British and Gulf officials have called on businesses and investors to begin turning a landmark free trade agreement into concrete partnerships without waiting for its formal ratification, as both sides seek to deepen economic ties and expand cooperation beyond traditional trade.

The calls came during the UK-GCC Strategic Dialogue Forum, organised by The Business Year in central London on Tuesday, bringing together senior officials, representatives of Gulf sovereign wealth funds and private sector companies to explore investment opportunities arising from the agreement.

The UK became the first G7 economy to conclude negotiations on a free trade deal with the six-member Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) on 20 May 2026, when the British government announced that talks had been completed following nearly four years of negotiations that began in June 2022.

However, the agreement has yet to be formally signed and ratified, with both sides still working to finalise and legally verify its text before completing the necessary government and parliamentary procedures.

While the deal is not yet legally in force, officials at the forum stressed that businesses could already begin identifying investment opportunities, building partnerships and preparing projects that could benefit from improved market access once it takes effect.

GCC Secretary-General Jasem Mohamed Albudaiwi described the agreement as a "significant achievement" in relations between Britain and the Gulf states, stressing that its importance extended well beyond the immediate benefits of trade.

Speaking at the forum, Albudaiwi said the agreement would strengthen economic partnerships, support diversification efforts and improve competitiveness across the Gulf economies, which have increasingly sought to reduce their dependence on oil revenues.

"GCC estimates put total investment between the two sides at $643 billion, while bilateral trade reached approximately $70 billion in 2025," he said.

The agreement is expected to eliminate tariffs on more than 90% of GCC exports to the UK, opening new opportunities for businesses and strengthening the Gulf's position as a major economic partner for Britain.

"The deal would support the GCC's wider economic objectives, including greater economic integration, diversification of production, improving the business environment and empowering the private sector," Albudaiwi said.

He highlighted opportunities in developing smart cities, sustainable living and attracting leading international technology companies, alongside cooperation in healthcare, financial technology, artificial intelligence, advanced manufacturing and clean energy.

These sectors have become increasingly important to Gulf economic transformation plans, as governments seek to attract international expertise, develop new industries and create sources of growth beyond oil and gas.

The GCC chief stressed that the success of the agreement would ultimately be measured not simply by its signing, but by the joint ventures, business partnerships and economic opportunities it generated.

He urged business leaders and investors from both sides to seize the opportunities offered by the agreement and begin translating its provisions into practical projects.

UK pledges support amid regional uncertainty

British Trade Minister Lord Anas Sarwar echoed those calls, urging businesses not to wait until the agreement had been formally signed and ratified before exploring new partnerships.

Addressing the forum, Sarwar acknowledged that the Gulf was experiencing a "nervous time" and a "time of challenge", offering assurances of Britain's continued support for its regional partners.

"It is in difficult times that you know where your friends are," he said, explaining that his first overseas visit as trade minister had been to the Gulf.

Sarwar stressed that the partnership was important to the British government and could contribute to economic growth and improved living standards across the UK.

He described the relationship as being about more than signing an agreement, calling for immediate cooperation across sectors including aviation, security systems, financial services and legal services.

He also highlighted opportunities in artificial intelligence and digital infrastructure, pointing to Britain's research capabilities and the Gulf's access to energy and resources needed to support the expansion of data centres and cloud computing infrastructure.

Such cooperation could allow British companies to contribute technical expertise and specialist services to major Gulf development projects, while creating opportunities for Gulf investors to expand their involvement in Britain's technology and infrastructure sectors.

Sarwar said economic cooperation needed to work in both directions, with Britain seeking not only greater Gulf investment in the UK but also increased British investment and exports into Gulf markets.

He also encouraged businesses to explore joint investments in third countries, arguing that UK-Gulf cooperation should extend beyond bilateral projects.

Lord Mayor of London Alderman Sir Alastair King similarly highlighted the potential for British and Gulf investors to combine their resources and expertise to pursue opportunities in other international markets.

The UK hopes the agreement will encourage larger and more sustained flows of Gulf capital into British infrastructure, property and other strategic sectors, while opening one of the world's most important markets to British exporters.

The emphasis on joint investment also reflects a broader ambition to move beyond conventional trade in goods and services towards longer-term partnerships involving technology, infrastructure development and international projects.

Four years of negotiations

GCC chief negotiator Raja Almarzoqi expressed optimism about the agreement's long-term economic benefits, revealing that negotiators from both sides had held approximately 900 meetings before reaching an agreement.

He said one of the most challenging aspects of the negotiations had been securing a unified position among the GCC's six member states, which have different economic priorities and domestic interests.

Almarzoqi cited studies by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund suggesting that free trade agreements could increase trade between participating countries by 60% to 100% over five to ten years after implementation.

He expressed confidence that the UK-GCC agreement could deliver similar results, although the scale of any increase would depend on how businesses used the opportunities created by the deal.

Kuwait's Trade Minister Abdulaziz Naser Almarzouq also emphasised the importance of economic diversification, saying Gulf countries were seeking high-quality investments capable of supporting sustainable long-term growth.

He described Britain as a strong economic partner and called for existing relations to be expanded through new investment opportunities.

Discussions at the forum also focused on financial markets, investment and the Gulf states' economic transformation strategies, including Oman's efforts to diversify away from an energy-dependent economy.

The free trade agreement is expected to provide British companies with greater long-term access to Gulf markets while giving GCC businesses improved opportunities to expand their activities in the UK.

For businesses, the potential benefits extend beyond tariff reductions to opportunities for new commercial relationships, investment planning and greater participation in sectors targeted for growth by both sides.

However, the agreement's practical benefits will depend on its final provisions, implementation and the extent to which companies are able to take advantage of the new arrangements.

Although the main terms were agreed in May, the final legal text must still be completed and verified before the agreement can be signed. It will then need to undergo the necessary approval procedures in Britain and the GCC states, including parliamentary scrutiny in the UK.

TEHRAN, Oct. 20 (MNA) – Arab media have claimed that the United States and Iran have given their preliminary approval to a fresh 'compromise proposal' presented by Pakistan and Qatar.

The EU “will not drill and will not buy” Arctic oil and gas, EU officials said on Tuesday (20 October), as the European Commission presented its new Arctic strategy. 

“Our position on Arctic oil, gas and coal has not changed,” a senior EU official told reporters. “It’s fairly simple. We will not drill in the Arctic, and we will not buy hydrocarbons from the Arctic.”

The strategy follows months of heavy lobbying by Norway’s prime minister Jonas Gahr Støre and his cabinet. 

Oslo used the energy supply disruption caused by the Iran war to push the EU to drop its 2021 support for a moratorium on oil and gas drilling in the Arctic, insisting that it was crucial for future energy security. 

But EU officials made clear on Tuesday they did not buy that argument. “We do not need Arctic resources to keep our energy supply secure,” the official said.

What happened to the moratorium?

This article continues, but the full version is available only to EUobserver.com subscribers. Visit account.euobserver.com/membership

No hay forma de luchar contra el Imperio sin eludir su control sobre el sistema financiero internacional.

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Ya se ha desatado el caos a la hora de investigar qué está ocurriendo exactamente en relación con los últimos movimientos, sin duda turbios y vinculados a EE. UU., en territorio y aguas pakistaníes. Tras una evaluación inicial en Transition Protocol —que, como se reconoció, no proporcionó todas las respuestas necesarias—, profundizamos en un análisis mucho más exhaustivo respaldado por varias fuentes.

Lo que estamos observando en varios puntos clave de la conexión terrestre entre Irán y Pakistán, de extrema sensibilidad, no es un cierre total de la frontera, sino un delicado equilibrio de doble vía por parte de Islamabad entre la tremenda presión financiera de Washington y el salvavidas estratégico de Teherán.

Así que esta es la situación actual, combinando los datos contrastados con nuestras últimas consultas.

El punto clave: el detonante normativo fue una medida de sanciones bancarias, no solo la seguridad fronteriza.

Aunque los responsables provinciales de Baluchistán justificaron públicamente el sábado el cierre de dos puntos clave —Taftan y Gabd–Rimdan— alegando motivos de seguridad, lucha contra el terrorismo y lucha contra el contrabando, lo que más importa es el mecanismo exacto en torno a un memorándum emitido el viernes pasado por el Ministerio de Comercio pakistaní.

Dicho memorándum revocó de inmediato una prórroga, concedida el 3 de octubre, de la exención del Formulario Electrónico de Importación (EIF, en inglés) para mercancías importadas de Irán, y coincidió con la orden de Islamabad de cerrar el puesto de inmigración de la Agencia Federal de Investigación (FIA, en inglés) en Taftan.

Lo fundamental es que, sin la exención del EIF, los importadores pakistaníes deben tramitar las compras iraníes a través de los canales bancarios oficiales de Pakistán —lo que, por supuesto, las sanciones estadounidenses hacen absolutamente imposible.

Peyman Sanandaji, presidente de la Comisión de Transporte de la Cámara de Comercio de Teherán, confirmó oficialmente que ha sido el cumplimiento de las sanciones bancarias (el abandono del EIF) lo que ha paralizado las exportaciones iraníes a Pakistán.

El impacto inmediato en los pasos fronterizos oficiales fue considerable: están en peligro más de 4.000 toneladas de importaciones diarias de GLP iraní a través de Gabd–Rimdan. El expresidente de la Cámara de Comercio de Quetta, Ayoub Miryani, informó de que solo en Gabd–Rimdan hay más de 2.000 contenedores varados, con cientos de camiones de mercancías más atascados en Taftan.

¿Por qué está ocurriendo esto ahora? Debido a la nefasta coincidencia entre el pago del tramo del FMI del 7 de octubre que Pakistán tenía que abonar y la «Operación Economic Outcast» del Tesoro imperial estadounidense.

En el marco de la «Operación Economic Outcast», Washington dio a terceros países un «plazo definido para cerrar» las vías de suministro comerciales relacionadas con Irán o enfrentarse a la expulsión del sistema financiero estadounidense. A esto le siguieron las designaciones de la OFAC del 1 de octubre contra las redes ferroviarias terrestres e industriales de Irán y las medidas del 8 de octubre contra 17 petroleros de la «flota en la sombra».

Pero entonces, el 7 de octubre —solo nueve días antes de que el Ministerio de Comercio revocara la exención del EIF—, Islamabad llegó a un acuerdo con el FMI sobre la cuarta revisión de su Servicio Ampliado del Fondo para desbloquear 1.210 millones de dólares. Esto aún requiere la aprobación del Consejo Ejecutivo del FMI.

Por supuesto, no existe ningún documento público que demuestre una orden directa de EE. UU. o del FMI para cerrar las fronteras entre Irán y Pakistán. Pero fuentes de Islamabad subrayaron que mantener vigente una exención de instrumentos bancarios de duración indefinida antes de la votación del Consejo del FMI se había convertido en una vulnerabilidad insostenible para Pakistán en materia de sanciones.

Las fuentes de Islamabad insisten en que la medida vino acompañada de auténticas preocupaciones por el contrasabotaje y se coordinó discretamente entre Islamabad y Teherán (cursiva mía) para que la pausa no rompiera las relaciones bilaterales.

El portavoz del Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores iraní, Esmaeil Baghaei, calificó públicamente la interrupción como una pausa temporal debida a «problemas técnicos» y «medidas de precaución».

Las fuentes oficiales pakistaníes, por su parte, insistieron en que el endurecimiento de los controles es una medida conjunta de lucha contra el terrorismo que refleja un «entendimiento mutuo» con Teherán tras un repunte de los atentados en Sistán-Baluchistán; las emboscadas en autopistas; y un ataque marítimo perpetrado el 11 de octubre contra embarcaciones de la Guardia Costera de Pakistán frente a Jiwani —que las autoridades pakistaníes atribuyeron a «actores extranjeros» que pretendían sabotear la mediación de Pakistán en el acuerdo de paz con Irán—.

Vuelta al mismo patrón de siempre: yihadistas salafistas utilizados como arma y manipulados por los sospechosos habituales.

La única llamada telefónica confirmada públicamente entre el viceprimer ministro Ishaq Dar y el ministro de Asuntos Exteriores Abbas Araghchi tuvo lugar el domingo 18 de octubre —dos días después del memorándum del 16 de octubre— y sus comunicados oficiales solo mencionan la diplomacia regional y la reunión de la OCI en Bagdad.

Por lo tanto, la coordinación previa a nivel de los ministros Dar y Araghchi y las detenciones específicas por sabotaje forman parte de nuestra propia información.

Exportaciones asimétricas de alimentos y rutas informales

En resumen, los productos siguen cruzando las fronteras. Islamabad ha permitido deliberadamente que sigan circulando los productos perecederos y las exportaciones alimentarias pakistaníes hacia Irán. Los productos perecederos esenciales —entre ellos, tomates, patatas y cebollas— siguen circulando, junto con los flujos tradicionales de petróleo y combustible, a través de la porosa frontera de 909 km.

El registro normativo explica el motivo: hace ocho meses, Pakistán promulgó una exención bancaria específica para diez productos alimenticios exportados a Irán por vía terrestre (en la que se enumeraban explícitamente el arroz, las patatas, las cebollas, los tomates, la carne y la fruta), además de productos farmacéuticos.

La Cámara de Comercio de Teherán confirmó el pasado sábado que, si bien las exportaciones iraníes a Pakistán se ven paralizadas por la normativa del EIF, las importaciones de Pakistán a Irán continúan, y el comercio informal de combustible y el comercio fronterizo a través de Baluchistán ya alcanzan un volumen estimado de entre 800 millones y más de 1 000 millones de dólares anuales al margen de los controles aduaneros oficiales.

Debe prestarse especial atención a los puertos de Gwadar y Karachi, así como a la arquitectura general de tránsito entre China e Irán. Según nuestras fuentes, el tránsito de terceros países y el tránsito entre China e Irán a través de Pakistán sigue estando protegido.

A nivel jurídico, un documento que detalla el tránsito de mercancías por Pakistán estableció seis corredores de tránsito terrestre designados que unen Gwadar, Karachi y Port Qasim con Gabd y Taftan para la carga de terceros países con destino a Irán bajo una garantía bancaria.

Además, una notificación de la Junta Federal de Ingresos del pasado mes de junio designó formalmente la estación de ferrocarril de Taftan como puesto aduanero terrestre, y los ministros iraníes y pakistaníes han promovido el corredor ferroviario para conectar China con Irán y Europa.

Sin embargo, siguen existiendo dos limitaciones operativas muy complicadas.
La modernización de la línea ferroviaria Quetta-Taftan sigue figurando oficialmente como una mejora prevista; y la designación por parte de la OFAC, el 1 de octubre, de la Compañía Ferroviaria de la República Islámica de Irán (RAI) tenía como objetivo explícito frenar el cambio de Teherán de las rutas marítimas bloqueadas al ferrocarril.

En resumen: se necesita una habilidad extraordinaria para enfrentarse al Imperio de la Piratería.

Islamabad ha llevado a cabo una maniobra clásica y calculada: revocar de forma visible la exención formal de importación del EIF en Taftan y Gabd-Rimdan para proteger su próximo tramo del FMI, de 1.210 millones de dólares, y a los bancos paquistaníes de las sanciones secundarias del Tesoro de EE. UU.

Y todo ello sin dejar de mantener vivas las exportaciones alimentarias paquistaníes, las vías fronterizas informales y los marcos de tránsito de terceros países con Teherán.

Que esto siga siendo un breve reajuste administrativo o se consolide en un cuello de botella más prolongado lo decidirán tres indicadores durante las próximas quince días:

1. Una notificación modificada del EIF o del trueque por parte del Ministerio de Comercio.
2. Despacho de aduanas independiente para la carga en tránsito por Gwadar/Karachi.

Movimientos de mercancías documentados a través del enlace ferroviario Taftan-Zahedan.

Que la lección quede grabada en las tierras raras para que todo el Sur Global reflexione: no hay forma de luchar contra el Imperio sin eludir su control del sistema financiero internacional.

Investors sold off French government bonds after a weekend of violent protests, pushing the yield on the country’s 10-year debt as high as 4.94 percent on Monday and widening the premium over German bonds toward levels last seen during the eurozone debt crisis.

With some of the most violent images of the protest involving predominately migrant youths, the social unrest crisis and decades of mass immigration could actually lead to a debt crisis as well.

The sell-off followed days of unrest over the cost of living and conditions in schools that turned into riots, with thousands of arrests, looted shops and damaged public buildings across France, according to French news outlet BFMTV.

‘The true face of the Great Replacement’ – Right-wing politician Zemmour says French riots driven by ‘hordes of North African and African barbarians’

Yields rise when bond prices fall, and the jump in French borrowing costs reflected investor concern that the disorder would make it harder for the government to reduce its large deficit and debt.

The gap between French and German 10-year yields, a key measure of the risk premium on French debt, widened sharply and approached or reached its highest level since 2012, according to market data. fSome accounts put the French 10-year yield’s rise at as much as 16 basis points on the day, leaving it near multi-decade highs.

2,000 shops looted or damaged across France, Macron rejects Interior Minister Núñez resignation offer

The violence prompted President Emmanuel Macron to condemn what he called “unbridled violence,” while Prime Minister Sébastien Lecornu’s government asked some local authorities to impose curfews and did not rule out a state of emergency.

France has been struggling with weak growth, a budget deficit projected around 5 percent of GDP or higher, and a debt-to-GDP ratio above 115 percent. The government has yet to secure passage of its budget for next year.

Analysts said the unrest added to existing doubts about whether Paris can deliver the spending cuts needed to stabilize its finances, especially with presidential elections approaching in 2027 and Marine Le Pen currently forecast to win. Additionally, the euro weakened and French stocks fell, with the sell-off also affecting some other European markets.

On Tuesday, French yields remained elevated near 24-year highs as protest groups announced further demonstrations.

Ratings agency Moody’s is scheduled to review France’s credit rating later in the week.

The post Following mass riots, France debt interest soars to 4.94%, reaching risk levels not seen since 2012 appeared first on Remix News.

VERSIONE IN ITALIANO

Over the past ten days, a great many extreme weather events have been recorded—from the USA to Europe, and from Asia to South America.

Is it truly all the fault of El Niño only?

Or does geoengineering—a subject to which Gospa News has devoted numerous investigations—play a role?

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UPDATE on OCTOBER, 22, 2026

New Massive and Flash Flooding in the US even inside an Hospital

In the latest hours and days new massive floods are devastating some US states and North America. Four footages in one video below on ocober, 2026 events.

• 1st footage – Water Surges Through Endoscopy Recovery Bays in Austin Hospital in Texas
• 2nd footage – Flash flooding buried cars in debris on Tuesday in Clifton, Arizona.
• 3rd footage – Heavy rain inundated parts of West Texas on Thursday, part of a multi-day flood threat fueled by tropical moisture colliding with a massive cold front moving across the country.
• 4th – footage Millions in Electronics Drenched as a Massive Ceiling Flood Destroys a Toronto Showroom

Wild Weather across Europe. Devastation in Spain, UK, Italy, France and Portugal

The western Mediterranean is currently experiencing a period of extreme weather, characterized by torrential rain, flooding, and overflowing rivers across Europpe ande above all eastern Spain, southern France, and Italy. The situation is most critical along the Spanish coast, where Storm Adam has triggered exceptional rainfall, resulting in a heavy toll of casualties and displaced people.

The Valencian Community has been among the hardest-hit areas. In Pego, in the province of Alicante, 693 mm of rain was recorded over a 36-hour period.

As of October 20, the provisional toll stands at four fatalities, with over 2,100 people evacuated and hundreds of rescue operations carried out. Blocked roads, flooded homes, and vehicles swept away by the currents bear witness to the intensity of the event.

The severe weather is now also affecting southern France and Corsica. This Mediterranean weather system has primarily impacted the Languedoc region, with the departments of Hérault and Gard being of particular concern.

In the latest hours and days new massive floods are devastating some European countries. Below the footages from Spain, France, UK, Italy and Portugal in October, 2026

1st footage – Helicopters continue to rescue people trapped in Oliva (Valencia, Spain). The La Safor and La Marina Alta districts are the most severely affected.
2nd footage – An intense downpour hit El Palo, Málaga (Spain). The storm dumped nearly 60 liters per square meter in just 30 minutes, causing significant water accumulation on the streets.
3rd footage – Massive Flash Flood Turns a London Airport Baggage Hall Into a Raging River
4th footage – The famous giant waves of Nazaré are found at Praia do Norte, in the town of Nazaré, in the Western region of Portugal.

France

Italy

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FIRST POSTED on OCTOBER, 20, 2026

Harsh Floods in Las Vegas, Newport and Long Beach

El Niño Alert: WMO and Peterson Institute Warn of Up to $986 Billion in Damages by 2027

The current El Niño event could have far-reaching economic and humanitarian consequences. The World Meteorological Organization (WMO) predicts that the phenomenon will almost certainly persist until February 2027, while the Peterson Institute for International Economics estimates that global losses in 2027 could reach nearly $986 billion if the event’s intensity matches that of 1997–98.

The WMO has issued warnings regarding potential impacts on temperatures and precipitation, noting an increased risk of heatwaves, droughts, and floods.

In its Global Seasonal Climate Update for the September–November 2026 quarter, the organization forecasts a likely rise in temperatures across Europe—particularly in central and southern regions—along with a higher probability of above-average rainfall in Southern Europe.

The repercussions will extend beyond the climate. An analysis by the World Food Programme, cited in the study, indicates that among 45 countries already facing food insecurity, an additional 49 million people could fall into a state of severe food insecurity by the end of 2027. The most significant effects are expected in parts of Central America and Southern Africa, with substantial impacts also anticipated in East Africa, as well as South and Southeast Asia.

HAARP DOSSIER – 10. Military “GEOMAGNETIC STORMS” from Alaska at 3,6 MegaWatts (as Energy from 12,000 Homes). Over the “foF2 Frequency” that can “Modeling SPACE WEATHER” with Dangerous Impacts on Earth, Clouds (US-EU Studies – Videos)

From an economic perspective, the outlook is concerning: the Peterson Institute warns that, in addition to the nearly $1 trillion in losses projected for 2027 alone, cumulative losses over the following five years could exceed $7.2 trillion in the absence of coordinated intervention.

These figures have reignited the debate regarding the international community’s preparedness and response capabilities.

Extreme weather events in Italy have risen from 60 in 2015 to 376 in 2025.

On the mornign of October 9, 2026, in Marsala (Sicily, Italy) , a double waterspout struck the Alcide De Gasperi school, where approximately 270 children were present.

The building has been rendered unusable; reports vary, but five or six children sustained minor injuries. In Petrosino, two people are in critical condition (classified as “red code”) after their car was forced off the road. This is not an isolated incident.

Around the same time, severe weather rendered a nursery school in Viareggio unusable, left a school bus stranded in floodwaters in Giugliano, and caused a lightning strike on a 17th-century church in Forio d’Ischia.

Extreme weather events recorded in Italy have increased from 60 in 2015 to 376 in 2025—a sixfold increase in ten years.

The estimated cost of damages for 2025 alone is 11.9 billion euros. A national adaptation plan was approved at the end of 2023; the observatory tasked with its implementation began its work in February 2026, yet, according to Legambiente, the necessary funding is still missing.

MAIN SOURCES

GOSPA NEWS – ITALIAN VERSION

GOSPA NEWS – CLIMATE GEOENGINEERING DOSSIER

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RELATED POSTS AND VIDEOS

HAARP DOSSIER – 9. CYCLONES, LANDSLIDES and POLAR VORTEX after New SECRET U.S. MILITARY TESTS. Electromagnetic Bombing from Alaska Station Before Climate Disasters

The FURY of RING of FIRE STRUCK AGAIN! 7.7 Earthquakes in Panama after 7,2 in Peru (VIDEO). Wild Weather or Geoengineering Nightmares inside HAARP & HARP, US Pentagon partner?

WEATHER WARFARE & GEOENGINEERING HISTORY. From Operation Popeye to recente Devastating storm ‘Ditwah’ in Asia

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Europe is supposed to be financing its defence together. It barely is.

Of the €800bn announced under ReArm Europe in March 2025, €650bn is not common money. It is an estimate of the extra room governments get under the national escape clause to spend up to 1.5 percent of GDP more on defence for four years.

Each country still pays for that spending itself.

The room is also temporary: EU Commission simulations suggest that maintaining higher defence spending after 2028 could require additional annual fiscal adjustment of 0.25 to 0.4 percentage points of GDP from 2029.

The other €150bn is SAFE, and it is loans, not grants.

The EU borrows and lends the money on, and each country repays its share. Grants are small: €1.5bn from the European Defence Industry Programme for 2025-2027, plus the European Defence Fund for joint research.

Not every country has used these tools, as Table 1 shows. The Netherlands and Sweden have used neither. Like Germany, which has taken only the clause, they can borrow at least as cheaply as the EU, so SAFE gets them nothing.

France has taken SAFE but not the clause, to protect the credibility of its budget plans.

Table 1. Who uses SAFE and the national escape clause

Source: Council of the EU, European Commission. Data as of 17 October 2026. * Hungary: allocated €16.2bn, now requesting €5.4bn; still pending. ** Italy: the Commission backed its request on 8 October 2026; the Council has yet to decide.

Where SAFE does matter is on the eastern flank. Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia can borrow the equivalent of five to eight percent of their GDP, and Poland almost five percent.

Graph 1. SAFE loans as a share of GDP, by country (%)

Source: Council of the EU, European Commission, Eurostat. SAFE loans only, as a share of 2025 GDP. Amounts approved by the Council, except Italy and Hungary (* revised requests of €8bn and €5.4bn, September 2026). Data as of 17 October 2026.

That leaves private money.

The European Investment Bank and the European Investment Fund are trying to bring in private investors, partly by removing the reputational stigma of financing defence.

But defence is almost a monopsony: the state is nearly the only buyer. Without a clear flow of public orders, private investment will be hard to come by.

So Europe barely borrows together. And it buys alone.

This article continues, but the full version is available only to EUobserver.com subscribers. Visit account.euobserver.com/membership

The European Commission has selected 77 industrial and technology projects across 23 European Economic Area countries to receive €3.4 billion in funding, as Brussels attempts to strengthen the continent’s manufacturing capacity and reduce dependence on imported energy and critical materials.

The funding, announced on Monday, 19 October, will come from the EU Innovation Fund, which uses revenues generated by the Emissions Trading System to support investment in technologies intended to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.

The selected projects include manufacturing facilities, renewable energy installations, advanced energy storage, critical raw materials processing and industrial carbon management. For the first time, the programme also includes a small modular nuclear reactor project and a direct air carbon capture and storage initiative.

The announcement comes amid growing concern over Europe’s industrial competitiveness, particularly as manufacturers face high energy costs, increasing competition from China and difficulties securing investment for major industrial projects.

Funding for industrial production

According to the Commission’s announcement, the 77 selected projects span energy-intensive industries, clean technology manufacturing, alternative fuels, transport and several other sectors.

Six projects concern critical raw materials, an area in which the EU has been seeking to reduce its exposure to foreign suppliers.

These investments are intended to strengthen European supply chains for technologies including batteries, renewable energy equipment and permanent magnets, which are essential components in electric motors and other industrial applications.

The funding follows renewed political pressure to expand the processing and production of strategically important materials inside Europe.

As EU Today recently reported, the European Parliament has been pressing for stronger measures to reduce dependence on China for critical raw materials used by European manufacturers.

China occupies a dominant position in several international processing and refining markets, leaving European companies exposed to supply interruptions and trade restrictions.

The Commission is seeking to support alternative production capacity through financial assistance, industrial regulation and measures designed to attract private capital.

However, the selection of projects for EU funding does not automatically mean that the proposed facilities will be built. Their implementation will still depend on financing agreements, regulatory approvals and commercial decisions.

Nuclear technology enters funding programme

The inclusion of a small modular nuclear reactor project represents a new development in the Innovation Fund’s portfolio.

Small modular reactors are designed to produce electricity or industrial heat using nuclear technology on a smaller scale than conventional nuclear power stations.

Supporters argue that modular construction could reduce certain project risks and provide stable electricity supplies for energy-intensive industries.

However, the technology faces substantial challenges involving construction costs, regulatory approval, supply chains and the transition from demonstration projects to commercial production.

The Commission published a European strategy for small modular reactors in March, outlining plans to accelerate their development and support the first operational facilities in the early 2030s.

The latest funding decision gives the technology access to a financial instrument principally associated with industrial decarbonisation and clean energy investment.

Another newly represented technology is direct air carbon capture and storage, which involves extracting carbon dioxide from the atmosphere and storing it.

Both technologies remain at comparatively early stages of commercial deployment in Europe, making their eventual costs and performance important considerations.

Emissions trading revenue finances investment

The Innovation Fund is financed through revenues from the EU Emissions Trading System, under which companies operating in covered sectors must obtain allowances for their greenhouse gas emissions.

Part of the revenue generated from auctioning allowances is reinvested into projects designed to introduce lower-emission technologies into industrial production.

The Commission estimates that the 77 newly selected projects could avoid approximately 290 million tonnes of greenhouse gas emissions during their first ten years of operation.

That figure is a projection based on the projects’ anticipated performance, rather than an achieved reduction. Actual results will depend on construction, commissioning and subsequent commercial operation.

The funding announcement also follows the publication of the EU’s broader industrial policy initiatives, which seek to increase domestic production of clean technologies and improve investment conditions for European manufacturers.

The Commission announced a separate allocation of more than €390 million to 135 environmental and climate projects under the LIFE programme on the same day. That funding is distinct from the €3.4 billion Innovation Fund selection.

Funding agreements still to be concluded

The companies and organisations behind the selected Innovation Fund projects must now complete the procedures necessary to obtain their grants.

During the Commission’s 19 October press briefing, officials indicated that project-specific grant amounts would become available when the agreements are signed, currently envisaged for the first quarter of 2027.

The final allocations and implementation conditions therefore remain subject to the grant preparation process.

For industrial companies, the principal test will be whether the European funding attracts sufficient additional investment to bring the selected technologies into commercial operation.

The results will also provide an indication of how effectively Brussels can translate its industrial policy objectives into additional European manufacturing capacity, particularly in sectors where supply chains remain concentrated outside the Union.

Image Credit: © European Union, 2024 / CC BY 4.0

A new tax on added sugar in France could lead to higher prices for sweet products. The measure was proposed by the government as part of the 2027 draft budget and has been approved by members of parliament. However, it has raised concerns among manufacturers. The new tax follows an existing levy on carbonated drinks […]

TEHRAN, Oct. 20 (MNA) – Iran's First Vice President Mohammad Reza Aref said trade between Iran and Tajikistan has grown 50% in recent months despite the imposed war on Iran.

Registrations of fully electric cars across 17 European markets increased by 70.3 per cent in September, according to industry figures published on Monday, 19 October, as France and Germany seek to ease the European Union’s emissions requirements for new vehicles.

The data show that 300,202 battery-electric cars were registered during the month, accounting for 32.6 per cent of new passenger-car registrations in the markets surveyed.

The figures emerge three days after Paris and Berlin announced a joint position on the future of Europe’s automotive industry, proposing greater flexibility in the EU’s 2035 emissions regime while introducing measures intended to favour vehicles manufactured in Europe.

Electric vehicles gain market share

The latest figures, compiled by E-Mobility Europe, New Automotive and Fier Automotive, indicate that electric vehicle demand accelerated sharply during September.

According to the industry data published on 19 October, approximately 1.98 million battery-electric cars have been registered across the 17 markets during the first nine months of 2026, an increase of 38.1 per cent compared with the equivalent period last year.

Higher oil prices, government incentives and the introduction of more affordable electric models have all contributed to demand.

The figures represent a substantial change in the composition of European new-car sales, although they cover selected markets rather than constituting a complete statistical account of the EU’s 27 Member States.

France recorded 65,243 battery-electric registrations in September, representing 41.7 per cent of its new-car market. Germany registered 88,724 electric vehicles, giving the technology a market share of 34.6 per cent.

Both countries have substantial automotive manufacturing industries and are directly involved in negotiations over Europe’s future emissions legislation.

Significant differences between European markets

Despite the overall increase, electric vehicle adoption remains uneven across the continent.

Norway retained its position as Europe’s most electrified new-car market, with battery-electric vehicles accounting for 98.8 per cent of registrations in September.

Denmark followed with 88.8 per cent, while Finland recorded 62.7 per cent and Sweden 49 per cent.

Electric models also accounted for approximately half of new-car registrations in Belgium, the Netherlands, Ireland and Portugal.

At the other end of the market, battery-electric vehicles represented only 11.2 per cent of registrations in the Czech Republic, 7.6 per cent in Italy and 6.2 per cent in Poland.

These differences illustrate the difficulty of establishing a uniform European transition timetable.

Household incomes, purchase incentives, vehicle prices and charging infrastructure differ substantially between countries. The availability of affordable electric cars is particularly important in markets where buyers are more sensitive to the initial purchase price.

The varying national figures also complicate the EU’s industrial calculations, since manufacturers must operate across markets progressing at different rates.

France and Germany reach automotive compromise

On 16 October, French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Friedrich Merz agreed on a joint approach to changes in European automotive regulations.

Under the proposed compromise, car manufacturers would be required to reduce carbon dioxide emissions from new vehicles by 90 per cent by 2035 compared with the 2021 reference level.

The agreement would also remove a proposed requirement to compensate for the remaining emissions through measures such as the use of low-carbon steel.

The change would create additional opportunities for manufacturers to continue selling vehicles powered by combustion engines beyond 2035, subject to the final legislative framework.

In their joint declaration on the automotive industry’s future, the French and German governments argued that emissions reduction must be combined with industrial competitiveness, investment and European manufacturing capacity.

The agreement also envisages preferential treatment for vehicles produced in Europe under certain public procurement and subsidy arrangements.

Britain could potentially benefit from provisions allowing selected European partners to qualify under the proposed industrial framework.

The Franco-German understanding is not, however, a final EU legislative decision. Changes to the regulatory regime require agreement through the relevant European legislative procedures.

Automotive competitiveness enters the debate

The principal argument advanced by supporters of greater regulatory flexibility is that European manufacturers need additional time to adapt production, protect employment and compete with international rivals.

German manufacturers retain extensive investment in combustion-engine and hybrid technology, while French producers have placed considerable emphasis on electric vehicles and maintaining European supply chains.

The negotiations therefore concern more than emissions limits. They also involve battery production, access to raw materials, manufacturing costs and the ability of European companies to compete with producers in China and other markets.

Supporters of the existing transition timetable argue that weakening long-term requirements could discourage investment in electric manufacturing capacity just as consumer demand is increasing.

Manufacturers seeking greater flexibility maintain that regulatory targets must account for uneven market conditions and the cost of developing new technologies.

September’s sales figures provide evidence that electric vehicle adoption is accelerating, but they do not establish whether the same rate of growth will continue without existing incentives.

The debate now centres on whether regulatory relaxation will preserve Europe’s automotive industry during the transition or slow investment in the technology that is already capturing an increasing share of the market.

Recent media reports projecting South Korea’s per capita GDP to surpass Japan’s have generated considerable excitement across the regional countries that see Korea as a role model. According to the IMF’s October 2026 projections, South Korea’s nominal GDP per capita could reach approximately $49,000 in 2027, compared with Japan’s $37,000-38,000. Its achievements in semiconductors, advanced […]

The post South Korea: A growing national crisis and a strategic warning appeared first on Asia Times.

The richest countries climbed to prosperity by methods they now forbid everyone else to use. Hamilton, List, Carey and Polanyi, four economists explained why those methods work and why abandoning them ends badly. There is a story the world’s wealthiest capitals love to tell about themselves. Prosperity, it goes, is the reward for opening your […]

There’s no way to fight the Empire without bypassing its control of the international financial system.

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All hell is already breaking loose when it comes to probing what is exactly taking place related to the latest, definitely murky U.S.-linked movements in Pakistani land and sea. After an initial assessment at Transition Protocol – which avowedly did not provide all the necessary answers – we dug deeper into a way more comprehensive examination supported by several sources.

What we are watching across several nodes of extremely sensitive Iran-Pakistan overland connectivity is not a blanket border shutdown; but a surgical, two-track balancing act by Islamabad between Washington’s tremendous financial vise and Tehran’s strategic lifeline.

So here’s where it all stands – compounding the verified record with our latest consultations.

The key point: the regulatory trigger was a banking sanctions move, not just border security.

While provincial officials in Balochistan publicly framed Saturday’s halt at two key nodes, Taftan and Gabd–Rimdan, around security, counterterrorism, and anti-smuggling, what matters most is the exact mechanism around a memorandum issued last Friday by the Pakistani Ministry of Commerce.

That immediately revoked an October 3 extension of the Electronic Import Form (EIF) waiver for goods imported from Iran, and coincided with Islamabad’s instruction to close the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) immigration gate at Taftan.

What is key is that without the EIF waiver, Pakistani importers must process Iranian purchases through formal Pakistani banking channels – which U.S. sanctions, of course, make absolutely impossible.

Peyman Sanandaji, head of the Transportation Commission at the Tehran Chamber of Commerce, confirmed on the record that it is banking sanctions compliance (ditching the EIF) that halted Iranian exports into Pakistan.

The immediate shock at the formal gates was quite something: more than 4,000 tons of daily Iranian LPG imports through Gabd–Rimdan are at risk. Former Quetta Chamber of Commerce president Ayoub Miryani reported that over 2,000 containers are stranded at Gabd–Rimdan alone, with hundreds more freight trucks backed up at Taftan.

So why is this happening now? Because of the nasty convergence between the October 7 IMF tranche Pakistan had to pay, and the imperial U.S. Treasury “Operation Economic Outcast”.

Under Operation Economic Outcast, Washington gave third countries a “defined timeline to shut down” Iran-related commercial lifelines or face expulsion from the U.S. financial system. That was followed by OFAC’s October 1 designations against Iran’s overland rail and industrial networks and October 8 actions against 17 shadow-fleet tankers.

But then, on October 7 – only nine days before the Ministry of Commerce revoked the EIF waiver – Islamabad reached an agreement with the IMF on the Fourth Review of its Extended Fund Facility to unlock $1.21 billion. That still requires IMF Executive Board approval.

Of course there is no public document showing a direct U.S. or IMF order to close Iran-Pakistan borders. But sources in Islamabad stressed that leaving an open-ended banking-instrument waiver on the books ahead of the IMF Board vote had become an untenable sanctions vulnerability for Pakistan.

Islamabad sources are adamant that the move was paired with genuine counter-sabotage concerns and quietly coordinated between Islamabad and Tehran (italics mine) so the pause would not rupture bilateral ties.

Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Esmaeil Baghaei publicly called the disruption a temporary pause due to “technical issues” and “precautionary measures”.

Pakistani official sources, for their part, insisted that the tightened controls are a joint counterterrorism measure reflecting “mutual understanding” with Tehran after a spike in Sistan-Balochistan attacks; highway ambushes; and an October 11 maritime attack on Pakistan Coast Guard boats off Jiwani – which Pakistani officials attributed to “foreign actors” seeking to sabotage Pakistan’s mediation of the Iran peace deal.

Back to the same old pattern of Salafi-jihadis weaponized and manipulated by the usual suspects.

The only publicly confirmed telephone call between Deputy Prime Minister Ishaq Dar and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi took place on Sunday, October 18 – two days after the October 16 memorandum – and its official readouts mention only regional diplomacy and the Baghdad OIC meeting.

So prior coordination at the Dar–Araghchi Foreign Minister level and specific sabotage arrests therefore are part of our own reporting.

Asymmetric food exports and informal routes

In a nutshell, stuff is still moving across borders. Islamabad deliberately left alive Pakistani perishables and food exports to Iran. Essential perishables – including tomatoes, potatoes, and onions – continue to move, alongside traditional oil and fuel flows across the porous 909-km border.

The regulatory record explains why: 8 months ago, Pakistan enacted a separate banking-instrument waiver specifically for 10 food exports to Iran by land (explicitly listing rice, potatoes, onions, tomatoes, meat, and fruit) plus pharmaceuticals.

Tehran’s Chamber of Commerce confirmed this past Saturday that while Iranian exports to Pakistan are stalled by the EIF rule, imports from Pakistan into Iran are continuing, and informal fuel and border trade across Balochistan already operates at an estimated $800 million to over $1 billion annually outside formal customs.

Special attention should be placed on the ports of Gwadar and Karachi, and the overall China–Iran Transit Architecture. Third-country and China-Iran transit through Pakistan, according to our sources, remains protected.

On a legal level, a document detailing Pakistan’s transit of goods established six designated overland transit corridors linking Gwadar, Karachi, and Port Qasim to Gabd and Taftan for third-country cargo bound for Iran under a bank guarantee.

And a Federal Board of Revenue’s notification this past June formally designated Taftan railway station as a Land Customs Station, with Iranian and Pakistani ministers pitching the rail corridor to link China to Iran and Europe.

However, two very complicated operational constraints remain in place.

The Quetta-Taftan rail modernization is still listed officially as a planned upgrade; and OFAC’s October 1 designation of the Islamic Republic of Iran Railway Company (RAI) was explicitly designed to choke Tehran’s shift from blockaded sea lanes to rail.

To sum it all up: it takes supreme skill to face The Empire of Piracy. Islamabad has executed a classic, calibrated maneuver: visibly revoking the formal EIF import waiver at Taftan and Gabd–Rimdan to insulate its pending $1.21 billion IMF tranche and Pakistani banks from U.S. Treasury secondary sanctions.

And all the while keeping Pakistani food exports, informal border valves, and third-country transit frameworks alive with Tehran.

Whether this remains a brief administrative reset or hardens into a longer choke point will be decided by three indicators over the next fortnight:

1. A modified EIF or barter notification from the Commerce Ministry.
2. Separate customs clearance for Gwadar/Karachi transit cargo.
3. Documented freight movements across the Taftan–Zahedan rail link.

May the lesson be imprinted on rare earths for the whole Global South to ponder: there’s no way to fight the Empire without bypassing its control of the international financial system.

Four years after Washington set out to cripple Russia’s energy economy, America’s war with Iran has forced it to seek relief from the very country it tried to isolate, encircle, and defeat. The Sanctions Strategy Meets Its Limits On October 9, US President Donald Trump announced an extraordinary agreement with Russian President Vladimir Putin: Moscow […]

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Non disponendo delle condizioni materiali necessarie per sfidare la supremazia industriale cinese, l’Unione Europea continua a trasformare le proprie difficoltà economiche in una giustificazione per una nuova escalation delle ostilità.

Segue nostro Telegram.

I leader europei sembrano aver individuato una nuova missione strategica: ricostruire la capacità industriale del continente riducendo al contempo la sua dipendenza dalla Cina. L’iniziativa è stata recentemente avanzata congiuntamente da Francia e Germania e viene presentata come una risposta alla crescente presenza della Cina sul mercato europeo. Il problema è che i leader responsabili di questo progetto continuano a ignorare una questione fondamentale: nessuna reindustrializzazione su larga scala può avere successo senza un approvvigionamento energetico stabile, abbondante e a prezzi accessibili.

L’Europa dispone di eccellenti università, di una forza lavoro qualificata, di centri tecnologici all’avanguardia e di una tradizione industriale che le conferisce ancora notevoli vantaggi. Tuttavia, queste risorse non possono funzionare in modo isolato. Gli impianti chimici, le acciaierie, gli stabilimenti metallurgici e numerose altre industrie dipendono da un approvvigionamento energetico continuo e competitivo. Il capitale, le conoscenze scientifiche e i lavoratori specializzati non possono compensare all’infinito i costi di produzione elevati. È proprio su questo punto che la strategia dell’Europa contraddice i propri stessi obiettivi.

Per decenni, l’integrazione economica tra l’Europa occidentale e la Russia ha fornito condizioni favorevoli allo sviluppo di importanti settori industriali. Le forniture di gas naturale russo, in particolare, hanno contribuito a sostenere attività ad alto consumo energetico. Questo rapporto ha soddisfatto gli interessi economici concreti di entrambe le parti: Mosca disponeva di un importante mercato per le proprie esportazioni, mentre le economie europee ottenevano una risorsa essenziale per la loro competitività.

L’introduzione delle sanzioni nel 2022 ha profondamente alterato questa situazione. Le misure coercitive illegali hanno reciso un partenariato di lunga data tra Russia ed Europa, lasciando la parte occidentale del continente economicamente indebolita e dipendente da approvvigionamenti energetici esterni più costosi e meno sicuri. L’Europa, che già prima di allora stava subendo una graduale deindustrializzazione, è successivamente precipitata in una crisi energetica, con conseguenze che vanno dall’aumento delle bollette energetiche ai fallimenti aziendali causati dall’incapacità di mantenere una produzione competitiva.

Sarebbe ragionevole aspettarsi che una strategia di ripresa industriale iniziasse affrontando queste vulnerabilità. Invece, i leader europei stanno tentando di costruire una nuova base produttiva senza risolvere adeguatamente il problema energetico. I responsabili della politica economica europea sembrano ritenere che sussidi, incentivi fiscali e programmi di investimento siano sufficienti a ripristinare la competitività. Tali strumenti possono contribuire allo sviluppo industriale, ma la loro efficacia rimarrà limitata fintantoché persisteranno gli svantaggi strutturali nei costi energetici.

È in questo contesto che la Cina sta assumendo una posizione sempre più di rilievo nella «lista delle preoccupazioni» di Bruxelles. La capacità della Cina di produrre su vasta scala, rifornire catene industriali complesse e offrire attrezzature a prezzi competitivi rappresenta una sfida per un’Europa che cerca di recuperare la propria autonomia produttiva. Anziché riconoscere la portata del declino accumulato e sviluppare una strategia coerente per invertire la tendenza, alcuni settori della leadership europea preferiscono ricorrere a barriere commerciali, indagini punitive e meccanismi di contenimento economico.

Tale approccio rivela una comprensione piuttosto superficiale della concorrenza industriale. Limitare le importazioni cinesi non comporta automaticamente la creazione di stabilimenti europei, né riduce i costi dell’elettricità, né garantisce l’approvvigionamento di gas agli impianti industriali. Al contrario, le aziende che dipendono da attrezzature, componenti e materie prime cinesi potrebbero trovarsi a dover sostenere spese più elevate proprio nel momento in cui hanno bisogno di investire per recuperare la propria posizione sui mercati internazionali.

La questione russa rende questa situazione ancora più delicata. Il ripristino della cooperazione energetica con Mosca costituirebbe il primo passo di qualsiasi serio piano di ripresa industriale. Grazie alle forniture energetiche russe e ad ampie partnership commerciali con la Cina, l’Europa potrebbe ritrovare una nuova strada verso lo sviluppo, proprio come stanno ora iniziando a fare i paesi africani e asiatici attraverso le loro partnership con la Russia e la Cina.

Bruxelles, Parigi e Berlino, tuttavia, si stanno muovendo nella direzione opposta. Gli strateghi europei sembrano determinati a confrontarsi contemporaneamente con due delle maggiori potenze industriali ed energetiche del mondo, senza dimostrare di possedere le risorse necessarie per sostenere tale ambizione. In primo luogo, hanno compromesso un rapporto energetico fondamentale con la Russia. Ora rischiano di trasformare la Cina in un avversario commerciale permanente.

In definitiva, ciò che i falchi europei perseguono non è lo sviluppo dell’Europa, bensì la strumentalizzazione di questioni quali l’industria e il commercio per portare avanti la propria agenda autodistruttiva. In base a questa strategia, i cittadini europei – già privati dell’energia russa e potenzialmente destinati a un accesso ridotto ai prodotti cinesi nel prossimo futuro – saranno ancora una volta i primi a subirne le conseguenze.

Berlin and Paris spent months negotiating over the future of Europe’s auto industry.

Germany wanted to keep selling new combustion-engine cars beyond 2035. In return, France wanted strict “Made in Europe” rules: public money spent on electric vehicle (EV) purchase incentives, subsidies and government contracts should benefit cars genuinely made in Europe, not simply assembled here. 

One concession in exchange for the other. French president Emmanuel Macron and German chancellor Friedrich Merz have now sealed the deal.

Both can claim victory at home, and both say they want the same thing: to strengthen Europe’s auto industry against Chinese competition. 

But the trade-off undermines that very goal. It rightly pushes for more European production, but pays for it with less ambition for electric vehicles.

For Europe’s automakers to compete, two things need to happen: More of the value generated by car manufacturing must stay in Europe, and the transition to electric vehicles must remain on track. Trading one for the other weakens both. 

Value creation is already moving elsewhere 

On one point, France is right: a growing EV market alone won’t protect European jobs. Many of the most important components in electric cars already come from China, especially batteries.

Meanwhile, Chinese automakers are building factories in Hungary and Spain, securing direct access to the European market. 

The risk is clear: cars assembled in Europe from imported components qualify as European products, benefit from purchase incentives and win public contracts.

Final assembly stays in Europe, but much of the economic value is created elsewhere. European auto suppliers have already cut more than 100,000 jobs in two years, and the European Commission warns that up to 600,000 more could disappear over the next five to 10 years. 

That’s where the proposed Industrial Accelerator Act comes in. It would link public spending on subsidies, purchase incentives and government procurement to production in Europe.

This isn’t just about shutting out foreign competition. It steers demand to where it strengthens Europe’s industrial base.

To work, the rules must target the components that will shape the industry’s future: battery cells, software, electric drivetrains and power electronics.

“Made in Europe” can’t simply mean attaching the wheels here. 

That doesn’t mean every nut and bolt must come from the EU.  The auto industry relies on global supply chains and trusted trading partners.

But a law riddled with exemptions would be little better than no law at all: It would create more red tape without bringing a single new factory to Europe. 

Factories need customers 

Even the best industrial policy will fail without buyers. A battery factory can only make money if it produces enough batteries. Yet Europe’s battery plants are running well below capacity because they don’t have enough orders. Every battery that goes unproduced drives up the cost of those that are made. Factories, machinery and workers still have to be paid for. 

Since 2022, roughly a quarter of announced battery projects in the EU have been canceled or put on hold. 

This is why Germany’s push to delay the phaseout of combustion-engine cars is so damaging. Every combustion-engine car sold instead of an EV means one fewer battery that could be made in Europe. The very factories meant to make “Made in Europe” a reality would lose potential customers. 

The best way to boost demand for European batteries is to build more small, affordable EVs in Europe. That’s where the biggest sales volumes are. Yet German automakers in particular have been slow to embrace this market, despite significant demand potential in Germany itself. Delaying the combustion-engine phaseout would only give them another reason to hold back.  

Slow down, lose out

For European automakers, the stakes go far beyond their home market. Sell fewer EVs at home, and manufacturers will launch fewer new models, produce fewer cars and face higher costs. That will make it harder to compete abroad, too. Giving combustion engines more time won’t close the gap with China. It could make it wider. 

Political uncertainty only makes matters worse. Automakers plan new models, factories and supplier contracts years in advance. Every fresh debate over exemptions gives investors and consumers another reason to hesitate. 

Companies investing billions in EVs and batteries – and consumers considering buying an electric car – need to know that policymakers won’t change direction tomorrow.  

The Franco-German bargain ignores economic reality. The future of the car is electric, and China figured that out long ago.

Beijing is doing everything it can to build an unbeatable lead in EVs, including through unfair practices such as massive government subsidies.

And Europe? It’s haggling over more time for yesterday’s technology. At stake is nothing less than the auto industry – the backbone of Europe’s industrial economy and a major source of jobs.

This deal is not yet law. A better deal would be simple: Europe should pursue electric vehicles with the same determination as China while making sure the jobs, factories and economic benefits stay in Europe. 

by Matt Agorist, The Free Thought Project: Will an effort to limit and eventually ban cash payments work in a nation where 80 to 90 percent of payments are made in cash? (The Last American Vagabond) On Wednesday, the Mexican government inched closer to passing a law that would begin the process of phasing out cash […]

Five people have been arrested in Cyprus, Germany and Italy as part of a European investigation into an alleged €114 million VAT fraud operation involving the cross-border smartphone trade.

The European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) announced on 16th October that three suspects had been detained in Cyprus, one in Germany and one in Italy following an investigation coordinated by its Munich office.

Investigators believe the suspects established and controlled a network of companies designed to exploit the tax treatment of goods traded between EU member states.

The alleged operation involved smartphone transactions through businesses and so-called missing traders operating in Germany, Albania and Sweden. Prosecutors estimate that the activities caused VAT losses of approximately €80 million in Sweden and €34 million in Germany.

According to the official announcement of the arrests, the operation forms part of a wider investigation known as Midas, which is examining organised cross-border tax fraud.

Searches across several countries

The arrests were accompanied by searches and seizures in Cyprus, Greece and Italy, conducted with the assistance of national police, financial investigators and tax authorities.

Prosecutors said 12 searches had been carried out at premises connected with the suspects and companies under investigation.

Assets of up to €80,000 were frozen, while investigators also seized or took action against bank accounts, vehicles and property.

The operation involved cooperation between Germany’s tax authorities, Cyprus’s financial intelligence and cybercrime units, the Greek financial police and Italy’s Guardia di Finanza.

The suspects are believed to have played leading roles in organising and controlling the alleged scheme, although prosecutors have not publicly established their individual criminal responsibility.

The investigation remains subject to proceedings before the competent German courts. All suspects are presumed innocent unless proven guilty.

How the alleged fraud operated

The case concerns a form of tax evasion known as missing-trader intra-community fraud, commonly described as carousel VAT fraud.

Under the EU’s VAT system, qualifying business-to-business transactions involving goods transported between member states are generally exempt from VAT in the country of dispatch.

The purchaser accounts for VAT under the rules applicable in the destination country, while subsequent domestic sales normally involve VAT being charged to the buyer.

Fraudsters can exploit those arrangements by establishing companies that purchase goods through cross-border transactions before reselling them domestically.

A missing trader collects VAT from the purchaser but fails to remit it to the relevant tax authority. Other companies in the transaction chain may then seek deductions or refunds.

The same goods can pass through several businesses and, in some arrangements, move repeatedly between countries, allowing the fraud to be repeated.

Smartphones and electronic equipment are particularly attractive because they are relatively expensive, easily transported and can be traded in large volumes.

The complexity of the arrangements makes investigations difficult when businesses are established in several jurisdictions and transactions move rapidly between companies.

A wider European problem

The latest arrests follow another substantial VAT fraud operation announced earlier this month.

On 7th October, the EPPO reported that 62 suspects had been detained in a separate investigation involving alleged losses of at least €410 million.

That operation, known as Hermes, involved searches across eight countries and allegations concerning the sale of mobile phones and other electronic devices.

Although separate from Midas, the investigation illustrates the scale and organisation of suspected VAT fraud involving internationally traded consumer electronics.

According to the EPPO‘s 2025 annual report, prosecutors were handling 3,602 active investigations at the end of last year, with estimated potential damage exceeding €67 billion.

Of that amount, more than €45 billion related to suspected VAT and customs fraud.

Those figures concern estimated losses under investigation, rather than sums established by final court judgments or amounts that have already been recovered.

Protecting European tax revenues

The financial consequences extend beyond the immediate losses attributed to individual schemes.

VAT is a major source of revenue for national governments and forms part of the system used to calculate certain contributions to the EU budget.

Fraudulent transactions can also distort competition by allowing dishonest operators to offer prices that legitimate businesses cannot match.

The Commission’s 2025 VAT gap report estimated that EU countries failed to collect approximately €128 billion in expected VAT revenue in 2023.

That broader figure includes losses arising from several causes, including administrative errors and insolvency, and cannot be attributed entirely to criminal fraud.

The latest arrests also demonstrate the importance of cross-border investigative cooperation when suspected financial offences involve companies, transactions and assets located in different countries.

In the Midas investigation, prosecutors must now establish the precise roles of the suspects, prove the alleged transactions and determine whether criminal proceedings can result in convictions and financial recovery.

The arrests represent another stage in the investigation, not a judicial finding that the alleged €114 million fraud has been proved.