Despite Illinois’ sanctuary laws, local police in and around Chicago helped ICE investigative agents track activists engaged in First Amendment–protected activities.

The Trump administration's attempts to fast-track construction of the president's long-promised border wall through Texas' remote Big Bend region have ground to a halt amid fierce opposition, protests, and legal challenges from landowners and conservation groups.

A federal judge on Wednesday released an opinion explaining her decision to issue a preliminary injunction blocking border wall construction through the Big Bend area. U.S. District Judge Kathleen Cardone found that the plaintiffs, which included the Center for Biological Diversity and several longtime residents of the region, had shown a substantial threat of irreparable harm if the construction project is allowed to continue.

The Trump administration wants to spend $7.5 billion building additional security infrastructure along a 500-mile stretch of the U.S.-Mexico border running through the Big Bend region, which includes Big Bend National Park. The federal government began sending threatening letters to property owners announcing its intent to acquire necessary pieces of their land this summer, and it waived several environmental regulations, allowing it to put bulldozers on the ground inside the national park by September.

However, numerous groups and local landowners say the border wall project will alter their way of life and permanently scar one of the most rugged and pristine landscapes in the country. The project attracted bipartisan criticism and protests.

Cardone also found that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their claims that Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary Markwayne Mullin exceeded his authority when he issued environmental waivers for the project.

The injunction is a temporary reprieve for property owners such as David Keller, an archaeologist and part-time river guide on the Rio Grande River. The original plans for the border wall expansion would have cut through Keller's 10-acre property near Redford, Texas, putting a 30-foot-tall wall on the levee that sits between the river and the rest of his land.

Keller says the Trump administration gravely underestimated how much anger its tactics and attitude would generate.

"It's a level of arrogance—they're just used to being able to bulldoze over people," David Keller says. "They were moving forward as if they weren't expecting any resistance, but boy, they're due for a wakeup call. And they're having it right now."

Keller is a plaintiff in a separate lawsuit against the DHS by Conserve Big Bend, a coalition of landowners, conservationists, river tour guides, researchers, and other affected parties.

Keller says he's loved wild, open country since he was a child, and as soon as he saw the region in the 1990s, he decided he would find a way to live and work there, which he's done for the past 25 years. "It's visually magnificent," Keller says. "It's incredible. It's like no other place I'd ever seen. It's one of the last unspoiled places remaining in the lower 48."

Keller says it's where he plans on being buried, too, although these days he's unsure whether to say "plans" or "planned." The proposed border construction is an existential threat to the life he's built, he says, and if the wall goes up, he'd likely move.

"I didn't come down here to live in a cage," Keller says.

The proposed border wall would not only block access to the river for farmers, ranchers, and outdoors enthusiasts along the river, as well as block the view into Mexico, it would wreck "the whole feeling of the place, the historical cross-border culture that we've developed," Keller says.

So far, the federal government has not tried to seize any private property in the Big Bend region through eminent domain, although it sent letters to property owners this summer requesting access to survey their land and warning them that it held the option to invoke eminent domain if they did not quickly sell.

Both Keller's and the Center for Biological Diversity's lawsuits argue that the department's justification for building and expediting additional border infrastructure in the Big Bend Region are factually and legally incorrect. The DHS determined that the sector of the border is an "area of high illegal entry."

However, despite making up roughly a quarter of the entire U.S.-Mexico border, the Big Bend sector only accounted for between 0.3 percent and 2.2 percent of total border-wide arrests over the past 30 years.

Cardone cited the low apprehension numbers in her finding that Mullin exceeded his authority to issue the waivers.

"The unrebutted evidence shows that the Big Bend Sector is, by far, the sector with the lowest rate of migrant apprehensions along the entire U.S.-Mexico border, both in terms of gross totals and apprehensions per mile of border," Cardone wrote. "Therefore, if the Big Bend Sector is an area of high illegal entry, so is every other sector, and the waiver authority would apply to the entire U.S.-Mexico border."

The post Landowners in Texas' Big Bend Region Fight Trump Administration's Attempts To Seize Land for Border Wall appeared first on Reason Magazine.

The consequences of Kiev’s campaign against Russian refining infrastructure had travelled considerably further than the drones themselves. Months of attacks had damaged refineries, reduced fuel production and contributed to shortages inside Russia. Much of the discussion surrounding the campaign focused on the damage inflicted on Moscow: how many facilities had been hit, how much refining […]

Attacks on Russian and Saudi oil infrastructure threaten global energy security by disrupting supplies, increasing oil prices, and intensifying economic pressures on importing countries. Coordinated international efforts are essential to protect energy facilities, diversify supplies, and secure maritime trade routes. Recently, countries and non-state actors have changed their methods of warfare. The world has witnessed […]

“Yemen did not want this war, but we are bringing the fire back to Saudi Arabia.”

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The Saudi kingdom is facing the danger of collapse from soaring war costs as Yemeni air strikes ramp up, hitting its northern neighbor’s capital and industrial centers with impunity.

Yemeni journalist Hussein al-Bukhaiti says the corruption and arrogance of the “House of Evil” is culminating in historic defeat. Its U.S. patron seems unable to avert the coming collapse.

Despite decades of the U.S. selling weapons worth hundreds of billions of dollars to the Saudi rulers, the regime seems shockingly exposed, with no viable defenses. Yemen’s missiles are striking Saudi Arabia at will. The panicky rulers are pleading with the United States and Europe for help.

Yemen’s armed forces are taking the war to Saudi Arabia, striking its airports, imposing a no-fly zone over the entire state and shutting down its vital oil industry.

“The Saudis cannot stop our drones and hypersonic missiles… we are taking the war to them,” says Sanaa-based Hussain al-Bukhaiti.

With no oil exports, Al-Bukhaiti reckons the Saudi rulers are facing an existential nemesis. Many observers have long predicted that the autocratic Saudi kingdom, created by the British Empire, is awaiting downfall from its ossified and family-run power structure.

Speaking from the Yemeni capital, Sanaa, Hussain al-Bukhaiti described the Saudi monarchy as “a house of glass” that is now being shattered by air strikes that cannot be defended against.

“Yemen did not want this war, but we are bringing the fire back to Saudi Arabia.”

Western politicians and media are portraying the conflict between the two Arab Peninsula countries as being caused by recent aggression from the Ansar Allah-led Yemeni government.

Saudi Arabia’s King Khalid international airport was attacked on October 10 with ballistic missiles that killed several people. Other Saudi airports have also been hit. This has led international airlines to suspend flights.

The state-owned Aramco oil industry has also been blasted with missiles. Fires are raging at major facilities, including at the main base of operations in Dammam on the Persian Gulf coast.

Following the missile strike on Riyadh airport at the weekend, U.S. President Donald Trump and all European leaders condemned an “act of terrorism” by Yemen.

Hussain al-Bukhaiti pointed out the gross hypocrisy of European governments not condemning the thousands of Saudi air strikes on Yemen that have occurred since 2015. These governments still remain silent about the ongoing Saudi atrocities against Yemeni civilians. The European Union even declares “solidarity” with Saudi Arabia.

The Saudi monarchy, led by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, started the war with unprovoked attacks in March 2015. The aggression was enabled by the United States, Britain, and France supplying warplanes, bombs, and intelligence.

These Western powers continue to arm and direct the Saudi regime in its war against Yemen.

Since 2015, there have been thousands of Western-backed air strikes on Yemen, resulting in more than 20,000 mainly civilian deaths.

“They hit everything, schools, hospitals, water-treatment plants, farms, homes, wedding and funeral halls,” says Al-Bukhaiti.

In addition, over 400,000 Yemenis have died from starvation and diseases caused by a blockade on the country imposed by Saudi Arabia and its Western backers for over 10 years.

He says the war reignited in July 2026 after the Saudis broke a four-year truce signed in 2022 by bombing Sanaa international airport. There was no condemnation by Europe of the Saudi violation then.

What Yemen is doing to Saudi Arabia now is but a taste of what the House of Saud inflicted on Yemenis since 2015 with Western support.

The Yemenis this week rejected a reported Saudi proposal for a short-term truce because they see it as just a ploy by the Saudis for rearming and regrouping in a losing situation.

For the war to end, Saudi Arabia must respect Yemen’s sovereignty and stop interfering in its internal affairs.

However, Hussain al-Bukhaiti thinks that the United States will double down and escalate its military involvement in Yemen with a full-blown war. This is not primarily to support the Saudi monarchy, he believes, but rather to prop up the Israeli regime.

Yemen has inflicted huge damage on the Israeli state since it intensified the genocide against Palestinians in October 2023. Yemeni air strikes have repeatedly struck Tel Aviv despite American air defenses.

An expanded U.S. war in Yemen might seem surprising given that Trump has made such a mess of his reckless aggression against Iran and may not have the military forces at his disposal.

But Al-Bukhaiti believes the issue is beyond Trump’s choice. Washington is locked in with the Zionist regime and will do whatever it takes to salvage Israel from defeat. Yemen represents the biggest threat to Israel from the cutting off of its shipping in the Red Sea.

“We are ready for the war that is coming,” he warns.

Russia has done a remarkable job by strengthening the multipolar world and hosted Center 2026 and Interaction 2026 military exercises. These were multi-vectored military exercises. Introduction The recent Russia-led military drills ‘Center 2026’ and ‘Interaction 2026’ help explain Russia’s vision of a multilateral foreign policy and its response to the West’s ‘containment’ policy on Russia. […]

Israeli digital advertising agency Discover-Tech used a sprawling network of online ads to track internet users and help hack their devices, according to reports from Citizen Lab and Confiant.

NATO’s new “block, blunt, and break” doctrine promises deterrence through military might, but technological overconfidence, resource constraints, and fragile political unity could turn deterrence into strategic instability. “We will block, blunt, and break the enemy,” said General Grynkewich, Supreme Allied Commander Europe. New words, novel phrases, and the very old technique of turning people’s heads […]

America’s coming revolution in warfare may not mean fighting fewer wars but fighting more of them without putting Americans on the battlefield. Taking Americans out of the fight When US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth launched Project Meridian on September 30, he presented it as an exercise in imagining warfare decades into the future. Led by […]

Drone strikes against merchant vessels off Bulgaria have brought Russia’s war into waters bordering NATO and the European Union. With grain exports threatened, shipping costs rising and Sofia seeking allied protection, Moscow’s campaign against maritime trade risks becoming another instrument of economic and political pressure.

Russia’s expanding campaign against commercial shipping in the Black Sea is creating a security crisis that extends far beyond Ukraine. The latest drone attacks off Bulgaria’s coast have left 11 sailors missing, forced Sofia to seek assistance from NATO and the European Union, and raised concerns that Moscow is attempting to disrupt one of the world’s principal agricultural export routes.

On 13th October, the Guinea-Bissau-flagged HS Dignity sank after being struck by drones approximately 17 nautical miles east of the Bulgarian village of Krapets. Another vessel, the Ukrainian-owned, Maltese-flagged Chelsea 3, was attacked near Byala. All 15 crew members were rescued, although five sustained minor injuries. The incidents followed earlier attacks in Bulgaria’s exclusive economic zone on 6th October, when the ALFA WATAN sank and the grain-carrying ABLE was damaged.

The significance lies not simply in the destruction of merchant vessels but in the geographical expansion of the threat. Commercial routes previously regarded as comparatively safer alternatives to Ukraine’s exposed ports are now becoming operationally dangerous. Bulgaria and Romania, both NATO and EU members, face disruption to trade, maritime insurance and port operations as the conflict spreads across the western Black Sea.

Russia’s Campaign Against Maritime Trade

The latest attacks follow months of Russian strikes against Ukrainian ports, export terminals and civilian shipping. As EU Today previously reported, repeated attacks on Odesa have already reduced Ukraine’s grain-export capacity, while alternative routes through the Danube and neighbouring European countries cannot fully replace its major Black Sea terminals.

The extension of attacks towards Bulgaria changes the economic calculation. Ships carrying agricultural products, those approaching Danube ports and vessels operating between Black Sea countries now face greater uncertainty, regardless of whether they enter Ukrainian territorial waters.

Maritime security company Ambrey assessed the earlier October attacks as highly likely to have been conducted by Russian forces. Its assessment identified vessels associated with Ukrainian grain trade as the principal targets, rather than suggesting that every commercial ship was being attacked indiscriminately.

This distinction is important, but it offers little reassurance to international shipping companies. A campaign directed against Ukrainian trade can disrupt the wider maritime economy when insurers, shipowners and exporters cannot establish which routes remain safe.

The economic consequences are already becoming apparent. Shipowners must consider higher insurance premiums, additional security measures and the possibility of losing vessels and crews. Traders may redirect cargoes or withdraw from routes whose commercial returns no longer justify the risks.

Radev Confronts the Consequences of Moscow’s War

The attacks have also placed Bulgarian Prime Minister Rumen Radev in an increasingly difficult political position.

Radev has advocated renewed diplomatic engagement with Moscow and questioned the emphasis placed on military assistance to Ukraine. He has rejected accusations of being pro-Russian, presenting his approach as a pragmatic alternative to prolonged confrontation.

Yet the attacks have demonstrated the limitations of maintaining political distance from a war whose economic and security consequences are reaching Bulgarian waters.

After summoning Russian Ambassador Eleonora Mitrofanova on 13th October, Radev acknowledged that Bulgaria possessed no conclusive evidence establishing responsibility for the latest strikes. Nevertheless, he argued that their consequences benefited Russia and questioned why Ukraine would attack its own commercial vessels.

According to the Bulgarian News Agency’s account of the meeting, the prime minister also warned that higher insurance costs and shipping companies’ reluctance to serve Bulgarian ports were already damaging the national economy.

This is the fundamental change confronting Sofia. The conflict is no longer solely a question of Bulgaria’s position towards Ukraine or its diplomatic relationship with Russia. It is affecting the country’s commercial interests, energy supplies and responsibilities as a NATO member.

Radev’s response does not necessarily indicate a wholesale reversal of his previous political position. It demonstrates that the practical obligations of government can leave considerably less room for accommodation with Moscow than the arguments advanced from outside direct responsibility for national security.

Food Security Becomes Another Instrument of Pressure

The broader consequences may be felt most severely outside Europe.

Ukraine remains an important supplier of wheat, maize and vegetable oils to international markets, including countries in Africa, Asia and the Middle East. Interruptions to these exports affect more than Ukraine’s agricultural revenues. They can increase transport costs, delay deliveries and reduce the availability of competitively priced food in import-dependent countries.

Speaking at the Warsaw Security Forum on 12th October, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy warned of a possible agricultural crisis, arguing that Russian interference with Black Sea shipping could leave countries in Africa, Asia and the Middle East facing serious supply difficulties within months.

The warning reflects a mechanism already familiar from the earlier stages of Russia’s invasion. Following Moscow’s withdrawal from the UN-brokered grain agreement in July 2023, Ukrainian agricultural exporters faced renewed attacks on port infrastructure and substantial uncertainty over maritime access.

The danger is not necessarily an immediate worldwide shortage of grain. Wheat prices remained relatively steady following the 13th October incidents. Rather, sustained disruption could progressively reduce available export capacity, increase costs and place vulnerable importing countries under greater pressure.

For Moscow, such disruption could serve several purposes simultaneously: weakening Ukraine’s economy, raising the costs of international support for Kyiv and creating additional pressures on governments concerned about food inflation and social stability.

Europe’s Black Sea Security Strategy Faces a Practical Test

The immediate challenge for Brussels and NATO is how to protect commercial navigation without allowing the conflict to expand into a direct military confrontation.

Bulgaria has requested stronger air and maritime surveillance and is seeking closer coordination with Romania and Turkey. Defence Minister Dimitar Stoyanov said on 14th October that Sofia expected to join a NATO counter-drone initiative by the end of the month.

The EU has already developed a framework for addressing precisely such threats. Its Black Sea strategy, announced in May 2025, proposed a maritime security hub integrating surveillance, intelligence-sharing, infrastructure protection and regional cooperation.

The attacks now expose the difference between developing a security framework and providing effective protection to merchant vessels. Better intelligence can identify threats, but preventing further sinkings requires detection systems, coordinated responses and sufficient defensive capabilities.

Turkey’s involvement is particularly important because of its control over the Bosphorus and Dardanelles and its established role in Black Sea maritime security. Any workable regional arrangement must therefore extend beyond cooperation between Bulgaria and Romania.

The incidents occurred outside Bulgaria’s 12-nautical-mile territorial sea, meaning they do not automatically constitute an armed attack on NATO territory under Article 5. Nevertheless, repeated strikes within the economic zones of alliance members pose a substantial challenge to maritime security.

Russia’s campaign against Ukrainian exports is increasingly imposing costs on neighbouring European states and international trading partners. The question facing the EU is whether it can secure the commercial routes on which both Ukraine’s economy and the food supplies of millions beyond Europe depend.

Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s unusually direct criticism of Donald Trump marks a turning point in relations between Kyiv and Washington. With American satellite restrictions disrupting Ukrainian military operations, intelligence cooperation under scrutiny and the White House easing pressure on Russian energy exports, Ukraine faces a fundamental question: how can it defend itself when its most powerful partner is increasingly willing to accommodate Moscow?

President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has abandoned much of the diplomatic restraint that characterised his dealings with Donald Trump since their confrontation in the Oval Office in February 2025. In an interview on 14 October, the Ukrainian president accused his American counterpart of moving towards Russia and choosing the wrong side of history.

His intervention followed a series of American decisions that have increased pressure on Kyiv while offering Moscow economic and diplomatic advantages. A controversial agreement involving Russian diesel exports, uncertainty surrounding the provision of American intelligence and sudden restrictions on military satellite communications have brought relations between the two countries to their most difficult point since Trump’s return to the White House.

Zelenskyy’s criticism was unusually personal. Questioned about whether he felt betrayed by Washington’s recent decisions, he acknowledged the sense of betrayal but emphasised that Ukraine’s survival could not be treated as a commercial negotiation. He said Ukraine was not selling its country and argued that an American president claiming to act as an intermediary must not favour one of the belligerents.

The shift reflects the apparent exhaustion of a strategy Kyiv has pursued for more than a year: avoid openly challenging Trump, maintain personal contact with the White House and hope that American support can be preserved through diplomatic accommodation. That calculation is becoming increasingly difficult to sustain as Washington’s demands threaten to constrain Ukraine’s military operations without producing corresponding concessions from Russia.

American leverage becomes a Ukrainian vulnerability

The immediate demonstration of Ukraine’s dependence on American technology came during the night of 13–14 October, when SpaceX imposed restrictions on Starshield, the military-grade version of its Starlink satellite communications service.

According to accounts provided by Ukrainian frontline commanders, the changes disrupted connections to terminals travelling above approximately 160 kilometres per hour, forcing the abandonment of several drone missions. The restrictions affected systems used for reconnaissance, interception and strikes against Russian military targets.

As EU Today reported on 14 October, the disruption exposed a weakness extending beyond individual drone missions. Satellite communications form part of Ukraine’s operational infrastructure, supporting the movement of battlefield information, remote weapons control and communications across areas where conventional networks are vulnerable to Russian electronic warfare.

An interruption imposed remotely by a commercial provider can therefore affect military capabilities without any physical attack on Ukrainian equipment. Decisions taken outside Ukraine’s military command structure can alter the effectiveness of systems already deployed on the battlefield.

Ukraine’s Defence Ministry subsequently opened discussions with American officials, SpaceX and NATO partners while examining alternative communications arrangements.

Later on Wednesday, former Ukrainian defence minister Mykhailo Fedorov announced that Starlink functionality at speeds up to 160 kilometres per hour was being restored. Work was still required to remove the restrictions on Starshield altogether. The partial reversal offered immediate operational relief but did not resolve the underlying dependency.

There is no established evidence that the Trump administration ordered SpaceX to impose the restrictions. Nevertheless, their timing, amid mounting disagreements over Ukraine’s military operations, has reinforced Kyiv’s concerns about relying on communications infrastructure controlled by an American company.

Intelligence warnings and the protection of civilians

The dispute over satellite access coincides with growing uncertainty about American intelligence cooperation.

Following Russian ballistic missile strikes on Kyiv on 12–13 October, Zelenskyy complained that Ukraine had received no advance warning from its international partners. The attacks damaged residential buildings and energy infrastructure, while Ukraine’s authorities raised concerns about the absence of advance intelligence.

Advance information about Russian missile launches is particularly important when ballistic weapons leave civilians only minutes to reach shelters. Intelligence cooperation also supports Ukrainian air-defence units in assessing threats and preparing interceptions.

Trump denied on 13 October that Washington had stopped sharing intelligence with Ukraine. Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha likewise confirmed that cooperation continued. The absence of warnings about particular attacks therefore cannot be equated with a complete suspension of American assistance.

Yet the consequences of unreliable warning arrangements remain serious. For Ukraine, the distinction between information withheld, delayed or simply unavailable offers little protection when Russian ballistic missiles reach civilian neighbourhoods without sufficient warning.

The wider concern is that intelligence provision could become another instrument of diplomatic pressure. Accounts of negotiations over Ukrainian attacks on Russian refineries have raised the possibility that Washington might use such assistance as leverage. Reports of explicit threats have been disputed, but the controversy has increased uncertainty surrounding a capability central to Ukraine’s defence.

Why the diesel agreement changes the strategic calculation

The confrontation has also exposed a contradiction in Washington’s approach to the war.

Trump’s agreement allowing Russian diesel to return to international markets offers Moscow additional export opportunities at a time when Ukrainian attacks have damaged refining capacity and disrupted domestic fuel supplies.

The American administration has justified the arrangement partly through the need to ease fuel prices. Yet the initially announced quantities are modest in relation to international petroleum markets, raising questions about how much immediate relief the measure can realistically provide.

For Putin, its diplomatic significance may be considerably greater. Russia has secured a relaxation of American economic restrictions while Washington simultaneously presses Kyiv to limit attacks on the infrastructure that generates revenue for Moscow’s war economy.

The commercial implications of Washington’s sanctions reversal extend beyond the initial shipment volumes. The Treasury authorisation permits certain transactions involving Russian-origin diesel until April 2027, creating opportunities for international traders and financial intermediaries while leaving the broader sanctions framework formally intact.

Trump’s proposed energy ceasefire has compounded the difficulty. As EU Today examined earlier this week, Kyiv has offered to suspend strikes against Russian energy facilities if Moscow reciprocates. Russian attacks on Ukrainian power infrastructure have nevertheless continued.

An arrangement in which Ukraine stops targeting Russian refineries while Russia retains the ability to strike Ukrainian electricity generation would remove an important source of pressure on Moscow without protecting Ukrainian civilians.

Such an outcome would change the military and economic conditions of the war in Russia’s favour, regardless of how Washington describes its diplomatic objectives.

The White House, Congress and the limits of presidential power

Zelenskyy’s sharper language also reflects a possible reassessment of where influence over American policy can be exercised.

For much of Trump’s second presidency, Kyiv’s diplomacy has concentrated on preserving a workable relationship with the president himself. That approach assumes that personal engagement can influence White House decisions even when Trump’s broader political instincts favour accommodation with Putin.

The events of October suggest that this strategy has reached its limits.

Ukraine’s alternative is not necessarily an outright confrontation with Washington. Rather, it involves placing greater weight on Congress, the American defence establishment and the institutional relationships that have supported Ukraine since Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022.

There is a historical precedent. During Trump’s first presidency, Congress supported military assistance to Ukraine despite differences within the administration over relations with Russia. Under Joe Biden, congressional resistance also demonstrated how domestic American politics could determine the timing and scale of weapons deliveries.

The months-long delay in approving the 2024 military assistance package contributed to severe ammunition shortages at a critical stage of Russia’s offensive operations. Ukraine’s loss of Avdiivka illustrated the danger of making battlefield planning dependent on political negotiations in Washington.

The congressional elections on 3 November 2026 could alter the balance of power. A change in control of either chamber would increase opportunities for oversight, investigations and legislative pressure on the administration, although Congress cannot independently direct every aspect of intelligence sharing or presidential diplomacy.

A less compliant Congress could nevertheless make it politically harder for the White House to restrict Ukrainian assistance without explanation.

Europe confronts a more permanent problem

For European governments, the dispute carries implications extending well beyond the immediate confrontation between Trump and Zelenskyy.

The transatlantic security relationship has historically depended on the assumption that American military capabilities, intelligence networks and political commitments would remain available to European allies during a major security crisis.

That assumption is increasingly difficult to reconcile with an American administration prepared to link assistance to Ukraine with wider commercial negotiations and domestic political objectives.

The consequences are particularly acute in areas where European capabilities remain insufficient to replace American systems quickly, including satellite intelligence, strategic reconnaissance, missile defence and specialised communications.

Europe can expand weapons production, finance Ukrainian purchases and develop alternatives to American technology. Replacing the full range of capabilities provided by the United States, however, requires investment measured in years rather than months.

The problem will not necessarily disappear when Trump leaves office. His return to power demonstrated that the American foreign-policy consensus which supported European security for decades can be challenged through the electoral process.

Future American administrations may seek to restore traditional alliances, but European governments must now account for the possibility that another election could reverse those commitments.

For Zelenskyy, the immediate calculation is exceptionally difficult. Public criticism risks provoking further retaliation from a president whose administration still controls capabilities essential to Ukraine’s defence. Continued diplomatic restraint, however, has not prevented Washington from offering concessions to Russia or introducing uncertainty into Ukraine’s military planning.

His latest intervention suggests that Kyiv is no longer convinced that avoiding confrontation will preserve American support. The question is whether greater political scrutiny of Washington’s decisions can prevent a further erosion of assistance before Russia turns the resulting military advantages into territorial gains.

The geopolitical aspects of Bab-al-Mandab extends way beyond any narrow view, both historically and contemporarily. So, before the next “maritime security initiative” arrives, ask the 4 main questions the brochure never answers Ethiopia lost its sea, Yemen’s highlands never accepted a master, and this month a Zaydi movement took the strait’s Arabian shore. Every capital […]

Iranian officials have confirmed top-level discussions about the country’s potential exit from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). What does this mean for the Middle East and for the world? Essence of the Matter Iran, as Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmail Baghaei noted at a briefing, continues, as before, to faithfully fulfill […]

Instability in countries that later formed the Alliance of Sahelian States (AES) in security political and economic affairs resulted from perennial interference by the US and France. Military assistance from Russia is helping these countries to regain sovereignty and capture more value from their resources. Mali and Africa Corps reenter Kidal On October 6, 2026, […]

Amid ongoing military-political and economic pressure from the US and Israel, Iran is demonstrating full readiness for fierce resistance and a protracted multi-front war, while simultaneously keeping the door open for a diplomatic settlement on its own terms. US decision-makers have placed a multi-layered approach toward Tehran on their agenda, encompassing threatening rhetoric, economic pressure, […]

This is an escalation in a criminal investigation of US Rep. Ilhan Omar, in the final weeks of her reelection bid. She is a frequent target of Israel partisans and the Trump Administration over her opposition to Israel's human rights violations and the Israel lobby's destructive influence in the US

The most unsettling failure in digital payments may not be a black screen. Imagine a fraud-detection model that remains online but suddenly flags thousands of legitimate transfers as suspicious. Banks may see functioning servers while customers see rejected payments, delayed salaries and complaints no single institution can explain. This is a hypothetical scenario, not a […]

The post The AI risk no bank can manage alone appeared first on Asia Times.

The creation of “Project Meridian” is not a path to US military superiority but an admission of its own weakness, rooted in a financialized system rather than a technology gap. US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth recently announced the creation of the 120 day task force, “Project Meridian.” On the US Department of Defense’s website […]

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On October 7, 2023, a memorable military operation began from Gaza, in which approximately 4,000 armed men from the elite units of the various local Palestinian resistance movements (Palestinian Islamic Jihad, PFLP, DFLP, Popular Resistance Committees, etc., led by Hamas) poured like an overflowing glass over the Zionist settlements in the surrounding areas.

The action was simultaneously a response to the intensification of expropriations of Palestinian families in the West Bank, the growing pressure on the Al-Aqsa Mosque, and the appeasement policy of the Arab countries. It aimed, through the capture of Israeli military personnel (active and reservists), to force the Zionist entity into a war of attrition that could lead to significant exhaustion of Israel, internally and externally, and to a reassertion of the Palestinian State question.

Apparently, one of the expectations of the Hamas leadership was that Hezbollah and Iran, and perhaps the military organizations of the West Bank, would also engage, briefly and sustainably, in the conflict with Israel. For a series of reasons – entirely different for each of the actors – this did not happen, except in the case of Hezbollah, and only in a limited way until the ground invasion of Lebanon, and in the case of Iran, also in a limited way during the 12-Day War.

The event led to cataclysmic transformations in the Middle East that we can already describe, and to a panorama that may be disconcerting for many who predicted a scenario of total Zionist victory.

It is not our intention to provide a detailed description of the processes that were initiated by the Gaza War, so we will only attempt to summarize each of the scenarios in their main events and current panorama.

As for Gaza itself, its population was the victim of ethnic cleansing. The death toll, if we add all causes, may reach 200,000, that is, 10% of the population of the Gaza Strip. A significant part of the Hamas leadership, in turn, was assassinated during the war. Israel, however, was defeated in the conflict, considering that it failed to achieve its objectives of destroying Hamas, permanently occupying the entire Gaza Strip, and displacing the Palestinian population. The material and social damage to Israel, in turn, was immense. 60 billion dollars in general economic losses, increased internal social tensions, and total – perhaps irreversible – destruction of Israel’s international image. Furthermore, unable to defeat Hamas, Israel was forced to accept a peace agreement imposed by the US. Meanwhile, Hamas continues with approximately 12,000 active fighters and another 15,000 young recruits in training, so that it will soon return to approximately the same level of strength as before October 7, 2023.

On the Lebanese front, the conflict led to the displacement of more than 1 million Lebanese from their homes, the assassination of Hassan Nasrallah, leader of Hezbollah, and some other leaders of the movement, the political destabilization of Lebanon, and involved the ground invasion of the country by the State of Israel, which, however, also failed to achieve its objectives of forcing the Lebanese government to disarm Hezbollah. Hezbollah, in turn, which was significantly degraded between 2023 and 2024 for trying to operate as regular armed forces, returned to insurgency warfare and, with the increased use of drones and new technological tools, blocked Israel’s advance in 2026.

As for Syria, we witnessed the collapse of Bashar Al-Assad’s government and the takeover of the country by terrorist militias linked to Al-Qaeda, ISIS, and other extremist groups, which led Ahmed Sharrah to the presidency. Israel took advantage of the moment to destroy most of Syria’s military hardware and occupy a security belt around the Golan Heights, establishing a tenuous alliance with the Druze tribes and militias of the region. The fall of Assad imposed difficulties on Hezbollah’s logistics, which relied on Syria for the transit of equipment coming from Iran. If Israel expected free passage through Syria, however, the situation is made more complex by the fact that the region is disputed, as an area of influence, with Turkey, so that tensions between both countries continue to increase.

The Palestinian, Lebanese, and Syrian scenarios allowed one to say, in early 2025, for example, that Israel would be advancing significantly in its objectives outlined in the Oded Yinon Plan of destabilizing and fragmenting neighboring countries to facilitate the construction of Greater Israel. We would have here, at that moment, the collapse of the Shiite Crescent strategy and of Qassem Soleimani’s geopolitical project. When we add the Iraqi and Iranian scenarios, as well as the general context of the Middle East, the situation changes significantly.

Because in the space between the 12-Day War and the Iran War, we saw the collapse of US regional power in the Middle East, the rise of Iran as the main contender for regional hegemony, and Israel’s retreat to a more defensive and rear-guard position.

Signs that the Israeli project was more fragile than it seemed at first glance appeared already in the conflict with Iran in 2025. Unable to defeat Iran, which was pounding Israeli defenses and infrastructure with swarms of drones and missiles, Israel had to appeal for help from the US, which carried out a largely symbolic airstrike against empty nuclear facilities in Iran. This did not go unnoticed.

The new round of conflict in 2026, beginning at the end of February, despite starting with the assassination of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, led to the elimination of a good part of US bases in the Middle East, the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, the destruction of Israeli air defense capabilities, the evacuation of US troops in Iraq, and the destruction of the myth of the US’s incontestable military superiority.

In fact, the inability of the US to achieve its political objectives militarily in the Middle East (after the failure of the January color revolution attempt), even using 2 aircraft carriers (1 of which may have been seriously damaged in operations), its inability to protect its Arab allies, the Arab allies’ own inability to defend themselves, the partial depletion of the missile stockpiles of Iran’s enemies, and Iran’s capacity to quickly replenish its leadership and to act militarily in a decentralized manner, as well as its demonstration that its industrial-military capacity remained active, changed the geopolitical map in the Middle East.

To some extent, today, it is Iran that calls the shots. The evacuation of Iraq by the US reopens the country to the penetration of Iranian influence, which puts at risk even Ahmed Sharrah’s domination of Syria.

To circumvent Iranian control of Hormuz, the Saudis have been experimenting with using the Red Sea and land routes. If these efforts were successful, the importance of Hormuz would diminish and, with it, Iran’s bargaining power. The problem is that, exactly when this began to happen, the Yemeni Ansarullah entered the board, initiating a large-scale military operation to defeat the rebels supported by Riyadh. The Saudi response to the Houthi advances led to the partial closure of the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait and attacks not only against ARAMCO facilities, but even against Saudi oil wells.

If we return to the Israeli geopolitical panorama, finally, the country still finds itself with a Palestinian problem in Gaza, Hezbollah active in Lebanon, unable to advance in Syria because of the Turkish threat, and with its defensive military capabilities considerably reduced.

Far from the “Pax Judaica” and “Greater Israel,” we are seeing the repositioning of geopolitical actors, and the actor in the most advantageous position is, today, Iran. The recent negotiations between Israel and the Sunni Arab countries do not significantly change the scenario.

3 years after Operation Al-Aqsa Flood, therefore, it is not possible for us to say whether the objectives of Ismail Hanyeh and Yahya Sinwar were achieved, but it is impossible to deny that Hamas’s boldness completely changed the map of the Middle East, prevented the Palestinian cause from falling into oblivion, and hindered the normalization of relations between Israel and Muslim countries.

Production: By Europod, in co-production with Sphera Network.

EUobserver is proud to have an editorial partnership with Europod to co-publish the podcast series “Briefed” hosted by Léa Marchal. The podcast is available on all major platforms.

Find the full transcript below: 

European gas storage levels are unusually low for this time of year, reaching their lowest autumn level since 2011.

With Russian gas imports set to end in 2027, could Europe face a tougher challenge in the months ahead? 

First, how do Europe’s gas reserves work? EU countries fill underground gas storage sites during spring and summer, when demand is lower, and draw on these stocks during the winter, when heating pushes consumption up.

Since 2022, the EU has required member states to ensure their gas storage facilities reach 90 percent of capacity by a deadline between 1 October and 1 December. That helps secure supplies ahead of winter.

But this year, stocks are well below that target, at just over 70 percent in early October. They still have time to rise before the deadline, but the situation is attracting attention.

Does that mean Europeans are at risk of running out of gas this winter? According to the European Commission, no. It acknowledges that storage levels are low compared with previous years, but says the EU’s gas system should still be flexible enough to meet demand this winter.

That said, a colder or longer winter than expected, or disruptions to supplies in other parts of the world, could put additional pressure on the market. Especially at a time when the EU is preparing to phase out Russian gas imports in 2027.

The EU has adopted a gradual ban, with transitional arrangements for existing long-term contracts.

Russian liquefied natural gas, or LNG, is due to be phased out completely from January 2027 only. Russian gas delivered by pipeline will follow later, with the deadline set for the end of September 2027.

And Russian gas still accounted for around 12 percent of EU gas demand through May 2026. Imports even increased in the first months of this year compared with the same period in 2025, amid disruptions to energy flows linked to the war in the Middle East.

So, from January, Europe will lose one source of supply.  Which means Europe should try and reduce its gas consumption.

But it’s easier said than done, particularly as winter approaches. Heating needs depend heavily on temperatures, and households cannot simply stop heating their homes.

Still, Europe has shown in the past that consumption can fall significantly. After Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the European Commission called on member states to reduce their gas demand by 15 percent. 

And they succeeded: their gas demand fell of around 18 percent, compared with the previous five-year average. A few months ago, following the escalation of the war in the Middle East, the Jacques Delors Institute recommended reviving efforts to reduce gas demand.

That being said, the reduction achieved in 2022 was partly helped by a mild winter and greater use of alternative energy sources, including coal and nuclear power.

Those options may help again, but they come with limitations. Much will depend on the weather and how long the winter lasts.

Which doesn’t mean Europe should not call for lowering the demand and accelerate the deployment of renewable energy.