Europe has already learned to better recognize hybrid threats, which is definitely a good thing, but recognition alone is not enough and doesn't serve as sufficient deterrence.
European officials have grown accustomed to scenarios where a cyberattack disrupts public services and critical infrastructure, drones appear over sensitive sites,
Men before a British court charged under the National Security act over an alleged, attempted Iranian state-backed guerrilla attack.
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Journalists from 17 European public service broadcasters, coordinated by the European Broadcasting Union’s (EBU) Eurovision News Spotlight network, published an interactive map on 23 October 2026. It documents hybrid incidents linked to Russia across 17 European countries between 1 April and 15 October. Journalists compiled a database of hundreds of reported incidents, categorizing each by type and the source and strength of its alleged links to Russia, then verifying them through open-source research.
The map comes as officials warn the campaign is growing. On 28 September, EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas said in Brussels that Russia was planning more acts of sabotage to divide societies and intimidate them into abandoning their support for Ukraine. The points on the map represent an incomplete list of publicly known cases attributed to Russia or suspected of being linked to it, the report states.
The map covers airspace violations, sabotage attempts, “disposable” agents with no formal intelligence training, migration used as a weapon, and Russian military activity near or across European borders. It excludes cyberattacks, influence operations, and espionage by trained intelligence officers.
The EBU calls the result a very conservative estimate, not an official tally. Russia has consistently denied responsibility for the incidents. Many single points represent several incidents of the same type in one area or in quick succession. In Moldova, for example, Defense Minister Anatolie Nosatîi said on 30 September that the government had recorded 84 drone incursions.
The map shows four incidents in Germany, according to BR.
Internal papers from the new Joint Hybrid Defense Center, seen by Correctiv, record 163 suspected sabotage cases in 2026 up to 19 August. The targets included rail lines, military facilities, substations, and radio masts. The same papers record 1,034 drone overflights of critical infrastructure, military sites, and defense companies, and 25 espionage investigations. The papers cover possible attacks by Russia, China, and Iran, and media did not report a breakdown of the sabotage cases by country.
On 15 April, Swedish civil defense minister Carl-Oskar Bohlin said pro-Russian groups had moved from denial-of-service attacks to attempts at destructive cyberattacks, including one on a Swedish power plant in 2025. On 1 September, German Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul named Russia as the perpetrator of the Leipzig attack and accused Moscow of “blatant hostility” toward Germany.
On 18 September, French President Emmanuel Macron said Russia’s hybrid attacks would not go unanswered and ordered a plan to protect France’s critical infrastructure. On 1 October, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz said Germany was preparing for new hybrid attacks, “including serious ones.” NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte on 14 October called the attacks a sign of Russian weakness at a press conference in Tallinn and said NATO would react where needed without being “rattled.”
The investigation, coordinated by the European Broadcasting Union, examined incidents reported between 1st April and 15th October 2026, including sabotage attempts, arson, airspace violations, suspicious drone activity and the exploitation of migration routes along the European Union’s eastern borders.
Published on 23rd October, the resulting interactive map provides a geographical picture of incidents publicly linked to Russia by intelligence agencies, law-enforcement authorities, government officials or reporting. The degree of attribution varies considerably, however, and many incidents remain under investigation.
The findings point to a fundamental problem for European security: hostile activities can be conducted across national boundaries without necessarily triggering the legal, military or political mechanisms designed to respond to conventional aggression.
Among the cases examined is an incident in Munich in September, when two Bulgarian nationals allegedly threw incendiary devices from a moving vehicle onto a construction site near several defence companies.
Police arrested the suspects after a witness reported the incident. Bavarian Interior Minister Joachim Herrmann and regional criminal investigators subsequently indicated that political motives were being considered. Investigators reportedly suspected possible involvement by Russia’s military intelligence service, the GRU, although the allegations have not been established in court.
The case illustrates growing concern about so-called disposable agents: individuals recruited to undertake relatively limited operations without formal intelligence training or a longstanding relationship with an intelligence service.
Such arrangements can complicate investigations. Even where perpetrators are identified, establishing a legally demonstrable connection between their actions and a foreign intelligence organisation may prove considerably more difficult.
Germany’s Federal Criminal Police Office has registered a mid-three-digit number of suspected sabotage and reconnaissance cases since the beginning of 2026, according to information provided to investigators involved in the European mapping project.
Only a small proportion have been publicly attributed to Russia. Four German incidents were included in the map, demonstrating the distinction between a broad national caseload and cases meeting the investigation’s publication criteria.
The geographical distribution reveals substantial activity along NATO’s eastern flank, particularly around the Baltic states, Belarus and the Black Sea.
Incidents include repeated airspace violations, suspected reconnaissance operations and attempts to facilitate unauthorised border crossings. Lithuanian authorities have accused Belarus of deliberately exploiting migration as an instrument of political pressure.
Commercial shipping has also become increasingly exposed. Drone attacks involving vessels near Romania and Bulgaria have raised concerns about the extension of the war’s consequences into maritime areas adjoining EU and NATO territory.
These developments reinforce earlier warnings about Russia’s expanding sabotage campaign, particularly the difficulty of distinguishing isolated security incidents from coordinated operations intended to test national responses.
Teija Tiilikainen, director of the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats, identified Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as an important factor behind the increasing pressure. According to her assessment, Moscow’s objectives include weakening Western unity and undermining continued support for Ukraine.
The central difficulty is not simply the absence of criminal legislation. Arson, espionage, sabotage and unlawful interference with critical infrastructure are already punishable under national laws.
Rather, the challenge involves establishing foreign direction, coordinating investigations across jurisdictions and identifying when a series of apparently separate offences constitutes a wider hostile campaign.
Germany’s domestic intelligence chief, Sinan Selen, has described the environment as a grey area between war and peace. German foreign intelligence chief Martin Jäger has similarly identified Russia as the country’s most dangerous adversary.
European governments are beginning to address these difficulties collectively. At their 15th–16th October summit, EU leaders condemned intensifying hybrid attacks and called for stronger resilience, greater use of existing countermeasures and accelerated work on drone security.
On 8th October, the Council also extended sanctions targeting Russian destabilisation activities until October 2027. The restrictions cover 80 individuals and 20 entities.
Meanwhile, a European Commission research initiative, published on 23rd October, proposes combining anticipation, active defence and retaliatory measures into a more coherent deterrence strategy.
The investigation’s significance extends beyond the number of incidents recorded. By bringing together information previously dispersed among national authorities and separate investigations, it makes possible a wider assessment of the methods, geographical concentration and recurring characteristics of suspected hostile operations.
Nevertheless, the map does not establish Russian responsibility for every incident it records, nor does it constitute a complete European database. Russia has repeatedly denied conducting the hybrid attacks attributed to it.
For European governments, the unresolved question is how to move from recognising a pattern of hostile activity to demonstrating responsibility and responding effectively.
As EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas has warned, the consequences already extend beyond infrastructure disruption to risks affecting civilian lives.
The emerging security challenge therefore concerns not only the detection of individual perpetrators, but also Europe’s ability to connect incidents across borders, establish responsibility and prevent successive operations from becoming an accepted feature of the continent’s security environment.
France’s violent protests have exposed a vulnerability in European security that conventional policing cannot easily address: the ability of foreign information networks to exploit domestic political crises, amplify social divisions and transform legitimate grievances into instruments of geopolitical pressure.
President Emmanuel Macron has acknowledged foreign manipulation of information surrounding the disturbances of 17–18 October but insists there is no evidence that foreign actors organised the violence itself. His assessment reflects the evidence currently available, although new investigations indicate that Russian-linked networks were actively exploiting the protest movement weeks before the worst disorder began.
On 24 October, France deployed approximately 70,000 police officers and gendarmes to prevent further violence. Yet the security operation addresses only the physical consequences of a crisis whose online dimension extends across national borders.
An investigation published on 22 October by Alliance4Europe provides evidence that Russian-linked information networks were exploiting French discontent well before the disturbances.
Researchers examined 547,471 posts and articles across nine languages. They identified 639 coordinated messages attributed with high confidence to Russia’s Doppelgänger operation, generating approximately 7.4 million views in the six weeks preceding 17 October.
The campaign used genuine concerns about living costs and public expenditure to promote a particular political argument: money allocated to Ukraine was being taken from European citizens.
This was not a random selection of grievances. France’s budget difficulties, public-service pressures and disagreements over defence expenditure provided material through which Moscow could seek to weaken support for Kyiv.
The researchers found that the operation targeted pro-European and pro-Ukraine politicians across the political spectrum. It praised selected proposals associated with Jean-Luc Mélenchon while also promoting nationalist narratives, illustrating a strategy driven less by ideological consistency than by opposition to existing European policies.
An earlier investigation by EK Strategies, published on 8 October, identified an additional development.
Russian-linked channels were not merely commenting on existing demonstrations. They were circulating protest dates, identifying organisers and encouraging French audiences to follow the example of demonstrators in Germany.
On 28 September, the International Reporters network published an appeal urging French audiences to take to the streets. Other channels subsequently reproduced information about planned school blockades and demonstrations.
In one instance, a channel identified as Gavroche published rhetoric encouraging an attack on France’s Education Ministry.
Such activity goes beyond retrospective propaganda. It attempts to influence participation and behaviour while events are developing. Nevertheless, evidence that a network encouraged protests does not establish that it controlled the organisers or directed subsequent violence.
The original demonstrations arose from domestic grievances over schools, prices and government policy. The significance of the foreign activity lies in attempts to redirect and intensify an existing movement.
Once violence erupted, the information campaign acquired an international audience.
Alliance4Europe found that claims blaming migrants or Islam for the disturbances appeared in approximately one in 33 French-language posts, compared with nearly one in five English-language posts.
False allegations that immigrants had burned Limoges town hall circulated substantially more frequently in English than in French.
The same report identified 1,018 articles distributed through 28 websites associated with the Russian Pravda network. Their rapid republication across languages enabled a common narrative to reach audiences far beyond France.
The operation also presents a longer-term technological problem. Repeated publication of manipulated accounts can contaminate material subsequently retrieved or reproduced by artificial-intelligence systems, allowing false narratives to persist beyond the original campaign.
The political effects were visible when President Donald Trump and other foreign leaders portrayed France’s unrest principally through immigration and cultural conflict.
Speaking in Qatar on 21 October, Macron rejected these portrayals and criticised the circulation of fabricated AI-generated images. His remarks identified foreign manipulation after the riots but stopped short of alleging foreign responsibility for their organisation.
The transcript raises a more substantial allegation: that the American Heritage Foundation and Russia’s FSB have participated in a coordinated effort to destabilise France.
There are documented connections between the Heritage Foundation and political institutions associated with Hungary’s former prime minister Viktor Orbán.
A 2026 investigation into Hungarian-funded international influence networks established that the Danube Institute had channelled substantial public funding towards foreign researchers and commentators. The institute also maintained a formal relationship with Heritage.
Heritage has acknowledged its cooperation with Hungarian conservative institutions but denied receiving funding or direction from foreign governments.
These relationships demonstrate the development of transatlantic political networks capable of circulating common ideas about sovereignty, migration and European integration.
They do not establish operational cooperation with Russian intelligence. Nor has credible evidence emerged connecting Heritage to the organisation or financing of France’s October riots. Ideological convergence, institutional cooperation and participation in a clandestine operation require separate evidential assessments.
The European Union’s response has exposed a regulatory problem.
Under the EU’s Digital Services Act, major online platforms must address systemic risks arising from their services, including the amplification of illegal content and threats to public security.
On 23 October, the French government announced enhanced cooperation with digital platforms. More than 100 priority reports had been submitted ahead of the weekend demonstrations, approximately half resulting in account suspensions.
These measures targeted unlawful online activity, particularly incitement to violence and looting. They did not constitute findings that the suspended accounts belonged to foreign intelligence networks.
The European Commission has likewise refrained from activating emergency measures under the Digital Services Act without sufficient evidence connecting foreign manipulation to the violence.
The broader security concern is that foreign operations can exploit the interval between the emergence of social unrest and the establishment of reliable information about its causes.
Russia need not organise an entire protest movement to advance its strategic interests. By amplifying domestic grievances, promoting hostility towards support for Ukraine and circulating distorted accounts internationally, it can attempt to convert France’s internal political difficulties into pressure on European policy.
With France approaching its 2027 presidential election, these operations warrant continuing scrutiny. The central investigative question is no longer simply whether foreign networks spread false information after violence occurred, but whether their activities before and during demonstrations materially influenced mobilisation, radicalisation or political responses.
The evidence currently demonstrates organised manipulation and attempts at amplification. Establishing direct responsibility for violence would require a further evidential step, involving financial records, communications, operational instructions or connections with identifiable perpetrators.
France’s experience illustrates how contemporary information warfare can operate within a democratic society without necessarily directing events on the ground. Its immediate objective may be to alter the political interpretation of a crisis; its longer-term consequence may be to influence the policies adopted in response.
Italy is investigating the possibility that foreign actors, including Russian operatives, helped amplify the violent unrest that swept Milan and other Italian cities on 17–18 October. The inquiry introduces a national security dimension to demonstrations initially driven by rising living costs, dissatisfaction with public services and broader economic grievances.
According to information disclosed about the government’s intelligence inquiries, officials working under Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni have requested assessments of whether foreign provocateurs contributed to the disorder. No public evidence has established that Moscow organised the violence, and Meloni’s office has declined to comment on the reported intelligence discussions.
The developments follow EU Today’s earlier coverage of the Milan disturbances, which documented extensive looting, attacks on police and the detention of hundreds of young people, many of them minors. Since then, Rome has moved beyond emergency consultations, approving legislation that expands police powers and introduces tougher criminal penalties for violent demonstrations.
On Saturday, 24 October, Italian security forces are preparing for another wave of protests, with additional military personnel, drones and specialist police units deployed in several major cities. The immediate question is whether the government can prevent further disorder while establishing how much of the unrest was locally organised and whether foreign information operations influenced its development.
Defence Minister Guido Crosetto introduced the hybrid warfare argument during a Defence Procurement Forum in Rome on Tuesday, 20 October. In remarks recorded by Italian public broadcaster Rai, he described the disturbances as the culmination of a form of conflict being conducted through TikTok, YouTube and other social media platforms.
Crosetto argued that young Italians were undergoing what he called a form of counter-education outside their families and schools, absorbing political attitudes and values increasingly hostile to democratic institutions. He criticised Western governments for failing to recognise the consequences of this process, although he did not publicly present intelligence establishing Russian responsibility for the riots.
His comments also exposed differences within the governing coalition. Deputy Prime Minister Matteo Salvini questioned suggestions of Russian involvement, arguing that the immediate priority was identifying violent groups and preventing their movement into Milan.
European investigators have identified activity by established Russia-linked disinformation networks, including Operation Overload and Doppelgänger, which have circulated and amplified material concerning the unrest.
These operations have previously used manipulated content, misleading narratives and coordinated online distribution to influence European audiences. In the present case, investigations into the online amplification of the violence have identified foreign exploitation of the disturbances, rather than proof that foreign governments organised them.
The European Commission has consequently declined to initiate emergency intervention against social media platforms, citing insufficient evidence linking foreign manipulation directly to the organisation of the protests.
France has taken a similarly cautious position. President Emmanuel Macron acknowledged that foreign actors had manipulated information after the violence but said there was no established evidence that they caused the disturbances. French Foreign Minister Jean-Noël Barrot has separately identified hostile narratives originating from Russia, China and Iran.
For European security authorities, the principal investigative question concerns the relationship between genuine domestic grievances and externally coordinated information campaigns. Foreign networks can exploit political divisions without necessarily directing the organisations or individuals involved in street violence.
Meanwhile, Meloni’s government has proceeded with a substantial legislative response. Following cabinet approval on 20 October, Decree-Law No. 190 of 22 October 2026 entered into force on 23 October.
The legislation introduces penalties of two to five years’ imprisonment and fines of €10,000 to €20,000 for specified forms of organised violence during public demonstrations. Those organising or encouraging qualifying violent groups, including through digital communications, face potential prison terms of four to twelve years. It also expands provisions concerning juvenile offenders and preventive policing. The decree must undergo parliamentary consideration within 60 days.
Separately, the Italian Defence Ministry confirmed the deployment of 500 additional soldiers to Milan under Operation Strade Sicure until 31 December. The soldiers will reinforce security around sensitive locations and support existing police operations without acquiring additional judicial policing powers.
Security arrangements have been intensified ahead of demonstrations scheduled for Saturday, 24 October, in Milan, Rome, Turin, Bologna, Florence and other cities.
According to the latest security preparations, Rome is deploying approximately 1,500 officers, while Milan is preparing a combined police and military presence supported by aerial surveillance.
On Friday, Italian investigators conducted searches targeting approximately 100 people suspected of involvement in the previous weekend’s disturbances, including 51 minors. Authorities are also monitoring online calls for renewed protests, some organised by groups whose leadership and membership remain unclear.
The unrest presents Meloni with two parallel challenges: containing violence and determining whether hostile foreign networks have played a significant role in its escalation. Italy’s investigations may help establish whether the events represent primarily a domestic public-order crisis, the exploitation of existing tensions by foreign actors, or a combination of both.
For Brussels, the outcome could influence future enforcement of the EU’s Digital Services Act and its wider response to foreign information manipulation. For now, the evidence supports concern about Russian amplification of European unrest, but not a definitive conclusion that Moscow orchestrated the riots.
European governments are reconsidering who should be authorised to intercept hostile drones as energy companies and critical infrastructure operators confront an increasingly serious threat to electricity networks, transport systems and other essential facilities.
France has already introduced legislation permitting approved operators to deploy counter-drone systems, while Germany is reviewing similar arrangements and Austria has announced plans to extend certain protective powers to infrastructure companies.
Poland has moved further by authorising designated security units to disable or destroy drones entering restricted areas around important energy installations.
The changes reflect concerns that national police and armed forces cannot provide permanent protection for every substation, power station, railway facility or pipeline against relatively inexpensive unmanned aircraft.
In August 2026, the French parliament approved legislation allowing authorised operators of critical infrastructure and their contractors to detect, jam and intercept drones near designated facilities.
The legislation followed a series of reported drone incursions over sensitive locations, including military installations.
Under the French approach, operators of strategically important infrastructure may eventually use approved counter-drone systems without relying exclusively on the immediate intervention of military personnel.
Potential beneficiaries include electricity operators and organisations responsible for transport infrastructure.
French authorities are testing detection equipment, electronic countermeasures and interceptor drones at Brétigny-sur-Orge, south of Paris.
The programme examines systems capable of identifying approaching aircraft, determining whether they present a threat and initiating an appropriate response.
France intends to expand the protection of sites classified as strategically important, with further deployment planned during 2027.
The initiative would introduce responsibilities traditionally associated with military or police operations into the management of civilian infrastructure.
Germany is examining the legal conditions under which private companies and infrastructure operators could participate in active counter-drone operations.
At present, responsibility for neutralising threatening aircraft remains primarily with the competent public authorities.
The debate has intensified following security incidents involving unmanned aircraft, including the discovery of an explosives-laden drone near a Ukrainian cargo aircraft at Leipzig/Halle airport in August.
German authorities attributed the incident to Russia, an allegation Moscow denied.
The German government’s review concerns not only the equipment that companies may possess but also whether trained security personnel should be permitted to deploy countermeasures without waiting for a separate police authorisation.
Austria announced plans in September to extend comparable powers to selected critical infrastructure operators, including major energy companies.
The government has acknowledged the practical limitations of protecting a large number of widely dispersed installations using state security personnel alone.
Poland has already established restricted drone zones around sensitive energy facilities, with designated security units authorised to intercept aircraft entering those areas under applicable national rules.
Electricity infrastructure presents a difficult security problem because essential installations are distributed across extensive geographical areas.
Transmission operators manage thousands of kilometres of high-voltage lines, while substations, transformers and switching stations connect generation facilities to consumers.
A successful attack against critical equipment can produce consequences extending well beyond the immediate site.
Large power transformers are particularly difficult to replace. Manufacturing, transporting and installing specialised equipment can require lengthy preparation, making rapid recovery uncertain after serious damage.
European utilities have traditionally concentrated on physical security, maintenance and restoring services after technical failures or accidents.
The spread of drones creates additional demands for surveillance, early warning and the ability to respond before an attack reaches its target.
Russia’s repeated strikes against Ukraine’s electricity infrastructure have demonstrated the extensive disruption that attacks on power systems can cause.
European governments are now evaluating how comparable vulnerabilities could be exploited against their own networks.
Giving civilian operators access to counter-drone equipment raises unresolved legal questions.
Electronic jamming can interfere with communications and navigation systems beyond the targeted aircraft. A drone brought down over an industrial or residential area could injure members of the public or damage surrounding property.
Security personnel must also determine whether an unidentified drone is hostile, operating unlawfully or simply present because of an error by its operator.
A mistaken interception could expose infrastructure companies to compensation claims and other legal consequences.
European governments must therefore establish who can authorise an intervention, which countermeasures are permitted and how responsibility is allocated when damage occurs.
There is no uniform European approach.
Some operators support expanding their protective powers, while others argue that the use of force should remain the responsibility of the state.
Finland’s national electricity transmission operator, Fingrid, has expressed reservations about transferring such authority to energy companies.
The position reflects a wider concern that infrastructure operators should concentrate on maintaining essential services rather than assuming responsibilities for armed or coercive security operations.
The regulatory debate is developing alongside a rapidly expanding market for counter-drone technology.
Manufacturers are offering equipment that integrates radar, optical sensors, electronic detection and software capable of classifying possible threats.
Interceptor drones and electronic countermeasures are increasingly being designed for use around civilian infrastructure rather than exclusively on military installations.
German defence company Rheinmetall has reported growing interest from private infrastructure operators in counter-drone protection.
However, the technology is advancing faster than the legal frameworks governing its use.
The immediate challenge for European governments is to establish protective arrangements that allow rapid intervention while preserving clear accountability.
A counter-drone system can identify an approaching aircraft within seconds. Determining who is authorised to stop it remains a matter for national law.
Patrol density along Lithuania’s border with Russia’s Kaliningrad exclave has practically doubled since soldiers joined the border guards there in early October. Lithuanian Armed Forces Commander Raimundas Vaikšnoras told LRT this in an interview. He linked the deployment to provocations and to what he described as Russian preparations for a large-scale mobilization.
Kaliningrad is a piece of Russia wedged between Lithuania and Poland on the Baltic Sea. Lithuanian Defense Minister Robertas Kaunas said people would naturally flee a Russian mobilization. Earlier, on 11 August, President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy said that Russia planned to mobilize several hundred thousand people by the end of 2026, after its parliamentary vote.
Vaikšnoras said Russia is struggling in Ukraine and needs to fill gaps in its capabilities. Moscow would probably like a breakthrough but lacks people, he added. In July, Ukraine’s Foreign Intelligence Service estimated that Russia had signed about as many new military contracts this year as it had lost troops.
He also cited provocations. In Latvia, armed men recently tried to push migrants across the border, he noted, leaving open whether they were bandits or criminals. Belarusian ruler Alyaksandr Lukashenka denies everything, he added. On 6 October, Latvian Interior Minister Jānis Dombrava wrote that the escorts stood on the Belarusian side, were armed, and threatened Latvian soldiers.
Lithuania decided to send troops after that Latvian incident. On 7 October, Interior Minister Martynas Katelynas asked Defense Minister Kaunas for troops to help the State Border Guard Service. Kaunas then approved up to 100 soldiers until 16 October, LRT reported.
On 16 October, Kaunas extended the mission to mid-November at Katelynas’s request. The Defense Ministry cited possible flows of people fleeing Kaliningrad and related illegal border crossings. It also said military intelligence sees no significant changes in military activity in Kaliningrad. Katelynas had earlier called the step preventive, BNS noted. He cited public, non-intelligence reports of a call-up planned after Russia’s parliamentary elections and said the threat level at the border had not risen.
Vaikšnoras said Russia and Belarus may not want open incidents that leave their traces right now. He added that he does not believe in their good intentions. He noted it has been said publicly that Russia’s capability in Kaliningrad is sharply reduced, because most of its forces are committed to Ukraine. Back in June 2025, Poland’s foreign minister said that, from what he knew, Russia had withdrawn a large part of its troops from the exclave.
Instead, hybrid attacks and sabotage that cannot be traced at once will probably continue, Vaikšnoras said. LRT noted the interview took place before a Ukrainian drone crashed in Pasvalys district on Sunday and before an attempted arson at premises used by SpaceX in Vilnius.
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