Cabinet ministers are turning on Ed Miliband, accusing him of blocking AI investment to protect Net Zero – while families pay the price in lost jobs and holidays.
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Irán y Pakistán están inmersos en la construcción de un orden financiero posestadounidense en la encrucijada entre Asia Occidental y Asia Meridional.
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Vayamos directamente al meollo de la cuestión: tras examinar minuciosamente el tablero de ajedrez, los dirigentes políticos y militares de Teherán ya han llegado a la conclusión de que un ataque conjunto de EE. UU. e Israel —cuya planificación avanza a un ritmo frenético— es inevitable.
Por eso se han posicionado ahora como una cobra enroscada, lista para atacar e inyectar su veneno mortal ante el primer indicio de una amenaza inminente del Sindicato de Epstein, incluso sin esperar a que se produzca un ataque real.
La ofensiva preventiva, ya delineada, será devastadora, se extenderá más allá de las bases estadounidenses en Asia Occidental a otros objetivos regionales e incluirá potencialmente la infraestructura energética del Golfo y los cables submarinos (en este caso, afectando principalmente al Golfo y a la India, mucho más que a EE. UU. y Europa).
Nos encontramos en territorio de peligro claro y presente: una maniobra militar estadounidense-israelí destinada a ejercer presión se interpretará sin duda en Teherán como el inicio de un ataque.
Así pues, la presión a favor de la guerra por parte del culto a la muerte y de Trump se encuentra ahora con un umbral iraní peligrosamente bajo. Las opciones de ataque del Pentágono abarcan desde las instalaciones nucleares iraníes hasta la infraestructura energética.
Huelga decir que el «sociópata en jefe» —que ya está en pánico ante la inminente debacle de las elecciones de mitad de mandato— es una presa fácil para el poderoso lobby sionista y los donantes a favor de la guerra. El peligro estratégico supremo es, pues, que esta presión incesante pueda generar una señal que Teherán interprete como un ataque inminente, incluso mientras Washington mantiene públicamente que no se producirá ningún ataque antes de las elecciones de mitad de mandato.
Yemen está llevando todo esto al siguiente nivel
Paralelamente, fuentes privilegiadas en Islamabad confirman el éxito de una prueba de misil paquistaní a Mach 7, con un alcance de varios miles de kilómetros. Esta nueva capacidad tiene todo lo necesario para alterar sustancialmente el equilibrio de poder en Asia Occidental, reforzando el alcance disuasorio de Pakistán y su capacidad para influir en todos los cálculos de seguridad regional, además de contribuir a la creciente interconexión de Pakistán con China, Irán y las petro-monarquías del Golfo.
Y ahora, otra exclusiva: personal de la inteligencia militar israelí, incluido un general de división, ha abandonado Riad después de que MbS, en un supuesto momento de lucidez, dijera «no» a la oferta de «asistencia» del culto a la muerte. Y, sin embargo, siguen allí más de 100 miembros del CENTCOM.
Es posible que la decisión de MbS le haya sido impuesta por Turquía y Pakistán —los otros dos signatarios de la Alianza de Defensa de La Meca—, que de repente se encontraron en la misma sala de guerra en Riad, codo con codo con agentes del culto a la muerte.
Ahora bien, aunque su partida puede haber eliminado un riesgo de escalada, los agentes estadounidenses siguen expuestos: cualquier ataque, venga de donde venga, que provoque bajas estadounidenses arrastrará inmediatamente a Washington a la guerra entre Arabia Saudí y Ansarallah.
La guerra entre Arabia Saudí y Ansarallah, de hecho, está alcanzando el siguiente nivel: la volatilidad. La mezcla tóxica de la interceptación de un misil de crucero sobre la provincia de Medina; las interceptaciones de drones en otras partes de Arabia Saudí; y los ataques con misiles de las Fuerzas Armadas yemeníes contra el complejo presidencial del gobierno títere de Adén es solo el principio.
Lo que ocurrió después de que Ansarallah atacara Najran —una de las provincias del sur de Arabia Saudí arrebatadas a Yemen en 1934 por los británicos— es algo que realmente llama la atención.
Un portavoz saudí acusó a Ansarallah de lanzar un misil de crucero contra Medina. La respuesta del emblemático portavoz de las Fuerzas Armadas yemeníes, el general Yahya Saree, fue contundente: «Hoy no hemos llevado a cabo ninguna operación militar dirigida contra territorio saudí. Por lo tanto, la afirmación del enemigo saudí de que Medina fue atacada es una invención absoluta y una grave falsedad».
Traducción: Yemen ataca una de sus antiguas provincias; los saudíes recurren a noticias totalmente falsas, inventándose un ataque contra una de las dos mezquitas sagradas —sin duda como preparación para una operación de bandera falsa—; luego, Yemen niega de inmediato haber atacado ningún (cursiva mía) territorio saudí.
Esto significa que Saná está declarando sutilmente, para que todo el mundo lo entienda, que ya no lleva a cabo operaciones en el extranjero (cursiva mía) en las tres provincias: Jizan, Najran y Asir. Ya están —psicológica y operativamente— preparando el terreno para recuperar su territorio robado.
Todo ello se plasma en este conciso análisis desde Yemen sobre la deconstrucción de la ostentosa Casa de Saud:
«Yemen está destrozando los pilares extremadamente frágiles de la economía no petrolera en la que los piratas del desierto depositaron todas sus esperanzas: imagen, inversiones (IED), escapismo e impunidad e invulnerabilidad frente al terrorismo en el extranjero».
Cómo Pakistán e Irán eluden al FMI
Ahora prestad atención a algo bastante sorprendente que ocurrió a mediados de semana en Bangkok, durante la reunión anual del FMI y el Banco Mundial —dignamente recibida por protestas callejeras tailandesas—.
El presidente del Banco Central de Irán, Abdolnaser Hemmati, se reunió con el presidente del Banco Central de Pakistán, Jameel Ahmad, al margen del principal ritual anual en alabanza del dólar estadounidense.
Pakistán se encuentra bajo las feroces garras del ajuste estructural del FMI y el Banco Mundial —y, además, amenazado con sanciones estadounidenses por comerciar con Irán—.
Así pues, que Pakistán e Irán estén discutiendo de facto la desdolarización justo en la guarida del león —el templo del dólar estadounidense— no tiene precio.
La infraestructura está en marcha desde 2023, a través de un acuerdo de intercambio de divisas que utiliza el rial y la rupia en lugar del dólar estadounidense. El trueque lo gestionan ambos bancos centrales, y los canales bancarios pasan por el Banco Melli en Irán y el Banco Mellat en Pakistán. Sus mercados fronterizos —al menos seis de ellos— están en pleno auge: rutas comerciales físicas que eluden por completo al dólar estadounidense.
Lo que se debatió en Bangkok a principios de esta semana es cómo ampliar todo este sistema: les importan un comino las sanciones secundarias de EE. UU. Sobre todo porque Teherán ofrece a Islamabad lo que el sistema estadounidense simplemente no puede ofrecer: soberanía, sin cambio de régimen, sin austeridad, sin sermones y, sobre todo, sin ajuste estructural.
Por no mencionar que Pakistán necesita urgentemente el gas iraní —y las rutas comerciales de la Nueva Ruta de la Seda impulsadas por China—.
Irán ha construido toda una economía que elude por completo al FMI —y capaz de sobrevivir a un tsunami de sanciones, a un bloqueo y a la guerra—.
Ahora, Irán y Pakistán están inmersos en la construcción de un orden financiero posestadounidense en la encrucijada entre Asia Occidental y Asia Meridional —con intercambios de divisas, comercio de trueque, mercados fronterizos en auge y canales bancarios adecuados—, lo que convierte las sanciones secundarias en una burla.
Por cierto, esto está ocurriendo justo cuando un inmenso tren iraní, cargado de petróleo crudo —y el primero de muchos— está listo para partir hacia… China a través de Asia Central, por la línea ferroviaria de la Nueva Ruta de la Seda construida por China.
La cobra enroscada puede estar lista para atacar. Pero a la cobra, desde tiempos inmemoriales, también le encanta hacer negocios.
Traducción: Geopolítica rugiente
For decades, the European Union has been a global leader in biodiversity protection. The Natura 2000 network, the Birds and Habitats Directives and, more recently, the Nature Restoration Regulation show that Europe has a strong legal framework.
At international level, the EU also played a decisive role in the adoption of the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework, which was agreed in December 2022 at COP15 of the Convention on Biological Diversity. The framework established a global roadmap to halt and reverse biodiversity loss by 2030.
Next week (19-30 October), Yerevan will host COP17 of the Convention, where the first global review of progress since the adoption of the Framework will take place. It will be an important opportunity to determine whether the commitments made are being translated into concrete action and results on the ground.
As co-chair of the European Parliament delegation attending the conference, I will defend a united European position that is consistent with our historic leadership and responds to the urgency of the challenge.
The European Commission, which formally negotiates on behalf of the Union on the basis of the position agreed with the member states, must promote decisions that accelerate implementation of the Global Biodiversity Framework during the remaining years to 2030.
This global review must be accompanied by an honest assessment of our own performance. Europe should arrive in Yerevan acknowledging both the progress it has made and the work that remains.
The commission’s latest report on the implementation of the framework presents a mixed picture.
Of the 45 targets established for the EU, only two have been achieved and 16 are on track, while progress remains too slow on another 25 and two cannot yet be assessed.
There are positive signs in the EU. Protected areas have expanded, organic farming has increased and a greater proportion of fish stocks is being managed sustainably.
However, the overall situation of many habitats and species remains worrying, while farmland birds and grassland butterflies, among others, continue to decline.
The main problem is not a lack of legislation, as Europe already has many of the instruments it needs. The challenge is to implement them properly and turn them into visible improvements on the ground, which requires public authorities with sufficient capacity, reliable data, clear plans and stable funding.
The Nature Restoration Regulation is a good example.
Restoring wetlands, rivers, forests, soils and marine ecosystems will not only help biodiversity recover, but will also retain water, reduce flood damage, protect soils and make our territories more resilient to droughts, heatwaves and wildfires.
However, the regulation will only deliver results if member states meet their obligations.
The deadline for submitting draft national restoration plans was 1 September, yet only nine countries have done so.
This delay not only slows implementation, but also makes it harder to calculate the cost of restoring nature and the resources that will be required.
The commission was expected to present an assessment of restoration funding needs and gaps in August 2025, but we are still waiting for a complete analysis.
The commission argues that it needs the national plans to calculate these costs. Yet negotiations on the 2028-2034 financial framework are moving forward while many plans remain outstanding and we still lack a full estimate of the resources needed to implement one of our most important environmental laws.
This situation reflects one of the main challenges facing COP17.
Adopting targets is no longer enough. We must also agree on how they will be implemented, how progress will be measured and how action will be financed.
In this context, I believe that the European position should focus on five priorities. We must mobilise more resources for biodiversity, consolidate the Cali Fund, make progress in eliminating harmful subsidies, assess progress through concrete results and strengthen the role of nature in climate adaptation.
Finance will be one of the central issues in Yerevan, as the Global Biodiversity Framework calls for the mobilisation of at least $200bn [€178bn] a year from all sources by 2030. Public investment must remain the foundation of this effort, but private capital will also be needed.
With this aim, the commission presented its roadmap for nature credits in July 2025 and is now developing the methodologies, certification systems, oversight arrangements and pilot projects needed for their deployment.
These instruments could help finance conservation and restoration, but they will only be useful if they are governed by rigorous rules and deliver real, verifiable and additional benefits for biodiversity. They must never replace public funding or be used to justify damage to nature in one place in exchange for financing action elsewhere.
COP17 must also consolidate the Cali Fund, which was created so that companies benefiting from the use of digital information on genetic resources contribute to biodiversity conservation. The agreement reached at COP16 was an important step, but we now need real contributions and a fair distribution of resources, including for Indigenous Peoples and local communities.
Another priority must be to eliminate incentives and subsidies that harm biodiversity. It makes no sense to call for new resources to protect nature while public budgets continue to support activities that destroy it.
The European Union should therefore examine its own policies honestly, particularly in areas such as agriculture, fisheries, energy and infrastructure, and establish a timetable for progressively phasing out and ultimately eliminating this harmful support.
The global review must also measure concrete results. Success cannot be assessed simply by counting strategies or setting targets. We need to know whether ecosystems are recovering, whether species are in better condition, whether protected areas are being managed effectively and whether funding is actually reaching action on the ground.
We must also strengthen the connection between biodiversity and climate adaptation. The droughts, floods, heatwaves and wildfires affecting Europe show that protecting and restoring nature is not a secondary concern. Healthy ecosystems are among our best defences against the effects of climate change and represent a direct investment in our security, agriculture and economy.
All these priorities lead us inevitably to the European budget, because political commitments are only credible when they are backed by sufficient resources.
There is currently a clear contradiction between the leadership that the European Union wishes to maintain on biodiversity and the place given to it in the proposal for the 2028-2034 financial framework.
Although the commission proposes that 35 percent of the next budget should contribute jointly to climate and environmental objectives, it removes the specific 10 percent target for biodiversity included in the current budget and no longer presents LIFE as a standalone programme.
By placing biodiversity within much broader objectives and funds, its financing becomes less visible and risks being pushed aside by priorities such as security, defence and competitiveness.
Parliament must defend sufficient and clearly identifiable resources for biodiversity and for the activities currently financed through LIFE.
Simplification can make funding easier to access, but it must not reduce environmental ambition, transparency or democratic oversight.
This budget debate also affects our international credibility. Europe cannot ask other countries to increase their ambition and financial contributions while weakening budgetary support for biodiversity within the Union itself. Our leadership in Yerevan will depend not only on what we defend in the negotiations, but also on what we are able to implement and finance at home.
Europe has strong laws, valuable experience and the capacity to lead. We do not need to start again. We need to deliver what we have already agreed, provide the necessary resources and use COP17 to accelerate global action.
The global review cannot be limited to describing how far we remain from the 2030 targets. It must help us agree on how to close that gap during the four years that remain. I will travel to Yerevan with the European Parliament delegation determined to support that objective.
Dalle strade del Sud arriva una domanda che riguarda tutto il Paese: chi decide quanto costa produrre in Italia, e chi ne paga il prezzo quando la decisione viene presa altrove.
Una mappa che segue l’energia
A metà ottobre, per un camionista siciliano, tenere il mezzo fermo nel piazzale costa meno che metterlo in strada. Con il gasolio intorno ai 2,40 euro al litro sull’isola, il Comitato autotrasportatori siciliani stima fra 700 e 900 euro di perdita al giorno per ogni camion. Il coordinatore Salvatore Bella l’ha detto senza giri di parole: «Oggi lavorare in perdita con il gasolio a 2,40 al litro non è più possibile». Ne è nato il fermo che va dalla mezzanotte del 16 ottobre al 20, senza cortei: i tir restano nelle aziende, i semirimorchi non vengono ritirati dai porti. In Calabria Fedralog ha fermato i mezzi negli stessi giorni, mentre la sezione trasporti di Confindustria Catania ha deliberato all’unanimità uno stop fino al 22.
Il fermo arriva dopo settimane di mobilitazione. Il 1° ottobre agricoltori e autotrasportatori hanno bloccato lo svincolo di Pizzo sulla A2; il 12 i trattori hanno presidiato le portinerie del polo industriale tra Augusta e Melilli, rallentando il carico delle autobotti, per iniziativa degli stessi produttori e senza sigle sindacali alle spalle. In Puglia i blocchi hanno impedito l’accesso delle autocisterne alla raffineria Eni di Taranto, a ridosso dell’ex Ilva, i cui lavoratori sono in sciopero dal 12 ottobre. Gli olivicoltori sommano al caro carburante il calo del prezzo dell’olio. Il 22 toccherà ai pescatori: giornata di sciopero nazionale e cento pescherecci a chiudere simbolicamente lo Stretto di Messina.
La geografia dei presìdi dice qualcosa che i comunicati non dicono. Raffinerie, porti, svincoli autostradali, lo Stretto: chi protesta va a colpire i nodi da cui passa l’energia, come se sapesse bene dove nasce il problema. E c’è un paradosso evidente. Il Sud ospita Augusta, Priolo, Taranto, cioè una parte rilevante della capacità di raffinazione del Paese, ma i produttori che vivono a pochi chilometri da quegli impianti non riescono più a pagarne il prodotto.
La guerra arriva alla pompa
Queste proteste sono la coda italiana di una crisi aperta lontano. I rincari sono partiti con la guerra in Iran e con le difficoltà di approvvigionamento dal Golfo: già a fine marzo, nel Siracusano, il gasolio agricolo era salito da 0,88 a 1,45 euro al litro. A settembre la media nazionale del gasolio superava i 2,16 euro, 35 centesimi più di febbraio; il 12 ottobre il self costava in media 2,252 euro. La crisi di Hormuz, che finora abbiamo letto soprattutto come stress test per le petromonarchie e per i flussi finanziari del Golfo, ha anche una trasmissione verso il basso. Lungo la catena, ogni anello scarica il costo su quello successivo, finché arriva a chi non ha nessuno a valle: il piccolo autotrasportatore che non può ritoccare le tariffe, l’agricoltore che vende a prezzi fissati dalla grande distribuzione.
Le isole pagano due volte. Al carburante si sommano i noli marittimi, appesantiti dalle nuove regole ambientali sul trasporto navale, e i ritardi del Sea Modal Shift, l’ex Marebonus che dovrebbe compensare il costo del passaggio via mare da e per la Sicilia e la cui prima annualità non è stata pagata entro giugno. Le risposte arrivate finora agiscono sul prezzo alla pompa (tagli temporanei delle accise, il tetto annunciato da Eni sulla propria rete dal 28 settembre) e quasi mai sulla struttura dei costi. Per un trattore che brucia 300 euro di gasolio a mattina, uno sconto di 15 centesimi non cambia i conti.
Letta con gli strumenti dell’analisi dei sistemi-mondo, la vicenda ha una forma riconoscibile: gli shock esterni attraversano il centro e si depositano sulla periferia, che ha meno margini per assorbirli. Il Mezzogiorno funziona da periferia interna dell’Europa. Importa energia a prezzi di mercato globale, esporta prodotti agricoli in competizione con importazioni soggette a standard diversi, dipende da una logistica strada-mare che nessun incentivo pagato in ritardo riesce a rendere sostenibile. Su questo si innestano fragilità di lungo periodo come il credito difficile, lo spopolamento e l’arretramento dei servizi, che l’autonomia differenziata rischia di accentuare.
La copertura nazionale ha registrato i blocchi come cronaca del traffico più che come fatto politico. È una scelta che pesa: una protesta trattata come disagio stradale non obbliga nessuno a rispondere sul merito. Eppure il merito è chiaro. Un Paese che importa gli effetti delle guerre altrui senza strumenti propri per governare il costo dell’energia finisce per trasferirli sui territori e sulle categorie più deboli.
Per le prossime settimane gli indicatori da seguire sono pochi e osservabili: un intervento specifico sul gasolio agricolo e da autotrazione, il pagamento del Sea Modal Shift, l’eventuale proroga dei fermi oltre il 20 e il 22, la saldatura con lo sciopero dei pescatori. In assenza di misure, gli stessi promotori siciliani hanno già prospettato di proseguire. Se accadrà, sarà difficile continuare a chiamarla una vertenza di categoria.
Dalle strade del Sud arriva una domanda che riguarda tutto il Paese: chi decide quanto costa produrre in Italia, e chi ne paga il prezzo quando la decisione viene presa altrove.
European Central Bank President Christine Lagarde has warned that a sharp sell-off in government bonds is tightening financial conditions across the eurozone, threatening to weaken economic growth at a time when European governments are already struggling with mounting debt and higher energy prices.
Speaking during the International Monetary Fund’s annual meetings on Saturday, 17 October, Lagarde said rising bond yields were imposing additional pressure on the European economy, potentially reducing demand and helping to bring inflation down.
Her comments came as investors demanded higher returns on government debt across major developed economies, reflecting concerns about persistent inflation, widening budget deficits and the substantial borrowing requirements associated with investment in artificial intelligence.
The development presents a complicated situation for the ECB, which has already raised its key interest rate twice this year in response to renewed inflationary pressure following the conflict in the Middle East.
Higher government bond yields effectively tighten monetary conditions even without a further decision by the central bank to increase official interest rates.
The latest sell-off has pushed borrowing costs higher across Europe, although the pressure is particularly acute in countries with large public debts and persistent budget deficits.
When investors sell government bonds, their market prices fall and yields rise. Those higher yields eventually feed into the costs of borrowing for governments, businesses and households.
Lagarde indicated that financial conditions had become tighter than assumed in the ECB’s September economic forecasts.
According to her latest assessment of the bond market, the resulting slowdown in demand could help moderate inflation, but would also place additional pressure on an economy whose growth prospects remain limited.
The ECB’s September projections forecast eurozone economic growth of just 0.9 per cent in 2026, followed by 1.4 per cent in 2027 and 1.5 per cent in 2028.
Inflation was expected to average 3.0 per cent this year before declining to 2.5 per cent in 2027 and 2.1 per cent in 2028.
Those forecasts were based on assumptions about financial conditions and energy prices that may no longer fully reflect developments in international markets.
France has emerged as one of the most vulnerable major eurozone economies because of its high public debt, persistent deficits and political disagreements over fiscal consolidation.
French government bond yields have risen sharply as investors question whether Paris can deliver the spending reductions required to stabilise its finances.
As EU Today reported earlier this month, eurozone finance ministers have been pressing France to produce a credible budget that would restore confidence in the country’s fiscal position.
The borrowing premium demanded on French debt relative to German government bonds has also widened, reflecting investors’ concerns about the financial outlook and the political difficulties surrounding the 2027 budget.
The IMF has warned that continued increases in borrowing costs could eventually force the French government to undertake more substantial fiscal adjustments.
In its assessment of French bond yields, the Fund said the immediate pressures remained manageable, partly because France benefits from established debt markets and relatively long borrowing maturities.
Nevertheless, persistently elevated yields would increase the cost of refinancing government debt as existing bonds mature.
The wider concern is that higher borrowing costs could reduce the room available for public investment and other expenditure across several European economies simultaneously.
Lagarde’s intervention coincided with renewed warnings from the IMF about the sustainability of European public finances.
In its latest European economic assessment, the Fund argued that governments must either accelerate economic growth or reduce borrowing to prevent debt burdens from becoming increasingly difficult to manage.
The IMF expects eurozone growth of approximately 1.1 per cent in 2026 and 1.2 per cent in 2027, with continuing pressure from energy costs, demographic changes and weak productivity.
The European Commission’s forecasts indicate that eurozone government debt could rise from 88.7 per cent of GDP in 2025 to 91.2 per cent in 2027.
The IMF has also identified structural weaknesses, including barriers within the European single market, which restrict investment and productivity growth.
These problems are becoming more difficult to address as European governments face demands for greater defence expenditure, infrastructure investment and support for industries affected by higher energy prices.
The ECB has already increased its deposit rate to 2.5 per cent following successive increases in June and September.
As EU Today reported after September’s decision, the central bank has been attempting to contain inflation generated by rising energy costs without causing a more substantial economic slowdown.
The IMF now expects at least one additional quarter-percentage-point increase before the end of 2026.
Such a decision would bring the deposit rate to 2.75 per cent, although the ECB has not committed itself to that outcome.
The challenge is that tighter monetary policy would coincide with financial restrictions already being imposed by bond markets.
At the same time, higher energy prices continue to affect household purchasing power and business operating costs.
In her statement to the International Monetary and Financial Committee, Lagarde acknowledged that the eurozone had proved more resilient than expected, while warning that risks to growth remained tilted to the downside and risks to inflation to the upside.
The duration of the Middle East conflict, developments in energy markets and changes in investor confidence will be important in determining the economic outlook.
For the ECB, a bond-market slowdown could reduce the need for further interest-rate increases by weakening demand. But if energy-driven inflation remains elevated, the central bank may still face pressure to tighten policy.
Europe’s governments, meanwhile, have considerably less control over the borrowing costs demanded by international investors.
The next ECB interest-rate decision will therefore take place against an increasingly difficult combination of sluggish growth, persistent inflation and financial markets imposing their own constraints on public and private borrowing.
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