UK home secretary’s meeting comes after PM said he wanted to rejoin European law enforcement databases

The UK home secretary, Shabana Mahmood, will meet the EU’s home affairs commissioner on Monday for further talks just days after Andy Burnham said he wanted to rejoin European law enforcement databases from which the UK has been locked out of since Brexit.

According to the European Commission, they will discuss “migration, border management, law enforcement cooperation and counter-terrorism”, with the latest Frontex data published on Monday showing a 43% decline in small boats crossing the Channel.

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© Photograph: Marcin Nowak/Anadolu/Getty Images

© Photograph: Marcin Nowak/Anadolu/Getty Images

© Photograph: Marcin Nowak/Anadolu/Getty Images

Brussels, 18 October, (Brussels Morning Newspaper) – Brussels migration tensions intensified during the European Council summit on 15–16 October, as EU leaders clashed over immigration policies, border security and Spain’s plans to regularise approximately 600,000 undocumented migrants. Denmark… Read more

The U.S. negotiates with Moscow and Europe is left commenting. Zakharova’s “none of her business” says it all.

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A Senate session

On October 14, 2026, in her address to the Senate ahead of the European Council, Giorgia Meloni did something that, until just a few years ago, would have seemed unthinkable for a right-wing Italian government: she publicly distanced herself from the President of the United States to defend a position even more uncompromising than his own. The issue at hand was the diesel fuel agreement announced by Donald Trump following a phone call with Vladimir Putin, accompanied by a temporary license from the U.S. Treasury that reopens the global market to Russian fuel. For the prime minister, this is a “very risky” decision: it legitimizes Moscow while bombs are falling on Ukrainian cities, provides it with new revenue, and weakens the leverage of sanctions. During the same session, Meloni argued that Putin is seeking a new enemy, and that that enemy could be Europe; and that a Ukraine that stopped defending itself would not achieve peace, but occupation.

So much for the news report. The rest was left to the chamber and the newspapers. The applause from the majority was joined by that of a portion of the opposition: Azione, Italia Viva, and the reformist wing of the Democratic Party. La Stampa framed support for Kiev as a matter of values and borders – those borders that “are being defended there.”

There is also a detail that speaks louder than many analyses. When questioned by ANSA, Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova dismissed the prime minister’s remarks with a curt response: “It’s none of her business.” At the same time, Volodymyr Zelenskyy was in London, welcomed by Prime Minister Andy Burnham, and denouncing the restriction of military satellite services provided to the Ukrainian army. Elon Musk, for his part, clarified that the StarShield network belongs to the U.S. government and that any restrictions depend on the U.S. military and, ultimately, on the president. Washington deals with Moscow; Moscow responds to Washington. Rome applauds itself. Pathetic, isn’t it?

Not an exclusively Italian case

It would be a mistake to view the October 14 session as merely an episode of domestic politics. Italy’s stance is the national manifestation of a framework that today unites nearly all European capitals, and which has three rules. The first: the conflict in Ukraine is presented as an existential clash between political civilizations, in which any compromise amounts to surrender. The second: the Russian threat is projected beyond Ukraine, onto EU territory, so as to make rearmament an indisputable necessity. The third, the most insidious: internal dissent is attributed to the enemy’s influence.

Germany offers the clearest example. Defense Minister Boris Pistorius, who as early as 2023 had called for the country to become kriegstüchtig – capable of waging war – and who has since pointed to a timeframe of just a few years within which Russia could attack a member of the Alliance, has argued in recent days that the widespread fear of war in German society is being deliberately fueled by Putin and the AfD. This line of reasoning deserves attention. In a country that lost millions of lives in the two world wars, the fear of a new conflict would not need external agents to explain itself. Attributing it to Moscow and the main opposition party means transforming a legitimate political sentiment into a national security issue.

The same pattern is repeated elsewhere, albeit with different nuances. Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski claims credit for the results of Ukrainian attacks on Russian refineries and infrastructure; his German counterpart, Johann Wadephul, argues that now is not the time to ease sanctions, but to tighten them. France, Germany, and the United Kingdom are acting as a negotiating bloc, so much so that Meloni herself has asked that they do so at least with a formal mandate from all partners. These words are backed by numbers: the ReArm Europe plan presented by the Commission in March 2025; the commitment made at the NATO summit in The Hague to raise defense and security spending to 5% of GDP by 2035; and the 90-billion loan to Kiev approved by the European Council in December 2025. This rhetoric is not the eccentricity of some minister; it is literally the official language of the Union – and unfortunately, we have grown accustomed to it.

A foolish and counterproductive stance

Calling this approach foolish is not polemical hyperbole, if by “foolishness” we mean the stubborn persistence in repeating behavior that produces effects opposite to those declared. This is evident on three levels.

The first is strategic. Deterrence theory has taught us for decades that a threat is only as valuable as the credibility of the one making it, and that credibility depends on the ability to back up one’s words with action. Today’s Europe is raising the tone without having the tools to back it up. The Starlink affair has demonstrated this with almost textbook clarity: the Ukrainian military, which Europeans fund and encourage, depends for communications and drone guidance on infrastructure owned by an American company and controlled by the Pentagon. All it takes is a decision in Washington for part of the operations to grind to a halt. Promising victory in a war where one does not control the satellites is a form of strategic hypocrisy, and adversaries see it for what it is.

The second aspect is economic, of course. As early as 2024, Mario Draghi’s report on European competitiveness identified the energy price differential with the United States as one of the factors behind the continent’s industrial lag. Since then, the rejection of Russian hydrocarbons has become dogma; the war in Iran has driven fuel prices even higher; and the commitment to spend 5% of GDP on defense promises to absorb resources that public budgets simply do not have – unless at the expense of healthcare, pensions, and civilian investments. The paradox is clear: just as Washington, for entirely domestic reasons tied to the midterm elections, is seeking cheap diesel even from Moscow, European governments are touting the fact that they pay more for energy than their competitors as a moral principle.

The third level is diplomatic, and perhaps the most decisive one. A foreign policy that rules out negotiation on principle dooms itself to being left out of the talks when negotiations finally begin. And that is exactly what is happening: the United States and Russia are hammering out energy agreements, the pace of the war, and the terms of a possible truce, while Europe merely comments. Zakharova’s response to the Italian prime minister is not merely a diplomatic snub.

It is the exact measure of the weight Moscow currently attributes to European capitals. One can debate whether it is right; it is harder to argue that it is wrong as a description.

The price of credibility

The deepest damage, however, is not measured on the front lines or even in the markets. It is measured in the relationship between institutions and citizens. When the gap between what is proclaimed and what actually happens becomes visible to the naked eye, public discourse loses its value. For four years, European citizens have been told repeatedly that Russia’s defeat is near, that sanctions are bringing it to its knees, and that every new aid package will be the decisive one. Now they see their main ally negotiating with Moscow, Ukraine dependent on decisions made in Washington, and their own governments increasing military spending while public services deteriorate. No foreign disinformation campaign is needed to breed mistrust. A simple comparison between rhetoric and results is enough.

This distrust stems from a crisis of representation with deeper roots. About a decade ago, in his book *Ruling the Void*, Peter Mair described – well in advance – the withdrawal of political parties from society toward the state, and the gradual separation between responsible government – that is, one faithful to external constraints – and representative government – that is, one responsive to the demands of voters. Together with Richard Katz, he coined the term “cartel party” to describe political formations that compete in the electoral arena but share the management of resources and fundamental policy decisions. The cross-party applause on October 14 is an almost perfect illustration of that model. On an issue of life-and-death importance – the cost of energy and the fate of industry – voters who dissent find no political alternative in Parliament that represents them.

The effects are plain for all to see. In France, governments fall one after another without a stable majority emerging. In Germany, the ruling coalition governs with the strongest postwar opposition breathing down its neck. In Italy, abstention has become the largest “party.” Procedures remain intact, elections are held regularly, but significant decisions are made elsewhere, and the vote ends up merely confirming choices that have already been made.

Governing through distrust

At this point, a less obvious question arises. If distrust damages institutions, why do Europe’s ruling classes continue down a path that fuels it? The simplest answer would be incompetence. But there is a more robust hypothesis that better explains the facts: distrust, within certain limits, is a resource for governance.

Here’s how the mechanism works. A disillusioned electorate becomes fragmented, abstains from voting, and scatters among new and unstable parties. Fragmentation leads to ungovernability; ungovernability, in turn, makes “responsible” grand coalitions, technocratic governments, and cross-party agreements – which keep forces deemed unreliable out of power – indispensable. The more unstable the system is, the more necessary the center becomes, as it promises stability. The crisis of representation, rather than weakening those in power, consolidates their position, because it makes them the only bulwark against the chaos that the crisis itself has produced.

War perfects this mechanism in two ways. First, it allows dissent to be treated as a security issue. When the fear of conflict is attributed to Putin and the opposition, those who call for negotiations cease to be political adversaries and become vehicles of enemy influence. Carl Schmitt identified the state of exception as the place where sovereignty is revealed; Giorgio Agamben has shown how the exception tends to become an ordinary technique of governance.

A permanent state of emergency – whether health-related, financial, or military – removes decision-making from democratic debate and entrusts it to those who present themselves as guarantors of collective survival. Second, war justifies shifting decision-making to forums beyond electoral control: the European Commission, the European Council, NATO, and small-group formats such as the E3.

We must be precise on one point, so as not to slip into caricature. This interpretation does not presuppose a plan agreed upon in some secret room. There is no need for that. It is enough that interests converge: the defense industries seeing orders increase, the European bureaucracies acquiring new powers, the ruling parties finding a raison d’être in the emergency, and the major media conglomerates peddling moral mobilization. Each acts in its own self-interest, and the sum of these self-interests produces a self-perpetuating system. We are, to all intents and purposes, in a Gramscian “organic crisis” – the phase in which the old dies and the new cannot be born, and in which morbid phenomena proliferate. The management of mistrust is one such phenomenon: a way to survive the crisis without resolving it.

Winning at any cost

The final question remains – and it is the most serious one. What are these elites willing to sacrifice to emerge victorious from the current phase? Looking back at recent years, the answer is that part of the sacrifice has already been made. Politics was sacrificed when fundamental decisions were shifted outside of parliaments and the distinction between majority and opposition became merely ornamental. The economy was sacrificed when the continent’s industrial competitiveness was subordinated to geopolitical objectives set elsewhere, accepting unsustainable energy prices and the very real risk of deindustrialization. Those who have already given up these two pillars have little to lose when it comes to the third – the human cost.

For now, that cost is being borne primarily by the Ukrainians. Even members of the Verkhovna Rada who zealously supported the line of all-out war – such as Mar’jana Bezuhla – or who have distanced themselves from it – such as Anna Skorochod – describe a country with destroyed infrastructure, forced mobilization marked by abuses, and a population on the brink of collapse, and admit that the conflict has become a business opportunity for some; but the cost is also beginning to fall on European societies: in public budgets, in wages eroded by energy inflation, and in the idea – now voiced without embarrassment by sitting ministers – that we must get used to the prospect of fighting.

Here, the rhetoric of war reveals its deepest function, for it does not serve to win the war against Russia, which no European government has the means to win on its own. It serves to win the domestic battle, to maintain control over political systems that can no longer generate consensus and that need an external enemy to justify their continued existence. In this sense, the human cost is not a side effect of the calculation. It is a variable, adjusted according to the convenience of the moment, in the perpetual dance of death that is political utilitarianism.

There is an alternative, and it does not amount to surrender: it consists of bringing diplomacy back to the center of European foreign policy, recognizing that a now multipolar international order cannot be governed by moral crusades, and restoring to parliaments and voters the power to decide on war and peace. The indicators for gauging whether anything is changing are concrete: the mandate that the next European Council will – or will not – entrust to the negotiators; the fate of the sanctions regime following the U.S. exemption on diesel fuel; and the stability of national budgets in the face of the 5% target.

As long as the response remains the one applauded on October 14, Europe will continue to pay an ever-increasing price for a war it does not control, while those who govern it will find in its very instability the reason to remain where they are.

Dalle strade del Sud arriva una domanda che riguarda tutto il Paese: chi decide quanto costa produrre in Italia, e chi ne paga il prezzo quando la decisione viene presa altrove.

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Una mappa che segue l’energia

A metà ottobre, per un camionista siciliano, tenere il mezzo fermo nel piazzale costa meno che metterlo in strada. Con il gasolio intorno ai 2,40 euro al litro sull’isola, il Comitato autotrasportatori siciliani stima fra 700 e 900 euro di perdita al giorno per ogni camion. Il coordinatore Salvatore Bella l’ha detto senza giri di parole: «Oggi lavorare in perdita con il gasolio a 2,40 al litro non è più possibile». Ne è nato il fermo che va dalla mezzanotte del 16 ottobre al 20, senza cortei: i tir restano nelle aziende, i semirimorchi non vengono ritirati dai porti. In Calabria Fedralog ha fermato i mezzi negli stessi giorni, mentre la sezione trasporti di Confindustria Catania ha deliberato all’unanimità uno stop fino al 22.

Il fermo arriva dopo settimane di mobilitazione. Il 1° ottobre agricoltori e autotrasportatori hanno bloccato lo svincolo di Pizzo sulla A2; il 12 i trattori hanno presidiato le portinerie del polo industriale tra Augusta e Melilli, rallentando il carico delle autobotti, per iniziativa degli stessi produttori e senza sigle sindacali alle spalle. In Puglia i blocchi hanno impedito l’accesso delle autocisterne alla raffineria Eni di Taranto, a ridosso dell’ex Ilva, i cui lavoratori sono in sciopero dal 12 ottobre. Gli olivicoltori sommano al caro carburante il calo del prezzo dell’olio. Il 22 toccherà ai pescatori: giornata di sciopero nazionale e cento pescherecci a chiudere simbolicamente lo Stretto di Messina.

La geografia dei presìdi dice qualcosa che i comunicati non dicono. Raffinerie, porti, svincoli autostradali, lo Stretto: chi protesta va a colpire i nodi da cui passa l’energia, come se sapesse bene dove nasce il problema. E c’è un paradosso evidente. Il Sud ospita Augusta, Priolo, Taranto, cioè una parte rilevante della capacità di raffinazione del Paese, ma i produttori che vivono a pochi chilometri da quegli impianti non riescono più a pagarne il prodotto.

La guerra arriva alla pompa

Queste proteste sono la coda italiana di una crisi aperta lontano. I rincari sono partiti con la guerra in Iran e con le difficoltà di approvvigionamento dal Golfo: già a fine marzo, nel Siracusano, il gasolio agricolo era salito da 0,88 a 1,45 euro al litro.  A settembre la media nazionale del gasolio superava i 2,16 euro, 35 centesimi più di febbraio; il 12 ottobre il self costava in media 2,252 euro. La crisi di Hormuz, che finora abbiamo letto soprattutto come stress test per le petromonarchie e per i flussi finanziari del Golfo, ha anche una trasmissione verso il basso. Lungo la catena, ogni anello scarica il costo su quello successivo, finché arriva a chi non ha nessuno a valle: il piccolo autotrasportatore che non può ritoccare le tariffe, l’agricoltore che vende a prezzi fissati dalla grande distribuzione.

Le isole pagano due volte. Al carburante si sommano i noli marittimi, appesantiti dalle nuove regole ambientali sul trasporto navale, e i ritardi del Sea Modal Shift, l’ex Marebonus che dovrebbe compensare il costo del passaggio via mare da e per la Sicilia e la cui prima annualità non è stata pagata entro giugno. Le risposte arrivate finora agiscono sul prezzo alla pompa (tagli temporanei delle accise, il tetto annunciato da Eni sulla propria rete dal 28 settembre) e quasi mai sulla struttura dei costi. Per un trattore che brucia 300 euro di gasolio a mattina, uno sconto di 15 centesimi non cambia i conti.

Letta con gli strumenti dell’analisi dei sistemi-mondo, la vicenda ha una forma riconoscibile: gli shock esterni attraversano il centro e si depositano sulla periferia, che ha meno margini per assorbirli. Il Mezzogiorno funziona da periferia interna dell’Europa. Importa energia a prezzi di mercato globale, esporta prodotti agricoli in competizione con importazioni soggette a standard diversi, dipende da una logistica strada-mare che nessun incentivo pagato in ritardo riesce a rendere sostenibile. Su questo si innestano fragilità di lungo periodo come il credito difficile, lo spopolamento e l’arretramento dei servizi, che l’autonomia differenziata rischia di accentuare.

La copertura nazionale ha registrato i blocchi come cronaca del traffico più che come fatto politico. È una scelta che pesa: una protesta trattata come disagio stradale non obbliga nessuno a rispondere sul merito. Eppure il merito è chiaro. Un Paese che importa gli effetti delle guerre altrui senza strumenti propri per governare il costo dell’energia finisce per trasferirli sui territori e sulle categorie più deboli.

Per le prossime settimane gli indicatori da seguire sono pochi e osservabili: un intervento specifico sul gasolio agricolo e da autotrazione, il pagamento del Sea Modal Shift, l’eventuale proroga dei fermi oltre il 20 e il 22, la saldatura con lo sciopero dei pescatori. In assenza di misure, gli stessi promotori siciliani hanno già prospettato di proseguire. Se accadrà, sarà difficile continuare a chiamarla una vertenza di categoria.

Dalle strade del Sud arriva una domanda che riguarda tutto il Paese: chi decide quanto costa produrre in Italia, e chi ne paga il prezzo quando la decisione viene presa altrove.

Brussels, 18 October, (Brussels Morning Newspaper) – The EU energy cost dispute has intensified following a European Council summit in Brussels on 15–16 October, where European leaders disagreed over carbon pricing, electricity bills and measures to protect industries … Read more

Brussels, 18 October, (Brussels Morning Newspaper) – Belgium is facing renewed pressure from European Union partners over Belgium Russian assets negotiations, as EU leaders seek additional financial assistance for Ukraine following the European Council summit on 15–16 October. … Read more

Brussels, 18 October, (Brussels Morning Newspaper) – Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has requested an additional €70 billion in European financial and military assistance for 2027, placing the Zelenskyy EU funding request at the centre of discussions following the … Read more

Brussels, 18 October, (Brussels Morning Newspaper) – The EU budget crisis has intensified after European Union leaders concluded a two-day summit in Brussels without reaching an agreement on the bloc’s proposed €1.62 trillion long-term spending framework. Disagreements over … Read more

For more than three decades, Michael Gove has been a leading figure in British Conservatism. As a journalist, government minister and now editor of the Tory bible the Spectator, he has helped shape the right even as it has moved further rightwards. In the latest episode of Radical Thinking, Gove joins Aditya Chakrabortty to discuss the future of the right, his record on Brexit and austerity, and the Spectator’s position on Islam

Watch the full episode with Michael Gove here.

Aditya’s suggested reading:

To read the fruits of Michael Gove’s dalliance with the Marxism Today gang, look up his essay in a 1998 collection called The Moderniser’s Dilemma: Radical Politics in the Age of Blair

For a slalom ride through Michael Gove’s years in power, read The Demented Dalek by the historian Richard J Evans in the London Review of Books

To learn more on what’s become of the British right, there’s a Guardian column by Aditya

Phil Burton-Cartledge analyses in depth why the most successful political party is now failing in his book The Party’s Over: The Rise and Fall of the Conservatives from Thatcher to Sunak

Phil also writes a very good blog on British politics, which keeps a close eye on how each party is trying to marshall a coalition of voters. Here he is on Kemi Badenoch

Geoffrey Wheatcroft does an entertaining short narrative in Bloody Panico!:

or, Whatever Happened to The Tory Party

For more on the economics of the Cameron years, this paper is acute on how the Tories failed to move the UK away from being a country of renters towards a country of makers. Two of its authors will join us for a podcast later in the series.

And if you want to read how Brexit may have cost the UK 8% of GDP, there’s this paper based on data from the Bank of England

Finally, on the Spectator, read Nesrine Malik’s recent Guardian column

Why has Britain’s oldest political magazine become such a rabid cheerleader for Islamophobia?

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© Photograph: James Tindale/The Guardian

© Photograph: James Tindale/The Guardian

© Photograph: James Tindale/The Guardian

Macron, com 15% de aprovação, prepara guerra com Rússia e dissolve associação Egalité et Réconciliation de Alain Soral por “extremismo político”.

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Macron é, hoje, muito possivelmente, o presidente mais impopular do planeta, contando com apenas 15% de aprovação, segundo uma enquete Ipsos BVA-Cesi. Sob seu comando, a França se depara com a estagnação econômica (crescimento de 0,6% em 2025) e com o endividamento (120% do PIB). Sob Macron, a França viu também a desindustrialização acelerada do país, com as indústrias correspondendo a apenas 9% do PIB, menor patamar da União Europeia, e não surpreendentemente, o poder de compra despencou, com metade dos franceses dizendo que sua renda dá apenas para o essencial e apenas 70% dos cidadãos em idade ativa ocupando um posto de trabalho, atualmente.

Como se isso já não fosse o bastante, em aproximadamente 10 anos de governo Macron, aproximadamente 4 milhões de imigrantes entraram no país (muitos dos quais não trabalham, mas recebem benefícios sociais); quantia que torna impossível a absorção econômica bem como a assimilação etnocultural dos recém-chegados. Naturalmente, ao descontrole imigratório estão vinculadas taxas de criminalidade, favelização de centros urbanos e aumento das tensões sociais. Muitos franceses étnicos sentem-se demograficamente substituídos em sua terra natal, e não por acaso, tudo indica que Marine Le Pen ganhará (finalmente) as eleições presidenciais francesas em 2027.

Não sabemos quais seriam os resultados de uma presidência Le Pen e é razoável ser cético a respeito, mas claramente o atual curso da França é perigosíssimo, inclusive em sua política externa.

Gradualmente, nos últimos 2 anos, começaram a aparecer inúmeros sinais de que Macron estaria preparando o país para uma guerra com a Rússia. O governo francês criou um serviço militar voluntário e aprovou a expansão das forças armadas permanentes a 275 mil homens, bem como um aumento orçamentário para a defesa. O general Fabien Mandon, do Estado-Maior, afirmou em 2025 que a França deveria se preparar para um conflito de alta intensidade com a Rússia no prazo de três a quatro anos, e agora em setembro de 2026 Macron declarou que a França “poderia” se tornar alvo de drones explosivos. Constantemente, também, se ouve discursos sobre a necessidade de transformar a economia francesa numa “economia de guerra”.

Por isso, talvez seja surpreendente para muitos (mas não para nós) que em meio a tudo isso que tem acontecido no país, o governo Macron ainda encontre tempo para a implementação de um aparato de censura e repressão de níveis totalitários.

Sua nova vítima é a associação Egalité et Réconciliation (Igualdade e Reconciliação), criada pelo sociólogo e escritor Alain Soral. A associação se identifica como “nacionalista de esquerda” e tem como principal slogan “esquerda do trabalho, direita dos valores”, apelando a uma superação da falsa dicotomia entre esquerda e direita e, ainda mais importantemente, por uma reconciliação nacional entre todos os setores sociais; em anos recentes, ela esteve envolvida nas manifestações dos Coletes Amarelos, em algumas atividades ligadas ao partido Reagrupamento Nacional (apesar de, simultaneamente, manter uma postura de “crítica construtiva” contra certas tendências sionistas e liberais presentes no partido) e à militância pró-Palestina.

Ocorre que, no dia 9 de outubro, o Ministro do Interior do governo de Macron, Laurent Nuñez, anunciou a abertura de um procedimento de dissolução contra a associação Egalité et Réconciliation, sob a acusação de “extremismo político”. A sua equipe jurídica recebeu um prazo de 1 semana para se defender, e a decisão a respeito deve ocorrer, ainda, em outubro.

O próprio Alain Soral é uma figura de elevado espírito inconformista, razão pela qual já foi vítima de incontáveis perseguições judiciais – dezenas de fato – majoritariamente por “delitos de opinião”, ou seja, por comentários críticos contra pessoas específicas ou “minorias protegidas”. Em condenações, Soral já acumulou milhões de euros a serem pagos em indenização para ONGs globalistas diversas, soma obviamente impagável, bem como já foi encarcerado algumas vezes, também pelos mesmos motivos. A perseguição judicial foi tão intensa que Soral teve que se exilar de sua pátria, primeiro na Suíça e depois na Rússia.

Agora, para além das justificativas oficiais, por qual motivo o Estado francês baniria uma organização relativamente pequena e de poucos recursos financeiros?

É possível analisar o “ângulo” da presença de Alain Soral na Rússia, em mais de um sentido. Primeiro, porque ao estar na Rússia Soral finalmente tornou-se imune à constante perseguição judicial e às ameaças de prisão que ele sofria na França, ao mesmo tempo em que seguia tomando parte ativa no debate político e cultural francês, mesmo à distância. Nisso, ele era capaz de exercer e expandir a sua influência, “sob a proteção dos russos”, o que certamente alimenta as típicas paranoias atuais da elite francesa sobre uma “guerra informacional” russa.

Existe, porém, também um aspecto interno. Recentemente, Alain Soral voltou a ser bastante comentado pela mídia francesa por dois motivos. Um é o “caso Bardella”, o qual diz respeito à descoberta de supostos escritos “politicamente incorretos” de Jordan Bardella, presidente do partido Reagrupamento Nacional, e à informação de que em sua juventude a principal influência intelectual de Bardella era Alain Soral. O segundo é uma pesquisa de opinião indicando que 15% dos homens franceses com menos de 35 anos de idade se identificam com as ideias de Soral.

Isso às vésperas das eleições presidenciais representa um risco significativo para Macron e para o establishment francês. Ainda que, aparentemente, não haja chance de vitória para qualquer candidato contra Le Pen, não podemos duvidar da possibilidade de manipulação do processo eleitoral, tal como aconteceu na Romênia.

Esse silenciamento é ainda mais preocupante pelo fato de que Soral e o E&R serem praticamente os únicos personagens socialmente e culturalmente relevantes na França hoje que defendem a reconciliação nacional e que evitam a incitação do tensionamento interno, promovido pelos elementos mais islamofóbicos do RN e pela própria liderança do LFI de Mélenchon com seu “exército” de antifas e imigrantes.

BRUSSELS, October 16, 2026
At the EU Summit Europe Steps Up Pressure on Russia, Accelerates Ukraine’s EU Bid Amid Energy and Migration Crises also.

European Union leaders have pledged stronger support for Ukraine, accelerated progress towards EU membership and coordinated … Read more

Le Pen leads with 32-36%. France’s minorities are preparing their exit.

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Contact us: info@strategic-culture.su

According to an Ifop poll for the newspaper Marianne, nearly half of Muslims and Jews would consider leaving the country if Marine Le Pen were to emerge victorious in the presidential election next year. 20% of them would “certainly” do so.

Which candidate would cause you to leave France? This is one of the questions posed by the Ifop poll for Marianne, released on Thursday, October 15. The study reveals that a significant proportion of Muslims and Jews say they are prepared to leave the country if Marine Le Pen wins the 2027 presidential election.

Some 46% of that number are planning “leaving France to settle in another country,” while 20% say they will “certainly” take the plunge. More broadly, 40% of younger French people say they have made plans to leave. Among voters of La France Insoumise, the figure rises to 43%. Furthermore, 44% of Jewish citizens responded that they would consider leaving the country.

Marine Le Pen’s rise to power could create “significant obstacles” and generate “high levels of fear and insecurity,” Francois Kraus, director of the political division at Ifop, explained to journalists. More than eight out of ten Muslims fear an “increase in attacks and discrimination” against them. This concern is particularly relevant in the context of the National Rally’s plan to ban the wearing of the Islamic veil in public spaces. Confirmed at the end of August by MP Jean-Philippe Tanguy, the new measure would impose stiff fines on offenders and is expected to be included in Marine Le Pen’s platform for the 2027 presidential election. To circumvent the legal hurdles that such a ban might encounter, the presidential candidate is reportedly considering putting it to a referendum.

Meanwhile, only 27% of Muslim respondents would be willing to “conceal [their] religious affiliation on a daily basis,” for example, by ceasing to wear the headdress in public (18%). More broadly, 41% of those surveyed, regardless of their religion, would refuse to “respect laws” they consider “unjust.” This distrust affects three out of four Jean-Luc Melenchon voters and nearly half of civil servants (45%). According to the latest Ifop-Fiducial poll, Marine Le Pen maintains a significant lead in the first round. Depending on the scenario, the National Rally candidate is in first place with between 32% and 36% of the total vote.

While Le pen has remained antagonistic towards Islam in France, she has often cast herself as a protector of the Jewish people in the country.

In 2024, she remarked, “The best shield for French people of the Jewish faith is the National Rally. It is the only movement that has the will, the conviction and the means to fight Islamist fundamentalism, which is the major danger facing them.”

Yet, nearly as many Jews said they would leave the country under a Le Pen presidency as Muslims.

RT | October 17, 2026

Russia’s Foreign Ministry has warned citizens to exercise caution when traveling abroad “amid a worldwide hunt for Russians.”

The statement follows the detention of Russian military blogger Mikhail Zvinchuk in Montenegro, a NATO member state in the Balkans, on October 9.

After nine hours in custody, Zvinchuk, founder of the Rybar Telegram channel, his wife and three associates were expelled from the country on the grounds of what Montenegro’s leading daily, Vijesti, described as “criminal, operational and intelligence processing.”

“We are compelled to once again remind people of the need to remain vigilant when traveling abroad, even if there is the slightest suspicion of any kind of claims by US law enforcement agencies, amid a worldwide hunt for Russians,” Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova said on Friday.

Montenegro, where the blogger was detained, is not on Russia’s list of unfriendly states, Zakharova said, adding that similar situations were unfolding in countries not considered unfriendly to Russia.

The arrest was described as targeting alleged “hybrid activity” by the Rybar network, but no specific evidence supporting the accusation has been presented.

Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov declined to comment on the details of the arrest but warned Russian citizens that visiting Europe is “currently dangerous.”

The Rybar channel, which has around 1.3 million subscribers, had previously also faced US and British accusations of spreading Russian propaganda and conducting information operations abroad. The US State Department had even issued a $10 million bounty in 2024 for any information about the individuals behind the channel.

Russians who have been targeted include basketball player Daniil Kasatkin, a point guard playing for the national team, who was arrested at Paris airport in June 2025 at the behest of the US, which accused him of being a member of a ransomware gang. He denied the allegations and was released in January 2026 as part of a Russia-France prisoner exchange.

Mark Smith, who has severe health issues, says he was told three times he needed to do nothing in order to remain after Brexit

A seriously ill British man living in Sweden has been forced into hiding amid fears he will be deported as a result of what he says is a government Brexit residency error.

Mark Smith, 60, who has had heart attacks, strokes, severe headaches and chronically high blood pressure that has been difficult to treat, was told on the phone he should leave Sweden by 17 October as he was an “alien” without permission to stay.

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© Photograph: Annika Karlbom/Hallands Nyheter

© Photograph: Annika Karlbom/Hallands Nyheter

© Photograph: Annika Karlbom/Hallands Nyheter

Brussels, 17 October, (Brussels Morning Newspaper) – The EU membership debate has returned to British politics as Prime Minister Andy Burnham prepares for a major summit in Brussels, raising fresh questions about the United Kingdom’s long-term relationship with … Read more

President Donald Trump has waived sweeping sanctions and tariffs targeting Russia’s energy revenues, invoking national interest provisions in legislation passed only last month. The decision follows his controversial diesel agreement with Vladimir Putin and threatens to deepen divisions with Congress and European allies over economic pressure on Moscow.

President Donald Trump has suspended the implementation of sweeping American sanctions against Russia, using presidential waiver powers to prevent penalties approved by Congress from taking effect just weeks after he signed them into law.

The executive order issued by the White House on Friday, 16 October, suspends tariffs of up to 500 per cent on Russian imports, alongside penalties targeting major purchasers of Russian oil and gas. It also waives numerous financial and commercial restrictions intended to reduce Moscow’s ability to finance its war against Ukraine.

The decision comes two days before the 18 October deadline for implementing key provisions of the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026, which Trump signed on 18 September. The legislation was named after the late Republican senator Lindsey Graham, who had championed tougher economic measures against Russia.

Sanctions established but immediately suspended

The presidential order formally establishes the tariff increases required by the legislation while simultaneously suspending their application.

Under the law, Russian imports into the United States would face additional duties of 500 per cent. A separate provision would impose 100 per cent tariffs on goods imported from the five largest purchasers of Russian crude oil and natural gas if those countries knowingly made new purchases from 18 October, subject to specified conditions and exemptions.

Another provision targets countries identified as leading facilitators of Russian oil sanctions evasion, potentially exposing their exports to similar American penalties.

Trump invoked Section 115 of the legislation, which permits the president to waive sanctions and tariffs after certifying to Congress that doing so serves the national interests of the United States.

The order confirms that the certification and an accompanying explanatory report have been submitted to Congress. However, the publicly released document provides no detailed justification for suspending the measures.

The waivers will remain in effect until the president or designated senior officials decide that further action is appropriate. Existing sanctions imposed under earlier executive orders are explicitly preserved, meaning the decision does not remove all American restrictions against Russia.

Nevertheless, the order prevents the new legislation’s principal economic penalties from operating at a time when Congress had sought to intensify pressure on Moscow.

Diesel agreement shapes Washington’s decision

The suspension follows Trump’s agreement with Putin to facilitate renewed Russian diesel exports, announced on 9 October as part of an effort to reduce international fuel prices.

As EU Today previously reported, the agreement envisages an immediate release of more than 300,000 tonnes of Russian diesel, followed by additional shipments in November and subsequent months. Washington also authorised certain transactions involving Russian diesel until April 2027.

The arrangement has raised questions about the relationship between the administration’s energy policy and sanctions intended to constrain Russia’s war economy.

Diesel prices have become an increasingly important domestic political issue ahead of the American congressional elections on 3 November. The war involving Iran and disruptions to international energy supplies have contributed to exceptionally high fuel costs, creating additional pressure on the administration.

The White House hopes additional Russian supplies will relieve pressure on international markets. However, energy analysts have questioned whether the quantities involved will materially affect American prices, particularly before the elections.

The latest waiver also removes the immediate threat of punitive tariffs against major Russian energy customers, including China and India, which had objected to the proposed measures.

Congressional opposition and European concerns

The decision is likely to intensify opposition within Congress, where the sanctions legislation attracted substantial bipartisan support.

Earlier this week, 12 senators, including six Republicans, called on Trump to reverse his diesel agreement, arguing that allowing Russian fuel back onto international markets would provide Moscow with additional revenue for its military operations.

Democratic Senator Richard Blumenthal, who helped develop the sanctions legislation, criticised the diesel arrangement as contrary to Congress’s intention to strengthen economic pressure on Russia.

The decision also exposes a widening divergence between Washington and Brussels.

At the European Council meeting on Friday, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and European Council President António Costa reaffirmed that EU sanctions against Russia would remain in place until Moscow ended its war against Ukraine.

Costa declared that the present circumstances required increased pressure on Moscow rather than a relaxation of existing restrictions. The European Union is also preparing a 22nd sanctions package while considering additional financial support for Kyiv.

For Ukraine, the decision means that Russia will continue to benefit from energy exports and the international trade that helps finance its war. Instead of tightening restrictions on these revenues, Washington has suspended measures specifically intended to cut them.

The timing is particularly significant. While Trump is pressing Kyiv to halt attacks on Russian oil refineries and other energy facilities, Moscow continues its strikes against Ukrainian cities and civilian infrastructure. Zelenskyy has argued that Ukraine cannot be expected to stop targeting Russia’s energy sector while Russian attacks on Ukrainian infrastructure continue.

Although Trump can reinstate the sanctions, his decision removes the immediate threat of additional penalties against Russia and its principal energy customers. It also places Washington increasingly at odds with its European allies. Brussels remains committed to maintaining and expanding sanctions against Moscow, while the White House is now giving priority to reducing American fuel prices, even if that means easing economic pressure on Russia.

Brussels, 17 October, (Brussels Morning Newspaper) – Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has appealed to European Union leaders for an additional €70 billion in financial assistance for 2027, warning that Ukraine’s growing military expenditure threatens its ability to sustain … Read more

EU leaders have failed to settle their differences over the 2028–2034 budget, with Germany demanding further reductions to the proposed spending framework and the European Council taking charge of negotiations ahead of a difficult December deadline.

European Union leaders have ended their Brussels summit without agreement on the bloc’s next seven-year budget, after German Chancellor Friedrich Merz rejected the scale of spending envisaged under the latest compromise proposal and demanded deeper cuts.

The discussions on 15–16 October exposed the continuing division between governments determined to contain national contributions and those seeking to protect agricultural subsidies, regional development and new European investment programmes. The dispute now threatens the political timetable for approving the 2028–2034 Multiannual Financial Framework, the budget that will determine the Union’s spending priorities over the next seven years.

In their formal summit conclusions, leaders invited European Council President António Costa to take negotiations forward towards a timely agreement. No new spending settlement was endorsed, despite the Irish presidency having presented revised figures immediately before the summit.

Germany rejects the compromise

The European Commission originally proposed a framework approaching €2 trillion in current prices, arguing that Europe needed greater financial capacity to meet its growing responsibilities in defence, competitiveness, technological development, migration and external security.

Ireland, which holds the rotating Council presidency, submitted a revised negotiating document on 10 October intended to narrow the differences between governments. The latest proposal includes substantial reductions compared with the Commission’s initial ambitions while seeking to preserve financing for established EU programmes.

Those concessions have not satisfied Berlin. Merz argues that the Union must recognise the difficult fiscal position facing national governments and that the proposed increases in common spending remain excessive.

Germany, the largest contributor to the EU budget in absolute terms, has been working with other budget-conscious governments to seek reductions from the original Commission proposal.

EU Today reported on the proposed €141 billion in reductions, including the implications for defence and competitiveness funding.

The Irish compromise has done little to bridge the divide. The revised framework seeks to combine greater financial restraint with protection for agricultural and cohesion policies, while retaining significant investment in security, research and competitiveness.

Yet every attempt to rebalance the proposed spending exposes another political conflict.

Agriculture, cohesion and defence compete for funding

The Common Agricultural Policy and cohesion funding remain among the largest and most politically sensitive components of the EU budget. Agricultural payments support farmers across the Union, while cohesion programmes finance infrastructure, regional investment and economic development, particularly in less prosperous territories.

Governments benefiting heavily from those programmes are reluctant to accept reductions, particularly when national finances are already under pressure.

France, Italy and other countries defending traditional EU expenditure have therefore resisted attempts to transfer the burden of budget restraint disproportionately onto agriculture and regional support.

At the same time, the Commission has argued that the EU cannot simply preserve the spending structure of previous decades while promising a stronger role in European defence, industrial development and economic security.

The contradiction is increasingly apparent. European governments demand greater independence from external suppliers, stronger military capabilities and sustained financial support for Ukraine, yet remain unwilling to agree on the larger common budget that might help deliver those objectives.

Cuts to research, innovation, cross-border infrastructure or defence-industrial programmes would not necessarily produce immediate political costs. Their consequences would emerge later, through investments postponed, capabilities not developed and projects left dependent on national budgets.

Conversely, reducing agricultural payments or regional investment would produce more immediate resistance from farmers, local authorities and national governments.

The demands of 17 EU governments seeking to protect farm and cohesion spending illustrate the growing tension between established programmes and the Union’s newer strategic priorities.

A timetable becoming difficult to defend

The Council’s budget negotiations had been intended to deliver a political agreement before the end of 2026. That would leave 2027 for the European Parliament and member states to complete the legislation required for the new financial framework to operate from January 2028.

Failure to reach that timetable would not immediately stop EU expenditure. It would, however, compress the period available for completing the detailed legal arrangements underpinning individual programmes and could complicate the uninterrupted delivery of funding at the beginning of the next budget cycle.

The political environment is hardly favourable. Several governments face difficult domestic debates over public spending, taxation and the demands of European integration. In France, the approach of the 2027 presidential election adds another complication to negotiations requiring sensitive national concessions.

Agreement on the seven-year framework requires unanimity among member states, followed by the consent of the European Parliament. The latter has already argued that the EU needs sufficient financial resources to match the responsibilities its governments have assigned to it.

Costa now faces the task of converting competing national positions into a financial settlement that all 27 governments can accept. That will require decisions not only about the overall ceiling but also about the balance between national allocations and programmes managed at European level.

The Brussels summit has demonstrated that the principal disagreements remain unresolved. The next negotiating round will determine whether governments are prepared to compromise on spending priorities or whether their ambitions for a more capable European Union will once again run ahead of their willingness to finance it.

Brussels, 17 October, (Brussels Morning Newspaper) – European Union leaders have ended a two-day summit in Brussels without agreeing on the bloc’s next long-term budget, as disagreements over spending priorities, national contributions and financial reforms threaten to delay … Read more

Italy and five other member states have failed to secure a further postponement of the EU’s new carbon market for heating and transport fuels, although European leaders have ordered a fresh assessment of its impact on households and businesses.

European Union leaders have resisted demands for another postponement of carbon pricing for road transport and building fuels, exposing deep disagreements over climate policy, industrial competitiveness and the burden of energy costs on European households.

At the European Council summit in Brussels on 15–16 October, the Visegrad countries — Poland, Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic — pressed for the second European Emissions Trading System, known as ETS2, to be delayed until 2030. Italy and Greece joined calls for greater flexibility over carbon costs, although Rome also sought a national exemption from aspects of the energy-price regime rather than simply a uniform delay. No further postponement was agreed.

The European Council conclusions call on the European Commission to update its assessment of ETS2, particularly its design and safeguards. Leaders also demanded action to reduce volatility in the existing carbon market and limit the effect of carbon prices on electricity costs.

The outcome stops short of the further postponement sought by several governments, but demonstrates how far energy affordability has moved towards the centre of European climate negotiations.

The growing rebellion over ETS2

ETS2 is designed to extend the principle of carbon pricing to fuels used for heating buildings, road transport and certain smaller industrial activities. Unlike the existing Emissions Trading System, which covers large industrial installations and power generation, the new mechanism reaches sectors closely connected to everyday household expenditure.

Under the scheme, fuel suppliers must purchase allowances corresponding to the emissions associated with the fuels they sell. Households and motorists will not buy allowances themselves, but suppliers may pass those additional costs through to customers.

That distinction is fundamental. A policy designed to encourage investment in cleaner heating systems and vehicles may initially appear to consumers as an increase in petrol, diesel and domestic heating bills.

The current legislative timetable provides for ETS2 to become operational in 2028, following an earlier one-year postponement. The latest demands from several Central European governments would push that date back to 2030.

Their argument is that consumers and smaller businesses cannot reasonably be expected to absorb another source of energy-price pressure while European economies continue to contend with geopolitical uncertainty, expensive fuel and comparatively weak industrial competitiveness.

Czech Prime Minister Andrej Babiš has been particularly outspoken in his criticism, arguing that carbon pricing risks weakening Europe’s industrial base and making everyday life more expensive.

Italy has supported calls for greater flexibility, with Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni presenting the discussion as part of a wider attempt to restore competitiveness and make the transition more affordable.

Why other governments opposed another delay

The initiative encountered resistance from governments concerned that repeatedly postponing established climate legislation would weaken investment certainty and reduce confidence in European policy.

The Nordic member states have been particularly reluctant to reopen the timetable. Their position reflects a broader concern that businesses investing in clean technologies need credible long-term rules, rather than legislation liable to be revised whenever political opposition intensifies.

Carbon pricing is intended to change economic incentives gradually. Higher costs for carbon-intensive fuels are supposed to make alternatives such as better-insulated buildings, electric vehicles and cleaner heating more financially attractive.

Critics of further postponement argue that delaying implementation would also delay those incentives, potentially increasing the eventual cost of reaching the Union’s emissions-reduction targets.

Yet the opposition has exposed a weakness in that argument: consumers cannot always respond quickly to price signals. A household relying on an older heating system or a worker with no practical alternative to driving may face higher costs long before affordable low-carbon options become available.

That issue has been central to earlier discussions over ETS2. EU Today reported on stronger carbon-price safeguards in June, when European institutions moved to provide additional market intervention if allowance prices rose sharply.

Commission ordered to reassess the economic impact

Rather than endorsing a new delay, European leaders have asked the Commission to review ETS2’s economic impact and safeguards.

The summit also urged faster progress on adjustments to the Market Stability Reserve, the mechanism intended to help manage the supply of carbon allowances and prevent excessive price volatility.

Under the existing scheme, market interventions can increase or reduce allowance availability in response to defined conditions. For ETS2, safeguards are especially politically sensitive because the cost of carbon allowances may ultimately be reflected in household transport and heating expenditure.

The European Commission’s updated auction arrangements already envisage auctions of ETS2 allowances beginning in 2027, ahead of the system’s operational launch in 2028.

That timetable gives governments a relatively narrow window to settle the remaining political disputes and put protective measures into effect.

A central part of the response is the Social Climate Fund, intended to support vulnerable households, transport users and small businesses through investments in energy efficiency, cleaner heating, improved transport and temporary financial assistance.

EU Today previously examined the European Investment Bank’s €3 billion advance financing initiative, which aims to accelerate support for households before the new carbon market becomes fully operational.

The central practical question is whether such assistance reaches consumers quickly enough to offset rising costs, particularly in member states where incomes are lower and households remain heavily dependent on fossil fuels.

Climate commitments meet industrial reality

The ETS2 dispute is connected to a broader argument over Europe’s existing carbon market and its effects on energy-intensive industries.

Manufacturers already face substantial costs arising from electricity, fuel, regulatory requirements and international competition. Governments concerned about deindustrialisation argue that European climate policy must account more directly for these pressures.

The summit conclusions acknowledged those concerns by demanding a predictable carbon market that limits price volatility and protects industry against the relocation of production to jurisdictions with less demanding environmental rules.

At the same time, leaders reaffirmed the importance of maintaining carbon pricing as an incentive for investment and emissions reduction.

For the governments seeking a postponement, the Commission’s new assessment offers an opportunity to maintain pressure for further concessions. For governments defending the existing timetable, it provides an alternative to another politically damaging delay.

The immediate result is therefore a compromise over scrutiny rather than a change in law. ETS2 remains scheduled for 2028, while Brussels must demonstrate that its safeguards can withstand both market volatility and political opposition.

The next phase will be determined less by arguments about long-term emissions targets than by the ability of EU institutions and national governments to show households and businesses how the transition can be financed without placing disproportionate costs on those least able to adjust.