From the complaint in Piker v. Jennings; of course, this is just Piker's side of the story—I expect we'll get Jennings' in a forthcoming motion to dismiss:

On August 11, 2026, Scott Jennings falsely told a nationwide podcast audience that Hasan Piker was "out there calling for Black voters to be lynched." He falsely told his listeners that Mr. Piker had a "plan of returning our country to lynchings." And then he falsely told his social media followers that Mr. Piker "says the USA should resume lynchings against black people."

All of Mr. Jennings' accusations are false. Mr. Piker has never advocated the lynching of Black Americans, or anyone else. He has never called for a return to lynchings. And he has never proposed anything remotely resembling the supposed plan that Mr. Jennings falsely attributed to him.

Mr. Jennings did not merely mischaracterize something Mr. Piker said. He took a false, fabricated, and manipulated video of Mr. Piker, added a made-up quotation that Mr. Piker never uttered, and then made accusations that went beyond even what the manipulated footage purported to show. Mr. Jennings presented those accusations as fact, telling his viewers to "[l]isten for yourself" about Mr. Piker, knowing that he was playing a falsified video of Mr. Piker for those viewers, and completely disregarding the truth of Mr. Piker's actual words.

The underlying footage came from a broadcast nearly two years earlier on Twitch, an online streaming service owned by Amazon. On October 29, 2024, Mr. Piker was reacting to a debate between two Black political commentators, one liberal and one conservative. When the conservative commentator blamed "woke DAs" for policies supposedly harming Black Americans, Mr. Piker mocked him by sarcastically portraying that comment as nostalgia for an era before the civil rights movement. Laughing, Mr. Piker said:

He said, "We need more Klansmen, okay? Can we go back to a better time when lynchings were happening? This is what I like as a Black man. Also, there's no real racism in America." My man said, "woke DAs," dude. What are you saying?

Mr. Piker was plainly ridiculing the commentator's position. He was not endorsing it. The debate video remained visible behind him. Mr. Piker introduced the remarks with "He said," laughed as he delivered them, and concluded by questioning the commentator's argument. His viewers understood the sarcasm. Some laughed along. Others expressly described his comments as hyperbole. Still others predicted that someone would eventually remove the context and circulate the resulting footage as though Mr. Piker had been speaking sincerely.

That is precisely what happened. In August 2026, a 42-second video began circulating on social media that combined fragments of three separate Twitch broadcasts. The portions taken from Mr. Piker's October 2024 stream had been cropped, shortened, and rearranged. The underlying debate was removed from view. So was the contemporaneous audience commentary.

The words "He said," which identified the object of Mr. Piker's ridicule, were omitted. Mr. Piker's laughter and subsequent explanation were also removed. The resulting video portrayed sarcastic criticism of another as though it were an expression of Mr. Piker's own beliefs.

On August 11, 2026, Mr. Jennings broadcast that false video on The Scott Jennings Show, misrepresenting the manipulated video as authentic. But Mr. Jennings did not stop at repeating someone else's misleading edit. He added his own caption to the video, presented as a direct quotation from Mr. Piker:

PIKER: "LET'S GO BACK TO A BETTER TIME WHEN LYNCHINGS WERE HAPPENING" …

Mr. Piker never said those words. The original broadcast does not contain that statement. Neither does the manipulated video that Mr. Jennings chose to air. Mr. Jennings converted a sarcastic question, expressly attributed to and directed toward someone else, into a patently false first-person statement of Mr. Piker's own supposed beliefs, and then relayed that false statement to his viewers.

Mr. Jennings then went even further. After warning Black listeners to pay particular attention, Mr. Jennings accused Mr. Piker of "calling for Black voters to be lynched" and referred to "the Piker plan of returning our country to lynchings." Later that day, Mr. Jennings published the same false accusation on social media, telling his followers that Mr. Piker believed the United States "should resume lynchings against black people."

These were not expressions of disagreement with Mr. Piker's politics. Nor were they rhetorical characterizations of an admittedly controversial commentator. They were factual assertions about what Mr. Piker had said and advocated in his work. Each statement was demonstrably false.

The distinction matters. Mr. Jennings was free to criticize Mr. Piker, to condemn his political positions, or to argue that his commentary was offensive. Mr. Jennings was also free to play Mr. Piker's actual words, and provide his own commentary on what Mr. Piker actually said. Mr. Jennings was not free to do what he did: knowingly attribute to Mr. Piker statements that Mr. Piker never made, and then present those invented statements as evidence that Mr. Piker supports the racially motivated murder of Black Americans….

The post Hasan Piker Sues Scott Jennings appeared first on Reason Magazine.

From a long opinion yesterday by Judge Eumi Lee (N.D. Cal.) in Alibaba Group Holding Ltd. v. U.S. Dep't of Defense:

On February 13, 2026, the United States Department of Defense ("Department") publicly designated Alibaba Group Holding Limited as a "Chinese military company" ("CMC"). On June 30, 2026, 10 U.S.C. § 4663 went into effect, barring the Department from contracting with any company who retained the same lobbyist as a CMC. Alibaba asserts that Section 4663 has caused lobbyists to withdraw from representing Alibaba for fear of losing other clients.

The court issued a preliminary injunction, concluding § 4663 likely violates the Free Speech Clause and the Petition Clause:

Alibaba is an e-commerce and cloud-computing company that provides products, technology, infrastructure, and services to consumers and businesses for civilian and commercial use. Alibaba provides U.S. companies and businesses with a platform to sell their products to consumers in China. Additionally, it provides commercial cloud services to companies, including U.S. companies, operating in China and other countries. Alibaba has developed open-source AI models, including Qwen, with a focus on "commercial applications that make it more efficient and secure for businesses to sell goods to consumers in China." Alibaba is publicly listed on both the New York Stock Exchange and Hong Kong Stock Exchange.

"Prior to being designated [a CMC], Alibaba had retained over two dozen lobbyists and multiple lobbying firms to represent its interests before Congress and the Executive Branch" [including] … "… the Executive Office of the President, the Federal Communication Commission [("FCC")], the Federal Trade Commission, the Consumer Products Safety Commission, the Department of the Treasury, and [other entities]" …. "They presented Alibaba's views on legislation, rules, regulations, executive orders, and other government policies of commercial interest to the company. Specifically, they advocated regarding export expansion, small business export promotion, technology policy, access to U.S. capital markets, e-commerce-related issues, consumer-protection laws, and intellectual property." …

The Court finds that First Amendment scrutiny applies because Section 4663 regulates speech. By restricting Alibaba's ability to retain lobbyists, Section 4663 functionally restricts its political speech. "Discussion of public issues" is "pure speech" that is at "the core of the protection afforded by the First Amendment[.]" The First Amendment also protects "[t]he right to petition," that is, "the right of the people to inform their representatives in government of their desires with respect to the passage or enforcement of laws[.]"Lobbying government officials is therefore an activity fully protected by the First Amendment. FTC v. Super. Ct. Trial Laws. Ass'n (1990) ("It is, of course, clear that the association's efforts to … lobby District officials to enact favorable legislation … were activities that were fully protected by the First Amendment.")….

Here, Section 4663 appears to be directed at defense contractors, but its consequences are on Alibaba's speech. "[A] government official cannot do indirectly what she is barred from doing directly" by "coerc[ing] a private party to punish or suppress disfavored speech on her behalf." NRA v. Vullo (2024)…. Section 4663's impact falls on the relationship between Alibaba and the third parties crucial to its speech rights. Thus, the Court finds that Section 4663 burdens Alibaba's speech….

Defendants observe that Alibaba is not completely banned from appearing before the federal government—it could hire more in-house lobbyists or find a firm that is willing to forgo defense contractor clients…. [But] Alibaba is unlikely to find a lobbyist willing to forgo any clients who might want to contract with the Department. {The statute applies to defense contractors who contract with "entities"—in other words, lobbying firms—who also contract with CMCs. Defense contractors would not risk their ability to enter into a contract with the federal government when there are plenty of capable lobbying firms available. The lobbying firm then must choose. One or more of its lobbyists can choose to represent Alibaba, but then the entire lobbying firm must forgo representing defense contractors. The only rational choice for a lobbying firm is to stop representing Alibaba.}

[Alibaba also] represents that it cannot hire the number of experienced in-house lobbyists needed to address the federal government for all its interests…. The reduction to Alibaba's speech is sufficient to demonstrate a colorable First Amendment claim….

The court then concluded that the law was subject to strict scrutiny:

"Content-based regulations are subject to the most exacting scrutiny because 'the government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.'" In examining a statute, courts must also examine "restrictions distinguishing among different speakers, allowing speech by some but not others." "Speech restrictions based on the identity of the speaker are all too often simply a means to control content." Thus, identity-based regulations may "demand strict scrutiny when they reflect the Government's preference for the substance of what the favored speakers have to say (or aversion to what the disfavored speakers have to say)." …

{Section 4663 is not a content-based restriction…. Section 4663 operates based solely on whether a CMC is involved. What the CMC (or non-CMC) plans to say does not affect whether Section 4663 applies.} [But] Section 4663 is a speaker-based restriction on speech—it is only applicable if a CMC seeks to retain a lobbyist. As a speaker-based restriction on political speech, Section 4663 is subject to strict scrutiny.

Defendants assert that Section 4663 should be considered under intermediate scrutiny, because Alibaba's "differential treatment" is justified by its "special characteristic[ ]," namely the potential involvement of a foreign adversary. Defendants again rely on TikTok, where the Supreme Court applied intermediate scrutiny despite finding that the divestiture statute was a speaker-based restriction, because the differential treatment was due to a content-neutral reason, namely TikTok's susceptibility to foreign control.

While Section 4663 also involves a foreign adversary, TikTok is distinguishable because political speech was not at issue. Id. ("emphasiz[ing] the inherent narrowness" of its holding and observing that "[a] law targeting any other speaker would by necessity entail a distinct inquiry and separate considerations"). Here, Defendants provide no authority to suggest that differential treatment with respect to political speech may be considered under intermediate scrutiny. Citizens United v. FEC (2010) states the opposite: "Laws that burden political speech are 'subject to strict scrutiny,'" and "the First Amendment generally prohibits the suppression of political speech based on the speaker's identity." The Court thus applies strict scrutiny in determining whether Section 4663 violates the First Amendment.

{The Court recognizes that this is a close question. But for the context of political speech—specifically the ability and right to petition the government—Defendants' argument that intermediate scrutiny should apply would likely prevail, because Section 4663 is otherwise a content-neutral statute. As in TikTok, Section 4663 singles out a particular group of speakers, but not because of the content of their speech. Instead, the treatment is based on a particular characteristic of the speaker, i.e., their status as a CMC.} …

And the court held that the law failed strict scrutiny, because it was not narrowly tailored to the government interests in "(1) … prevent[ing] CMCs 'from accessing sensitive military information through their relationships with lobbyists,' and (2) … ensur[ing] that CMCs 'cannot subtly influence any of [the Department's] decisions related to national security by influencing a lobbyist'":

[T]he government cannot impose a restriction on speech based solely on "mere conjecture." Rather, it must "point to record evidence or legislative findings demonstrating the need to address a special problem."

Here, Defendants fail to meet their burden. Defendants provide only one exhibit in support of their opposition: the joint explanatory statement submitted as part of the legislative record for the Act. The statement provides an overview of Section 4663 and then "direct[s] the Comptroller General of the United States to submit a report to the congressional defense committees, not later than one year after the enactment of this Act, on the national security risks posed by consulting firms who simultaneously contract with the Department of Defense and the Chinese government or its proxies or affiliates."

Of note, the Comptroller General is directed to study consulting firms, not lobbyists. The statement does not express any findings by the Comptroller General or Congress about the risks posed by lobbyists retained by CMCs. At the preliminary injunction hearing, Defendants were unable to confirm whether a report by the Comptroller General had been submitted to Congress by December 23, 2025, one year after the Act's enactment; nor did Defendants provide a copy of the report. Other than the statement, Defendants do not provide any evidence of the national security risks or other compelling government interests….

[Moreover, d]efendants do not offer any evidence demonstrating that alternative [and less speech-restrictive] means were contemplated, much less rejected for being insufficient…. Meanwhile, Alibaba submits evidence that less alternative restrictions may exist. With respect to CMCs, Nebraska has required lobbyists representing entities on the 1260H List to file an acknowledgment that they are representing a foreign adversary. The Supreme Court "has upheld registration and disclosure requirements on lobbyists" as a "less restrictive alternative to more comprehensive regulations of speech." Defendants present no reason why a disclosure requirement, like Nebraska's, would be inadequate for the federal government.

Instead, Defendants summarily conclude that Alibaba's proposed disclosure requirement would not suffice because "there would still be access and the potential for influence." This speculation is insufficient to support a restriction on the First Amendment….

Carter G. Phillips, Christopher A. Eiswerth, Jennifer J. Clark, and Sheila Anil Gogate Armbrust (Sidley Austin LLP) represent Alibaba.

The post Alibaba and the Forty Lobbyists, and the First Amendment appeared first on Reason Magazine.

A Pennsylvania man put up Halloween decorations around his property. He had no idea they would unleash the horrors of government jawboning. 

Mark, whose real name is being withheld, is a homeowner in Bristol Borough, a suburb near Philadelphia. He decorated his home with a small graveyard, two monster scarecrows, and five mannequins hanging from a large tree on his property. One additional mannequin was lashed to the tree. The faux bodies were wrapped in black plastic secured with duct tape. 

Now local officials are haunting Mark.

At an October 12 borough council meeting, a neighbor complained about Mark's decorations, concerned the display looked too close to lynching. Karla Scott said the decorations are "very offensive, not just to the black people in the community, but the community as a whole." Scott told FOX 29 that her "mind went back to what my ancestors went through being hung from trees with nooses around their neck." (In the televised story, the reporter gives a trigger warning and then blurs the very decorations viewers are supposed to judge as either offensive or old-fashioned spooky fun.)

After Scott voiced her concerns, Council President Ralph DiGuiseppe said Mark had broken no ordinance and that Mark told the borough he would not take the decorations down. "They're just Halloween decorations," Mark told the Bucks County Courier Times. "I think it's been blown out of proportion." 

Despite acknowledging that Mark had violated no ordinance, DiGuiseppe noted a zoning inspector nevertheless visited his house immediately after the decorations went up. 

"Our borough inspector did stop there and talk to him. But we were unsuccessful….[Mark] feels they're Halloween decorations, and he won't take them down," DiGuiseppe told Scott at the meeting. DiGuiseppe then turned to another official who said, "We'll continue our efforts."

The decorations have divided the community, with some residents saying they're simply Halloween decorations and others saying they're racially insensitive. After receiving a complaint from a resident, the local NAACP chapter said in a statement on Facebook, "Something can be legally permissible and still be profoundly harmful." The statement also called for "continued engagement by borough leadership and voluntary reconsideration of the display. This is not about restricting Halloween celebrations or freedom of expression. It is about historical awareness, empathy, and respect for our neighbors."

But Mark's insistence that he would not take them down hasn't been respected by the borough. He was also contacted by Bristol Borough Manager James Dillon and other members of the council, according to Fox News Digital, which also did not publish any pictures of the display. Mark again said he would not take the decorations down. When the mayor of Bristol Borough, Frank Peranteau, reached out to him, Mark invited the mayor to have dinner with his family to discuss the matter. In an email to Reason, Peranteau said he wasn't there to try and change Mark's mind and "found him to be a genuinely caring person with no signs of prejudice." 

Nevertheless, things get spooky when government officials won't take no for an answer when contacting a law-abiding resident to "voluntarily" take down his constitutionally protected expression on his own property. This behavior by borough leadership and staff looks very much like jawboning, which is when government officials try to chill private citizens from exercising their constitutional rights through pressure or indirect threats. 

While Scott and other community members may prefer there be a rule to prevent such decorations, an ordinance banning "offensive" lawn displays would be dead on arrival, constitutionally speaking. It would be viewpoint discrimination and a direct violation of the First Amendment.

Mark says he may have considered removing the display if Scott would have approached him and explained how she felt, according to Peranteau. "He told me that he was upset at the way things were handled in the beginning and he may have considered removing the display then had it been different," the mayor said, "but it was a matter of principle at that point."

Talking with your neighbor may resolve more than summoning government ghouls.

The post Government Officials Admit His Halloween Decorations Are Legal. Why Won't They Leave Him Alone? appeared first on Reason Magazine.

From Magistrate Judge Enjolique A. Lett (S.D. Fla.):

[1.] Defendant served its Notice of Subpoena Duces Tecum to non-party Mar-a-Lago Club, LLC ("MAL") seeking two discrete categories of documentation: (1) documents sufficient to identify the total number of applications for MAL membership from January 6, 2020, through January 6, 2026, and (2) documents sufficient to identify the total cost of membership and initiation fees for a new MAL applicant from January 6, 2020, through January 6, 2026. Defendant contends it needs this information for discovery purposes to generally contest Plaintiff's allegation of damages of "not less than $10,000,000,000."

The scope of discovery is broad, allowing each party to "obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case…." Notably here, non-party MAL has neither moved to quash the subpoena nor raised any burdensome objections. In fact, the only issue before the Court is Plaintiff's contention that the subpoena seeks discovery outside the permissible scope of the amended pleadings.

The Court disagrees. The Amended Complaint alleges Defendant's defamatory actions "injured President Trump in his profession, occupation, and trade," "damaged President Trump in his occupation," and "damaged his professional reputation." As Chief Executive of the United States, it is publicly known that President Trump often carries out his presidential duties in MAL. See, e.g. President Donald Trump meets with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky at Mar-a-Lago.

Moreover, the scope of discovery is broader than the scope of admissibility. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) ("[i]nformation within this scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable"). Plaintiff's argument that President Trump is not synonymous with and does not affect the financial success or failure of MAL may be well taken as it relates to the admissibility of the sought-after evidence, but at this stage in the proceedings, given MAL's relationship with the profession and professional persona of President Trump, Defendant's subpoena is a permissible basis of inquiry.

[2.] There can be no dispute that all parties, even some non-parties, must participate in the discovery process. This is especially true of a plaintiff who initiates the lawsuit and seeks affirmative relief.

Unsurprisingly therefore, Plaintiff does not dispute that he must sit for a deposition; the only point of contention is the timing of said deposition. Despite scheduling the deposition for October 16, 2026, President Trump unilaterally cancelled the deposition and did not offer alternative dates within the discovery period notwithstanding the quickly approaching December 18, 2026, discovery deadline. In light of this, the time for the deposition to occur is now….

President Trump shall sit for his deposition on or before December 11, 2026. Failure to do so may result in sanctions, including dismissal of the lawsuit. It is the Court's understanding that another extension of the discovery deadline may be sought. In the event Judge Kuntz grants such a request, the parties may agree to a mutually convenient date to conduct President Trump's deposition within the extended discovery period.

Charles David Tobin, Maxwell S. Mishkin, Maya Devi Gandhi, Richard W. Miller, Sasha (Alexandra) Dudding, and Yanni Chen (Ballard Spahr LLP) represent the BBC.

The post Two Brief Discovery-Related Orders in <i>Trump v. BBC</i> appeared first on Reason Magazine.

From today's opinion in Jackson v. Thomson Reuters Am. Corp., by Fourth Circuit Judge Paul Niemeyer, joined by Judges Steven Agee and Pamela Harris; the law covers :

West Virginia's Daniel's Law …, which is designed "to enhance the safety and security" of judicial and law enforcement officials, prohibits the disclosure by any person or entity of the home addresses or unpublished telephone numbers of … {"any active, formerly active, or retired judicial officer, prosecutor, … public defender, … or law-enforcement officer"} if a reasonable person would believe that such a disclosure would create a risk of harassment or harm. The law authorizes protected persons to bring a civil action for damages….

As distinct from the Daniel's Laws in other States, … West Virginia's version does not require that the Covered Person, upon discovering an improper disclosure, notify the person or entity that disseminated the information and request that the person or entity delete the information before liability arises. In addition, for liability to arise under West Virginia's version, the person or entity need not know that they have disclosed a Covered Person's information. The only limiting principle of § 5A-8-24(e) liability is that the information must have been disclosed "under circumstances in which a reasonable person would believe that providing such information would expose another to harassment or risk of harm to life or property." …

For generations now, home addresses and telephone numbers have been disseminated to the public, initially through Whitepages and Yellow Pages and now through "people search" services on the Internet. The public has thus long had the facility to look up the name of a person and obtain that person's address and telephone number. Sharing that information has been the gateway to communication and the exchange of ideas or messages that have long been protected by the First Amendment. In the digital age, such information may now be shared with greater efficiency, but the tradition continues with the understanding that it is protected speech.

In a similar vein, it has long been custom and practice to record for public examination the names and addresses of persons buying, selling, and financing real property. And it has been the tradition to share publicly information about taxes, appraisals, liens, and voting.

To be sure, while the dissemination of such information is protected speech necessary to the exchange of ideas, it can also contribute to abuse and the pursuit of harmful and, indeed, malicious ends, as exemplified by the murder of Daniel Anderl. To address such abuse, governments have enacted laws like Daniel's Law in an effort to restrict the dissemination of home addresses and unpublished telephone numbers of specified public officials who serve in roles important to society. And the parties here agree that those governments have a compelling interest in enhancing the safety and security of such officials. The task, therefore, is to draw an appropriate line between protecting the dissemination of such information while, at the same time, excepting from dissemination the same information when it creates a potential for harm of specified public officials.

Because of the high value that our Constitution and longstanding practices place on the free dissemination of information and the exercise of free speech, we draw the line with the greatest caution, requiring that governments regulate speech about the home addresses and telephone numbers of designated public officials in a manner that is the least restrictive of speech.

In this case, West Virginia was fully justified in attempting to regulate such speech in light of the compelling government interest in enhancing the safety and security of certain public officials, but its efforts reached more broadly then necessary to accomplish the task; it did not employ the least restrictive means of doing so. For that reason and only that reason, we agree with the district court that West Virginia could have regulated more narrowly to accomplish its purpose and thereby be less restrictive of what is otherwise protected speech. Thus, we agree that the provision of West Virginia's Daniel's Law at issue here … violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments.

The court concluded that the law is a speech restriction, not just a restriction on "data":

[Jackson argues] that speech must be communicative such that it "convey a particularized message" with "the likelihood … that the message would be understood by those who" received it. Since Daniel's Law regulates disclosures of "pure facts" that lack a particularized message, he argues, the law is not subject to any First Amendment analysis….

[But] the Supreme Court has clearly held that the scope of "speech" regulated by the First Amendment is broader and includes data, reasoning that facts are "the beginning point for much of the speech that is most essential to advance human knowledge and to conduct human affairs." Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc (2011). Indeed, the Court has noted more specifically that statutes like West Virginia's Daniel's Law, which address only the disclosure of information, involve the regulation of speech protected by the First Amendment, observing, "If the acts of 'disclosing' and 'publishing' information do not constitute speech, it is hard to imagine what does fall within that category …." Bartnicki v. Vopper (2001).

The court then concluded that the law was content-based:

West Virginia's Daniel's Law …, on its face, distinguish[es] between different disclosures based on communicative content alone. It restricts disclosure of certain kinds of information (home addresses and unlisted telephone numbers), and it does so for certain individuals (judicial and law enforcement officers and their families)….

This means, for example, that a disclosure that a grocery store clerk lives at 100 Main Street is permitted, while a disclosure that a police officer lives at 100 Main Street is prohibited. The only difference between the two disclosures is the communicative content, or what the disclosures mean. In the hypothetical, the latter disclosure is prohibited because it identifies 100 Main Street as being the home address of the police officer, while the earlier disclosure is permitted because it identifies 100 Main Street as belonging to the grocery store clerk.

The court held that the law wasn't limited to "commercial speech" (which generally refers to commercial advertising), a category of speech that is entitled to lower protection:

While a speaker's economic motivation for speech may be a relevant factor in determining whether speech is commercial, economic motivation alone is insufficient to justify a categorization of that speech as commercial. Furthermore, because, even under Jackson's argument, only some of the regulated speech would be commercial, that fact does not render the law subject to the intermediate scrutiny of commercial speech. When a statute "applies with equal force to both commercial and noncommercial messages" with "no exception for noncommercial speech," the fact that some of the regulated speech is commercial does not justify an application of intermediate scrutiny….

And the court held that the law, as a content-based speech restriction, had to pass strict scrutiny, which is to say that (among other things) it had to be the "least restrictive means" of serving a "compelling government interest"; and the court held that the law failed such scrutiny:

[T]he parties agree, as do we, that the law's purpose of enhancing the safety of judicial and law enforcement officials is a compelling government interest …. [But] West Virginia's Daniel's Law does not employ the least restrictive means of serving the law's purpose.

Section 5A-8-24(e) imposes liability on a data broker immediately upon its disclosure of addresses and telephone numbers, regardless of whether the data broker had knowledge that the information related to Covered Persons. Whenever an entity such as a data broker collects names and addresses of all persons in a particular town using public land records and then publishes that information in some form of a directory, it undoubtedly violates the law because that directory includes, albeit unknowingly, information about, for instance, a police officer or public defender…. When a restriction on speech creates liability without a knowledge requirement, speakers are understandably incentivized to engage in self-censorship to avoid inadvertently incurring liability. See Counterman v. Colorado (2023) (noting that "prohibitions on speech have the potential to chill, or deter, speech outside their boundaries")….

Jackson argues, however, that the law is much more limited because it imposes liability only if "a reasonable person would believe that providing such information would expose another to harassment or risk of harm to life or property."

That provision, however, is hardly limiting, … because every disclosure of a person's name and address on the Internet exposes that person to harassment or a risk of harm…. [Indeed, in his complaints, Jackson] alleged that the mere disclosure of home addresses and unpublished telephone numbers "exposed [him] and his peers to harassment and/or risk of harm to life or property." And to support that unremarkable proposition, he quoted the FTC's report on "Data Brokers," which highlights the "potential risks to consumers from data brokers' collection and use of consumer data," including the fact that "people search products can be used to facilitate harassment, or even stalking, and may expose domestic violence victims, law enforcement officers, prosecutors, public officials, or other individuals to retaliation or other harm." Indeed, Jackson added that the FTC's report explains why the defendants' disclosures are "so dangerous." Thus, the argued "limitation" in § 5A-8-24(e) is actually not limiting but universal, as it is inevitable that every disclosure of personal information on the Internet poses an additional risk of harassment or harm to the person whose information is disclosed.

Additionally, States other than West Virginia that have enacted Daniel's Laws have uniformly required that, before liability attaches to a disclosure of home addresses and unpublished telephone numbers, Covered Persons give notice of their request that the data broker (or any other disclosing party) remove the information. Only on the failure to comply does liability attach. But West Virginia's Daniel's Law alone does not require notification as a precondition of liability. Thus, this aspect of the law fails to provide the least restrictive means of furthering the law's compelling interest.

While we hasten to note that requiring notice prior to imposing liability is one method for narrowing the law, it is not the only way. But it is the way that Congress and virtually every other State has chosen to narrow their laws and render them less speech-restrictive.

At bottom, we agree with the district court's conclusion:

[D]ue to its lack of a notice requirement, [§ 5A-8-24(e)] of West Virginia's Daniel's Law is far more restrictive then its comparators [in other States] and is definitively not the least restrictive means of achieving its compelling interest. Section [5A-8-24(e)] of West Virginia's Daniel's Law therefore fails strict scrutiny even as other more narrowly tailored federal and state statutes aiming at the same compelling interest pass constitutional muster….

The paragraph endorsing the district court's conclusion strongly suggests that the panel endorsed laws limited to situations where a covered person first demands that covered material be removed. But it's not clear whether the panel would endorse broad versions of such laws, which apply even when the address or phone number is relevant to a matter of public concern (see Kratovil v. City of New Brunswick (N.J. 2025), which upheld such a broad law), or whether it would insist that there be an exception for such public-concern situations (as there is in the federal version of Daniel's Law).

Samir I. Deger-Sen (Latham & Watkins LLP) argued on behalf of the defendants.

The post W. Va. Law Restricting Disclosing Home Addresses and Phone Numbers of Judges and Police Struck Down, but … appeared first on Reason Magazine.

The article examines how editorial disputes, legal restrictions and institutional decisions shape the way Palestinian history, suffering and political expression are presented to the public.

From E.B. v. J.R., decided Aug. 20 by Massachusetts Appeals Court Justices Sabita Singh, Rachel Hershfang, and Chauncey Wood:

The defendant appeals from harassment prevention orders issued pursuant to G. L. c. 258E (258E orders), by a judge of the District Court, requiring the defendant, among other things, to stay away from a city zoo where she had regularly protested the treatment of animals in its care. The plaintiff, a veterinarian who worked at the zoo, sought and obtained an ex parte 258E order against the defendant, which was later extended following a hearing after notice….

When reviewing whether the evidence was sufficient to support the issuance [or extension] of a 258E order, we consider [consistently with the statutory requirements] whether, "by a preponderance of the evidence, together with all permissible inferences," the judge could have found "that the defendant had committed '[three] or more acts of willful and malicious conduct aimed at a specific person committed with the intent to cause fear, intimidation, abuse or damage to property and that [did] in fact cause fear, intimidation, abuse or damage to property.'" …

Where the harassing acts consist of speech, each act must be the type of speech that is not protected by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, i.e., generally either "true threats" or "fighting words." True threats include "direct threats of imminent physical harm" and "words or actions that—taking into account the context in which they arise—cause the victim to fear such [imminent physical] harm now or in the future and evince intent on the part of the speaker or actor to cause such fear." Fighting words are limited to personal insults that are inherently likely to incite a violent reaction….

The plaintiff's affidavit described the following four alleged incidents of harassment.

First, in July 2024, while the plaintiff was working at the zoo, the defendant began "yelling and screaming" at the plaintiff that she "should lose [her] job and right to be a veterinarian[,] … that [she] was abusing [her] power[,] and that [she was] abusing and killing the animals."

Second, in September 2024, while the plaintiff was working at the zoo, the defendant began "telling other [zoo] visitors falsehoods about the elephants being beaten." The plaintiff told the visitors that the allegations were not true, but the defendant "immediately yelled at [her] over [her] explanation to the visitors and got within inches of [her] face to continue yelling" at her. About forty-five minutes later, the defendant reapproached the plaintiff and got "in [her] face yelling at [her] about how [she was] a bad veterinarian and [her] cruelty towards animals." The plaintiff alleged that she "felt like [the defendant] was trying to intimidate [her] to quit [her] job." The defendant was "in [her] face videotaping" the plaintiff, so the plaintiff called 911. While the plaintiff was on the phone, the defendant "chased after [the plaintiff]."

Third, also in September 2024, the defendant "formally fil[ed] a written complaint to the [veterinary licensing] Board" that "was all lies and falsehoods."

Fourth, in November 2024, a television news crew was at the zoo reporting on the elephants when the defendant disrupted an interview and began to "yell and scream at [the plaintiff] that [she was] not a licensed veterinarian and that she [did] not have a license to practice in [Massachusetts], and that [she was] abusing and murdering elephants." The defendant also "threaten[ed] [the plaintiff's] career."

Of the four incidents alleged, only the second arguably constituted harassing conduct—getting within inches of the plaintiff's face while yelling and chasing after the plaintiff. The remaining alleged conduct constituted protected speech, not rising to the level of fighting words or true threats…. [T]hreats containing ideas or advocacy causing fear of economic loss or unfavorable publicity are not "true threats" …. As a result, the judge erred in finding that the incidents described by the plaintiff amounted to three requisite acts of harassment pursuant to G. L. c. 258E….

The court also concluded the court violated plaintiff's due process rights:

[At the motion hearing, t]he plaintiff's attorney recited the procedural background and the judge began to review the plaintiff's affidavit. The plaintiff's lawyer then started to relate that the defendant had been charged with violating the ex parte order, when the defendant stated, "I object to that, Your Honor." The judge admonished the defendant, "No, no. First of all, … you're going to understand what the rules are; okay? … The rules are, you're not to interrupt at any time." The judge then explained, "You don't, in a civil case, have the opportunity to say you object…. It doesn't work that way…. That's in a criminal case."

The judge then turned to the plaintiff and asked her about the Federal trial in which the plaintiff had testified the previous year. [This appears to me to be Rowley v. City of New Bedford (D. Mass. 2024). -EV] The plaintiff explained that the defendant had filed a lawsuit against the city for violation of the Endangered Species Act and that the suit was resolved in favor of the city. The plaintiff's counsel offered to provide the judge with a copy of the decision.

When the judge asked whether the defendant had a copy, the defendant replied, "Yes, ma'am, I do. Yes, Your Honor," and added, "I object to it being relevant." The judge responded, "What did I say about objections?" and "I decide whether something is relevant[,] right?" The defendant then stated that she disagreed that the Federal court decision was relevant to the plaintiff's request for a 258E order. The judge replied, "You can disagree all you want, but—and you can voice that, I don't want you [to] think you can't voice it…. But you can't say you object."

The judge then said that she had reviewed the defendant's motion to vacate and asked why she should not extend the 258E order. Just as the defendant began to explain that the plaintiff's claims did not meet the legal standard, the judge cut off the defendant and asked a series of questions, pointedly asking why the plaintiff would accuse the defendant if the allegations were not true. When the defendant attempted to explain the context and her theory that it was in retaliation for the Federal lawsuit, the judge again cut off the defendant, telling her to "[s]top talking," and that she (the judge) did not need to know about the elephants at the zoo or the plaintiff's background as a veterinarian.

The judge then invited the plaintiff's counsel to cross-examine the defendant. The cross-examination centered around the Federal lawsuit (concerning the elephants) and the plaintiff's status and licensure as a veterinarian. The plaintiff's counsel then presented the testimony of the plaintiff, who affirmed the truth of her affidavit. The plaintiff expressed how the "entire situation [was] causing [her] immense stress."

At the conclusion of counsel's direct examination, the judge asked the plaintiff, "[Y]ou are concerned for your safety because of the actions of [the defendant] physically, verbally, and on social media; is that right? … And there have been several instances where she has intimidated you; is that right?" After the plaintiff answered in the affirmative, the judge stated, "I have no doubts that you're a competent veterinarian or [the zoo] wouldn't have hired you," and "don't you for one minute second guess your training. Nobody in this room is a veterinarian and knows anything about what you do, okay? … You got your degree. You worked hard for it. Move on with that." …

[T]he judge appeared to shift the burdens by accepting the plaintiff's affidavit and then challenging the defendant to disprove the allegations contained within it. The defendant had no burden to testify or present evidence. Furthermore, due process required that she be heard on her legal argument that the plaintiff's claims did not meet the elements for a 258E order.

Instead, the defendant was repeatedly shut down when attempting to make her valid legal points, incorrectly told that she had no right to make objections, and subjected to questioning pointedly challenging her veracity while assuming the veracity of the plaintiff. Then, the plaintiff's counsel was invited to cross-examine the defendant. The plaintiff, who had the burden, testified after the defendant and was not cross-examined at all. The record reflects that the defendant did not have a meaningful opportunity to be heard. Collectively, these irregularities raise troubling due process concerns….

For more on such unconstitutional speech-based injunctions in harassment cases, see this article.

The post Harassment Restraining Order Based Largely on Speech Critical of Zoo Veterinarian, appeared first on Reason Magazine.

On a lecture tour of China, John Macnab finds that even one slide mentioning Taipei is enough to get organisers sweating and warning of consequences for his hosts. If this is his last column, you'll know what has happened.

The post I Mentioned Taiwan, but I Didn’t Get Away With It! appeared first on The Daily Sceptic.

From Wednesday's decision in Fontainebleau Florida Hotel, LLC v. Botach [Rabbi Shmuley], decided by Magistrate Judge Marty Fulgueira Elfenbein:

Plaintiff's four subpoenas to the AI Providers and its Seventh RFP seek the same information, specifically Defendant's communications with AI platforms since December 3, 2024, concerning various categories of subjects:

1. All of Defendant's AI Communications with AI since December 3, 2024, concerning or relating to the Fontainebleau Hotel.
2. All of Defendant's AI Communications with AI since December 3, 2024, concerning or relating to this litigation.
3. All of Defendant's AI Communications with AI since December 3, 2024, concerning or relating to counsel for Plaintiff.
4. All of Defendant's AI Communications with AI since December 3, 2024, concerning or relating to any employee, owner, or representative of the Fontainebleau Hotel.
5. All of Defendant's AI Communications with AI since December 3, 2024, concerning or relating to any Court Order entered during this litigation.
6. All of Defendant's AI Communications with AI since December 3, 2024, concerning or relating to Judge K. Michael Moore or the undersigned.

In addition, to these six categories, Plaintiff seeks one more category of documents in the subpoenas to the AI providers (but not in the Seventh RFP), consisting of:

7. All of Defendant's AI Communications regarding Requests 1 through [6] that have, since their creation, been deleted….

Plaintiff [argued] that Defendant's AI communications may reveal the extent of his alleged malice toward Plaintiff, the intentionality underlying his conduct, and evidence relevant to the determination of punitive damages, including whether an exception to Florida's statutory cap [on punitive damages] applies….

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1) permits discovery of nonprivileged matters relevant to a party's claims or defenses and proportional to the needs of the case. The Rule expressly recognizes that information within the permissible scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable…. The District Court's Order at ECF No. [261], which authorized the Parties to conduct "discovery limited to damages," also governs the scope of discovery at this juncture…. Thus, the relevant inquiry is whether the particular AI communications sought by Plaintiff bear a sufficient relationship to the damages issues remaining in this action….

The degree of reprehensibility, the defendant's intent, and the circumstances surrounding the wrongful conduct are … relevant to determining an appropriate punitive-damages award…. To the extent Defendant used AI platforms to generate, revise, or refine statements concerning Plaintiff, its counsel, or its representatives, those communications may reveal not merely the final content of Defendant's statements but also the purpose for which the statements were created, the instructions Defendant supplied, and the effects he sought to achieve. Such information may provide evidence of the intent underlying Defendant's conduct that cannot necessarily be discerned from the resulting public statements alone. The Court does not determine that those communications will establish malice or specific intent to harm; it determines only that they bear a sufficient relationship to those disputed damages issues to warrant discovery….

According[] to Defendant, his alleged hostility does not necessarily prove constitutional actual malice, and it therefore should not be considered when deciding whether punitive damages are appropriate. Constitutional actual malice in a defamation action concerns knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for truth. By contrast, the reprehensibility inquiry and the specific-intent exception under section 768.73(1)(c) require consideration of the defendant's culpability and intent to harm the claimant. Evidence of hostility, planning, or deliberate efforts to inflict or amplify injury to Plaintiff may be relevant to those questions when sufficiently connected to the alleged wrongful conduct here.

Plaintiff seeks evidence not simply to establish that Defendant disliked the Hotel, but to determine whether Defendant deliberately engaged in conduct intended to cause injury and whether that intent bears on the reprehensibility and statutory treatment of the punitive damages sought. The Court therefore rejects Defendant's argument that because hostility does not necessarily prove constitutional actual malice, it should not be considered when deciding whether punitive damages are appropriate.

Nor does the fact that some requested communications postdate the original publications render them categorically undiscoverable. Subsequent statements and conduct may, depending on their content and context, provide circumstantial evidence of a defendant's earlier intent or reveal a continuing course of conduct relevant to the injury. The temporal relationship between a communication and the alleged injury may affect its probative value, but it does not create an absolute bar to discovery….

The Court does not hold that every subsequent statement by Defendant may support an award of punitive damages. The Supreme Court has cautioned that punitive damages may not be used to punish a defendant for unrelated or dissimilar conduct merely because that conduct reflects poorly on the defendant's character. But the permissible scope of discovery is broader than the scope of evidence that may be ultimately admitted at trial. The present inquiry is whether the requested information is relevant and proportional under Rule 26(b)(1) to the damages issues remaining in this case.

Here, Plaintiff alleges a continuing course of conduct directed toward the Hotel, its personnel, and its representatives, including conduct involving AI-generated content. Plaintiff has also identified testimony from its damages expert concerning the alleged cumulative effect of Defendant's continuing online activity on the Hotel's reputation and business. As such, Defendant's communications with AI platforms concerning the Hotel and the Hotel's employees, owners, or representatives, including Plaintiff's counsel, may reveal information relevant to Defendant's alleged intent to harm Plaintiff, the nature and persistence of the challenged conduct, and the extent to which that conduct allegedly amplified Plaintiff's injuries. The Court therefore concludes that Request Nos. 1 (seeking AI communications about the Hotel), 3 (seeking AI communications about Plaintiff's counsel), and 4 (seeking AI communications about any employee, owner, or representative of the Hotel) in the subpoenas to the AI providers and the Seventh RFP fall within the scope of damages discovery authorized by the District Court….

Further, to the extent Request No. 7 in the subpoenas to the AI providers … seeks Defendant's AI communications regarding Requests Nos. 1 through [6] that have been deleted since their creation, the Court concludes that this Request is authorized by the District Court's Order only to the extent it seeks any deleted AI communications regarding Request Nos. 1, 3, and 4….

But the court rejected the other requests, which dealt with AI communications "concerning or relating to this litigation" (2), "concerning or relating to any Court Order entered during this litigation" (5), and "concerning or relating to Judge K. Michael Moore or the [Magistrate Judge]" (6):

Starting with Request No. 2 in the subpoenas and the Seventh RFP, it seeks all AI communications concerning or relating to "this litigation." That formulation is exceptionally broad. It encompasses potentially every AI exchange on matters having no meaningful connection to the amount of damages or Defendant's alleged intent to harm Plaintiff. Plaintiff has not established that every communication relating to this litigation bears on an issue remaining for the damages trial….

Turning to Request No. 5 in the subpoenas and the Seventh RFP, it seeks all AI communications concerning or relating to any Court Order entered during this litigation. Such communications may include Defendant's attempts to understand an Order, research its consequences, consider procedural options, or evaluate the litigation. The fact that Defendant may have expressed disagreement with, frustration about, or hostility toward a Court Order does not, without a sufficient connection to the alleged injury, make the communication relevant to Plaintiff's damages. Although Plaintiff contends that Defendant's reactions to Court Orders reflect the depth of his hostility and the reprehensibility of his conduct, that theory is too attenuated to justify discovery of every AI exchange concerning every Order entered in this case. The Court therefore finds that Request No. 5 exceeds the permissible scope of damages discovery.

Finally, Request No. 6 in the subpoenas and the Seventh RFP seeks all AI communications concerning or relating to District Judge K. Michael Moore or the undersigned Magistrate Judge. The Court likewise finds that Defendant's private communications with AI platforms concerning judicial officers, without more, do not bear a sufficient relationship to the damages Plaintiff seeks for the alleged harm to the Hotel. The discovery inquiry is not whether Defendant has criticized the judiciary; it is whether the requested information is relevant and proportional to the damages issues remaining in this action. A request encompassing every AI communication about the judges presiding over this litigation exceeds that scope. The Court thus finds that Request No. 6 exceeds the permissible scope of damages discovery.

The Court recognizes Plaintiff's argument that Defendant's criticism of the judicial process may demonstrate the persistence of his alleged hostility. But the Supreme Court has cautioned against using dissimilar conduct as a basis for punishing a defendant for being an objectionable person rather than for the conduct that injured the plaintiff….

And the court rejected the argument that the communications were categorically "protected work product":

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3)(A) generally protects "documents and tangible things that are prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another party or its representative." The doctrine is designed to protect the adversarial process by preserving the privacy necessary for litigation preparation….

The Eleventh Circuit's interpretation of Rule 26(b)(3)(A) confirms that work-product protection is not limited to materials prepared by counsel but extends to materials prepared by or for a party or its representative in anticipation of litigation….

When determining whether a document is protected under the work-product doctrine, "litigation need not necessarily be imminent … as long as the primary motivating purpose behind the creation of the document was to aid in possible litigation." The document must have been "created principally or exclusively to assist in anticipated or ongoing litigation." "Just because a document may have been used later to assist in litigation … does not mean it was principally prepared for such purpose." …

Here, communications independently generated by Defendant to create, revise, or disseminate content concerning the Hotel, its personnel, or Plaintiff's counsel are not transformed into attorney work product merely because Defendant is a litigant or because the resulting content may bear on this action. To the extent such communications were created for the purpose of producing public-facing statements or pursuing Defendant's independent activities, rather than preparing the defense of this litigation, they ordinarily would not satisfy Rule 26(b)(3)(A). The Court therefore rejects Defendant's blanket work-product objection to Request Nos. 1, 3, 4, and 7.

However, that conclusion does not foreclose a properly supported, document-specific claim of protection. If a particular communication was prepared because of this litigation and otherwise satisfies Rule 26(b)(3), Defendant may assert the protection in accordance with the Federal Rules. Defendant must, however, identify the withheld material and describe the nature of the asserted protection sufficiently to permit Plaintiff to assess the claim without revealing the protected information itself….

[I]f Plaintiff serves the subpoenas on the AI providers and requires them to produce the document directly to Plaintiff's counsel, Defendant will be deprived of the opportunity to determine whether there are any work-product protected documents within the production that should otherwise be withheld and identified on a privilege log. For that reason, the Parties are DIRECTED to meet and confer to discuss the logistics of how the AI providers, to the extent they have responsive materials, will be instructed to produce such materials….

Some backstory on the lawsuit from an earlier post, Magistrate Judge Recommends Massive Sanctions on Rabbi Shmuley Boteach for Violating Court Order in Anti-Semitism Lawsuit (District Judge K. Michael Moore had since adopted the Magistrate Judge's Report):

This case arises from an incident that occurred at the Fontainebleau Florida Hotel …. Plaintiff alleges that the following events occurred:

After more than an hour of loitering, Defendant Boteach engaged in an uneventful conversation with a registered guest of the Hotel and the two parted ways. More than an hour later (after midnight on Sunday, December 2, 2024), Defendant Boteach engaged in a verbal altercation with the same registered guest wherein the guest and Defendant Boteach exchanged hateful words at each other.

The guest used language that was heinous and accused Defendant Boteach of being a "baby killer" and other words that are easily interpreted as antisemitic. Defendant Boteach, in turn, hurled anti-Islamic words at the registered guest and repeatedly shouted, "Allahu Akbar? Are you going to blow yourself up or something? … he uses the expressions of, like, suicide bombers." Within hours, Defendant Boteach posted an edited video of the exchange on Instagram and began his campaign of threats against the Hotel, its ownership, its outside lawyer, and its employees—who had nothing to do with the altercation except that Hotel security de-escalated and ended it.

Plaintiff alleges that following the altercation, the Defendant, who the FAC [First Amendment Complaint] describes as a "social media influencer and rabbi" with "hundreds of thousands of social media followers[,]" went on a "multi-week assault on the [Hotel], its personnel, and representatives—creating AI videos purporting to show them celebrating antisemitism, comparing them to Nazi collaborators, falsely accusing them of banning Jews from the property, and fabricating statements that they embraced a policy of Judenrein, i.e., the extermination of six million Jews." The FAC alleges that Defendant falsely stated that he was denied entry to the Hotel because he is "too Jewish," that the Hotel refused to cooperate with law enforcement's investigation of the incident, and that he "was trespassed from the Hotel for being 'too Jewish[.]'"

Plaintiff further alleges that "Defendant Boteach published a statement that, in part, called for guests 'who have booked' at the Hotel to 'cancel your reservations'" and to "'be smart and cancel and give your hard-earned money to a hotel that doesn't abide antisemites.'" Moreover, Plaintiff alleges:

At all hours of the day and night, Defendant Boteach proceeded to harass the Hotel and its representatives. For example, he posted a "headshot" photograph of the head of the Hotel's outside counsel with the words "DIGITALLY DECAPITATED" and later, at 3:49 am, menacingly threatened that counsel was "about to have a really interesting Shabbat" when he arrived at his synagogue, which Defendant Boteach identified by name and location. Defendant Boteach directly contacted counsel's clergy and posted harassing images of them.

That post also explains the Magistrate Judge's conclusion that the defendant had repeatedly and willfully violated a court order, and therefore ought to have default judgment entered against him as to liability (with further proceedings to take place as to damages).

Sean Alexander Burstyn (Burstyn Law PLLC), Christopher Ara Ajizian (Christopher Ajizian P.A.) and Todd Rapp Friedman represent the hotel.

The post Some Communications by Rabbi Shmuley with AI Platforms May Be Discovered in Order to Determine Punitive Damages appeared first on Reason Magazine.

Prime Minister Andrej Babiš’s government has advanced legislation replacing independent funding for Czech public broadcasters with state budget allocations, despite protests, warnings from European media organisations and concerns that the changes could expose journalists to political interference.

The Czech government has taken a further step towards fundamentally restructuring the country’s public broadcasting system, pushing controversial legislation through its first parliamentary reading after an extraordinary overnight session that triggered demonstrations and clashes with police in Prague.

In the early hours of Saturday, 24 October, the Chamber of Deputies advanced a government proposal abolishing licence fees for Czech Television (ČT) and Czech Radio (ČRo), replacing them with direct financing from the state budget. Opposition attempts to reject the legislation or return it for revision failed.

The decision represents another stage in the confrontation between Prime Minister Andrej Babiš’s governing coalition and organisations defending independent public broadcasting. Critics argue that the proposed financial arrangements could give successive governments greater leverage over the country’s principal public service media institutions.

Police intervene as protesters confront parliament

Hundreds of demonstrators gathered outside parliament on Prague’s Malostranské Square on Friday, protesting against the legislation and the government’s decision to accelerate its parliamentary consideration.

According to the Czech News Agency’s account of the demonstrations, several dozen protesters attempted to force their way into the parliamentary building. Officers from a special police unit prevented their entry.

Police spokeswoman Eva Kropáčová confirmed that the situation was brought under control without arrests. Demonstrators also confronted SPD parliamentarian Jaroslav Foldyna, requiring police intervention.

Inside parliament, the governing coalition of ANO, Freedom and Direct Democracy (SPD) and the Motorists party imposed limits on parliamentary debate and scheduled the decisive vote for 4.36am.

Of the 177 MPs present, 81 supported rejecting the proposal. The opposition subsequently pledged to continue resisting the legislation during its remaining parliamentary stages.

Financial dependence and political influence

The central controversy concerns the proposed transfer of financial responsibility for public broadcasters from licence-fee payers to the state.

Under the government’s plan, Czech Television would receive approximately CZK 5.74 billion annually, while Czech Radio would receive CZK 2.07 billion.

Combined funding would amount to approximately CZK 7.8 billion, representing a reduction of around CZK 1.4 billion, or 15 per cent, compared with existing licence-fee revenues.

Culture Minister Oto Klempíř, who developed the proposal, maintains that budget financing is an established European model. The government argues that abolishing the combined CZK 205 monthly household charge would reduce costs for consumers without compromising editorial independence.

However, the dispute extends beyond the immediate financial reductions.

Under the existing system, licence fees provide broadcasters with revenue that is substantially separated from annual government spending decisions. Financing through the state budget introduces a different relationship between broadcasters and political authorities.

Even where allocations are established by legislation, future parliamentary majorities can amend the law governing those payments.

A particularly significant development emerged on Saturday when an examination of the government’s own legislative documentation showed that its regulatory impact assessment had identified direct budget financing as the riskiest funding option.

The accompanying documents explicitly acknowledge the possibility of increased dependence on the state and political pressure without adequate safeguards.

European organisations warn of consequences

The controversy has attracted criticism from international organisations responsible for defending independent journalism.

In a joint statement issued on 23 October, the European Broadcasting Union, Reporters Without Borders, International Press Institute and other organisations warned that the accelerated parliamentary process was incompatible with the thorough scrutiny required for such legislation.

They highlighted the proposed funding reductions and questioned whether the new arrangements would sufficiently protect the broadcasters’ operational and editorial independence.

Their objections have a specific legal foundation.

Article 5 of the European Media Freedom Act requires EU member states to provide public service broadcasters with adequate, sustainable and predictable financing, based on transparent and objective criteria.

Budget financing is not prohibited under EU legislation. However, financial arrangements must contain safeguards against political interference.

As EU Today previously examined, the European Media Freedom Act establishes legally binding obligations intended to prevent governments from undermining independent journalism through institutional or financial pressure.

The Czech proposal therefore raises questions about whether its safeguards and funding provisions satisfy those requirements.

Journalists prepare further industrial action

Employees of Czech Television and Czech Radio have announced a nationwide strike for Tuesday, 3 November, organised by the Veřejnoprávně initiative.

The industrial action follows an earlier warning strike in June, when journalists and other broadcasting employees protested against the government’s plans.

A further public demonstration is scheduled for Sunday, 25 October, in Prague’s Old Town Square.

The confrontation also reflects the broader political divisions that have emerged since Babiš returned to government in December 2025.

Opposition politicians have drawn comparisons with political intervention in public broadcasting elsewhere in Central Europe, particularly Hungary and Slovakia.

The government rejects accusations that it intends to nationalise public broadcasters or interfere with their editorial decisions.

For the moment, the legislation remains subject to parliamentary scrutiny and has not become law. Its passage would nevertheless change the financial relationship between the Czech state and two of the country’s most established news institutions.

The central question is whether future governments would acquire additional means of influencing broadcasters through their budgets, even without exercising direct control over individual editorial decisions.

Social media platforms in Germany will be required to ensure 20% of news feed journalistic content is 'diversity-certified' by the Government under draconian new laws designed to combat the 'far Right', says Eugyppius.

The post Social Media Platforms Required to Boost “Diversity-Promoting” Content Under New German Legislation appeared first on The Daily Sceptic.

A short excerpt from the long opinion in Jackson Fed. of Teachers v. Fitch, decided yesterday by Fifth Circuit Judge Jerry Smith, joined by Judge Kurt Engelhardt:

In April 2025, Mississippi enacted House Bill 1193 (H.B. 1193), a law designed to keep Mississippi public education funds from being spent on diversity, equity, and inclusion ("DEI") initiatives and similar controversial programs. The law prevents government-run institutions from requiring activities such as diversity training or pushing DEI ideology, so defined, in the course of government-funded business.

H.B. 1193 does four main things. First, it prevents educational institutions from mandating DEI programs and diversity trainings in a variety of contexts. Second, it stops public educational institutions from punishing students for their views on DEI. Third, it prohibits regulated institutions from endorsing or promoting DEI through course materials. Finally, it prevents institutions and their educators from otherwise engaging in DEI methods or actions, preventing bad actors from circumventing prohibitions and frustrating its purposes. The statute also creates an administrative process to handle claims that a given educational institution is not in compliance. H.B. 1193 excepts several activities from its sweep, including scholarly work, the activities of students and their groups, and creative engagement.

Plaintiffs sued, claiming (among other things) that the law violated the First Amendment, but:

The proceedings in the district court were a botch job, to say the least. Judge Henry Wingate issued a temporary restraining order ("TRO") enjoining enforcement of H.B. 1193 that contained several factual assertions nowhere to be found in the record, or indeed, in any proceeding of the case. Those included mention of plaintiffs and defendants not in the complaint, supposed "declarations" from non-existent or never-present individuals, false quotations purporting to be taken from the text of H.B. 1193, and several erroneous claims that the law had already led to the demise of apparently fictitious programs.

After this came to light, Judge Wingate replaced the TRO without explaining.

Forging forward despite the bungled TRO, Judge Wingate issued a pre-enforcement preliminary injunction. The various state defendants appeal.

At oral argument in this court, it was discovered that even the "corrected" TRO—which was incorporated by reference into the preliminary injunction order—still contained hallucinated information (namely, a citation to a purported Fourth Circuit case, "Cousins v. School Bd. of City of Norfolk," that does not exist).

This district judge carelessly exercised his Article III power by issuing sloppy edicts based on falsehoods and fabrications. Upon discovering some of these falsehoods, Judge Wingate dug in his heels and claimed that the hallucinated claims had no bearing on its reasoning; he offered no explanation as to why he included such apparently irrelevant material in the original TRO or why the TRO nevertheless was justified in its absence.

Moreover, the district court got the law wrong. The TRO and preliminary injunction order rested on impoverished legal analysis that barely paid lip-service to the precedents of the Supreme Court or this court, seeming at times purposely to misconstrue the law by manipulating the words of statutes and cases, without regard to their texts' meaning as a whole. The district court—or perhaps, being charitable, its AI agent—ignored and manipulated governing law, apparently to satisfy a policy agenda.

Because of the extraordinarily grave errors by the district court, we vacate and remand for assignment to a different district judge. Per the Supreme Court's decision in Moody, we instruct the new judge to conduct proceedings consistent with federal law as interpreted by the Supreme Court and this circuit….

The original TRO—the one actually issued on July 20, 2025—named as plaintiffs eleven individuals and organizations who had never been party to the case; named as defendants two officials who were not actually sued; claimed, without evidence, that three post-secondary institutions had already cancelled DEI initiatives or programming because of the act; further declared, again without evidence, that staff at another school had been told not to discuss certain topics, including "historical interpretations involving systemic racism"; misquoted H.B. 1193 as applying to "race or sex stereotyping," "race or sex scapegoating," "critical race theory," and "institutional bias," despite none of these terms' appearing in the act's text; and referenced purported declarations of four individuals who do not appear in the record at all and may not even exist….

On July 22, 2025, defendants filed a motion to clarify, pointing out these errors. In response, the court, without explanation, replaced the original TRO with a seemingly corrected version. Though that document was docketed on July 22, it was backdated to July 20. Defendants requested that the original order be restored to the docket to keep the record whole and requested that the court explain the inaccuracies in the original order. The district court denied that motion, claiming the factual inaccuracies were merely "clerical."

In response, U.S. Senator Chuck Grassley accused the district court of using artificial Intelligence ("AI") to prepare the TRO, with the substantive errors' arising from AI-generated hallucinations. Fifteen days later, Judge Wingate admitted the errors, claiming that a law clerk had used AI to assist drafting an earlier version of the TRO that was docketed by mistake. His letter stated that he had removed the original TRO from the docket to avoid confusion and that the errors were clerical, in his view, because they did not relate to "core legal reasoning or the ultimate judgment on the merits" but instead to "failure to confirm the accuracy of certain information."

The seemingly corrected TRO did not explain how or why the factual inaccuracies were not necessary to the reasoning of the original TRO. The merits analysis failed to cite a binding authority from after the year 2000. It claims that H.B. 1193 constitutes viewpoint discrimination, without any analysis whatsoever of a state government's authority to regulate its own speech. And the document did not correct all of the errors: At Fifth Circuit oral argument, it was discovered that the doctored TRO cited to "Cousins v. School Bd. of City of Norfolk, 503 F.2d 422, 426–27 (4th Cir. 1974)." That case does not even exist; it is an apparent AI hallucination….

Judge Catharina Haynes did not join these parts of the opinion.

There's also some interesting First Amendment analysis in the case, which I hope to blog about later today. (I'm tied up for the next several hours.) Thanks to @WillChamberlain and Glenn Reynolds (Instapundit) for the pointer.

Anthony M. Shults, Justin Lee Matheny, Rex Morris Shannon, III, and Scott G. Stewart represent defendants.

The post "The District Court—or Perhaps, Being Charitable, Its AI Agent—Ignored and Manipulated Governing Law, Apparently to Satisfy a Policy Agenda" appeared first on Reason Magazine.

President Donald Trump has been ordered to answer questions under oath by 11th December in his $10 billion defamation action against the BBC, after the broadcaster complained that the American president was delaying evidence-gathering.

US Magistrate Judge Enjoliqué Lett issued the order at a hearing in Miami on Thursday, 22nd October. The judge warned that non-compliance could result in sanctions, potentially including the dismissal of the lawsuit, unless the discovery schedule is formally extended.

The dispute concerns a BBC documentary that edited together passages of a speech Trump delivered on 6th January 2021, ahead of the assault on the US Capitol. The broadcaster acknowledged that the presentation created a misleading impression of continuity but disputes Trump’s claim that it is legally liable for defamation.

Trump’s lawyers cancelled an earlier deposition scheduled for 16 October, citing presidential responsibilities. The BBC’s legal representatives challenged the delay, maintaining that the plaintiff’s testimony is essential to assessing the allegations and the damages sought.

The developments are detailed in the latest reporting and official material, against the background of EU Today’s earlier coverage.

A dispute over the editing

The broadcaster faces questions about its editorial judgment, but the court must separately decide whether the legal elements of the president’s claim are established. A misleading edit does not automatically determine the outcome of a defamation case, particularly where questions of publication, harm and applicable American law are disputed.

The amount sought, $10 billion, is a claim made by Trump’s side and not a judicial assessment of damage. Evidence-gathering may examine the effect of the programme, how it was distributed and whether it caused measurable reputational or economic harm.

The BBC has already apologised for the edit. It is contesting legal liability, leaving the litigation centred on both the programme’s presentation and the extent of any injury attributable to it.

What the judge ordered

The court permitted a video recording of the deposition, restricted to use by legal representatives. It also ordered production of figures relating to membership applications and fees at Trump’s Mar-a-Lago club, material the BBC believes could help it evaluate the claim for damages.

Lawyers have also disputed whether former special counsel Jack Smith should testify. The Justice Department must consider authorisation for that testimony, adding a further procedural complication.

The discovery period is currently due to close on 18 December. The judge’s intervention therefore leaves little time for the parties to complete outstanding exchanges if the existing timetable remains unchanged.

Wider implications

The case places the conduct of a British public-service broadcaster before an American court at a moment of intense political scrutiny of news organisations. Its outcome may influence the BBC’s legal costs and editorial procedures, although any broader precedent will depend on the issues eventually decided.

Trump’s position as a sitting president creates scheduling difficulties, but it does not remove the usual evidential obligations assumed by a person bringing civil proceedings. The immediate question is whether he will comply with the December deadline or seek further relief from the court.

Neither the deposition order nor the BBC’s apology resolves the merits of the lawsuit. Those questions remain for later proceedings.

From N.Y. State Div. of Hum. Rts. V. D. Auxilly NYC LLC, decided today by New York appellate judges Sallie Manzanet–Daniels, Manuel Mendez, Barbara Kapnick, Bahaati Pitt–Burke, and Matthew Parker–Raso:

Complainant, at the time a Missouri resident, emailed D. Auxilly, a New York based business that produces and sells attire, including bridal outfits, to inquire about a bridal jumpsuit she had seen advertised on one or more of D. Auxilly's social media pages. Specifically, complainant requested information about payment options for the jumpsuit. Complainant also informed D. Auxilly that as her fiancé had "fallen in love" with it after struggling to find anything she liked, complainant wanted to purchase it for their upcoming wedding.

Dominique Galbraith, D. Auxilly's owner and operator, responded on behalf of D. Auxilly advising complainant of the payment requirements of the business but that she would not be able to make the garment for a same-sex wedding because it would go against her religious beliefs. She also urged complainant and her fiancé to reconsider getting married….

The First Amendment does not shield D. Auxilly from liability for this discrimination. Unlike the baker in Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Comm (2018), D. Auxilly was not asked to design and create customized items which might constitute an "expressive statement." Nor was it tasked with creating a customized wedding website, as in 303 Creative LLC v. Elenis (2023). Instead, D. Auxilly refused to sell the wedding garment it had previously designed and which it had marketed to the public. While the garment likely would need to be adjusted for sizing, this potential sizing alteration would not constitute an expressive statement. Neither would D. Auxilly's "speech" be compelled here by requiring it to sell the previously designed and marketed garment.

Enforcement of the [law] here also does not violate D. Auxilly's right to free exercise of religion. The statute is "neutral, both on its face and due to a lack of evidence that it targets religious conduct for a distinctive treatment."

{[T]he Division had jurisdiction in the instant matter because the discriminatory conduct occurred in New York and its impact was felt in the state. Complainant reached out to D. Auxilly, a business which markets its clothes as "made in New York," seeking to purchase goods from this New York business. D. Auxilly's discriminatory conduct based upon complainant's sexual orientation deprived complainant of an opportunity to engage in commercial activity here. Indeed, by affirmatively labeling its products as being "made in New York" but then refusing to sell those same "New York" products to people of a certain sexual orientation, D. Auxilly implicitly associated the City and State of New York with a discriminatory act, and the impact test is satisfied. Additionally, the fact that complainant communicated with D. Auxilly online through social media rather than traveling to a New York storefront does not deprive petitioner of jurisdiction over this matter.}

Finally, we find the awards of compensatory damages [$5,000] and civil penalties proper. The award to complainant is reasonably related to the wrongdoing, supported by evidence before the Division, and in line with other awards for similar injuries. Likewise, the civil penalty of $20,000 is neither disproportionate to the offense nor does it shock the conscience.

My thoughts:

1. Bridal jumpsuit! New one on me. A quick Google Images search further enlightened me.
2. Pedantically speaking, wouldn't it be "her fianceé" rather than "her fiancé"?
3. Oh, wait, there's a legal issue here. Well, I think that there's a First Amendment right not to be compelled to create speech, such as photos, videos, and web sites, and I've argued this since 2012. But I don't think there's such a right as to fundamentally nonspeech products, even ones that people use as conventional parts of ceremonies, such as cakes or jumpsuits (as I've argued since 2017). The precise line, of course, can at times be fuzzy, e.g., as to cakes or jumpsuits that have specific expressive decorations (e.g., words, possibly rainbow designs, etc.), but it's still a sensible line; for more on that, see this amicus brief that Dale Carpenter and I put together in Masterpiece Cakeshop.
4. For more on the designer, see here and here; for more on the case, see here.

Melissa Franco and Michael K. Swirsky (New York State Division of Human Rights) represent the state.

The post No First Amendment Right Not to Sell Bridal Outfit for Same-Sex Wedding appeared first on Reason Magazine.

From Judge Kenneth Bell (W.D.N.C.) today in Global Plasma Solutions, Inc. v. Elsevier Ltd Inc.:

In this action, now spanning over four and a half years and nearly 400 docket entries, Plaintiff Global Plasma Solutions, Inc. ("GPS") contends that its air purifier business was greatly harmed by a defamatory article published in Building and Environment ("BAE"), a scientific journal owned by Defendant Elsevier …. Specifically, GPS alleges that several critiques of its "bipolar ionization" technology were false and Elsevier's advertisement of BAE's articles as "peer reviewed" violated the Lanham Act….

The law provides strong protection for scientific inquiry and debate on matters of public concern. This includes the allegedly defamatory article, which was published in March 2021 at the height of the COVID-19 pandemic when air purification technologies were under intense scrutiny.

Because the Court finds that GPS was a limited purpose public figure with respect to the safety and efficacy of its bipolar ionization technology and cannot establish by clear and convincing evidence that Elsevier published the article with "actual malice," Elsevier is entitled to summary judgment on GPS's defamation claim. Similarly, a reasonable jury could not find that Elsevier is liable for false advertising under the Lanham Act, where there is insufficient evidence that a substantial portion of the intended audience would be misled by the truthful statements that the article was "peer reviewed" or that an Elsevier advertisement was a proximate cause of GPS's claimed diminution in its corporate value….

[V]iewing the evidence in the light most favorable to GPS, the conduct alleged here—while in several respects falling well short of being fabricated or fraudulent data—might possibly justify limiting the full, dispositive First Amendment protection for scientific opinion urged by Elsevier. However, the Court need not (and will not) reach a definitive conclusion on the scope of the Article's "scientific opinion" protection because, as discussed below, GPS has not shown evidence of actual malice sufficient to support its defamation claim, which independently resolves GPS's defamation claim in Elsevier's favor….

There's a lot more, which you can read here; and there's something at the end about public access to court records:

As explained by the Court at the hearing on these motions and in its earlier order on the Parties' various motions to seal, the Parties have excessively filed memoranda, documents, and other exhibits under seal in violation of the strict legal principles applicable to publicly filed motions, in particular dispositive motions at summary judgment (including, incredibly, press releases and other obviously public documents).

Under the governing First Amendment standard, a "denial of access" to publicly filed documents "must be necessitated by a compelling … interest and narrowly tailored to serve that interest." Accordingly, a party moving to seal documents filed in support of summary judgment in a civil case bears a heavy burden. Having reviewed the Parties' summary judgment submissions, the Court finds that all memoranda and exhibits filed under seal should be refiled in unredacted form and linked to the original filed sealed exhibit on the schedule described below. The Court will allow the Parties a short period of time to file very limited and narrowly tailored requests to maintain the sealing or partial sealing of specific filings and exhibits, other than the Parties' memoranda of law and any exhibit specifically cited in this order….

The Parties are directed to refile—on or before October 26, 2026—an unredacted copy of any memoranda in support of or in opposition to the Parties' Summary Judgment motions and any exhibit specifically cited in this Order that were filed under seal. All refiled documents must be linked to the originally sealed filing. All remaining sealed exhibits filed in connection with the Parties' Motions for Summary Judgment must be similarly refiled and linked on or before 14 days from the date of this Order, unless otherwise ordered by the Court. The Parties may file under seal very limited and narrowly tailored requests to maintain the sealing of any of the remaining sealed exhibits on or before 10 days after the date of this Order ….

The post No Liability for Scientific Publisher (Elsevier) in Defamation Lawsuit by Air Purifier Company appeared first on Reason Magazine.

Once again, a member of President Donald Trump's administration is threatening to punish private citizens for their speech using the power of the government.

Specifically, the chairman of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) threatened broadcasters who dare to report on polls the president doesn't approve of. Even if the complaint were valid, it would be difficult to enforce without violating the First Amendment.

"During this election season, there has been a significant surge in entirely Fake Polls and Suppression Polls designed to do nothing more than interfere with the regular functioning of the electoral process and alter the normal patterns of voter turnout and enthusiasm," FCC Chairman Brendan Carr wrote on X. "Many journalists and broadcasters have been amplifying or airing these Polls without regard to basic journalistic ethics and without informing the public that those Polls lack a scientific, accurate, or even real basis."

Carr is directly adopting Trump's terminology, in addition to his erratic capitalization: The president often uses the term suppression polls to describe surveys that don't reflect in his favor. The implication is that these polls are manufactured to conceal or downplay enthusiasm for Trump or his preferred candidates, making it less likely that his supporters will turn out if they think it's a lost cause.

Carr doesn't single out any offenders, though there are some likely examples. This week, purported pollster Wedgewood Polls revealed that as part of an "experimental project," it had released surveys with "fabricated numbers" that were printed by outlets like FiftyPlusOne (which sussed out the fraud) and The New York Times.

Similarly, in August, Median Strategies withdrew two polls, then revealed that it had fabricated the results for a "social experiment."

Each scenario is deplorable. And depending on what promises were made, it's possible one firm or the other could face legal consequences.

But it's hard to see how a news outlet could face legal reprisal for just reporting the results of a survey it thought was conducted accurately.

"The FCC takes these issues seriously," Carr added. "Broadcasters are prohibited by the terms of their federal licenses from engaging in News Distortion or promoting Broadcast Hoaxes. It is important that broadcasters comply with their public interest obligations."

There are indeed rules against news distortion and broadcast hoaxes, but they're narrowly tailored to avoid conflicting with the First Amendment.

"News distortion 'must involve a significant event and not merely a minor or incidental aspect of the news report,'" according to the FCC. In addition, "broadcasters are only subject to enforcement if it can be proven that they have deliberately distorted a factual news report. Expressions of opinion or errors stemming from mistakes are not actionable."

The hoax rule, on the other hand, is even less applicable: It involves "broadcasting false information concerning a crime or a catastrophe," where the broadcaster "knows this information is false" and can foreseeably "cause substantial public harm" but airs it anyway, and the broadcast then "does in fact directly cause substantial public harm."

In other words, neither standard applies to a broadcaster that covered an inaccurate poll, especially without knowing at the time that it was wrong.

"Pollsters who intentionally mislead the public should answer for it, but broadcasters who report publicly available polling data should never be punished when a poll is wrong," Anna Gomez, the lone Democratic FCC commissioner, wrote on X. "FCC rules on news distortion or hoaxes do not apply to a station that reports this data in good faith."

Carr doesn't specify what he thinks should happen to any offenders, though since he tends to define "public interest" as whatever Trump says, we can make an educated guess.

Right before the 2024 presidential election, The Des Moines Register published a poll that found then–Vice President Kamala Harris leading Trump in Iowa by three percentage points. Trump ended up winning the state by 13 percentage points, but he was apparently so upset by the poll that he sued both the Register and pollster Ann Selzer, claiming the inaccurate survey constituted "brazen election interference" that violated the Iowa Consumer Fraud Act.

It was clear at the time that the lawsuit was completely meritless. Just as Carr suggested this week in his social media post, Trump was trying to create an exception to the First Amendment for "fake news."

"In the United States there is no such thing as a claim for 'fraudulent news,'" Robert Corn-Revere, chief counsel at the Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression, wrote in a motion on the defendants' behalf. "No court in any jurisdiction has ever held such a cause of action might be valid, and few plaintiffs have ever attempted to bring such outlandish claims."

A judge agreed and dismissed the lawsuit last month.

"If someone is accurately reporting the results of a poll, that wouldn't be a false statement," UCLA law professor Rick Hasen told The Washington Post at the time. "The poll might have errors in it, but that wouldn't be a false statement."

That's as true then as it is now. Unless he can somehow prove that a broadcaster knew a pollster had faked a survey, there's no way Carr can punish someone for reporting on the results without running afoul of the First Amendment.

"Brendan Carr is not the journalism police. And he is just about the least qualified person in the country to lecture the press about journalistic ethics," Seth Stern, chief of advocacy at the Freedom of the Press Foundation, said in an emailed statement. "News broadcasters have a First Amendment right to report polling data, even if it proves to be inaccurate, just like they have a First Amendment right to report on Carr and Trump's own countless lies and distortions, even when they turn out to be inaccurate. FCC policies about hoaxes and distortions must be applied narrowly to avoid clashing with the Constitution, if they can be constitutionally applied at all."

The post FCC Chair Brendan Carr Echoes Trump, Threatens Broadcasters Over 'Fake Polls' appeared first on Reason Magazine.

An uncanny strength of the second Trump administration has been its ability to be involved in so many scandals that no single one seems to become a dominant story.

Take the most recent allegations about Alina Habba, Trump's former personal defense attorney, who recently landed a plush gig working for Julio Herrera Velutini, a Venezuelan banker. Habba will get $50 million over five years to do unspecified work for a company that barely exists, according to The New York Times, while Herrera got a presidential pardon for a 2025 campaign finance charge.

That's just a typical day for the current White House, where the mingling of personal and public business has become routine. Some days, the story is President Donald Trump trying to help himself to taxpayer funds by suing the government he runs, or shipping billions of taxpayer dollars to a foreign mining company partially owned by his sons. Other times, it is Trump selling political influence in the form of digital coins, or his appointees getting caught in naked pay-to-play schemes. If you have a hard time keeping track of it all, I get it. The corruption is so deep and wide that focusing on any singular item becomes difficult.

But that constellation of corruption might finally be breaking through to voters ahead of next month's midterm elections.

A recent Fox News poll found that "government corruption" was the top issue for voters, ranking ahead of inflation and gas prices. Conservative commentators are taking notice.

"What they're saying is, 'Look, we're tired of you getting rich and us getting poor,'" former White House Chief of Staff Mick Mulvaney said this week.

Tim Carney, senior columnist at the conservative Washington Examiner, also tabs the corruption issue—along with other "avoidable mistakes" such as the Iran War and tariffs—as one of the major reasons why Democrats are likely to win the midterms:

Trump and his family have enriched themselves in this second term in ways more similar to third-world regimes or Cook County than to any previous administration. He and his family operate a financial company that has received heavy investments from Qatar's government. He's sold access to himself by selling otherwise worthless cryptocurrency. The IRS he controls settled a lawsuit with him, promising to pay him $1.8 billion (this settlement was voided by a judge).

Trump is not directly on the ballot next month, of course. And most voters might not be able to tell you the details of any single Trump scandal in detail. Even so, this may turn out to be the defining narrative of the second Trump administration, and there seems to be a growing consensus that Republicans have allowed (if not aided and abetted) his corrupt behavior, so it's time to give Democrats a shot at reining it in.

The Trump corruption issue is like the Biden cognitive decline issue in one key sense: Everyone around the president or even supporting him professionally from afar should be asked about it, and their lies/claims of ignorance should be hung around their necks like dumbbells.

— Matt Welch (@MattWelch) October 20, 2026

Vice President J.D. Vance told journalist Mark Halperin this week that he's "never seen any evidence that anybody's selling access to the president." When Halperin pushed back, Vance doubled down: "What I would say is I don't think there's evidence that the Trump family has become enriched by politics," the vice president said.

So either Vance isn't paying attention, or he's deliberately misleading. "Credit to Vance, it's as good an argument as is available to him," writes Daniel Foster at National Review. "The bad news is it's still not very good."

---

The internet nearly crashed on Wednesday as digital security and website administrators scrambled to patch two vulnerabilities in the PHP programming language that serves as the basis for many websites.

"Since its development in the 1990s, PHP has evolved into an essential scripting language for web development and is used across vast swaths of the internet in websites and software," explains Wired. "Everything from publishing systems like WordPress and Drupal to e-commerce platforms like Adobe's Magento are built on PHP."

Amid fears that hackers and AI agents could exploit the security weakness, many websites were taken offline. The National Security Agency and its counterparts in the United Kingdom and the European Union sounded the alarm. Even the prime minister of Japan, Sanae Takaichi, was telling website administrators to take the issue seriously.

The potential hacking abilities of advanced AI agents make these sorts of security risks more serious. In this case, however, the problem was also identified with the help of AI.

"Ryan Austin, a researcher at Calif, uncovered the flaws with help from GPT-5.6 Sol, one of OpenAI's most advanced models, during an audit of PHP's source code in August," The Wall Street Journal reports. Another security researcher had flagged the issue years ago, but it had never been fixed because it was considered "considered too difficult to exploit" by human hackers.

This is the future of humanity's digital landscape. "Given the severity of these flaws and PHP's widespread use, we consider this one of the most impactful security issues in recent memory," OpenAI said in a statement on Wednesday. "It highlights how AI can uncover security flaws with internet-scale impact, but the same capabilities can also help attackers rapidly develop offensive tools and exploits."

(A shoutout to Reason's web development team for keeping us up and running, today and every day.)

---

"Fanciful fiction." Media outlets also continue to face decidedly nondigital threats over articles and polls that make the president unhappy.

The White House threatened Politico on Wednesday with unspecified "consequences" for publishing "fanciful fiction" in a series of articles earlier this month about White House Chief of Staff Susie Wiles. If the articles are not retracted, it would trigger "an immediate review of Politico's relationship with the White House, and, of course, consideration of all other appropriate and available legal remedies," wrote White House counsel William O. Scharf in a letter to the media outlet's publisher.

Meanwhile, FCC Chairman Brendan Carr issued vague threats to broadcasters who cover what Carr called "Fake Polls" intended to "alter the normal patterns of voter turnout and enthusiasm."

These sorts of threats are an affront to the First Amendment, of course. But they are downstream of a more significant issue: the very existence of the FCC.

It's a problem, obviously, that the FCC is run by an authoritarian jackass. But the bigger problem is that the agency contains so many tempting tools for an authoritarian jackass to wield. https://t.co/Q4IJXntkOy

— Jesse Walker (@notjessewalker) October 21, 2026

---

QUICK HITS

• A judge in New Mexico ordered social media giant Meta (which owns Facebook and Instagram, among other things) to pay $25 billion for misleading users about data privacy. Last month, a jury found that Meta had violated the state's consumer protection laws 43 million times.
• Officials are trying to pin the blame on Elon Musk for a Starlink slowdown that limited the effectiveness of Ukrainian missile defenses. Musk says the decision was made by the U.S. military and Trump.
• Peter Thiel joins the majority of Americans in thinking that Trump's Iran War was a mistake. Even so, the U.S. and Israel are reportedly planning another round of attacks after the election.
• The environmental studies for California's high-speed rail line include such absurdities as counting bumblebees "one by one" and considering the train's "acoustic impacts on waterfowl and shorebirds." That's how to spend 16 years and $15 billion building nearly nothing.
• Obvious metaphor alert!

A group dispatched by Hegseth's team in February attempted to move the historic globe, said to be used by Eisenhower during World War II.

They lifted it from its home in an Army office in the Pentagon … and dropped it. pic.twitter.com/vTjWdYXn0k

— Dan Lamothe (@DanLamothe) October 22, 2026

The post The Swamp King appeared first on Reason Magazine.

From Butler v. Lipscy, decided Monday by Minnesota Court of Appeals Judge Keala Ede, joined by Judges Diane Bratvold and Jon Schmidt:

Butler alleged that Lipscy engaged in acts of harassment targeting Butler and her children, including: following, monitoring, or pursuing Butler; making unwanted visits to Butler; frightening Butler with threatening behavior; taking pictures of Butler without permission; and using social media to harass Butler….

The facts, according to the appellate court's summary of the trial court findings, were this:

At the time the district court issued the HRO, Butler was a licensed marriage and family therapist who served "historically marginalized communities." This included members of "the Queer community," which Butler defined as "the Two Spirit (2S)/Gay/Lesbian/Bisexual/Transgender/Intersex/etc. community as a whole and individually." Butler was also "active in her local Itasca Pride board and community as a volunteer and current board member." She has three children, one of whom is "non-binary."

Lipscy held "Christian beliefs" that she posted about on the internet. And Lipscy administered a webpage called "Grand Rapids Rant."

Itasca Pride held a festival on June 23, 2024. Before that event, Lipscy posted on the internet about a public gathering called, "Protect the children from Pride/Drag show and Walk with Prayer," which Lipscy scheduled for the same date, time, and location as the Itasca Pride Festival. Before the events occurred, Lipscy wrote on the internet: "But if you cause one of these who trust in me to fall into sin, it would be better for you to have a large millstone tied around your neck and drowned in the depths of the sea. #BeTheirVoice Matthew 18:6." Lipscy also used the internet to encourage people to attend and to wear white shirts in opposition to Itasca Pride and in celebration of "traditional family values." At the June 23 Itasca Pride event, Lipscy took pictures of Butler's children, and Butler's husband told Lipscy to stop.

On September 28, Lipscy posted images from an Itasca Pride webpage on her Grand Rapids Rant internet site, with her own captions. These images included Butler's children with captions such as "Sickening," "Poor children," and "Those poor poor kids." Lipscy also identified Butler by name, listed Butler's title as "local therapist"—which "insinuate[ed] … [that] Butler was not a real therapist"—and referred to an event coordinated by the Minnesota Department of Natural Resources and Itasca Pride as having "influence over … children."

On October 20, Lipscy attended an event led by a school-board candidate who was advocating for a prohibition on transgender females in female sports. Lipscy broadcast the event on her Grand Rapids Rant webpage, identified Butler's husband, and described him as "pushing for boys to be in girls' bathrooms and supporting bringing kids to drag events." More specifically, Lipscy stated that Butler's husband "wasn't truly interested [on the day of the event] …, he just wanted to report back. Silly boy, [he] could've just watched live with [Butler]." In addition, "Butler's children attend the same school as … Lipscy's niece," and "Lipscy ha[d] been at the school since the above-described incidents … occurred."

Butler was "generally fearful for the safety of herself and children following the incidents involving … Lipscy." She "installed [four] cameras on her property and [two] cameras on her vehicle," "spent sessions with her clients discussing concerns the clients ha[d] about their safety given … Lipscy's social media posts referring to … Butler," "removed signage from her office, met with clients in a place other than her office, and met via tele-health to address concerns about client safety."

Her children became "afraid to go out in public without a parent and [had] an increased fear when out in the community." One of Butler's children "changed the way they dress[ed] because they [did] not want to get physically or emotionally hurt." Butler's children were "fearful that their photos [would] be put online to shame their family," "ask[ed] in public if they [were] safe," and "question[ed] whether people around them [were] 'people that hate Queer people.'"

The court issued a harassment restraining order that provided, in relevant part, that Lipscy

• "shall not harass … [Butler] or her minor children included in the Petition";
• "shall have no direct or indirect contact with … [Butler] or her minor children including any visits, phone calls, contact via electronic means such as email or social networking sites, threats or assaultive behavior to the protected persons, damaging or stealing property belonging to the protected persons, breaking into and entering the protected persons' residence, and/or taking pictures of the protected persons without permission from … [Butler]";
• "is prohibited from being within 500 feet of … [Butler's] home" or "job site"; …
• "is restrained from harassing, stalking, or threatening the protected persons, or engaging in other conduct that would place the protected persons in reasonable fear of bodily injury to that person"; and "is prohibited from the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the protected persons that would reasonably be expected to cause bodily injury."

Given that the court had found that Lipscy's social media posts referring to Butler were "harassment," and then restrained Lipscy from "harassing" Butler, the order thus forbade Lipscy from continuing to mention Butler. And indeed the appellate court acknowledged this, stating (emphases added) that the HRO

• "allows Lipscy to express her religious views, provided that she does not mention Butler and her children and does not approach Butler, her home, and her workplace," and
• "merely prohibits [Lipscy] from directing harassing conduct toward Butler and her children—such as photographing them, repeatedly naming them, and targeting them."

The appellate court upheld the order, reasoning that Lipscy's actions could indeed be found to be harassment, defined by the Minnesota HRO statute as "repeated incidents of intrusive or unwanted acts, words, or gestures that have a substantial adverse effect or are intended to have a substantial adverse effect on the safety, security, or privacy of another":

The district court determined that Lipscy "engaged in harassment," reasoning that Lipscy had: followed, monitored, or pursued Butler and her children; frightened Butler and her children; taken pictures of Butler's children without permission; and used social media to harass Butler on multiple occasions. In making this determination, the district court relied on evidence in the record that Lipscy had reposted pictures of Butler's children from the Itasca Pride webpage to the Grand Rapids Rant internet site with her own captions including: "Sickening," "Poor children," and "Those poor poor kids."

The district court also based its decision on evidence that Lipscy had reposted pictures from the Itasca Pride event while referring to Butler in a manner that questioned Butler's credentials as a therapist and had shared a video of Butler's husband while referring to Butler by name. And the district court made specific findings about how Butler was "generally fearful for the safety of herself and children following the incidents involving … Lipscy." …

And the court held that this doesn't violate Lipscy's free speech or religious freedom rights, because it is directed only at "speech or conduct that … is in violation of one's right to privacy," which Minnesota courts had held is constitutionally unprotected.

I think such an injunction is unconstitutional, at least as to the prohibition on repeatedly naming Butler in posts; for more on such orders, and the appellate decisions that mostly set them aside, see my Overbroad Injunctions Against Speech (Especially in Libel and Harassment and Cases) article. And while I'm sympathetic to the argument that adults should keep the children out of this, I'm not sure it's constitutional even as to that. But in any event, the Minnesota Court of Appeals thought the injunction was permissible, and I thought it worthwhile to note that.

Sara Jane Baldwin (Gender Justice) represents plaintiff.

The post Anti-Transgenderism/Anti-Homosexuality Activist Ordered to Stop Talking About Local Therapist/Pride Activist appeared first on Reason Magazine.

by Ryan McMaken, Lew Rockwell: I recent weeks, German and French politicians have denounced free speech, and especially the concept of “freedom of speech” as long envisioned in the libertarian tradition of natural rights. French President Emmanuel Macron on September 29 stated that ”The so-called American ‘free speech’ today, which some people have promoted, is the […]

In this segment of Free Media, Reason Senior Editor Robby Soave and Daily Caller Editor in Chief Amber Duke discuss worrisome remarks from Sen. Elissa Slotkin (D-MI) and journalist Kara Swisher, suggesting retribution for those in the Trump Administration if and when Democrats regain control of Congress.

If you enjoy Free Media, come watch Robby debate at our upcoming Reason Versus in D.C. Tickets are available here. 

The post Elissa Slotkin and Kara Swisher Want Democrats To Go After MAGA if They Win appeared first on Reason Magazine.