A new investigation into the activities of Google, Meta and other technology companies has intensified scrutiny of EU plans to revise data-protection legislation, placing Ireland and Germany at the centre of a dispute over corporate influence and European digital sovereignty.

European technology policy has become the focus of a dispute over corporate lobbying after researchers documented extensive contacts between major technology companies and political decision-makers during negotiations to revise EU data-protection rules.

An investigation published on 28 October by Corporate Europe Observatory and the German transparency organisation LobbyControl alleges that leading technology companies mounted a coordinated campaign to influence European governments and legislators.

The findings come one week after EU member states agreed a negotiating position on the Digital Omnibus, a legislative package intended to simplify aspects of European data-protection, privacy and cybersecurity regulation.

The campaigners argue that the proposed changes risk weakening existing safeguards in order to accommodate the commercial requirements of artificial intelligence developers.

Ireland, which holds the rotating presidency of the Council of the European Union, has rejected suggestions that its handling of the legislation was improperly influenced by technology companies.

The dispute exposes a fundamental disagreement over the balance between commercial innovation and the protection of personal information.

The scale of the lobbying campaign

According to LobbyControl’s investigation, non-European technology companies recorded 103 meetings with representatives of Germany’s federal government between May 2025 and September 2026.

Google accounted for 28 meetings, Microsoft 18, Amazon 16 and OpenAI 11.

Germany’s Digital Minister, Karsten Wildberger, participated in 18 meetings with representatives of major technology companies, the researchers reported.

In Ireland, the organisations identified extensive engagement involving Meta, Google and politicians ahead of the country’s assumption of the EU Council presidency in July.

Their findings indicate that Meta engaged with 41 Irish parliamentarians over the Digital Omnibus, while Google recorded 30 meetings.

The researchers also identified 655 lobbying meetings concerning the legislation involving members of the European Parliament.

According to their analysis, approximately 83 per cent represented business interests, compared with 11 per cent involving civil society organisations or trade unions.

These figures demonstrate the intensity of corporate engagement, although the existence of lobbying meetings does not, by itself, establish that particular legislative provisions were adopted because of that activity.

Why the Digital Omnibus matters

The legislative package forms part of a broader European Commission initiative to reduce administrative burdens and improve competitiveness.

Its provisions address several areas of digital regulation, including the General Data Protection Regulation, commonly known as GDPR.

The proposals seek to simplify compliance obligations, clarify the treatment of personal information and revise rules governing certain forms of data processing.

One particularly contentious issue concerns the use of personal data in developing and operating artificial intelligence systems.

AI developers require large quantities of information to train and improve their models. However, the collection and processing of personal information remain subject to European legal safeguards.

Technology companies have argued that regulatory complexity can discourage investment and make it more difficult for European businesses to compete internationally.

Privacy campaigners maintain that simplifying regulatory procedures must not become a mechanism for reducing substantive protections.

The disagreement concerns not merely administrative paperwork but the legal circumstances under which companies may process information relating to identifiable individuals.

Ireland rejects allegations of improper influence

Ireland occupies a particularly sensitive position in the debate.

The country hosts major European operations of several American technology companies, including Google and Meta, and has substantial economic interests in the digital sector.

At the same time, its presidency of the EU Council requires it to coordinate negotiations between member states.

According to RTÉ’s reporting on the investigation, the Irish government strongly rejected the allegation that it had weakened data safeguards in response to corporate pressure.

A presidency spokesperson emphasised that Ireland’s responsibility was to facilitate agreement between member states and that the negotiating mandate approved on 21 October enjoyed broad support.

The Council has presented the proposed changes as a means of reducing compliance costs while preserving established privacy protections.

In its official statement, the Council said its mandate retains the existing definition of personal data and introduces additional provisions governing pseudonymisation.

It also includes safeguards relating to sensitive information used for biometric verification and AI systems.

These details are significant because they demonstrate that the negotiating text contains protections alongside proposed simplifications.

Germany’s role in the negotiations

Germany has also emerged as an important participant in the controversy.

The investigation points to close contact between the German government and international technology companies during discussions about the future of European digital regulation.

Berlin has supported reducing administrative restrictions that it considers obstacles to innovation and the development of competitive AI technologies.

For Germany, the issue is connected to wider concerns about industrial competitiveness, investment and Europe’s dependence on foreign technology suppliers.

Yet an unresolved question remains.

Measures designed to assist European innovators may also benefit established American companies whose extensive computing infrastructure and data resources give them advantages over smaller competitors.

Consequently, easing restrictions does not necessarily guarantee a stronger European technology industry.

The European Parliament holds the next decision

The Council’s negotiating position does not make the Digital Omnibus law.

The European Parliament must establish its own position before negotiations between the institutions can determine the final legislation.

Parliamentarians will therefore have an opportunity to examine the treatment of personal data, the safeguards attached to AI development and the relationship between regulatory simplification and individual rights.

The lobbying investigation is likely to become part of that debate.

Its central political significance lies in the competing interpretations of European technological sovereignty.

For governments seeking investment, regulatory flexibility may provide an instrument for improving Europe’s international competitiveness.

For privacy organisations, the same flexibility could increase the influence of companies already dominant in global digital markets.

The outcome will help determine whether Europe’s future digital framework preserves the existing balance between commercial data use and individual protections, or establishes a different relationship between the two.

French senators have approved legislation that could expose participants in violent demonstrations to compensation claims of up to €10,000, including individuals who did not personally damage property. The proposal has reopened a dispute over public order, collective responsibility and the right to protest.

France’s Senate has approved controversial legislation designed to recover the costs of damage caused during violent demonstrations, extending potential financial liability beyond those who personally committed acts of vandalism.

The bill, adopted in the early hours of 28 October by 229 votes to 105, would allow the authorities to pursue compensation from certain participants in gatherings where destruction or violence occurred.

Its provisions include a potential liability of up to €10,000 per person and mechanisms for recovering compensation through deductions from certain social benefits.

The legislation, widely described in France as the casseurs-payeurs bill, reflects growing political pressure to respond to property destruction accompanying demonstrations and public gatherings.

However, it also raises legal questions about the circumstances in which individuals may be held financially responsible for damage they did not personally cause.

The bill must still be considered by the National Assembly before it can become law.

From individual responsibility to collective liability

Under existing arrangements, the French state can be required to compensate victims for certain damage resulting from gatherings or public disorder.

Authorities may subsequently seek reimbursement from individuals legally responsible for that damage.

The proposed legislation would expand the circumstances in which compensation could be recovered.

According to the French Senate’s official explanation, liability could extend to people who participated in a violent group or remained in a gathering despite police orders to disperse, when they could not reasonably have been unaware that violence or destruction was taking place.

An individual would not necessarily have to be identified as the person who broke a window, damaged a vehicle or destroyed public property.

Instead, participation in a gathering meeting the relevant legal conditions could provide a basis for civil liability.

The distinction is central to the controversy.

The proposed €10,000 ceiling concerns financial compensation rather than a new criminal fine imposed automatically on demonstrators.

Nevertheless, opponents argue that expanding civil responsibility beyond direct perpetrators could undermine the principle that liability should reflect an individual’s own conduct.

A response to repeated unrest

The government introduced the legislation in September against a background of public disorder associated with demonstrations and sporting celebrations.

Violence following Paris Saint-Germain’s Champions League victory in May contributed to demands for stronger mechanisms to recover the costs of destruction.

Subsequent disturbances during demonstrations on 17 October added urgency to the debate.

The Senate’s conservative and centrist majority supported the bill, while left-wing lawmakers opposed important elements of the proposed system.

Interior Minister Laurent Nuñez defended the principle that those involved in destruction should contribute to the cost of repairs.

Supporters maintain that criminal penalties alone do not adequately compensate shopkeepers, residents and public authorities faced with substantial financial losses.

They also argue that taxpayers should not automatically bear the costs of damage attributable to individuals involved in violent gatherings.

The disagreement therefore extends beyond criminal punishment to the distribution of financial responsibility after public disorder.

Social benefits become part of the debate

One of the most disputed provisions concerns the recovery of compensation from people with insufficient resources to pay.

As approved by the Senate, the legislation would permit deductions from certain social benefits, including housing assistance and family allowances.

Senators also extended the proposed mechanism to the revenu de solidarité active, or RSA, the minimum-income benefit available to eligible low-income individuals.

Supporters of the measure argue that financial responsibility should not disappear simply because an individual lacks conventional assets or income.

The proposed arrangements would nevertheless have to leave recipients with a minimum amount for living expenses.

Opposition lawmakers have questioned whether deductions from family-related benefits could impose financial consequences on relatives who had no involvement in the original incident.

This is particularly relevant where parents’ social payments could be affected by damage attributed to their children.

The debate therefore concerns both the enforceability of compensation claims and the possibility that recovery measures could affect entire households.

The constitutional question

France’s legal framework recognises freedom of expression and the right to demonstrate, subject to restrictions established by law.

It also permits the authorities to impose obligations and penalties on individuals involved in unlawful conduct.

The issue raised by the proposed legislation is where the boundary between these principles should be drawn.

A system requiring direct evidence of property destruction presents different legal questions from one imposing liability based on participation in a wider gathering.

The latter arrangement would require careful assessment of the individual’s conduct, awareness of violence and opportunity to leave.

Opponents fear that demonstrators could face substantial financial exposure even without personally committing vandalism.

Supporters respond that the legislation is directed at participation in violent disorder, rather than peaceful protest itself.

Any final legislation could face scrutiny over proportionality, equality before the law and the protection of constitutional freedoms.

An uncertain passage through parliament

The Senate vote represents an important stage, but not the completion of the legislative process.

The National Assembly remains politically divided, making the final form of the proposal uncertain.

Deputies could amend the conditions for civil liability, the compensation ceiling or the provisions concerning social benefits.

The government’s ability to secure sufficient parliamentary support will determine whether the measures survive intact.

The legislation illustrates an increasingly difficult issue in French politics: how to ensure compensation for victims of public disorder without extending legal liability so broadly that participation in demonstrations becomes a substantial financial risk.

The answer will depend on the precise safeguards contained in the final text and how courts would be required to apply them.

A revamped EU border force Frontex is set to have around 17,000 people involved in deportations at its disposal, while human-rights monitoring is narrowed and the agency’s ability to terminate operations in a member state over rights violations is weakened.

The overhaul, presented on Tuesday (27 October), follows months of speculation by a European Commission determined to give the Warsaw-based agency a more central role in the bloc’s deportations, as reported last week by EUobserver.

“The fundamental rights framework in Frontex is among the strongest in any EU agency, and that will stay also with this review,” Henna Virkkunen, a commission vice-president, told reporters.

“I’m not aware of any other border management authority with stronger protection anywhere in the world. I would actually say, and we’re not changing that. So this is pretty clear,” also said Magnus Brunner, the EU commissioner for migration.

But the claims, made at a press conference in Brussels, do not entirely match its 275-page proposal that it published only later on Tuesday evening.

Unable to scrutinise the text ahead of the press conference, reporters could only guess at what the proposal actually contained without being able to directly challenge the commissioners.

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EU member states remain deadlocked over whether to delay the bloc’s methane rules for oil and gas importers by one year or three, with neither side able to secure a majority.

Ambassadors were due to agree the EU Council’s negotiating position this week, after a first attempt failed last week.

But the Irish presidency has had to push the vote back to 6 November again as the two camps continue to disagree on the timeline. 

On the one hand, France, Spain, Finland, Denmark, Luxembourg and Portugal back the European commission’s proposal for a one-year delay. 

The other group, including Italy, Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, Greece and Slovenia, wants three years.

And then there is a third group of countries that haven’t decided yet, or could live with either scenario.

The undecideds and waverers 

Belgium, for example, signed a call in June for a three-year delay, but could live with the commission’s timeline, though it would refuse a pause of more than three years, which parliament’s proposed 2029 review could open the door to.

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The midnight sky was clear, the waves gentle, and the full moon lit the way for our inflatable rescue boat to reach the dinghy in distress.

The southward winds of the central Mediterranean had abated for a brief détente in the early hours of Tuesday (27 October), after days of wondering how any small vessel could ever safely make their way out of African waters.

The lethal conditions of one of the region’s stormiest months of the year, were confirmed by the sight of an empty blow-up raft wandering adrift the previous evening.

“Bridge, bridge, bravo, we have a visual on a small rubber boat,” the search-and-rescue lead from the German NGO SOS Humanity said over the radio, while leading the search from the bow of an inflatable boat. 

The makeshift dinghy floated less than 200 meters from the charity’s Humanity 1, 43 nautical miles (90 km) from Libyan shores.

The passengers had been on the water for 24 hours.

Their proximity to a country notorious for its mistreatment and trafficking of migrants kept the rescue team tentative in their advance, as some aboard the distressed floater could believe they are being approached by the EU-funded militias masking as the Libyan coast guard – or by European border forces ready to push them back south of Italian waters. 

Yet at first contact, everyone aboard the distressed vessel lit up in celebration. 

The small raft burst with excitement, as the dozens aboard revived their hopes of escaping the perils of the open air cemetery that is for so many the Mediterranean sea.

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Thousands of demonstrators have gathered outside Portugal’s parliament as rising property prices, disputed eviction legislation and police operations bring the country’s housing problems into direct confrontation with the government.

Thousands of protesters gathered outside Portugal’s parliament in Lisbon on 27 October, demanding action over soaring housing costs and criticising police operations against housing activists, as the country’s long-running property crisis developed into a broader political confrontation.

The demonstration coincided with parliamentary debate on the government’s proposed 2027 budget and followed several days of protests in Lisbon and Porto.

At the centre of the dispute is an increasingly familiar European contradiction: property values continue to rise, while wages and household incomes have failed to keep pace with the cost of obtaining accommodation.

For Portugal, the problem has become particularly pronounced.

House prices have more than doubled since 2017, while rents for newly agreed tenancies have almost doubled over the same period.

According to figures reported during the demonstrations, the cost of housing in Portugal increased by 147 per cent between 2015 and 2025, compared with an EU average of 60.5 per cent.

The result is a growing disparity between earnings and the cost of independent living, particularly among younger adults.

A property market detached from wages

In Lisbon, a one-bedroom flat can routinely command monthly rent of approximately €1,500.

Portugal’s minimum wage stands at €920 per month before tax.

Although these figures do not represent every household or property, they illustrate the scale of the affordability problem for lower-paid workers.

Between the first quarters of 2025 and 2026, Portuguese house prices increased by almost 20 per cent, according to national statistical figures cited in recent reporting.

Rental costs have also continued rising, recording an increase of approximately 68 per cent since 2020.

The country’s attractiveness to foreign investors, retirees and remote workers has contributed to demand, particularly in Lisbon, Porto and coastal areas.

Tourism has introduced additional competition for residential property, with some homes converted into short-term accommodation.

However, investment and tourism are only part of the explanation.

Restrictions on construction, administrative delays, limited affordable housing supply and the geographical concentration of employment have also contributed to pressure on the market.

These conditions have produced a widening gap between those who already own property and those seeking to purchase or rent their first home.

Disputed eviction legislation

The immediate political confrontation concerns government proposals that would accelerate certain eviction procedures and remove restrictions on rents for new tenancy agreements.

The legislation passed its first parliamentary reading, with the right-wing Chega party abstaining.

Housing campaigners argue that removing protections without first increasing affordable supply could leave tenants more exposed to rising rents and displacement.

The minority centre-right government, led by Prime Minister Luís Montenegro, has pursued measures intended to encourage construction and increase the availability of housing.

These include tax reductions for new building projects and a commitment to deliver 145,000 homes.

Such measures, however, require time before additional properties become available, while many households face immediate financial pressures.

Police operations become a second controversy

The housing dispute intensified following police operations to remove protest encampments in Lisbon and Porto during the weekend.

Police used batons during the clearances, while campaigners alleged excessive force.

According to accounts of the subsequent parliamentary demonstration, police reported 11 minor injuries, including three officers. The housing organisation Casa para Viver claimed that 60 people had been injured.

Portugal’s internal affairs watchdog has opened an inquiry, while prosecutors are conducting a separate investigation into officers’ conduct.

Montenegro defended the police response in parliament, arguing that officers had acted according to the principles of necessity, proportionality and adequacy.

President António José Seguro has convened a meeting of the Council of State to consider the growing protests.

The dispute has consequently expanded beyond housing economics to include questions about policing, public demonstrations and political accountability.

A European problem with national consequences

Portugal’s demonstrations follow similar protests in Spain and growing political scrutiny of housing affordability elsewhere in the EU.

The European Commission has begun addressing the issue through initiatives intended to encourage construction, facilitate investment and give authorities greater legal certainty over short-term rental restrictions.

As EU Today recently reported, the proposed European Affordable Housing Act would provide additional regulatory tools for areas facing severe housing pressure.

Yet the principal responsibilities for housing supply, planning and tenancy law remain with national and local governments.

This division creates a political challenge: Brussels can support investment and coordinate legislation, but the most immediate decisions affecting rents, construction and evictions are taken elsewhere.

For Portugal, the next test will be whether the government’s housing measures can deliver sufficient additional supply while responding to demands for immediate tenant protection.

The demonstrations outside parliament show that housing affordability has become more than a question of property prices. It now affects the government’s legislative agenda, the 2027 budget debate and the relationship between the authorities and an increasingly organised protest movement.

European agriculture ministers have reached a negotiating position on the future Common Agricultural Policy, advancing plans to restructure farm support after 2027. The agreement leaves unresolved the central dispute over funding and the balance of power between Brussels and national governments.

European Union agriculture ministers have agreed a negotiating position on the future Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), advancing a restructuring of the bloc’s agricultural support system while postponing decisions about the financial arrangements that will determine how the reforms operate.

The agreement reached on 26 October establishes the Council’s position on the framework governing agricultural payments and support measures from 2028 onwards.

However, ministers have deliberately excluded funding allocations and several related financial provisions, which remain subject to negotiations over the EU’s next seven-year budget.

The distinction is important.

Governments have agreed how they want the future system to operate, but not how much money will ultimately be available to finance it.

A fundamental restructuring of farm support

The proposed reform would integrate agricultural funding into a broader system of national and regional partnership plans covering several major areas of European spending.

Under the existing CAP, agricultural support is organised around two principal funds: one primarily financing direct payments and market measures, and another supporting rural development.

The Commission wants to replace this arrangement with a more integrated structure, while retaining agricultural policy instruments within the new framework.

Each member state would prepare a comprehensive national and regional plan incorporating agriculture, cohesion, fisheries and several other funding programmes.

Brussels argues that the new system could simplify administration, reduce overlapping procedures and give governments more flexibility to address domestic requirements.

However, greater national discretion also raises questions about whether the policy will remain sufficiently uniform across the European single market.

Agricultural conditions differ considerably between member states, from large cereal producers in Eastern Europe to smaller farms operating in mountainous or Mediterranean regions.

Allowing governments to tailor support to domestic conditions may improve flexibility, but it also creates the possibility of greater variation in how European funds are distributed.

Who should receive agricultural payments?

One of the principal changes concerns the distribution of income support.

The Council supports a proposed system known as Degressive Area-Based Income Support, or DABIS, intended to direct assistance more effectively towards farmers actively engaged in agricultural production.

Member states would be required to establish a definition of an active farmer, although governments would retain discretion over the precise national criteria.

The distinction matters because agricultural subsidies have historically generated disputes over payments based primarily on land ownership or agricultural area rather than the scale of productive activity.

The Council has also proposed an optional redistributive mechanism intended to help governments adjust the distribution of payments.

More contentious decisions, including possible payment ceilings and reductions for larger recipients, have been postponed until the broader budget negotiations.

The problem of Europe’s ageing farmers

The reform also addresses generational renewal.

Governments would be required to provide additional income support for young farmers and assistance to help them establish agricultural businesses.

Each member state would have to develop a generational renewal strategy and provide a package of support measures covering areas such as training, advice and access to agricultural activity.

These provisions reflect the difficulties facing younger people seeking to enter farming.

High land prices, expensive equipment and restricted access to finance can create substantial barriers, particularly where established farms are passed between generations.

The Council also supports expanded risk-management arrangements, including insurance and assistance following severe weather, animal diseases and other agricultural emergencies.

Environmental requirements would remain part of the framework, combining common conditions with incentives for practices intended to protect biodiversity and natural resources.

The €300 billion question

The most consequential disagreement concerns financing.

The European Commission has proposed protecting approximately €300 billion for agricultural income support and crisis measures under the 2028–2034 budget.

Additional agricultural and rural-development funding could be available through the broader national and regional plans.

The final ringfenced amount, however, has not been agreed.

As EU Today reported earlier this month, 17 member states have called for agricultural and cohesion spending to be protected during negotiations over the Commission’s proposed €2 trillion long-term financial framework.

The disagreement reflects competing budgetary priorities.

Agriculture remains one of the EU’s largest expenditure areas, but governments are simultaneously facing demands for greater defence spending, industrial investment, infrastructure and migration-related programmes.

Protecting agricultural funding would therefore limit the financial resources available for other priorities unless governments agree to increase the overall budget.

The latest agreement also follows the Council’s 19 October negotiating position on agricultural market rules, which addressed sectoral support and market organisation but similarly avoided resolving the wider funding dispute.

Negotiations enter a decisive stage

Irish Agriculture Minister Martin Heydon, whose government holds the rotating Council presidency, described the latest agreement as a milestone intended to provide farmers with greater stability and flexibility.

The Council’s position now provides a basis for negotiations with the European Parliament.

However, the final shape of agricultural policy will depend heavily on the separate negotiations over the 2028–2034 financial framework.

Until governments agree how much money will be available, questions about payment limits, distribution between countries and the balance between agricultural and other EU priorities will remain open.

The October agreement establishes the proposed framework for European farming after 2027. The budget negotiations will determine the scale of support that framework can actually provide.

Dear readers,

We are back with a new issue of the Secrecy Tracker – your regular update on what the EU institutions prefer to keep under wraps. 

I am Alexander Fanta, a journalist with Follow the Money, who has struggled for years to gain access to EU documents. I wrote this newsletter with the help of EUobserver’s Nikolaj Nielsen and Pascal Hansens from Investigate Europe.

Media outlets, journalist associations and press freedom organisations have penned an open letter to European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen to voice their frustration about the recent deterioration in the EU’s freedom of information.

The letter, which was co-signed by the publishers of this newsletter – Follow the Money, EUobserver and Investigate Europe – urges the commission to end the silent crisis that has hampered journalists finding the documents they need to scrutinise matters of public importance – such as how the member states (mis-)spent billions of euros in post-Covid recovery funds, or how the commission hides its arms research cooperation with Israel.

The signatories of the letter include press lobby groups such as the International Federation of Journalists, but also some of the weightiest voices in investigative journalism – the International Consortium of Investigative Journalism and the Organised Crime and Corruption Reporting Project.

The letter asks the commission to address the excessive redactions and long delays journalists face when asking for documents under the EU’s freedom of information law, Regulation 1049/2001, as well as the Commission’s failure to keep crucial documents – think von der Leyen’s texts with Pfizer chief Albert Bourla. 

Moreover, the commission should reverse a controversial change to its internal rules of procedure in 2024 which made access requests more difficult by limiting the definition of what is considered “a document”, and putting entire areas of the commission’s work – such as enforcement of its Big Tech laws – out of bounds from access requests.

The leading figure behind the letter, the Committee to Protect Journalists’ Tom Gibson, has asked von der Leyen’s cabinet for a meeting to discuss these issues, and seek improvements.

“The European Commission purports to uphold press freedom in Europe as well as through its external policy”, Gibson said. “Yet, in Brussels, we see that the European Commission is seeking to actually put obstacles in the way of creating an enabling environment for journalists who report on the institutions – in order, seemingly, to maintain an ability to control the official narrative.”

“This has to change otherwise the European Commission can be accused of double standards”, according to Gibson.

EUobserver’s Gaza complaint

Last week, the European Ombudswoman, an administrative watchdog, launched a probe into EUobserver’s complaint against the European Commission. The Brussels-executive had refused to release 17 documents it has on how the EU spent money on bricks-and-mortar projects in Gaza.

We had first asked in February as part of an investigation that sought to get an idea to what extent the Israelis destroyed EU-funded infrastructure in the Strip. We were stonewalled, amid arguments there is no overriding public interest even though tens of thousands of people have been killed, triggering massive Europe-wide protests and flotillas. Our appeal went unanswered.

Now EU ombudswoman Teresa Anjinho is demanding, as a first step, a commission response to our appeal by November 4 latest. If the commission still fails to deliver, she will review the documents herself.

Aarhus Convention vs data-centre secrecy

The secrecy surrounding data centres’ environmental footprint is coming under increasing scrutiny. In April, Investigate Europe broke the news, and reported in this newsletter, that a provision in a delegated act to the energy efficiency directive, which keeps key information of data centres environmental impact secret, likely violates transparency obligations under the Aarhus convention.

Now, Lighthouse Reports has published a story that they are formally challenging the law. Frustrated by facing repeated refusals from more than a dozen EU member states and the European Commission to access data on energy consumption by data centres across Europe, collected under the Energy Efficiency Directive (EED).

Lighthouse Reports decided last September to turn to the Aarhus Convention – a binding treaty aims to protect access to environmental information and is often used as a last resort solution – and its compliance committee to seek disclosure. Lighthouse Reports may face a long wait for a ruling though, as the process can take years.

When EU’s top court challenges transparency watchdog’s authority

The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJUE) has challenged the European Ombudsman’s authority to investigate its refusal to disclose past financial declarations of interests of its judges and advocates general, according to a decision published today by the EU’s transparency watchdog.

The dispute began after Investigate Europe reporters, while investigating judges’ currently declared financial interests, discovered that older declarations were no longer publicly available. The Court initially refused, arguing that those documents were judicial and not administrative ones, and therefore fell outside the rules on public access to documents.

Following our complaint to the ombudswoman and its subsequent decision to open an inquiry, the court eventually agreed to release the requested former declarations, but only upon request. So Teresa Anjinho closed the case, as she considered that the court remedied the problematic situation.

The ombudswoman firmly rejected the court’s interpretation: handling public access requests is an administrative activity, regardless of the nature of the documents concerned. She also called for greater clarity on how the court distinguished between judicial and administrative documents. 

So a small victory for transparency, but a broader question remains: should the EU’s top court have such discretion over which of its own internal documents face public scrutiny? 

How to get access across Europe

A new guide promises to give journalists (and anyone else) an easy introduction into making freedom of information requests in 39 European countries and with the EU.

The first-of-its-kind compendium, curated and co-written by yours truly with the help of 45 journalists, academics and FOI advocates from around the continent and published by Arena for Journalism, answers practical questions such as “how can I appeal” and provides contacts who can help in each country. 

Find the guide – free to use and share – under this link.

New research by Corporate Europe Observatory (CEO) and LobbyControl shows that Big Tech lobbying is pushing the EU towards sweeping deregulation of data protection rules.

The new publication finds signs of an intensive lobbying campaign between Big Tech and Germany and Ireland which are helping to gut fundamental European data protection safeguards.

“The Big Tech campaign to kill data protection in Europe” documents how MEPs are meeting with Big Tech lobbyists under the guise of boosting AI tech innovation.

The report documents extensive contacts between Big Tech companies and European policymakers over the EU Commission’s proposed Digital Omnibus.

The aim is to change and influence how personal data are used to develop and operate AI systems, warns CEO.

“It is a really drastic change,” Bram Vraken researcher and campaigner at CEO told EUobserver.

Introduced by the commission last November, the Digital Omnibus forms part of the EU executive’s wider drive to simplify regulation and strengthen European competitiveness.

The commission has presented the proposal as a way to make Europe “simpler and faster” and to “adapt” its regulatory framework to a “more volatile world”.

The Digital Omnibus “provides a simple, innovation-friendly environment for our European AI ecosystem to grow,” said commission’s president Ursula von der Leyen.

But the proposed changes potentially create broad exemptions from existing data protection rules for AI companies.

“What we see is a creation [of] this huge backdoor, which in many cases will make the GDPR (General Data Protection Regulation) meaningless,” Vraken said.

If adopted by the European Parliament, the changes would allow companies to collect people’s personal data to train and operate AI systems without consent.

Google and Meta

Under the parliament’s rules, all MEPs and their assistants must publicly declare scheduled meetings with lobbyists and third-country representatives and access to these information is public.

From November 2025, CEO and LobbyControl identified 655 meetings with lobbyists in the parliament, the report says. This comes as Big Tech lobby budgets hit record levels.

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