Rick Devens, 42, vencedor do reality show “Big Brother” dos Estados Unidos, e sua esposa, Becca Devens, 40, contaram nas redes sociais neste domingo (25) que ela está com câncer.

“Fui diagnosticada com câncer de mama. Isso é uma droga, mas descobrimos bem no início porque eu faço minhas mamografias certinho. Vou fazer uma mastectomia dupla — mas, como pegamos bem no começo, achamos que é só isso que vamos precisar fazer, o que é ótimo”, disseram em um vídeo.

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Becca contou que vai fazer um exame de ressonância magnética nesta terça-feira (27) para descobrir com mais precisão onde o câncer está.

“Se vocês quiserem mandar energias e orações, seria incrível. As crianças estão bem, e vamos mantendo todos informados”, concluíram. O casal tem dois filhos: Jackson, de 12 anos, e Juliet, de 9 anos.

Rick saiu vencedor do “Big Brother” no dia 2 de outubro — quando recebeu o prêmio de US$ 810 mil (cerca de R$ 4,4 milhões).

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Conheça as versões do Big Brother de outros países

Dalla linea ad alta velocità Whoosh in Indonesia all’asse Cina-Laos e ai cantieri in Thailandia e Malaysia, la Nuova Via della Seta sta ridisegnando mobilità, commercio e geografia economica del Sud-Est asiatico, trasformando collegamenti nazionali in una rete regionale.

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Nel Sud-Est asiatico, la Nuova Via della Seta sta assumendo una forma sempre più concreta: viadotti, gallerie, stazioni, terminali logistici e linee elettrificate capaci di ridurre drasticamente distanze che per decenni hanno frenato l’integrazione regionale. Oltre alla possibilità di spostare più rapidamente passeggeri e merci, la posta in gioco è la riorganizzazione della geografia economica di una delle aree più dinamiche del mondo, dove oltre 680 milioni di persone convivono con reti ferroviarie ancora frammentate e spesso desuete, scartamenti differenti e collegamenti transfrontalieri insufficienti.

La Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), nota in italiano come Nuova Via della Seta, sta permettendo oggi di realizzare alcuni ambiziosi progetti in questo senso, come l’obiettivo di collegare Kunming a Singapore, che appartiene da tempo alla pianificazione dell’ASEAN. L’iniziativa cinese ha fornito capacità ingegneristiche, finanziamenti, materiale rotabile, formazione e volontà politica per trasformare una parte di quel disegno in infrastrutture operative. È questa convergenza tra priorità nazionali, integrazione dell’ASEAN e cooperazione con la Cina a spiegare la nuova stagione ferroviaria della regione.

Whoosh, la prova che l’alta velocità può funzionare ai tropici

Il caso più avanzato è quello indonesiano. Entrata in servizio commerciale il 17 ottobre 2023, la Whoosh collega l’area metropolitana di Giacarta con Bandung lungo 142,3 chilometri. I convogli raggiungono i 350 chilometri orari e hanno ridotto il viaggio tra i due principali centri urbani dell’isola di Giava a circa 45 minuti. È stata la prima linea ad alta velocità dell’Indonesia e dell’intero Sud-Est asiatico, ma soprattutto ha dimostrato che tecnologie sviluppate in un contesto continentale possono essere adattate a un territorio tropicale caratterizzato da elevata attività sismica, forti precipitazioni e una complessa densità urbana.

I dati di esercizio mostrano che la ferrovia non è rimasta una vetrina tecnologica. Nel luglio 2026, aveva superato 16,58 milioni di viaggiatori complessivi; i servizi giornalieri erano saliti dai 14 iniziali a 62 e la puntualità si manteneva oltre il 95 per cento. Parallelamente, tecnici e macchinisti indonesiani sono stati formati per assumere funzioni operative, di manutenzione e di sicurezza. Il trasferimento di competenze è essenziale: un’infrastruttura strategica, infatti, produce sviluppo duraturo soltanto quando il Paese che la ospita acquisisce la capacità di gestirla, adattarla ed estenderla. Oggi, infatti, si parla anche di un eventuale prolungamento verso Surabaya, che permetterebbe alla linea di attraversare tutta l’isola di Giava.

La ferrovia Cina-Laos e la trasformazione di un Paese senza sbocco al mare

Se la Whoosh rappresenta la punta tecnologica, la ferrovia Cina-Laos costituisce il caso più significativo dal punto di vista geopolitico e logistico. Il collegamento di 1.035 chilometri fra Kunming e Vientiane è operativo dal dicembre 2021. Sul territorio laotiano attraversa montagne e valli mediante una successione di ponti e gallerie, con treni passeggeri che raggiungono i 160 chilometri orari e servizi merci integrati.

Per il Laos, unico Paese del Sud-Est asiatico privo di accesso al mare, la linea ha cambiato la relazione fra geografia e sviluppo. L’obiettivo dichiarato di passare da Paese landlocked a Paese land-linked non è più soltanto uno slogan: entro marzo 2026 la ferrovia aveva registrato più di 70 milioni di viaggi passeggeri sull’intero asse; nell’agosto successivo aveva movimentato oltre 90 milioni di tonnellate di merci, delle quali più di 21 milioni in traffico transfrontaliero. Nei primi sei mesi del 2026 il valore delle importazioni e delle esportazioni trasportate aveva raggiunto 17,17 miliardi di yuan, con un aumento del 33,8 per cento rispetto all’anno precedente.

Il dato più rilevante non è però il volume assoluto, bensì la diversificazione: dalle poche categorie merceologiche dei primi mesi si è passati a migliaia di prodotti, fra elettronica, pannelli fotovoltaici, fertilizzanti, gomma, macchinari e frutta trasportata nella catena del freddo. La rete merci raggiunge ormai numerosi mercati asiatici, collegando il Laos non soltanto alla Cina ma anche a Thailandia, Vietnam, Malaysia, Singapore e ad altri Paesi. In questa prospettiva, la ferrovia non è un semplice corridoio bilaterale: è la spina dorsale potenziale di un sistema logistico continentale che si innesta sulle reti dell’ASEAN.

La Thailandia costruisce l’anello centrale

Il segmento thailandese sarà determinante per capire se i nuovi collegamenti diventeranno una vera rete nord-sud. La prima fase della ferrovia ad alta velocità sino-thailandese, fra Bangkok e Nakhon Ratchasima, si estende per 250,77 chilometri, prevede sei stazioni e una velocità massima di 250 chilometri orari. Il tempo di percorrenza previsto è di circa un’ora e mezza.

Nel luglio 2026, l’avanzamento complessivo delle opere civili aveva raggiunto il 55,27 per cento: due contratti risultavano completati, dieci erano in costruzione e gli ultimi due in fase di affidamento. Il progetto ha accumulato ritardi e il nuovo obiettivo indicato dalle autorità thailandesi è completare la prima fase entro il 2030. Proprio questa lentezza dimostra che la Nuova Via della Seta non è un meccanismo nel quale Pechino decide e gli altri eseguono. Espropri, appalti, bilanci, autorizzazioni e priorità politiche restano in larga misura nazionali; la cooperazione cinese fornisce tecnologia ferroviaria, progettazione dei sistemi, materiale rotabile e formazione, mentre Bangkok conserva un ruolo centrale nella realizzazione e nel finanziamento delle opere civili.

La seconda fase, approvata dal governo thailandese e ancora in preparazione, dovrebbe proseguire per circa 356 chilometri da Nakhon Ratchasima a Nong Khai, sul fiume Mekong. È questo il tratto che attribuirà al progetto il suo pieno valore regionale. Una volta completati la connessione transfrontaliera e i relativi impianti logistici, Bangkok potrà essere collegata a Vientiane e, attraverso la ferrovia Cina-Laos, a Kunming. La Thailandia diventerebbe così il principale nodo intermedio di un asse destinato, nel lungo periodo, a estendersi verso la Malaysia e Singapore.

La Malaysia e il ponte terrestre fra due mari

In Malaysia, la East Coast Rail Link offre un modello differente. Il progetto complessivo copre 665 chilometri fra Kota Bharu, sulla costa orientale, e Port Klang, sullo Stretto di Malacca. I treni passeggeri sono progettati per raggiungere i 160 chilometri orari, quelli merci per gli 80. Non è quindi alta velocità in senso stretto, ma una grande ferrovia elettrificata a traffico misto e uno dei principali progetti della cooperazione tra Cina e Malaysia nell’ambito della BRI.

Alla fine del 2025, i lavori avevano superato il 90 per cento; il completamento della tratta fino al terminale integrato di Gombak era previsto entro dicembre 2026, con l’avvio commerciale indicato a partire dal gennaio 2027. La Malaysia Rail Link rimane proprietaria del progetto e dell’infrastruttura, mentre la China Communications Construction Company è il principale appaltatore. Per la futura gestione è stata costituita una società con partecipazione paritaria malese e cinese: una struttura che distribuisce responsabilità e incentivi ben oltre la sola fase di costruzione.

Il valore strategico dell’ECRL deriva dalla sua funzione di ponte terrestre. Collegando il porto di Kuantan, rivolto verso il Mar Cinese Meridionale, con il sistema portuale di Port Klang sullo Stretto di Malacca, la ferrovia può offrire ad alcune categorie di merci un’alternativa intermodale al periplo della penisola. Non sostituirà il traffico marittimo, né renderà marginale Singapore, ma può accrescere la resilienza logistica della Malaysia, favorire lo sviluppo delle regioni orientali e distribuire investimenti oggi concentrati nell’area di Kuala Lumpur e sulla costa occidentale.

Il Vietnam prepara il collegamento fra frontiera, capitale e porto

Anche il Vietnam sta entrando in questa geografia ferroviaria, pur con tempi e modalità differenti. Il progetto Lào Cai-Hà Nội-Hải Phòng è stato riorganizzato nel 2026 e prevede circa 363 chilometri di linea principale e 63 chilometri di diramazioni, con scartamento standard di 1.435 millimetri. Il traffico sarà misto: la velocità di progetto raggiungerà 160 chilometri orari sul tratto principale, scendendo nelle aree urbane e sui collegamenti secondari. Parallelamente, esiste anche un programma nazionale distinto per la futura alta velocità nord-sud vietnamita da 350 chilometri orari, in grado di collegare la capitale politica Hà Nội a quella economica Hồ Chí Minh City.

Tornando al primo progetto, esso costituisce un corridoio industriale e logistico destinato a collegare il confine cinese di Lào Cai con Hà Nội e il porto di Hải Phòng. Nel 2025 sono partite attività preliminari e progetti di reinsediamento; nell’autunno 2026 il governo stava completando lo studio di fattibilità e indicava l’inizio dei lavori sulla linea principale per i primi mesi del 2027. La Cina ha fornito assistenza tecnica alla progettazione e i due Paesi hanno inserito la cooperazione ferroviaria nel raccordo fra la strategia vietnamita dei «Due corridoi, una cintura» e la Nuova Via della Seta.

Per Hà Nội il punto essenziale è evitare che il nuovo asse diventi soltanto una via d’ingresso per prodotti cinesi. Collegare le aree manifatturiere del Vietnam settentrionale sia al mercato cinese sia al porto di Hải Phòng può invece rafforzare le esportazioni vietnamite, ridurre i tempi della logistica e integrare le catene del valore elettroniche, meccaniche e agroalimentari. Il progetto mostra inoltre che la cooperazione con Pechino non impedisce al Vietnam di mantenere una politica estera autonoma e rapporti economici diversificati con Giappone, Corea del Sud, Unione Europea e Stati Uniti.

Una nuova geografia per un mondo multipolare

La rappresentazione occidentale della BRI oscilla spesso fra due caricature: da un lato un piano onnipotente con cui la Cina imporrebbe la propria volontà; dall’altro una serie di «cattedrali nel deserto» destinate inevitabilmente al fallimento. La realtà del Sud-Est asiatico è più complessa. I progetti sono stati negoziati, modificati, sospesi, ridimensionati e rilanciati dai governi locali. La Malaysia ha rinegoziato costi e tracciato dell’ECRL; la Thailandia ha scandito gli appalti secondo procedure nazionali; l’Indonesia ha costruito la Whoosh attraverso una società congiunta; il Vietnam definisce autonomamente priorità e calendario; il Laos ha scelto la ferrovia come strumento per superare un vincolo geografico strutturale.

Per secoli l’economia del Sud-Est asiatico è stata organizzata soprattutto attorno alle rotte marittime e ai porti, secondo una struttura rafforzata dall’esperienza coloniale. Le nuove ferrovie non cancellano quella vocazione, ma aggiungono una dimensione continentale. Per secoli l’economia del Sud-Est asiatico è stata organizzata soprattutto attorno alle rotte marittime e ai porti, secondo una struttura rafforzata dall’esperienza coloniale. Le nuove ferrovie non cancellano quella vocazione, ma aggiungono una dimensione continentale.

La Nuova Via della Seta ferroviaria nel Sud-Est asiatico è dunque ancora incompleta, ma ha già superato la fase delle promesse. Il prossimo passaggio sarà trasformare una costellazione di opere in un sistema realmente connesso e vantaggioso per tutti i Paesi coinvolti.

Iniciativa inspira-se no Ano Internacional da Mulher Agricultora e decorre a 3 de dezembro, com participação gratuita A Escola Profissional de Alte promove, no dia 3 de dezembro de 2026, o Encontro sobre o Papel da Mulher na Agricultura e no Desenvolvimento Local, uma iniciativa que se inspira nas comemorações do Ano Internacional da Mulher […]

• A24's new documentary "You Can See Everything" follows Elizabeth Holmes and her partner Billy Evans.
• The movie features an early scene of full-frontal nudity while Evans is showering.
• Director Lance Oppenheim said the scene was Evans' idea and "he didn't care about being seen naked."

In "You Can See Everything," one person apparently took the movie's title to a physical extreme.

A24's twisty new documentary is ostensibly focused on Theranos founder Elizabeth Holmes, one of Silicon Valley's most infamous felons — yet it's her longtime partner, William "Billy" Evans, who frequently steals the show.

Evans' comfort in front of the camera is evident when the couple invites co-directors Nathan Fielder and Lance Oppenheim to capture intimate moments in their home life, just a few weeks before Holmes is scheduled to begin an 11-year prison sentence.

In fact, according to Oppenheim, Evans proactively suggested one of the movie's buzziest and most revealing moments: a full-frontal shot of Evans in the shower.

"We were in the car ride on the way back from the gym, and I said to Billy, 'We will give you some time to shower,'" the filmmaker said in a recent interview with GQ. "And Billy responded, 'Want to film me showering?' I offered to film him in a way that could avoid seeing his genitals, but Billy said he didn't care about being seen naked."

Oppenheim speculated that Evans was inspired to give the audience "full access," though he admitted that he was personally baffled by the choice.

"There's a camera in the bathroom, there's a camera that was on Nathan, there's a camera outside the bathroom, and there's an interaction that we see after Billy leaves where he sort of looks at the camera and smiles," Oppenheim said. "So I don't know what that means, but I feel like there's enough stuff in there that gives me the impression that maybe he was excited that people could see everything and that there was full access, I guess. But it really beats me, honestly."

Oppenheim said that, to his knowledge, neither Holmes nor Evans has seen the movie. Evans has not commented publicly on his portrayal, and he did not respond to a request for comment from Business Insider.

"We haven't talked with Billy in a bit now," Oppenheim told GQ. "You sort of see it in the film. Billy can be intense, and there were a lot of conversations he had about the future of the film and the release of the film that made us uncomfortable. So contact broke down for a bit."

Holmes reports to prison about halfway through "You Can See Everything," though Fielder and Oppenheim continue to film Evans as he adjusts to life as a single dad and aspiring entrepreneur; at one point, Evans tells Fielder that he's planning to build another company off the back of Theranos and "do it all again."

In 2025, The New York Times and NPR reported that Evans had raised millions for a new blood-testing startup called Haemanthus.

Evans also boasts that he's in charge of running Holmes' social media while she's incarcerated, telling Fielder that he has power of attorney. "I can literally do whatever," he says.

Apoiando a esposa, o compositor Jon Batiste, 39, compartilhou uma foto com a amada, Suleika Jaouad, em suas redes sociais na tarde de domingo (25), declarando seu amor pela parceira.

No clique, a dupla aparece abraçada em uma cama de hospital, posando em diferentes ângulos. Aos 22 anos, logo após se formar na Universidade de Princeton, Jaouad foi diagnosticada com leucemia mieloide aguda, uma forma de câncer que atinge o sangue e a medula óssea.

Desde então, ela continua passando por vários tratamentos e transplantes em busca da cura da condição e de uma melhor condição de vida.

“As crianças estão bem hoje e continuam perdidamente apaixonadas”, escreveu Jon na legenda da declaração para a esposa. Nos comentários, diversos artistas e amigos da família elogiaram os registros e mandaram mensagens de apoio para a família.

“Meu coração está com vocês dois”, “Enviando muito amor, e estou feliz com essa notícia. Obrigada por nos manter atualizados”, “Enviando amor e boas vibrações para vocês”, “Nós amamos muito vocês dois. O mundo inteiro está torcendo por vocês”, escreveram alguns usuários.

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No final de setembro deste ano, Suleika revelou que precisava se submeter a um terceiro transplante de medula óssea, já que os tratamentos que antes mantinham sua leucemia “sob controle” “não estavam mais surtindo efeito”.

Anteriormente, em suas primeiras cirurgias, a influenciadora já havia demonstrado confiança total nos médicos que cuidam de seu bem-estar e, em entrevista ao jornal britânico The Guardian, ela chegou a destacar a importância do apoio de sua família.

“Tenho Jon, minha família e amigos que aparecem sempre com jogos, flores e piadas inapropriadas. Tenho quatro cachorros, dois pavões e quatorze galinhas. Tenho um plano e muita esperança”, declarou.

Jon Batiste encontra Gilberto Gil no Brasil

Liderando uma das apresentações mais esperadas do Rock in Rio 2026, o cantor e multi-instrumentista americano Jon Batiste realizou um de seus desejos ao se encontrar com Gilberto Gil nos bastidores do festival. Em um vídeo gravado pela CNN Brasil, os dois se abraçaram e trocaram alguns elogios no camarim.

Em agosto, Jon já havia relatado em uma entrevista exclusiva à CNN Brasil que esteve em um evento com o baiano quando tinha 17 anos, em Nova York, nos Estados Unidos. No entanto, ele não chegou a conhecer o músico brasileiro na ocasião, mas estava ansioso para que esse encontro acontecesse.

“Quando o evento começou, anunciaram que ele estava ali para receber o prêmio e que faria um discurso. A primeira coisa que ele disse no discurso foi: ‘Esse jovem pianista, esse jovem músico… ele pode voltar e tocar comigo?’, porque ele iria apresentar uma música depois do discurso. Eu achei que ninguém estivesse me ouvindo. Foi uma grande lição para mim, para a minha vida e para o meu desenvolvimento”, disse ele, na época.

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*Sob supervisão de Ana Beatriz Dias, da CNN Brasil

Relembre trajetória de Isabel Veloso, que morreu aos 19 anos com câncer

Iniciativa inspira-se no Ano Internacional da Mulher Agricultora e decorre a 3 de dezembro, com participação gratuita

A Escola Profissional de Alte promove, no dia 3 de dezembro de 2026, o Encontro sobre o Papel da Mulher na Agricultura e no Desenvolvimento Local, uma iniciativa que se inspira nas comemorações do Ano Internacional da Mulher Agricultora.

Declarado pelas Nações Unidas para 2026, o Ano Internacional da Mulher Agricultora procura dar visibilidade ao papel essencial das mulheres nos sistemas agroalimentares, da produção ao comércio, um contributo muitas vezes pouco reconhecido.

Neste contexto, o seminário pretende contribuir para a redução das diferenças de género na agricultura, para a melhoria dos meios de subsistência das mulheres nos territórios rurais e para incentivar a fixação de mulheres, em particular das mais jovens, no setor, reconhecendo o seu contributo para o desenvolvimento local.

O encontro reunirá agricultoras(es), investigadoras(es), técnicas(os), dirigentes, estudantes e membros da comunidade, num espaço de reflexão, inspiração e partilha de conhecimento e experiências. Pretende ainda valorizar o papel das mulheres na preservação dos saberes locais e na construção de comunidades mais fortes e sustentáveis.

O programa inclui comunicações, testemunhos na primeira pessoa e momentos de debate, culminando com uma visita à Quinta do Freixo. Pretende-se, assim, promover o diálogo entre tradição, inovação e desenvolvimento sustentável dos territórios rurais.

Para aceder ao programa, clique aqui. A participação é gratuita, mas implica uma inscrição clicando aqui.

Com esta iniciativa, os promotores convidam todos a conhecer histórias de dedicação, inovação e futuro que inspiram todas as gerações, pelo que para mais informações, deve contactar pelo e-mail: epalte@epalte.pt , ou pelo telefone +351 289 478 100 (custo de chamada local).

The American Association of Jurists (AAJ) has demanded the immediate release of former Ecuadorian presidential candidate Luisa González, who remains in pretrial detention as part of the Labyrinth case—an investigation into alleged money laundering linked to the financing of the 2023 presidential campaign of the Citizen Revolution (RC) movement.

RELATED:

Ecuador Opposition Figure Luisa González Challenges Arrest

In a statement released on October 26, the organization described the opposition leader’s detention as arbitrary and questioned the precautionary measure, which was imposed just over a month before Ecuador’s local elections, scheduled for November 29.

The AAJ maintained that pretrial detention must be justified by specific procedural risks, such as the risk of flight or the potential to obstruct an investigation. According to the association, González had remained available to the judicial authorities since a raid conducted in January 2026; she had kept them informed of her international travel, returned to the country, and was subsequently arrested at her home.

“In the absence of a procedural risk, this measure functions as a preemptive sentence,” the organization stated, citing both the Ecuadorian Constitution and Inter-American jurisprudence to argue that the deprivation of liberty prior to a conviction should be an exceptional measure.

The AAJ also denounced the use of ongoing investigations—in which no verdict has been reached—as tools for electoral exclusion, noting that González’s detention occurs within a broader context of decisions that, in the organization’s view, restrict democratic competition.

The text reads, “The American Association of Jurists condemned the detention of @LuisaGonzalezEc and demanded her immediate release. The organization denounced the use of pretrial detention and investigations without a sentence as mechanisms of electoral exclusion and warned about the proscription of the opposition in Ecuador. The AAJ will bring the case before the IACHR and UN organizations.”

In its statement, the association linked González’s case to a series of actions taken against opposition organizations and figures. These include the temporary suspension of the Citizen Revolution, the deregistration of other political parties, the suspension of the AMIGO movement, and the rejection of González’s candidacy.

The organization also pointed to the raid on the Quito municipal government offices and the decision to move up the date of the elections. According to the AAJ, these actions constitute a pattern of suppressing the political opposition in Ecuador. The organization argued that the American Convention on Human Rights limits the restriction of political rights and prohibits the suspension—even during states of emergency—of the judicial guarantees essential for their protection.

Furthermore, the legal organization announced that it will bring the case before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers, and the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention.

Additionally, it called on electoral observation missions to assess the conditions for fair competition in the elections scheduled for November 29. The statement was signed by Claudia V. Rocca, president of the AAJ Continental, and Vanessa Ramos, the organization’s secretary-general.

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) have opened talks to establish a framework for cooperation, marking a new attempt to rebuild relations following years of political tensions over sovereignty, military coups, and regional sanctions.

The two blocs held their inaugural ministerial dialogue in Dakar, Senegal, on October 17, 2026, where they agreed to establish joint thematic working groups to develop a Cooperation Framework Agreement. The meeting brought together representatives of ECOWAS and the AES Confederation, comprising Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger.

In a joint communiqué issued after the meeting, both sides welcomed the “spirit of fraternity, mutual respect, and openness” that characterized their discussions, recalling the historical, sociocultural and economic ties that unite the peoples of West Africa.

The parties also agreed that their future relations should be guided by “good neighborliness, respect for sovereignty, dignity, and the well-being of West African populations.”

The dialogue marks a significant diplomatic development following the deterioration of relations between ECOWAS and the three Sahelian countries, whose military-led governments have pursued a political course centered on national sovereignty and a rejection of established Western influence.

Political tensions to dialogue

Relations between the two blocs deteriorated following military coups in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger between 2020 and 2023. ECOWAS imposed sanctions and threatened further measures in response to the military takeovers, while the governments of the three countries increasingly challenged the regional organization’s authority.

In January 2024, the three countries announced their intention to withdraw from ECOWAS, their withdrawal formally took effect on January 29, 2025, opening a new chapter in regional relations.

The AES had been established in September 2023, initially creating a mutual defense framework among Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger. The three countries subsequently deepened their cooperation, formally establishing the Confederation of Sahel States in July 2024.

Throughout the confrontation, the Sahelian governments maintained that their decisions reflected the right of their peoples to determine their own political and economic futures. ECOWAS sanctions, particularly those imposed on Niger following the July 2023 coup, generated considerable opposition within the country and wider debate over the consequences of regional punitive measures for ordinary people.

For many supporters of the AES, ECOWAS’s response to the coups reinforced the perception that the organization was protecting Western, particularly French, strategic interests rather than defending the sovereignty of West African peoples. 

A framework for cooperation

According to the joint communiqué, the Dakar meeting followed earlier consultations held on May 22, 2025, in Bamako, Mali. The latest session allowed the parties to exchange views on areas of common interest and discuss how future negotiations could be structured.

Both sides expressed their willingness to pursue a cooperation framework that is “balanced, realistic and preserves the interests of their peoples.”

The communiqué further states that joint thematic working groups will undertake technical consultations towards developing a formal Cooperation Framework Agreement. Their findings will be submitted to the ministers for consideration before the next session.

The agreement to establish these working groups is an initial step towards institutionalizing dialogue between the two organizations. However, the communiqué does not specify a final agreement, a timetable for completing negotiations or detailed commitments in individual policy areas.

The discussions nevertheless provide an opening for the two blocs to address practical questions arising from their separation, including the maintenance of cross-border relations and the interests of communities whose economic and social lives extend across national boundaries.

Despite their institutional differences, the populations of the two blocs remain connected through trade, migration, family ties and shared cultural histories. The three AES countries are landlocked, and their economic relationships with neighboring West African states remain important to regional commerce and livelihoods as it defends its sovereignty.

The weakened Latin American left is celebrating Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s epic comeback in grand style — the “Pelé of progressivism” who is preparing to become president of Brazil for a fourth time. From Mexico’s Claudia Sheinbaum to Colombia’s Gustavo Petro, and including Argentina’s Cristina Fernández de Kirchner and Chile’s Gabriel Boric, the bloc was quick to hail Lula’s victory as soon as it became irreversible, despite the defeated Flávio Bolsonaro’s promise to seek to annul the election. The right, split between acknowledging the result and remaining silent, has left Bolsonaro alone in his challenge.

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Israeli voters head to the polls on Tuesday in a closely fought election that will determine Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's political future and the direction of Israel's policies towards Palestinians.

The vote pits a coalition of opposition parties led by former military chief Gadi Eisenkot against the far-right bloc led by Netanyahu, whose opponents accuse him of undermining Israel's democratic institutions.

It is the first Israeli election since the Hamas-led attack of 7 October 2023 and Israel's subsequent genocidal war on Gaza, which has been followed by wider regional conflicts involving Lebanon, Iran and Yemen.

While much of the campaign has focused on Netanyahu's leadership, the war and domestic divisions, the outcome will also affect millions of Palestinians in Gaza and the occupied West Bank who have no vote in the election.

Palestinian citizens of Israel, meanwhile, could play a decisive role in determining the balance of power in the Knesset, even as the main Jewish-led political blocs remain reluctant to cooperate with them.

How will the vote work?

Polling stations will open at 7am on Tuesday and close at 10pm.

Major Israeli news organisations will publish exit polls shortly after voting ends, with counting beginning the same evening.

More than three dozen parties are contesting the election, with around 7.4 million people eligible to vote at polling stations across Israel.

Israel uses proportional representation, meaning voters choose a party rather than an individual candidate. The 120 seats in the Knesset are allocated according to each party's share of the national vote.

Candidates enter parliament according to their positions on their party's electoral list.

Parties must win at least 3.25% of the vote to enter the Knesset, equivalent to four seats.

No single party has ever secured an outright majority, meaning Israeli governments have always depended on coalitions.

When will the results be announced?

The official results must be declared by 4 November, although the likely distribution of seats should become clear as early as Wednesday morning.

Attention will then turn to coalition negotiations, with parties seeking to assemble a parliamentary majority of at least 61 seats.

After the official results are announced, President Isaac Herzog will consult parliamentary factions before selecting a Knesset member to attempt to form a government.

These negotiations could take weeks, particularly if neither of the main blocs wins enough seats to govern.

What are the polls saying?

The final opinion polls suggest that neither Netanyahu's bloc nor the opposition coalition led by Eisenkot is on course to secure a majority.

Surveys published over the weekend put the opposition on 54 to 56 seats, compared with around 50 for Netanyahu's Likud-led alliance.

Eisenkot's Yashar party was projected to become the largest party with 22 to 23 seats, ahead of Likud on 19 to 21.

The polls also pointed to gains for the far right, with National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir's Jewish Power party projected to win eight seats.

But the remaining seats could prove crucial.

Parties representing Palestinian citizens of Israel were projected to win between 14 and 16 seats, potentially leaving them with considerable influence over whether a government can be formed.

Eisenkot has previously ruled out forming a coalition with Palestinian-led parties, leaving questions over how the opposition could secure the parliamentary support it needs.

Could Palestinian voters decide the election?

Palestinian citizens of Israel account for a substantial share of the electorate, but their political representation has long been constrained by divisions between parties, low turnout and the reluctance of major Jewish-led parties to include them in governing coalitions.

This election could nevertheless give their parties considerable influence over whether Netanyahu remains in power.

The two main Arab-majority electoral lists are Ra'am, also known as the United Arab List, and the Joint List, bringing together Hadash, Balad and Ta'al.

Their performance will depend partly on turnout among Palestinian citizens of Israel, whose votes could influence both the number of seats won by Arab-led parties and the overall balance of the Knesset.

In an interview with The New Arab, Balad leader Sami Abu Shehadeh highlighted the importance of Palestinian voters in an election where neither main bloc appears assured of a majority.

The campaign has also been marked by attempts to exclude Palestinian-led parties and candidates.

Israel's Central Elections Committee voted in September to bar the Joint List and Ra'am from contesting the election, but the Supreme Court overturned the decision.

The court nevertheless upheld the disqualification of Abu Shehadeh over an article in which he described the 7 October attacks as an important historical event.

The episode has renewed questions about the political rights of Palestinian citizens of Israel and the limits placed on their participation in Israeli politics.

Netanyahu has also repeatedly portrayed the possibility of opposition cooperation with Arab-led parties as a campaign warning, seeking to pressure his rivals into ruling out such an arrangement.

What about Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank?

Millions of Palestinians living under Israeli occupation in the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip cannot vote in the election that will help determine the policies governing their lives.

The next Israeli government will have a major influence over military operations, movement restrictions, settlement expansion and the future of Gaza.

In the occupied West Bank, Palestinians face an expanding network of military checkpoints, road closures and settler attacks.

Israel has also announced the closure of land crossings into the West Bank for election day, adding to restrictions that have intensified since October 2023.

In Gaza, the central questions include whether Israel will ease its blockade, withdraw troops from occupied areas, allow displaced Palestinians to return home and permit reconstruction after three years of devastating war.

However, Netanyahu's principal challengers have offered little indication that a change in government would bring a fundamental shift in Israeli policy towards Palestinian statehood or the occupation.

Eisenkot, a former Israeli military chief, has opposed the establishment of a Palestinian state, while other prominent opposition figures have supported Israel's military campaigns and taken hardline positions towards Gaza.

Yisrael Beiteinu leader Avigdor Lieberman, whose party is part of the opposition coalition, has criticised Netanyahu for being too soft on Gaza and called for the Palestinian Authority to be dismantled.

Meanwhile, far-right ministers Ben-Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich have advocated annexing Palestinian territory and ethnically cleansing the Palestinians.

The election could therefore change Israel's leadership without necessarily bringing major changes to the policies Palestinians face.

What are the main election issues?

Netanyahu's opponents have sought to make the vote a referendum on his leadership, focusing on the security failures surrounding the 7 October attack, his long-running corruption trial and Israel's growing international isolation.

According to the Israel Democracy Institute, the October 2023 attack is expected to play an important role in the voting decisions of more than two-thirds of the electorate.

Other major issues include military conscription exemptions for ultra-Orthodox Jews and Netanyahu's attempts to overhaul the judiciary in 2023, which sparked widespread protests.

The election also comes after years of Israeli military operations in Gaza and regional conflicts involving Hezbollah, Iran and the Houthis.

Yet there is considerable overlap between the main Jewish-led parties on questions relating to Palestinian rights, the occupation and Israel's military operations.

While opposition politicians have criticised Netanyahu's handling of the wars and the diplomatic damage caused by his government, few have advocated a fundamental reversal of settlement expansion or a renewed peace process leading to Palestinian statehood.

The most explicit calls for annexation and Palestinian displacement have come from the far right, particularly Ben-Gvir and Smotrich.

What happens if coalition talks fail?

If neither bloc can assemble 61 seats, Israel could face prolonged negotiations over a possible minority government or another election.

A minority government would need support or abstentions from parties outside the governing coalition to survive key parliamentary votes.

That could make Palestinian-led parties particularly important, even if they are excluded from formal coalition agreements.

If negotiations fail altogether, another election could be called in 2027, with Netanyahu potentially remaining as caretaker prime minister until a new government takes office.

The result could therefore leave Israel facing continued political deadlock, with Palestinian parties holding potentially important seats but little guarantee of a role in government.

For Palestinians in Gaza and the occupied West Bank, the immediate consequences will depend less on which party wins the most seats than on the policies the next government adopts towards the occupation, military operations, settlements and displacement.