Production: By Europod, in co-production with Sphera Network.

EUobserver is proud to have an editorial partnership with Europod to co-publish the podcast series “Briefed” hosted by Léa Marchal. The podcast is available on all major platforms.

Find the full transcript below:

From this Sunday, the EU is imposing a new €2 charge on parcels coming from outside the bloc. It comes on top of the €3 charge on small parcels announced in June.

So why is the EU doing this, and what difference will it make? Let’s start with what’s changing.

From this Sunday, there will be a €2 tax on each product category contained in a parcel coming from outside the EU. This ads up to the €3 tax on small parcels introduced in June this year. So for a parcel of less than €150, you can already count a €5 charge, and that’s if your parcel contains just one category of item.

Say you order four different garments from the Chinese platform Shein. The total charge comes to €20.

Officially, it’s the sellers who are supposed to pay, not consumers. But in practice, they pass the cost on to customers one way or another.

So why this second charge? The €3 charge adopted in June was meant to tackle the flood of small parcels coming from companies like Temu and Shein.

Parcels of very low value, often just a few euros. And that’s not an exaggeration. According to Kristian Vanderwaeren, Belgium’s head of customs, the average value of a parcel before the charge was around €5. And that’s an average, so imagine the number of parcels worth less than €5 that literally come from the other side of the world.

Until now, parcels worth less than €150 were exempt from customs duties. That was a big hole in customs revenue. And at the same time, customs officers had more and more parcels to process. Hence the €3 levy.

Now the new charge is different. It applies to all parcels, not just the smallest ones. Its goal is to raise revenue to cover the cost of checks. Because if the EU wants to fight fraud and make sure products on the market are safe, customs controls have to increase. And that takes time, and therefore money.

We don’t know yet exactly how much the new tax will bring in revenues. What we know, even if the situation is not comparable, is what the €3 tax is starting to bring.

Between June and September, the €3 charge brought in €364mln for Belgian customs. In just three months.

Belgium is a major entry point for parcels bound for the EU, through the port of Antwerp and Liège airport. So we cannot duplicate that figure for other EU countries.

Still, over a full year, the two charges combined, on top of standard customs duties, should raise a significant amount. We can therefore imagine that countries outside the EU are not happy, especially China.

Beijing describes the measure as protectionist. It also argues that the cost will largely be passed on to European consumers, which means, in its view, that the EU is shooting itself in the foot.

But that is, to some extent, exactly what Europeans are hoping for. If Chinese products become more expensive, they become less attractive.

Business groups agree. Comeos, the Belgian federation for trade and services, welcomed the charge as a response to unfair competition.

Think about an everyday product worth less than €100. There is usually a big price gap between the Chinese version and the one made in Europe. When that gap is somewhere between €5 and €20, the charge can tip the balance. It may push you to buy local, or not to buy at all. In both case, this means less money getting out of the EU.

And there are already signs it’s working. Since the €3 charge came in in June, the volume of small parcels arriving at Liège airport has dropped by 60 percent.

The European consumer organisation BEUC has also welcomed the move, saying more border controls mean safer products.

Something that is not immediately visible for citizens, but which has its importance. 

Production: By Europod, in co-production with Sphera Network.

EUobserver is proud to have an editorial partnership with Europod to co-publish the podcast series “Briefed” hosted by Léa Marchal. The podcast is available on all major platforms.

Find the full transcript below:

The EU-Canada summit opens today in Montreal and runs until tomorrow (30 October). One idea is overshadowing the meeting: making Canada an “associate member” of the EU. However, the 27 member states are far from agreed on it.

So, what can we actually expect from this summit?

Canada is, let’s say, one of the EU’s favourite partners. And it went as far as this: Ursula von der Leyen proposing to make Canada an associate member of the EU.

This came as a surprise, because the idea had not been discussed with the 27 member states. And now that we are getting into the details, it has become a real issue.

So much so that the EU is scrambling at the last minute to agree on the wording to use during the summit with Ottawa. 

As an illustration, as recently as yesterday, the EU still didn’t know what to do with the term “associate member” in the joint EU-Canada declaration. Council officials had suggested mentioning the status, while making clear it was the Commission’s idea. But even in that form, Germany, France, Italy and Greece objected.

Why? First, because no decision was ever taken through the proper channels.
And above all, because the status simply doesn’t exist.

The word “member” is already a problem, because it implies some form of participation in the EU. And the treaties limit that to a certain geographical area, which, as you can imagine, doesn’t stretch across the Atlantic.

So what does the Commission actually have in mind? According to an EU official, associate member status would mean consulting each other even more on a number of policies: climate, energy, AI, security and so on.

Canada could also join some EU programmes more automatically. Although in reality, it already takes part in several of them, such as Horizon, the research programme, or SAFE, the defence loan instrument. The same official says there would also be more regular meetings to coordinate positions.

But all of this remains very vague. For many observers, von der Leyen’s proposal was above all a way to show the friendship between the EU and Canada, at a time when the United States is behaving in a threatening way.

Now, what does Canada think of this? When von der Leyen made her proposal in her speech, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney welcomed it, as diplomacy and politeness require.

Since then, according to Canadian media, he has avoided using the expression “associate member”. And in any case, Canada has no intention of joining the EU. It simply isn’t something it is interested in.

So whether there are ways to deepen cooperation is, once again, still to be seen.

The summit, will surely not bring answers or decisions on such a relationship.
More time will be needed to discuss a new status, or leave it completely.

In the meantime, the two blocs will sign what they call an “alliance for the future”. It is less binding and more consensual.

That’s what bilateral summits like this are for: reminding everyone of existing alliances, or clarifying them in some cases. Both sides adopt a joint declaration, a document in which they try to announce shared projects and take common positions on major international issues.

But as for associate membership, that will have to wait. 

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EUobserver is proud to have an editorial partnership with Europod to co-publish the podcast series “Briefed” hosted by Léa Marchal. The podcast is available on all major platforms.

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The European Commission has unveiled its plan to help Europe adapt to climate change. But as extreme heat and climate disasters become the norm, the plan offers very few binding commitments.

So what does it actually change? Let’s start with what’s on the table. The commission is proposing a law that would require all 27 member states to work from the same reference scenario for rising temperatures. And, based on that, to adopt national adaptation plans.

The idea is to stop countries from redoing their own analyses and justifying what their actions are based on. From now on, the shared assumption would be: 1.5 degrees of warming by 2030, 2 degrees by 2050, and 3 degrees by 2100.

There is already something notable here: this scenario is more pessimistic than the Paris Agreement, which aims to keep global warming well below 2 degrees.

The European commissioner for climate, Wopke Hoekstra, gave an explanation ot that: 

“It would be unwise not to prepare for the scenarios science puts on the agenda: so scientists are saying 1,5 might do more or less for now, but by 2050 you’re looking at 2 degrees. And by 2100, you’re looking at 3. so I would argue we need to do 2 things: one is staying close to 1,5 and make sure if there is an overshoot, we bring things down, and at the same time, let’s not contemplate and wait but let’s prepare also for a hollow future, that is also the logic of the proposal.”

Now, this assumption is also at the source of another criticism: the EU isn’t doing enough to cut greenhouse gas emissions in the first place.

At yesterday’s press conference, a journalist asked the commissioner how he could defend the Paris Agreement while the EU was lowering climate ambitions at the same time. Because in recent years, the EU has watered down several key measures of the Green Deal.

Think of the rollback on the end of combustion-engine cars, the suspension of the regulation on methane emissions, or the one on imported deforestation.
In parallel, the commission is no longer proposing new legislation to cut emissions.

Now, moving to the proposition in itself, will they really help countries to prepare for climate events to come, starting by with the next summer?

Not immediately. The package will make it easier to share useful data with national authorities, notably thanks to Copernicus, the EU’s Earth observation programme.

The commission will also publish a catalogue of adaptation solutions, available to everyone.

So overall, the package is mostly about exchanging information and ideas, and about commitments to implement national adaptation plans. It also streamlines some existing work, which is always useful.

But what the commission does not do is force member states to take concrete action, or let’s say, to show tangible results.

The Climate Law already requires countries to have adaptation plans. But those plans don’t come with quantified targets. Whether it’s about adapting soils, making buildings more resilient to heat, or protecting vulnerable people.

This is something the Greens in the European Parliament regret. German MEP Kai Tegethoff warns that the risk is to end up with plenty of information about the risks, and then do nothing about them. He is calling for binding targets.

And then, there’s one last thing: money. The commission hasn’t announced any new funding for adaptation.

So: technical tools and encouragement, but no obligations and no cash.
Commissioner Hoekstra even highlighted the amounts already allocated in the current budget, and in the proposal for the next one.

But as we know, negotiations on the next long-term EU budget are heading towards cuts. So it is unlikely that there would be an increase in the budget for climate measures.

This transcript was updated on 29 October to correct MEP Kai Tegethoff’s nationality to German.

Production: By Europod, in co-production with Sphera Network.

EUobserver is proud to have an editorial partnership with Europod to co-publish the podcast series “Briefed” hosted by Léa Marchal. The podcast is available on all major platforms.

Find the full transcript below: 

Israelis are heading to the polls today for legislative elections. It is the first national vote since 2022, and a decisive moment for Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who is running again.

So who are the main candidates, and what is actually at stake? First, a quick look at where we are.

A lot has happened since the last elections in 2022. Since the Hamas terrorist attack on 7 October 2023, which killed more than 1,100 people, the Israeli government has cracked down on Gaza: the death toll is at 74,500 people, according to the Gaza Health Ministry. The number of people wounded is triple that.

While a ceasefire was signed last year, around 1,500 Palestinians have been killed since then. In the West Bank, settlement expansion has accelerated, with growing violence. Over the past three years, more than 10,000 Palestinians have been displaced.

So this is the context in which the elections are taking place. The current prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, is running for re-election, as there is no term limit for prime ministers in Israel. And he is no newcomer: he has spent around 16 years in power, though not consecutively.

Now, what do the polls say? According to several surveys published last Friday, Gadi Eisenkot is slightly ahead of Netanyahu. But neither is expected to reach an absolute majority.

So who is Gadi Eisenkot? He is Netanyahu’s rival, but politically he is closer to the current government’s line than you might expect.

He is a former chief of staff of the army, and he also served in Netanyahu’s war cabinet for several months after the 7 October attack.

He later left, accusing the prime minister of mismanaging events, and in particular of failing to anticipate the attack.

His son was killed in the war in Gaza in December 2023, which seems to have given him a certain sympathy among the public.

On the Palestinian question, he opposes the creation of a Palestinian state, and he does not challenge Israel’s policy of territorial expansion. He only promises to tackle settler violence, in the name of the rule of law.

Then there is the duo Naftali Bennett and Yair Lapid. Bennett briefly served as Prime Minister in 2021. The duo represent a centre-right line that does not differ hugely from Netanyahu’s.

On the left side of the political spectrum, there seems to be only one candidate: Yair Golan, of the Democrats party. He is the only one calling for the recognition of a Palestinian state.

He is also the candidate many Israelis abroad are coming home to vote for. The French daily newspaper Le Monde has published a long article interviewing Israeli expatriates around the world.

Most of them back Golan, who, according to several of those interviewed, represents the only hope of putting Israel back on the right track. But the polls suggest he is well behind the right-wing candidates. He would win around 10 seats in parliament, against 22 for Gadi Eisenkot and 19 for Likud, Netanyahu’s party.

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EUobserver is proud to have an editorial partnership with Europod to co-publish the podcast series “Briefed” hosted by Léa Marchal. The podcast is available on all major platforms.

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In Germany, the far-right party Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) won two state elections in September. Now, talks are underway to build coalitions.  How close is the AfD to governing in these States?

In both Saxony-Anhalt and Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, the AfD won the elections a few weeks ago. But it does not have an absolute majority in either regional parliament.

As for the state of Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, the AFD has no prospect of forming alliances to secure a majority, and negotiations are well under way between the Social Democrats, the Greens and the Left Party to reach an agreement. Together, they hold an absolute majority.

But the situation is quite different in Saxony-Anhalt. What will most likely happen, is an alliance with the BSW, the party founded by Sahra Wagenknecht.

The BSW describes itself as radical left, fighting for social justice. But in practice, it takes a very hard line on migration. And it is also notably lenient towards Russia.

In the end, the BSW and the AFD share similar views on a number of things, so they have been talking to build a coalition. They haven’t announced any deal whatsoever for now.

But there are two things we should look at. First, the election of the AfD candidate as president of the regional parliament in Saxony-Anhalt.
Tobias Rausch is the first AfD member to be landtag president.

He won thanks to votes from the AfD and the BSW. This would have been enough. But he even got 4 more votes.

Together, BSW and AFD have 44 votes, while Rausch received 48. That means at least four votes came from other parties, which are not supposed to cooperate with the far right. Some suspect they came from the CDU. But as Friedrich Merz pointed out, the ballot is secret, so there is no way to verify that.

Now, president of the regional parliament is not a particularly powerful position. But still, it is the first time the AfD has won it, and it came as a shock in Germany earlier this month.

So does this mean the same thing will happen when the regional prime minister is chosen? Well, not necessarily. The vote could take place in December. No date has been set yet. So there is plenty of time to negotiate a deal.

But the fact that the AfD and the BSW managed to agree on the parliament’s president shows that an agreement is conceivable.

There is something else worth noting. The two parties have just voted together on a non binding resolution on the war in Ukraine. In it, they call on Ukraine to capitulate to Russia, and demand an end to financial support for Kyiv.
So again, this shows they share several positions.

And in the end, even if the AfD doesn’t manage to get its candidate, Ulrich Siegmund, elected as head of the state, the AfD and the BSW could still form a majority on many votes, just as they did on the resolution about Ukraine.
Which would mean a change of policy for the region.

Before we wrap up, you might be wondering: what powers do German states actually have? Quite a lot, in fact. Education and culture, police and public security, media as well, since regional public broadcasters, for example, are governed by the states.

Each state has its own government. And the regional prime minister leads it, much like a prime minister would, at national level. The states are also represented in the Bundesrat, a kind of senate, which takes part in drafting national laws.

So yes, and AFD led regional government would mean a shift in local policies. 

Production: By Europod, in co-production with Sphera Network.

EUobserver is proud to have an editorial partnership with Europod to co-publish the podcast series “Briefed” hosted by Léa Marchal. The podcast is available on all major platforms.

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Do you remember the Yellow Vests movement that shook France 2018? On TikTok, a young user has called for a national mobilisation on the seventeenth of October against the cost of living, and the video quickly went viral. So could the Yellow Vests make their big return?

“Please, give us a date, we’re ready to protest! We young people are struggling. We just can’t make a living anymore,” that’s what Justine, a TikToker from Normandy in France has posted a few weeks ago, while wearing a fluorescent yellow vest.

The reference to the 2018 Yellow Vests is unmistakable. The French movement, which began in protest at rising fuel prices, has been widely revived on social media in recent weeks, especially by younger users.

Our colleague Romane Lizée from StreetPress, a fellow member of the Sphera Network alongside Europod, spoke to some of them: young people reviving a protest movement they only knew from a distance.

Yves, a 24-year-old TikToker with over 80,000 followers, made a video called “Survival Guide for the Yellow Vests 2026”. He gives would-be protesters practical advice, such as bringing thick ski goggles or writing a lawyer’s phone number on a piece of paper.

So why is the movement resurfacing now? For many, the movement has come to stand for a general sense of being fed up, something they still feel today.

 “Eight years ago, France put on the yellow vest because petrol hit 1.50 euros a litre, and now we’re almost at three euros and nothing is happening!” That’s how Saïd, a 23-year-old delivery driver, sees it.

The economic context is indeed worse than it was eight years ago. The price of fuel is now almost 2.40 euros a litre.

Throughout September, a series of protests followed one another, called by different professions and for different reasons: climate action, firefighters, a public-sector strike, the law on sexual violence, and finally the student blockades.

High school students have been protesting for a few weeks now, blockading their schools to demand better conditions. We talked about this in a previous Briefed episode. You can find the link in the description.

Now, will the protest be as big and long-lasting as the one in 2018?

Online, a petition launched by the website 17octobregiletjaune, which calls for the protest, has gathered more than 21,000 signatures. Over a thousand actions across the country have been identified on a map by the same website: mostly protests in several cities, but also actions on roundabouts and at petrol stations.

Youth organisations, students’ unions and education staff have already answered the call. More importantly, the CGT, one of France’s main labour unions, has backed it, as have some political figures, like Marine Tondelier, the Green candidate for the presidential election. Still, the true extent of the movement is difficult to predict.

In other European countries, protests are also multiplying, especially among young people. In Spain, huge demonstrations for the right to housing have been taking place in several cities since mid-September. They went quite far: they pushed Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez to call snap elections.

In Brussels, on October 9th, thousands of protesters, including rail workers, teachers, and university and secondary school students, marched against the federal government’s policies, in particular its socio-economic measures. Here again, precarity is a central grievance.

In Italy, on October 8th, students called for mobilisation, notably by camping in front of universities across the country to protest against the sharp rise in tuition fees and student rents.

The triggers behind these protests are not all the same, and the mobilisations take different forms from country to country. But the goal is broadly the same: to call for better living conditions and to defend basic social rights. And young people are particularly mobilised.

Production: By Europod, in co-production with Sphera Network.

EUobserver is proud to have an editorial partnership with Europod to co-publish the podcast series “Briefed” hosted by Léa Marchal. The podcast is available on all major platforms.

Find the full transcript below: 

Ten years after the Brexit vote, more and more Britons are asking whether they should go back. According to a YouGov poll conducted earlier this month, 52% would vote to rejoin the EU in a referendum.

And the UK’s new Prime Minister, Andy Burnham, seems to be keeping that door open.

But how realistic is that? Andy Burnham became Prime Minister this summer. And since then, he has been dropping hints here and there about a possible return to the EU. A few months ago, he was saying it was too early to even discuss it.

So what changed? Perhaps the international context, but also the realisation that the UK cannot get everything it wants while staying outside the Union.

On 20 November, EU leaders will have the opportunity to discuss the relationship with the UK during a bilateral summit. They will try to reach agreements on a number of issues that have stalled.

What are those topics? First, food. Today, agri-food products face checks and certification when they enter the EU, and that slows trade down. The solution on the table is for the UK to align its sanitary and phytosanitary standards with the EU’s. But the details still need to be agreed.

Second, people. Right now, a European who wants to work in the UK needs a visa. The two sides could agree on a scheme to make mobility easier, especially for young people.

Third, carbon. The British would like to link their carbon market to the EU’s, so that their exporters don’t have to pay extra for their emissions when they sell to Europe. In practice, that means avoiding the EU’s carbon border tax.

Last but not least, industry. And this is a big part of the discussion. As the EU moves towards giving priority to European products, the British fear being left out of this “European preference”.

Now, you might say: in all these cases, isn’t this a bit like being in the EU, without the drawbacks? That’s exactly what critics call cherry-picking.

At the heart of the problem is a simple question: where do you draw the line between being a member and being a partner? It’s the same debate the EU has with Switzerland, which wants to stay very close but not be part of the bloc.

Now, is a return to the EU a realistic scenario? The door is open, as Emmanuel Macron and others have put it.

The UK could apply, and it’s unlikely that any member state would block the process. But the European Commission has already warned: there would be no special treatment for the British.

On the positive side, the UK would start from a good position. It already applies a good part of EU legislation, and it meets the rule-of-law criteria.

But all these years after leaving the EU, the two sides are still negotiating. There are sticking points on free movement and on standards. And those disagreements would make any accession talks that much harder.

Let’s see what comes out of the summit on 20 November.

Production: By Europod, in co-production with Sphera Network.

EUobserver is proud to have an editorial partnership with Europod to co-publish the podcast series “Briefed” hosted by Léa Marchal. The podcast is available on all major platforms.

Find the full transcript below: 

Two ships have been hit by drones in Bulgarian waters in the Black Sea on Monday. Several other ships have been targeted in recent weeks, at a time when Russia is intensifying its attacks on Ukraine.

So, at what point does a hybrid attack become an attack on Nato? On Monday, two ships were hit by drones in the Bulgarian economic zone in the Black Sea.

One of them sank, with 11 crew members missing. The second vessel, which belonged to Ukraine, was damaged but did not sink, and all 15 people on board were rescued.

A week earlier, two other cargo ships had been attacked by drones in the same area, killing 10 people. And on 5 October, a Turkish cargo ship carrying grain was sunk by drones shortly after leaving Ukraine.

There is currently no evidence proving that Russia was behind these attacks, and Moscow has not claimed responsibility.

But that did not stop Bulgarian Prime Minister Roumen Radev from summoning Russia’s ambassador. Radev said that, while there was no conclusive evidence, the outcome of these attacks clearly benefited Russia more than anyone else.

Russia’s ambassador to Bulgaria, Eleonora Mitrofanova, said she had received no information from the Russian defence ministry about the attacks. She also suggested that they could have been provocations carried out by a third party.

And that uncertainty is important, because it makes it much harder for Nato countries to decide when an incident should be treated as an attack.

So how do Europeans cope with these attacks? We’ve already seen several Russian drones end up inside EU territory in recent months. And in some cases, they have been clearly identified.

Take the Russian drone that crashed on a residential building in the Romanian city of Galați in May and injured two people. Or the two drones found at Leipzig airport in Germany this summer, charged with explosives. They were all identified as Russian.

So far, however, the response has consisted mainly of diplomatic measures and political statements. Neither Bulgaria nor Germany has requested formal consultations under Article 4 of the Nato treaty.

Article 4 allows a Nato member to ask for consultations when it believes its territorial integrity, political independence or security is threatened.

Bulgarian Prime Minister Radev has spoken with Nato Secretary General Mark Rutte about the incidents, which are serious enough to be discussed at Nato level. But Bulgaria has not gone as far as triggering Article 4.

One reason is precisely the ambiguity surrounding all these drone attacks: who is controlling them, whether they were deliberately sent into EU territory, and whether they were jammed or diverted.

But if an attack were clearly attributed to Russia, how would Nato respond? That’s one of the questions currently being discussed within the alliance.

On Monday, Nato’s top military commander, US General Alexus Grynkewich, said he did not believe a conflict between Russia and Nato was imminent or inevitable.

But he also presented what Nato calls a “theory of victory”: a plan designed to ensure that the alliance could rapidly neutralise an enemy attacking one of its members.

The strategy rests on several pillars. One is establishing clear red lines that an adversary should not cross. Another is investing in new military technologies, with drones playing a central role. And the third is maintaining the ability and readiness to fight at short notice.

The idea is not only to be able to respond if a direct attack happens, but also to deter Russia from continuing what Nato describes as hybrid activities against its members.

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EUobserver is proud to have an editorial partnership with Europod to co-publish the podcast series “Briefed” hosted by Léa Marchal. The podcast is available on all major platforms.

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The United States has imposed new sanctions on the International Criminal Court, this time targeting the institution itself. While the EU insists on its firm support for the ICC, it is still not using the one tool designed for this kind of situation: the blocking statute.

So, why is the EU holding back? First, a quick reminder of what we’re talking about. The International Criminal Court, or ICC, is based in The Hague. It tries people accused of the gravest crimes: genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression.

With one important limit: It can act when a crime is committed on the territory of a state that is party to the Rome Statute, or by one of that state’s nationals. The United States is not a party. Neither is Israel or Russia.  

And Washington’s goal is clear: dismantling the court. The Trump administration considers it politicised and without legitimacy.

It is particularly opposed to the arrest warrant against Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. That’s why, since 2025, the US has imposed several rounds of sanctions, targeting judges and, more recently, the court’s president, the Japanese national, Tomoko Akane.

On Friday, Washington went a step further, targeting the court as an institution.

So what does that mean in practice? All of the court’s assets in the United States are frozen. And, crucially, American companies and citizens can no longer provide services to the court or its members.

You might remember the case of the ICC judge Nicolas Guillou, who has been under sanctions for some time. We’ve talked about him in a previous Briefed episode.

He has explained that he can no longer use basic services such as Mastercard, or online platforms like Airbnb. He has also been warning that these sanctions are meant to intimidate, and that they undermine judges’ independence.

In a state governed by the rule of law, judges must not be put under pressure. This explains why the court’s reaction is so strong. It speaks of an obstruction of justice and an attack on the rule of law. And it is now calling on its members to take concrete action to protect its independence.

In response, the European Commission and the European Council have expressed their support for the court and its work. But without going too far.

They say the EU is ready to take measures so that the court can keep functioning. Yet when the Commission is asked what those measures are, and this has happened several times in recent months, it sidesteps the question.

Because beyond negotiations and diplomatic pressure, there is a tool created for precisely this kind of situation: the so-called blocking statute. It protects Europeans against the extraterritorial reach of sanctions imposed by third countries.

It doesn’t concern American actors. It concerns European companies and individuals who, under the threat of secondary sanctions, may become overly cautious.

In the case of the ICC, it’s about the court’s European banks, insurers and service providers.

Several European countries have called for the blocking statute to be activated. Yesterday, at the Foreign affairs council in Luxembourg, the Belgian and Dutch ministers asked the Commission to start analysing whether to do so.

But for now, they are still waiting for an answer. The Commission believes the priority is to use the six months before the sanctions take effect to negotiate with Washington, possibly to get them withdrawn.

This approach was backed by several EU foreign ministers yesterday. Let’s see whether that window for dialogue is enough, or whether the pressure to activate the blocking statute keeps growing.

Production: By Europod, in co-production with Sphera Network.

EUobserver is proud to have an editorial partnership with Europod to co-publish the podcast series “Briefed” hosted by Léa Marchal. The podcast is available on all major platforms.

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European gas storage levels are unusually low for this time of year, reaching their lowest autumn level since 2011.

With Russian gas imports set to end in 2027, could Europe face a tougher challenge in the months ahead? 

First, how do Europe’s gas reserves work? EU countries fill underground gas storage sites during spring and summer, when demand is lower, and draw on these stocks during the winter, when heating pushes consumption up.

Since 2022, the EU has required member states to ensure their gas storage facilities reach 90 percent of capacity by a deadline between 1 October and 1 December. That helps secure supplies ahead of winter.

But this year, stocks are well below that target, at just over 70 percent in early October. They still have time to rise before the deadline, but the situation is attracting attention.

Does that mean Europeans are at risk of running out of gas this winter? According to the European Commission, no. It acknowledges that storage levels are low compared with previous years, but says the EU’s gas system should still be flexible enough to meet demand this winter.

That said, a colder or longer winter than expected, or disruptions to supplies in other parts of the world, could put additional pressure on the market. Especially at a time when the EU is preparing to phase out Russian gas imports in 2027.

The EU has adopted a gradual ban, with transitional arrangements for existing long-term contracts.

Russian liquefied natural gas, or LNG, is due to be phased out completely from January 2027 only. Russian gas delivered by pipeline will follow later, with the deadline set for the end of September 2027.

And Russian gas still accounted for around 12 percent of EU gas demand through May 2026. Imports even increased in the first months of this year compared with the same period in 2025, amid disruptions to energy flows linked to the war in the Middle East.

So, from January, Europe will lose one source of supply.  Which means Europe should try and reduce its gas consumption.

But it’s easier said than done, particularly as winter approaches. Heating needs depend heavily on temperatures, and households cannot simply stop heating their homes.

Still, Europe has shown in the past that consumption can fall significantly. After Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the European Commission called on member states to reduce their gas demand by 15 percent. 

And they succeeded: their gas demand fell of around 18 percent, compared with the previous five-year average. A few months ago, following the escalation of the war in the Middle East, the Jacques Delors Institute recommended reviving efforts to reduce gas demand.

That being said, the reduction achieved in 2022 was partly helped by a mild winter and greater use of alternative energy sources, including coal and nuclear power.

Those options may help again, but they come with limitations. Much will depend on the weather and how long the winter lasts.

Which doesn’t mean Europe should not call for lowering the demand and accelerate the deployment of renewable energy.

Production: By Europod, in co-production with Sphera Network.

EUobserver is proud to have an editorial partnership with Europod to co-publish the podcast series “Briefed” hosted by Léa Marchal. The podcast is available on all major platforms.

Find the full transcript below: 

Spain is heading for early elections, after prime minister Pedro Sánchez called a snap vote last week. According to current polls, the conservative People’s Party, or PP, is ahead of Sánchez’s Socialists, while Vox is also making significant gains.

So, what would happen if the PP and Vox decided to govern together? And what would that mean for Europe? 

Let’s start with the numbers. According to Politico’s poll of polls, the PP, the conservative right-wing party, is currently polling first, at around 34 percent. The Socialists of the PSOE are at around 26 percent, and the far-right party Vox at around 18 percent.

The Socialists already came second in the last general election, in 2023. The PP won the most seats, but it couldn’t form a government. Pedro Sánchez eventually secured enough support from other parties, including the left-wing Sumar, to remain prime minister.

This time, the balance could be different. If the current polling were reflected in the election result, the PP and Vox could have enough seats to form a government together. PP leader Alberto Núñez Feijóo has said he could negotiate with Vox.

And this would not be completely new in Spain. The PP and Vox are already governing together in four Spanish regions: Extremadura, Aragon, Castilla y León and Andalusia.

Now, would that mean Spain would have  a government with Vox ministers? One possibility would be a government led by the PP, with Vox supporting it from outside, without taking ministerial positions. That’s what we’ve seen in Sweden, for example.

But what seems more and more likely is that Vox would become part of the government itself. The Vox MEP José Buxadé told Politico a few weeks ago that if his party negotiates a coalition with the PP, it would seek ministerial positions proportional to the number of votes it receives.

According to Politico, based on current polling, that could mean a third of ministers coming from Vox. So, what would this mean for Europe and for Spain? A lot.

Spain is currently one of the EU countries where the government has taken relatively progressive positions on issues such as migration, climate policy and social policy.

A change of government would therefore give more weight to the right in the European Council. That could be particularly important on migration, but also on economic files.

And then there is climate policy. Vox has called for the abolition of the European Green Deal, arguing that environmental policies have harmed employment and Spain’s energy policy.

Something that is very much contradicted by the fact that Spain is one of the European countries that has been particularly resilient during the energy crisis, thanks to its renewable energy.

So a change in climate policy could have consequences not only for Spain, but also for the EU’s wider energy transition.

And there could be another major change: foreign policy. Pedro Sánchez has been one of the more outspoken European leaders on the war in Gaza. Spain has taken a particularly critical position towards Israel and has recognised a Palestinian state.

Vox takes a very different position. The party strongly supports Israel and has called for European funding to the Palestinian Authority to be suspended.

The Spanish election is still several weeks away, so we don’t yet know whether the PP and Vox will actually be able to form a government, or what form such an agreement would take.

But if they do, Spain’s position in Europe could change quite significantly.

Production: By Europod, in co-production with Sphera Network.

EUobserver is proud to have an editorial partnership with Europod to co-publish the podcast series “Briefed” hosted by Léa Marchal. The podcast is available on all major platforms.

Find the full transcript below: 

France has been seeing growing protests by high school and university students in recent weeks.

The movement is continuing today with a fourth day of mobilisation. According to the government, the far-left opposition party is fuelling the protests. For Donald Trump, the movement is the result of mass migration and the presence of Islam.

But what are young people actually protesting about? High school students’ anger has been building for some time. One of the tipping points came in June, when temperatures inside many schools rose above 35 degrees. Many classrooms had no fans, let alone air conditioning.

And this happened in buildings that were already often in poor condition. Add to that the fact that absent teachers are frequently not replaced. The result was what you might call a general overheating — both literally and politically.

The government, meanwhile, has accused the left-wing party La France Insoumise (France Unbowed, or LFI) of fuelling the protests. Some commentators have even suggested that the movement was orchestrated by the party from the beginning.

There is little doubt that LFI is supporting the mobilisation and may be trying to benefit politically from it. But dismissing the protests as political manipulation risks ignoring problems that are well documented.

As sociologist and child psychiatrist Laelia Benoit recently told Le Monde, assuming that high school students cannot think for themselves and must necessarily be manipulated by adults or political parties is, in her words, a way of denying them their ability to act politically.

And many of their demands are supported by both parents and teachers. Teachers, for example, have long complained about the lack of replacements when they are absent.

This is supported by the latest PISA report on France: 87% of French students — as well as school principals — said their school’s capacity to teach was affected by a lack of teachers.

So young people are increasingly asking to be heard. Earlier this week, they put forward their demands, resulting in 10 concrete measures supported by both high school and university students.

Among other things, they are calling for a major programme to renovate schools, more staff, a guaranteed €1 meal at university canteens, and higher housing benefits and grants so that students can live with dignity.

So what is the government offering in response? France has opened an online platform in recent days where students can submit their demands. Prime Minister Sébastien Lecornu said yesterday that the platform had already received more than 40,000 contributions.

So for now, the government’s message is essentially: go back to class and submit your demands online. The prime minister then pointed to the additional €1 billion he has proposed for the education budget next year.

And as for more immediate measures, he announced five areas of work that should begin at the end of October. They include tackling teacher replacements, improving schools’ material conditions, reorganising school timetables, reforming the university admissions platform which appears to be a nightmare, and thinking about how to give high school students a greater voice.

Let’s see if that is enough to ease the protests.

Production: By Europod, in co-production with Sphera Network.

EUobserver is proud to have an editorial partnership with Europod to co-publish the podcast series “Briefed” hosted by Léa Marchal. The podcast is available on all major platforms.

Find the full transcript below: 

Chinese carmakers are taking an increasing share of the European car market, particularly when it comes to electric vehicles. Why are European carmakers now opening their factories to their Chinese competitors?

Until recently, the main concern in Europe was Chinese-made electric vehicles being imported into the EU. That’s why, two years ago, the EU imposed hefty tariffs on Chinese electric cars.

But Chinese manufacturers have found another way into the European market: they are setting up production here. Some are building factories of their own. Others are entering partnerships with European carmakers and using their existing production sites.

That’s the case with Stellantis and Chinese manufacturer Leapmotor. And now Dongfeng is also negotiating to produce cars at the French plant of Rennes La Janais. Because by moving production to Europe, Chinese manufacturers may be losing one of their main advantages, which is cheap labour.

But low labour costs are only one part of their competitive edge.

Chinese manufacturers also continue to benefit from state support. And setting up production in Europe doesn’t necessarily mean building brand-new factories.

In many cases, Chinese companies are looking to partner with European manufacturers and use factories that are already there — factories that are no longer operating at full capacity. That means they can save significantly on investment costs. And they can also rely on their European partners’ existing sales and distribution networks.

So how big is this Chinese presence in Europe becoming? For 2028, there are already 12 projects involving Chinese carmakers setting up production in Europe. Several are in Spain, with others in France, Belgium, Slovakia, Hungary, Sweden and Austria.

Now, why would European manufacturers allow their Chinese competitors to produce cars in their own factories? Part of the answer is that European carmakers are struggling to keep up in electric vehicles sells. And that is contributing to factory closures and job losses.

European manufacturers have to meet EU targets on average CO2 emissions each year. And producing more electric vehicles is necessary to meet those requirements.

So partnerships with Chinese manufacturers can serve two purposes: they can help European companies fulfilling their green cars objectives, while also keeping existing factories and jobs running.

Though there is a longer-term risk for European manufacturers. The more Chinese companies establish themselves in Europe, the more competitive pressure they could put on European brands — potentially even leading to takeovers. That has happened before: Volvo Cars, for example, was acquired by Chinese group Geely in 2010. 

In Germany, carmakers are for now refusing to open the doors of their production sites to the Chinese. But they do have partnerships with Chinese companies to produce vehicles in China, where they can benefit from lower production costs. That explains why they were very much opposed to imposing tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles.

But the situation is now changing. Volkswagen closed its Dresden factory last year, and other German plants are also facing closure risks. Germany’s car industry is therefore increasingly joining calls for stronger protection against Chinese competition.

And that brings us back to the Franco-German paper that is circulating in Brussels, which calls for measures to restrict Chinese access to the European market.

Because this debate goes well beyond cars. The EU is increasingly concerned about Chinese competition and dependence in a range of strategic industries. This will be discussed next week, when EU leaders meet in Brussels.

The European Commission could also present a new so-called “diversification” tool, either at the summit or around it. One possibility would be to require companies not to rely exclusively on China for certain critical materials. Something which could trigger what we call a trade war. I’ll be following that very closely!

Production: By Europod, in co-production with Sphera Network.

EUobserver is proud to have an editorial partnership with Europod to co-publish the podcast series “Briefed” hosted by Léa Marchal. The podcast is available on all major platforms.

Find the full transcript below: 

The EU wants to bring new countries on board faster. But after years of waiting, will the Commission’s new proposals actually make enlargement easier?

On Tuesday (6 October), the European Commission is expected to propose changes to the EU’s enlargement process. The goal is clear: speed things up. Some candidate countries have been waiting for more than a decade, without a single new member joining the EU.

And geopolitics is adding to the pressure. With Russia’s war against Ukraine and a changing global balance of power, EU leaders increasingly see enlargement as a way of strengthening Europe’s weight on the international stage.

But bringing one, two, or several new countries into the EU raises some very complicated questions. One of them is decision-making. Another is money. So, what is the Commission proposing?

First, it wants to change the way enlargement negotiations are approved. At the moment, EU countries have to agree unanimously on several key steps in the process — including granting candidate status and opening different chapters of negotiations.

The Commission wants to make some of those decisions easier and faster, while keeping unanimity for the final decision on membership.

The other idea is gradual integration. In other words, candidate countries could take part in more EU programmes and benefit from certain forms of integration before actually becoming full members.

This is not exactly new. MEP’s think tankers, EU member states have been raising that idea for a while. And candidate countries already have access to a number of EU programmes and funding mechanisms. The idea is to give countries something concrete while they are still going through the accession process.

Now, there is an even bigger obstacle: money. The EU would have to finance enlargement at a time when its budget is already under pressure.

Because none of the countries currently considered likely to join in the nearer term would be expected to become a net contributor to the EU budget. In other words, they would likely receive more from the EU than they would contribute.

Ukraine is the obvious example. Despite being a big country with a solid economy, its current situation makes it fragile and unable to contribute largely to the EU budget. 

Its accession could have a significant impact on EU spending, particularly through the Common Agricultural Policy and cohesion funds.

So the Commission is considering a transition period during which new members would not immediately have full access to all EU programmes.

That could make enlargement financially easier in the short term. But it doesn’t solve the problem permanently. Once the transition period ends, the same question comes back.

And there is a broader issue too: would the EU itself be able to function as a union of more than 30 countries? What could prove difficult, is that many important decisions still require unanimity — including areas such as foreign policy, taxation and parts of the EU budget.

Changing that would require treaty reform, which is politically extremely sensitive because member states would have to give up some of their veto powers.

Andrew Duff, a former British liberal MEP who has written about enlargement for the European Policy Centre, argues that the EU should have started thinking about this much earlier — particularly after Brexit. In his view, the EU has not carried out the kind of institutional reform that would prepare it for a much larger membership.

So in the end, today’s proposals could make the accession process more flexible and give candidate countries more opportunities to integrate before membership.

But they don’t resolve two of the biggest questions: how to finance enlargement, and how to reform EU decision-making.

Before we wrap up, a quick word on the countries which are believed to become members next. The frontrunner is Montenegro. The most optimistic forecasts suggest it could potentially become an EU member as early as 2028. Then comes Albania, which is also well advanced in the process.

Production: By Europod, in co-production with Sphera Network.

EUobserver is proud to have an editorial partnership with Europod to co-publish the podcast series “Briefed” hosted by Léa Marchal. The podcast is available on all major platforms.

Find the full transcript below: 

Germany shut down its last nuclear power plants in 2023, bringing Angela Merkel’s nuclear exit policy to its conclusion. But now, nuclear power is making a strong comeback everywhere in Europe. Will Germany return to nuclear policy?

Until now, German chancellor Friedrich Merz had been reluctant to bring the nuclear topic on the table, partly because there was no agreement within his coalition. He has even said that Germany’s nuclear phase-out was irreversible. But that position is not shared by everyone in his own party.

And as support for the far-right AfD (Alternative for Germany) grows — a party that is strongly in favour of nuclear power — nuclear energy is becoming less politically taboo in Germany.

According to a non-public document sent by Berlin to other EU member states and reported by the media Euractiv (currently Rapporteur), the German government wants nuclear energy to be taken into account when the EU sets its climate targets for 2040.

For now, those discussions focus on renewable energy. Germany is not proposing to abandon renewable-energy targets, but rather to leave room for other low-carbon technologies, including nuclear power and carbon capture.

The logic is similar to the debate over the EU’s 2035 target for new cars: the overall objective remains, but countries could have more flexibility over how they achieve it.

And that proposal is likely to be welcomed in France. But could they convince a majority of EU countries? The picture across Europe is changing.

Many EU countries already operate nuclear power plants, while others are building new reactors or considering a return to nuclear. Italy, for example, is looking to revive a nuclear industry after abandoning nuclear power following the 1986 Chernobyl disaster.

Poland has never operated a nuclear power plant, but it is now developing its first one. And several other countries that currently have no reactors are seriously considering building them.

Only a small group of EU countries remain opposed to developing nuclear power, including Austria, Portugal, Luxembourg and Malta.

So why has nuclear power become more politically acceptable again? The legacy of Chernobyl and Fukushima still matters. But Europe’s energy crisis following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has also changed the debate.

The shock of soaring fossil-fuel prices has encouraged governments to look for energy sources that can provide electricity without relying on fossil fuels — and nuclear power is increasingly being presented as one of them. Although there are major questions around that argument.

Nuclear power can provide large amounts of low-carbon electricity once a reactor is operating. But building and renovating reactors is extremely expensive and can take decades.

Take France’s Flamanville reactor: its final cost has been estimated at around €23bn , compared with an initial estimate of around €3bn.

There are also questions over nuclear waste, the risk of accidents, and the security of uranium supplies. European countries remain partly dependent on foreign suppliers, including Russia, for uranium.