Ukraine now builds far more weapons than it can afford to buy. A year ago, it promised to sell the surplus abroad and turn the proceeds back into its own army. However, 12 months later, that promise has barely materialized: a state fee of up to 30% is pricing Ukrainian arms out of foreign markets, and no one can say how much the army has actually gained, said Ihor Fedirko, executive director of the Ukrainian Council of Armorers.

President Volodymyr Zelenskyy announced the resumption of controlled weapons exports in October 2025, resting it on four promises: 1) sell what Ukraine makes beyond its own needs, 2) channel part of the proceeds into a special fund for the army, 3) open export offices in Europe and the US, and 4) establish joint ventures abroad.

The surplus is real: Ukraine's defense output is projected to reach $55 billion in 2026, far beyond what the state can finance. A year on, Fedirko checked each promise in turn.

1) Export of surpluses: rules that strangle businesses

On 1 July 2026, the government approved rules for controlled arms exports. They shortened the maximum application review period from 90 to 30 days, but also introduced an export fee: 20% for finished products and technologies, and 30% for components. For finished products exported under the special procedure, the contract value must be at least $334,000.

In September, the Ukrainian Council of Armorers, together with other associations, proposed a zero rate, no advance collection of the fee, refunds for deals that fall through, and simplified test shipments. The industry was promised that its amendments would be taken into account and that the resolution would be rewritten.

Even in early October, however, the rules still needed work. According to Fedirko, the new mechanism has effectively not started working. Whether it can bring in additional funds for defense depends on how acceptable the export terms are to manufacturers.

Fedirko says, though, that judging by current decisions, the state intends to keep the export fee.

“The industry is ready to discuss its contribution to defense financing. But the rate must be economically justified,” he says.

2) Procurement for the Ukrainian military: balance is only being established

He adds that the Ukrainian Council of Armorers intends to push for a rate significantly lower than 20%, one that would let companies fulfill contracts and invest in production.

With such high rates, Fedirko says, the competitiveness of Ukrainian weapons on foreign markets is in question, as is the ability to send even small test batches to potential buyers.

“The fundamental requirement is post-payment: after the contract has actually been fulfilled and the manufacturer has been paid. A company should not pay the state in advance a share of income it has not yet received,” he says.

He added that, given all this, the real export figures remain unclear, as does how much exports have actually brought the military.

“The military and manufacturers must feel the benefit of exports. I sincerely hope that next year will bring much better results,” he says.

In addition, on 12 October, the Ukrainian Parliament passed bill No. 15400 in the first reading. It provides for crediting the export fee to a special fund directed to the Ministry of Defense: 50% for the procurement, modernization, and repair of weapons and equipment, and 50% for the pay of Armed Forces personnel.

The bill has not yet been adopted, but Fedirko says he expects “final adoption and launch of the mechanism.”

3) Export offices: offices in Germany and Denmark

On 3 November, the Ukrainian government named the first cities for export offices: Berlin and Copenhagen. On 15 December, it again spoke of preparing an office in Berlin. In reality, Fedirko says he does not know the office’s status, and it likewise remains unclear how companies can apply to it and how many contracts it has helped close.

4) Joint ventures abroad: There are concrete results in this area

According to Fedirko, eight joint ventures have been created, five of which are already supplying products to Ukraine. He stresses that this is the result of work by Ukrainian companies, foreign partners and the state, and that it deserves recognition.

As early as February 2026, the authorities spoke of plans to create ten joint ventures in Europe within a year. At the same time, they announced Quantum Frontline Industries in Germany, with a planned annual capacity of 10,000 drones for Kyiv.

Beyond the number of ventures and deliveries, however, it is important to understand how other manufacturers can join the Build with Ukraine program.

“Who accepts applications, by what criteria are decisions made, and what support does a company receive?” Fedirko asks.

In other words, joint ventures are already delivering results, but the rules of participation and the state support mechanism must be clear to companies that want to develop production abroad.

QatarEnergy has signed two long-term agreements to purchase up to 4 million tonnes of U.S. liquefied natural gas annually from Cheniere Energy through 2054, as the Gulf producer continues to...

Investors who buy idle sanctioned tankers and refit them could put the ships back into legal oil trade, US Energy Secretary Chris Wright said on 19 October, Bloomberg reported. He laid out the plan five days after a US official described it to Reuters.

That official said the aim was to cut record tanker freight rates. The Energy Department added that any relief would not help Russia move its oil. The plan comes weeks before the 3 November midterms, with voters worried about fuel costs after gasoline and diesel prices surged in the Mideast conflict. Yet the shadow fleet is also how Russia sells oil past sanctions, and those sales fund its war against Ukraine. In December 2025, Ukraine’s foreign intelligence counted more than 1,100 tankers serving Russia alone, 226 of them under US sanctions.

An approval process Wright didn’t detail

Many sanctioned tankers sit idle, Wright told Bloomberg’s Annmarie Hordern, and buyers keep approaching the administration offering to fix them up and carry only legal oil.

“We’re going to move some of the ships from what I call the ‘bad-guy fleet’ to the ‘good-guy fleet,’” he said. “They will not carry sanctioned oil anymore.”

The ships must go through an approval process, Wright said, but he gave no criteria. He insisted “there is no removing of sanctions.”

He put the global dark fleet at about 1,600 ships, a count covering vessels that hauled Venezuelan, Iranian, and Russian oil. Dozens or even hundreds could turn legitimate, he said. The ships are no longer needed for Venezuelan oil, Wright said, and no Iranian oil is moving. Russian oil exports, he added, “are certainly not growing.”

Diesel, a waiver, and the tankers

Earlier, on 9 October, the Treasury issued General License 135, allowing some deals in Russian diesel until 7 April 2027. On 16 October, US President Donald Trump waived sanctions and tariffs under the Graham Act, leaving earlier sanctions intact. That law had directed him to review and sanction shadow-fleet vessels. Trump defended the waiver as a way to keep Moscow at the negotiating table.

House Speaker Mike Johnson told Fox News host Larry Kudlow on 18 October that he had asked the White House team to “carefully consider the unintended consequences,” The Hill reported. He added that he thought “the right decision will be made” in the end.

A tanker loaded with Russian diesel will sail for the US on Thursday as Moscow starts to implement a fuel supply deal struck by Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump, according to Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak.

Russian diesel shipments are returning to Türkiye and Brazil after Moscow lifted its export ban and the US temporarily suspended sanctions on Russian fuel supplies, Reuters reported on 20 October, citing shipping data from Kpler and LSEG.

The resumption of exports gives Russia another source of revenue to support its war against Ukraine, allowing Moscow to profit from fuel sales despite the domestic shortages that prompted its export ban. The US sanctions relief is helping Russia restore access to international buyers while its full-scale invasion continues.

According to Reuters, at least two tankers carrying Russian diesel have departed the Baltic port of Primorsk for Türkiye and Brazil in recent days. Each vessel is carrying around 300,000 barrels, according to Kpler data cited by Reuters. Morocco has also resumed importing Russian diesel since the export ban was lifted.

Russia ended its self-imposed diesel export ban on 9 October after reaching a deal with US President Donald Trump to resume fuel supplies to global markets. Moscow had introduced the ban to address domestic shortages triggered by Ukrainian drone attacks on Russian oil refineries.

Those supply problems have not been resolved, but the US temporarily lifted sanctions on Russian fuel supplies as part of the deal, allowing Moscow to prioritize export opportunities despite domestic shortages. EU and UK embargoes on Russian fuel imports remain in force.

Russian diesel exports remain below last year's levels

Russian diesel exports averaged around 345,000 barrels per day in 2026 so far, down 41% from the previous year, according to shipping data cited by Reuters. Exports had already fallen during the summer before Moscow imposed its ban.

Türkiye accounted for around 34% of Russian diesel loadings this year, followed by Brazil at 24% and Morocco at 10%, Kpler data showed.

Trump said Russia would initially export 300,000 metric tons of diesel, followed by 500,000 tons in November and 1 million tons afterward. Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak said Moscow could raise exports to as much as 3.5 million metric tons per month by the end of the year.

US seeks to ease diesel prices

The deal comes as Trump seeks to present a picture of bringing down diesel prices ahead of the US midterm elections on 3 November. Fuel prices have risen amid disruptions to global energy supplies caused by Trump's war with Iran, which has shaken oil markets and raised concerns about supply routes.

Trump has blamed Ukraine's attacks on Russian oil infrastructure for driving up energy prices, despite the broader market disruption caused by his war with Iran. The Russian diesel deal offers a way to increase global fuel supplies, but also allows Moscow to earn revenue from exports while its war against Ukraine continues.

However, the volumes from Russia initially outlined by Trump would cover only a small share of the global supply shortfall. 

Defence City, Ukraine’s special support regime for arms makers, now has 63 member companies, the Defense Ministry said in a 19 October release. That is more than double the late-May count, and Euromaidan Press calculations show the newcomers are, on average, much smaller firms.

Ukraine already buys most of its weapons at home. More than 75% of its 2025 weapons procurement budget went to domestic manufacturers. Most new weapons models cleared for military use are Ukrainian too: 892 of the 1,000 authorized from the start of 2026 to mid-June. Defence City is meant to turn that demand into more production capacity, and our calculations suggest it is now reaching smaller producers too.

Who is joining

Each resident’s figure in the ministry’s count is its qualified income, meaning revenue from selling weapons and military equipment. Applicants file details of their defense contracts for the previous calendar year with their application, the ministry’s guide shows. So the combined total changes as members join. It does not track month-to-month sales.

The 63 current residents have a combined qualified income of nearly $2.47 billion. At the end of May, 31 residents had $2 billion, the ministry reported. By July, 45 residents had over $2.07 billion, it added.

By Euromaidan Press calculations, the 32 companies added since May bring about $15 million each on average. The first 31 averaged about $64 million each. The math assumes all 31 early members remain, with unchanged figures. If they do, the newcomers are smaller producers on average, because each figure reflects a firm’s own prior-year weapons sales.

What residents get

The profit-tax break comes with a condition. Residents choose where their untaxed profit goes, but it must go to purposes the tax code allows, the ministry explained. If the money goes elsewhere, the break does not apply.

Residents also get customs incentives and state support to relocate plants and better protect production sites. They can rent state property without an auction. They can also ask to restrict access to sensitive information about them in public registries. Some defense export procedures are simplified too.

Resident status also makes a company eligible to be designated critically important to the defense industry. That lets it defer up to 100% of its staff liable for military service from the draft, the ministry noted.

To join, a company must confirm it meets the legal requirements and file an application with supporting documents. By law, the ministry has 10 working days to decide. If approved, a ministerial order grants the status, and the company enters the Defence City register.

Russia's oil exports through its Northern Sea Route (NSR) in 2026 have already exceeded last year's by nearly 50%, with some 20 million barrels shipped to Asia from the start of navigation in July to mid-October, traders said and data showed.

ANKARA, Oct 18 (Reuters) – Turkey will take some of the diesel Russia is supplying to global markets under its agreement with US President Donald Trump, Energy Minister Alparslan Bayraktar said on...

Ukrainian drones struck St. Petersburg’s oil terminal, a fuel depot, an Ozon distribution center, and a VK data center overnight, setting off fires across the city, monitoring channels reported. Russian outlet Meduza called it apparently the largest attack on the city and Leningrad Oblast since the war began. Russian officials acknowledged fires, damaged homes and substations, and power cuts.

Russia keeps fighting along the front while bombarding Ukrainian cities and the grid behind it. Ukraine’s long-range drones, in turn, target the oil exports and logistics that fund and supply that war, and Russia’s Baltic oil ports have been hit repeatedly this year. St. Petersburg is a symbolic place: Russia’s so-called second capital and Putin’s hometown.

Oil terminal and fuel depot on fire

Ukrainian forces struck the Petersburg Oil Terminal with FP-1 drones, starting a fire, Ukrainian drone maker Fire Point said. The company described the terminal as one of the region’s largest, handling 12.5 million tonnes of petroleum products a year, including for export.

Piter port and oil facility in one shot pic.twitter.com/KfptwkhsDS

— Exilenova+ (@Exilenova_plus) October 18, 2026

St. Petersburg Governor Aleksandr Beglov acknowledged fires at the terminal and in four city districts, adding that Pulkovo airport had restricted flights. By morning, firefighters were still battling blazes at the terminal, the Ruchyi oil depot, and industrial warehouses in the Kolpinsky district, he wrote. He claimed one person was killed and five injured. Ukrainian monitoring channel Exilenova+ reported that the Ruchyi depot had been burning since the night.

Ozon hub, VK data center, and a bridge

An Ozon distribution center in Kolpinsky district caught fire after the attack, the company said, Russian independent outlet Astra reported. Astra’s open-source intelligence analyst described it as one of Ozon’s busiest fulfillment centers in northwestern Russia, covering up to 79,000 m².

Ozon in St. Peterburg pic.twitter.com/tA9iwRJf7d

— Exilenova+ (@Exilenova_plus) October 18, 2026

FP-1 drones also hit a VK data center in Novosergiyevka, Leningrad Oblast, causing serious damage, Fire Point said. VK acknowledged a drone attack on the site but claimed its services were working normally. Leningrad Oblast Governor Aleksandr Drozdenko claimed air defenses downed 145 drones over the oblast alone. He acknowledged damage to the data center’s transformer equipment and warehouse complex, and minor damage to the Vostochnaya substation. Two other substations in Yanino went offline, cutting power to about 20,000 people, he said.

A drone also hit the cable-stayed bridge over the Korabelny fairway, part of a toll highway linking the city’s north and south, Exilenova+ reported, adding that the extent of the damage was still being clarified. The channel also reported a fire near a Russian Aerospace Forces radar company outside the village of Kaporskoye.

To reach St. Petersburg, Ukrainian drones had to cover 1,000 km across four Russian regions guarded by air defenses and electronic warfare, said Serhii Beskrestnov, adviser to Ukraine’s president on defense technology.

“And these are not cruise missiles with special systems, these are drones that fly at speeds of up to 200 km/h,” he wrote.

Strikes resume after a one-sided truce

The same night, Russia hit Ukraine’s grid again, and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy counted 76 Russian strikes on energy since the ceasefire was announced. US President Donald Trump declared the truce on 11 October. Ukraine paused its refinery strikes for three days at Washington’s request, but Russia struck a Kharkiv power plant within hours and kept hitting the grid. Zelenskyy then said Ukraine was resuming strikes on Russian oil and would stop again only in exchange for more US interceptors for its Patriot systems. Trump called the renewed strikes “a disgrace” and said he found Zelenskyy “more difficult to deal with than Putin.”

Ukraine has hit the St. Petersburg area before. In July, drones set fire to Wildberries warehouses near the city. In August, Ukraine began striking Ozon hubs, starting in Samara Oblast. The hubs move dual-use goods such as electronics and drone components.

By Milda Seputyte and Aaron Eglitis Oct 16, 2026 (Bloomberg) –Europe should block the transit of Russian grain through Baltic ports as that may force Moscow to seek ways to open...

Drone strikes against merchant vessels off Bulgaria have brought Russia’s war into waters bordering NATO and the European Union. With grain exports threatened, shipping costs rising and Sofia seeking allied protection, Moscow’s campaign against maritime trade risks becoming another instrument of economic and political pressure.

Russia’s expanding campaign against commercial shipping in the Black Sea is creating a security crisis that extends far beyond Ukraine. The latest drone attacks off Bulgaria’s coast have left 11 sailors missing, forced Sofia to seek assistance from NATO and the European Union, and raised concerns that Moscow is attempting to disrupt one of the world’s principal agricultural export routes.

On 13th October, the Guinea-Bissau-flagged HS Dignity sank after being struck by drones approximately 17 nautical miles east of the Bulgarian village of Krapets. Another vessel, the Ukrainian-owned, Maltese-flagged Chelsea 3, was attacked near Byala. All 15 crew members were rescued, although five sustained minor injuries. The incidents followed earlier attacks in Bulgaria’s exclusive economic zone on 6th October, when the ALFA WATAN sank and the grain-carrying ABLE was damaged.

The significance lies not simply in the destruction of merchant vessels but in the geographical expansion of the threat. Commercial routes previously regarded as comparatively safer alternatives to Ukraine’s exposed ports are now becoming operationally dangerous. Bulgaria and Romania, both NATO and EU members, face disruption to trade, maritime insurance and port operations as the conflict spreads across the western Black Sea.

Russia’s Campaign Against Maritime Trade

The latest attacks follow months of Russian strikes against Ukrainian ports, export terminals and civilian shipping. As EU Today previously reported, repeated attacks on Odesa have already reduced Ukraine’s grain-export capacity, while alternative routes through the Danube and neighbouring European countries cannot fully replace its major Black Sea terminals.

The extension of attacks towards Bulgaria changes the economic calculation. Ships carrying agricultural products, those approaching Danube ports and vessels operating between Black Sea countries now face greater uncertainty, regardless of whether they enter Ukrainian territorial waters.

Maritime security company Ambrey assessed the earlier October attacks as highly likely to have been conducted by Russian forces. Its assessment identified vessels associated with Ukrainian grain trade as the principal targets, rather than suggesting that every commercial ship was being attacked indiscriminately.

This distinction is important, but it offers little reassurance to international shipping companies. A campaign directed against Ukrainian trade can disrupt the wider maritime economy when insurers, shipowners and exporters cannot establish which routes remain safe.

The economic consequences are already becoming apparent. Shipowners must consider higher insurance premiums, additional security measures and the possibility of losing vessels and crews. Traders may redirect cargoes or withdraw from routes whose commercial returns no longer justify the risks.

Radev Confronts the Consequences of Moscow’s War

The attacks have also placed Bulgarian Prime Minister Rumen Radev in an increasingly difficult political position.

Radev has advocated renewed diplomatic engagement with Moscow and questioned the emphasis placed on military assistance to Ukraine. He has rejected accusations of being pro-Russian, presenting his approach as a pragmatic alternative to prolonged confrontation.

Yet the attacks have demonstrated the limitations of maintaining political distance from a war whose economic and security consequences are reaching Bulgarian waters.

After summoning Russian Ambassador Eleonora Mitrofanova on 13th October, Radev acknowledged that Bulgaria possessed no conclusive evidence establishing responsibility for the latest strikes. Nevertheless, he argued that their consequences benefited Russia and questioned why Ukraine would attack its own commercial vessels.

According to the Bulgarian News Agency’s account of the meeting, the prime minister also warned that higher insurance costs and shipping companies’ reluctance to serve Bulgarian ports were already damaging the national economy.

This is the fundamental change confronting Sofia. The conflict is no longer solely a question of Bulgaria’s position towards Ukraine or its diplomatic relationship with Russia. It is affecting the country’s commercial interests, energy supplies and responsibilities as a NATO member.

Radev’s response does not necessarily indicate a wholesale reversal of his previous political position. It demonstrates that the practical obligations of government can leave considerably less room for accommodation with Moscow than the arguments advanced from outside direct responsibility for national security.

Food Security Becomes Another Instrument of Pressure

The broader consequences may be felt most severely outside Europe.

Ukraine remains an important supplier of wheat, maize and vegetable oils to international markets, including countries in Africa, Asia and the Middle East. Interruptions to these exports affect more than Ukraine’s agricultural revenues. They can increase transport costs, delay deliveries and reduce the availability of competitively priced food in import-dependent countries.

Speaking at the Warsaw Security Forum on 12th October, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy warned of a possible agricultural crisis, arguing that Russian interference with Black Sea shipping could leave countries in Africa, Asia and the Middle East facing serious supply difficulties within months.

The warning reflects a mechanism already familiar from the earlier stages of Russia’s invasion. Following Moscow’s withdrawal from the UN-brokered grain agreement in July 2023, Ukrainian agricultural exporters faced renewed attacks on port infrastructure and substantial uncertainty over maritime access.

The danger is not necessarily an immediate worldwide shortage of grain. Wheat prices remained relatively steady following the 13th October incidents. Rather, sustained disruption could progressively reduce available export capacity, increase costs and place vulnerable importing countries under greater pressure.

For Moscow, such disruption could serve several purposes simultaneously: weakening Ukraine’s economy, raising the costs of international support for Kyiv and creating additional pressures on governments concerned about food inflation and social stability.

Europe’s Black Sea Security Strategy Faces a Practical Test

The immediate challenge for Brussels and NATO is how to protect commercial navigation without allowing the conflict to expand into a direct military confrontation.

Bulgaria has requested stronger air and maritime surveillance and is seeking closer coordination with Romania and Turkey. Defence Minister Dimitar Stoyanov said on 14th October that Sofia expected to join a NATO counter-drone initiative by the end of the month.

The EU has already developed a framework for addressing precisely such threats. Its Black Sea strategy, announced in May 2025, proposed a maritime security hub integrating surveillance, intelligence-sharing, infrastructure protection and regional cooperation.

The attacks now expose the difference between developing a security framework and providing effective protection to merchant vessels. Better intelligence can identify threats, but preventing further sinkings requires detection systems, coordinated responses and sufficient defensive capabilities.

Turkey’s involvement is particularly important because of its control over the Bosphorus and Dardanelles and its established role in Black Sea maritime security. Any workable regional arrangement must therefore extend beyond cooperation between Bulgaria and Romania.

The incidents occurred outside Bulgaria’s 12-nautical-mile territorial sea, meaning they do not automatically constitute an armed attack on NATO territory under Article 5. Nevertheless, repeated strikes within the economic zones of alliance members pose a substantial challenge to maritime security.

Russia’s campaign against Ukrainian exports is increasingly imposing costs on neighbouring European states and international trading partners. The question facing the EU is whether it can secure the commercial routes on which both Ukraine’s economy and the food supplies of millions beyond Europe depend.

President Donald Trump’s deal for Russian diesel exposed the US to legal questions, opened a rift with his Republican allies and European leaders and heightened tensions with Ukraine — all in exchange for an outcome that experts suggest is unlikely to succeed.

Dense heavy crude, which oil refiners around the world favor for its typically low cost, is piling up in the Americas as soaring freight rates have stifled exports and US refiners have been running close to their limits. 

By Jan Wolfe Oct 11 (Reuters) – Republican US Senator Thom Tillis on Sunday said President Donald Trump’s diesel supply deal with Russia may be illegal and will put American lives at risk, adding to bipartisan...

President Donald Trump said Friday that Russia has agreed to release millions of tons of diesel fuel into U.S. and global markets following a telephone call with Russian President Vladimir...

The Middle East has seen many explosions of violence in recent years. But while the US-Iran war has grabbed the headlines this year, the rapidly escalating conflict between the Houthis and Yemen’s internationally recognized government and Saudi Arabia risks becoming just as consequential for the region. The complexity of Yemen’s internal conflict cannot be underestimated. […]

The post How Yemen’s renewed civil war could set the whole region ablaze appeared first on Asia Times.

The war between the United States and Iran is no longer just a confrontation between Washington and Tehran. A second contest is taking shape alongside and behind it. China is not fighting the United States directly, but its economic, technological and diplomatic links to Iran are complicating Washington’s strategy and ability to win the conflict. […]

The post The China factor behind the Iran war appeared first on Asia Times.

Pakistan exported about 169,000 metric tons of rice to Saudi Arabia in 2025, worth around $163 million.

The post Pakistan, Saudi Arabia set $3 billion agricultural export target within two years appeared first on BOL News.

CHICAGO: Corn and wheat futures have rallied to their highest prices in more than three years, though the factors driving the gains for each crop remain distinctly different. Wheat futures settled Friday at $7.84 per bushel, up 3.1% on the day, after hitting an intraday peak of $7.9025, the highest level since Feb. 14, 2023. ... Read more

The post Corn, wheat prices surge to multi-year highs on divergent supply threats appeared first on BOL News.

Purchases of crude oil and petroleum products increased 58.1%.

The post Jordan’s total exports jump 14.5% in H1 as trade deficit narrows appeared first on BOL News.