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Ukraine finds Russia’s Geran drones fitted with a compass that works through GPS jamming, but Western electronics still at their core

29 October 2026 at 10:56

magnetometers in geran

Russia has started installing magnetometers in the tails or tail fins of its Geran attack drones, Vladyslav Vlasiuk, the Ukrainian president’s commissioner for sanctions policy, said on Facebook on 28 October.

Russia uses its Shahed-Geran series drones in massive daily attacks on Ukraine. Ukrainian forces jam Gerans’ satellite navigation to push them off course, and Russia keeps hardening the drones against it, already fitting them with adaptive antennas. The magnetometer appears designed to go further, giving the drone a heading that doesn’t depend on satellites at all. Earlier this month, Ukrainian military intelligence reported a US-made magnetometer in the upgraded Geran-4.

A new jamming device, and Western parts at the core

Vlasiuk posted photos from a site where Ukraine studies Russian weapons and their components. He said he takes the findings for Ukraine’s sanctions work. He did not say which Geran models carry the magnetometer.

Ukrainian specialists study electronics taken from Russian weapons
Ukrainian specialists study electronics from Russian weapons. Photo: Vladyslav Vlasiuk/Facebook

At the same time, Ukraine is studying how a new jamming device works. Vlasiuk did not say where it was found or what it targets.

“Western electronics are at the core everywhere,” Vlasiuk wrote.

Geran-4 already flew with a US-made sensor

On 5 October, Ukraine’s Defense Intelligence (HUR) said the upgraded Geran-4 carries a new “MOKh” unit built around a PNI5GA magnetometer made by US firm PNI Sensor. The unit works with the SADRA inertial navigation module to cut gyroscope drift and make the drone’s autonomous navigation more accurate.

HUR said Russia also added an electro-optical navigation system called Susanin to the upgraded Geran-4. It compares camera images with a reference image stored in memory to keep the drone on its route to the target. The new K5 version of the Geran-5 uses a similar system.

Presidential adviser Serhii “Flash” Beskrestnov warned on 28 October that if Russia starts using Susanin en masse on Geran-5s and other drones and missiles at night, Ukraine may have to go back to switching off lights, especially on roads.

NATO's drone-predicting AI gives Ukrainian commanders a glimpse into Russia's next moves on the front line

29 October 2026 at 06:46
Ukrainian soldier looks at a tablet in a shelter.
Ukrainian troops use computers, phones, and tablets to see Delta's battlefield management system.

Diego Herrera Carcedo/Anadolu via Getty Images

  • NATO has provided new details about its AI model for predicting Russian drone strikes on the front lines.
  • Called Initiative 13 or Model 13, it works for about 31 miles behind the line of contact.
  • The AI gives commanders a map showing the next day's expected Russian drone activity.

A new NATO artificial intelligence model gives Ukraine's forces a frontline map of where Russian drone activity is expected the next day, per the alliance's innovation center.

The system, called Initiative 13 or Model 13, "turns an array of disparate data into a clear map of expected activity" for commanders to plan their next day of operations, a spokesperson for NATO's Joint Analysis, Training, and Education Center, or JATEC, told Business Insider.

Business Insider reported on Ukraine's announcement of the program earlier this month, but JATEC is now providing new details on how it works.

Initiative 13 covers areas 5 to 50 km, or roughly 3 to 31 miles, of Ukrainian territory behind the line of contact, and divides that space into geographical cells, per JATEC.

"For each cell, the system determines the expected intensity of strike and reconnaissance activity of UAVs, the level of threat, the trend of its change, and the range of possible values," its spokesperson said.

The map shows a forecast for the next day, helping commanders to highlight risk areas so they can better deploy their forces and equipment, they said.

They added that the AI model is trained on battlefield data and considers previous Russian drone activity, what types of drones were used, when and how they were deployed, weather conditions, terrain, and distance to the line of contact.

"Initiative 13 does not replace data from the current situation and commander's decisions," the JATEC spokesperson added. JATEC is NATO's joint organization with Ukraine, based in Poland, that aims to glean lessons and innovations from the war.

Ukraine's defense ministry said in mid-October that Initiative 13, which it called Model 13, was "ready for integration into the Armed Forces of Ukraine's situational awareness systems."

The AI model, it said, could predict Russia's drone strikes with "high probability."

Kyiv's forces use a battlespace management system called Delta, which feeds data from the front lines onto an interactive map that commanders can access via laptop, phone, or tablet.

The drone-predicting AI was developed by Ukraine's forces and NATO's Allied Command Transformation, with support from JATEC.

Ukraine's defense ministry said in its initial announcement that another AI model, dubbed No. 32, for planning artillery deployments was also in the works but is still in prototype stages.

Artificial intelligence has increasingly been making its way into Ukraine's war, from helping mid-range attack drones identify and strike targets to sending uncrewed ground vehicles to autonomously complete supply runs.

Read the original article on Business Insider

Romania Accuses Russia of Coordinating Sabotage Network Targeting European Defence Industry

29 October 2026 at 06:38

Romanian intelligence services say a Russian-directed network was responsible for a fire near an arms manufacturing facility in Brașov. Investigations involving Germany and Poland have exposed what authorities describe as a wider operation targeting military and industrial defence infrastructure across Europe.

Romania has accused Russia of coordinating a cross-border sabotage network responsible for an industrial fire near an arms manufacturing facility, prompting a diplomatic confrontation with Moscow and investigations involving several European countries.

Romanian intelligence and prosecutors announced on 26th October that they had identified three foreign nationals allegedly involved in the operation, which caused a fire on an industrial site in Brașov on 14th September.

The suspects, two Belarusian nationals and one Ukrainian, are alleged to have participated in a network directed by individuals operating from Russia.

Two suspects have been detained in Germany, while a third has been located in Poland.

Romania is seeking their extradition as investigators examine possible connections to other attempted attacks against military and industrial installations.

Russia has rejected the allegations.

The case has drawn attention to the security of European defence production facilities at a time when NATO governments are seeking to increase military manufacturing capacity and sustain assistance to Ukraine.

Fire near a Romanian arms manufacturer

The investigation concerns an industrial complex in Brașov, a city with an established defence manufacturing sector.

The fire occurred on 14th September at premises situated close to CARFIL SA, a subsidiary of Romania’s state-owned defence company ROMARM.

According to the Romanian Intelligence Service, the incident was caused by individuals belonging to a sabotage network coordinated from the Russian Federation.

The fire damaged premises occupied by several commercial businesses.

Although the industrial site is associated with the CARFIL complex, authorities have not established publicly that the arms manufacturing facility itself sustained damage.

That geographical distinction is important when assessing the consequences of the operation.

CARFIL manufactures military equipment and ammunition and has pursued partnerships involving drones, explosives and other defence technologies.

Its proximity to the incident has heightened concerns about the security of industrial facilities supporting Romania’s armed forces.

Suspects identified in three countries

Romania’s Directorate for Investigating Organised Crime and Terrorism, known as DIICOT, says the evidence connects three individuals to the incident.

According to Romanian national news agency AGERPRES, the Bucharest Court of Appeal issued European arrest warrants following the investigation.

Two suspects were detained in Germany while allegedly preparing similar operations.

The third was located in Poland, where authorities received a further European arrest warrant issued on 26 October.

Romanian prosecutors are pursuing extradition procedures.

The nationalities of the suspects do not establish responsibility on the part of Belarus or Ukraine. Romanian authorities attribute the alleged coordination to individuals based in Russia.

The investigation also indicates that the Brașov incident may not have been an isolated operation.

Romanian intelligence claims the network’s potential targets included government-owned and private arms manufacturers, military-related facilities and other strategic industrial sites in several European countries.

Those claims remain subject to ongoing criminal investigation.

Bucharest summons Russian ambassador

The Romanian government escalated the matter diplomatically on 27th October.

Foreign Minister Dan Neculăescu summoned Russia’s ambassador, Vladimir Lipaev, to deliver a formal protest concerning the alleged operation.

According to the Romanian Foreign Ministry’s account reported by AGERPRES, Bucharest stated that evidence gathered during the investigation demonstrated Russian responsibility.

The ministry described the operation as part of a broader pattern of hostile activity affecting European states.

President Nicușor Dan also condemned the alleged sabotage, linking it to attempts to undermine European security and solidarity.

Moscow rejected the accusations.

The Russian Embassy maintained that the allegations were unfounded and disputed Romania’s account of the evidence presented during the diplomatic meeting.

The conflicting positions mean the attribution remains contested, notwithstanding the conclusions announced by Romania’s intelligence authorities.

A recruitment model designed for deniability

The Romanian Intelligence Service has provided details about how it believes the wider network recruits and directs participants.

According to its statement, recruitment can begin through social media with offers of payment for apparently minor activities, such as photographing or observing particular locations.

Subsequent assignments may become more serious, involving property destruction, arson or other acts of violence.

Individuals may be targeted because of financial difficulties or other personal vulnerabilities.

The service also identified methods allegedly used to conceal movements, payments and communications.

These include encrypted messaging applications, telephone numbers registered outside the country of operation and accommodation or transport arrangements booked under other identities.

Such methods can complicate investigations because the individuals physically carrying out an operation may have limited knowledge of the organisers.

Romanian authorities emphasised that individual indicators should be assessed in context and do not themselves prove involvement in sabotage.

Defence factories become a security concern

The case has implications beyond Romania.

European governments are investing in ammunition production, air defence systems and military technologies, partly in response to the continuing war in Ukraine.

The resulting expansion of manufacturing capacity creates additional infrastructure requiring protection.

Industrial sites may be vulnerable not only to direct attacks but also to disruption affecting nearby businesses, transport networks, power supplies and specialist contractors.

The Brașov investigation illustrates how an incident outside a defence factory’s perimeter can nevertheless raise questions about the security of the wider industrial complex.

It also demonstrates the importance of cooperation between European intelligence services and criminal investigators.

The detention of suspects in Germany and the identification of another in Poland show that investigations into alleged sabotage may cross several jurisdictions.

The wider European response

Romania’s allegations come amid growing concern over hostile activities involving cyberattacks, disinformation, surveillance and physical sabotage.

Attributing such incidents to a foreign government requires intelligence assessments, criminal evidence and international cooperation.

The public allegations against Russia do not replace the judicial process concerning the three suspects.

However, the investigation has already prompted a diplomatic response and additional scrutiny of industrial security.

For European governments seeking to expand their defence industries, the immediate challenge is protecting production facilities and associated infrastructure without allowing relatively small-scale disruptive operations to undermine wider manufacturing programmes.

The outcome of Romania’s criminal proceedings will be important in establishing the responsibility of those accused and clarifying how the alleged network operated across national borders.

Main Image: By MAPN – http://www.mapn.ro/fotodb/20051020_expomil?page=1, CC BY-SA 3.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=14997305

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