Beijing has proposed banning exports of the technology used to make next-generation solar cells, a move that could complicate United States technology guru Elon Musk’s plan to expand into space solar power. The ban, which covers production technology for perovskite and tandem solar cell modules, is part of a proposal by China’s Ministry of Commerce […]
The post China next-gen solar tech curb to impact SpaceX AI computing plan appeared first on Asia Times.
For years, the idea of speaking forthrightly to China would evoke an admonition from the US State Department and most of the American policymaking class: “We can’t do that. They won’t like it.” They’d often add, “China has red lines, don’t you know?” There are things you are told you just can’t say – questioning […]
The post Talking with China, say what you’re told you can’t say appeared first on Asia Times.
Russia wants America and China to decide Ukraine’s future without Kyiv. Europe must challenge this dangerous return to diplomacy of the strong for the strong
Does Vladimir Putin know exactly how to play Donald Trump? The history of chummy phone calls, high-profile meetings and attempts to bring Russia in from the cold certainly suggests that Moscow’s thuggish ruler has a hold on this American president. If Mr Trump agrees to negotiate Ukraine’s future with Mr Putin and China’s Xi Jinping without Ukraine at the table, he will have handed the Russian leader a victory before talks begin. The message will be that strongmen are ruling the world and determining the fate of weaker nations.
Ukraine has the right to determine its future. That right cannot be waved away by a self-serving Russian proposal, however much it indulges Mr Trump’s belief that world affairs should be settled by powerful men. The scales are falling from European eyes. Trumpian America is raising doubts about whether it will help deter aggression or even honour its Nato commitments. If Washington now rewards Moscow and pressures Ukraine to accept a raw deal, it would be a betrayal. European governments would wonder where America might be in the future when their own security is threatened.
Do you have an opinion on the issues raised in this article? If you would like to submit a response of up to 300 words by email to be considered for publication in our letters section, please click here.
Continue reading...
© Photograph: José Luis Magaña/AP
© Photograph: José Luis Magaña/AP
© Photograph: José Luis Magaña/AP
The proposals, scheduled for debate in Strasbourg on Monday, 19 October, and a vote on Tuesday, would strengthen coordination over strategic supplies and revise the responsibilities of European companies that depend on vulnerable international supply chains.
At the centre of the discussions is a proposal to establish a European Critical Raw Materials Centre, which would coordinate purchasing arrangements, assess supply risks and support the development of strategic reserves.
The initiative comes amid increasing concern over China’s dominant position in the processing and supply of several materials regarded as indispensable to European industry.
According to the European Parliament’s October plenary briefing, the proposed Critical Raw Materials Centre would operate as an EU body responsible for several functions currently distributed between European institutions and national authorities.
These would include identifying vulnerabilities in supply chains, conducting risk assessments, coordinating contingency stocks and supporting joint purchasing arrangements.
The objective is to give European governments and manufacturers greater capacity to respond to interruptions in supplies of minerals and processed materials that cannot easily be replaced.
The legislative report has been prepared by the Parliament’s Committee on Industry, Research and Energy, with Dutch Social Democrat MEP Mohammed Chahim serving as rapporteur.
The committee examined amendments to the existing legislation during 2026, with its revised report submitted for plenary consideration on 9th October.
Tuesday’s vote is intended to establish Parliament’s position for negotiations with the Council. It would not, by itself, constitute final adoption of the amended regulation.
The European Union depends heavily on imported critical raw materials, particularly those required for batteries, permanent magnets, semiconductors and specialist industrial equipment.
China occupies a particularly important position in the refining and processing of rare earth elements, graphite and several other materials used in high-technology manufacturing.
The concentration of production creates vulnerabilities because disruption at a single stage of processing can affect manufacturers operating across multiple European countries.
According to the Council of the European Union’s assessment of strategic mineral supplies, China is the principal supplier to the EU for numerous materials, including gallium, germanium, magnesium and rare earth elements.
These substances are used in applications extending well beyond electric vehicles.
Permanent magnets are required for certain electric motors, wind turbines and defence systems, while other critical materials are used in radar, satellites, aircraft components and advanced electronic equipment.
Restrictions affecting their availability can therefore have consequences for European industrial output, defence procurement and the development of new technology.
The question for EU policymakers is not simply whether minerals can be obtained, but whether Europe has sufficient alternative sources and processing capacity to withstand restrictions imposed by a dominant supplier.
The Critical Raw Materials Act entered into force in May 2024 and established benchmarks intended to strengthen European production and diversify imports by 2030.
Under the existing framework, the EU aims to develop extraction capacity equivalent to at least 10 per cent of its annual consumption of strategic raw materials, where geological reserves allow.
The corresponding benchmarks are 40 per cent for processing and 25 per cent for recycling.
The legislation also seeks to prevent any single non-EU country from supplying more than 65 per cent of the Union’s annual consumption of a particular strategic raw material at any relevant processing stage.
These are policy benchmarks rather than binding production quotas imposed on individual companies.
Their achievement depends on the development of mines, processing facilities and recycling operations, as well as the ability to attract investment.
New extraction projects frequently require lengthy environmental assessments, infrastructure development and extensive capital investment. Processing operations face additional challenges involving energy costs, technical expertise and commercial competitiveness.
Consequently, reducing import dependence involves more than identifying mineral deposits within European territory.
The proposed amendments also address the responsibilities of major European companies using strategic raw materials.
Under provisions examined by the parliamentary committee, the European Commission would take a greater role in identifying large manufacturers whose operations depend on strategically important supplies.
These companies could face requirements to assess vulnerabilities in their supply chains, including the geographical location of extraction and processing operations and the ownership of relevant facilities.
The arrangements would be particularly significant for businesses producing batteries, aircraft, drones, satellites, advanced chips and other products considered strategically important.
Where significant risks are identified, companies could be expected to consider measures including diversification, improved material efficiency or maintaining stocks.
The proposals also seek to strengthen recycling and the recovery of valuable materials from existing products, reducing the quantity of newly extracted resources required by European industry.
Recycling alone cannot remove the need for imports, particularly where demand for new technologies is increasing, but it can provide an additional source of supply.
The legislation forms part of a wider effort to link European industrial policy with economic security.
Brussels has been seeking additional raw materials partnerships with third countries, while manufacturers remain concerned about the commercial cost of building alternative supply chains.
Recent EU discussions concerning cooperation with Vietnam illustrate the emphasis being placed on securing alternative access to minerals such as tungsten and rare earth elements.
However, diversifying supplies does not necessarily mean transferring extraction and processing to Europe. Partnerships with reliable external producers may remain essential, particularly for materials unavailable in sufficient quantities within the Union.
The proposed European centre would therefore have to balance internal production, international purchasing, strategic stocks and commercial demand.
The immediate legislative issue is whether the revised framework gives European institutions sufficient powers to coordinate these activities without placing disproportionate administrative obligations on businesses.
Tuesday’s parliamentary vote will determine the negotiating position MEPs take into discussions with EU governments over how those responsibilities should be distributed.
By Peter VAN BUREN
Join us on Telegram
, X
, and VK
.
Contact us: info@strategic-culture.su
Critics of Trump’s diplomatic staffing don’t address why it’s important to have a top man on the ground in the Zoom era.
During my more than two decades at the State Department as a diplomat, my well-meaning mother often asked what I’d have to do to make ambassador. The answer was simple: Dad would have to die young, and Mom would then have to donate the whole estate to the winner of the next presidential election. Then I’d get appointed ambassador to a small, unimportant country. For so many reasons, I am glad Dad lived to a ripe old age, and that Mom looks forward to taking care of the Humane Society in her will instead. I would have made a terrible ambassador.
Since 1960, 72 percent of America’s ambassadors to desirable posts in Western Europe and the Caribbean have been political appointees like the recently departed Kimberly Guilfoyle, as I might have been if the plan with Mom had worked out. Their primary and often only qualification is spending big on the guy who won the presidency. Career diplomats on the other hand are often promoted as ambassador into politically less important hardship posts, no donation required. All must be confirmed by the Senate. The United States is unusual among developed democracies in the scale of political ambassadorial appointments. Unlike the U.S., most developed democracies, including Britain, Germany, Japan, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, reserve ambassadorships almost entirely for career diplomats.
So while the debate over political ambassadors versus career diplomats has gone on for more than a century, in 2026 the more interesting question may be whether we need ambassadors in every capital at all. What useful and productive thing was Guilfoyle doing in Greece anyway?
It is important to have a good person in the role; he acts as the personal representative of his country’s leader, in America’s case, answerable to the Oval Office. He receives confidential instructions from the White House before taking up his job abroad, and for many political ambassadors, can often pick up the phone and call the president and cabinet officials directly. I was in the room as a subject matter expert when ambassador Howard Baker simply picked up the phone and dialed Vice President Dick Cheney at his ranch in Wyoming and untied a significant bureaucratic knot that was burdening our relationship with Japan. This demonstrates something well-connected political ambassadors can uniquely do. On the other hand, communication inside an embassy can be problematic for political appointees; many Foreign Service Officers (FSO) see them as outsiders come to mess up their way of doing things and slow-walk ambassadorial initiatives because they are sure they know better. Political appointees, especially those taking leave from large businesses to serve, also tend to spend a lot of their time back in the U.S., creating friction with the staff.
In the American system, because most career ambassadors owe their own bottom-line allegiance (and pension) to the State Department, communication is often not that close and friendly with the Executive under most circumstances. A White House unsure of whether the State Department is even on its side will be unlikely to be reassured by a career ambassador in place, not to mention State’s long-standing institutional resistance to too many political appointees in general. Careerists usually do have strong host-country knowledge and maybe language skills. Some, however, can get too deep into the weeds on administrative, visa, or personnel matters a political appointee usually leaves to subordinates, and some use their new-found authority to settle old scores or pursue personal projects adjacent to core foreign policy.
The ambassadorial title remains the profession’s highest achievement. It would be surprising if ambitious FSOs did not aspire to it. But just being the most qualified for anything inside State is rarely enough. That leaves plenty of careerist yes-men around looking to get into an ambassador’s chair.
The struggle over who is better at the job, political appointees or careerists, will never conclusively end. It has been a factor of American diplomacy for decades, under all flavors of administrations. The mainstream media negatively focus on some of Trump’s ambassadorial choices, but to anyone familiar with diplomacy it is nothing more than another round in a century-old political argument.
The new question, unique to the second Trump administration, is whether or not the president should appoint anyone at all, career or political, to a particular ambassadorial job. Trump currently has 92 ambassadorial seats empty, with either the candidate stuck in the Senatorial confirmation process or the chair simply left vacant by Trump’s choice. The same number of empty offices at comparable points of their presidencies was only 54 under Biden, and 55 under the first Trump administration. A lot of the empties are in smaller countries of lesser political importance, but a few larger embassies stand out, including Egypt, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Germany. Some have pending nominees, some do not. Senate intransigence aside, this seems to be by choice. The real question is, however, how much it matters.
Any American embassy without an ambassador is led by a charge, someone temporarily in the ambassadorial role, typically the embassy’s deputy chief of mission (DCM). The DCM is usually a State Department career FSO, typically the most experienced and senior one at post, and often has done multiple tours in the country in subordinate roles. This seems like the kind of person State would want in charge, yet the American Foreign Service Association and most rank-and-file FSOs curiously complain about not having enough career officers in leadership roles. One wonders whether for some critics the temporary nature of the title itself has become too much the issue.
Things are complicated by the fact that until something goes wrong, most ambassadors work without real oversight. One of the criticisms in Dennis Jett’s excellent book American Ambassadors is the lack of standards and definitions of success for an ambassador. They report to the president after all, who is usually too busy to pay much attention to things on a day-to-day basis in Lesotho, no matter who the ambassador is. Underlings in the embassy by culture and negative experience tend to be sparse in their suggestions upward, and State has little of the military’s tradition of after-action summaries, tough lessons-learned reports, and sincere historical evaluation of mistakes. Ambassadors tend to choose their own path. Some try to be local celebrities, scoring photo-ops and ribbon-cuttings and hosting VIPs. Others focus near-exclusively on American business promotion abroad, while others remember their own days in the bureaucracy and dive deep into political or economic reporting. This all further complicates what is and is not a “good” ambassador. So do we really need them?
Some Democrats think so. Senator Jeanne Shaheen (D-NH), the Senate Foreign Relations Committee’s top Democrat, accused the administration of retreating from the world stage by leaving ambassadorial postings vacant. “China has ambassadors in nearly every country it has diplomatic relationships with, advancing its interests at the expense of America’s,” she said in a statement. Yet she and others rarely provide specific examples of what America’s ambassadors are doing or might be doing. Critics rarely identify policy outcomes that required a Senate-confirmed ambassador rather than a competent charge. That is the problem in these discussions, an unwavering belief that diplomatic presence is inherently valuable, even when its measurable effects are difficult to identify, and that if we’re not careful China will do it better. Remember of course the exact argument was made during the Cold War about the Soviet Union, leading the U.S. to open embassies in countries with little global importance, only to close them when priorities changed.
Ambassadors are increasingly curiosities left over from the 19th century, a past when Washington, DC, needed trusted representatives empowered to make decisions a world away. Embassies as they exist today were created for a world without Zoom, encrypted messaging, presidential and cabinet travel, celebrity special envoys, global media reporting, and easy direct leader-to-leader calls. It raises the question in 2026 that few people are willing to ask: If 92 embassies can function for months without ambassadors, how indispensable were those ambassadors in the first place?
Original article: www.theamericanconservative.com
Successive Australian governments have reacted with alarm at China’s influence-building activities in Southeast Asia and the Pacific. They have passed foreign interference laws, tightened foreign investment regulations, and regulated university collaborations with institutions overseas. They have executed a Pacific Step-Up and a plan for greater trade and investment with Southeast Asia. And they have tightened […]
The post What Australia could learn from SE Asia about managing China appeared first on Asia Times.
Indonesia has spent a decade trying to turn its mineral wealth into something more valuable than raw commodity exports. The strategy is ambitious: restrict raw nickel exports, attract investment, build processing capacity and move downstream into electric-vehicle (EV) batteries that will power the next generation of transport and energy storage. China is central to the […]
The post Owner or owned? Indonesia’s Chinese battery chain dilemma appeared first on Asia Times.
Non disponendo delle condizioni materiali necessarie per sfidare la supremazia industriale cinese, l’Unione Europea continua a trasformare le proprie difficoltà economiche in una giustificazione per una nuova escalation delle ostilità.
I leader europei sembrano aver individuato una nuova missione strategica: ricostruire la capacità industriale del continente riducendo al contempo la sua dipendenza dalla Cina. L’iniziativa è stata recentemente avanzata congiuntamente da Francia e Germania e viene presentata come una risposta alla crescente presenza della Cina sul mercato europeo. Il problema è che i leader responsabili di questo progetto continuano a ignorare una questione fondamentale: nessuna reindustrializzazione su larga scala può avere successo senza un approvvigionamento energetico stabile, abbondante e a prezzi accessibili.
L’Europa dispone di eccellenti università, di una forza lavoro qualificata, di centri tecnologici all’avanguardia e di una tradizione industriale che le conferisce ancora notevoli vantaggi. Tuttavia, queste risorse non possono funzionare in modo isolato. Gli impianti chimici, le acciaierie, gli stabilimenti metallurgici e numerose altre industrie dipendono da un approvvigionamento energetico continuo e competitivo. Il capitale, le conoscenze scientifiche e i lavoratori specializzati non possono compensare all’infinito i costi di produzione elevati. È proprio su questo punto che la strategia dell’Europa contraddice i propri stessi obiettivi.
Per decenni, l’integrazione economica tra l’Europa occidentale e la Russia ha fornito condizioni favorevoli allo sviluppo di importanti settori industriali. Le forniture di gas naturale russo, in particolare, hanno contribuito a sostenere attività ad alto consumo energetico. Questo rapporto ha soddisfatto gli interessi economici concreti di entrambe le parti: Mosca disponeva di un importante mercato per le proprie esportazioni, mentre le economie europee ottenevano una risorsa essenziale per la loro competitività.
L’introduzione delle sanzioni nel 2022 ha profondamente alterato questa situazione. Le misure coercitive illegali hanno reciso un partenariato di lunga data tra Russia ed Europa, lasciando la parte occidentale del continente economicamente indebolita e dipendente da approvvigionamenti energetici esterni più costosi e meno sicuri. L’Europa, che già prima di allora stava subendo una graduale deindustrializzazione, è successivamente precipitata in una crisi energetica, con conseguenze che vanno dall’aumento delle bollette energetiche ai fallimenti aziendali causati dall’incapacità di mantenere una produzione competitiva.
Sarebbe ragionevole aspettarsi che una strategia di ripresa industriale iniziasse affrontando queste vulnerabilità. Invece, i leader europei stanno tentando di costruire una nuova base produttiva senza risolvere adeguatamente il problema energetico. I responsabili della politica economica europea sembrano ritenere che sussidi, incentivi fiscali e programmi di investimento siano sufficienti a ripristinare la competitività. Tali strumenti possono contribuire allo sviluppo industriale, ma la loro efficacia rimarrà limitata fintantoché persisteranno gli svantaggi strutturali nei costi energetici.
È in questo contesto che la Cina sta assumendo una posizione sempre più di rilievo nella «lista delle preoccupazioni» di Bruxelles. La capacità della Cina di produrre su vasta scala, rifornire catene industriali complesse e offrire attrezzature a prezzi competitivi rappresenta una sfida per un’Europa che cerca di recuperare la propria autonomia produttiva. Anziché riconoscere la portata del declino accumulato e sviluppare una strategia coerente per invertire la tendenza, alcuni settori della leadership europea preferiscono ricorrere a barriere commerciali, indagini punitive e meccanismi di contenimento economico.
Tale approccio rivela una comprensione piuttosto superficiale della concorrenza industriale. Limitare le importazioni cinesi non comporta automaticamente la creazione di stabilimenti europei, né riduce i costi dell’elettricità, né garantisce l’approvvigionamento di gas agli impianti industriali. Al contrario, le aziende che dipendono da attrezzature, componenti e materie prime cinesi potrebbero trovarsi a dover sostenere spese più elevate proprio nel momento in cui hanno bisogno di investire per recuperare la propria posizione sui mercati internazionali.
La questione russa rende questa situazione ancora più delicata. Il ripristino della cooperazione energetica con Mosca costituirebbe il primo passo di qualsiasi serio piano di ripresa industriale. Grazie alle forniture energetiche russe e ad ampie partnership commerciali con la Cina, l’Europa potrebbe ritrovare una nuova strada verso lo sviluppo, proprio come stanno ora iniziando a fare i paesi africani e asiatici attraverso le loro partnership con la Russia e la Cina.
Bruxelles, Parigi e Berlino, tuttavia, si stanno muovendo nella direzione opposta. Gli strateghi europei sembrano determinati a confrontarsi contemporaneamente con due delle maggiori potenze industriali ed energetiche del mondo, senza dimostrare di possedere le risorse necessarie per sostenere tale ambizione. In primo luogo, hanno compromesso un rapporto energetico fondamentale con la Russia. Ora rischiano di trasformare la Cina in un avversario commerciale permanente.
In definitiva, ciò che i falchi europei perseguono non è lo sviluppo dell’Europa, bensì la strumentalizzazione di questioni quali l’industria e il commercio per portare avanti la propria agenda autodistruttiva. In base a questa strategia, i cittadini europei – già privati dell’energia russa e potenzialmente destinati a un accesso ridotto ai prodotti cinesi nel prossimo futuro – saranno ancora una volta i primi a subirne le conseguenze.
Glenn Diesen | October 18, 2026
Jennifer Kavanagh is a Senior Fellow and Director of Military Analysis at Defense Priorities and an Adjunct Professor at Georgetown University’s Center for Security Studies. Kavanagh discusses her policy paper advocating a US withdrawal from the First Island Chain to avoid war with China, and explains why it sparked such a strong reaction.
Follow Prof. Glenn Diesen:
Support the research by Prof. Glenn Diesen:
Buy Diesen merchandise: https://diesen-shop.fourthwall.com/en-nok
Nearly a month ago, we reported on a uniquely configured vessel that was far along in its construction at Hudong-Zhonghua Shipyard on Changxing Island in Shanghai. The intentions behind this design appeared to be as an uncrewed underwater vehicle (UUV) mothership, capable of deploying a handful of very large vehicles or many more smaller ones via its stern garage door and well deck. Its large pylons would be used to lift the vessels up and down out of the water and to different levels in the ship. Now it appears China has not just one, but two of these vessels nearly complete.
Make sure to read our initial report on this vessel configuration for full context by clicking here.
The new image was taken in Guangzhou and the vessel has a near identical shape, but with smaller proportions and minor changes to its overall moldline, compared to the larger one in Shanghai. This new vessel appears to be about a third smaller overall than its counterpart. The lift towers number six in total instead of six larger ones and six smaller ones on the Shanghai vessel. Regardless, the major design features are all there, including the flight deck and hangar behind the forward superstructure, the location of the smokestacks, and so on.
While two of these assets could still be considered largely intended for experimental use, a growing fleet would have increasing tactical and even strategic importance. Being able to easily launch and recover large numbers of UUVs, or a few very large ones, far from Chinese shores would provide an asymmetric capability. A fleet of ships that is dedicated to deploying, recovering, and tending to these systems, some of which can remain on patrol for very long periods, would be a major indication of how important China sees UUV operations as part of its future strategy.
There have been rumors that these vessels are part of a larger overall program that will see more ships with similar capabilities constructed. Once again, this would be a strong indication that these vessels’ utility will go beyond testing and limited operational use cases. The launch and recovery of large UUVs remains a conceptual work in progress for the U.S., with nothing similar in the U.S. Navy’s inventory, as we discussed in our original post.
Large long-range UUVs can be used for many tasks, from mapping the sea floor to hunting submarines and ships to searching for mines to launching cruise missiles and drones to being turned into immensely destructive weapons in their own right that can circumvent traditional strategic defenses. For China, providing a credible threat to America’s outposts deep in the Pacific and even the U.S. seaboard would be on the table.
There is speculation online as to where exactly this vessel was built. The first place that came to mind is Guangzhou Shipyard International’s (GSI) facilities on Longxue Island, just southeast of the city of Guangzhou. GSI is a subsidiary of the China State Shipbuilding Corporation (CSSC). It is here that many of China’s most unique vessels are born. These include drone test ships of various kinds, massive beach landing barges, and giant supply ships. Upon closer review of archival satellite imagery, we can say for certain that GSI did build this ship. An image from October 2nd shows it peeking out of a covered graving yard area at the facility prior to launch.
The emergence of two of these large UUV tenders in such a short period of time underscores China’s major bet on the technologies they will support. If more ships are added to the currently known fleet of two, a clearer picture of the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s large UUV plans, and its expeditionary potential, will come into focus.
Contact the author: Tyler@twz.com
The post Second Chinese Submarine Drone Mothership Emerges appeared first on TWZ.
In the three weeks since a health worker’s death in Siberia, officials have stonewalled the WHO – setting a worrying precedent for future pandemics
Is there a plague outbreak in Russia? If the answer were a clear yes, there shouldn’t be much reason to worry. With swift medical intervention, plague is treatable. But in the nearly three weeks since a worker at a Siberian plague research unit died of a mysterious respiratory illness, state officials have been consistently tight-lipped about what happened and whether there were any further cases.
It is this uncertainty that has the World Health Organization (WHO) and international community worried: partly because there is a – very small – risk of an outbreak, and partly because it is yet another warning that the international coordination we rely on to prevent pandemics is fraying along with the rest of international politics, and could easily fail to protect us in the future.
Continue reading...
© Photograph: Smirnov Vladimir/Anadolu/Getty Images
© Photograph: Smirnov Vladimir/Anadolu/Getty Images
© Photograph: Smirnov Vladimir/Anadolu/Getty Images
The second energy crisis in less than five years — both triggered by wars, first in Ukraine and then in the Middle East — is dismantling resistance to a shift away from fossil fuels. Month by month the debate over electrification gains momentum: powering economic sectors that still rely on coal, oil, and gas with electricity. If there were few arguments left —environmental, economic, and strategic autonomy — in favor of a rapid electrification, gasoline and diesel prices in Europe have delivered the final blow.
© ABEDIN TAHERKENAREH (EFE)
L’Iran e il Pakistan sono fortemente impegnati nella costruzione di un ordine finanziario post-americano nel punto di incontro tra l’Asia occidentale e l’Asia meridionale.
Andiamo subito al nocciolo della questione: dopo aver esaminato attentamente la scacchiera, la leadership politica e militare di Teheran è già giunta alla conclusione che un attacco congiunto statunitense-israeliano, la cui pianificazione procede a ritmo frenetico, sia inevitabile.
Pertanto, si sono ora posizionati come un cobra arrotolato, pronto a colpire e a iniettare veleno letale al primo sentore di una minaccia imminente da parte del Sindacato di Epstein – senza nemmeno attendere un attacco effettivo.
L’offensiva preventiva, già delineata, sarà devastante, estendendosi oltre le basi statunitensi nell’Asia occidentale ad altri obiettivi regionali e includendo potenzialmente le infrastrutture energetiche del Golfo e i cavi sottomarini (in questo caso con ripercussioni che interesseranno soprattutto il Golfo e l’India, molto più che gli Stati Uniti e l’Europa).
Ci troviamo in una situazione di pericolo chiaro e imminente: una mossa militare statunitense-israeliana intesa come pressione sarà certamente interpretata a Teheran come l’inizio di un attacco.
Pertanto, la pressione bellica esercitata dal «culto della morte» e da Trump si scontra ora con una soglia di tolleranza iraniana pericolosamente bassa. Le opzioni di attacco del Pentagono spaziano dagli impianti nucleari iraniani alle infrastrutture energetiche.
Va da sé che il «sociopatico in capo» – già in preda al panico per l’imminente debacle delle elezioni di medio termine – sia una facile preda della potente lobby sionista e dei suoi finanziatori favorevoli alla guerra. Il pericolo strategico supremo è quindi che questa pressione incessante possa produrre un segnale che Teheran interpreti come un attacco imminente, anche se Washington sostiene pubblicamente che non vi sarà alcun attacco prima delle elezioni di medio termine.
Lo Yemen sta portando la situazione a un livello superiore
Parallelamente, fonti privilegiate a Islamabad confermano il successo di un test missilistico pakistano a Mach 7, con una gittata di diverse migliaia di chilometri. Questa nuova capacità ha tutte le carte in regola per alterare concretamente l’equilibrio di potere in Asia occidentale, rafforzando la portata deterrente del Pakistan e la sua capacità di influenzare ogni calcolo di sicurezza regionale, oltre ad accrescere la sempre più profonda interconnessione del Pakistan con la Cina, l’Iran e le petro-monarchie del Golfo.
Ed ora un’altra esclusiva: membri dei servizi di intelligence militare israeliani, tra cui un generale di divisione, hanno lasciato Riyadh dopo che MbS, in un presunto momento di lucidità, ha detto «No» all’offerta di «assistenza» da parte del culto della morte. Eppure, più di 100 membri del personale del CENTCOM rimangono sul posto.
La decisione di MbS potrebbe essergli stata imposta dalla Turchia e dal Pakistan – gli altri due firmatari dell’Alleanza di Difesa della Mecca, che si sono improvvisamente ritrovati nella stessa sala operativa a Riyadh fianco a fianco con agenti del culto della morte.
Ora, la loro partenza potrebbe aver eliminato un rischio di escalation, ma gli agenti statunitensi rimangono esposti: qualsiasi attacco, da qualunque parte provenga, che causi vittime tra le forze statunitensi trascinerà immediatamente Washington nella guerra tra Arabia Saudita e Ansarallah.
La guerra tra Arabia Saudita e Ansarallah, infatti, sta raggiungendo il livello successivo: quello della volatilità. Il mix esplosivo costituito dall’intercettazione di un missile da crociera sopra la provincia di Medina, dalle intercettazioni di droni in altre zone dell’Arabia Saudita e dagli attacchi missilistici delle Forze Armate yemenite contro il complesso presidenziale del governo fantoccio di Aden è solo l’inizio.
Ciò che è accaduto dopo che Ansarallah ha preso di mira Najran – una delle province meridionali dell’Arabia Saudita sottratte allo Yemen nel 1934 dagli inglesi – è un fatto che suscita grande stupore.
Un portavoce saudita ha accusato Ansarallah di aver lanciato un missile da crociera contro Medina. La risposta dell’iconico portavoce delle Forze Armate yemenite, il generale Yahya Saree, è stata devastante: «Oggi non abbiamo condotto alcuna operazione militare contro il territorio saudita. Pertanto, l’affermazione del nemico saudita secondo cui Medina sarebbe stata presa di mira è una vera e propria invenzione e una grave menzogna».
Traduzione: lo Yemen colpisce una delle sue ex province; i sauditi ricorrono a una notizia totalmente falsa, inventando un attacco a una delle due moschee sacre – senza dubbio come preparazione per un’operazione sotto falsa bandiera; poi lo Yemen nega prontamente di aver colpito qualsiasi (corsivo mio) territorio saudita.
Ciò significa che Sana’a sta dichiarando in modo sottile, affinché tutti possano comprenderlo, di non condurre più operazioni all’estero (il corsivo è mio) nelle tre province: Jizan, Najran e Asir. Sta già – psicologicamente e operativamente – preparando il terreno per recuperare il proprio territorio sottratto.
Tutto ciò si sintetizza in questa concisa analisi proveniente dallo Yemen sulla decostruzione della sfarzosa Casa dei Saud:
«Lo Yemen sta minando i pilastri estremamente fragili dell’economia non petrolifera su cui i “pirati del deserto” hanno riposto tutte le loro speranze: immagine, investimenti (FDI), evasione dalla realtà, nonché impunità e invulnerabilità nei confronti del terrorismo proveniente dall’estero».
Come Pakistan e Iran aggirano il FMI
Prestino ora attenzione a un fatto piuttosto sorprendente avvenuto a metà settimana a Bangkok, durante la riunione annuale del FMI e della Banca Mondiale – debitamente accolta da proteste di piazza in Thailandia.
Il governatore della Banca Centrale iraniana, Abdolnaser Hemmati, ha incontrato il governatore della Banca Centrale pakistana, Jameel Ahmad, a margine del principale rituale annuale in lode del dollaro statunitense.
Il Pakistan è sottoposto alla ferrea morsa degli adeguamenti strutturali imposti dal FMI e dalla Banca Mondiale – e, come se non bastasse, è minacciato dalle sanzioni statunitensi perché intrattiene rapporti commerciali con l’Iran.
Pertanto, il fatto che Pakistan e Iran stiano di fatto discutendo della de-dollarizzazione proprio all’interno della tana del leone – il tempio del dollaro statunitense – è di un valore inestimabile.
L’infrastruttura è operativa dal 2023, grazie a un accordo di swap valutario che utilizza il rial e la rupia al posto del dollaro statunitense. Il baratto è gestito da entrambe le Banche Centrali, mentre i canali bancari passano attraverso la Bank Melli in Iran e la Bank Mellat in Pakistan. I loro mercati di confine – almeno sei – sono in forte espansione: rotte commerciali fisiche che aggirano completamente il dollaro statunitense.
Ciò di cui si è discusso a Bangkok all’inizio di questa settimana è come espandere l’intero sistema: non gliene importa nulla delle sanzioni secondarie statunitensi. Soprattutto perché Teheran sta offrendo a Islamabad ciò che il sistema americano semplicemente non può offrire: sovranità, nessun cambio di regime, nessuna austerità, nessuna lezione e, soprattutto, nessun aggiustamento strutturale.
Senza contare che il Pakistan ha un disperato bisogno del gas iraniano – e delle rotte commerciali della Nuova Via della Seta promosse dalla Cina.
L’Iran ha costruito un’intera economia aggirando completamente il FMI – e in grado di sopravvivere a uno tsunami di sanzioni, a un blocco e alla guerra.
Ora l’Iran e il Pakistan sono impegnati a fondo nella costruzione di un ordine finanziario post-americano all’incrocio tra l’Asia occidentale e l’Asia meridionale – completo di swap valutari, commercio di baratto, mercati di confine in forte espansione e canali bancari adeguati, che rendono le sanzioni secondarie una farsa.
A proposito, ciò sta avvenendo proprio mentre un immenso treno iraniano, carico di petrolio greggio – e il primo di molti – è pronto a partire alla volta della… Cina attraverso l’Asia centrale, sulla ferrovia della Nuova Via della Seta costruita dalla Cina.
Il cobra arrotolato potrebbe essere pronto a colpire. Ma il cobra, da tempo immemorabile, ama anche fare affari.
L’Iran et le Pakistan sont pleinement engagés dans la construction d’un ordre financier post-américain à la croisée du Moyen-Orient et de l’Asie du Sud.
Allons droit au cœur du sujet : après avoir soigneusement examiné l’échiquier, les dirigeants politiques et militaires de Téhéran sont déjà parvenus à la conclusion qu’une attaque conjointe américano-israélienne, dont la planification avance à un rythme effréné, est inévitable.
Ils se positionnent donc désormais comme un cobra lové, prêt à frapper et à injecter son venin mortel au premier signe d’une menace imminente du syndicat Epstein — sans même attendre une attaque effective.
Cette offensive préventive, dont les contours sont déjà tracés, sera dévastatrice ; elle s’étendra au-delà des bases américaines au Moyen-Orient vers d’autres cibles régionales, et pourrait notamment inclure les infrastructures énergétiques du Golfe ainsi que les câbles sous-marins (ce qui, dans ce cas, affecterait principalement le Golfe et l’Inde, bien plus que les États-Unis et l’Europe).
Nous sommes en présence d’un danger clair et immédiat : une opération militaire américano-israélienne destinée à exercer une pression sera certainement interprétée à Téhéran comme le début d’une attaque.
Ainsi, la pression en faveur de la guerre exercée par le «culte de la mort» et par Trump se heurte désormais à un seuil de tolérance iranien dangereusement bas. Les options de frappe du Pentagone vont des installations nucléaires iraniennes aux infrastructures énergétiques.
Il va sans dire que le «sociopathe en chef» — déjà en pleine panique face à la débâcle imminente des élections de mi-mandat — est une proie facile pour le puissant lobby sioniste pro-guerre et ses donateurs. Le danger stratégique suprême réside donc dans le fait que cette pression incessante puisse envoyer un signal que Téhéran interpréterait comme une attaque imminente, même si Washington affirme publiquement qu’aucune frappe n’aura lieu avant les élections de mi-mandat.
Le Yémen fait passer la situation à un niveau supérieur
Parallèlement, des sources privilégiées à Islamabad confirment le succès d’un essai de missile pakistanais à Mach 7, d’une portée de plusieurs milliers de kilomètres. Cette nouvelle capacité a tout ce qu’il faut pour modifier concrètement l’équilibre des pouvoirs au Moyen-Orient, en renforçant la portée dissuasive du Pakistan et sa capacité à influencer tous les calculs de sécurité régionaux, tout en approfondissant les liens du Pakistan avec la Chine, l’Iran et les pétro-monarchies du Golfe.
Et voici une autre exclusivité : des membres des services de renseignement militaire israéliens, notamment un général de division, ont quitté Riyad après que MbS, dans un prétendu moment de lucidité, eut dit «non» à l’offre d’»assistance» de la secte de la mort. Et pourtant, plus de 100 membres du CENTCOM sont toujours sur place.
La décision de MbS lui a peut-être été imposée par la Turquie et le Pakistan — les deux autres signataires de l’Alliance de défense de La Mecque, qui se sont soudainement retrouvés dans la même salle de crise à Riyad, côte à côte avec des agents de la secte de la mort.
Si leur départ a peut-être écarté un risque d’escalade, les agents américains restent révélés : toute frappe, d’où qu’elle vienne, faisant des victimes américaines entraînera immédiatement Washington dans la guerre entre l’Arabie saoudite et Ansarallah.
La guerre entre l’Arabie saoudite et Ansarallah atteint en effet un nouveau niveau de volatilité. Le mélange explosif constitué par l’interception d’un missile de croisière au-dessus de la province de Médine, les interceptions de drones ailleurs en Arabie saoudite et les frappes de missiles des forces armées yéménites contre le complexe présidentiel du gouvernement fantoche d’Aden n’est qu’un début.
Ce qui s’est passé après qu’Ansarallah a pris pour cible Najran — l’une des provinces du sud de l’Arabie saoudite volées au Yémen en 1934 par les Britanniques — est tout à fait stupéfiant.
Un porte-parole saoudien a accusé Ansarallah d’avoir lancé un missile de croisière sur Médine. La réponse du porte-parole emblématique des forces armées yéménites, le général Yahya Saree, a été cinglante : «Nous n’avons mené aucune opération militaire visant le territoire saoudien aujourd’hui. Par conséquent, l’affirmation de l’ennemi saoudien selon laquelle Médine aurait été prise pour cible est une pure invention et un mensonge grave».
Traduction : le Yémen frappe l’une de ses anciennes provinces ; les Saoudiens se lancent dans des fausses informations à outrance, inventant de toutes pièces une attaque contre l’une des deux mosquées sacrées — sans doute en préparation d’une opération sous faux pavillon ; puis le Yémen nie aussitôt avoir frappé quelque (italiques de ma part) territoire saoudien.
Cela signifie que Sanaa déclare subtilement, pour que tout le monde comprenne, qu’elle ne mène plus d’opérations à l’étranger (italiques de ma part) sur les trois provinces : Jizan, Najran et Asir. Elle prépare déjà — psychologiquement et opérationnellement — le terrain pour récupérer son territoire volé.
Tout cela se résume dans cette analyse yéménite succincte de la déconstruction de la fastueuse Maison des Saoud :
«Le Yémen sape les piliers ultra-fragiles de l’économie non pétrolière sur lesquels les pirates du désert ont fondé tous leurs espoirs : l’image, les investissements (IDE), l’évasion de la réalité, ainsi que l’impunité et l’invulnérabilité face au terrorisme à l’étranger».
Comment le Pakistan et l’Iran contournent le FMI
Prêtez maintenant attention à un événement assez surprenant qui s’est produit en milieu de semaine à Bangkok, lors de la réunion annuelle du FMI et de la Banque mondiale — dûment accueillie par des manifestations de rue en Thaïlande.
Le gouverneur de la Banque centrale d’Iran, Abdolnaser Hemmati, a rencontré le gouverneur de la Banque centrale du Pakistan, Jameel Ahmad, en marge de ce rituel annuel de premier plan à la gloire du dollar américain.
Le Pakistan est soumis à la poigne de fer des ajustements structurels imposés par le FMI et la Banque mondiale — et, pour couronner le tout, menacé de sanctions américaines parce qu’il entretient des relations commerciales avec l’Iran.
Le fait que le Pakistan et l’Iran discutent de facto de la dédollarisation au cœur même de la tanière du lion — le temple du dollar américain — n’a donc pas de prix.
L’infrastructure est en place depuis 2023, grâce à un accord de swap de devises utilisant le rial et la roupie à la place du dollar américain. Le troc est géré par les deux banques centrales, et les flux bancaires transitent par la Banque Melli en Iran et la Banque Mellat au Pakistan. Leurs marchés frontaliers — au moins six d’entre eux — sont en plein essor : des routes commerciales physiques qui contournent complètement le dollar américain.
Ce dont ils discutaient à Bangkok en début de semaine, c’est la manière d’étendre ce système : ils se moquent éperdument des sanctions secondaires américaines. D’autant plus que Téhéran offre à Islamabad ce que le système américain ne peut tout simplement pas offrir : la souveraineté, pas de changement de régime, pas d’austérité, pas de leçons de morale et, surtout, pas d’ajustement structurel.
Sans compter que le Pakistan a cruellement besoin du gaz iranien — et des routes commerciales de la nouvelle Route de la soie rendues possibles par la Chine.
L’Iran a bâti toute une économie en contournant complètement le FMI — et capable de survivre à un tsunami de sanctions, à un blocus et à la guerre.
Aujourd’hui, l’Iran et le Pakistan sont en pleine construction d’un ordre financier post-américain à la croisée du Moyen-Orient et de l’Asie du Sud — avec des swaps de devises, du troc, des marchés frontaliers en plein essor et des canaux bancaires adaptés, tournant ainsi en dérision les sanctions secondaires.
Soit dit en passant, cela se produit au moment même où un immense train iranien, chargé de pétrole brut — et le premier d’une longue série —, s’apprête à partir pour… la Chine via l’Asie centrale, sur la ligne ferroviaire de la «nouvelle Route de la soie» construite par la Chine.
Le cobra lové est peut-être prêt à frapper. Mais le cobra, depuis des temps immémoriaux, adore aussi faire des affaires.
Traduction: Reseau International
By Katie FORSTER
Join us on Telegram, X, and VK.
Contact us: info@strategic-culture.su
STARK warnings from artificial intelligence researchers that advanced forms of the technology could wipe out humanity have raised questions over whether governments are moving fast enough to regulate it.
What are the potential dangers of “superintelligent” computer systems, and should we be worried?
In 2023, hundreds of AI scientists and industry figures, including the heads of top US labs, signed a “statement on AI extinction risk” calling for the issue to be treated as seriously as pandemics or nuclear war.
If an out-of-control future AI deems that humans are obstructing its goals, it could use robots to “synthesise and spread novel pathogens”, said Stuart Russell, computer science professor at the University of California, Berkeley.
Or it could “convince people to initiate nuclear war, including by hacking into early warning systems”, Russell, a prominent voice on AI safety, said.
Such existential fears do not concern current AI systems, he said. But as the technology improves, it could take lethal action beyond our understanding, such as by removing oxygen from the atmosphere.
“We are less intelligent than superintelligent AI. If you ask chimpanzees how humans could wipe them out, they probably wouldn’t be able to give you all the right answers.”
In the meantime, “in the next year or two, I think the risk is higher from human misuse”, Russell added, such as an AI-enabled terror attack.
“The stakes are well-understood,” Jacob Coxon, a 27-year-old researcher, wrote on X last week, announcing his resignation from US AI startup Anthropic.
“But they are locked in a race to get there first,” he added, saying that Anthropic “believes no one else will act responsibly, so they must do it themselves”.
Anthropic this year removed a pledge from its safety charter to halt development of its models if it failed to control their risks.
It argued that if it unilaterally paused its work, its less cautious rivals would dominate the industry, making it less safe overall.
“The people building AI earnestly believe that it could kill us all by the end of the decade,” said Coxon, who previously worked at ChatGPT maker Open-AI.
He accused both companies of “gambling with our lives” as they strive to develop AI models capable of self-improvement.
Fears are heightened over rogue AI after OpenAI technology operating outside human supervision hacked into Hugging Face, a repository of AI models.
“We really do earnestly believe AI could kill all humans!” Anthropic safety executive Evan Hubinger chimed in on X, estimating the risk at more than 10 per cent over the next decade.
It’s important to remember that doom-laden percentage predictions are “absolutely unscientific”, said Hussein Abbass, a computing professor at UNSW Canberra.
“The situation is still controllable, and it can be managed,” Abbass said.
But governments should not sit on their hands when it comes to regulating AI, he added, urging an “agile” approach as AI development accelerates.
Both Anthropic and OpenAI are expected to go public soon, and some sceptics say scary warnings make AI appear powerful and worthy of large investments.
Others argue that focusing on the risk of extinction distracts from more pressing problems caused by AI, from job losses to machines discriminating against minorities.
In July, more than 1,000 tech employees, including Anthropic’s CEO, called on Washington to support a coordinated slowdown in the development of the most advanced AI systems.
OpenAI halted training of its latest models for two weeks in August before resuming it under tighter controls.
The United States has been firmly against global regulation of the sector that could stifle innovation.
But the hacking capabilities of the most cutting-edge models have given Washington pause, with recent Anthropic and OpenAI releases delayed over national security concerns.
Even then, “we don’t want to restrict them where all of a sudden we come in second to China”, President Donald Trump has said.
“Maybe it will take a massive, Chernobyl-scale disaster to get governments to act,” Russell said, urging them to establish a licensing regime for AI, as exists with aviation, medicine or water supply.
“Perhaps at some point governments will remember that their voters prefer not to be dead.”
Original article: www.nst.com.my
Login