish Britannia Shield from a British version of Israel’s Iron Dome.
Iron Dome has become one of the best-known elements of Israel’s layered air defense network, having been developed primarily to deal with short-range rockets, artillery, and mortar rounds threatening populated areas. The system has evolved, however, and newer configurations can also engage threats including cruise missiles and drones. Importantly, Israel’s Iron Dome systems protect a country a twelfth of the size of United Kingdom and deal with only a portion of the potential threats in critical areas.
Mention should also be made of the U.S. Golden Dome missile defense initiative, which envisions integrating sensors, interceptors, and other defensive capabilities as part of an enormous architecture with a greater emphasis on protecting the U.S. against a range of aerial and missile threats, up to and including intercontinental ballistic missiles.
Talking to the BBC, Badenoch argued that Britain does not face the same kind of persistent rocket and missile threat as Israel and therefore does not require an equivalent level of coverage. Instead, the Conservative proposal is intended to combine improved radar, command and control, interceptor missiles, and counter-drone capabilities into an integrated network designed around the threats Britain is considered most likely to face.
Britain already has some of the components that such a system could leverage. Royal Navy Type 45 destroyers — when they are available — provide a highly capable long-range air-defense layer through Sea Viper missiles, while the Army’s Sky Sabre system uses CAMM missiles for shorter-range engagements. The RAF provides combat aircraft and airborne surveillance capabilities, and Britain is integrated into NATO’s wider air and missile defense architecture. The problem is that these capabilities were not designed to provide a dense, permanent defensive umbrella over critical infrastructure, and the ground-based component in particular remains relatively limited when compared with the scale of the potential target set. There is also the reality that these assets are required to defend locales far from the British Isles themselves.
A British Army Sky Sabre battery. Crown Copyright
The government’s own 2025 Strategic Defense Review acknowledged that changing threat environment, allocating up to £1 billion in new funding for homeland air and missile defense and calling for improvements to the United Kingdom’s wider integrated air and missile defense architecture. Britannia Shield would therefore be a much larger political commitment to expanding and integrating capabilities that already exist, while adding new layers intended to deal with the growing drone and missile threat.
The £10 billion figure provides little idea of the scope of capabilities. The scale of the proposed system will determine whether that additional money represents a major expansion or simply the beginning of a much larger requirement.
Gen. Sir Richard Barrons has previously estimated that an entry-level system of the kind outlined could cost around £80 billion over a decade, illustrating how quickly the cost can rise once the requirement expands from protecting selected sites to providing something approaching comprehensive national coverage.
2/ Estimates suggest north of £80bn for the full cost of a perfect system, so we almost certainly need to think differently than a “dome” solution. A layered air defence will include a number of elements, including the ability to deter and strike back at an adversary.
Badenoch’s description of the threat instead points toward a system in which Britain would identify the infrastructure and military facilities most important to national resilience and then build increasingly dense layers of protection around them. That would include major airbases, ports, energy infrastructure, communications facilities, and other critical nodes, rather than attempting to create a continuous defensive bubble over the entire country.
RAF No. 617 Squadron F-35B jets at RAF Marham in England. Crown Copyright
Such a system would also have to account for the fact that the location of the launch platform can be as critical as the weapon itself. Badenoch described a scenario in which an adversary could operate in the English Channel to launch drones or missiles against targets in Britain. The resulting reduction in warning time would place greater demands on sensors and command systems, but it would also mean that the defensive problem could begin well before an incoming weapon reached British airspace. Maritime surveillance, intelligence collection, fighter aircraft, and naval forces could all potentially contribute to detecting or disrupting a launch platform before it had the opportunity to fire.
A Russian Kilo class submarine, its accompanying tugboat (center), and the RFA fast fleet tanker Tidesurge (background), as seen from a Merlin helicopter from 814 Naval Air Squadron. The helicopter and RFA tanker shadowed the submarine and tugboat as they sailed westward from the North Sea, through the Strait of Dover and into the English Channel in 2025. Crown Copyright
That broader approach is particularly important because the economics of countering drones are fundamentally different from those associated with conventional air defense targets. A system that responds to inexpensive drones by firing a sophisticated interceptor costing hundreds of thousands or millions of dollars would rapidly become unsustainable during a large attack. Any serious British architecture would therefore need several layers, with electronic warfare, guns, low-cost interceptors, and other counter-drone systems, potentially including directed-energy weapons, dealing with the lower end of the threat wherever possible. Meanwhile, more expensive surface-to-air missiles would be preserved for cruise missiles, aircraft and other targets that cannot be economically engaged by cheaper means.
A British Army Wolfhound armored vehicle, seen here with a mounted portable Laser Directed Energy Weapon (LDEW). This was the first high-powered laser energy weapon to be successfully fired from a British Army combat vehicle. Crown Copyright
The recent situation at RAF Fairford adds another dimension to that problem. The United States recently withdrew a dozen B-1 bombers from the Gloucestershire base amid reported concerns about a possible Iran-backed attack, after U.S. officials said commanders had received new information about a potential plot. British authorities maintained that the base was safe, while British sources reportedly questioned whether Iran could reproduce the kind of complex operation carried out by Ukraine against Russian airfields in 2025. The episode nevertheless demonstrated the degree to which even a major military installation can become a concern when an adversary is believed to be looking for unconventional ways to reach it.
A B-1B Lancer assigned to the 9th Expeditionary Bomb Squadron parks on the flightline at RAF Fairford, United Kingdom, in 2023. U.S. Air Force Photo by Senior Airman Ryan Hayman
That brings Operation Spiderweb into the discussion, although there is no public evidence that Iran is preparing a comparable operation against Britain. Ukraine’s June 2025 attack was prepared over roughly 18 months and involved small drones being moved deep into Russia inside containers carried by trucks before being launched remotely against military airfields. The operation illustrated that once relatively cheap drones have been positioned close to their targets, the defender may have little opportunity to intercept them through traditional long-range air defense means. This is exactly a scenario we have been warning of for many years.
Today, Ukrainian intelligence reportedly launched 117 attack drones from trucks that had been placed near Russian air bases. I tasked several collects this morning via @umbraspace and my first images have already started processing. What a remarkable success in a well-executed… pic.twitter.com/LzXulw8jnK
For Britannia Shield, that means protecting an airbase such as RAF Fairford cannot simply be a matter of installing missile batteries. Physical security, counter-intelligence, surveillance of access routes, low-level drone detection, electronic warfare and the ability to identify suspicious activity before an attack begins would all become part of the same defensive problem. Hardened infrastructure would also be essential, helping to protect aircraft, fuel, munitions, command facilities and other critical assets from attacks that penetrate the outer layers of the defense. The distinction is increasingly important as military aircraft themselves become more valuable and as relatively inexpensive unmanned systems demonstrate their ability to threaten aircraft on the ground without ever having to penetrate the surrounding air defense network.
The new British proposal also becomes more complicated because its intended coverage extends beyond the British mainland. Badenoch has specifically referred to defending installations in Cyprus and the Falkland Islands, which introduces a very different set of operational and logistical requirements. A network supporting critical infrastructure in Britain can draw on dense communications infrastructure, nearby industrial support and the wider NATO system, whereas a defensive capability at RAF Akrotiri or in the Falklands requires its own radar coverage, launchers, personnel, ammunition stocks, and sustainment arrangements. Extending the same architecture across those locations would therefore consume considerably more resources.
A RAF 1435 Flight Typhoon FGR4 pair flying over West Falkland island during a routine training flight. Crown Copyright
A similar problem exists with ammunition stocks. Ukraine has repeatedly demonstrated that sophisticated air defenses can come under sustained pressure during large missile and drone attacks, while Western countries have struggled to replenish some categories of precision-guided weapons at anything approaching wartime consumption rates. A British system that looks impressive on paper but has only a small stockpile of interceptors would provide much less meaningful protection during a prolonged campaign, particularly if an adversary deliberately attempted to exhaust the defenses through repeated attacks using inexpensive drones.
Ukraine also offers lessons for how Britain could organize such a network. Mobile air defense teams, distributed sensors, acoustic detection systems, and digital applications that connect air defense operators with military units and civilian spotters have all become increasingly important in Ukraine, where defenders have had to detect and respond to large numbers of drones and missiles across a wide area. There are echoes here of the distributed air defense networks developed during World War II, when observers, radar operators, fighter controllers, and anti-aircraft units were linked together to provide early warning and direct defensive responses. As in 1940, Britain would need an air defense network that is distributed, mobile, and adaptable to new threats.
A RAF Regiment light anti-aircraft gun team man their Bofors 40mm gun in a rain-sodden emplacement in southeast England, to help defend London from flying bombs in World War II. Crown Copyright
The most revealing details of Britannia Shield are yet to be provided. The number of defended sites, the types and numbers of radars, the number of launchers, the size of interceptor stocks, and the proportion of the budget devoted to counter-drone capabilities all remain unclear for now. The same applies to the money required for training, maintenance, software, communications, and replenishment across the life of the system.
There is also a straightforward political limitation to the proposal. The Conservatives have pledged to invest in Britannia Shield as part of a broader plan to increase defense spending, but that money is not currently sitting in a government procurement account waiting to be spent and defense budgets are increasingly stretched by other big-ticket programs. The Conservatives would first have to return to government, establish the program as a formal requirement, and then make the associated spending and procurement decisions. Even if those steps were taken quickly, the most capable elements of the system would take years to design, procure, integrate, and deploy.
A rendering of of the new Dreadnought class of ballistic submarines for the Royal Navy, representing the largest British defense investment of recent years. Crown Copyright
Whether £10 billion would ultimately be sufficient depends on the mission the future government assigns to the system. If Britannia Shield were expected to provide nationwide protection against sustained attacks involving ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and large numbers of drones, the budget would fall far short, particularly once interceptor stocks and long-term sustainment are included. If it is designed as a layered network protecting a defined group of critical infrastructure sites and military bases, integrated with the RAF, Royal Navy, Army, and NATO systems already in place, the proposal becomes more realistic, but it wouldn’t address higher-end threats, like longer-range ballistic missiles.
That limitation is particularly significant when considering Russia, which remains the most serious military threat to the United Kingdom and its European allies. From what we know so far, Britannia Shield is heavily focused on drones and shorter-range missile threats, but Russia possesses a much broader strike arsenal that includes ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and hypersonic weapons. A British air defense program that concentrates primarily on the lower and middle tiers of the threat therefore leaves a significant gap at the upper end of the spectrum.
Russian Yars intercontinental ballistic missiles travel through central Moscow during a rehearsal for the Victory Day parade in 2025. Photo by Alexander NEMENOV / AFP
The United Kingdom is also not considering this problem in isolation. Across Europe, governments are increasingly pursuing multinational efforts to strengthen air and missile defenses, as the return of large-scale state-on-state warfare and the experience of the war in Ukraine have made the vulnerability of European infrastructure and military forces much more tangible. Nearly three decades after the end of the Cold War, ballistic and cruise missile defense has once again become a central European security requirement. Britannia Shield would therefore need to be considered not only as a national counter-drone and air-defense program, but as part of a much broader European effort to rebuild layered air and missile defenses against the full range of modern threats.
The experience of Ukraine and the Middle East suggests that Britain is unlikely to solve this problem simply by buying more surface-to-air missiles. Increasingly, air warfare relies on complex networks that find the attacker, identify the weapon, choose the appropriate response, and undertake this all at a cost that can be sustained throughout a conflict. That network also has to extend beyond the airspace itself, because the threat may involve a launch platform approaching the coast, a drone operator operating near a military installation, or small drones already hidden inside the defender’s security perimeter.
Last line of defense: British Army riflemen testing a Mossberg 590M Counter SUAS shotgun (foreground) and handheld Counter-Unmanned Aerial System effectors against drones. Crown Copyright
With their proposed reorientation of Britain’s air defense priorities, the Conservatives have put a financial value and a recognizable name around a capability gap that has become increasingly difficult to ignore. If they return to government, there will be many tougher questions to address, including which sites should receive protection, how many layers are required, how much ammunition must be held in reserve, and how the system can be sustained on a wartime footing.
The recent concerns surrounding RAF Fairford, together with the lessons of Operation Spiderweb, underline why that question is becoming more complicated. The next serious attack on a British military installation may not arrive as a large formation of aircraft or a visible wave of missiles crossing the Channel. It could involve a mixture of long-range weapons, cheap drones, electronic warfare, and hybrid warfare activity taking place much closer to the target. A future Britannia Shield would have to be designed around that reality, and would come with a price tag to match.
Originally posted on October, 7, 2026 – updated on October, 8, 2026
As the tragic anniversary of October 7, 2023, approaches —the day Hamas terrorists massacred Israelis near the Gaza Strip border, triggering the genocide in Palestine perpetrated by Benjamin Netanyahu’s Zionist regime —we are publishing an exclusive intelligence analysis.
This video marks the launch of a new Gospa News series titled “TOP SECRET Interview” by Fabio G.C. Carisio—founder and director of Gospa News—which will also be republished on the long-standing American site VT UnCensored Foreign Policy (where Carisio hosts a column).
This features an interview with Antonio Evangelista, a top Italian police official and counter-terrorism expert who spent seven years as Interpol official in Jordan, and who is now an author of geopolitical essayes and novels concerning international intrigue.
He confirms that the recent attack in the Holy Land—like the September 11 attack on the Twin Towers in New York—was a horrific “false flag” operations…
A “false flag” operation is one carefully premeditated over a long period by a foreign intelligence entity to implicate an enemy nation and discredit it in the eyes of global public opinion. It is planned down to the finest detail, carrying the risk of causing actual casualties.
In fact, if unforeseen “collateral damage”—such as unexpected deaths beyond the planned injuries or killings—occurs during the operation, the orchestrators are even more pleased, as the resulting bloodshed lends greater credibility to the terrorist attack.
Historically, the CIA (US counter-intelligence) and Mossad (Israeli counter-intelligence) have been recognized masters of such plots, occasionally utilizing partners such as the secret services of other nations or terrorist groups.
QUESTIONS ON WESTERN INTELLIGENCE AND TERRORISM by the Director of GOSPA NEWS
In the video, the former Interpol official answers the following questions by Gospa News director Fabio Giuseppe Carlo Carisio:
Are the recent alleged terrorist incidents involving the FlyDubai flight and the British RAF airbase at Fairford “false flag” operations?
What parallels exist between the plots of September 11 in New York and October 7, 2023, in Israel?
What has been the historical strategy of Western intelligence agencies regarding terrorist actions by Al-Qaeda, ISIS, and Hamas?
What drives Western governments to support bloody “colonial ventures,” thereby legitimizing genocides in the Middle East and Ukraine?
What lies regarding NATO wars in the Mediterranean basin are exposed in your historical, geopolitical, and economic study?
Do US, Europe and Italy face a real risk of a world war?
No summary today. If you want to hear the answers, watch the video to the end.
Below the video, you will find links to the major investigations mentioned in the footage.
VIDEO INTERVIEW to ANTONIO EVANGELISTA – Former Interpol official in Jordan
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