As European leaders gathered in Brussels today for a crucial summit, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky is looking to Europe for stronger support as tensions with Donald Trump threaten to weaken the Western front against Russia. With energy security, financial assistance … Read more
Russian President Vladimir Putin has ordered the transfer of five Western-owned businesses into compulsory Russian management, extending a campaign of asset seizures targeting European companies that continued operating in Russia after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
The decree, signed on 15 October, affects businesses with combined annual revenues exceeding 53 billion roubles, approximately €530 million. They include French flooring manufacturer Tarkett, Belgian hygiene products group Ontex, German packaging producer Menshen, Kappa Rus and Eviosys Packaging Kuban, now linked to American group Sonoco.
Under Presidential Decree No. 738, operational control has been transferred to Centre Capital, a little-known Moscow company established in February 2026 with registered share capital of just 10,000 roubles.
The decision follows similar interventions against Nestlé, Auchan, FM Logistic and Metro in September. Together, the measures demonstrate how Moscow is using foreign-owned businesses as instruments of economic retaliation against countries supporting Ukraine.
Centre Capital is headed by Marat Mirkhaydarov, a former senior official in Russia’s Zabaykalsky region who reportedly served with the Akhmat military formation during Russia’s war against Ukraine.
The scale of the companies placed under his management contrasts sharply with the financial standing of the administrator.
Tarkett’s Russian operations generated approximately 19.3 billion roubles in revenue during 2025, while Kappa Rus recorded 16.5 billion roubles and Ontex RU another 10.3 billion. Eviosys Packaging Kuban and Menshen Packaging CIS reported approximately 6.1 billion and 1.4 billion roubles respectively.
The decree does not formally transfer ownership of the companies to Centre Capital. It does, however, remove the foreign shareholders’ effective control over management, operations and commercial decisions.
For Belgian manufacturer Ontex, the consequences are immediate.
In an official statement issued on 16 October, the Aalst-based company confirmed that a government-appointed administrator had assumed operational control of its Russian subsidiary.
Ontex Russia employs approximately 350 people, operates a manufacturing facility in Noginsk and maintains a sales office in Moscow. The subsidiary accounts for around five per cent of the group’s total revenue and between seven and eight per cent of adjusted EBITDA.
The company said it was examining measures to protect its assets and maintain business continuity.
Tarkett likewise confirmed that it was losing effective control of its Russian operations.
The legal framework for such interventions dates to April 2023, when Putin introduced Decree No. 302, allowing the Russian authorities to place assets associated with countries designated as unfriendly under temporary external management.
The appointed administrator can exercise extensive ownership-related powers, although the formal right to dispose of the assets remains excluded.
Crucially, the arrangement can be terminated only by presidential decision. There is no automatic deadline for returning operational control to the original owners.
Moscow maintains that the measures are reversible. Nevertheless, the loss of management authority raises questions about whether businesses could eventually be returned with their financial position, organisational structure and commercial value intact.
The latest decree extends the process already documented by EU Today following the September takeover of Nestlé and Auchan’s Russian operations.
The Kremlin’s approach also serves domestic economic objectives. Keeping factories, retail networks and distribution facilities operating under Russian management helps preserve employment, production capacity and established supply chains.
At the same time, appointing Russian administrators allows the authorities to exercise greater influence over businesses originally developed through foreign capital, technology and expertise.
Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov has explicitly linked the seizures to the nationality of the affected companies and the policies of their governments.
He accused European states of participating in the unlawful seizure of Russian property through sanctions and financial restrictions.
Moscow’s argument centres partly on approximately €210 billion in Russian sovereign assets immobilised in the European Union, most of them held through Belgium-based securities depository Euroclear.
The European Union has used extraordinary revenues generated by those assets to support Ukraine, while further proposals involving the underlying funds remain subject to legal and political debate.
Belgium has been particularly concerned about potential financial exposure and legal claims. As EU Today reported in September, a Belgian Council of State judgment raised additional questions about the administrative procedures governing certain frozen assets.
The dispute has also moved into the European courts, with the Bank of Russia challenging EU measures intended to protect Euroclear against the enforcement of Russian judgments.
Moscow’s treatment of European businesses adds another dimension to this confrontation. By retaining control over foreign-owned industrial and commercial assets, Russia possesses a means of exerting pressure on companies whose governments support sanctions and military assistance to Ukraine.
The implications are particularly serious for Western banks that still maintain substantial Russian operations.
Austria’s Raiffeisen Bank International and Italy’s UniCredit remain exposed to Russia through local subsidiaries. Any extension of compulsory administration to financial institutions could create additional difficulties involving deposits, capital and banking supervision.
The seizures also expose the financial risks faced by Western companies that delayed their withdrawal after February 2022.
Many initially sought to protect their investments, employees and commercial infrastructure. Others reduced operations but retained ownership, expecting that conditions might eventually permit an orderly sale or renewed business activity.
Russian restrictions have progressively complicated that calculation, requiring foreign investors from designated countries to accept substantial discounts on asset sales and obtain official approval for transactions.
Companies remaining in the country now face the additional possibility that the government will appoint administrators without their consent.
The consequences extend beyond the businesses immediately affected. Russia is establishing a precedent under which foreign investment can remain legally owned by its original shareholders while its economic benefits and operational management are placed beyond their control.
For European governments, the latest decree illustrates the increasing connection between commercial interests and geopolitical decisions.
The Kremlin has demonstrated that sanctions imposed over its invasion of Ukraine can be answered not only through diplomatic or financial measures, but also through direct intervention in European-owned businesses operating on Russian territory.
Any eventual negotiation over sanctions relief and the restoration of economic relations will consequently have to address the status of these assets, the rights of their original shareholders and the question of compensation.
Until then, Western companies remaining in Russia face an investment environment in which the ultimate authority over their businesses rests increasingly with the Kremlin rather than their shareholders.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has disclosed that Kyiv offered to suspend attacks on Russian oil refineries in exchange for temporary American anti-ballistic missile protection for Ukraine’s energy infrastructure. Washington did not provide the requested systems, leaving Ukraine exposed to continued Russian missile strikes while the United States sought to restrict Ukrainian operations against Russia’s oil industry.
Speaking at a press conference in Brussels on Friday, 16 October, Zelenskyy said the proposal had been presented to Washington as a compromise following President Donald Trump’s agreement with Vladimir Putin on Russian diesel supplies and restrictions on attacks against energy facilities.
The Ukrainian president confirmed that Kyiv had not been consulted before Washington reached its understanding with Moscow. He described the diesel agreement as a surprise and objected to arrangements determining Ukraine’s military actions without its participation. Any agreement concerning Ukrainian strikes on Russian territory, he argued, required consultation with the Ukrainian government.
Nevertheless, Zelenskyy said Ukraine had been willing to accommodate American demands, even under an arrangement that did not require Russia to suspend its own attacks. Instead of insisting on reciprocal restrictions, Kyiv proposed receiving sufficient anti-ballistic missile systems to protect its electricity network for the duration of the requested suspension.
The proposal reflected Ukraine’s immediate security requirements. Russia has repeatedly targeted power stations, substations and other critical infrastructure, while Ukrainian forces have attacked Russian refineries to disrupt fuel production and reduce revenues available to Moscow. Halting the Ukrainian campaign without additional defensive capabilities would have left Kyiv surrendering one means of economic pressure while remaining vulnerable to Russian bombardment.
Zelenskyy said he had asked Washington for a limited number of systems, rather than a substantial new military commitment. The proposed deployment would have lasted only as long as the United States required Ukraine to refrain from attacking Russian refineries. However, according to the president, no such assistance was provided.
The disagreement follows the diesel arrangement announced by Trump on 9 October, under which Russia agreed to resume substantial petroleum product exports to American and international markets. Washington also authorised certain transactions involving Russian diesel, easing restrictions previously intended to reduce Moscow’s energy revenues.
The agreement created a direct conflict between American energy policy and Ukraine’s strategy of targeting Russian refining capacity. Washington wants additional diesel supplies to ease pressure on fuel markets, while Kyiv regards attacks on oil infrastructure as a means of weakening Russia’s ability to sustain its invasion.
That disagreement intensified after Ukraine resumed attacks on Russian refineries, including a strike against a facility in the Ryazan region. Trump criticised the operations, accusing Kyiv of contributing to higher global oil prices. Zelenskyy, meanwhile, argued that increased Russian diesel revenues would provide Moscow with additional resources to finance its military campaign.
The Ukrainian president’s proposal also exposed the limitations of the temporary energy ceasefire promoted by Washington. Russia continued attacks against Ukrainian civilian infrastructure, including electricity facilities, despite the American initiative. Kyiv’s proposed compromise would have addressed the resulting imbalance by providing defensive protection rather than relying on Russian restraint.
The urgency of Ukraine’s request was illustrated by renewed Russian attacks during Zelenskyy’s visit to Brussels. According to the Ukrainian presidency, strikes on 15 October damaged energy infrastructure in several regions, leaving almost 15,000 people without electricity in Volyn and disrupting supplies in parts of Kyiv and the surrounding region.
Ukraine continues to face shortages of the interceptors required to defend against ballistic missiles. Zelenskyy has identified anti-ballistic capabilities as an immediate priority, particularly as Russia intensifies attacks ahead of winter. During talks with NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, he stressed the need for additional missile interceptors and other air defence equipment.
The president also raised these requirements during Friday’s meeting with European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and European Council President António Costa. Discussions covered air defence, protection of energy infrastructure and financial assistance needed to sustain Ukraine’s resistance to Russian aggression.
Zelenskyy said European leaders had supported Ukraine’s position in the dispute with Washington. His remarks came as the EU reaffirmed its intention to maintain economic pressure on Moscow despite the Trump administration’s decision to facilitate Russian diesel exports.
As EU Today reported earlier on Friday, von der Leyen and Costa rejected any relaxation of European sanctions while Russia continues its war. The Commission is preparing a further sanctions package, maintaining a policy intended to restrict Moscow’s ability to finance its military operations.
The contrasting American and European positions have become increasingly significant for Kyiv. Washington is seeking to stabilise fuel markets through arrangements with Moscow, while European governments remain committed to reducing Russian energy revenues and strengthening Ukraine’s military and economic resilience.
For Zelenskyy, the unresolved question is whether Ukraine can be expected to limit attacks on Russian oil infrastructure while receiving neither reciprocal guarantees from Moscow nor additional protection against Russian ballistic missiles. His account of the unsuccessful American negotiations indicates that Kyiv was prepared to compromise, but only if its immediate defensive needs were addressed.
Par Thomas FAZI
Des preuves appuient-elles ce récit ? Ou cela indique-t-il plutôt une campagne de guerre psychologique menée par l’establishment UE-OTAN lui-même contre sa propre population ?
Dernièrement, il ne se passe pas un jour en Europe sans qu’une peur des drones, un incendie ou une panne d’électricité ne soient imputés à la Russie. On nous dit que ces incidents font tous partie d’une “guerre hybride” incessante que la Russie mène contre l’Europe ; une guerre qui implique des incursions de drones, des violations de l’espace aérien, des sabotages, des incendies criminels, des cyberattaques et plus encore. On nous dit que cela « inclue des complots pour placer des engins incendiaires à bord des avions cargo DHL, faire sauter des voies ferrées en Pologne et incendier des entrepôts et des centres commerciaux dans toute l’Europe », ainsi que « des actes de sabotage contre les entreprises de défense et l’industrie de la défense en Europe », et « des attaques contre les infrastructures critiques européennes » — mais aussi, apparemment, l’envoi d’agents secrets pour déféquer dans les toilettes des députés finlandais. On nous dit également que « [de] telles attaques ont commencé à se produire peu de temps après que la Russie a lancé son invasion à grande échelle de l’Ukraine en 2022 » et se sont intensifiées ces derniers mois et semaines. Selon Kaja Kallas, « l’Europe est confrontée à une prolifération rapide d’attaques de sabotage et de violations de l’espace aérien ».
Les tensions se sont intensifiées de façon spectaculaire le mois dernier après que l’Allemagne a officiellement attribué une tentative d’attaque par drone explosif à l’aéroport de Leipzig/Halle à la Russie, des enquêtes ultérieures remonteraient jusqu’aux renseignements militaires russes. Cela a considérablement augmenté la tension : il s’agissait de l’un des incidents les plus graves sur le sol allemand jamais officiellement attribué à Moscou par Berlin, même si cette opération a été un “échec”. Le ministre allemand des Affaires étrangères Johann Wadephul a déclaré que l’attaque « s’inscrit dans un schéma plus large d’opérations hybrides russes en Europe ».
En quelques heures, les dirigeants de l’UE et de l’OTAN avaient non seulement accepté l’attribution, mais s’étaient mis d’accord sur la signification de l’incident : un élément d’une campagne coordonnée, avec un motif connu, nécessitant une réponse prédéterminée, c’est-à-dire des sanctions et un soutien accru envers l’Ukraine. « Les preuves sont claires », a déclaré le Secrétaire général de l’OTAN, Mark Rutte, le jour même de l’annonce du gouvernement allemand ; bien qu’à ce moment-là, les Allemands n’avaient encore partagé aucune preuve, ni avec le public ni, semble-t-il, avec d’autres gouvernements UE-OTAN. Le président français Emmanuel Macron a également déclaré que l’attaque était une preuve claire que « la menace hybride russe contre les Européens… s’est intensifié ». Le ministre polonais des Affaires étrangères Radosław Sikorski a averti que la confrontation de la Russie avec l’Europe devenait de plus en plus « cinétique« , ajoutant que “la Russie est en guerre avec l’Europe”. « C’est la nouvelle norme », a déclaré la présidente de la Commission européenne Ursula von der Leyen. Apparemment confirmant cela, quelques semaines plus tard, le 29 septembre, le gouvernement estonien a officiellement accusé les services spéciaux russes d’avoir commandité un incendie criminel contre le bâtiment de la société de défense estonienne Milrem.
Avertissements que cela pourrait empirer
Pendant ce temps, on nous dit aussi constamment que la Russie a l’intention d’intensifier encore plus ses attaques ; c’est-à-dire que nous devrions nous préparer à des attaques beaucoup plus graves contre l’Europe, peut-être juste au coin de la rue. En l’espace de quelques jours, il a été rapporté que « des responsables du renseignement européens ont évoqué la possibilité d’un test imminent de l’OTAN par la Russie, l’un d’eux disant qu’une attaque potentielle pourrait survenir dans quelques « mois, pas des années » » ; que, selon le FBI « la Russie prépare des assassinats ciblés à travers les États-Unis et dans les pays européens » ; et qu’il existe un rapport de la CIA avertissant l’Italie, la France et l’Espagne d’une potentielle opération russe impliquant des attaques de drones lancées depuis des navires marchands en Méditerranée, du moins c’est ce que le journaliste qui a publié le “scoop” dans El Mundo a affirmé avoir été informé par une source anonyme proche du ministère lituanien de la Défense.
L’article a reçu une couverture mondiale massive — pourtant, en moins de 24 heures, le ministre italien de la Défense Guido Crosetto et Macron ont fermement nié avoir reçu un tel avertissement et ont rejeté ces affirmations comme étant sans fondement, suggérant que l’histoire avait été concoctée soit par la « source anonyme », soit par le journaliste lui-même. L’épisode montre également que de telles affirmations, en particulier lorsqu’elles sont présentées sans aucune preuve à l’appui, doivent être traitées avec une extrême prudence — en particulier lorsqu’elles reposent sur une logique fragile pour commencer. Dans ce cas, par exemple, on peut raisonnablement se demander quel intérêt aurait la Russie à attaquer l’Espagne et l’Italie, deux des partisans les moins enthousiastes de la guerre éternelle en Ukraine.
Mais il y a eu des déclarations encore plus bizarres. Au cours des dernières semaines, il y a eu des messages coordonnés à travers l’OTAN disant que la Russie pourrait préparer une « attaque sous fausse bannière … dans les prochains mois » — c’est-à-dire une frappe de drone ou de missile que la Russie prétendrait être un “accident” ou même tenterait d’en accuser l’Ukraine. Mais comment la Russie bénéficierait-elle de l’un ou l’autre de ces scénarios ? Ils se sont déjà produits tous les deux — il y a eu plusieurs cas de drones russes et ukrainiens errants pénétrant dans l’espace aérien de l’OTAN près de la frontière avec l’Ukraine (voir ci-dessous), et le seul effet a été de durcir la position de l’OTAN. De plus, si la Russie visait un déni plausible, pourquoi aurait-elle laissé ses empreintes digitales partout pour la tentative d’attaque de drone à Leipzig/Halle ? Et comment ces affirmations concordent-elles avec l’affirmation contraire selon laquelle la Russie pourrait lancer une attaque ouverte contre un pays de l’OTAN “d’ici quelques mois”, comme l’ont récemment déclaré les services de renseignement danois ? Lequel est-ce ? Mais on ne s’attend pas à ce que nous posions des questions ou que nous signalions des incohérences dans l’histoire ; on s’attend simplement à ce que nous croyions ce que nos médias et nos gouvernements nous disent.
La Russie est-elle sur le point d’attaquer ? Même l’OTAN n’est pas sûre
Bien sûr, aucun d’entre nous n’a aucun moyen de savoir ce que la Russie envisage de faire, d’autant plus qu’il s’agit d’une situation dynamique dans laquelle les actions de la Russie sont influencées par les actions de l’OTAN et vice versa. Le président russe Vladimir Poutine, pour sa part, nie toutes les allégations et a déclaré à plusieurs reprises – le plus récemment le 19 septembre – que la Russie n’avait « aucune intention agressive envers l’Europe ou les pays européens » et était prête à rétablir les relations et à coopérer avec ses voisins européens – tout en accusant les dirigeants européens d’utiliser la prétendue menace russe pour justifier leurs propres politiques et rechercher une escalade avec Moscou. Bien sûr, on peut soutenir que si la Russie était prête à attaquer, elle ne le dirait pas à l’avance aux Européens, et donc ses paroles ne devraient pas être prises pour argent comptant.
C’est vrai, bien sûr. Dans le même temps, dans la mesure où la plupart des États sont des acteurs rationnels qui ont tendance à penser et à agir de manière stratégique – et la Russie correspond certainement à cette description – on peut se demander quel intérêt rationnel ou stratégique la Russie aurait à lancer une attaque contre l’Europe qui pourrait facilement conduire à une guerre totale OTAN-Russie, d’autant plus que le refus de la Russie jusqu’à présent de riposter en nature aux attaques ukrainiennes permises par l’OTAN sur son territoire, y compris contre des civils, a probablement été motivé précisément par le désir d’éviter un tel résultat. Il est intéressant de noter qu’un tel scepticisme est partagé même par certaines voix au sein de l’establishment de l’OTAN.
Le service de renseignement extérieur estonien, par exemple, a écrit dans son rapport annuel 2026, publié en février : « Il n’y a… aucune raison de paniquer. Selon l’évaluation du Service de renseignement extérieur estonien, la Russie n’a aucune intention d’attaquer militairement l’Estonie ou tout autre État membre de l’OTAN au cours de l’année à venir. Nous sommes susceptibles de parvenir à une évaluation similaire l’année prochaine ». Même le président finlandais, Alexander Stubb, par ailleurs très belliciste à l’égard de la Russie, a repoussé les avertissements de ses collègues dirigeants européens selon lesquels la Russie pourrait attaquer l’OTAN dans un proche avenir, affirmant que les renseignements d’Helsinki ne voyaient aucune preuve d’une menace militaire imminente. « Nous n’en voyons pas la preuve », a déclaré Stubb. « Dans nos renseignements, nous voyons qu’il y a de l’activité mais pas de menace militaire imminente pour le moment ». En effet, comme le rapporte Politico, même l’évaluation officielle de l’OTAN est qu’il n’y a pas de menace imminente : « Pour le moment, nous ne voyons aucune menace imminente d’attaque », a déclaré un responsable de l’OTAN s’exprimant au nom de l’organisation. Le 29 septembre, lors d’une conférence de presse conjointe de l’OTAN, le Premier ministre lituanien, Mindaugas Sinkevičius, a déclaré qu’il avait demandé à Mark Rutte de véritables preuves de renseignement selon lesquelles la Russie préparait une attaque imminente, recevant la confirmation qu’il n’en existait aucune. « J’ai demandé à [Rutte] y a-t-il une preuve, une preuve réelle, que la Russie prépare quelque chose ? Mais il n’y a en fait rien », a-t-il déclaré.
Cela montre que même les propres évaluations de l’OTAN sont très contradictoires. En termes d’opinion publique, cependant, cela ne fait guère de différence, car les allégations d’attaque imminente l’emportent de loin sur les évaluations les plus prudentes, qui ne reçoivent généralement pratiquement aucune couverture. Dans tous les cas, en l’absence de preuves allant dans un sens ou dans l’autre, les spéculations sur les scénarios futurs ne restent finalement que cela : des spéculations ; d’autant plus que nous devons supposer que la posture de la Russie n’est pas figée mais est inévitablement influencée par les actions de l’OTAN. Ce que nous pouvons évaluer avec une certaine certitude, c’est dans quoi la Russie s’est engagée jusqu’à présent, ce qui nous donne la meilleure idée possible de ce qu’elle pourrait faire ensuite. La question qui doit être posée est donc la suivante : les preuves soutiennent-elles les affirmations occidentales selon lesquelles la Russie est engagée dans une « guerre hybride » contre l’Europe ?
Les rapports sur la « guerre hybride » et leurs incohérences
Il existe plusieurs bases de données et rapports qui prétendent quantifier la guerre hybride russe, qui sont souvent cités comme preuve d’une campagne russe coordonnée et croissante. Ceux-ci incluent des ensembles de données et des rapports du Référentiel européen des Cyberincidents, qui se concentre strictement sur les cyberattaques, l’Université de Leiden, le Soufan Center, Associated Press, le groupe de réflexion américain Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), l’Institut International d’Études Stratégiques (IISS) basé au Royaume-Uni et le groupe de réflexion GLOBSEC basé à Bratislava. Pris individuellement et au pied de la lettre, chacun de ces rapports brosse un tableau apparemment accablant comprenant des dizaines – et dans certains cas des centaines – de sabotages présumés, d’attaques et d’opérations d’influence couvrant plusieurs pays européens sur de nombreuses années. Inquiétant en effet. Lus côte à côte et en détail, cependant, ils racontent une histoire très différente : les chiffres divergent énormément ; le concept central n’est pas défini ; l’attribution ne repose souvent sur rien de plus que des articles de presse faisant état de soupçons officiels ; et les propres mises en garde des rapports – enfouies dans les notes de bas de page, les annexes et les sections méthodologiques – sapent souvent les affirmations faites dans leurs résumés exécutifs.
Pour commencer, les chiffres ne correspondent pas. Selon le rapport que vous lisez, la Russie a mené entre 52 et 255 attaques hybrides en Europe après février 2022 – du simple au quintuple pour ce qui est censé être la même campagne. Le Centre Soufan, qui ne couvre que six pays – dont deux, la Moldavie et la Géorgie, en dehors de l’UE – enregistre plus d’incidents pour la seule année 2025 que le SCRS pour trois ans sur l’ensemble du continent. Les chiffres divergent car il n’y a pas de réponse convenue à la question la plus fondamentale : qu’est-ce qu’une attaque hybride ? Le document de l’IISS lui-même concède que la guerre hybride est « un terme amorphe » avec de grandes variations dans les définitions. Certains rapports se limitent aux attaques physiques et aux complots et, même dans ce cas, ils vont de l’incendie criminel à la pose d’autocollants pro-Kremlin, au vandalisme et à la pulvérisation de graffitis ; d’autres incluent des « opérations d’influence » telles que des manifestations mensuelles pour la paix à Amsterdam ; et d’autres incluent même des passages de frégates russes à travers la Manche. En fin de compte, le terme peut être utilisé pour inclure presque tout. La plus grande différence de nombre est déterminée par le traitement des (présumées) observations de drones attribuées à la Russie – au nombre de centaines mais dans la plupart des cas finalement démystifiées (voir ci-dessous) – et donc exclues par la plupart des rapports, malgré une énorme couverture médiatique et étant l’un des plus grands contributeurs à l’hystérie de la « guerre hybride ».
De plus, dans la plupart des cas, les preuves liant la Russie sont très faibles, voire inexistantes. Dans tous ces rapports, la preuve que la Russie était à l’origine d’un incident donné consiste généralement en un article de presse rapportant que des responsables le soupçonnent. Il n’y a pas de vérification indépendante : si un gouvernement dit “la Russie l’a fait”, il figure sur la liste, même en l’absence de toute preuve. De plus, l’ensemble de données de Leiden comprend des incidents liés à la Russie par des responsables ou des politiciens, ou découverts par des enquêtes journalistiques – mais aussi ceux qui “semblent simplement s’inscrire dans un schéma” d’événements similaires. Les rapports s’appuient également les uns sur les autres. L’ensemble de données de l’IISS est construit sur l’ensemble de données de Leiden ; GLOBSEC cite les chiffres de Leiden, l’IISS et un décompte AP ; le SCRS cite la recherche de Leiden ; le Soufan Center a interviewé l’auteur de l’ensemble de données de Leiden. En fin de compte, la plupart des chemins mènent au même pool de reportages médiatiques sur les affirmations officielles, dans la plupart des cas d’implication russe “possible” ou “probable”. Et ces affirmations officielles ne sont pas neutres. Le document de l’IISS, remarquablement, le dit lui-même : les décisions sur l’attribution sont “rarement prises dans un vide politique”, et les déclarations publiques “reflètent des calculs stratégiques plus larges autant que leur confiance dans les preuves”.
De nombreuses organisations à l’origine de ces rapports ne peuvent pas non plus être considérées comme neutres. L’IISS, le CSIS et GLOBSEC ont tous des liens de financement avec des fabricants d’armes américains et européens (GLOBSEC compte parmi ses donateurs la société de défense Helsing, dont la guerre en Ukraine a fait la start-up la plus profitable d’Europe), ainsi qu’avec l’establishment transatlantique, et sont connus pour leur approche belliciste de la guerre en Ukraine et de la Russie. Le langage des rapports eux-mêmes trahit leur engagement idéologique. Le mémoire du SCRS soutient que l’OTAN devrait abandonner son « état d’esprit d’auto-dissuasion » et lancer une « campagne offensive calibrée » contre la Russie. L’IISS exhorte à une « position plus affirmée et proactive« , son président, Lord Mark Sedwill, affirmant que la Grande-Bretagne est en guerre contre la Russie. Le rapport GLOBSEC parle de « terrorisme d’État ».
Mais, en fait, comme indiqué ci-dessus, les rapports eux-mêmes contiennent très peu de preuves, voire aucune, pour étayer le récit “La Russie est en guerre contre l’Europe”.
Mis à part la poignée de sabotages qui a abouti à des condamnations – discutées ci-dessous – et même alors avec seulement des liens ténus avec l’État russe, pratiquement tous les incidents consignés dans ces rapports sont basés uniquement sur des affirmations non fondées faites par des responsables occidentaux, des services de sécurité ou des médias, souvent sans présenter de preuves (comme nous le verrons, cela s’applique également aux actions formellement attribuées comme l’incident du drone de Leipzig/Halle). Comme l’admet Associated Press, « il est souvent difficile de prouver l’implication de la Russie, et le Kremlin nie mener une campagne de sabotage contre l’Occident. Mais de plus en plus de gouvernements attribuent publiquement des attaques à la Russie ». Ce discours constant sur les attaques russes « possibles » ou « potentielles » génère finalement une perception publique d’une campagne incessante menée contre l’Europe, même en l’absence de preuves. Comme l’a noté Ivo Capaul de l’ETH Zürich, l’effet de la couverture médiatique et du climat politique (entièrement intentionnel, j’ajouterais) est de créer des « biais cognitifs sous la forme d’une illusion de quantité » – voir des modèles entre des points de données qui ne sont pas nécessairement connectés, ou qui dans certains cas n’existent pas du tout.
Les revendications ne résistent pas à un examen minutieux
En effet, ce qui est étonnant, c’est le nombre d’allégations largement rapportées de sabotage russe qui ont fini par s’effondrer après un examen minutieux. L’un des cas les plus tristement célèbres s’est produit en septembre de l’année dernière, lorsqu’il a été largement rapporté (initialement par le Financial Times) que la Russie avait “imprudemment” bloqué le GPS de l’avion de von der Leyen au-dessus de la Bulgarie, forçant les pilotes à atterrir en utilisant des “cartes papier” après “avoir tourné autour de l’aéroport pendant une heure”. Le Secrétaire général de l’OTAN, Mark Rutte, n’a pas tardé à suggérer que l’incident s’inscrivait dans un schéma plus large de “guerre hybride” qui comprenait “des cyberattaques et la coupure de câbles sous-marins”. Un tollé général s’ensuivit. Cependant, l’histoire s’est effondrée en quelques heures : un service de suivi des vols a démontré que le signal n’avait jamais été perdu et que l’avion n’avait en fait que 9 minutes de retard. Le Premier ministre bulgare, Rosen Zhelyazkov, a déclaré qu’il n’y avait rien à enquêter. Il s’agissait d’un cas significatif d’affirmations promues par des sources proches du sommet de la Commission européenne qui ont été clairement exposées comme fausses, mais les déclarations n’ont jamais été rétractées ou clarifiées. Elles n’ont pas non plus donné lieu à un examen plus approfondi du récit sur la “guerre hybride russe”.
Mais ce n’était pas un cas isolé : il y a eu d’innombrables allégations de sabotage russe ou d’activité hybride qui ont été massivement amplifiées par les médias, pour être ensuite démystifiées ou prouvées fausses — ces rectifications n’ayant en grande partie pas été rapportées. En novembre 2024, une série d’incidents ayant endommagé des câbles en mer Baltique a été largement rapportée dans les médias. La couverture a été alimentée par des décideurs européens attribuant ouvertement les incidents à la Russie avant même que les enquêtes ne soient terminées. Le manque d’informations claires a suscité des spéculations publiques sur les responsables des incidents et sur la manière exacte dont ils se sont produits. Les autorités finlandaises ont arrêté un navire, soupçonné de faire partie de la “flotte fantôme” de la Russie utilisée pour éviter les sanctions, après que ce câble et d’autres aient été endommagés. Il s’est finalement avéré que les câbles sous-marins endommagés dans la mer Baltique avaient été causés par des navires battant pavillon de Hong Kong et de Chine – et non par des navires russes. Le service de renseignement finlandais SUPO a observé que « statistiquement, le nombre de cas de dommages aux câbles ces dernières années est assez typique de la mer Baltique ». Encore une fois, aucune excuse n’a été présentée par les autorités européennes pour cette fausse accusation.
Le même mois, un avion DHL s’est écrasé en Lituanie. Plusieurs responsables européens ont laissé entendre que le crash aurait pu être le résultat d’un sabotage russe, ces affirmations étant largement amplifiées dans les médias occidentaux. Le jour même de l’accident, avant qu’aucune enquête n’ait été menée, Annalena Baerbock, alors ministre allemande des Affaires étrangères, a évoqué la possibilité qu’il puisse s’agir d’un “incident hybride”, faisant référence à la récente rupture des câbles de la mer Baltique. Le général Carsten Breuer, chef de la Défense de la Bundeswehr, est allé encore plus loin, suggérant qu’il s’agissait peut-être d’un “test” de la Russie pour sonder les faiblesses, disant “Nous avons rencontré une situation similaire plus tôt cette année, et maintenant quelque chose s’est produit qui correspond à ce schéma” et que le Kremlin pourrait “tester les vulnérabilités”. Quelques jours après l’accident, Sir Richard Moore, alors chef du MI6, a allégué que la Russie avait lancé une “campagne de sabotage incroyablement imprudente” en Europe. En mars 2025, des enquêtes exhaustives menées par les Lituaniens ont révélé que l’accident avait été causé par une erreur du pilote, une constatation qui n’a pas été rapportée avec la même force que les allégations initiales selon lesquelles l’avion avait été abattu par l’action russe. Une fois de plus, il a été démontré que des accusations notables étaient manifestement fausses d’une manière qui devrait soulever des questions sur le récit plus large – mais cela ne s’est pas produit.
Une situation similaire s’est produite lorsque l’aéroport d’Heathrow près de Londres a fermé ses portes le 21 mars 2025, après qu’une sous-station électrique a pris feu. Les affirmations selon lesquelles l’incendie faisait partie d’une campagne de guerre hybride ont été largement médiatisées. Philip Ingram, un ancien colonel du renseignement militaire britannique, a déclaré que les attaques ressemblaient à quelque chose “tout droit sorti du manuel du renseignement militaire russe”. Quelques mois plus tard, la véritable cause de l’accident a été révélée, et elle s’est avérée beaucoup plus banale : une compagnie d’électricité privatisée n’avait pas correctement entretenu et modernisé l’installation. Le même schéma d’accusations précédant les faits a pu être observé dans d’autres cas, des explosifs trouvés près d’un pipeline de l’OTAN à un trou dans la clôture d’une installation allemande de traitement de l’eau.
La panique à propos des drones, beaucoup de bruit pour rien ?
Un schéma similaire peut également être observé dans l’hystérie du “drone russe” qui a fini par dominer le récit de la “guerre hybride” au cours de l’année écoulée. En particulier, l’automne 2025 a vu une véritable frénésie médiatique autour de ce sujet. De nombreux rapports ont été publiés sur des observations de drones dans toute l’Europe — en Allemagne, en Pologne, en France, en Norvège, en Lituanie, au Danemark et dans d’autres pays — entraînant souvent des fermetures d’aéroports. Les dirigeants européens, comme le chancelier allemand Friedrich Merz, ont ouvertement blâmé la Russie pour ces drones. « Nous soupçonnons que la Russie est derrière la plupart de ces vols de drones », a déclaré Merz après des incidents à l’aéroport de Munich, sans fournir aucune preuve. La Première ministre danoise Mette Frederiksen et von der Leyen l’ont qualifiée de « guerre hybride« . Le ministre danois de la Justice est allé jusqu’à comparer la situation au 11 septembre. La crise est survenue à un moment où les dirigeants européens étaient enfermés dans un débat intense sur la politique de défense commune de l’Europe, après que le président américain Donald Trump eut mis un terme (temporaire) aux livraisons militaires à l’Ukraine. En effet, plusieurs de ces observations ont eu lieu juste avant un sommet des dirigeants européens en octobre 2025 à Copenhague, où le financement d’un « mur anti drones » et d’autres mesures de défense figurait en bonne place à l’ordre du jour.
Cependant, pratiquement toutes les observations de “drones russes” se sont rapidement révélées infondées. L’incident de drone qui a conduit à la fermeture de l’aéroport de Francfort a été causé par un “pilote amateur de drone” de 41 ans. Il s’est avéré que la fermeture du plus grand aéroport de Lituanie n’était pas due aux drones russes, mais à des montgolfières utilisées par les contrebandiers de cigarettes. Dans un cas frappant, il a été rapporté que, selon le Premier ministre polonais Donald Tusk, la sécurité de l’État polonais avait neutralisé un drone au-dessus du palais présidentiel et que le président polonais avait demandé le soutien de l’OTAN. Mais le récit du Premier ministre était incorrect et a ensuite été corrigé ; l’une des personnes arrêtées était un jeune Ukrainien, l’autre sa petite amie biélorusse de 17 ans. Jacek Dobrzynski, porte-parole du ministre de la Coordination des Services spéciaux, a démenti peu après à Euronews toute rumeur selon laquelle il s’agissait d’une opération d’espionnage : “Nous rejetons les rumeurs selon lesquelles il s’agit d’une opération d’espionnage à grande échelle. Ce sont des jeunes, c’était peut-être de la négligence, peut-être de l’ignorance, peut-être qu’ils voulaient faire un film”.
En fait, une enquête du journal néerlandais Trouw a révélé que dans près de 60 autres incidents, il y avait “beaucoup de panique et pratiquement aucune preuve d’implication russe”. Les preuves dans 41 des observations de drones sont restées non concluantes. De plus, il y a eu 14 cas d’autres objets volants (avions civils, oiseaux) confondus avec des drones et trois se sont avérés être des drones civils “de loisir” utilisés par des particuliers. Par exemple, les Belges prenaient les (petits) avions et hélicoptères pour des drones, tandis que les objets volants du Sud du Limbourg et de Billund, au Danemark, étaient des étoiles. Des enquêtes menées au Danemark, en Belgique et en Norvège ont abouti à des conclusions similaires : dans la plupart des cas, les observations de drones étaient inexactes et non vérifiées et se sont avérées être des avions, des hélicoptères ou des satellites ; aucune preuve n’a été trouvée que ceux-ci étaient en aucune façon liés à la Russie.
Il y a eu des cas similaires plus récemment. À la mi-septembre, un avion de combat de l’OTAN a été brouillé après une possible observation de drone dans l’espace aérien lituanien, mais il s’est avéré qu’il s’agissait d’une volée d’oiseaux. Quelques jours plus tôt, le Premier ministre norvégien Jonas Gahr Støre avait affirmé que l’avion de Zelensky avait “failli être touché par un drone” alors qu’il décollait de Moldavie en route vers Oslo. Cependant, des rapports officiels des autorités moldaves et des sources présidentielles ukrainiennes ont par la suite clarifié ce qui s’était réellement passé : le drone en question ne s’est jamais approché de l’aéroport ; il s’est écrasé à environ 160 kilomètres de là, près de la frontière moldave-ukrainienne. Et ainsi l’histoire a discrètement disparu des premières pages, sans corrections ni excuses – mais la presse grand public, désormais en permanence sur le pied de guerre de la Troisième Guerre mondiale, avait déjà atteint son objectif : pointer du doigt Moscou et attiser une nouvelle vague alarmiste.
Les retombées de la guerre dans le voisinage
Les autorités moldaves et les experts en sécurité ont déclaré plus tard que le drone était bien d’origine russe. Même si, comme toujours, aucune vérification indépendante n’a été possible, cela n’est pas improbable. Il y a eu une poignée d’incidents – en Roumanie, en Moldavie et en Pologne – où il a été confirmé que des drones russes étaient effectivement entrés dans l’espace aérien de ces pays. Mais dans pratiquement tous les cas, ces violations de l’espace aérien se sont produites près de la frontière de ces pays avec l’Ukraine, lors d’attaques russes contre des cibles ukrainiennes voisines, et étaient donc très probablement des drones errants – c’est-à-dire des drones qui avaient dévié de leur trajectoire, peut-être en raison du brouillage ukrainien anti-drone. En d’autres termes, cela ressemblent beaucoup plus à des retombées de la guerre dans le voisinage qu’à une campagne d’incursions délibérées.
Cela s’applique également au missile de croisière russe qui s’est écrasé dans un champ en Pologne en juillet, probablement parce qu’il a mal fonctionné ou a été dévié de sa trajectoire par des interférences. Même le Premier ministre polonais Tusk a souligné plus tard que “il n’y a aucune raison de penser que la Pologne était la cible prévue pour ce missile”. Pendant ce temps, les nouvelles d’avions de combat russes pénétrant occasionnellement dans l’espace aérien estonien, parfois juste pour quelques secondes, ont également tendance à attirer beaucoup l’attention des médias ces jours-ci. En fait, ces incidents ont tendance à se produire à proximité d’une étroite bande d’espace aérien international au-dessus du golfe de Finlande, où il est très facile de s’égarer accidentellement dans l’espace aérien de l’Estonie, et cela se produit depuis des années.
L’incident le plus récent à ce jour s’est produit en Lituanie, le 15 septembre, lorsqu’un drone est entré dans l’espace aérien du pays depuis la Biélorussie et a été abattu dans le centre de la Lituanie. Le président lituanien lui-même a déclaré que l’incident n’était probablement pas une attaque délibérée contre la Lituanie. “Très probablement, il s’agissait d’un drone russe destiné à l’Ukraine qui a été détourné de sa trajectoire par des mesures de guerre électronique ukrainiennes et est entré sur notre territoire, où il a été abattu”, a-t-il déclaré. En effet, les drones errants ne sont pas seulement russes. En mars et mai, plusieurs drones ukrainiens se sont écrasés en Finlande, en Lettonie et dans les autres États baltes lors des attaques à longue portée de l’Ukraine contre les infrastructures pétrolières russes, probablement à cause de la guerre électronique russe. La Russie, pour sa part, a nié les accusations et a accusé les Pays Baltes/OTAN d’autoriser activement les drones ukrainiens à utiliser leur espace aérien pour des frappes contre la Russie, qualifiant cela d’agression de la part de l’OTAN. Dans un cas, des drones ont frappé des infrastructures pétrolières en Lettonie, déclenchant la démission du Premier ministre letton et du ministre de la Défense, bien que l’histoire ait à peine fait la une des journaux.
Il y a cependant deux incidents impliquant (prétendument) des drones russes loin de la frontière ukrainienne : l’événement de septembre 2025 en Pologne et, bien sûr, « l’échec de l’attaque de drone » à l’aéroport de Leipzig/Halle en août, dont il est question plus loin. Dans la nuit du 9 au 10 septembre 2025, la Pologne a affirmé avoir abattu plusieurs drones russes qui avaient pénétré dans son espace aérien, dans certains cas à près de 300 kilomètres à l’intérieur du pays, avec des défenses aériennes de l’OTAN impliquées dans la riposte. Cela s’est produit pendant des exercices polonais, lituaniens et de l’OTAN impliquant 30 000 soldats polonais et juste avant les exercices russo-biélorusses Zapad 2025. Certains soupçonnent donc qu’il s’agissait soit d’une provocation délibérée de la Russie, soit d’une mission de reconnaissance bâclée, mais cela pourrait aussi être dû au brouillage de l’OTAN. De plus, une maison polonaise a été gravement endommagée. Des images de la maison lourdement endommagée ont été diffusées dans le monde entier comme preuve de l’assaut effronté de la Russie lors du tout premier engagement direct entre l’OTAN et Moscou. Cependant, il a été révélé plus tard que la maison avait été touchée par un missile tiré d’un F-16 polonais, et non par un drone russe, comme l’avait initialement affirmé le gouvernement de Varsovie. En tout cas, même des responsables du renseignement occidentaux ont admis “en privé” à CNN que l’incursion russe n’était probablement pas intentionnelle et que les trajectoires de vol suggéraient que les drones avaient perdu leurs repères à cause des contre-mesures de guerre électronique.
Leipzig/Halle : une évaluation mais peu de preuves
Il y a un incident majeur de drone – sans doute le plus important à ce jour en termes de répercussions politiques – qui reste à discuter : l’incident de Leipzig/Halle. Le 5 août, le ministère allemand de l’Intérieur a annoncé que le personnel de la veille au soir à l’aéroport de Leipzig/Halle – un important hub de fret qui, depuis 2022, est également devenu un centre logistique clé pour l’OTAN et pour les expéditions vers l’Ukraine, et le principal hub allemand pour les vols vers le pays – avait remarqué un petit drone posé sur le tarmac près d’un cargo Antonov ukrainien garé, prétendument transportant une charge explosive et un détonateur. L’explosion ne s’est pas déclenchée et les enquêteurs ont déclaré que l’engin explosif avait été désamorcé. À peu près au même moment, un avion cargo DHL approchant de l’aéroport serait entré en collision en vol avec un deuxième drone, bien qu’aucune épave n’ait été retrouvée, peut-être parce qu’elle a été détruite dans les moteurs. Environ trois semaines après l’attaque, les enquêteurs ont trouvé un autre drone dans un champ à Kabelsketal, une zone adjacente à l’aéroport de Saxe-Anhalt, transportant peut-être des explosifs militaires.
Le 1er septembre, le gouvernement allemand a officiellement accusé la Russie pour l’incident, affirmant que les renseignements indiquaient “des personnes impliquées qui agissaient au nom d’entités étatiques russes”. Le lendemain, les médias allemands ont rapporté que le Parquet fédéral enquêtait sur deux suspects – un Biélorusse et un Russe, dont au moins l’un serait lié à un service de renseignement russe – bien que cela n’ait pas été officiellement confirmé. Jusqu’à présent, personne n’a été arrêté ni même inculpé. Le même jour, l’Allemagne a également annoncé la fermeture du consulat russe à Bonn, le dernier consulat de Moscou dans le pays, et de la “Maison russe” à Berlin, une nouvelle dégradation des relations diplomatiques déjà bien basses.
La Russie a nié toute implication dans l’incident de Leipzig ; le porte-parole du Kremlin, Dmitri Peskov, avait précédemment qualifié les allégations d’une campagne de sabotage russe en Europe de « vides et éphémères« . Pourtant, quelques heures après l’annonce du gouvernement allemand – avant qu’un suspect ait été publiquement identifié ou que des preuves aient été rendues publiques – les dirigeants de l’OTAN, de l’UE et des pays se sont tous ralliés à l’Allemagne, dans une démonstration chorégraphiée de soutien qui suggérait une coordination préalable minutieuse. Ils ont tous publié des déclarations presque identiques, exprimant leur « pleine solidarité » avec l’Allemagne et accusant la Russie de mener une « attaque hybride » et même de se livrer à du « terrorisme parrainé par l’État », comme l’a dit Kaja Kallas. « Les preuves sont claires », a déclaré le Secrétaire général de l’OTAN, Mark Rutte.
En fait, à ce moment-là, les autorités allemandes n’avaient fourni aucune preuve réelle au public ou, semble-t-il, aux autres gouvernements de l’UE. Au contraire, le ministre de l’Intérieur Alexander Dobrindt avait simplement déclaré que “pris ensemble, les enquêtes policières, les schémas des infractions et les résultats des services de Renseignement établissent la responsabilité russe de la tentative d’attentat à l’aéroport de Leipzig”, ajoutant que “les moyens utilisés pour commettre l’acte” de sabotage à Leipzig – et il a énuméré la configuration du drone, les divers composants utilisés et les explosifs – “nous sont communs à d’autres opérations hybrides menées par la Russie et sa guerre contre l’Ukraine”. Mais ce n’est pas une preuve ; c’est la description d’une évaluation ; une évaluation que le public est censé prendre pour argent comptant.
Même les voix et les médias alignés sur l’establishment ont exprimé des doutes. “Le gouvernement allemand maintient maintenant que le modus operandi, ainsi que les conclusions de la police et des services de renseignement, désignent la Russie comme l’auteur”, a déclaré Johannes Varwick, professeur de relations internationales et de politique européenne à l’Université Halle-Wittenberg, à EUobserver. « C’est peut être plausible, mais il n’y a évidemment aucune preuve – du moins aucune qui ait été rendue publique, même en termes qualifiés ou indirects », a déclaré Varwick. Les reportages ultérieurs des médias ont donné quelques détails – le type d’explosif, une supposée trace ADN – mais ceux-ci n’ont pas été confirmés par les autorités, laissant au public un ensemble de fuites anonymes se chevauchant partiellement, chacune attribuée aux cercles de sécurité. Compte tenu des antécédents de l’UE et de l’OTAN en matière de “guerre hybride russe” et de sa tendance à faire des accusations sans preuves contre la Russie, dont plusieurs ont ensuite été discrètement réfutées et beaucoup d’autres jamais étayées, un certain scepticisme semble justifié. En effet, l’AfD et le BSW populiste de gauche ont mis en doute le manque de preuves présentées lorsque le gouvernement de Berlin a fait son allégation.
Étant donné les conséquences potentielles d’accuser ouvertement la Russie de tenter de commettre un attentat terroriste en Allemagne, le moins que les autorités allemandes puissent faire est de fournir des preuves tangibles au public ; sinon, les gens pourraient être tentés d’être d’accord avec Maria Zakharova, porte-parole du ministère russe des Affaires étrangères, qui a déclaré que les preuves de la responsabilité russe “n’existent tout simplement pas et ne peuvent pas exister”. Jusque-là, l’incident de Leipzig/Halle devrait être traité comme une énième affirmation non étayée faite par les gouvernements occidentaux et reprise par les médias, que le public est simplement invité à accepter pour argent comptant.
Le traitement de l’incident par le gouvernement allemand ressemblait étroitement à la réponse des autorités polonaises au sabotage ferroviaire de novembre 2025, lorsque deux engins explosifs ont endommagé des tronçons de la ligne Varsovie-Lublin. Le ministre polonais des Affaires étrangères Radoslaw Sikorski avait immédiatement qualifié l’acte de « terrorisme d’État » russe, tandis que le Premier ministre Tusk a qualifié l’incident de “probablement la pire attaque contre la sécurité de l’État depuis le déclenchement de la guerre en Ukraine”, soulignant que “une ligne rouge a été franchie”. En seulement 70 heures, les forces de sécurité polonaises avaient identifié deux suspects présumés responsables des deux attaques qui avaient déjà fui en Biélorussie, tous deux ukrainiens “avec une longue histoire de collaboration avec les services de renseignement russes”, selon Tusk. Un troisième Ukrainien a ensuite été arrêté, mais l’affaire n’a pas encore été portée devant les tribunaux. La « pire attaque » contre la sécurité de la Pologne depuis des années semble avoir été rapidement oubliée.
Le récit de la « désinformation russe »
Un autre point qui mérite d’être brièvement mentionné est la prétendue dimension informationnelle de la supposée guerre hybride de la Russie. On nous dit que la Russie est engagée depuis des années dans une campagne massive d’influence et de désinformation visant à manipuler les électeurs européens impuissants ; en effet, il est maintenant devenu courant dans toute l’Europe de prétendre que les résultats électoraux indésirables – y compris le récent référendum islandais sur l’UE – sont dus à l’ingérence russe. Pourtant, c’est le domaine où les preuves sont les plus rares et où les conséquences sont les plus dramatiques. Il a servi d’excuse à l’introduction d’outils de censure, tels que la Loi sur les services numériques (DSA), et à des outils de plus en plus répandus “d’intégrité électorale”, tels que le Bouclier de la démocratie, qui permettent en pratique à l’UE d’interférer de plus en plus dans les élections nationales, sous prétexte de lutter contre l’ingérence russe.
La Roumanie représente le cas le plus flagrant. En novembre 2024, le candidat indépendant eurosceptique et critique de l’OTAN, Călin Georgescu, est sorti vainqueur du premier tour de l’élection présidentielle. Avant que le second tour, que les sondages suggéraient qu’il gagnerait confortablement, puisse avoir lieu, la Cour constitutionnelle a annulé le résultat dans une décision sans précédent, invoquant une prétendue ingérence russe, en particulier une campagne sur les réseaux sociaux sur TikTok soutenant Georgescu. Aucune preuve n’a jamais été fournie. En effet, des documents internes obtenus par la suite par la Commission judiciaire de la Chambre des représentants des États-Unis ont montré que TikTok avait explicitement informé la Commission qu’elle n’avait trouvé “aucune preuve” d’un réseau coordonné inauthentique. Néanmoins, le bureau électoral a par la suite interdit à Georgescu de participer à la nouvelle élection.
Ce qui reste réellement
Comme nous l’avons vu jusqu’à présent, le tableau qui se dégage en y regardant de plus près est très différent de celui brossé par les dirigeants et les médias européens. Bon nombre des cas les plus médiatisés de supposée “guerre hybride” russe – l’avion bloqué de von der Leyen, les coupures de câbles baltes, le crash de DHL à Vilnius, l’incendie d’Heathrow, la vague d’observations de drones qui a balayé l’Europe à l’automne 2025, la campagne roumaine TikTok – se sont avérés être des spéculations amplifiées par les médias qui se sont effondrées après un examen minutieux, les rétractations n’ayant reçu qu’une fraction de la couverture médiatiques qu’avaient reçu les accusations initiales. Beaucoup d’autres n’ont tout simplement jamais été étayés. Là où les drones russes ont manifestement pénétré dans l’espace aérien de l’OTAN, ils l’ont presque toujours fait près de la frontière ukrainienne lors de frappes sur des cibles ukrainiennes voisines, et très probablement par accident – un sous-produit de la guerre voisine plutôt qu’une campagne délibérée contre l’Europe. Et même dans le cas de Leipzig/Halle, l’incident le plus politiquement conséquent à ce jour, le gouvernement allemand n’a encore rendu publique aucune preuve réelle de la responsabilité russe.
En fin de compte, une fois que tous ces “incidents” spéculatifs, non prouvés ou carrément inexistants sont mis de côté, il ne reste qu’une poignée de cas de sabotage démontrable. Sur les centaines d’incidents attribués à la Russie, seul un petit nombre a conduit à des condamnations — et même pour celles-ci, le lien avec l’État russe a rarement été démontré. Les tribunaux ont condamné des recrues de bas niveau, généralement rémunérées ; la preuve de qui a donné les ordres n’a jamais été testée en audience publique, reposait sur des plaidoyers de culpabilité ou n’allait pas plus loin que le contact avec des gestionnaires anonymes sur Telegram. Pour aucun de ces cas un responsable russe n’a été identifié, et encore moins jugé.
La Pologne a obtenu le plus de condamnations, dont 14 membres d’un réseau qui prévoyait de faire dérailler des trains d’aide vers l’Ukraine en 2023 et trois Ukrainiens condamnés en 2025 pour appartenance à un groupe de sabotage. Pourtant, les accusations concernant l’incendie le plus notoire attribué à ce groupe, au centre commercial Marywilska de Varsovie, n’ont été déposées qu’en avril 2026, et les procureurs admettent que l’incendiaire, ainsi que le cerveau présumé ayant ordonné l’attaque depuis la Russie, n’ont pas été identifiés.
L’affaire la plus souvent citée comme preuve d’une campagne russe de colis piégés est encore plus trouble : en juillet 2026, un tribunal a condamné Igor Rogov, un ancien employé de la campagne Navalny ayant obtenu l’asile en Pologne, à sept ans pour avoir espionné des exilés russes pour le FSB, la principale agence de sécurité de Russie, et pour implication dans un colis d’explosifs intercepté en 2024. Le procès s’est déroulé à huis clos – et selon certains rapports, Rogov aurait en fait pu faire partie d’une opération de renseignement ukrainienne faisant entrer clandestinement des composants explosifs en Russie.
Ailleurs, le motif se répète. En Lituanie, un adolescent ukrainien a plaidé coupable de l’incendie criminel d’IKEA à Vilnius, tandis que l’enquête sur son commanditaire se poursuit. En Estonie, la condamnation d’un activiste pour avoir organisé une attaque contre la voiture du ministre de l’Intérieur au nom du GRU, l’agence de renseignement militaire russe, est intervenue sans audience publique. À Londres, les hommes qui ont incendié un entrepôt stockant du matériel Starlink pour l’Ukraine ont été reconnus coupables d’avoir agi pour le groupe Wagner, mais les preuves indiquaient un manutentionnaire contacté sur Telegram, et non un organisme d’État identifiable. Un Colombien qui a incendié des bus de Prague pour 3 000 dollars promis a été condamné sur un accord de plaidoyer qui n’a jamais établi qui était derrière son contact Telegram.
Le seul procès terminé en Allemagne est révélateur. En août, le tribunal de Stuttgart a conclu qu’un organisme d’État russe était à l’origine des colis GPS-tracker envoyés vers l’Ukraine, prétendument pour repérer des cibles et des itinéraires de transport à des fins de sabotage. Le procureur fédéral avait allégué que des colis transportant des engins incendiaires devaient suivre, mais le prétendu complot d’incendie criminel n’a pas pu être prouvé. Parmi les trois accusés ukrainiens, un courrier a été reconnu coupable et condamné à une peine qu’il avait déjà purgée ; les deux autres ont été acquittés. Le même schéma s’applique au cas le plus fréquemment cité dans les capitales occidentales comme preuve de la « guerre hybride » russe : les colis incendiaires qui ont pris feu dans les centres de messagerie de Birmingham, Leipzig et près de Varsovie en juillet 2024. Les enquêteurs pensent que les colis-envoyés de Lituanie et contenant des jouets sexuels, des cosmétiques et des oreillers de massage équipés d’appareils faits maison à base de magnésium-étaient un “essai à vide” dirigé par le GRU pour des attaques sur des vols cargo vers l’Amérique du Nord. Des arrestations ont suivi en Pologne et en Lituanie, et plusieurs suspects ont été accusés d’avoir agi pour le compte des services de renseignement russes. Des procès formels pour terrorisme ont débuté début 2026 à Varsovie et à Vilnius, où les procureurs visent à prouver que l’opération a été orchestrée par les services de renseignement militaires russes.
Pris ensemble, ces cas montrent que de véritables actes de sabotage ont eu lieu, mais alors que les agences de renseignement des capitales occidentales ont tendance à attribuer ces activités hybrides à la Russie, les preuves réelles testées par les tribunaux européens révèlent souvent une réalité opérationnelle de niveau beaucoup plus bas : mandataires rémunérés, gestionnaires numériques anonymes et opérations ambiguës qui aboutissent rarement à établir des liens avérés avec l’État russe. Mais même si la Russie était derrière chacun de ces cas, nous parlerions encore de quelques dizaines d’incidents par an au maximum — aucun d’entre eux n’ayant été mortel, et avec des dommages qui, bien que parfois graves, ont été confinés à des sites individuels. Un véritable problème de contre-espionnage, peut-être, s’il est réel ; mais pas la menace existentielle ou la guerre hybride totale soutenue que les dirigeants européens invoquent régulièrement – et incomparable à la campagne soutenue de frappes de drones que les pays de l’OTAN ont permis au plus profond de la Russie, y compris contre des cibles civiles, en fournissant à l’Ukraine des renseignements et un soutien satellitaire, et de plus en plus les drones eux-mêmes, ainsi que des missiles à longue portée (plus à ce sujet ci-dessous).
Les attaques dont personne ne parle
Mais le trou le plus béant dans l’histoire est peut-être le fait qu’il y a effectivement eu une attaque très grave contre les infrastructures européennes ces dernières années, qui n’a pas été perpétré par la Russie, mais, selon les procureurs allemands eux-mêmes, par l’Ukraine. Je fais référence, bien sûr, à la destruction du Nord Stream en 2022. Que l’on pense qu’elle a effectivement été menée par un groupe ukrainien agissant seul, ou que l’Ukraine fut utilisée pour détourner l’attention du rôle des États-Unis et de l’OTAN dans le sabotage, est hors de propos (personnellement, je suis partisan de cette dernière explication). Une analyse approfondie du sabotage lui-même n’entre pas non plus dans le cadre de cet article. Ce qui importe dans le cadre de la présente discussion, c’est que, même si nous prenons l’histoire officielle pour véridique – qu’il s’agissait d’une opération entièrement ukrainienne – la réaction des gouvernements allemand et d’autres gouvernements de l’UE reste néanmoins choquante : le pays officiellement accusé d’avoir mené le pire cas de terrorisme industriel de l’histoire de l’Europe, dans un complot qui, selon les médias, a été conçu au plus haut niveau de l’État ukrainien, n’a pas été soumis à des sanctions ou à une confrontation politique.; au contraire, on lui a promis un soutien financier et militaire illimité, et on l’a arrosé de centaines de milliards d’euros. Pendant ce temps, l’attaque elle-même a été rapidement balayée sous le tapis – mais pas avant que les médias occidentaux n’essaient, absurdement, de mettre l’attaque sur le dos de la Russie.
Outre le sabotage du Nord Stream, il y a le cas de la bombe qui a explosé à l’entrée d’un immeuble à Monaco en juin, blessant grièvement un magnat ukrainien lié à la Russie et des membres de sa famille. L’auteur présumé de l’attentat, une Ukrainienne, s’est enfuie en Ukraine, où elle a été retrouvée abattue quelques jours plus tard. Bien que l’État ukrainien n’ait pas été formellement impliqué, un officier en service de l’agence de renseignement militaire ukrainienne a d’abord avoué son meurtre (bien qu’il soit revenu plus tard sur ses aveux). Pourtant, cette attaque, elle aussi, a rapidement disparu des gros titres. Il n’est pas difficile d’imaginer comment les dirigeants et les médias européens auraient réagi si l’officier en question avait appartenu au GRU russe.
La vraie guerre hybride
En fin de compte, un examen approfondi du récit de la “guerre hybride russe” ne peut conduire qu’à une conclusion inquiétante. Une « guerre hybride » est en effet menée contre l’Europe, mais elle est menée par l’establishment UE-OTAN lui-même, contre sa propre population. Les Européens sont soumis à une campagne soutenue de guerre cognitive ou psychologique visant à les conditionner à croire que l’Europe est attaquée par la Russie et que ces attaques hybrides sont un prélude aux hostilités conventionnelles ; une affirmation pour laquelle, dans l’ensemble, il y a peu ou pas de preuves. Ce que le dossier montre, en fait, est une campagne délibérée d’inflation des menaces dans laquelle les gouvernements, les médias et les “groupes de réflexion” financés par l’industrie de l’armement se sont entendus pour instiller un sentiment permanent de peur dans la population, à travers une couverture incessante des “incidents”, des “attaques”, des “sabotages” et des “campagnes” qui, dans la plupart des cas, n’existent tout simplement pas. Comme l’a écrit Mihail Evans, chercheur à l’Institut d’études avancées du New Europe College de Bucarest :
Lorsqu’un récit officiellement promu reste incontesté par la majeure partie des médias et est, en effet, activement soutenu, nous sommes dans une situation assez inhabituelle. Quelque chose de similaire s’est produit pendant la pandémie et on pourrait soupçonner que les techniques de gestion des médias perfectionnées à l’époque sont maintenant réutilisées. Dans les deux cas, il y a une tentative de modeler les perceptions et les comportements du public principalement par la peur. […] Après avoir examiné la faible base des allégations de « guerre hybride », nous pourrions commencer à soupçonner qu’il existe effectivement un “manuel” à l’œuvre, mais géré par l’OTAN et l’UE.
En effet, ce conditionnement psychologique s’étend bien au-delà des pages d’actualité. Prenons, par exemple, la sortie presque simultanée de deux longs métrages, au Royaume-Uni et en France, tous deux tournant autour d’un conflit OTAN-Russie. Dans la mini-série documentaire originale In the Sky The Wargame, sortie le mois dernier, des personnalités politiques réelles, telles que Michael Gove et Nicola Sturgeon, doivent réagir en temps réel à une simulation d’attaque russe sur le sol britannique ; pendant ce temps, dans le thriller géopolitique français Jupiter, qui sortira en salles en novembre, un président français nouvellement élu doit décider de lancer une attaque nucléaire unilatérale contre la Russie en réponse à l’ultimatum nucléaire lancé par la Russie contre l’Ukraine. Deux films ne forment pas un complot, mais ils montrent à quel point l’idée de guerre avec la Russie a migré de l’establishment de la sécurité vers le divertissement grand public.
Cui bono ?
Il y a plusieurs raisons pour lesquelles l’establishment UE-OTAN pourrait avoir intérêt à gonfler sauvagement la menace russe. Pour commencer, il y a une opposition significative et croissante dans de nombreux pays européens à la guerre éternelle en Ukraine – aux sommes considérables qui continuent d’être versées dans le pays et aux coûts économiques de la guerre – et à la campagne de réarmement plus large UE-OTAN, qui, de l’aveu même des dirigeants européens, nécessitera des coupes douloureuses dans l’État providence. Lorsque les Européens observent les forces russes lutter, plus de quatre ans plus tard, pour avancer au-delà de l’est de l’Ukraine, ils pourraient bien se demander pourquoi de telles sommes devraient être dépensées pour défendre le continent contre un pays qui n’a montré ni la capacité ni l’intention évidente de l’attaquer. « C’est là qu’intervient l’idée d’une « guerre hybride » », soutient Evans. “Cela permet de boosters les dépenses de défense en affirmant que la Russie frappe offensivement les nations européennes de manière non conventionnelle et d’impliquer qu’une telle agression secrète pourrait à tout moment provoquer l’ouverture des hostilités”.
Un certain nombre de spécialistes respectés des relations internationales suggèrent que c’est effectivement ce qui se passe. Un rapport de février 2025 de Galvin Wade – ancien Directeur des affaires Russes, baltes et Caucasiennes au Conseil de sécurité nationale des États-Unis – pour l’Institut Letton des affaires internationales soutient que l’emploi du “slogan nébuleux” qu’est la guerre hybride est “motivé autant par la nécessité d’augmenter les budgets de défense et la cohésion décroissante de l’OTAN que d’analyser le comportement de Moscou”. En effet, à la fin de 2025, le commissaire européen à la Défense, Andrius Kubilius, a utilisé la peur (démystifiée par la suite) des « drones russes » pour plaider en faveur d’une augmentation des capacités de contre-drones. “Toute l’Europe est menacée”, a-t-il déclaré, ajoutant : “Les drones russes peuvent frapper la Belgique, les Pays-Bas, la France et plus encore. Depuis les navires, les drones peuvent cibler toutes les côtes d’Europe. Tous les États membres ont besoin de capacités pour détecter les drones”.
Ça a marché. Les allégations de sabotage ont entraîné une augmentation des allocations budgétaires de la défense, y compris un paquet de 250 millions d’euros de la Commission européenne pour les “capacités de drones et de contre-drones”. À l’été 2026, les pays de l’OTAN ont promis 40 milliards de dollars (environ 35 milliards d’euros) pour la même chose. Cela signifie que le secteur militaro-industriel a également tout intérêt à gonfler la menace russe. Comme déjà noté, de nombreux groupes de réflexion prônant le récit de la “guerre hybride”, tels que l’IISS, le CSIS et GLOBSEC, ont tous des liens de financement avec des fabricants d’armes américains et européens qui profitent directement de la guerre en Ukraine et d’une perception exagérée de la menace posée à l’Europe par la Russie. Depuis le début de la guerre en Ukraine, les entreprises de défense américaines ont connu une croissance régulière, tandis que la campagne de réarmement de l’Europe a fortement stimulé les revenus des fabricants d’armes européens. À lui seul, le marché européen des contre-drones devrait quadrupler d’ici 2030. Plus récemment, à la suite du reportage d’El Mundo sur le projet de la Russie de lancer des drones à partir de navires contre les pays méditerranéens (également rapidement démystifié), Robert Brovdi, commandant de l’unité de drones de l’Ukraine, a déclaré au quotidien italien la Repubblica que “L’Italie aussi doit mettre en place sa propre brigade de systèmes sans pilote ; ce sera crucial pour se défendre contre les attaques venant de la mer”.
L’establishment européen de la sécurité et du renseignement bénéficie également du récit de la “guerre hybride russe”. Ce n’est pas un hasard si bon nombre de ces réclamations proviennent des services de sécurité eux-mêmes – des agences qui obtiendront des budgets plus importants ou des pouvoirs plus étendus en raison de la perception d’une menace de sabotage, soulevant des questions évidentes de conflit d’intérêts. Le service de renseignement extérieur allemand, le BND, par exemple, a invoqué le danger du sabotage russe pour lever les restrictions sur ses activités datant de l’après-guerre, et pourrait désormais être autorisé à mener ses propres opérations de sabotage, ainsi que des cyberattaques offensives et un espionnage plus agressif. Aux Pays-Bas, le Premier ministre Rob Jetten a souligné la menace de sabotage lors du dévoilement d’une nouvelle loi sur la sécurité nationale accordant aux agences de renseignement des pouvoirs élargis.
Mais ce n’est pas seulement le complexe militaro-industriel et l’establishment de la défense et de la sécurité qui bénéficieront du spectre toujours présent d’une “menace russe” imminente. Cela fournit également à l’establishment de l’UE un dividende autoritaire plus large, dans la mesure où il est régulièrement invoqué pour justifier les attaques en cours contre les normes démocratiques et la gouvernance de plus en plus autoritaire – de la censure en ligne à la répression de la dissidence et à l’ingérence dans les élections nationales. Il fournit l’ennemi extérieur sans lequel cette consolidation autoritaire serait beaucoup plus difficile à justifier – un état d’urgence permanent, après tout, nécessite une menace permanente. C’est l’une des raisons pour lesquelles l’establishment de l’UE se montre si résistant à toute désescalade avec la Russie.
Escalade déguisée en défense
Un dernier point mérite d’être mentionné : la manière dont le récit de la “guerre hybride” permet aux gouvernements occidentaux de présenter leur propre escalade contre la Russie comme une simple “réponse” à l’agression russe. En effet, l’amiral Giuseppe Cavo Dragone, président sortant du Comité militaire de l’OTAN, a ouvertement déclaré que l’OTAN envisageait une posture beaucoup plus “agressive” à l’égard des activités secrètes de la Russie – pouvant aller jusqu’à des frappes préventives, qui, selon lui, pourraient être considérées comme une forme “d’action défensive”. Fin septembre, quelques jours seulement après la dernière vague alarmiste de “guerre hybride”, l’Ukraine a lancé plus de 1 000 drones sur la Russie, y compris ce qui a été décrit comme sa plus grande attaque jamais menée contre Moscou. Ce n’était que la dernière d’une campagne soutenue de frappes contre les principales villes de la Russie, son infrastructure stratégique et, par extension, son leadership – une campagne soutenue par les services de renseignement occidentaux, exécutée avec des armes occidentales et désormais soutenue par un engagement explicite du G7 à “accélérer” la livraison de capacités à longue portée. Mais la logique occidentale se renforce d’elle-même : si la Russie devait riposter, sa réponse serait présentée comme la preuve que les avertissements étaient corrects. La logique est si effrontée qu’on ne peut s’empêcher de se demander si les élites occidentales tentent activement de provoquer une réponse russe.
Quoi qu’il en soit, le récit gonflé de la “guerre hybride” sert clairement les intérêts des gouvernements européens et de l’OTAN bien plus qu’une véritable guerre hybride ne servirait ceux de la Russie – sans parler d’une attaque conventionnelle contre l’OTAN. Selon des responsables européens, le sabotage russe vise à affaiblir le soutien européen à l’Ukraine. Pourtant, cela semble beaucoup plus susceptible d’avoir l’effet inverse. Commentant l’incident de Leipzig/Halle, par exemple, le politologue Johannes Varwick a demandé quel intérêt la Russie aurait pour une attaque susceptible de produire “un approfondissement de la perception de la menace en Allemagne donc un engagement plus fort à soutenir l’Ukraine”. « N’importe quel planificateur russe aurait reconnu qu’une provocation matériellement sans conséquence nuit finalement à la Russie et profite à l’Ukraine« , a-t-il ajouté. « La question est donc : cui bono ? ».
De Gladio à aujourd’hui
Exactement : cui bono? A qui profite le crime ? Cela entraine une question inquiétante : étant donné ce que les gouvernements européens et l’OTAN ont investi – et en sont venus à dépendre – du récit de la « guerre hybride » et de l’idée que la Russie est une menace existentielle pour l’Europe, continueront-ils à se limiter à gonfler une menace qui a peu de fondement dans la réalité ? Ou pourraient-ils à un moment donné se sentir obligés d’aller plus loin ? Il y a, après tout, un précédent historique impliquant l’OTAN. En octobre 1990, le Premier ministre Giulio Andreotti a confirmé au Parlement italien l’existence de “Gladio” : un réseau paramilitaire secret, établi au début de l’après-guerre dans divers pays de l’OTAN sous les auspices de l’OTAN avec la participation de la CIA, équipé de stocks d’armes cachées et maintenu pendant quatre décennies en dehors de tout contrôle parlementaire. La résolution du Parlement européen de novembre 1990 décrivait une organisation qui avait « échappé à tout contrôle démocratique » et avait été impliquée, « comme en témoignent diverses enquêtes judiciaires », dans de graves affaires de terrorisme dans certains États membres.
Des enquêtes parlementaires ont suivi en Italie, en Belgique, en Suisse et en Allemagne. En Italie, ces enquêtes ont abouti aux conclusions les plus nettes. Une décennie plus tard, un rapport des membres de la commission parlementaire sur les massacres concluait qu’une “stratégie de la tension” – explosions de bombes touchant des civils dans des lieux publics, imputée à la gauche pour effrayer l’électorat et le pousser vers la droite anticommuniste – avait été “organisée ou promue ou soutenue par des hommes à l’intérieur des institutions de l’État italien et, comme cela a été découvert plus récemment, par des hommes liés aux structures du renseignement américain”. C’est ce que l’on appelle communément aujourd’hui un faux drapeau : une opération secrète conçue pour dissimuler qui est vraiment responsable et rejeter la faute sur quelqu’un d’autre. Il est donc curieux que des responsables européens et de l’OTAN aient eux-mêmes accusé la Russie de planifier des attaques sous fausse bannière. Cela pourrait-il préparer le public à un scénario dans lequel une attaque ne porterait aucune trace de la Russie — et serait néanmoins imputée à Moscou précisément pour cette raison, comme un “faux drapeau russe” ?
Une prophétie auto-réalisatrice
Quelle que soit la réponse, un danger est déjà clair : celui d’une prophétie auto-réalisatrice. Un récit qui présente chaque tir, observation de drone ou câble endommagé comme un acte de guerre ne se contente pas de mal décrire la réalité ; il commence à la remodeler. Les gouvernements qui ont passé des années à dire à leurs citoyens qu’ils étaient déjà en guerre contre la Russie se laissent peu de place pour la retenue lors du prochain incident – et les incidents continueront d’arriver, qu’ils soient causés par des drones déréglés par la guerre électronique, par des oiseaux, par une erreur de pilotage ou par un véritable sabotage. La Pologne modifie ses règles d’engagement afin que les pilotes puissent ouvrir le feu sur la seule base des données radar ; les hauts responsables militaires de l’OTAN discutent ouvertement de frappes préventives ; les frappes de l’Ukraine au plus profond de la Russie, permises par les renseignements et les armes occidentaux, ne cessent de s’intensifier. Chaque étape est présentée comme une réponse à l’agression russe. Vu de Moscou, tout cela ressemble à la confirmation que l’OTAN se prépare à la guerre – et les contre-mesures de Moscou, à leur tour, seront lues dans les capitales européennes comme la preuve que les avertissements étaient corrects depuis le début.
C’est le dilemme de sécurité classique, et dans un tel climat, il suffirait de très peu de choses – un drone mal identifié, une piste radar mal interprétée, un incident attribué à la Russie avant que les faits ne soient établis – pour qu’une “guerre hybride” qui existe en grande partie sur le papier se transforme en une véritable guerre entre puissances nucléaires. C’est le danger ultime de la stratégie actuelle de la tension : non seulement elle exagère une menace, mais en l’exagérant suffisamment longtemps, elle peut finir par la créer. Pour éviter ce résultat, il faut précisément ce que les gouvernements européens ont jusqu’à présent refusé d’offrir : des preuves avant les accusations, des corrections rendues autant publiques que les accusations qu’ils rétractent et une volonté de parler à Moscou plutôt que de parler de Moscou.
Publié à l’origine par Thomas Fazi
Traduction: Le Saker Francophone
By Larry C. Johnson | SONAR21 | October 14, 2026
I am back in NYC at the invitation of the Russian delegation to the United Nations. Unlike my previous appearance before the full UN Security Council, this was an Arria session. An Arria-formula meeting is an informal meeting called by one or more Security Council members to hear from people who normally can’t address the Council. These include NGOs, civil-society figures, experts, victims and witnesses, and non-state actors. It isn’t a formal Council meeting and has no basis in the Council’s rules of procedure.
All fifteen members of the Security Council were represented. Their response was quite revealing (I will reveal that below). Here was my statement:
Chair, Excellencies, distinguished delegates, thank you for the opportunity to address you.
My name is Larry Johnson. I served as an officer in the Central Intelligence Agency and later in the State Department’s Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism. I spent more than two decades working with United States Military Special Operations Forces. I come to this Council not as a spokesman for any government, but as someone who has spent a career studying how wars are fought and how civilians suffer in them and how hostilities are accompanied by disinformation campaigns.
For more than four years this Council has heard that Russia is waging a war against Ukraine and is targeting civilians. You do not need to come to the Security Council to hear this narrative, it is all over media and internet. I ask you to test that claim against the evidence.
Today we heard horrific stories of civilians targeted, of prisoners of war being tortured, and civilians held against their will by Ukrainian armed forces.
Ask yourselves a couple of questions: why are the civilians dying in Russia from drone attacks discounted and why are the civilians that were killed in Ukraine before February 2022 ignored? Based on my experience, the crisis in Ukraine has been accompanied by a sophisticated disinformation campaign designed to place all blame on Russia while exonerating Ukraine.
Begin with the scale of the fighting. By the Ukrainian government’s own figures, Russia has fired well over approximately two and a half million tons of munitions. This includes one hundred thousand glide bombs, attack drones, missiles and millions of artillery rounds since February 2022.
Now consider the human toll. The United Nations Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine has verified 16,431 civilian deaths through the middle of this year. Every one of those deaths is a tragedy, and I do not minimize any of them. However, the ratio of civilian deaths to munitions expended is extraordinarily low for a war of this intensity.
Compare those numbers with what the United States did in the Second World War, a war my country rightly regarded as just. Allied bombers dropped some 2.7 million tons of bombs on Europe and killed between half a million and three-quarters of a million civilians in Europe.
In the Pacific, the United States dropped about 160,000 tons of bombs on the Japanese home islands. In all, American air attacks on Japan killed somewhere between 330,000 and half a million civilians.
Put the figures side by side. In total, the United States killed somewhere between half a million and more than a million civilians in the Second World War. The verified toll in Ukraine, after more than four years, is a small fraction of that.
These numbers do not happen by accident. The record of Russia in Ukraine is consistent with a policy of not targeting civilians. These facts contradict the claim that Russia is waging a campaign of extermination against Ukraine’s civilian population.
The same standard must apply to Ukraine.
The killing of civilians in this conflict did not begin in February 2022. From 2014 through 2021, the OHCHR recorded at least 3,404 civilian deaths in the Donbass. From 2018 through 2021, the OHCHR found that 81 percent of civilian casualties from Ukrainian shelling, small-arms fire and drone attacks occurred in areas held by the Donetsk and Luhansk authorities. Those victims are forgotten by the world media and by the United Nations. Few call for any investigation or accountability.
Since February 2022, according to figures the Russian Foreign Ministry presented to the Human Rights Council last month, Ukrainian strikes have killed more than 9,000 civilians in the territories under Russian control and wounded more than 25,500. This Council has rarely discussed those victims. They deserve the same attention and the same investigation as every civilian killed on the other side of the line.
Today we heard some of the circumstances of their deaths. I hope that the United Nations will include those numbers in their reports in order to give an unbiased record of events…. At least 12,404 civilians have been killed by Ukrainian Armed Forces since 2014.
Thus, we come to the simple fact that the number of civilians killed on both sides of the front line are not that different even if we take numbers offered by OHCHR at their face value –12,404 compared to 16,431. And I know that the Government of Russia strongly challenges them, citing in particular the questionable OHCHR claim that Russia was responsible for Bucha.
Why is the focus exclusively on Russia while we hear nothing about Ukrainian Armed Forces committing crimes against civilians?
I am not asking this Council to excuse any unlawful act. Where a strike violates the principles of distinction, proportionality and precaution, it should be investigated, whoever carries it out. I am asking the Council to apply a single standard. The nations that sit in judgment of Russia should measure Russia’s conduct against the evidence and against their own history, not against a narrative.
False accusations and biased reports are not the most effective way to protect civilians in Ukraine. The key to protecting civilians is a negotiated end to this war. I urge the members of this Council to put their full weight behind that goal.
Thank you.
The biggest shock came from the US representative. Unlike my previous appearance before the Security Council when the US representative was aggressive and dismissive of my remarks, the guy sitting in the US chair today spoke as if the US had no role whatsoever in the war raging between Russia and Ukraine. He was quite subdued. A complete change in tone and attitude. This told me there is a definite change in the US policy towards Russia.
The Europeans on the other hand were out of their fucking minds. The representatives of Denmark, Latvia, France and Greece were aggressive and rude. They are boiling for a fight. The purpose of the meeting was to present evidence of Ukrainian attacks on civilians in territory now occupied by Russia. Instead of dealing with the facts, the European Lilliputians howled at the Russians.
Even the British representative took a low key approach. That also was surprising. The remaining eight members of the Security Council made measured, neutral remarks. My commentary was in support of Rodion Miroshnik, the Russian Ambassador tasked with investigating attacks on civilians. Rodion is a good man and an honest investigator. All in all, a fascinating day.
Depois de pressionar Washington a manter o apoio a Zelensky, as lideranças europeias enfrentam um novo desafio: convencer Trump a abandonar as oportunidades de aproximação com Moscou em favor dos interesses de Bruxelas.
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Desde o encontro entre Donald Trump e Vladimir Putin em Anchorage, em agosto de 2025, os governos europeus têm trabalhado para impedir uma mudança significativa na política americana em relação à Rússia. Para as lideranças da União Europeia, qualquer entendimento entre Washington e Moscou representa um risco à estratégia adotada desde o início do conflito ucraniano. Por isso, seus representantes intensificaram os esforços para convencer Trump de que as propostas russas não merecem confiança e de que o apoio militar a Vladimir Zelensky deve continuar.
Essa campanha conseguiu preservar importantes elementos da política ocidental de confronto com Moscou. Entretanto, a situação no campo de batalha continua desfavorável para a Ucrânia, enquanto os governos europeus demonstram dificuldades para apresentar uma perspectiva realista de vitória. A insistência em prolongar o conflito tem um custo crescente para os próprios países europeus, que precisam conciliar suas ambições geopolíticas com problemas econômicos e sociais internos.
A questão fundamental é saber até quando Trump estará disposto a acompanhar essa estratégia.
O presidente americano tem demonstrado que suas decisões dependem de uma combinação de interesses econômicos, objetivos políticos internos e cálculos de poder. Sua relação com a Europa é marcada por desconfiança em relação às elites tradicionais, que frequentemente tentam apresentar suas próprias prioridades como obrigações comuns do Ocidente. Trump, por sua vez, prefere negociar diretamente e cobrar contrapartidas concretas de seus parceiros.
Essa postura explica por que a aproximação com Moscou continua sendo uma possibilidade relevante. A Rússia possui recursos naturais, capacidade industrial e importância estratégica suficientes para tornar a cooperação bilateral atraente para setores econômicos americanos. Mesmo em um ambiente de rivalidade política, existem oportunidades que um empresário experiente como Trump dificilmente ignoraria sem uma razão convincente.
O recente acordo de comércio de diesel, com a Rússia exportando toneladas de combustível para Washington para aliviar o aumento nos preços, foi um exemplo muito interessante das possibilidades de negócios estratégicos e lucrativos entre ambos os países. O levantamento parcial de algumas sanções econômicas americanas foi, no mesmo sentido, uma sinalização de que esta parceria pode progredir ainda mais no futuro próximo.
Em acréscimo, o comércio de energia é apenas uma das áreas em que os interesses americanos podem divergir das preferências europeias. A normalização de determinadas relações econômicas com a Rússia poderia beneficiar empresas dos Estados Unidos e ampliar a margem de negociação de Washington. Para Trump, a possibilidade de obter vantagens concretas constitui um argumento importante em favor de uma diplomacia mais flexível.
A União Europeia, contudo, tem interesse em deteriorar as relações russo-americnas o máximo possível. Sem o envolvimento dos Estados Unidos na guerra, os governos europeus teriam maiores dificuldades para sustentar militarmente a Ucrânia e manter a pressão sobre Moscou. A proclamada autonomia estratégica europeia continua limitada pela dependência de capacidades militares, inteligência e recursos americanos.
Por essa razão, Bruxelas precisa manter Trump comprometido com uma política que em nada corresponde às suas próprias prioridades. Seus representantes podem recorrer à pressão diplomática, à retórica sobre a segurança europeia e aos vínculos históricos da aliança atlântica. Resta saber se esses instrumentos serão suficientes para impedir que o presidente americano explore alternativas mais vantajosas para Washington.
A Rússia, nesse cenário, tem motivos para acompanhar com atenção as divergências entre os dois lados do Atlântico. Moscou pode defender seus interesses nacionais por meio de negociações diretas com os Estados Unidos, sem aceitar que a União Europeia determine previamente os limites de qualquer entendimento. Uma relação bilateral mais pragmática também poderia reduzir o espaço de atuação daqueles que apostam na continuidade indefinida do conflito.
Naturalmente, Trump não oferece garantias de uma aproximação duradoura. Sua política externa é imprevisível, e os setores americanos favoráveis à confrontação com a Rússia continuam exercendo influência. Os europeus ainda dispõem de instrumentos para tentar condicionar as decisões de Washington.
Entretanto, a margem de manobra de Trump permanece considerável. Ele não chegou à Casa Branca para preservar os interesses de uma elite europeia que frequentemente critica e tampouco precisa aceitar todas as suas avaliações sobre a Rússia.
A verdadeira disputa será pela definição dos interesses que orientarão a política americana. Se Trump concluir que a negociação com Moscou oferece benefícios superiores aos custos da confrontação, a pressão europeia poderá perder força.
Para Moscou, essa possibilidade representa uma oportunidade diplomática. Para as lideranças europeias, constitui um alerta sobre os limites de sua influência. E para Trump, é a chance de demonstrar que a relação transatlântica não lhe impõe uma obrigação permanente de seguir as prioridades políticas da Europa.
Brussels, 16 October, (Brussels Morning Newspaper) – European Union leaders have demanded urgent action to tackle rising EU energy prices following a high-level summit in Brussels on 15–16 October. The European Council called for coordinated measures to protect … Read more
The Political Obituary of Zelensky’s Presidency
By Glenn Diesen | October 16, 2026
President Trump has, over the past days, lashed out against President Zelensky, calling for elections in Ukraine and arguing that Zelensky should have accepted a deal two years ago, when the terms were more favourable. The media has also reported that the US may cut its intelligence-sharing arrangements, which is significant, as this is a proxy war and Ukraine could not fight Russia without US support. How can we analyse this shift in rhetoric from the American president? The immediate significance cannot yet be determined, given Trump’s history of shifting positions. However, if we take a step back, this scolding of Zelensky represents a wider trend: a manufactured democratic icon falling apart.
What Does Trump Aim to Achieve?
The significance and consequences of this new tirade against Zelensky cannot yet be determined, as Trump did something similar during the renowned Trump–Zelensky confrontation in the Oval Office on February 28, 2025.
The first hypothesis is that Trump’s comments could reflect a wider strategic shift away from Zelensky in an effort to further outsource the war to the Europeans. Washington seemed to believe that escalation could bring an end to the war by putting pressure on Moscow, and Marco Rubio previously expressed optimism about this outcome in relation to the 40-day campaign of deep strikes against civilian infrastructure in Russia, intended to make civil society feel the war. The opposite happened, as the Russian public now sees the existential threat posed by what is accurately considered a NATO proxy war. As Russia has responded with a powerful escalation, including a naval blockade and powerful attacks against Ukrainian logistics and energy infrastructure, Trump may simply recognise that the strategy has failed and that the Ukraine war is entering its endgame. This may be why it is time for the US to extricate itself from the war, either by ending it or handing it over to the Europeans.
The second hypothesis is that Trump’s comments merely represent a knee-jerk reaction to Zelensky’s tactless comments about the US–Russia deal on diesel. The failed Iran war has put immense pressure on Trump to stabilise energy prices and appear to be in control ahead of the midterm elections in the US. Trump’s entire presidency is based on the premise that weak American leadership over the years has led to the relative decline of the US and that, as a strong leader, he is the solution to making America great again. What much of the world interprets as crude and unilateral behaviour in breach of existing norms and agreements is, for Trump, a sign of strength: the ability to act independently in the service of national interests. A proxy like Zelensky can only stay in power and fight Russia with US support, and having him lash out against Trump thus required a powerful response, which also serves as a warning shot to anyone else who thinks they can challenge Trump’s authority.
The third hypothesis is that this is merely a swing strategy designed to keep all sides uncertain, thereby strengthening the US in negotiations. Zelensky and European leaders are told that US military and financial support can disappear at any time, while Russia also has an incentive to make concessions before the US changes course again. Making all sides fear the alternative is not possible if they believe that the US is locked into a position, rather than having the ability to manoeuvre between the different sides. The willingness of the US to pressure all sides also strengthens its role as a mediator, which is an awkward position, given that the US has been the main actor in instigating and prolonging this war since 2014.
The Manufacture of a Democratic Icon
If we take a step back and assess this development in a wider context, we see a trend in which President Zelensky’s image as a PR project is gradually collapsing. Zelensky began his political career on a peace platform. He advocated respecting language rights in eastern Ukraine and pursuing peace with Russia. In 2019, he won the presidential election with 73% of the vote on such a peace platform, promising to implement the Minsk Agreement, open dialogue with Donbas, and make peace with Russia. Western NGOs outlined red lines against most of Zelensky’s election platform, and far-right militias funded by the US very openly threatened Zelensky’s life if he were to deliver on his election promises. Eventually, Zelensky fell in line and betrayed his own democratic mandate.
When Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, media coverage of Ukraine and Zelensky was transformed overnight. Through language and imagery, Vogue magazine and other publications presented Zelensky as the besieged underdog standing up for democracy and freedom. Zelensky went from governing a hub of corruption to becoming a leader of the free world and a beacon of democracy. The far-right groups that wear fascist insignia and follow the ideas of fascist movements from the Second World War were whitewashed as reformed freedom fighters. The suppression of language rights, political opposition, the media, and the Orthodox Church was defended as necessary to protect Ukraine’s democracy from a Russian hybrid war. Narratives about Ukraine winning the war and suffering low casualty rates were defended in the West to maintain public support for the war. The brutal conscription practices and ‘busification’ of Ukrainians were ignored and even dismissed as an effort to delegitimise Zelensky at the behest of the Russians. Zelensky was the new Churchill fighting Putin as the new Hitler, and in this struggle between good and evil, any critical coverage of Zelensky was quickly smeared as propaganda.
The Incremental Fall of Zelensky
Gradually, the image of Zelensky has begun to fall apart. Authoritarianism, corruption, fascist groups, ‘busification’, high casualty rates, and other issues began to tear away at the manufactured image of the beloved democratic leader. When domestic opposition emerged from former Ukrainian Defence Minister Mykhailo Federov, the Italians could protect Zelensky’s position by hiring Federov as an adviser in Italy. Zelensky is also needed by the West to sell the narrative that they “stand with Ukraine”. While polling demonstrates that most Ukrainians want a negotiated settlement, how can the Europeans justify their boycott of diplomacy and instead push for deporting Ukrainian refugees, lowering the conscription age, conscripting women, or other measures to keep the war going? With Zelensky repeating the talking points of his Western handlers, the proxy war to the last Ukrainian can be sold to the Western public as “supporting Ukraine”.
Trump himself bears some responsibility. When he initially criticised NATO expansion as the source of the war and criticised Zelensky, it may have been a negotiation tactic. However, he broke with the NATO narrative of an “unprovoked” Russian invasion and the Churchillian worship of Zelensky. While the success of his negotiation tactics remains uncertain, we can see that by breaking the consensus around the narrative, he opened a door through which many were able to walk through and criticize Zelensky. In a war between good and evil, peace is achieved through military force, while diplomacy is appeasement. As the manufactured icon of Zelensky falls apart, the entire narrative of the proxy war collapses. Soon, we may even see the decriminalisation of diplomacy.
The post-mortem of the Zelensky presidency and the manufacturing of his image is a tragedy. Zelensky ran on a peace platform and was captured by those who sought to use Ukraine as a proxy to weaken Russia. On March 27, 2022, before the UK and US sabotaged the Istanbul peace agreement, Zelensky stated the following in an interview with The Economist: “There are those in the West who don’t mind a long war because it would mean exhausting Russia, even if this means the demise of Ukraine and comes at the cost of Ukrainian lives.” As Zelensky falls, there may be another chance for peace.
This article was initially published by Prof. Glenn Diesen in Die Weltwoche: “Zerfall einer fabrizierten Ikone”
NFU analysis of official data shows falls in exports to UK’s largest trading partner since 2019 include 70% for sugar and 74% for egg products
Exports of British food and drink to the EU have collapsed by more than a third since Brexit with eggs, chicken and potato producers badly hit, new figures show.
Analysis by the National Farmers’ Union (NFU) of HMRC data shows a sharp fall in exports in the year to July compared with the same period in 2019, with sugar dropping the most, down 70%.
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© Photograph: David Levene/The Guardian
© Photograph: David Levene/The Guardian
© Photograph: David Levene/The Guardian
Lacking the material conditions to challenge Chinese industrial supremacy, the European Union insists on turning its economic difficulties into a justification for a new escalation of hostilities.
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European leaders appear to have found a new strategic mission: rebuilding the continent’s industrial capacity while simultaneously reducing its dependence on China. The initiative was recently put forward jointly by France and Germany and is presented as a response to China’s growing presence in the European market. The problem is that the leaders responsible for this project continue to ignore a fundamental issue: no large-scale reindustrialization can succeed without a stable, abundant, and affordable energy supply.
Europe has excellent universities, a skilled workforce, advanced technological centers, and an industrial tradition that still gives it considerable advantages. However, these assets cannot function in isolation. Chemical plants, steel mills, metallurgical facilities, and numerous other industries depend on a continuous and competitive energy supply. Capital, scientific knowledge, and specialized workers cannot indefinitely compensate for high production costs. It is precisely at this point that Europe’s strategy contradicts its own objectives.
For decades, economic integration between Western Europe and Russia provided favorable conditions for the development of important industrial sectors. Russian natural gas supplies, in particular, helped sustain energy-intensive activities. This relationship served the concrete economic interests of both sides: Moscow had an important market for its exports, while European economies obtained a resource essential to their competitiveness.
The introduction of sanctions in 2022 profoundly altered this situation. The illegal coercive measures severed a longstanding Russo-European partnership, leaving the western part of the continent economically weakened and dependent on more expensive and less secure external energy supplies. Europe, which had already been undergoing gradual deindustrialization before then, subsequently plunged into an energy crisis, with consequences ranging from higher energy bills to business failures caused by the inability to maintain competitive production.
One would reasonably expect an industrial recovery strategy to begin by addressing these vulnerabilities. Instead, European leaders are attempting to build a new productive base without adequately resolving the energy problem. Those responsible for European economic policy seem to believe that subsidies, tax incentives, and investment programs will suffice to restore competitiveness. Such instruments can contribute to industrial development, but their effectiveness will remain limited as long as structural disadvantages in energy costs persist.
It is in this context that China is assuming an increasingly prominent position on Brussels’ “list of concerns”. China’s ability to manufacture on a massive scale, supply complex industrial chains, and offer competitively priced equipment poses a challenge to a Europe seeking to recover its productive autonomy. Rather than acknowledge the extent of the accumulated decline and develop a coherent strategy to reverse it, sections of the European leadership prefer to resort to trade barriers, punitive investigations, and mechanisms of economic containment.
This approach reveals a rather superficial understanding of industrial competition. Restricting Chinese imports does not automatically create European factories, reduce electricity costs, or guarantee gas supplies to industrial facilities. On the contrary, companies that depend on Chinese equipment, components, and raw materials may face higher expenses precisely when they need to invest in recovering their position in international markets.
The Russian question makes this situation even more delicate. Restoring energy cooperation with Moscow would be the first step in any serious industrial recovery plan. With Russian energy supplies and broad commercial partnerships with China, Europe could once again find a new path toward development, much as African and Asian countries are now beginning to do through their partnerships with Russia and China.
Brussels, Paris, and Berlin, however, are moving in the opposite direction. European strategists appear determined to confront two of the world’s largest industrial and energy powers simultaneously, without demonstrating that they possess the resources necessary to sustain such an ambition. First, they undermined a fundamental energy relationship with Russia. Now, they risk turning China into a permanent trade adversary.
Ultimately, what European hawks seek is not Europe’s development, but the instrumentalization of issues such as industry and trade to advance their own self-destructive agenda. Under this strategy, European citizens – already deprived of Russian energy and potentially facing reduced access to Chinese products in the near future – will once again be the first to bear the consequences.
The EU will not lift sanctions on Russia while its war against Ukraine continues, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and European Council President António Costa said on Friday. Their statements came ahead of discussions at the European Council, where leaders were due to consider further support for Ukraine and the needs of its critical infrastructure before winter. The assurances followed Washington’s move to ease sanctions pressure in connection with a deal involving Russian diesel supplies.
Von der Leyen said the EU had supported the energy truce announced by US President Donald Trump, but accused Russia of failing to observe it. “We have seen that Russia did not respect it. Not a single minute. Instead, Russia escalated. We have to increase the pressure on Russia,” she said. She added that the Commission was working on a 22nd sanctions package and that the bloc would not lift any sanctions unless Russia stopped the war.
Costa also rejected any reduction in pressure. “We will not cancel any sanctions until Russia stops the war,” he said, calling for stronger support for Ukraine and increased pressure on Moscow to secure a genuine ceasefire. The statements set out the position of the Commission and European Council presidents; they were not, in themselves, a new sanctions decision by EU member states.
The US and EU sanctions regimes are separate. Washington’s decision concerns US restrictions associated with Russian diesel exports, while EU measures are adopted by the member states. Moscow said it had resumed diesel exports under the arrangement with the Trump administration, a development that has prompted concern in Kyiv and European capitals. The reported resumption of Russian shipments has brought renewed attention to the effect of energy revenue on the Kremlin’s ability to finance its war.
The Commission describes EU sanctions as a means of reducing Russia’s capacity to fund the war, imposing costs on its political leadership and weakening its economic base. The measures cover energy, trade and finance, alongside listings of individuals, companies and organisations. The EU’s sanctions framework against Russia has been expanded through successive packages since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
The leaders’ statements came as Ukraine prepared for another winter of Russian attacks on energy infrastructure. The European Council meeting agenda included continued support for Ukraine and the operational needs of its critical infrastructure. Von der Leyen said the EU would continue to support Ukraine through the winter. She also referred to progress on Ukraine’s accession process, saying the remaining negotiation clusters should be opened by the end of the year.
The EU has recently added measures targeting Russia’s military-industrial sector. In October, it adopted a package of listings aimed at companies and individuals connected to the country’s war effort, as covered in EU Today’s report on the latest sanctions. The diesel arrangement has also followed earlier tensions over the use of sanctions and energy policy, including the US deal with Moscow.
The EU’s stated position is that its sanctions will remain in place until Russia ends the war. The Commission is preparing further measures, while any new package will require agreement among member states. Friday’s statements did not change the existing regime, but made clear that the US decision on Russian diesel would not, by itself, prompt Brussels to ease EU restrictions.
Macron’s France: 15% approval, war prep with Russia, now dissolving Soral’s E&R for “extremism.” Elections loom. Romania-style manipulation?
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Macron is, today, quite possibly, the most unpopular president on the planet, with only 15% approval, according to an Ipsos BVA-Cesi poll. Under his command, France faces economic stagnation (0.6% growth in 2025) and indebtedness (120% of GDP). Under Macron, France has also seen the accelerated deindustrialization of the country, with industries accounting for only 9% of GDP, the lowest level in the European Union, and not surprisingly, purchasing power has plummeted, with half of French people saying their income only covers the essentials and only 70% of citizens of working age currently holding a job.
As if that were not enough, in approximately 10 years of Macron’s government, approximately 4 million immigrants entered the country (many of whom do not work but receive social benefits); an amount that makes economic absorption as well as the ethnocultural assimilation of newcomers impossible. Naturally, linked to the immigration失控 are crime rates, the formation of slums in urban centers, and increased social tensions. Many ethnic French people feel demographically replaced in their homeland, and not by chance, everything indicates that Marine Le Pen will (finally) win the French presidential elections in 2027.
We do not know what the results of a Le Pen presidency would be and it is reasonable to be skeptical about it, but clearly France’s current course is extremely dangerous, including in its foreign policy.
Gradually, over the last 2 years, numerous signs have begun to appear that Macron would be preparing the country for a war with Russia. The French government created a voluntary military service and approved the expansion of the permanent armed forces to 275,000 men, as well as a budget increase for defense. General Fabien Mandon, of the General Staff, stated in 2025 that France should prepare for a high-intensity conflict with Russia within three to four years, and now in September 2026 Macron declared that France “could” become a target of explosive drones. Constantly, too, one hears speeches about the need to transform the French economy into a “war economy.”
Therefore, it may be surprising to many (but not to us) that amid all this that has been happening in the country, the Macron government still finds time for the implementation of a censorship and repression apparatus of totalitarian levels.
Its new victim is the association Egalité et Réconciliation (Equality and Reconciliation), created by sociologist and writer Alain Soral. The association identifies as “left-wing nationalist” and has as its main slogan “left of work, right of values,” appealing to an overcoming of the false dichotomy between left and right and, even more importantly, for a national reconciliation among all social sectors; in recent years, it has been involved in the Yellow Vests protests, in some activities linked to the National Rally party (despite, simultaneously, maintaining a posture of “constructive criticism” against certain Zionist and liberal tendencies present in the party) and in pro-Palestinian activism.
It happens that, on October 9, the Interior Minister of Macron’s government, Laurent Nuñez, announced the opening of a dissolution procedure against the association Egalité et Réconciliation, under the accusation of “political extremism.” Its legal team was given a deadline of 1 week to defend itself, and the decision on the matter should occur, still, in October.
Alain Soral himself is a figure of high nonconformist spirit, which is why he has already been the victim of countless judicial persecutions – dozens in fact – mostly for “opinion offenses,” that is, for critical comments against specific people or “protected minorities.” In convictions, Soral has already accumulated millions of euros to be paid in indemnities to various globalist NGOs, an obviously unpayable sum, as well as having already been imprisoned several times, also for the same reasons. The judicial persecution was so intense that Soral had to exile himself from his homeland, first in Switzerland and then in Russia.
Now, beyond the official justifications, for what reason would the French State ban a relatively small organization with few financial resources?
It is possible to analyze the “angle” of Alain Soral’s presence in Russia in more than one sense. First, because by being in Russia Soral finally became immune to the constant judicial persecution and threats of imprisonment he suffered in France, while at the same time continuing to take an active part in the French political and cultural debate, even from a distance. In this, he was able to exercise and expand his influence, “under the protection of the Russians,” which certainly feeds the typical current paranoias of the French elite about a Russian “informational war.”
There is, however, also an internal aspect. Recently, Alain Soral has again been much discussed by the French media for two reasons. One is the “Bardella case,” which concerns the discovery of supposed “politically incorrect” writings by Jordan Bardella, president of the National Rally party, and the information that in his youth Bardella’s main intellectual influence was Alain Soral. The second is an opinion poll indicating that 15% of French men under 35 years of age identify with Soral’s ideas.
This, on the eve of the presidential elections, represents a significant risk for Macron and for the French establishment. Although, apparently, there is no chance of victory for any candidate against Le Pen, we cannot doubt the possibility of manipulation of the electoral process, as happened in Romania.
This silencing is even more concerning due to the fact that Soral and E&R are practically the only socially and culturally relevant figures in France today who defend national reconciliation and who avoid inciting internal tension, promoted by the most Islamophobic elements of the RN and by the very leadership of Mélenchon’s LFI with its “army” of antifa and immigrants.
Russia’s expanding campaign against commercial shipping in the Black Sea is creating a security crisis that extends far beyond Ukraine. The latest drone attacks off Bulgaria’s coast have left 11 sailors missing, forced Sofia to seek assistance from NATO and the European Union, and raised concerns that Moscow is attempting to disrupt one of the world’s principal agricultural export routes.
On 13th October, the Guinea-Bissau-flagged HS Dignity sank after being struck by drones approximately 17 nautical miles east of the Bulgarian village of Krapets. Another vessel, the Ukrainian-owned, Maltese-flagged Chelsea 3, was attacked near Byala. All 15 crew members were rescued, although five sustained minor injuries. The incidents followed earlier attacks in Bulgaria’s exclusive economic zone on 6th October, when the ALFA WATAN sank and the grain-carrying ABLE was damaged.
The significance lies not simply in the destruction of merchant vessels but in the geographical expansion of the threat. Commercial routes previously regarded as comparatively safer alternatives to Ukraine’s exposed ports are now becoming operationally dangerous. Bulgaria and Romania, both NATO and EU members, face disruption to trade, maritime insurance and port operations as the conflict spreads across the western Black Sea.
The latest attacks follow months of Russian strikes against Ukrainian ports, export terminals and civilian shipping. As EU Today previously reported, repeated attacks on Odesa have already reduced Ukraine’s grain-export capacity, while alternative routes through the Danube and neighbouring European countries cannot fully replace its major Black Sea terminals.
The extension of attacks towards Bulgaria changes the economic calculation. Ships carrying agricultural products, those approaching Danube ports and vessels operating between Black Sea countries now face greater uncertainty, regardless of whether they enter Ukrainian territorial waters.
Maritime security company Ambrey assessed the earlier October attacks as highly likely to have been conducted by Russian forces. Its assessment identified vessels associated with Ukrainian grain trade as the principal targets, rather than suggesting that every commercial ship was being attacked indiscriminately.
This distinction is important, but it offers little reassurance to international shipping companies. A campaign directed against Ukrainian trade can disrupt the wider maritime economy when insurers, shipowners and exporters cannot establish which routes remain safe.
The economic consequences are already becoming apparent. Shipowners must consider higher insurance premiums, additional security measures and the possibility of losing vessels and crews. Traders may redirect cargoes or withdraw from routes whose commercial returns no longer justify the risks.
The attacks have also placed Bulgarian Prime Minister Rumen Radev in an increasingly difficult political position.
Radev has advocated renewed diplomatic engagement with Moscow and questioned the emphasis placed on military assistance to Ukraine. He has rejected accusations of being pro-Russian, presenting his approach as a pragmatic alternative to prolonged confrontation.
Yet the attacks have demonstrated the limitations of maintaining political distance from a war whose economic and security consequences are reaching Bulgarian waters.
After summoning Russian Ambassador Eleonora Mitrofanova on 13th October, Radev acknowledged that Bulgaria possessed no conclusive evidence establishing responsibility for the latest strikes. Nevertheless, he argued that their consequences benefited Russia and questioned why Ukraine would attack its own commercial vessels.
According to the Bulgarian News Agency’s account of the meeting, the prime minister also warned that higher insurance costs and shipping companies’ reluctance to serve Bulgarian ports were already damaging the national economy.
This is the fundamental change confronting Sofia. The conflict is no longer solely a question of Bulgaria’s position towards Ukraine or its diplomatic relationship with Russia. It is affecting the country’s commercial interests, energy supplies and responsibilities as a NATO member.
Radev’s response does not necessarily indicate a wholesale reversal of his previous political position. It demonstrates that the practical obligations of government can leave considerably less room for accommodation with Moscow than the arguments advanced from outside direct responsibility for national security.
The broader consequences may be felt most severely outside Europe.
Ukraine remains an important supplier of wheat, maize and vegetable oils to international markets, including countries in Africa, Asia and the Middle East. Interruptions to these exports affect more than Ukraine’s agricultural revenues. They can increase transport costs, delay deliveries and reduce the availability of competitively priced food in import-dependent countries.
Speaking at the Warsaw Security Forum on 12th October, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy warned of a possible agricultural crisis, arguing that Russian interference with Black Sea shipping could leave countries in Africa, Asia and the Middle East facing serious supply difficulties within months.
The warning reflects a mechanism already familiar from the earlier stages of Russia’s invasion. Following Moscow’s withdrawal from the UN-brokered grain agreement in July 2023, Ukrainian agricultural exporters faced renewed attacks on port infrastructure and substantial uncertainty over maritime access.
The danger is not necessarily an immediate worldwide shortage of grain. Wheat prices remained relatively steady following the 13th October incidents. Rather, sustained disruption could progressively reduce available export capacity, increase costs and place vulnerable importing countries under greater pressure.
For Moscow, such disruption could serve several purposes simultaneously: weakening Ukraine’s economy, raising the costs of international support for Kyiv and creating additional pressures on governments concerned about food inflation and social stability.
The immediate challenge for Brussels and NATO is how to protect commercial navigation without allowing the conflict to expand into a direct military confrontation.
Bulgaria has requested stronger air and maritime surveillance and is seeking closer coordination with Romania and Turkey. Defence Minister Dimitar Stoyanov said on 14th October that Sofia expected to join a NATO counter-drone initiative by the end of the month.
The EU has already developed a framework for addressing precisely such threats. Its Black Sea strategy, announced in May 2025, proposed a maritime security hub integrating surveillance, intelligence-sharing, infrastructure protection and regional cooperation.
The attacks now expose the difference between developing a security framework and providing effective protection to merchant vessels. Better intelligence can identify threats, but preventing further sinkings requires detection systems, coordinated responses and sufficient defensive capabilities.
Turkey’s involvement is particularly important because of its control over the Bosphorus and Dardanelles and its established role in Black Sea maritime security. Any workable regional arrangement must therefore extend beyond cooperation between Bulgaria and Romania.
The incidents occurred outside Bulgaria’s 12-nautical-mile territorial sea, meaning they do not automatically constitute an armed attack on NATO territory under Article 5. Nevertheless, repeated strikes within the economic zones of alliance members pose a substantial challenge to maritime security.
Russia’s campaign against Ukrainian exports is increasingly imposing costs on neighbouring European states and international trading partners. The question facing the EU is whether it can secure the commercial routes on which both Ukraine’s economy and the food supplies of millions beyond Europe depend.
The simplest test for recognizing a collective pathology is to ask each of its members whether they would choose on their own to do what the group is doing.
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A pipe and an ocean
A gas pipeline is a pipe. It connects a gas field to a consumer, crosses a few borders, and, once built, transports energy at a very low cost per unit. A supply chain that starts at Russian gas fields, goes through an American contract, crosses the Atlantic on a LNG tanker, and arrives at a European regasification terminal does the same thing but with more steps, more markups, and more friction. No engineer, no accountant, no student of economic geography would choose the second option if they could choose the first. And yet that is where Europe seems headed: according to recent reports, Russian energy could return to European markets with an American stamp on it and a higher price tag attached.
I argue that this situation cannot be explained by Washington’s cunning—which certainly exists—nor by Brussels’ weakness—which certainly exists as well. It stems from a cognitive distortion shared by governments, institutions, and much of the public, which has rendered a geographical truism invisible. I call it the pathology of the absurd: the state in which a system continues to follow its own internal rules even as they produce an outcome that none of its individual components, taken on its own, would ever have wanted. The technical term for this mechanism is collective bias—that is, an error in judgment that does not stem from the stupidity of individuals but from the way a group convinces, rewards, and punishes itself.
How to lose a war without fighting it
A methodological clarification before proceeding. No official documents have been released yet (a treaty, an MoU, nothing public); what has been documented is scant and carries almost symbolic weight. Trump announced that Russia will supply the U.S. and global markets with over 300,000 metric tons of diesel immediately, another 500,000 in November, and one million shortly thereafter. Converted to barrels, that’s about 5.9 million in total—one-fifth of global consumption in a single day—and just over a week’s worth of Russian exports at last year’s rate. As a market transaction, it is insignificant, but as a political signal, it is quite the opposite.
Because politically speaking, the implications are much deeper. Moscow has lifted the ban on diesel exports that had been in place since July. Trump stated that the time has come for Ukraine to have a new president and proclaimed an “energy truce” effective immediately. According to an account by a U.S. official, the peace plan being developed by the White House and several European capitals would freeze the front along the current line of control and provide security guarantees comparable to NATO’s Article 5, a reconstruction mechanism entrusted to the World Bank and BlackRock, and a pipeline to bring Russian gas and oil back to Europe, with profits split between Moscow and Kyiv. Washington, meanwhile, is reported to have suggested suspending intelligence sharing and the PURL mechanism if Kyiv continues to strike Russian refineries.
Zelensky stated that the announcement of the truce was news to him and that Kyiv was awaiting details. Lavrov rejected the idea of a pause; Peskov spoke of ongoing contacts. If we leave it to the “theologians of journalism” to debate whether the chicken or the egg came first, we can focus on what lies behind the facts—namely, that Russian energy will return to Europe through a framework negotiated by Washington, which is a likely prospect in the medium term, with moderate confidence regarding the trajectory and low confidence regarding the details. And, it must be said, anyone reading these pages as the chronicle of a fait accompli is misreading them.
By “energy war,” we mean the contest over who sets the price, the route, and the rules governing a continent’s energy flows. In this contest, Europe set out in 2022 convinced it was fighting a moral battle; it cut off supplies from Russia, presenting the decision first as a necessary sacrifice, then as a strategic victory. The assessment after four years tells a different story: Europe has lost its cheapest and closest supply source, has rebuilt its dependence elsewhere, and the United States—which in the meantime had become the continent’s main supplier of liquefied natural gas—has gained both influence and profit margins as a result. When the European Parliament decides that, as of January 1, 2027, even the last remaining shares of Russian energy will be phased out of the Union’s energy mix, the circle will be complete, and the phase-out will be total—just as the other side of the Atlantic prepares to do business with Moscow.
In the tradition of classical geopolitics, this issue has an age-old name. Europe is the western peninsula of the vast Eurasian continent, and its natural logic of supply is continental: pipelines, long-term contracts, and interdependence with those to the east. The Atlantic logic is maritime, consisting of ships, terminals, and spot prices. Mackinder and Spykman, though by different paths, had understood that whoever separates the two systems profits from both sides of the divide. One need not adopt the entire theoretical framework of the Eurasianist school to recognize that geography does not negotiate here, and that for four years European institutions have acted as if it could.
The intermediary model
According to the model that has emerged so far, the United States would acquire Russian energy assets—starting with Lukoil’s foreign division—through an initial payment and a share of the profits, and could purchase, on competitive terms, the hydrocarbons that Europe no longer buys, in order to resell them to Europeans at full price. Washington’s interest is explicit and evident even in the most cautious sources. Trump faces midterm elections, an energy crisis triggered by the aggression against Iran, rising diesel prices, and low approval ratings. On the other hand, the American consumer has no reason to distinguish between Russian diesel and any other diesel.
What matters is the role assigned to Europe. Officials from the United Kingdom, France, and Germany were present at the talks in Florida. Their task is to ensure post-war security, finance reconstruction through instruments designed elsewhere, and, in the long term, open their own energy markets to a Russia that has, in the meantime, forged a direct relationship with Washington. They are the guarantors and the clients; they do not appear among the beneficiaries of the profits. When the diesel agreement was announced, the Europeans expressed irritation yet remained at the table—which is a good summary of where they stand.
And there is also a strange, biting irony in all of this: Nord Stream—which Washington did not want built and which was sabotaged—would be reactivated under a draft U.S. agreement, and the gas flows that Europe lost as a result of that sabotage would once again pass through U.S. intermediaries. If the pipeline were reactivated, Europe would pay to get back what it already had, at a price set by those who neither produce nor consume it. Pure madness.
Why it’s a pathology, not a mistake
We are facing a collective cognitive bias that has evolved to the point of becoming pathological. And it is not a simple “error in judgment,” since an error is corrected when it is discovered, whereas a pathology persists because it is sustained by the very structures that should be curing it. I identify four such structures, each of which is rational when viewed from within.
The first is moralization. Sanctions began as a tool and have become an identity. Anyone who today proposed reopening direct channels with Moscow would be seen as a traitor, not as an accountant. The accounting objection, however well-founded, has no place in the debate. The second is sunk costs: after years of sacrifices imposed on citizens and businesses, admitting that the plan was flawed costs more—in political terms—than continuing to pay the consequences. The third is the delegation of rationality. If Washington is the one to reopen the channel, no European government will have to admit it was wrong. The premium that Europe would pay to the intermediary is, in essence, the price of not having to admit the mistake. It is a bill that leaders present to their constituents under the heading of “security.”
The fourth is the institutional asymmetry between those who decide and those who pay. A parliamentary vote on sanctions generates immediate visibility for those who cast it, while the cost is spread across millions of utility bills and thousands of industrial plants, faceless and without a specific date. In such a system, the most convenient choice for any decision-maker is almost always the loudest one. There’s no need to hypothesize about a hidden agenda or secret plan to explain the outcome. Washington’s interest is stated openly and perfectly clear; Europe’s blindness is structural. These are two phenomena of different natures that have ended up interlocking.
The most serious criticism of this interpretation comes from countries bordering Russia. For Warsaw, Riga, or Vilnius, dependence on Moscow’s energy is not a matter of price but of exposure. The year 2022 demonstrated that an energy supply can be cut off, and the extra cost paid to diversify sources is an insurance premium like any other—or at least that is what the EU has tried to convince the countries of Northern Europe, spinning the fairy tale of a better world that would soon arrive, achieved through military victory alongside Kyiv. A fascinating fairy tale, to be sure, but one that holds up only to a certain extent. Insurance makes sense when the premium is limited and when the insurer does not profit from the occurrence of the loss. Here, the insurer is also the main beneficiary of the rift between Europe and Russia, as evidenced by the very fact that it is about to mend that rift when it suits its interests. Furthermore, dependence on the United States is a form of dependence like any other. The threats to suspend intelligence sharing and the PURL mechanism with Kyiv—if confirmed—show that Washington makes its available supplies contingent on its current political objectives.
Anyone who thinks that using energy as leverage applies only to Moscow has a selective memory. If Europe were to re-enter the Russian market through American intermediation, it would compound its vulnerabilities: it would be dependent on Russian energy and on the American infrastructure that delivers it. In other words, this objection justifies diversification, but it does not justify the decision to never negotiate on its own.
Scenarios and indicators
We can discern three plausible developments, with a 6- to 12-month timeframe—assuming we manage to get through this winter.
The first is the consolidation of U.S. mediation: sanctions eased in phases, Russian assets acquired by U.S. and Gulf operators, and energy flows returning to Europe under contracts that Europe did not draft. This is the most optimistic scenario, though with only moderate confidence. The second is the failure of the agreement, with Moscow refusing a ceasefire, Kyiv continuing to strike refineries, and Washington shifting its focus elsewhere; Europe would be left with high prices and no supply channels. This is a possible outcome, roughly equally likely. The third is a direct overture from Brussels or certain capitals toward Moscow—highly unlikely in the short term, for the political and psychological reasons already outlined.
Four indicators will help determine which of these scenarios unfolds: the text of any agreement setting the sanctions timeline; the name of the party holding the contracts for Lukoil’s international assets; the status of Nord Stream, if and when it is included in an official draft; The outcome of the U.S. midterm elections, which weigh on the entire situation more than Brussels cares to admit.
Added to these is a factor of uncertainty regarding the U.S. counterpart: the energy agreement does not resolve the structural weaknesses of the U.S. economy, ranging from public debt to rising interest rates to debt-financed artificial intelligence companies. A partner with such finances—and such a packed political calendar—is a mediator who offers little guarantee of longevity.
The simplest test for recognizing a collective pathology is to ask each of its members whether they would choose on their own to do what the group is doing. No European government official responsible for energy policy, if questioned in private, would say that buying Russian energy in Washington is the best solution. They would, it seems, provided that others are the ones making the decision.
The true price of a pipeline is the cost of the pipeline itself.
Everything else that is added—and that Europe would pay—reflects the cost of a choice that has never been made openly.
So far, no one has asked that question on the floor of the chamber.
by Fabio Giusepep Carlo Carisio
On October 13, 2020, two Chinese institutions (the School of Medicine at Zhejiang University, Hangzhou; the Life Sciences Institute and Innovation Center for Cell Signaling Network at Soochow University, Suzhou; and Anhui Anlong Gene Technology Co., Ltd., Hefei) published a study warning the world about the risks associated with mRNA and mDNA COVID-19 vaccines.
Their research highlighted the extremely high risk of severe autoimmune lung conditions.
Gospa News was among the very first outlets worldwide to report on this in February 2021—just weeks after the market launch of the Pfizer gene-based serum, which is now under investigation in the USA for concealed adverse effects.
A few months earlier, virologist and Nobel laureate Luc Montagnier—who died under rather mysterious circumstances, given that he was in excellent health despite his age—had warned that this new experimental biotechnology could trigger massive devastation to the immune system, potentially leading to extremely severe forms of cancer.
Over the past two years, the phenomenon of “turbo-cancer” linked to COVID vaccines has entered scientific literature, supported by dozens of studies as well as unequivocal results from medical tests and autopsies.
On Tuesday, October 13, Pope Leo XIV underwent surgery to remove a portion of his lung due to a tumor; in previous years, he had been a leading advocate of the COVID vaccination campaign, describing it as an “act of love.” Relying on information disseminated by the medical establishment, the then-bishop did not hesitate to spread the falsehood that mRNA Covid gene serums could limit transmission, a claim refuted from all quarters, most recently by the Florida Attorney General’s lawsuit against Pfizer, and previously by the authoritative journal *Science*.
These are facts, not opinions.
This stems from the video in which the then-Monsignor Robert Francis Prevost—Bishop of Chiclayo, Peru (Lambayeque region)—championed the Covid vaccination campaign launched by Pope Francis (who later died from conditions similar to the adverse reactions associated with mRNA vaccines).
Is there a faint possibility that, following his serious illness, a Christian like the current Pontiff—innately inclined to acknowledge and repent of his errors—might be ready to question the dangerous “Vaccine God” narrative?
This narrative was upheld by the Vatican to avoid defying the New World Order—comprising friends and profiteers of Big Pharma—during the SARS-CoV pandemic, a virus treacherously engineered in a laboratory.
If, as the Gospel states, Jesus Christ is the “way, the truth, and the life” (John 14:6), how do the Pope and the cardinals have the audacity to refrain from questioning the science to which they bowed?
That science did not arrive as a “gift of the Holy Spirit,” but rather as a business venture for the Big Pharma manufacturers of mRNA gene serums and for the sordid rulers—past and present—who continue to support these projects at the Siena Biotecnopolo, funded by the Meloni government.
Unfortunately for him, the Pope had to experience firsthand a highly probable adverse reaction to the very vaccines he had so imprudently and brazenly promoted
There is no proof of a correlation, nor will there ever be one; this is because the Vatican State—which was among the first in the world to mandate vaccination for its “subjects”—can never admit to an error of false “faith” so massive that it caused irreparable harm.
Yet, the health updates regarding Pope Leo XIV’s medical conditions echo with a sense of terrible nemesis, as they evoke two pathologies long listed among the most serious side effects of mRNA gene therapies:
Having made this long and inevitable preamble, let us look at what the Holy See’s official bulletin reports regarding the health issue facing the Bishop of Rome, Robert Francis Prevost.
“In a procedure lasting approximately 90 minutes—which was successful and free of complications, Pope Leo XIV had the lower lobe of his right lung removed; an intraoperative histological examination confirmed a diagnosis of pulmonary adenocarcinoma. The anticipated medical bulletin containing news on Pope Leo’s health arrived in the evening at 9:53 PM (Occtober, 13), just over two hours after the surgery performed this afternoon, October 13, at the Gemelli Policlinic,” writes Vatican News.
“In the bulletin released by the Holy See Press Office, Dr. Luigi Carbone—Director of the Directorate of Health and Hygiene for Vatican City State—and Professor Margaritora announced: ‘This afternoon, the Holy Father underwent the scheduled thoracic surgery. To ensure a radical resection, the lower lobe of the right lung was removed using a video-assisted technique. An intraoperative histological examination confirmed the diagnosis of pulmonary adenocarcinoma, as had been suspected based on pre-operative tests,'” the Vatican news site adds.
FREEMASONRY & VATICAN – 3. Pope XIV Magnifies the MASON FILMMAKER who Exalted the KU-KLUX KLAN
“The Holy Father,” the statement continues, “was in the operating room for approximately three hours; the surgery itself lasted about 90 minutes. The procedure was successful, and there were no complications.”
Following the surgery, Leo XIV “woke up normally and, after a brief period of observation, returned to his room on the tenth floor.”
Fabio Giuseppe Carlo Carisio – Founder and Director of Gospa News
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RT | October 14, 2026
Did Ukraine’s strikes on Russian data centers destroy the Kremlin’s pro-MAGA bot army? Or are Vladimir Zelensky and his European patrons insulting their citizens with remedial-grade propaganda? RT takes a trip down the rabbit hole.
Ukrainian forces hit three Yandex (Russia’s equivalent to Google) data centers with long-range drones between October 8 and 11. Yandex confirmed that operations were “completely halted” at the facility struck on October 8, and temporarily halted at the center struck on October 11. This much is true, but the story that followed veers into NAFO fiction.
How did the ‘Russian bots’ story begin?
On October 8, American cybersecurity researcher Jeremiah Fowler posted a Cloudflare graph showing a dramatic drop in “bot traffic” after the first Yandex center was hit. As Yandex is primarily a search company, its bots crawl the internet indexing content for users. All search engines function in this way, but Fowler – either through malice or ignorance – conflated this search bot activity with social media bot activity, claiming that the drop in traffic could “disrupt the midterm elections in the US.”
The story spread, hitting the mainstream media on October 11 when Tom’s Hardware published an article claiming that “Russian disinformation bot traffic” had been “nearly eliminated” after the strikes. The word “disinformation” was later pulled from the headline, but the tale had already taken on a life of its own.
That same day, an AI-created graph began circulating, claiming that “Russian bots” were making 56% fewer posts in support of Germany’s right-wing AfD party in the aftermath of the strikes. The graph, which was unsourced and had one axis unlabeled, measured the “decline in activity of Russian bots” up to October 15, four days in the future at the time it appeared online.
Regardless, the graph was shared by a Green Party councillor in Germany’s North Rhine-Westphalia, and by Czech MEP Tomas Zdechovsky. “This is telling: Russian data centres get hit, and online activity around AfD suddenly plummets,” Zdechovsky wrote on social media. “So much talk about German patriotism… then the connection from Russia goes down.”
Who spread the lie?
By October 12, the story had been reported by Germany’s Der Standard and Focus. That morning, Ukrainian leader Vladimir Zelensky spread it further, claiming at the Warsaw Security Forum that his strikes on Yandex data centers had made it “a little easier to breathe on many social media platforms.”
“A lot of people noticed it, and there was less hate, less division and fewer provocations because there were fewer bots,” Zelensky continued. “And it’s pretty clear where those bots were coming from. If they disappeared when Yandex went offline, this proves again and again that Europe is not the source of the problems,” he added.
Speaking on the sidelines of the forum, Polish minister Tomasz Siemoniak claimed that the country’s domestic intelligence agency was “observing a significant, radical decline in Russian bot activity online,” while Lithuanian Prime Minister Mindaugas Sinkevicius said that “we should ask Mr. Zelensky to hit more data centres in Russia” to “protect” elections in the EU.
Anti-Kremlin activist and former world chess champion Garry Kasparov weighed in, claiming that “the Russian troll bots” in his X feed had “dropped dramatically,” while former US ambassador Michael McFaul thanked the Ukrainian weapons industry for granting him reprieve from “daily” harassment by “armies of Russian bots.”
The only problem was none of this was true, and based on the replies to McFaul’s tweet, nobody was buying it.
How was the bots story debunked?
The story didn’t take long to fall apart. Common Consultancy, a Scandinavian NGO that has previously accused Russia of orchestrating social media influence campaigns, concluded that there was “no visible effect” on pro-MAGA or pro-AfD social media posts after the Yandex strikes. Leonid Volkov, an anti-Kremlin activist associated with deceased opposition figure Alexey Navalny, slammed Zdechovsky for spreading “nonsense and falsehood.”
CeMAS, a liberal German think tank, stated that it was “not seeing a drop in the number of posts that could be explained by an attack on data centers.” The Hasso Plattner Institute and Polisphere, two tech nonprofits, concurred, and German newspapers began quietly editing their articles on Monday night.
Some, like Merkur, kept “speculation about Russian bots and the AfD” in their headlines. Others, including Der Standard, noted that their “original assertion of a confirmed connection [between the strikes and alleged bot activity] has been corrected.” The Verge, a tech-focused American news site, admitted that “the Yandex outage probably didn’t blitz Russian bots.”
Is this hybrid war?
By the time the story was debunked and corrected, the damage was done. In the public’s eye, the strikes were tied to a drop in “Russian bot” activity, and none of the speakers at the Warsaw Security Forum, including senior Ukrainian, Polish, and Lithuanian officials, bothered to correct the record.
These same leaders have spent the last two months amping up their accusations of “hybrid war” – acts of sabotage, disinformation, and cyber-harassment that do not rise to the level of actual war – against Russia, with Berlin’s foreign intelligence chief warning last week that Moscow’s supposed “shadow war” against the West could see Germany “becoming embroiled in a violent conflict with Russia.”
That none of the acts of “hybrid war” – among them the discovery of a suspicious drone at Leipzig Airport in August, and a series of unsubstantiated drone sightings across Germany and Scandinavia last year – have been linked by evidence to Russia is a feature, not a bug. “Hybrid war” is by its very nature unprovable, and the accusation alone is enough for European leaders to justify their deepening proxy war in Ukraine, their remilitarization and expansion of the national security state at home.
Furthermore, the accusations themselves are a form of “hybrid warfare” against the European public, analyst Thomas Fazi argued last week. “Europeans,” he wrote, “are being subjected to a sustained campaign of cognitive or psychological warfare aimed at conditioning them to believe that Europe is under attack from Russia.”
Who stands to gain?
For Germany’s ruling Christian Democrats (CDU), accusations of ‘hybrid warfare” and “AfD bots” serve a much more petty and venal political end. Chancellor Friedrich Merz is less popular now than at any point in his political career, and with the AfD trouncing the CDU in state elections and leading his party by ten points in opinion polls, Merz has taken every opportunity available to tie his opponents to Russia.
“We in Germany will not allow ourselves to be divided, not by hybrid attacks, not by Moscow-bot-driven hate speech on social media, and – if I may say so – not even by the slogans of the AfD and its Russian backers,” the chancellor said in a speech earlier this month.
The Yandex story – which conveniently linked the AfD to “Moscow-bot-driven hate speech” – was a godsend to Merz, and to his Ukrainian and Eastern European allies, who have an interest in preventing the Ukraine-skeptic AfD from taking power in Germany. Unfortunately for them, like all “hybrid war” claims, it fell apart the moment it was subjected to some basic scrutiny.
The European Union has signed an international agreement strengthening the recovery of criminal assets, as Brussels seeks to address the failure of national authorities to confiscate the overwhelming majority of wealth generated through organised crime, corruption and money laundering.
The agreement, opened for signature in Strasbourg on Wednesday, 14 October, introduces additional provisions governing the identification, freezing, confiscation and management of assets held across national borders.
It supplements the Council of Europe’s Warsaw Convention, which established an international framework for cooperation against money laundering and the financing of terrorism.
The Additional Protocol adopted by the Council of Europe extends existing asset-recovery mechanisms and strengthens the ability of national authorities to cooperate when criminal proceeds are transferred beyond the country where an offence occurred.
European authorities have long struggled to deprive criminal organisations of the profits generated by their activities.
An estimate frequently cited by European institutions suggests that only around one per cent of criminal proceeds are ultimately confiscated.
The figure highlights a persistent weakness in criminal enforcement. Police and prosecutors may identify offenders and secure convictions without recovering the money used to finance further criminal operations.
Organised crime networks can distribute their assets through bank accounts, companies, property holdings and intermediaries operating in different jurisdictions.
Investigators must establish the origin and ownership of those assets, obtain the necessary legal orders and secure cooperation from foreign authorities before funds or property can be transferred again.
The problem has become increasingly serious as criminal organisations operate across several countries while enforcement powers remain largely national.
In an earlier examination of Europe’s response to drug-trafficking networks, EU Today reported on the importance of confiscating criminal assets rather than concentrating exclusively on arrests and drug seizures.
The financial structures supporting trafficking organisations can survive the prosecution of individual members, allowing criminal enterprises to replace personnel and continue operations.
The protocol is intended to address practical obstacles encountered when authorities seek assistance from another country.
Its provisions cover international cooperation in asset recovery, the management of seized property and the execution of confiscation decisions.
They also address circumstances in which confiscation may be possible without a conventional criminal conviction, subject to the safeguards and legal requirements established by participating states.
Such arrangements can be particularly relevant when suspects have fled, proceedings cannot be completed or assets are held through structures designed to conceal their ownership.
The protocol also provides for improved cooperation between designated asset-recovery authorities.
These mechanisms are intended to reduce the delays that can arise when investigators must navigate different national procedures while attempting to secure property that may be rapidly moved or disposed of.
The Council of Europe’s treaty documentation explains that the protocol seeks to update the Warsaw Convention in accordance with developments in international anti-money laundering standards.
The revised framework has also been developed with reference to EU rules and the recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force.
The agreement builds on legislation already adopted within the European Union.
The 2024 Asset Recovery and Confiscation Directive established stronger provisions concerning the tracing, freezing, confiscation and management of assets associated with criminal activity.
That directive is intended to improve national asset-recovery systems and strengthen cooperation between authorities.
The EU has separately developed a new anti-money laundering framework, including the establishment of the Frankfurt-based Authority for Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism.
The authority has responsibilities concerning the supervision of high-risk financial institutions and coordination between national bodies combating illicit financial activity.
The new Council of Europe protocol addresses a related but distinct problem: how authorities recover assets once suspected criminal proceeds have been identified, particularly when those assets are located in another jurisdiction.
An earlier EU Today report on criminal enforcement of sanctions violations illustrated the importance of asset confiscation in cases involving breaches of European restrictions.
Although sanctions enforcement and organised crime investigations operate under different legal arrangements, both can require authorities to identify property, obtain judicial orders and prevent assets from being moved beyond their reach.
The protocol was adopted by the Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers on 15 May 2026 and opened for signature on 14 October.
The European Union’s participation requires further legal procedures before the new provisions become binding.
The Commission had previously submitted proposals authorising the EU to sign the agreement, reflecting the division of responsibilities between the Union and its member states in criminal justice and financial regulation.
Individual governments must also determine how the international obligations interact with national procedures governing investigations, property rights and confiscation.
The effectiveness of the agreement will depend on the speed of its implementation and the resources available to investigators, prosecutors and financial intelligence authorities.
Criminal organisations can transfer funds internationally through transactions completed in minutes. Judicial cooperation and the enforcement of confiscation decisions frequently require considerably longer.
The protocol offers governments additional instruments for narrowing that gap, but cannot eliminate the administrative and legal obstacles without corresponding improvements in national enforcement.
For European authorities, the practical measure of success will be the amount of criminal wealth that can be identified and recovered.
The Strasbourg agreement provides a wider legal framework for that task at a time when the profits generated by organised crime continue to exceed the assets confiscated by enforcement agencies.
The European Union has maintained its Article 7 proceedings against Hungary despite acknowledging significant improvements in the country’s rule-of-law situation since Prime Minister Péter Magyar’s government took office earlier this year.
Ministers meeting at the General Affairs Council in Luxembourg on Tuesday, 13 October, reviewed reforms introduced by the Hungarian administration and received an updated assessment from the European Commission.
The proceedings, initiated by the European Parliament in September 2018, remain open eight years after concerns over judicial independence, corruption, media freedom and democratic accountability first prompted action under the EU treaties.
No decision was announced to terminate the procedure following the latest meeting.
European Commissioner Michael McGrath said ahead of the discussions that Hungary had made substantial progress towards addressing the institutional problems inherited from the administration of former prime minister Viktor Orbán.
Speaking in Luxembourg, McGrath acknowledged improved cooperation between the Hungarian government and European institutions.
However, he also indicated that the reform process remained incomplete, noting that the new administration had been in office for only several months.
The Commission’s assessment reflects the changing relationship between Budapest and Brussels following Magyar’s election victory and the subsequent introduction of reforms intended to restore judicial and institutional independence.
As EU Today reported in June, the change of government created an opportunity to resolve long-standing disputes over the condition of Hungary’s democratic institutions and the suspension of European funding.
The latest Council discussions indicate that the EU is prepared to recognise reforms already undertaken without automatically treating them as sufficient to close the Article 7 procedure.
The European Parliament initiated the proceedings in 2018 after raising concerns over developments affecting Hungary’s constitutional system, judicial independence, corruption safeguards and civil society.
Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union provides mechanisms for responding when a member state is considered at risk of seriously breaching the Union’s fundamental values.
Under its preventive provisions, the Council can determine whether there is a clear risk of such a breach.
More severe measures, including the possible suspension of certain membership rights, require additional procedures and higher institutional thresholds.
Hungary’s case has remained within the preventive stage, with successive Council meetings examining the country’s legal and political developments.
The Council’s account of the 13 October meeting confirms that Hungarian representatives presented measures intended to address concerns raised by the European Parliament and member states during earlier proceedings.
The Commission also briefed ministers on its latest assessment.
The meeting did not produce a formal finding that the outstanding concerns had been fully resolved.
Since assuming office, Magyar has sought to reverse elements of the institutional structure established during Orbán’s lengthy premiership.
The reforms have included measures concerning public administration, judicial accountability and the relationship between national institutions and European law.
The new government has also attempted to improve relations with Brussels after years of disputes that affected EU budget decisions, sanctions policy and cooperation over Ukraine.
EU Today has previously examined Magyar’s programme of institutional renewal and the political difficulties involved in changing institutions shaped by the previous administration.
Reforming legislation does not necessarily transform the institutions responsible for applying it.
Judicial appointments, regulatory structures, public procurement procedures and anti-corruption enforcement may all require additional measures before the effects of reform can be fully assessed.
The European Commission must therefore consider not only the laws adopted by the new government but also whether the institutions concerned operate independently and effectively.
The Article 7 proceedings are closely associated with wider disputes over Hungary’s access to European funding, although the relevant legal mechanisms are different.
During Orbán’s administration, the Commission and Council used financial conditionality procedures to restrict access to certain EU resources because of concerns affecting the protection of the Union’s budget.
Magyar’s reforms have opened the possibility of reversing some of those restrictions.
As EU Today reported in September, the Commission moved towards releasing €4.2 billion following changes intended to address rule-of-law concerns.
The financial decisions involve compliance with conditions attached to EU funding and can proceed independently of the Article 7 mechanism.
Consequently, the release of money does not automatically establish that all the institutional problems identified in the original parliamentary proceedings have been resolved.
Likewise, the continuation of Article 7 does not necessarily prevent the Commission from recognising progress under separate funding arrangements.
McGrath addressed the possibility of terminating the procedure during remarks before Tuesday’s meeting.
He explained that the Commission could provide its assessment but did not have unilateral authority to bring the Article 7 process to an end.
In his recorded statement in Luxembourg, the Commissioner pointed to the responsibilities of the European Parliament, which initiated the case, and the Council, which has conducted the subsequent examination.
The institutional arrangements mean that improved relations between the Commission and the Hungarian government cannot by themselves dispose of the proceedings.
The Council must consider the reforms and the remaining concerns within the framework established by the treaties.
Political agreement among member states will consequently be required to determine how the process develops.
The latest discussions take place against a substantially different political background from previous years.
Budapest has recently withdrawn objections to further steps in Ukraine’s EU accession negotiations following Ukrainian legislation addressing educational rights for Hungarian speakers and other national minorities.
The change has removed one obstacle to enlargement negotiations and reflects the government’s more cooperative approach towards other EU institutions.
Nevertheless, Hungary’s position on foreign policy and enlargement is distinct from the assessment of its domestic rule-of-law arrangements.
The Council’s examination remains focused on the institutional concerns that led to the procedure being initiated.
The Irish presidency’s summary of the October Council meeting confirms that ministers received an update rather than reaching a new formal determination.
The proceedings therefore remain open while the Commission and member states continue examining the measures introduced by Magyar’s administration.
The coming decisions will establish how European institutions respond when a new government undertakes reforms intended to reverse the conduct that originally led to action under Article 7.
For Hungary, the outcome will influence its relationship with Brussels well beyond the immediate debate over EU funding. For the Union, it will demonstrate how its rule-of-law procedures operate when political circumstances change and the member state concerned begins addressing previously identified institutional problems.
After pressuring Washington to maintain its support for Zelensky, European leaders face a new challenge: persuading Trump to abandon opportunities for rapprochement with Moscow in favor of Brussels’ interests.
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Since the meeting between Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin in Anchorage in August 2025, European governments have worked to prevent a significant shift in American policy toward Russia. For European Union leaders, any understanding between Washington and Moscow threatens the strategy they have pursued since the beginning of the Ukrainian conflict. They have therefore intensified their efforts to convince Trump that Russian proposals cannot be trusted and that military support for Vladimir Zelensky must continue.
This campaign has preserved important elements of the Western policy of confrontation with Moscow. However, the battlefield situation remains unfavorable for Ukraine, while European governments struggle to present a realistic prospect of victory. Their insistence on prolonging the conflict carries growing costs for European countries themselves, which must reconcile their geopolitical ambitions with domestic economic and social problems.
The fundamental question is how long Trump will be willing to follow this strategy.
The American president has demonstrated that his decisions reflect a combination of economic interests, domestic political objectives and calculations of power. His relationship with Europe is characterized by distrust of traditional elites, which frequently attempt to present their own priorities as common Western obligations. Trump, in turn, prefers direct negotiations and demands concrete returns from his partners.
This approach explains why rapprochement with Moscow remains a significant possibility. Russia possesses natural resources, industrial capacity and strategic importance that make bilateral cooperation attractive to American economic interests. Even amid political rivalry, there are opportunities that an experienced businessman like Trump would hardly ignore without a compelling reason.
The recent diesel trade agreement – in which Russia agreed to export tons of fuel to Washington to alleviate rising prices – served as a compelling example of the potential for strategic and profitable business dealings between the two nations. Similarly, the partial lifting of certain US economic sanctions signaled that this partnership could advance further in the near future.
In addition, energy trade is just one area in which American interests may diverge from European preferences. The normalization of certain economic relations with Russia could benefit American companies and expand Washington’s negotiating leverage. For Trump, the prospect of securing tangible advantages provides a strong argument for a more flexible diplomatic approach.
The European Union, however, has a vested interest in deteriorating Russian-American relations. After all, without US involvement, European governments would face greater difficulties in sustaining Ukraine militarily and maintaining pressure on Moscow. Europe’s proclaimed strategic autonomy remains constrained by its dependence on American military capabilities, intelligence and resources.
Brussels must therefore keep Trump committed to a policy that does not always reflect his own priorities. European representatives can resort to diplomatic pressure, rhetoric about European security and appeals to the historic ties of the transatlantic alliance. Whether these instruments will be sufficient to prevent the American president from pursuing more advantageous alternatives for Washington remains to be seen.
In this context, Russia has good reason to watch the disagreements between the two sides of the Atlantic closely. Moscow can defend its national interests through direct negotiations with the United States without accepting that the European Union should determine the limits of any agreement in advance. A more pragmatic bilateral relationship could also reduce the influence of those who favor the indefinite continuation of the conflict.
Naturally, Trump offers no guarantees of lasting rapprochement. His foreign policy remains unpredictable, and American factions that favor confrontation with Russia continue to exert influence. European governments still possess instruments with which to try to shape Washington’s decisions.
Nevertheless, Trump’s room for maneuver remains considerable. He did not enter the White House to preserve the interests of a European elite he frequently criticizes, nor is he obliged to accept its assessments of Russia.
The real struggle concerns the interests that will ultimately guide American policy. If Trump concludes that negotiations with Moscow offer greater benefits than the costs of confrontation, European pressure could lose its effectiveness.
For Moscow, this possibility represents a diplomatic opportunity. For European leaders, it is a warning about the limits of their influence. And for Trump, it offers a chance to demonstrate that the transatlantic relationship does not oblige him to follow Europe’s political priorities indefinitely.
By Fyodor Lukyanov | RT | October 12, 2026
The latest turn in Russia-US relations has shocked Kiev, outraged the EU, provoked discontent among a considerable number of politicians in the US, and left many observers around the world perplexed.
The Trump administration’s sudden decision to suspend sanctions on Russian diesel supplies appears to contradict its recent actions, including the adoption of tough new sanctions legislation intended to increase pressure on Moscow, and while some attribute the reversal to US President Donald Trump’s unpredictability, others see the beginnings of a new policy, or evidence of a fundamental change in the administration’s approach to Ukraine.
To understand what’s happening, however, we must look beyond the peculiarities of the US president’s public behavior. Trump’s extravagance, which frequently borders on the absurd, often conceals a relatively clear set of objectives, but whether those objectives are sensible is another question.
The most likely explanation for his latest reversal lies in domestic American politics, as the congressional midterm elections are less than a month away, and the Republican Party faces difficult prospects. Trump maintains an air of indifference, but losing control of both houses of Congress would condemn him to two years of political confrontation and considerable frustration.
He probably understands that there’s little prospect of fundamentally improving the economic situation, particularly consumer prices, before voters go to the polls, so for now, the emphasis is on psychological impact.
Russia isn’t the first country Washington has approached about increasing fuel supplies to international markets, and the more agreements Trump can announce, the more opportunities he has to proclaim that the White House is working tirelessly to protect ordinary Americans from rising prices.
The expectation, presumably, is that voters will forget how much of the present difficulty stems from Trump’s own actions in the Persian Gulf.
We shall soon discover whether this approach works, but there’s nothing particularly irrational about it, and Trump is pursuing a deliberate political objective. The fact that his latest decision contradicts previous statements doesn’t trouble him because he’s long operated on the assumption that words have value at the moment they’re spoken, but impose few obligations thereafter.
What does this mean for Russia, beyond the welcome prospect of additional budget revenues?
Colleagues from the Vatfor project have identified an important development, in that for the first time since the beginning of the conflict, the US president has made a significant decision regarding Russia without making Ukraine the determining consideration.
Until now, the Ukrainian question has been inseparable from virtually every aspect of Washington’s policy towards Moscow, but this time, not only has it been set aside, the decision directly contradicts Kiev’s interests at a particularly difficult moment.
Hence the indignation of the Ukrainian leadership, as from its perspective, the Americans have behaved unfairly.
There are probably several reasons for this change, but the principal one appears to be Ukrainian leader Vladimir Zelensky’s unwillingness to accommodate Washington’s demands that Ukraine stop attacking Russian energy infrastructure.
The strikes have become one of Kiev’s principal instruments of warfare, and American requests to curtail them have largely gone unanswered.
Trump, meanwhile, has become fixated on Russian oil supplies as a means of addressing rising fuel prices, and their importance shouldn’t be exaggerated, even if additional Russian supplies alone are unlikely to transform the global market. Nevertheless, Trump has evidently decided that Zelensky bears responsibility for aggravating the situation.
Once the US president reaches this conclusion, persuading him otherwise becomes extremely difficult. Therefore, for the moment, Kiev’s objections have simply been disregarded.
The more consequential question concerns American intelligence assistance, because to stop, or at least substantially reduce, Ukrainian attacks on Russian targets, Washington would have to restrict the intelligence it provides to Kiev, and much of this information amounts, in practical terms, to targeting assistance.
Trump already demonstrated willingness to use this instrument when around a year and a half ago, he temporarily suspended intelligence cooperation for several days to put pressure on the Ukrainian leadership.
A longer interruption would be a different matter and it would represent a genuine change in Washington’s approach to the conflict, effectively distancing the US from its Ukrainian partner, but whether Trump is prepared to take this step is uncertain.
There is, after all, an extensive informal coalition interested in maintaining the present course, and it includes the US defense industry, increasingly influential technology companies, European governments, and their political allies in Washington.
Trump encountered these forces during his previous attempt to advance his preferred settlement following the Anchorage summit, and that initiative ultimately produced little, so it remains to be seen whether the present effort will fare any better.
If Washington proves unwilling to exert sustained pressure on Kiev, the latest initiative could gradually lose momentum, and this is especially likely after the congressional elections, when the immediate political value of announcing presidential achievements will diminish.
The decisive question, therefore, is whether the US leadership can compel its partners to move in the direction it considers necessary, and if it can, an opportunity for further negotiations on a settlement could emerge.
There’s also a second conclusion which is particularly important for Russia, because Washington’s latest actions offer a glimpse of how Russia-US relations could develop after the military phase of the conflict ends.
The enormous collection of sanctions imposed on Russia is unlikely to disappear, and removing them would be exceptionally difficult, both procedurally and politically, given too many restrictions have become embedded in law and institutional practice.
Instead, the sanctions will probably remain formally in place, while decisions about their enforcement are taken according to circumstances; thus, when a particular restriction conflicts with US interests, Washington could suspend its application, but when the circumstances change, it can be restored.
In other words, sanctions will become instruments to be activated or deactivated according to immediate political and economic requirements, rather than permanent expressions of an immutable policy, and this is an important distinction between the American and European approaches.
The Americans generally display a greater degree of pragmatism as they are perfectly capable of proclaiming principles with great conviction, abandoning them when circumstances demand it, and returning to the same principles when doing so becomes convenient. European governments, by contrast, have increasingly bound themselves to political commitments from which retreat is both institutionally complicated and publicly embarrassing.
For Moscow, understanding this difference will be essential when constructing its future relationship with Washington now that the confrontation over Ukraine has reached a stage at which its consequences extend far beyond the immediate military and territorial questions.
Whatever the eventual outcome, it will help determine the structure of future political relations between Russia and the various components of the Western world, and while that structure is already beginning to emerge, its geometry remains unsettled, and the lines are still moving.
Fyodor Lukyanov is the editor-in-chief of Russia in Global Affairs, chairman of the Presidium of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, and research director of the Valdai International Discussion Club.
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