Russian strikes hit targets in the Sumy, Kharkiv, Zaporizhzhia, Dnipropetrovsk, Kherson, Kyiv, Vinnytsia, Zhytomyr, Ivano-Frankivsk, Odesa, Rivne, Khmelnytskyi, Cherkasy, Chernihiv regions, and the DPR;
According to the Ukrainian Air Force, Russian forces attacked Ukraine with Iskander-M/S-400 ballistic missiles and 280 strike UAVs;
Russian forces struck an industrial enterprise, the Oakline LLC UAV assembly workshop, another UAV workshop, and the Yuzhny road-rail bridge in Kyiv;
Russian forces struck the unloading and customs terminal of Regional Logistics Centre LLC in Kharkiv;
Russian forces struck a dry cargo vessel delivering cargo to the port of Chornomorsk in the Odesa region;
Russian forces struck an energy facility in Chernivtsi;
Ukrainian losses amounted to approximately 1,115 personnel over the past 24 hours.
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Russian forces advanced toward Khatneye.
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Russian forces advanced in the tract area near Miropolye and Velyka Rybytsia.
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During the past night, Russian air defenses destroyed 222 Ukrainian drones in the rear regions;
Russian air defenses intercepted UAVs in the Novgorod, Tver, Belgorod, Bryansk, Kursk, Kaluga, Oryol, Tula, Voronezh, Smolensk, and Rostov regions, in Krasnodar Krai, in the Republic of Crimea, and over the Black Sea;
Russian air defenses intercepted UAVs in the Novgorod, Tver, Belgorod, Bryansk, Kursk, Kaluga, Oryol, Tula, Voronezh, Smolensk, Rostov regions, Krasnodar region, the Republic of Crimea, and over the Black Sea;
One person was killed and six were injured in Bryansk. Several apartment buildings were damaged;
Ukrainian drones targeted a passenger bus traveling from Simferopol to Moscow, One person was killed.
On the night of October 27, the Russian Armed Forces carried out a massive combined strike across Ukrainian territory. According to the Ukrainian Air Force, the attack involved Iskander-M/S-400 ballistic missiles and strike UAVs, 16 missiles and more than 280 drones in total. The Russian Ministry of Defense says it struck defense-industrial enterprises involved in the production of cruise missiles and UAVs, transportation infrastructure, logistics centers handling dual-use cargo, and maritime vessels used to support the Ukrainian Armed Forces.
Strikes by Region
Kyiv and Kyiv Region
• Southern Road-and-Rail Bridge. A key piece of transportation infrastructure in the capital used for the transit of cargo by road and rail. Ukrainian sources confirmed damage to the crossing, which led to a partial suspension of service on the Green Line of the metro and major transport disruption at Darnytsia Station. • UAV assembly workshop of LLC Oakline. A production site that assembled and stored Fire Point’s FP-1 and FP-2 long- and medium-range unmanned aerial vehicles. • Industrial facility producing and storing long- and medium-range UAVs. Another Kyiv site struck during the overnight attack; its specific name has not been disclosed. • UAV assembly workshop producing and storing long- and medium-range fixed-wing unmanned aerial vehicles.
Kharkiv Region
• Unloading and customs terminal of the Regional Logistics Center company. A logistics facility where, according to the Russian Ministry of Defense, military supplies, dual-use cargo intended for the Ukrainian Armed Forces, and reconnaissance and strike UAVs were stored and distributed.
• Electronics manufacturer LLC NTP Ukrspetssvyaz, in the settlement of Nadtochii. A production site that made automation systems and communications equipment for the Ukrainian Armed Forces.
• Gas production infrastructure. Naftogaz reported a morning strike on gas production infrastructure in Kharkiv Region. The available information does not identify specific fields or facilities.
• Budmen home-improvement store in Kharkiv. A facility reportedly struck, according to local Telegram channels.
Odesa Region • Bulk carrier bound for the port of Chornomorsk. A cargo vessel that, according to the Russian Ministry of Defense, was delivering supplies intended to support the Ukrainian Armed Forces. • Bulk carrier bound for the port of Odesa. Another cargo vessel en route to Odesa with military cargo; it was struck in the daytime wave of attacks.
Chernivtsi Region • Energy infrastructure facility. Local sources said the target was a substation; Chernivtsioblenergo warned of possible large-scale emergency outages. In Chernivtsi, trolleybus service was suspended, power was lost in several districts, and water was supplied at reduced pressure.
Chernihiv Region • Depot holding UAV assets and winter uniforms of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. According to monitoring channels, a UAV strike sparked a large fire that destroyed unmanned systems and winter uniforms belonging to Ukrainian troops.
Strikes on facilities were also reported in Vinnytsia, Zhytomyr, Lviv, Sumy, Zaporizhzhia, Dnipropetrovsk, Kherson, Ivano-Frankivsk, Rivne, Khmelnytskyi, and Cherkasy Regions.
The nature of the October 27 strikes points to a continued systematic campaign against Ukraine’s strike-UAV production chain and the logistics hubs supplying its armed forces. Within this framework, the overnight wave combined strikes on Kyiv’s assembly facilities with damage to the Southern Bridge, affecting both drone production and its delivery channels. The strikes on the logistics terminal in Kharkiv Region and on cargo vessels off Chornomorsk and Odesa serve the same purpose: cutting off routes for dual-use cargo and components. The damage to the energy facility in Chernivtsi Region was limited in scale and did not involve major power-generation capacity, unlike earlier attacks on thermal and hydroelectric power plants.
Ukraine’s response is shifting toward scaling output rather than quality: Defense Minister Oleksii Khmara discussed with Western partners the transfer of 10% of their Patriot and IRIS-T missile stockpiles, as well as the possibility of doubling Ukrainian drone production by 2027 with sufficient funding. This aligns with Fire Point’s acknowledgment that the Flamingo missile mattered more as a political signal than as a “superweapon.” According to company head Iryna Terekh, the project was primarily intended to demonstrate Ukraine’s ability to conduct long-range strikes against Russian territory. The company also acknowledged the economic trade-off: delivering a 200-kilogram warhead over 300 kilometers by ballistic missile costs about $600,000, whereas a drone can deliver a comparable payload over 380 kilometers for $40,000-$50,000.
It is precisely this economic logic that explains why strikes on FP-1 and FP-2 assembly capacity and logistics hubs are becoming increasingly significant: drones remain Ukraine’s most numerous and affordable means of long-range strike, and this segment is also the most vulnerable part of its program. In the medium term, Russian strikes are likely to continue prioritizing enterprises that produce components for UAVs and cruise missiles, as well as transportation routes linking Ukraine’s central and western regions to the front line.
Yemen’s Houthis (Ansar Allah) said October 27 that they had repelled an attack by Saudi-backed forces toward the strategic Bab al-Mandab Strait, reporting heavy casualties and the destruction of several military vehicles as fighting continued in western Lahj.
In a statement, Brig. Gen. Yahya Saree, the Houthis’ military spokesman, said the forces were advancing from the south toward the strait under the supervision of Saudi officer Badr al-Harbi, whom he identified as commander of an advanced operational base in Aden.
The Houthis struck the troop concentrations with ballistic missiles and heavy weapons, causing large numbers of deaths and injuries, while ambulances rushed to the targeted areas, Saree said. The spokesman added that Houthi forces went on to destroy a number of military vehicles and thwart the advance.
“We warn those being misled against responding to calls from the Saudi enemy and its officers, who are pushing them into the furnaces of death,” Saree concluded.
The latest failed Saudi-backed attack follows a series of reported Houthi advances in western Lahj over the past several days.
On October 25, the Houthi-aligned Yemen Press Agency, citing southern political figure Adel al-Hasani, reported that the group had secured Wadi al-Nabiq after fierce clashes and was advancing toward al-Shatein, in the al-Mudharaba and Ras al-Arah districts.
The very next day, the agency reported that the Houthis had advanced beyond the Kahboub mountain range after positions held by the 31st Amaliqa Brigade collapsed, with remaining fighters withdrawing toward Aden.
Reports that surfaced around the same time Saree issued his latest statement described a further Houthi push toward al-Suqayyah following the reported gains around Kahboub.
The fighting has focused on the highlands and coastal routes of western Lahj, where control of the Kahboub range and surrounding areas could strengthen the Houthis’ positions along the southern approaches to Bab al-Mandab. The group captured the strategic coastal region in a lightning offensive last month.
During the past 24 hours, Iranian forces attacked several oil tankers in the Strait of Hormuz;
Iranian Armed Forces Chief of Staff Ali Abdollahi warned that vessels violating Iran’s designated maritime routes and transit procedures in the Strait of Hormuz could face serious damage;
Iran’s Persian Gulf Strait Authority threatened action against South Korea’s Sinokor Shipping Company over repeated violations of Iran’s Strait of Hormuz transit rules;
The UKMTO reported a vessel on fire 63nm southeast of Al-Faw, Iraq, on October 26.
Yemen’s Houthis (Ansar Allah) on October 27 claimed a series of missile and drone attacks against Saudi Arabia, including a ballistic missile strike on the Ras Tanura refinery that it said caused massive fires.
Brig. Gen. Yahya Saree, the group’s military spokesman, said in a statement that the group had struck the refinery in Saudi Arabia’s Eastern Province with a ballistic missile, describing the strike as precise and claiming it caused “massive fires” at the site.
Bloomberg News, citing a person familiar with the matter, reported that Saudi Arabia had contained a fire near the Ras Tanura oil terminal early in the day. The extent of the damage was unclear, and Saudi authorities had not confirmed that the refinery itself had been struck.
A resident of the nearby city of Al Khobar told Agence France-Presse that he received a mobile phone alert before hearing an explosion.
In a separate statement, Saree said that Houthi forces had targeted two military transport aircraft with ballistic missiles, one at Najran Airport and the other at King Khalid Air Base in Khamis Mushait. He said both operations had “achieved their objectives successfully.”
Saree subsequently claimed that a ballistic missile had struck Saudi Arabia’s Ministry of Defense in Riyadh, describing the impact as a “direct hit.”
In the fourth statement, he said the Houthis had targeted Abha International Airport with a drone, claiming the strike was precise and had disrupted air traffic at the airport.
Saudi authorities had not immediately confirmed the claimed strikes on the military aircraft, Defense Ministry or Abha airport.
The Saudi-led coalition said during the day that it had intercepted and destroyed three ballistic missiles launched toward the kingdom’s Eastern Province and four drones directed toward its southern regions.
Saudi Civil Defense issued early-warning alerts in the Eastern Province and Kharj governorate before announcing that the danger had passed.
In a separate report, Reuters said the coalition had also announced the interception and destruction of two ballistic missiles launched toward Riyadh. Saudi Civil Defense authorities briefly issued an air raid alert in the capital.
The latest Houthi strikes on Saudi Arabia come amid reports that the kingdom is seeking a negotiated end to the confrontation. Israel Hayom reported on October 26, citing unnamed Gulf diplomatic sources, that Riyadh had offered the group $1 billion through Iran in exchange for a ceasefire and an end to strikes on Saudi territory.
It don’t mean a thing if it ain’t got that Brazilian swing. The stakes couldn’t be higher: a matter of do or die. So Brazilians hit the streets – and the polling stations – and managed to pull it off.
They did nothing less than tame the Mother of All Hybrid Wars and defeat, even momentarily, a powerful, toxic coalition including the full force of the “Donroe Doctrine” administration; Silicon Valley techno-feudalism, especially deployed by Meta; Wall Street and the Goddess of the Market; the multiple tentacles of Zionism Inc.; the old reactionary elites – and their media; the new bling-bling elites; the evangelical dementia; and last but not least, a mediocre neo-fascist dynasty bent on converting Brazil into an extractivist neo-colony to the benefit of His Master’s Voice.
The – soothing – effect is similar to an Antônio Carlos Jobim bossa nova anthem sung by Frank Sinatra. Yes, Brazil is too big – and too wild – to be anyone’s backyard. And what a turnaround, when it comes to Lula personally: geopolitics hasn’t seen a comeback like this since the Battle of Stalingrad.
We lost: so the election was “rigged”
Election Day dawned in nail-biting territory – but with Flávio Bolsonaro still given an 82% chance of winning, according to DARPA darlings Polymarket. It’s as if the Deep State knew the result in advance – just like in the first round of voting.
Yet in the end Lula won by 4.4 million votes. Not without plenty of drama. Just before the polls closed, a Supreme Court justice – formerly Lula’s personal lawyer during the Car Wash corruption case – extended voting nationwide by two hours. The electoral court should have ruled on this. It didn’t because another Supreme Court justice – Bolsonaro-appointed – was dragging his feet over it.
The extension was vital – because by then it had already been proven that Bolsonarist mayors were deliberately hobbling public transport, especially buses, in Lula strongholds like Salvador in Bahia: a tactic straight from the oligarchic sabotage playbook, used to suppress the popular vote.
The key fact is that both campaigns had asked for a voting extension. And that completely undercuts claims by Bolsonarist and MAGA-linked twats that the election was “rigged.”
Predictably, Flávio Bolsonaro is refusing to concede and wants the election annulled. That won’t happen – according to the same Bolsonaro-appointed justice who was dragging his feet in the first place.
In the second round, Lula increased his vote total by over 10.1 million votes, while Bolsonaro got only 3.6 million more. Add to that a near improbability: there were over 1.8 million fewer (italics mine) null and void ballots compared to the first round – and the overwhelming majority went to Lula.
Several reasons explain the performance by the Comeback Kid – or Grandpa. Starting with massive popular mobilization: abstention fell from 21.08% to 19.21%. Nearly 3 million more people showed up at the polls.
Lula expanded his margins where he was strong – in the Northeast – and reduced his losses in the wealthy Southeast.
Lula’s campaign deployed serious self-correction: instead of focusing on the past – the practical results of his government – he started talking about the dire, present reality: family economics; huge levels of indebtedness; the cost of living; salaries; and even advancing concrete proposals for the next four years.
The digital mobilization campaign was something to watch – complete with a lethal weapon unleashed on WhatsApp: the “Lula’s Army” channel, which went from about 50,000 followers to a whopping 10 million in less than three weeks: a de facto digital infantry. Brazil is one of the most connected nations on the planet.
Spearheaded by newly elected Congressman André Janones, the campaign showed how Lula beat techno-feudalist hegemon Meta at its own game: the strategy will be studied in the annals of political science for generations.
And then there’s Flávio Bolsonaro’s stunning incompetence – a deadly mix of arrogance and ignorance which simply could not be sold as a moderate alternative.
Only two days before the runoff, during the last, crucial debate, Bolsonaro, live, in front of the whole nation and millions of undecided voters, called Lula “the 9 fingers” – mocking his physical disability.
Lula crafted the blowback in real time like a cobra. He recalled how he lost his pinkie at 19 in a metalworking press, a victim of the precarity and lack of safety that millions of workers in Brazil endure: “Something very different from you, Bolsonaro, who has never worked.”
That sealed it: the lost pinkie as the definitive symbol of dignity in the face of privilege.
This is gonna get very ugly
Governing Brazil will be a Sisyphean task for Lula’s fourth term. The Senate (81 seats) is controlled by the extreme right (48 seats): an absolute majority. In Congress, the extreme right has 303 seats (way above the majority at 257), the center has 86 seats, and the left only 124 seats. Any reform, budget, or law will face an Iron Wall.
Arguably the best definition of Lula was once offered by the late great El Comandante, Fidel Castro:
“He was never a leftist extremist, nor did he rise to the status of revolutionary from philosophical positions, but from those of a worker of very humble origin and Christian faith, who worked hard creating surplus value for others.”
Lula, now in his eighties, seems to have recovered that spark. There’s no question he knows very well how this massive defeat for Trump, MAGA and the Donroe Doctrine will force him to summon all of his powers – to organize Brazil while containing the out-of-control fury of the Empire.
Whatever the results in the US midterms next week, Trump will inevitably ramp up sanctions and/or tariffs against Brazil and will continue to pull out all the stops and launch dirty operations to destabilize the country. The CIA and the Deep State are deeply enmeshed in the Brazilian reality and able to unleash an unlimited bag of dirty tricks.
Lula knows: this will get very ugly.
In sum, Lula may be characterized as personifying a Catholic, traditional, Lusophone-mestizo and progressive Brazil.
This is in a frontal clash with the reactionary, evangelical neo-Pentecostal, Anglo-American Zionist axis. After all, neo-Pentecostalists carry the lunatic End Times theology that shaped Anglo-American Christian Zionism.
Flávio Bolsonaro – like all clan members – promised to move Brazil’s embassy to Jerusalem; dismissed BRICS as “highly ideological”; and attacked Lula’s relationship with Iran (also a BRICS member). Flávio, an empty shell, may have lost an election. Yet the infernal machine behind him will never give up.
As Fortis expands its facility along the Fraser, local air pollution is expected to worsen.
Emissions from the site of a recently approved LNG expansion in Metro Vancouver are projected to exceed Canadian ambient air quality standards for nitrogen dioxide, a harmful pollutant, according to company reports.
Last month, the provincial and federal governments approved FortisBC’s plan to further expand Tilbury, its decades-old LNG facility in North Delta, helping to turn it from a domestically focused, small-scale operation into a large export-oriented facility.
The province described the newly approved expansion as a “clean energy” project.
During the commissioning phase and when the facility’s equipment is malfunctioning, nitrogen dioxide levels in parts of Richmond, Delta and Vancouver are projected to be between three and 16 times above Canada’s guidelines for maximum hourly emissions. That estimate doesn’t include the cumulative impacts of emissions from Tilbury’s other, already approved expansions at the site.
During ongoing operations, Fortis predicts the site and associated marine traffic will slightly exceed national standards for average annual nitrogen dioxide levels, indicating the potential for long-term, chronic exposure. Those exceedances are expected to extend across schools, homes and child-care centres in southern Richmond.
Those elevated annual levels are expected even after factoring in significant reductions in the project’s predicted nitrogen dioxide emissions from yet-to-be-determined mitigation efforts Fortis says it will employ. If those mitigation efforts are unsuccessful, Tilbury’s emissions could be even higher.
The company has not yet made its final investment decision to proceed with the project, and some permits are still pending, but the recent approvals signal the federal and provincial governments are willing to allow the expansion to proceed.
The Tilbury expansion “has the potential to deliver significant economic and environmental benefits for B.C., and jobs for British Columbians,” Minister of Energy and Climate Solutions Adrian Dix said in a press release announcing the project’s approval.
But Tilbury’s projected nitrogen dioxide emissions suggest potential health implications from the expanded facility.
According to Canada’s Environment Ministry, long-term nitrogen dioxide exposure can increase susceptibility to respiratory infections, increase risks of developing asthma, affect cardiovascular health, lead to reproductive issues and increase the risk of premature death.
In an emailed statement, FortisBC told the Tyee: “The Tilbury Phase 2 LNG Expansion project will be built and operated in accordance with all municipal, provincial, and federal guidelines.” It added that the project must meet regulatory requirements by various levels of government.
A provincial spokesperson said government communications staff are unable to comment during the ongoing election period.
Emissions are predicted to increase
The Tilbury facility has produced LNG on site since the 1970s, relying on the liquefied fuel’s condensed form to store enough gas near the province’s urban centre to boost the region’s energy supplies during cold snaps. It was a low-profile operation, producing a small amount of LNG per year, mostly to supply local demand.
Just over a decade ago, Fortis began moving its expansion forward in a piecemeal fashion. The company first applied to build a new, bigger storage tank and to increase its liquefaction capacity in a project it called Phase 1A. In 2024, the province also approved the company’s plan to build a marine jetty that would allow export tankers into the river for the first time. This July, the province provided a regulatory exemption to support another expansion of the site’s storage and liquefaction capacity that Fortis has dubbed Phase 1B. The newly approved Phase 2 project will further expand liquefaction at the site, increasing the facility’s total production to 3.5 million tonnes of LNG per year.
LNG facilities like Tilbury use energy-intensive compressors to turn natural gas into a liquid state. Fortis plans to power its compressors with electricity, reducing some emissions during the process. But the company didn’t decide to electrify its hot oil heater, citing uncertainty about energy supply and the cost of power connection upgrades.
In the section of its application discussing its decision to choose gas to power its oil heater, Fortis wrote that “although electrification is seen as a ‘green choice’ and may reduce public opposition to the proposed project, early analysis suggests that there may not be adequate electrical power available to support the proposed project without significant capital upgrades.”
Fortis wrote that the upgrades could compromise the project’s schedule and commercial viability.
Other new components will also produce emissions, including a ground flare stack and acid gas incinerator. Together with the hot oil heater, these parts of the project are expected to produce the bulk of the expansion’s anticipated nitrogen dioxide pollutants.
“Just because you use electric compressors doesn’t mean you have zero emissions,” said Tim Takaro, a physician and researcher with Simon Fraser University and a member of the Canadian Association of Physicians for the Environment.
Pollutants from those systems will add to an already compromised airshed, Takaro said, noting that the region has one of the highest concentrations of nitrogen dioxide in the province.
“They’re already stretched in terms of air quality,” Takaro said.
Although Fortis describes Tilbury’s ground flare as “totally enclosed,” the facility will include a 200-metre open stack surrounding a low flare, meaning its exhaust will still enter the airshed.
When added to the existing pollution in the airshed, Tilbury’s Phase 1A and 1B expansions are anticipated to push nitrogen dioxide levels in the surrounding area above the federal government’s threshold for acceptable emissions, indicating possible short-term, acute exposures.
The company’s estimated maximum nitrogen dioxide emissions during commissioning and malfunctions are predicted to significantly exceed regulatory limits beyond the project’s immediate vicinity, including areas of Richmond, Delta and Vancouver and other parts of Metro Vancouver up to 11 kilometres from the project.
These kinds of disruptions have been ongoing at Canada’s only major LNG facility, LNG Canada, leading to high rates of flaring and bursts of black smoke — a sign that uncombusted or partially combusted gas is being released into the airshed.
Those unburned pollutants are particularly dangerous because they can include volatile organic compounds such as benzene, a potent carcinogen that has no safe threshold, said Dr. Melissa Lem, a Vancouver family physician and past president of the Canadian Association of Physicians for the Environment.
Fortis’s application said its production of volatile organic compounds in the airshed would be “negligible.”
According to Fortis’s application, it expects to vent unburned gas from the facility during mechanical disruptions and during commissioning, when the company expects it will not yet have its flare system installed.
When existing emissions and emissions from Tilbury’s various expansions and associated marine traffic such as LNG tankers are combined, the site is estimated to produce average annual nitrogen dioxide levels slightly exceeding national guidelines, indicating sustained long-term exposure to the pollutant near the facility.
The projections assume potential reductions from a set of mitigation measures for the Phase 2 expansion. According to Fortis, these measures “are not intended to represent final design commitments or regulatory conditions.” Fortis added that it is “exploring an emissions mitigation strategy” to meet air quality standards. The province called for an air quality management plan in its list of conditions for approving Tilbury’s application, including details on how it plans to reduce emissions and the technologies it plans to use.
Climate concerns
Besides local pollution, Lem noted that Tilbury’s forthcoming climate emissions would also have consequences for human health.
Additional emissions from Tilbury’s Phase 2 expansion and its associated upstream gas fracking activity are expected to produce about one million tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent per year, around 13 per cent of Metro Vancouver’s total target emissions by 2030.
About 800 people die prematurely every year in Vancouver due to air pollution, according to Tyee reporting from 2021. Pollution from wildfire smoke made more likely by climate change is a large part of the city’s air hazards.
“The fossil fuel industry doesn’t have to deal with patients on the frontlines when climate change drives all these harms,” Lem said. “Doctors and nurses, we are on the frontlines when wildfire smoke rolls in and people are having asthma attacks and high risk of anxiety and depression.”
Lem said the federal and provincial governments’ recent Tilbury approval is a mistake.
“If they were adhering to science, they would not be approving new fossil fuel projects like this Tilbury project,” she said.
Safety risks
The project’s location alongside the narrow, heavily trafficked Fraser River has also raised safety concerns among locals, including from Kelly Greene, the NDP’s MLA for Richmond-Steveston, a riding located just downriver from the Tilbury site. Greene, who was also the province’s minister of emergency management and climate readiness, cited her opposition to the project in a statement announcing she would not seek re-election.
“While no industrial activity is without risk, my work in emergency management taught me that low-probability events can still have profound impacts, particularly when they occur in densely populated or environmentally sensitive areas,” she wrote in a statement posted to LinkedIn.
“I remain deeply concerned about risks posed by the Tilbury LNG shipping channel and have advocated for better safety standards for a decade.”
Like Greene, Richmond Coun. Michael Wolfe worries about the safety risks from Tilbury’s riverside locale.
“It’s just a remarkably challenging environment for boats,” he told The Tyee.
The Society of International Gas Tanker and Terminal Operators advises that vessels carrying LNG avoid “long, narrow inland waterways… due to greater navigation risk.”
Alhough Tilbury’s operations are long-standing, the expansion project means international LNG carriers will enter the Fraser for the first time. Fortis’s application estimates the tankers will be about 300 metres long — roughly the size of three football fields.
Spills and explosions related to LNG production remain rare, but when they occur, their consequences can be profound. Supercooled and compressed LNG can explode when it comes into contact with water and rapidly changes from liquid to gas.
When it leaks, LNG can remain as heavier-than-air vapour that can travel long distances before it dissipates. Under certain conditions, that vapour can ignite if it contacts an ignition source, as it did at the Freeport LNG facility in Texas in 2022.
Wolfe noted that Tilbury sits adjacent to a jet fuel terminal on the other side of the river. “If one of these sites has a major event, it’s going to compromise all the other ones in the area,” he said.
“It’s absolutely crazy to think that people will do that and not care about the future generations.”
Hezbollah has spent the past three months rebuilding its military capabilities and preparing for a possible resumption of hostilities with Israel, following an influx of funding from Iran, Reuters reported on October 26, citing Lebanese security officials familiar with the group’s activities.
The group has focused on acquiring explosives and producing drones capable of attacking Israeli positions, according to two Lebanese security sources, who said that the group has also been working to restore command-and-control structures damaged during its previous battles with Israeli forces.
One of the security sources and another person close to Hezbollah said Iran had provided the group with tens of millions of dollars to strengthen its military capabilities.
The funding comes in addition to roughly $200 million Tehran provided to help displaced families in Hezbollah’s Shiite strongholds, Reuters reported earlier this month.
Hezbollah suffered heavy losses during two wars since 2023, and Israeli forces continue to occupy vast parts of southern Lebanon as a so-called “security zone.”
Hezbollah’s rearmament efforts come amid continued regional tensions following U.S.-Israeli strikes on Iran in February. The group opened fire on Israel on March 2 in support of Tehran, prompting an Israeli offensive that killed more than 4,000 people in Lebanon and displaced roughly a quarter of the country’s population.
Hostilities largely subsided over the summer after an interim agreement between Washington and Tehran included a ceasefire in Lebanon, while the U.S. mediated talks between Beirut and Jerusalem.
Full-scale fighting has not resumed despite the subsequent collapse of the U.S.-Iranian agreement, but Israel has continued striking Hezbollah targets in southern Lebanon.
Hezbollah is now preparing for the possibility that renewed U.S.-Iranian fighting could trigger another round of war on the Lebanese front, according to Reuters. However, the Lebanese security sources told the news agency that the group had not yet fully rebuilt its weapons stockpiles or restored its fighting force.
The group has also faced difficulties repairing its command structure after losses in key areas, including around the southern Lebanese town of Bint Jbeil and the strategically important Ali al-Taher ridge, according to the sources and three other security officials familiar with its operations.
Hezbollah’s use of small units and limited anti-tank missile supplies reportedly left some fighters isolated during those battles, making it difficult for them to counter Israeli remotely operated weapons systems, including drones and remote-controlled vehicles.
The Israeli military told Reuters that it uses such systems to monitor southern Lebanon while reducing the exposure of its troops to danger.
The rearmament effort has also involved explosives intended for use in drones. Hezbollah acknowledged this month that explosives seized by Lebanese authorities belonged to the group and were intended for attacks against Israel.
A Hezbollah official and a Lebanese security source told Reuters that the material was specifically intended for explosive-laden drones.
In response to questions from Reuters, Hezbollah’s media office said Israel’s presence on Lebanese territory gave the group a legitimate right to resist. It also rejected claims that its command-and-control systems had broken down.
While Hezbollah has suffered heavy losses as the Reuters report suggests, the claim that the group is overall getting weaker does not match its performance during the last round of fighting, when it expanded the use of drones, especially first-person-view suicide quadcopters, inflicting some serious damage on Israeli forces and limiting their freedom of operation in southern Lebanon.
Hezbollah is not likely to start another confrontation with Israel if war on Iran resumes. However, Israel itself could escalate to expand its occupation.
This is the newest update of the ‘U.S. Carrier Strike Groups Locations Map’ exclusive series showing the approximate locations of U.S. Carrier Strike Groups. SouthFront: Analysis & Intelligence tracks locations of U.S. aircraft carriers using the available open-source information. No classified information was used in production of the map.
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Carrier strike group (CSG) is an operational formation of the United States Navy. It is centered on an aircraft carrier and a carrier air wing of 65 to 70 aircrafts. It’s composed of roughly 7,500 personnel, an aircraft carrier, at least one cruiser, a destroyer squadron of at least two destroyers and/or frigates. A carrier strike group also, on occasion, includes submarines, attached logistics ships and a supply ship. Carrier strike groups comprise a principal element of U.S. power projection over the world’s oceans
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Europe and Russia are entering a phase in which diplomatic expulsions and explosives-laden drones at airports are no longer treated as exceptions. Germany is openly preparing its hospitals for an influx of wounded personnel, while the assessed threat of sabotage has officially been raised. Meanwhile, expensive energy and competition are costing European industry production capacity and jobs. Under these conditions, an external conflict offers a convenient way to blame economic failures on a foreign enemy. The question is no longer whether escalation is taking place, but how far the two sides are prepared to go before it slips beyond their control.
The autumn of 2026 has brought a series of developments that take the confrontation between Russia and Europe beyond the familiar boundaries of ‘hybrid warfare’. In August, drones carrying explosives were discovered at Leipzig/Halle Airport. The German authorities formally blamed Russia, describing the incident as ‘crossing a red line’ with potentially lethal consequences. Berlin closed Russia’s consulate-general in Bonn and its cultural center. Moscow responded by closing the German consulate in St. Petersburg.
In September, another drone carrying explosives was found near Wunstorf airbase. The Bundeswehr subsequently raised its assessment of the threat from Russian sabotage to ‘significant’, the second-highest level, for the first time. German intelligence services warn that further attacks are likely. Meanwhile, arson attacks have been reported at drone manufacturing facilities in Estonia, Poland and Slovakia, alongside drone incidents over military installations and civilian airports across Europe.
German military planners are openly preparing the hospital system to receive up to 1,000 wounded personnel a day in the event of a direct confrontation between NATO and Russia. Underground medical bunkers are being brought back into service, including one in Ulm with capacity for 2,000 people. Civilian surgeons are being trained to treat blast injuries and burns, while coordination between military and civilian hospitals is being strengthened. Diplomatic expulsions, consular closures, accusations of sabotage and preparations for mass casualties together suggest that both sides are already operating according to the logic of an ‘undeclared war’.
Military and diplomatic tensions, however, are only one part of the picture. The economic conditions in which this escalation is unfolding, and the political purpose it serves, are more consequential.
Europe’s economy is facing a deep structural crisis that can no longer be concealed behind reports celebrating the ‘green transition’. TTF benchmark gas prices are hovering around €87–88 per MWh, approximately 174% higher than a year earlier. EU gas storage facilities are just 71–74% full, among the lowest mid-October levels of the past decade, compared with around 83% last year. Germany’s position is even weaker, with storage levels fluctuating around 57–60%.
Electricity and fuel costs are putting pressure on the entire supply chain. Annual energy inflation reached almost 19% in September, while average diesel prices across the EU climbed to €2.14–2.23 per liter. Industrial energy costs are four to five times those faced by American competitors. Chemical plants and metal producers, particularly in Germany and northern Italy, are being forced to cut output or shut down production facilities. Industrial production in the eurozone continues to fall; in Germany, it is already almost 10% below its 2021 level. Industry’s share of EU GDP has declined from 17.4% to 14.3%.
The pressure extends to agriculture. Fertilizer prices have risen by more than 13%, while farmers’ energy costs have increased by around 22%. At the same time, the prices farmers receive for their produce are falling. This raises the risk of a poorer harvest in 2027 and a second wave of food inflation. Farmers in several countries are already warning that their operations are becoming commercially unviable, while transport costs are making many deliveries unprofitable.
The situation resembles a familiar scheme: a warehouse owner who has spent years stealing stock eventually sets fire to the building and tells investigators that everything was destroyed ‘by accident’. European governments have spent years pursuing policies that have made energy expensive, imposed excessive regulation and applied sanctions whose heaviest impact has fallen on their own industry and agriculture. Now, as gas, electricity, diesel and fertilizer bills squeeze businesses and households, and Chinese competitors capture market share, an external conflict offers a convenient excuse.
War, or even the prospect of war, allows rising prices, factory closures, cuts to social spending and budget shortfalls to be blamed on an ‘external aggressor’. Instead of acknowledging mistakes in energy and industrial policy, governments invoke the ‘price of freedom’ and the ‘defense of democracy’. The further tensions escalate, the easier it becomes to explain to the public why housing, food and heating cost more, and why industrial jobs are disappearing.
The current situation brings together two parallel developments. Tensions are rising through sabotage incidents, diplomatic expulsions, higher threat assessments and preparations for hospitals to receive large numbers of wounded personnel. At the same time, European elites need a convenient external explanation for economic failure. High gas and electricity prices, low storage levels, expensive diesel, rising fertilizer costs and shrinking industrial output are already a reality. Escalation creates political capital for those responsible for costly mistakes in energy and industrial policy over recent years. It allows them to shift the discussion from domestic policy failures to an ‘external threat’, postponing accountability.
This logic itself increases the risk of an uncontrolled shift from ‘hybrid’ operations to direct confrontation. As long as European governments prefer preparing hospitals for thousands of casualties to reconsidering their energy and industrial policies, the practice of ‘burning down the warehouse to conceal the missing stock’ continues. The remaining question is how far the two sides are prepared to go before the cost becomes too high for European societies themselves.
Iran has threatened action against South Korean shipping group Sinokor beginning November 1 over violations of Tehran’s transit rules for the Strait of Hormuz.
In a statement, the Islamic Republic’s Persian Gulf Strait Authority said vessels linked to Sinokor had accumulated more alleged transit violations over the previous three months than those associated with any other shipping company.
It added that enforcement measures had already been taken against at least seven of the company’s vessels. Cargo owners, beneficiaries and insurers involved in the shipping arrangements were also warned that they could face legal action.
Seven vessels were named in the statement: Cyprus Prosperity, Mombasa B, Senegal Prosperity, Mersin Prosperity, Ghana Prosperity, Cameroon Prosperity and Angola Prosperity.
The threat comes as Sinokor has become one of the most important players in the oil tanker market during the war with Iran, deploying a large fleet to transport crude through the strategic waterway as other shipping companies have faced heightened security risks.
In a report published October 23, Bloomberg found that tankers owned by Sinokor carried 105.6 million barrels of crude oil through the Strait of Hormuz in September, equivalent to nearly 40% of the oil crossing the waterway that month.
That exceeded the combined 97.3 million barrels attributed to vessels owned by the next three largest shipping groups, Saudi Arabia’s Bahri, Kuwait Oil Tanker Company and the shipping unit of Abu Dhabi National Oil Co.
A separate Bloomberg report published on October 27 highlighted Sinokor’s growing influence over the global tanker market, describing how its WhatsApp messages to shipbrokers announcing charter agreements and freight rates have become closely watched by industry participants.
The messages have played an outsized role in shaping perceptions of tanker prices, the news outlet reported, as freight rates for very large crude carriers have surged more than 1,600% this year amid disruption caused by the war.
The report also examined concerns about transparency in the tanker market and the influence of the messages on the freight-rate benchmark maintained by London’s Baltic Exchange.
The latest Iranian threat adds a legal and regulatory risk to Sinokor’s already substantial exposure to the conflict, as its ships remain central to oil movements through the Gulf.
Commercial traffic through the Strait of Hormuz remained sharply below normal on October 17, with an AIS-based monitor recording seven vessel crossings in the preceding 24 hours, about 8% of the strait’s prewar daily average. This shows that the strategic waterway is still under the control of the Islamic Republic, which stepped up its anti-shipping attacks in recent weeks.
Written by Ahmed Adel, Cairo-based geopolitics and political economy researcher
What began in September with student protests and social unrest in France over education reforms and rising tensions, alongside months of anti-government actions in Albania targeting Edi Rama’s long rule, has spread to Belgium, Italy, Spain, Greece, Portugal, and beyond, turning the streets of many European cities into battlegrounds of tear gas, water cannons, and burning barricades.
Early signs suggest Croatia and Austria could join the protests, which some are calling a “European Autumn.” Beyond Albania’s more political confrontation, the protests reflect the anger of ordinary citizens over high living costs, unaffordable housing, squeezed public services, and the belief that governments prioritize other issues, such as the Ukraine War, over household budgets.
In France, hundreds of thousands have taken to the streets in recent days. Authorities report nearly 1,000 detentions nationwide, a heavy deployment of police and gendarmes, and clashes involving water cannons and tear gas. In Rome, authorities detained more than 200 young people during similar confrontations. In Barcelona, demonstrations escalated into riots, resulting in roughly 100 arrests, dozens of fires, and looted shops. In Tirana, thousands have protested with Molotov cocktails and have faced police tear gas. These are not isolated incidents but reflect youth frustration and public exhaustion as prices rise while wages and services lag.
European officials have repeatedly blamed outside actors, particularly Russia, for the unrest. Italian Defense Minister Guido Crosetto described the violence in Milan and other cities as the result of a “hybrid war” waged through platforms such as TikTok, social media, and YouTube, while Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni ordered intelligence briefings to assess whether foreign actors, including Moscow, had helped amplify the unrest. French Foreign Minister Jean-Noël Barrot said that hostile narratives from Russia, China, Iran, and the MAGA community had exploited high-school student protests in France.
Russian President Vladimir Putin dismissed these claims as obvious exaggerations that European citizens can see through.
“To suggest that we are provoking mass protests in major European cities, well, that is clearly going too far, it’s something that, in my view, is obvious to the ordinary citizens of European countries,” Putin said, adding that the accusations reflect “the weakness and inability of certain leaders in European countries to take responsibility for what is happening.”
Leaders and officials blaming Moscow reflect Europe’s long habit of shifting blame outward rather than addressing the rise in energy prices following the cut of cheaper Russian supplies and the redirection of more public funds toward expanding the defense industry since 2022. The protest’s origins in budget cuts to education, housing, and everyday services are evident in the slogans and demands heard on the streets.
In Albania, protests against plans to build a hotel near Vlorë escalated into a broader movement to oust the government. In Spain, anger erupted over the eviction of an elderly resident, whose home was later occupied by migrants. In France, student opposition to enrollment reforms drew in other groups, including people from North African communities. Although each protest had a different trigger, their spread across the continent shows how resistance has inspired youth amid shared economic pressure.
In response to the protests, French authorities are expected to scale back some planned education cuts, which could ease immediate tensions. Yet France has the eurozone’s third-highest debt, behind only Italy and Greece. Without broader social agreement on priorities—including affordable energy, housing supply, and avoiding wasteful defense spending—the protests are likely to continue. Immigration pressures and social divisions further reinforce the sense that resources are being misdirected.
Politically, the unrest accelerates polarization already underway in France. Centrist parties continue to lose ground as voters move toward left- and right-wing alternatives. Some establishment figures try to use the disorder to limit options, including those of the far-right Marine Le Pen’s movement and the far-left Jean-Luc Mélenchon’s, but this only further erodes the current administration’s legitimacy.
Le Pen has used images of looting, burned vehicles, and street clashes to reinforce a law-and-order message, arguing that the country needs stronger command and that chaos cannot be a governing project. Mélenchon, by contrast, has aligned himself with the underlying student and cost-of-living grievances, criticizing police tactics and framing the protests as a response to years of underfunding in education and public services. Both draw support from different segments of the French public angered by the center’s failure to deliver affordable energy, housing, and stable public services while maintaining high debt and defense commitments.
Unless governments directly address energy prices, debt constraints, and migration, the so-called Autumn Wave will persist and spread across Europe, deepening polarization, as already evident in French politics. Blaming external actors, from Moscow to social media platforms, will not restore public trust or lower household costs, but will deepen the animosity already building.
A Russian ballistic missile struck Kyiv’s Southern Bridge overnight into October 27, damaging aboveground metro infrastructure and forcing authorities to close the key crossing over the Dnipro River.
Ukrainian media reported that Russia attacked Kyiv with ballistic missiles twice during the night and that one of the missiles struck the Southern Bridge.
Kyiv Mayor Vitali Klitschko said specialists were assessing the damage and that traffic across the bridge had been closed.
Click to see full-size image. (X)
Metro services on the Green Line were suspended between Osokorky and Chervony Khutir stations, with trains operating only between Syrets and Vydubychi stations. Local authorities had not yet announced when the affected services would resume.
The reported direct missile strike marks an escalation from the series of drone attacks Russia carried out against Kyiv’s bridges earlier in the month.
On October 1 and 2, Russian drones repeatedly struck the Southern Bridge, damaging a support structure, the roadway, barriers and protective concrete around the metro line. Later on October 3, a Russian drone hit the Northern Bridge, damaging its road surface and the overhead wires powering trolleybuses. The attacks disrupted traffic across several of the capital’s main crossings over the Dnipro River.
The latest ballistic missile strike marks a notable escalation in Russia’s campaign against bridges in the Ukrainian capital.
The strike also comes as Ukraine’s air defenses face mounting pressure from Russia’s sustained missile and drone strikes, with reported shortages of interceptor missiles adding to the challenge of protecting major cities and critical infrastructure.
Click to see full-size image. (Telegram\Kalashnikov)
Russia’s Kalitka-KA anti-drone gun system uses artificial intelligence (AI) to calculate aiming corrections, allowing it to destroy an aerial target with about 10 rounds, a Russian National Guard serviceman said in a report aired by Vesti on October 25.
Mounted on a pickup truck and armed with a 7.62 mm PKT machine gun, a weapon also used in Russian tanks, the system is designed to protect military crews from drones or operate independently.
The Kalitka-KA uses AI to compensate for aiming errors and help operators engage moving aerial targets with individual shots rather than sustained bursts. The system is semi-automatic, with the software calculating firing corrections while the operator retains control of the engagement, according to the report.
The system can also work with a radar station, expanding its ability to detect and engage aerial targets, especially drones.
Kalashnikov Concern unveiled the Kalitka-KA in Moscow last September. The system combines a rotating machine-gun mount with an electro-optical unit equipped with two daylight cameras and a rangefinder. A thermal imager enables operation at night.
The system is available in stationary and vehicle-mounted configurations. Kalashnikov says it is designed to protect military positions and critical infrastructure against reconnaissance and attack drones flying at low and extremely low altitudes.
Gun-based anti-drone systems offer a cost-effective way to counter relatively cheap drones without expending expensive interceptor missiles. Russia is currently expanding their deployment to provide troops and critical infrastructure with an additional layer of close-range protection.
Jordanian warplanes struck several sites in southern Syria late on October 26, killing at least seven people, including three children, according to Syrian authorities, after Amman said it had linked a deadly church shooting to terrorist groups operating across the border.
The strikes hit locations in the southern provinces of Daraa and Suwayda. Jordan described the operation as a counterterrorism measure conducted in coordination with Damascus, while the Syrian government said it had received no advance notification and condemned the civilian deaths.
The Royal Jordanian Air Force called the operation “Jordanian Deterrence – Hmoud,” saying it targeted hideouts belonging to terrorist organizations linked to the October 23 attack on a Greek Orthodox church in the Jordanian city of Karak.
“The terrorists behind the Hmoud attack have ties to the targeted terrorist organizations,” the Jordanian military said in a statement carried by the state-run Petra news agency.
It added that the strikes killed and wounded several members of the targeted groups and destroyed their equipment and vehicles. The military did not identify the organizations or specify the locations hit.
Syrian authorities, for their part, disputed Jordan’s account of coordination and said the strikes claimed the lives of civilians.
The Syrian Civil Defense said seven people were killed across several locations in Daraa and Suwayda. Five members of one family, including three children, a woman and a man, died when a strike hit a tent in rural Daraa, while two older men were killed in separate strikes. Three other members of the family were injured.
The Syrian Foreign Ministry said the operation was conducted “without prior coordination or notification with the Syrian side,” according to a statement carried by the Syrian Arab News Agency early on October 27.
Damascus announced an investigation into the strikes and said it had opened direct communication channels with Jordan to address the incident. It also stressed the need for joint security and military coordination along the border, warning that such operations must respect Syrian sovereignty.
The strikes came hours after Jordanian security forces arrested three suspects in connection with the church shooting following a shootout in the Karak area. The suspects, two brothers and their brother-in-law, were wounded during the operation, authorities said.
The October 23 attack took place during a funeral at the Greek Orthodox church in Karak, killing nine people and wounding 34. The shooting shocked the country, where attacks of this kind are rare, and prompted King Abdullah II to promise a forceful response.
“The Nashama have chased them to the very end. We vowed the terrorists would not escape punishment, and no proponent of dark ideologies that divide Jordanians will be tolerated,” the king said on X after the strikes on Syria. “We pray that the martyrs’ souls rest in peace and wish the injured a speedy recovery.”
Jordanian Interior Minister Mazen Al-Faraya described the attack as the product of “a terroristic, extremist way of thinking.”
The investigation has also raised questions about the alleged organizational links behind the shooting. Jordan’s Public Security Directorate chief, Maj. Gen. Obaidallah Abd Rabbo Al-Maayta, said the three suspects were not affiliated with any group, telling reporters, “They only represent themselves.”
Jordan’s military, however, subsequently said those responsible for the attack had ties to terrorist groups in southern Syria without publicly identifying them or detailing the evidence.
Following the strikes, Syrian authorities closed the Nassib border crossing, suspending passenger and commercial traffic between the two countries.
The escalation highlights a growing security threat from terrorist groups operating inside Syria. With southern Syria serving as a base for their activity, and Damascus seen as either turning a blind eye or failing to contain them, neighboring countries face mounting pressure to act on their own.
Click to see full-size image. (Russian Ministry of Defense)
In the Dnipropetrovsk direction, Ukrainian units are attempting to regain control of the western bank of the Mokri Yaly River. In the Sumy direction, assault units of the “North” grouping continue to advance deeper into the region with heavy fighting, engaging near Khoten, Velyka Rybytsia and Nikolskoye. In the Kharkiv direction, Russian assault groups are pressing Ukrainian defenses towards Kharkiv and in the north-east of the region. In the Zaporozhye direction, airborne troops of the “Vostok” grouping have driven more than five kilometers into Ukrainian lines, forced the Solyonaya River and taken Obshcheye. In the Slavyansk direction, Russian units have resumed offensive operations north of the agglomeration, fighting in the Lyman area and along the Ozyornoye–Yampol line. Meanwhile, the reluctance of several EU countries to allocate further funds to Ukraine has caused bewilderment in Berlin: the Czech Republic and Slovakia have already indicated they will not take part in a new lending program, and Hungary is expected to adopt a similar stance.
Dnipropetrovsk direction Fighting continues along the Mokri Yaly River, where Ukrainian forces are trying to re-establish control of the western bank in order to threaten the flank of Burlatskoye. Ukrainian formations were recently observed capturing a chain of strongpoints near Veseloye.
Russian troops retain firm control of Veseloye itself and most of the fortifications on its immediate approaches. The situation in neighboring Komar remains obscured by the “fog of war”; Ukrainian forces are actively employing loitering drones against supply units. On the right flank of the Dnipropetrovsk direction an extensive combat zone persists, with assault groups from both sides operating. Ukrainian units are relying on infiltration into the near rear of Russian positions in an effort to disrupt the defense and reach the fortified line along the Shevchenko–Veseloye axis.
Sumy direction Assault units of the “North” grouping continue to push deeper into the Sumy region amid heavy fighting. Ukrainian forces have not conducted significant offensive actions and have concentrated on strikes against civilian targets in the border areas. Russian aviation, artillery and drone crews have struck concentrations of personnel and equipment in the areas of Sumy, Pervomayskoye, Gnilitsa, Podishche, Markovske, Stepanovka, Korenek, Malaya Slobodka and Krasnopolye.
In the Sumy district there are no major changes: Russian assault troops are advancing step by step near Khoten, Velyka Rybytsia and Nikolskoye. In the Shostka district Russian units have cleared a section of woodland near Korenek. Russian forces continue to methodically press Ukrainian defenses, supported by artillery and drones, thereby expanding their control in the border districts.
Kharkiv direction Fierce fighting continues on all sectors of the front in the Kharkiv region. Russian units are pressing Ukrainian defenses towards Kharkiv and in the north-east of the region. The Ukrainian side is reinforcing its motorized infantry brigades with recruits from training centers.
On the Liptsy sector Russian assault groups are advancing south of Novaya Kazachya. Most of the area is already under Russian control; fighting is shifting towards Tsupovka. On the Volchansk and Velykyi Burluk sectors the heaviest fighting continues around Prikolotnoye and Malyi Burluk. Advances have been recorded near Bugayevka and Kotovka. Russian assault troops are pushing forward under heavy conditions in the Prikolotnoye, Bugayevka and Malyi Burluk areas, gaining up to 800 meters in the past 24 hours.
Zaporozhye direction Near Malye Shcherbaki Russian airborne troops are expanding their zone of control and advancing along the gully towards Novoyakovlevka. In the Novopavlovka area Russian forces are holding their positions and striking Ukrainian units that are transferring reserves in an attempt to retake Orekhov.
The battle for the approaches to Orekhov is intensifying. While the southern outskirts of the town remain the scene of heavy fighting, Ukrainian forces continue to send small assault groups into Malaya Tokmachka. Members of Ukrainian units were recently hit by drones near the center of the village. It is likely that the Ukrainian side is attempting to reach IK-88, an area long used as the main defensive node for Malaya Tokmachka.
As a result of coordinated action by unmanned systems troops, artillery, aviation and assault troops of the 39th Separate Motor Rifle Brigade of the 68th Army Corps of the “Vostok” grouping, Russian forces have driven more than five kilometers into Ukrainian defenses, forced the Solyonaya River, overcome a system of engineer obstacles including an anti-tank ditch, and taken control of Obshcheye.
Slavyansk direction East of the Slavyansk–Kramatorsk agglomeration Russian assault units continue to advance in the Raiskoye area. On the Krasny Liman sector Russian forces have resumed offensive operations north of the agglomeration. Fighting is under way in the Lyman area and along the Ozyornoye–Yampol line. Advances have been noted towards Maslyakovka and near Rai-Aleksandrovka. From the Zarechnoye area Russian units are moving towards Maslyakovka.
Meeting engagements continue in the Zarechnoye, Stavki and Dibrova sectors. Over the past 24 hours Russian units conducted several successful attacks towards Stavki and Dibrova. Reports from the eastern approaches to Krasny Liman are of particular interest: an advance from Zarechnoye towards Maslyakovka has been recorded, although the settlement itself has not yet passed under Russian control. Further south, heavy fighting continues along the Yampol–Ozyornoye line.
Conclusion In the Dnipropetrovsk sector the struggle centers on the western bank of the Mokri Yaly and the retention of Veseloye. In the Sumy direction Russian forces are slowly pressing the defense near Khoten, Velyka Rybytsia and Korenek. In the Kharkiv direction pressure continues on Prikolotnoye, Bugayevka and Malyi Burluk. In the Zaporozhye direction the more than five-kilometer penetration, the forcing of the Solyonaya and the capture of Obshcheye create conditions for further envelopment of the Orekhov grouping. In the Slavyansk direction the resumption of attacks north of the agglomeration and fighting along the Ozyornoye–Yampol line are gradually eroding Ukrainian defenses.
Meanwhile, the reluctance of several EU member states to provide further funding for Ukraine has caused consternation in Berlin, according to Politico, citing European diplomats and officials. “How can one seriously expect our taxpayers to send even one more euro from the cohesion funds to those who refuse to take part in defending the EU against the greatest threat to our common security?” a German diplomat told the publication. The Czech Republic and Slovakia have already indicated they will not participate in a new lending program; according to two sources, Hungary is likely to take the same position. At a recent EU summit Volodymyr Zelensky stated that Ukraine would require an additional €70 billion in 2027.
Russian strikes hit targets in the the Sumy, Kharkiv, Zaporizhzhia, Dnipropetrovsk, Kherson, Vinnytsia, Zhytomyr, Kyiv, Lviv, Odesa, Poltava, Rivne, Ternopil, Khmelnytskyi, Chernihiv, Chernivtsi regions, and the DPR;
According to the Ukrainian Air Force, Russian forces attacked Ukraine with 1 Kh-31P anti-radiation missile, 3 Kh-59/69 missiles, and 140 strike UAVs;
Russian forces struck a UAV depot and the Zalyutino PS-330 power substation in the Kharkiv region;
Russian forces struck the PS-330 power substation in the Khmelnytskyi region;
Russian forces struck the infrastructure of three berth terminals in the port of Chornomorsk and a dry cargo ship delivering military cargo to the port of Odesa;
Ukrainian losses amounted to approximately 1,285 personnel over the past 24 hours.
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Russian forces took control of Obshcheye and Nikolskoye in the Zaporizhzhia region.
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Russian forces took control of Mirovoe and advanced north of Dobropolye.
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During the past night, Russian air defenses destroyed 290 Ukrainian drones in the rear regions;
Russian air defenses intercepted UAVs in the Belgorod, Bryansk, Voronezh, Volgograd, Kaluga, Kursk, Lipetsk, Novgorod, Oryol, Pskov, Rostov, Ryazan, Smolensk, Tver, and Tula regions, and in the Moscow region;
Ukrainian strikes killed two civilians in Voronezh. Fires broke out at several industrial enterprises, and civilian infrastructure was damaged;
Ukrainian strikes injured two children and a man in Melitopol;
Ukrainian strikes targeted a freight train traveling from Bryansk to Gomel in Novozybkov. The train driver was killed.
On October 26, Saudi, Turkish and Pakistani officials met Iranian leaders in Tehran to discuss regional security and efforts to prevent further escalation;
Commercial shipping through the Strait of Hormuz fell sharply, with five commodity vessels recorded on October 24 and none on October 25;
During the past 24 hours, Iranian forces reportedly attacked several oil tankers in the Strait of Hormuz.
Illustrative image. (U.S. Air Force photo/Staff Sgt. Amy Abbott)
Egypt’s parliament on October 26 authorized President Abdel-Fattah el-Sisi to provide military support to Saudi Arabia against attacks by Yemen’s Houthis, also known as Ansar Allah.
The authorization, approved by a two-thirds majority following closed-door deliberations, allows Sisi to take necessary measures in coordination with Riyadh to defend Saudi territory, sovereignty and holy sites against external aggression.
A regional official briefed on the plans told The Associated Press that Egypt would provide air defense systems and warplanes to help intercept missiles and drones targeting Saudi Arabia. The official said the support would not include deploying ground troops to Yemen.
Sisi has repeatedly stressed that Cairo’s role would be strictly defensive, seeking to reassure Egyptians concerned that the country could become entangled in another regional war.
“I’m not speaking about fighting anyone or attacking anyone. I’m speaking only for defense,” Sisi said earlier this month.
He also reiterated that Egypt’s military effort would focus on protecting Saudi territory and borders rather than conducting attacks on Yemen.
The limited scope of the proposed mission means Egypt’s decision is unlikely to significantly change the military balance inside Yemen.
Egyptian air defense systems and warplanes could help Riyadh withstand further missile and drone attacks, but the announced approach does not involve an Egyptian ground campaign or direct strikes against Houthi positions across the border in Yemen.
Egypt’s involvement in the war has been cautious before. Cairo joined the Saudi-led military intervention in 2015, initially contributing naval and air forces to the campaign against the Houthis. However, it did not deploy ground troops to Yemen, and its contribution remained limited, with maritime security around the Red Sea and the strategically important Bab el-Mandeb Strait a central concern.
Egypt renewed its participation in the coalition during the following year but never became a major ground-combat participant in the conflict.
The latest authorization therefore provides Riyadh with the prospect of additional defensive military support without signaling a large-scale Egyptian campaign inside Yemen.
Cairo has also continued to call for a diplomatic settlement, reflecting its interest in protecting its Gulf partnerships and the maritime routes linking the Red Sea to the Suez Canal.
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