Egypt, a regional military power, has pledged to provide all forms of assistance to defend Saudi Arabia amid escalating Houthi attacks from Yemen, in a move aimed at maintaining its strategic position in the Gulf.

But analysts view another geopolitical objective behind the Egyptian support for Riyadh: countering Israel’s bid to play a security role in a region vital to Cairo’s political and economic interests.

On 17 October, President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi said Egypt would take any necessary measures to protect Saudi Arabia if Riyadh requested assistance. He called an emergency parliamentary session to authorise possible troop deployment.

The following day, the National Defence Council, Egypt’s top security body, pledged to provide all necessary and possible support to safeguard Saudi Arabia’s security, stability, and territorial integrity.

The Egyptian pledge came after US President Donald Trump said on 16 October that Israel had been helping Saudi Arabia counter Houthi attacks from Yemen and suggested Riyadh should accept further Israeli assistance.

It followed Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s visit to Cairo last month to seek support against the Iran-backed Houthis. The visit highlighted the importance of Egyptian-Saudi coordination on issues affecting the Red Sea and wider regional stability.

For Cairo, which has longstanding strategic ties with Riyadh, the prospect of Israel becoming a more prominent security partner for the kingdom adds urgency to its efforts to reinforce its role in regional security.

“Egypt’s interest lies in doing everything possible to strengthen its ties with Saudi Arabia, or at least to ensure that its relationship with Riyadh is closer than Israel’s,” Ahmed Aboudouh, an associate fellow at Chatham House in London, told The New Arab.

Strengthening ties with Saudi Arabia offers Egypt significant economic and geopolitical benefits as Cairo seeks foreign investment, financial support, and foreign currency. The kingdom is also important for millions of Egyptians working there, whose remittances provide a vital source of foreign currency.

Closer coordination with Riyadh also helps Egypt protect its interests in the Red Sea, particularly shipping through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, a key route to the Suez Canal and a major source of revenue for Cairo.

During Trump’s first term, the US brokered the Abraham Accords in 2020 to normalise relations between Israel and Arab countries, including Saudi Arabia’s neighbours, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Bahrain, allowing Tel Aviv to expand its economic, diplomatic, and security partnerships in the Gulf.

The American president has also pushed for normalising ties between Saudi Arabia and Israel, but Riyadh insists that any normalisation depends on resolving the Palestinian issue, including the establishment of a Palestinian state.

If Riyadh accepts any Israeli assistance against Houthi attacks, cooperation in areas such as intelligence sharing and air defence could expand, potentially giving Israel a greater role in Gulf security.

For Egypt, that possibility raises concerns about a changing regional balance in which Israel could become a more influential security partner for Arab states traditionally linked to Cairo.

Cairo's bid to keep Israel at bay

“Egypt would oppose any attempt by Israel to become a player in the Arab world’s collective security, regardless of who was involved, and Saudi Arabia would certainly stand with Cairo. This means keeping Israel out of regional military and intelligence cooperation,” Egyptian military expert Samir Ragheb told The New Arab.

Egypt was the first Arab country to sign a peace treaty with Israel in 1979, following decades of conflict and several wars, but their relations have remained largely cold despite formal diplomatic ties.

The relationship has been marked by mutual distrust, periodic tensions, and regional competition, particularly over Gaza and broader Middle East security arrangements.

Egyptian political analyst Mokhtar Ghobashi said Egypt’s pledge to defend Saudi Arabia could deter Israel from seeking a security role in the Gulf.

“Relying on Israel as a security guarantor for a country in the Arab world, amid divisions and conflicts between Arab states, is an extremely dangerous proposition,” he told The New Arab.

Since the 2020 Abraham Accords, security cooperation between Israel and some Gulf states has expanded, including arms sales and coordination on air and missile defence amid shared concerns over Iran.

Egypt’s support for Saudi Arabia reflects its interest in preserving its regional influence and maintaining a central role in shaping the security arrangements in the Middle East.

Cairo could face greater competition for influence if Riyadh turns to Israel for certain defence capabilities. While this would not necessarily weaken Egyptian-Saudi relations, it could reduce Egypt’s role in shaping the kingdom’s security policy.

The implications extend beyond bilateral relations. Closer security ties between Israel and Saudi Arabia could give Tel Aviv a greater role in shaping regional responses to threats, from Yemen’s Houthis to Iran.

Protecting Egypt's strategic interests

Red Sea security is another concern for Cairo. A broader Israeli security role in the Gulf could give Tel Aviv greater influence over decisions affecting the Bab el-Mandeb, a vital maritime corridor central to Egypt’s national interests.

Aboudouh said another objective behind Egypt’s pledge to defend Saudi Arabia is to protect its strategic interests in the Red Sea and around Bab el-Mandeb.

“Egyptian officials may have concluded that expanding the country’s regional role is now crucial to protecting maritime traffic through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait against any Houthi attempt to exploit a conflict with Saudi Arabia to disrupt shipping, as they have done in the past,” he told The New Arab.

Egypt has been hard-hit by regional instability following Israel’s war on the Gaza Strip and Houthi attacks on shipping in the Red Sea since 2023, losing an estimated around $20 billion in Suez Canal revenues.

Sisi framed Egypt’s potential role in Saudi Arabia as defensive, saying Cairo had no intention of attacking any party but was prepared to defend Saudi Arabia if requested. “We do not want to fight or attack anyone. We will only defend Saudi Arabia,” he said.

Egypt joined the Saudi-led coalition that intervened in Yemen against the Houthis in 2015, but its role remained limited. A deeper commitment now could expose Cairo to a costly conflict, particularly if operations extend beyond the defence of Saudi territory.

It could also strain Egypt’s resources and increase its exposure to instability along the Red Sea.

The extent and form of any Egyptian assistance will therefore be crucial. Intelligence-sharing, logistical support and maritime security cooperation would carry different risks from deploying troops to Yemen.

Cairo may seek to bolster Saudi Arabia’s defences while avoiding involvement in an open-ended conflict.

Mohamed Sabry is an Egyptian journalist based in Cairo with over two decades of experience covering Egypt, regional politics, foreign policy, and diplomacy. His work has appeared in Al-Monitor and InsideOver

Follow him on X: @MohamedSabry079

Edited by Charlie Hoyle

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The Houthis are seeking to manufacture parts of advanced Iranian-designed medium-range ballistic missiles inside Yemen, according to new research that raises questions about how effectively Saudi Arabia can interrupt the group’s ability to sustain its attacks.

In a report published on 14 October and previewed by The Wall Street Journal, Conflict Armament Research (CAR) identified components associated with the Iranian-designed Kheibar Shekan missile family alongside industrial equipment and raw materials in shipments intended for Houthi-controlled territory.

Shipping documents identified a Chinese supplier, suggesting that the group is expanding its procurement beyond Iran-linked networks.

The findings come as Riyadh faces repeated attacks on airports and other critical infrastructure. The strikes have disrupted aviation and exposed the costs of protecting a vast country against an adversary whose arsenal and methods have developed through years of war.

For Saudi Arabia, the concern extends beyond the specifications of an individual missile. A growing ability to source components, manufacture selected parts and adapt how different weapons are used could make the Houthi strike campaign more difficult to contain.

Beyond imported missile kits

The October report concerns four containers documented by Yemeni authorities in July 2026. They had arrived in Aden’s free zone aboard two vessels in June and October 2025, carrying shipments from China whose intended destination was the Houthi-controlled port of Hodeidah.

The cargo included machined components associated with the airframe and rocket motor of the Kheibar Shekan series, one of Iran’s most advanced and longest-range ballistic missiles, together with materials and machinery potentially useful for manufacturing and testing.

Their presence points towards an effort to produce parts locally, beyond reassembling weapons delivered in separate packages.

“Inspection of the cargo revealed Houthi ambitions to at least partially manufacture medium-range ballistic missiles inside Yemen,” Fabian Hinz, a senior analyst at CAR, told The New Arab. “Whether that effort has succeeded, remains a work in progress or has met major obstacles remains difficult to determine.”

Douglas Barrie, senior fellow for military aerospace at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), outlined a more limited scenario. “Final local assembly with domestic manufacturing of some components I think is most likely,” he told The New Arab.

The systems involved nevertheless represent a substantial ambition. Iran unveiled the original solid-propellant Kheibar Shekan in 2022, with a reported range of 1,450 kilometres. The missile was first used against targets in Syria in January 2024, and later against Israel and US bases in the MENA region.

CAR identifies several related variants in Houthi service, giving the group access to designs intended for long-range strikes and equipped with manoeuvring features that could complicate interception.

Earlier seizures show that the supply chain encompasses both weapons and the means to assemble or produce them. A shipment intercepted in Aden in August 2025, for example, included drone and propulsion-related equipment and advanced control components, according to US Central Command.

A separate CAR briefing, published in September, described missile kits bearing assembly labels that used Iranian rather than Houthi designations, suggesting they were produced in Iran. Broadening the supplier base would loosen that dependence.

“Sourcing components and raw materials from suppliers beyond Iran-linked networks can reduce dependence and potentially eliminate bottlenecks,” Hinz said. He cautioned that independence depends on the weapons involved: small drones built largely from commercial components are easier to manufacture than systems requiring specialised parts.

“For the more advanced weapons, the Houthis will likely continue to rely on the import of key subsystems, but further developing a domestic capability could increasingly allow for the manufacture of less sophisticated guided weapons. This would reduce dependency on external actors,” Barrie added.

Farzin Nadimi, a senior fellow at the Washington Institute, sees the Chinese supply chain as a substitute for “the Iranian one, which has been severely hampered by the US naval blockade”.

The cargo documented by CAR arrived in 2025, before the current blockade, so such channels were already in use; they are likely to matter more now that Iranian routes are under pressure. Replacement has limits, however. “Houthis still depend on Iran for critical missile subsystems and guidance components,” Nadimi told The New Arab. “The Houthis cannot get those from China.”

Chinese suppliers, in other words, can provide raw materials and machined parts, but not the most sensitive components. Nor is the technology itself new. Kheibar Shekan and Fattah technology, Nadimi said, “has been transferred to Houthis for quite some time now”, though he could not say whether the group has incorporated “the latest upgrade kits”.

Iran unveiled the Fattah, which it describes as hypersonic, in 2023. The new evidence therefore concerns ambitions to manufacture parts locally, rather than the first acquisition of those technologies.

The concern predates CAR’s latest findings. On 11 September 2025, the US Treasury sanctioned Hubei Chica Industrial Co., Ltd., accusing the China-based supplier of coordinating with Houthi procurement operatives to provide chemical precursors used to manufacture ballistic missiles, explosives and other weapons inside Yemen.

The US Treasury also accused China-based Shenzhen Shengnan Trading of shipping dual-use electronics to Houthi front companies.

CAR’s evidence requires qualification. Shipping documents identified a Chinese precision-metal producer advertising custom aerospace components, but investigators have not traced the items with the manufacturer or independently verified the documentation. The findings do not establish Chinese government involvement, production volumes or a link to specific attacks on Saudi Arabia.

For Riyadh, this widens the interdiction challenge to commercial suppliers and intermediaries beyond Iran. It also gives the kingdom an incentive to seek Beijing’s cooperation on export controls and end-use checks.

An evolving strike campaign

The industrial investigation coincides with indications that the Houthis are refining how they employ their weapons. According to the Gulf Research Center, as of 15 October, the Houthis have staged at least 42 attacks on Saudi territory, including nine targeting Riyadh and five targeting energy infrastructure in the Eastern Province. At least one third of these raids involved ballistic missiles.

The Associated Press reported on 12 October that regional officials described drones preceding cruise and ballistic missiles in an attack on Riyadh airport. The sequence suggests an effort to combine weapons with different flight characteristics, although it remains unclear whether the drones acted as decoys.

“Houthis and Iranians have both tested hybrid tactics, and I am sure they compare notes too,” Nadimi told The New Arab.

Iran’s April 2024 attack on Israel combined drones, cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles, while its October 2024 attack relied exclusively on ballistic missiles. The strike on Riyadh airport followed the first pattern.

Mixed attacks require defenders to track threats across different altitudes and speeds, while repeated strikes keep personnel and equipment under pressure. Barrie cautioned that Kheibar Shekan-family missiles must be accounted for even if their actual performance falls short of advertised capabilities, “further complicating the challenges facing a defender”.

CAR’s September briefing identified another operational development: a reconnaissance drone helped cue a close-range ballistic missile against a time-sensitive target. This points to improvements in battlefield targeting, alongside the group’s expanding long-range strike capabilities.

Against Saudi Arabia, repeated attacks on airports and energy infrastructure aim to raise the costs of Riyadh’s intervention in Yemen, pressing the kingdom to scale back support for anti-Houthi forces and ease restrictions on Houthi-controlled ports and airports. The goal is bargaining power, without having to defeat Saudi forces directly.

Inside Yemen, the 15 October attack on Aden, which hit the presidential palace, exposed the internationally recognised government’s vulnerability at its own seat of power, while strikes on Marib appear intended to disrupt preparations for counteroffensives.

In the Red Sea, the threat to shipping gives the Houthis leverage over Riyadh and outside powers weighing intervention, on a trade route made more important by insecurity around the Strait of Hormuz. Their declared blockade of Saudi Arabia ties this maritime pressure to the campaign against the kingdom’s airports.

Together, these operations seek to protect Houthi territorial gains while raising the costs of attempts to reverse them. Greater military reach does not guarantee political concessions, however: attacks causing civilian casualties could instead harden Saudi resolve and draw greater external assistance.

Riyadh's containment dilemma

“They are already changing the battlefield around KSA,” Nadimi told The New Arab. For Saudi Arabia, the challenge is both immediate and cumulative: preventing the next strike while reducing the Houthis’ ability to keep launching them.

ACLED reported on 12 October that Houthi strikes and attempted strikes on Saudi territory had more than doubled over the preceding week. An airport need not be destroyed for airlines to suspend services.

Interception also consumes finite resources. Regional officials have reported pressure on Saudi interceptor stocks during the wider Iran war, making replenishment and outside assistance central to sustaining the defensive effort.

Offensive operations face a different problem: airstrikes can destroy launchers, depots and workshops, but suppressing the campaign means repeatedly locating assets that may be mobile, concealed or dispersed. Nor have Houthi air defences closed Yemeni airspace: CTP-ISW assessed on 15 October that the group’s occasional successful engagements had not significantly disrupted the Saudi air campaign.

Wider procurement networks and partial local manufacturing could make replenishment harder to interrupt, even without making the Houthis self-sufficient, while imported subsystems remain a point of vulnerability.

Riyadh’s challenge is to reduce both the group’s ability to rebuild its arsenal and the political leverage it derives from using it.

Francesco Salesio Schiavi is an Italian specialist in the Middle East. His focus lies in the security architecture of the Levant and the Gulf, with a particular emphasis on Iraq, Iran, and the Arab Peninsula, as well as military and diplomatic interventions by international actors

Follow him on X: @frencio_schiavi

Edited by Charlie Hoyle

On 5 October, Lebanon’s Internal Security Forces stopped a van with two people on board at the Dahr al-Baydar checkpoint.

When searched, authorities discovered and then seized about 780 kg of explosives, including TNT and Composition C-4 plastic.

The two people arrested were reportedly linked to Hezbollah. They were tasked with transporting the cargo from the Bekaa region to Beirut.

The reported involvement of Hezbollah members in the explosives seizure prompted a wave of accusations from the group’s political rivals, with some suggesting they could be used for internal political assassinations.

Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea called the seizure “the most dangerous incident in years”, saying the weapons were probably meant for use inside Lebanon.

Kataeb leader Samy Gemayel wrote they were probably intended for a new wave of assassinations like those between 2004 and 2008, including that of former prime minister Rafic Hariri in 2005.

Lebanon’s prime minister, Nawaf Salam, also noted that C-4 had been used in previous assassinations and promised a full investigation.

However, on 15 October, Hezbollah MP Hassan Fadlallah acknowledged that the vehicle and its cargo belonged to the group. He denied allegations of an assassination plot and stated that the explosives are part of the capabilities Hezbollah uses against Israel, demanding the return of the shipment.

On the same day, US Secretary of State Marc Rubio reportedly called Lebanon’s President Joseph Aoun, urging him not to return confiscated explosives to Hezbollah.

Hezbollah’s demand for the return of the explosives has further strained its relationship with a government that has banned the group’s military activity and is pushing to disarm it.

Israel's occupation creates openings for Hezbollah to rebuild

The discovery of explosive materials comes as Israel continues to occupy swathes of southern Lebanon and launch near-daily strikes despite a US-brokered ceasefire agreed in June.

Hezbollah has halted its attacks since then, but the seizure of explosives points to efforts to rebuild its military capabilities as the risk of renewed US-Iran conflict threatens to reignite the Lebanese front.

It is not uncommon for Hezbollah to use ceasefire windows to rebuild its capabilities following a conflict with Israel.

Between the November 2024 ceasefire that ended the Israel-Hezbollah war linked to Gaza and March 2026, reports indicate that the group has rebuilt its command structure and rearmed with assistance from Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

David Wood, senior Lebanon analyst at the International Crisis Group (ICG), said that Israel’s continued occupation and attacks in Lebanon also contribute to the conditions that enable the group’s rebuilding.

“While it might be true that Hezbollah continues to operate militarily, despite the Lebanese government wanting to have a state monopoly over arms, it would be much harder for Hezbollah to do that if Israel were more willing to grant actual concessions as part of its negotiations with Lebanon and to create a viable and fair security arrangement between the two countries,” he told The New Arab.

The US-brokered framework signed in June between Lebanon and Israel has yielded limited results. Lebanon demands an end to Israeli attacks and occupation, the release of detainees, and the return of the displaced. Israel ties these conditions to Hezbollah’s disarmament, which the group rejects.

Israel has continued its military operations in southern Lebanon, occupying more than 600 square kilometres of Lebanese territory while conducting near-daily airstrikes, artillery fire, and home demolitions.

It has mostly levelled 48 of about 60 occupied southern Lebanese towns and villages. In September, Israeli forces took control of the strategic Ali al-Taher ridge near Nabatieh. They previously captured Beaufort Castle and crossed the Litani River.

Lebanon’s Health Ministry says more than 4,300 people have been killed since 2 March, following Hezbollah’s entry into the wider US-Iran war. Nearly 9,000 have been killed since 2023. Almost 330,000 people remain internally displaced.

Nicholas Blandford, a non-resident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programmes, told The New Arab that daily shelling and drone surveillance are ongoing, along with efforts to prevent reconstruction south of the Litani River, even outside the occupied zone.

“So in effect, the Israeli occupation extends far beyond where they are physically deployed. It's been quite intense over the last month,” he said.

Israel is also escalating threats to expand its southern Lebanon occupation. Last week, Israeli Defence Minister Israel Katz warned that Lebanon would lose Nabatieh and the Litani area to permanent Israeli control if Hezbollah joins Iran in attacking Israel.

A renewed Iran war could draw Lebanon back into conflict

In fact, US President Donald Trump is weighing fresh strikes against Iran, with Israel reportedly pushing for renewed hostilities. Iran is likewise preparing for war, and the conflict in Yemen further fuels regional escalation.

RANE’s lead MENA and defence analyst Freddy Khoueiry explained that repeated interceptions of weapons transfers in Syria and recent seizures of Hezbollah-linked material inside Lebanon show that the group is "clearly attempting to reconstitute parts of its military capability" to rebuild supply lines and replenish stock.

“Hezbollah is likely attempting to restore enough capability to at some point defend against a potential Israeli preemptive campaign and at the same time preserve the option to participate in another regional conflict involving Iran,” he told The New Arab.

For example, Khoueiry explained that seized TNT and C-4 could be used in explosive-drone payloads, rocket and missile warheads, and roadside bombs, mines and demolition charges against Israeli forces in southern Lebanon if conflict resumes.

Dual-use items like fibre-optic cables for drones could enter Lebanon through standard commercial channels, providing Hezbollah with an alternative route to Syria.

Hezbollah may be prioritising experimenting with and expanding the use of low-cost, fibre-optic-guided FPV drones, heavily deployed against Israeli troops in southern Lebanon before the June ceasefire, as they offer a cheap, effective, and hard-to-intercept option.

On the ground, the presence of Israeli troops in southern Lebanon may give Hezbollah an opening to use guerrilla tactics, such as small units staging hit-and-run attacks from familiar terrain. Its drone operations there could also expand the pool of trained drone operators.

Wood said that while Israel has vast military superiority, Hezbollah, this year, “has still managed to make a nuisance of itself”, demonstrating that “while it can't win a military victory over Israel, it can still inflict casualties”. Hezbollah drone attacks have reportedly killed at least 12 Israeli soldiers.

However, what Hezbollah’s role would be if the US and Israel resume strikes on Iran remains to be seen.

Blandford said that Hezbollah’s involvement would depend on Iran’s ability to absorb renewed US and Israeli attacks.

“The Iranians may conclude that if they can absorb fresh Israeli and US strikes, they don’t need to involve Hezbollah,” he said. However, if Iran deems additional pressure necessary, it may activate Hezbollah to engage Israel along the border, stretching and diverting Israel's resources.

Khoueiry further explained that Hezbollah’s weakened capabilities and fragile domestic position may limit its initial involvement, though opening a Lebanese front could pressure Israel and strengthen Hezbollah’s and Iran’s negotiating leverage.

“Hezbollah could specifically seek to link pressure on Israeli military presence inside of Lebanon and potentially northern Israel again to demand an Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, while Tehran could again attempt to incorporate the Lebanese front into a broader regional ceasefire or negotiating framework,” he said.

However, other kinds of pressures are also likely to shape Hezbollah’s calculations. The Shia community, estimated at 32% of Lebanon’s population, has borne much of the war’s human cost during the war. Last week, Hezbollah announced plans to financially help families in Lebanon whose homes were destroyed or rendered uninhabitable.

Polls diverge on Shia support for Hezbollah’s weapons, with a May poll finding that most respondents opposed disarmament and a September survey finding that most favoured placing their weapons under state control, reflecting the complexity of the group’s relationship with its constituency.

Wood said that Hezbollah weighs the suffering of its constituency but, at the same time, also weighs its deep alliance with Iran.

The group also argues that disarmament would leave the Shia community and Lebanon “wide open to Israeli abuses,” and at times, it “has used those factors to justify its decision to enter conflict in Lebanon, in the knowledge that the Shia will first and foremost pay the price”.

Blandford also argued that if Hezbollah loses Shia support, “then the game is over.”

“It doesn't matter how many weapons or how much money the Iranians give Hezbollah; if they haven't got the support of the Shia community, it's finished.”

Dario Sabaghi is a freelance journalist interested in human rights 

Follow him on X: @DarioSabaghi

Edited by Charlie Hoyle

Talks in Oslo have restored diplomatic contact between Kyiv and Washington, but Donald Trump continues to demand concessions from Ukraine while Moscow shows little willingness to compromise. Steve Witkoff’s forthcoming meeting with Russian officials will expose the limits of the American peace initiative.

The latest negotiations over Russia’s war against Ukraine have produced a renewed diplomatic initiative, with US presidential envoy Steve Witkoff preparing to travel to St Petersburg on Wednesday, 21 October, following consultations with Ukrainian and European leaders in Oslo.

President Volodymyr Zelenskyy met Witkoff alongside Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre and Finnish President Alexander Stubb on Tuesday. Jared Kushner, Donald Trump’s son-in-law, participated remotely. The discussions covered territorial questions, security guarantees, sanctions and proposals for a partial ceasefire.

The meeting concluded with cautious expressions of optimism. Stubb suggested that the negotiating process was back on track, while Støre confirmed that Witkoff would present proposals developed by American, Ukrainian and European representatives to the Russian leadership.

However, the diplomatic improvement contrasts with Trump’s renewed public pressure on Zelenskyy, raising questions about Washington’s negotiating strategy and whether Moscow has any intention of accepting the proposed settlement.

Washington’s contradictory signals

Speaking in the Oval Office on Tuesday, Trump again insisted that Ukraine must reach an agreement with Russia, portraying Moscow’s military position as increasingly advantageous.

His remarks closely resembled arguments advanced during earlier disputes with Zelenskyy, when Washington pressed Kyiv to accept territorial concessions rather than increase pressure on the Kremlin.

Meanwhile, Secretary of State Marco Rubio sought to reassure the Ukrainian leadership that American military cooperation had not been deliberately restricted.

Rubio denied that Trump had ordered changes to intelligence-sharing or weapons assistance. Zelenskyy subsequently confirmed that Ukraine was again receiving American early-warning intelligence concerning Russian ballistic missile attacks.

Nevertheless, serious problems remain. Ukraine has reported delays in deliveries of American-made Patriot interceptors purchased by European allies, while restrictions affecting the military Starshield satellite communications system have not been fully resolved.

These difficulties are particularly serious as Russia intensifies attacks against Ukrainian electricity infrastructure, attempting to undermine civilian services ahead of winter.

The conflicting signals leave Kyiv negotiating with an administration whose diplomatic representatives promise continued cooperation while its president publicly demands Ukrainian concessions.

Security guarantees without NATO membership

Among the proposals discussed in Oslo were security arrangements intended to provide Ukraine with protection comparable to NATO’s Article 5 collective-defence provision.

Zelenskyy acknowledged that American representatives had discussed such guarantees, although their precise obligations and enforcement mechanisms remain undisclosed.

The proposal presents a fundamental negotiating problem.

Russia has consistently opposed Ukrainian NATO membership, partly because the alliance’s collective-defence commitments would increase the consequences of any renewed Russian aggression.

An alternative arrangement offering genuinely comparable protection would consequently encounter many of the same Russian objections.

Conversely, guarantees lacking a credible enforcement mechanism would leave Ukraine exposed to another attack after a ceasefire.

Moscow’s record provides little reassurance. Russia violated Ukraine’s internationally recognised borders in 2014 and launched its full-scale invasion in 2022 despite previous commitments to respect Ukrainian sovereignty.

The Kremlin’s objectives extend beyond territory

Washington’s approach appears increasingly concentrated on securing an agreement involving territorial concessions and restrictions on Ukraine’s future security arrangements.

Yet Putin’s objectives have consistently extended beyond the territories occupied by Russian forces.

The Kremlin has demanded constraints on Ukraine’s military capabilities, international alliances and strategic independence. Accepting territorial gains alone would not necessarily satisfy Moscow’s wider political ambitions.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has maintained that Moscow is unwilling to make substantial political concessions, while the Kremlin continues to insist that any agreement must address what it describes as the underlying causes of the conflict.

Those conditions have previously included demands that would substantially restrict Ukraine’s sovereignty.

Consequently, even a Ukrainian willingness to consider elements of Washington’s proposals would not guarantee Russian acceptance.

The political calculation behind an energy ceasefire

One possibility under consideration is a limited ceasefire protecting energy and potentially food-related infrastructure.

Zelenskyy has indicated that Ukraine could suspend attacks against Russian energy facilities if Moscow stopped striking Ukrainian infrastructure.

Such an arrangement could reduce immediate civilian suffering. It would also have military and economic consequences.

Ukrainian attacks against Russian refineries, oil terminals and other energy installations have increasingly targeted infrastructure supporting Moscow’s war economy.

A temporary suspension could allow Russia to repair damaged facilities, restore production and stabilise export revenues. Without credible monitoring and enforcement, Moscow could exploit a limited agreement while leaving the wider conflict unresolved.

Trump has additional reasons to seek a rapid diplomatic result. With American congressional elections scheduled for 3 November, his administration is attempting to contain domestic fuel prices and demonstrate progress towards ending the war.

His recent decision to ease restrictions on Russian diesel exports has already provoked concern in Kyiv and European capitals over the potential financial benefits to Moscow.

The danger for Ukraine is that an agreement presented as a diplomatic achievement in Washington could provide Russia with economic relief without altering its military objectives.

The decision awaiting Washington

Witkoff’s visit to St Petersburg will establish whether Moscow is prepared to engage with the proposals developed in Oslo.

Putin could accept a temporary arrangement, particularly one suspending Ukrainian strikes on Russian energy infrastructure, while postponing discussions over territorial and political questions.

Alternatively, Moscow could reject the initiative and maintain its existing demands.

In either case, Washington will face a decision over the consequences of Russian intransigence.

For Kyiv, continued engagement with the United States remains essential because American intelligence, satellite communications and advanced air-defence weapons cannot readily be replaced.

But the prospects for a negotiated settlement will depend less on further Ukrainian concessions than on whether Russia faces sufficient political, military and economic pressure to abandon its maximalist demands.

The Oslo negotiations have restored cooperation between Ukraine, Europe and American mediators. They have not established that Putin is prepared to end the war on terms compatible with Ukraine’s continued independence.