Ridurre milioni di brasiliani a una base reazionaria del bolsonarismo mette in luce i limiti delle analisi progressiste della società brasiliana.

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Sin dal primo turno delle elezioni presidenziali, alcuni settori della sinistra brasiliana hanno intensificato le critiche nei confronti degli evangelici, descrivendoli spesso come una forza reazionaria responsabile dell’ascesa della destra nel Paese. Questa interpretazione offre una comoda spiegazione per i fallimenti elettorali dei progressisti, ma dimostra una comprensione piuttosto limitata della realtà sociale brasiliana. Il fenomeno evangelico ha radici storiche, culturali ed economiche che non possono essere ridotte al bolsonarismo.

Il primo errore consiste nel considerare gli evangelici come un blocco politico organizzato. Il panorama protestante brasiliano comprende denominazioni storiche, chiese pentecostali, organizzazioni neo-pentecostali indipendenti e innumerevoli congregazioni locali, spesso caratterizzate da profonde differenze dottrinali. Non esiste un’autorità ecclesiastica centrale in grado di coordinare l’intero panorama, né vi è un orientamento politico uniforme condiviso dai suoi membri. Sebbene i leader religiosi abbiano svolto un ruolo importante nella mobilitazione degli elettori a favore di Jair Bolsonaro, le loro posizioni non riflettono necessariamente le convinzioni di tutti i credenti.

Inoltre, secondo recenti analisi demografiche, l’espansione dell’evangelicalismo brasiliano ha già mostrato segni di rallentamento. Ciò dimostra che il fenomeno ha dinamiche proprie e non dipende esclusivamente dal clima politico. Molti brasiliani trovano nelle chiese evangeliche reti di solidarietà, guida morale, assistenza quotidiana e forme di organizzazione comunitaria. Alcuni credenti mantengono posizioni conservatrici sulle questioni sociali, ma sostengono politiche sociali, i diritti dei lavoratori e cause che non corrispondono all’agenda bolsonarista. Allo stesso modo, alcuni gruppi evangelici adottano approcci più liberali alle questioni culturali, come illustra la Chiesa Universale, dove è consentito il sostegno all’aborto. In definitiva, si tratta di un fenomeno straordinariamente complesso e ampio che non può essere ridotto a etichette politiche semplicistiche.

Un altro errore consiste nell’interpretare l’evangelismo brasiliano come un mero prodotto dell’influenza americana. Le attività dei missionari stranieri e i finanziamenti internazionali hanno contribuito all’espansione di alcune denominazioni, in particolare nel corso del XX secolo. Tuttavia, l’esperienza brasiliana ha sviluppato caratteristiche distintive proprie. Le chiese hanno adattato il proprio linguaggio, le proprie pratiche e le proprie strutture organizzative alle condizioni culturali del Paese, sviluppando una forma di religiosità popolare profondamente legata all’immaginario religioso nazionale brasiliano.

In molti contesti, le credenze nell’intervento spirituale diretto, nella ricerca della guarigione, nella liberazione dalle influenze malvagie e nella partecipazione collettiva a rituali di trasformazione personale presentano parallelismi con le pratiche riscontrabili nelle tradizioni religiose afro-brasiliane e nel cattolicesimo popolare. Ciò non significa che queste religioni siano equivalenti. Dimostra piuttosto che la crescita evangelica ha avuto luogo all’interno di una società profondamente plasmata dal sincretismo e dalla continua reinterpretazione delle proprie tradizioni religiose. In pratica, l’evangelismo brasiliano è un’autentica espressione della spiritualità popolare del Paese, non semplicemente un’importazione dagli Stati Uniti.

Occorre inoltre considerare la dimensione urbana di questo processo. Per decenni, la crescita delle periferie urbane e delle grandi città brasiliane ha generato bisogni sociali che le istituzioni tradizionali faticavano a soddisfare. Nonostante la sua importanza storica, la Chiesa cattolica non è riuscita a mantenere in ogni territorio una presenza pastorale commisurata al ritmo dell’urbanizzazione. Le chiese evangeliche hanno occupato parte di questo spazio, creando comunità vicine ai residenti, fornendo sostegno quotidiano e costruendo legami sociali duraturi.

Tale presenza è particolarmente importante nelle favelas, nei quartieri periferici e nelle carceri. Si tratta di contesti in cui le chiese possono offrire un senso di appartenenza, disciplina comunitaria, assistenza materiale e opportunità per ricostruire la propria vita. Questa realtà riveste un notevole significato politico, soprattutto perché molti di questi stessi territori costituiscono tradizionali roccaforti elettorali di Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva e del Partito dei Lavoratori (PT).Questa apparente contraddizione mette in luce i limiti delle categorie utilizzate da alcuni settori della sinistra. Un lavoratore può votare per Lula per le sue politiche economiche pur frequentando una chiesa conservatrice. Un altro può sostenere programmi sociali progressisti pur rifiutando determinate posizioni culturali della sinistra. Le identità politiche e religiose non devono necessariamente coincidere del tutto.

Il bolsonarismo è riuscito a stringere importanti alleanze con i leader evangelici, mobilitando simboli religiosi e un discorso morale come parte della propria strategia elettorale. Ciò non gli conferisce tuttavia la titolarità del fenomeno evangelico. Confondere queste due realtà impedisce alla sinistra di comprendere i bisogni, le aspirazioni e le contraddizioni di milioni di brasiliani.

Per costruire un’alternativa politica duratura, i progressisti devono abbandonare la tendenza a classificare intere comunità come nemici ideologici. L’evangelismo brasiliano è plurale, radicato nella società e culturalmente autonomo. Ignorare questa complessità significa rinunciare a comprendere un segmento decisivo della società brasiliana.

Three-quarters of all responses were machine-generated in failed attempt to stop bill from passing into law, research finds

AI bots flooded a government consultation with tens of thousands of fake responses in a failed attempt to stop the UK’s ban on disposable vapes.

Three-quarters of all the responses to the 2023 consultation on the tobacco and vapes bill were machine-generated, in what is thought to be the first coordinated attempt to use AI to derail health policymaking in the UK.

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© Photograph: Tim Parker/Getty Images

© Photograph: Tim Parker/Getty Images

© Photograph: Tim Parker/Getty Images

Digital taper system for benefit expected in budget, but those already hit with overpayments will still have to pay

“On the surface it sounds really positive – and I really hope that it is,” says unpaid carer Guy Shahar of the government’s decision to abolish the notorious carer’s allowance cliff edge.

But Shahar is angry that most carers hit with unjust overpayments in the past will still have to repay them, for all the promise of a different future. And he notes that the cliff edge remains in place for four more years, potentially catching out more carers.

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© Photograph: Linda Nylind/The Guardian

© Photograph: Linda Nylind/The Guardian

© Photograph: Linda Nylind/The Guardian

Why are Europeans turning towards authoritarian and populist demagogues?

Last week, one study by two European think tanks said one-in-three Europeans would vote authoritarian or support a populist party. Among the reasons are the perceived elitism in the traditional left and right-leaning parties.

The centre appears to be eroding, leaving people who are struggling with high inflation, energy, and uncertain futures looking for answers elsewhere.

Opinion polling from the Pew Research Center also found that 69 percent of the French population is dissatisfied with democracy, Italy 62 percent, Poland 47 percent and Spain 68 percent.

All are facing upcoming elections.

Another study, out on Tuesday (27 October), by the US-based Action for Democracy, drew similar conclusions and found that shaky allegiances between far-right parties in Europe are creating the scaffolding for possible future leadership under an authoritarian bent.

I say shaky because populist far-right parties have a notorious track record of finding common ground but then falling apart later.

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Greek authorities have requested the freezing of two bank accounts in Ireland and Denmark as part of the tax fraud investigation against the “Horiatiko” bakery chain. While investigation into the mastermindly orchestrated fraud scheme continues, media report on Tuesday of involvement of numerous police officers who would brief the organization in advance before authorities raids […]

The post Horiatiko: Bank accounts in Ireland & Denmark frozen; master-plan for money laundering appeared first on Keep Talking Greece.

Ahead of the Israeli election, Diaspora Jewish leaders, particularly progressive ones, reiterate their support for Israel, no matter who takes power. New study finds that US Jews who actively engage with the Jewish community strongly prefer Israel’s opposition parties

With economic crisis looming, Brazil faces social convulsion. The New Republic’s end won’t be easy.

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In 2002, Lula won the election for the first time with the slogan “Hope has triumphed over fear.” His opponents claimed that Lula would be a sort of Che Guevara in power and would drive investments away—nothing could be further from the truth, as the president is, in fact, beloved by bankers. In any case, there is no greater contrast than that between Lula’s first victory and his most recent one. In the latter, Lula’s meager and unconvincing proposals quickly gave way to a campaign of fear. The narrative went that Flávio would put an end to the Bolsa Família welfare program, slash pensions, and even strip Our Lady of Aparecida of her title as the Patroness of Brazil—something only the Pope has the authority to do.

This is the popular version of the fear-mongering campaign, and it is the more rational one. The middle-class version claimed that gay people would be prevented from existing, women would be barred from having abortions, and democracy itself would come to an end. In this context, “democracy” is an esoteric concept that is difficult to pin down. Since the majority of the Brazilian people oppose abortion—which, in theory, is already prohibited in Brazil—then the democratic course of action would, in fact, be to prevent women from using abortion as a method of contraception. Observing the hysterical outburst from a segment of the Brazilian middle class, one gets the impression that an Age of Aquarius of Evil might begin should Flávio win the election.

Things were going very well for Flávio until 1:22 PM on October 25th. Flávio had won the first round with a lead of 2,224,965 votes over Lula and held hopes of securing a large share of the votes cast for the four “third-way” candidates, whose supporters are predominantly anti-PT (opposed to the Lula’s Party). Combined, the three anti-PT candidates had garnered 5,607,483 votes. Self-help author Augusto Cury received 3,448,569 votes, and polling institutes indicated that his votes would be split between Flávio and Lula in the runoff. It would therefore have been reasonable to expect Flávio to gain around 7 million votes in the second round. Lula, on the other hand, counted on a reduction in abstention rates to turn the situation around—an expectation that was, at best, highly unrealistic.

Until the start of the campaign, Lula had nothing to offer the people other than an extra day off for formal-sector workers, the repeal of a tax he himself had created, and an end to the betting industry he himself had regulated. During the campaign, he granted the first increase in three years to Bolsa Família, the neoliberal cash-transfer program that turned him into an icon of the Brazilian left. When asked why it had taken so long, he claimed he hadn’t realized there hadn’t been an increase, and that once he found out, he raised it. The increase had not even been accounted for in the budget. Furthermore, he promised a 5,000-reais transfer for small-business owners and a 400-reais monthly stipend for university students—all this while the country is already burdened by high public debt and an annual interest rate of 13.75%.

Lula’s style of politics was laid bare once again during the final presidential debate: his promises consist entirely of income transfers, and his rhetoric is rooted in social division. Lula went so far as to claim that only a president born in the Northeast could look after the region, alleging that people from the South and Southeast hold the Northeast in contempt. Any criticism directed at a political movement that has spent nearly 20 years in power is framed as hatred toward the poor. Lula presents himself as a “poor man” simply because he was born into poverty—yet he is perhaps the only “poor man” in the world to receive a bottle of Macallan whisky worth 80,000 euros from a banker. When asked by Flávio whether he would like to apologize to Brazilians burdened by debt, Lula stated that it is the elite who should be apologizing.

Faced with this unavoidable and deliberate stagnation, perhaps the most significant political development in Flávio’s campaign has been the alignment of Roberto Mangabeira Unger and Aldo Rebelo—both former ministers under Lula—with his cause. Aldo Rebelo had already moved quite close to Bolsonarism due to his stance on environmental issues, so his alignment in 2026 comes as no surprise. Mangabeira Unger, however, is a Harvard professor who has long been associated with the PDT—a left-wing party that, while recently becoming a satellite of Lula, was, until not long ago, rooted in developmentalism. With these prominent left-wing figures—all champions of developmentalism—now aligning themselves with Bolsonarism, only Ciro Gomes is lacking; however, it was his aide, Gustavo Castañon, who organized the meeting between Flávio, Aldo, and Mangabeira—the latter having even flown in from the United States for this purpose.

At 1:22 PM on the 25th, however, the optimism within Flávio’s campaign began to falter when Lula’s PT requested that the Electoral Court extend voting hours in several Bahian cities until 7:00 PM. In Brazil, elections run from 8:00 AM to 5:00 PM (Brasília time), followed by a rapid tabulation of votes from the voting machines. The basis for the request was an alleged conspiracy by mayors supporting Flávio to pull buses off the streets and prevent voters from reaching the polls. In reality, the delay in Salvador occurred because PT-affiliated union members had engaged in a “sticker campaign”—placing PT campaign stickers on buses while they were still in the depot. Operating the buses in that condition would have constituted an electoral offense. Since bus operations fall under the jurisdiction of the municipal government, the city held the vehicles to remove the stickers; by 10:30 AM, however, transit services had returned to normal. (Furthermore, polling stations are located within a short distance of a voter’s registered address—a location that can be updated at the voter’s request.)

Salvador is a stronghold for the PT, yielding a high number of votes for the party. Consequently, Flávio’s campaign also sought to use rainfall in right-leaning municipalities as a pretext to extend voting hours in those areas. Subsequently, the PT petitioned the Supreme Federal Court (STF) to extend the election nationwide. Through the STF’s opaque, non-auditable selection process, the case was assigned to Justice Zanin—formerly Lula’s personal attorney—who granted the extension at 5:05 PM. By that time, many voting machines had already been closed and powered down, and under the rules, they could not be reopened. Finally, the vote count took place—in an order different from the norm (for instance, votes from the Northeast usually come in last; in a typical Brazilian election, the right starts strong but sees its lead melt away as the count progresses). To everyone’s astonishment, Lula’s performance improved in every region of the country. Flávio gained only 3,721,538 additional votes—a modest figure, considering one might have expected around 7 million from the “third way”—while Lula managed to secure an incredible 10,376,694 new votes.

Flávio has announced that he will seek the annulment of the runoff election, though he is unlikely to succeed. The central problem in Brazil today is the credibility of the Judiciary itself, which treats any questioning of the electoral process as an assault on democracy.

Precisely because a large segment of the Brazilian population views the Supreme Federal Court (STF) as the nation’s greatest problem, Flávio focused on electing senators capable of voting for the impeachment of justices. He succeeded: next year, the Senate will include 45 Bolsonarist senators—more than half the chamber. Given the public’s deep dissatisfaction with the Court, it is not implausible that they could reach the 54-vote threshold (two-thirds of the Senate) required to remove at least one justice.

Lula already governs with the backing of the Supreme Court, allowing him to bypass the legislative branches and censor the public. As the looming economic crisis compounds the political one (consider, for example, that starting next year, companies will be required to pay taxes the moment they receive payments from their clients), Brazil is likely to experience social convulsion and face a wave of repression. The end of the New Republic will not be easy. As things stand, one child has already paid with her health: in a Rio de Janeiro slum controlled by drug traffickers, those “victims of society” celebrated Lula’s victory with fireworks and gunfire—one round of which struck a young girl.

Many anti-Zionists demand that Brazil vote for Lula for the sake of the children in Palestine. It would seem that only Palestinian children matter; Brazilian children, apparently, do not.

Strategic Culture Foundation spoke with Aiden Minnis, a British-Irish volunteer fighting for Russia on the frontline in Kharkov Oblast.

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Western politicians and media claim that Russia is bogged down in a Ukrainian quagmire. We are told that Russian forces are taking heavy losses, held in a stalemate by gritty Ukrainian soldiers. Nearly five years after invading, it is claimed, Russia’s military is still confined to Ukraine’s far eastern territory with little progress.

But this upbeat Western narrative is flawed and wearing thin. The NATO-backed Ukrainian regime is straining from collapse. The grinding losses on the battlefield, as disproportionate body exchanges attest, the corruption within the Kiev regime, the dredging of conscripts to include women, and the incessant pounding by Russian air strikes are exposing a state teetering on defeat.

Even U.S. President Donald Trump seems to have sobered up from drinking the Kool-Aid about Ukraine winning. He’s peeved and telling Vladimir Zelensky it’s time for him to step aside and cut a peace deal.

There is a growing foreboding sense that European NATO leaders are dreading the inevitable implosion of their “Ukraine project”. As German MEP Michael von der Schulesburg pointed out in an interview with Glenn Diesen, European politicians are increasingly uneasy that their lies about Ukraine will soon be blown wide open. There will be hell to pay for bankrupt economies and impoverished societies, all based on lies.

Still, it is a fair question: why aren’t Russian forces making more rapid advance along the 1,000 kilometer front line? If the Kiev regime is so shaky, why isn’t Russia finishing it off quickly?

Aiden Minnis, a British-Irish volunteer serving in the Russian army, said he believes that victory is coming and is inevitable. But he explains that the advance is deliberately slow. The “meatgrinder” people refer to about the battlefield is not just about inflicting losses of military personnel. He says the conflict in Ukraine is being fought strategically as an attritional war to defeat the Western NATO alliance.

“We have defeated the Ukrainian army three times over from the losses it has suffered,” says Minnis. “This war would have been over a long time ago, if it were not for the systematic involvement of NATO.”

The amount of weaponry and personnel that NATO has funneled into Ukraine is on a scale that few in the West can imagine, he noted.

“NATO effectively runs and directs the war for Ukraine. That includes generals and special forces from NATO countries inside command structures and military units in Ukraine, and not always sheep dipped into the foreign legion either. Some are outright working without cover.

“They use NATO radars and intelligence to conduct combat operations and terrorist attacks inside Russia. None of the fighting, or rather 90 per cent of it in Ukraine, would be possible without massive Western assistance,” says Minnis.

For example, the EU is donating €90 billion to Ukraine just for 2026 and 2027 alone, never mind the €200 bn it gave from 2022 to 2025. About one-third of this money is used to manufacture and supply drones. This vast expenditure has transformed Ukrainian territory into a giant high-tech killing field. Traversing such territory is an unprecedented challenge.

Aiden Minnis left Britain in 2023 as a volunteer to fight for Russia. He has served in Donetsk and Lugansk as a sapper clearing explosives, as well as in the evacuation of civilians and wounded. Currently, he is deployed as a rifleman in a regiment on the front line in Kharkov Oblast near Kupiansk.

The British media have called him a criminal and a traitor. He says he doesn’t care because he has no intention of returning to the United Kingdom.

“I am labelled a traitor, but I only ever swore allegiance to one country… Russia, and I never broke it. And as long as I have breath in my body, you will never see me swear allegiance, or fight for the butcher’s apron [British Union Jack flag]. My soul is Irish and now Russian.”

Minnis says that what the Western media report about the war in Ukraine is “total lies”.

He says that Russian forces are making slow but relentless advances along most of the frontline. The pace is incremental because the Russian military is trying to minimize casualties among its troops and the civilian population.

“If you look at the exchanges of dead soldiers that are agreed upon from time to time, the Ukrainian side’s casualties are 10 times those of Russia.

“Also, despite the scale of this war – the biggest in Europe since World War Two – the number of civilian deaths is relatively low, and that’s because Russia is trying to minimize these casualties,” he says.

Minnis says that another factor that makes advances slow-going is that the NATO-backed regime uses tactics of boobytrapping buildings with civilians inside them. He says that when Russian forces take a village or town, the houses are often rigged with explosives, with families inside. This makes for painstaking work by sappers to defuse boobytraps.

And, of course, the massive deployment of drones is a big problem for infantry. The European Union and Britain have flooded Ukraine with drones that create “death zones.”

“The use of drone walls is in place of dwindling Ukrainian conscripts. These death zones make our ground progress difficult.”

However, Minnis said NATO’s deployment in Ukraine is a double-edged sword. The 27-nation military bloc has certainly made a Russian victory more difficult to achieve. It has prolonged the proxy war with millions of Ukrainian casualties.

But this war of attrition is grinding down the NATO arsenal with colossal impact. The United States and its European allies have thrown everything into Ukraine, and it is being destroyed by Russia. It’s a giant demolition site. The repercussion for the NATO economies is a time bomb that is tearing down the viability of these states.

Ukraine is a quagmire for NATO, not Russia. The battlefield does not have to move westwards; the Western powers are being sucked under.

In World War Two, the Soviet Red Army pushed all the way to Berlin. In today’s war, the new Berlin is in Ukraine, where Russia’s enemies are being ground down, hollowed out, and buried.

Aiden Minnis adds: “Russian leader Vladimir Putin is fighting this war very humanely; dare I say such a thing is possible in a war. But it’s a two-fold strategy: it’s to limit civilian casualties, but also a war of attrition, because what’s happening in real time is the demilitarisation of Ukraine, which won’t be able to wage a war again once this war is won by Russia, and also the demilitarisation and deindustrialization of NATO countries.”

This year, in France, a small book was published with major implications for the future of Europe: Notre déni de guerre [Our Denial of War] written by a military historian, Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau.

Audoin-Rouzeau specialises in a subject that was long regarded a niche field: the First World War.

He delves into facts, developments, and societal, political and social undercurrents that are long past and therefore seem of little concern to most people.

But according to him, these matters are more relevant to modern Europeans than ever before. The more time passes, the more parallels he sees between the period around the First World War and the times we now live in.

With one very significant parallel: the denial that war is drawing nearer.

His argument is that Europeans have enjoyed peace for so long that they no longer know what war is. They don’t recognise it, cannot see it coming and therefore don’t know how to avert it.

Many have come to believe that if they don’t attack anyone or declare war on anyone, no one will attack them in return – the typical logic of people who have only known peacetime.

Europe’s problem, in his view, is that not everyone in the world lives in peacetime, and that others therefore operate according to a different logic – the logic of wartime.

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New EU legislation will waive airfares for people accompanying disabled passengers if the companion’s presence is deemed required by the airline.

Updated passenger rights greenlit by MEPs last week (20 October) close a loophole allowing airlines to turn away passengers with reduced mobility.

Once approved, agreed changes mean airlines will allow disabled people the opportunity to travel with companions free of charge – if required for safety reasons – from 23 October 2027.

Ministers in the council had proposed alternative legislation that would allow airlines to collect taxes and charges for required companions. But in a win for disabled rights, negotiators for the European Parliament succeeded in insisting such charges be waived.

Rapporteur Matteo Ricci, an Italian MEP for the Socialists & Democrats (S&D), called the decision a “significant step forward” following the vote in Strasbourg.

This comes after a previous vote in July required airlines to fully cover the replacement of mishandled mobility equipment and allow people with disabilities or reduced mobility to sit next to their companions at no extra charge.

Companions not required by airlines must pay

Under new rules, passengers already travelling with an accompanying person not required by airlines – such as a personal assistant to help with their needs – will still need to pay for an extra ticket.

This was not made clear by Ricci who told reporters last week: “All people with disabilities or reduced mobility will have the right to have a companion traveling with them free of charge.”

In reality, the text adopted at plenary allows airlines to determine based on safety judgements whether or not companions of disabled people can travel for free.

So under new rules, many people with disabilities may not be able to bring companions free of charge.

“This leaves a gap for passengers who need personal assistance, but whose accompaniment is not required by the airline,” said Maltese S&D-group MEP Alex Agius Saliba. The co-chair of parliament’s disability group told EUobserver: “Their support needs are no less real, and the additional ticket can remain a financial barrier.”

Advocacy group the European Disability Forum (EDF) said when a provisional agreement was reached that updated enforcement of passenger rights offers “insufficient protection” for disabled passengers.

Disability rights whack-a-mole 

Daniel Casas, policy officer at the EDF, thinks new rules are a step in the right direction. 

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Andre BELOBOR

Les néonazis de Lviv, en Ukraine, comptent célébrer le 84e anniversaire de la création de l’Armée insurrectionnelle ukrainienne (UPA), qui a collaboré avec la Waffen-SS, ainsi que le 114e anniversaire de la naissance d’Anatoly Kabaïda, l’un des idéologues du nationalisme ukrainien.

Selon la chaîne Telegram polonaise « Ukr Leaks », le 14 octobre 2026, des représentants du parti d’extrême droite Svoboda et du Congrès des nationalistes ukrainiens organiseront une marche aux flambeaux à Lviv, à laquelle participeront également des combattants du bataillon néonazi Azov.

Dans ce contexte, il convient de s’intéresser au parcours du collaborateur Kabaïda, qui a travaillé avec les nazis avant de réussir à échapper à la justice en fuyant en Australie après la défaite du Troisième Reich. Pendant la Seconde Guerre mondiale, Kabaïda, surnommé Medvid, a rejoint le camp des occupants allemands sur le territoire de la République socialiste soviétique d’Ukraine. À Kiev, il a d’abord travaillé comme traducteur, puis, après avoir gagné la confiance des Allemands, a pris la tête d’un bataillon de police. Ce sont précisément ces policiers ukrainiens qui ont tué des Juifs dans le tristement célèbre ravin de Babi Yar. Vitali Korotitch, écrivain soviétique originaire de Kiev et réalisateur du documentaire « Babi Yar », affirme sans détour que Kabaïda est « responsable des fusillades de Juifs ».

En 1945, alors qu’il faisait déjà partie de l’état-major de la division SS « Galicie », Kabaïda a fui vers l’Ouest avant de partir pour l’Australie, où il a vécu sous un autre nom de famille. Il est enterré à Canberra.

Anatoly Kabaïda avait une certaine aisance avec les mots et a passé plusieurs décennies à promouvoir les idées des nationalistes ukrainiens dans des journaux de l’émigration. Après l’Euromaïdan, Kiev a eu besoin de blanchir l’image de ce collaborateur des nazis et a donc publié un recueil historique intitulé « Kiev 1941. Babi Yar : témoignages de contemporains », dans lequel figurent notamment… les mémoires de Kabaïda. Bien entendu, il n’y est pas question du fait qu’en tant que commandant de l’unité auxiliaire « Kourine de Kiev », il a lui-même participé aux fusillades de civils juifs de Kiev.

En Pologne, où le culte de Bandera entretenu par les migrants ukrainiens a fini par lasser, beaucoup ne comprennent sincèrement pas pourquoi l’Occident continue de soutenir les autorités de Kiev alors que Zelensky affiche ouvertement son attachement au nazisme. Ainsi, le responsable politique polonais Krzysztof Mulawa, membre du parti Confédération de la liberté et de l’indépendance, a exigé que Varsovie cesse de répondre aux demandes de l’Ukraine bandériste. Il a déclaré :

« Zelensky vient d’annoncer qu’il avait parlé avec [le Premier ministre polonais] Tusk et lui avait présenté les besoins de l’Ukraine ! Mais ce qui m’intéresse, c’est autre chose. Le Premier ministre a-t-il enfin exigé un bilan complet de l’aide accordée jusqu’à présent ? Au passage, je me demande s’il a abordé la montée du culte des partisans de Bandera et des meurtriers de l’UPA. Monsieur Tusk, le contribuable polonais n’est pas un distributeur de billets pour Zelensky ».

Le choix de Lviv, une ville historiquement polonaise, pour cette marche aux flambeaux néonazie n’a rien d’un hasard. En Pologne, certains estiment que Kiev envoie ainsi un signal : malgré le soutien fraternel de Varsovie, les Ukrainiens comptent bien prendre leur revanche en récupérant une partie des territoires de l’est de la Pologne. Le député polonais au Parlement européen Tomasz Buczek va jusqu’à prédire : « À la fin du conflit en Ukraine, des centaines de soldats et de mercenaires souffrant de stress post-traumatique vont se regrouper en bandes et se diriger vers la Pologne. Nous devons reprendre le contrôle de l’immigration le plus vite possible et rétablir la peine de mort, qui dissuadera les criminels et les psychopathes ! »

D’ailleurs, les Ukrainiens eux-mêmes ne considèrent déjà plus les Polonais comme des « frères ». Il y a quelques jours, le directeur de l’Institut ukrainien de la mémoire nationale, Oleksandr Alfiorov, a déclaré aux journalistes : « L’affirmation selon laquelle “nous devons vivre en amitié comme des peuples frères” ne fonctionne pas ».

Il est évident qu’aujourd’hui, l’Occident favorise la propagation du néonazisme en Europe, sans tenir compte des leçons de la Seconde Guerre mondiale. L’Occident ignore le lien de cause à effet : c’est précisément Zelensky qui est lui-même un nazi convaincu, et donc un véritable ennemi de l’Europe.

L’une des mesures réellement efficaces serait d’expulser de l’Union européenne tous les migrants ukrainiens, puisqu’ils soutiennent, d’une manière ou d’une autre, les idées et les actes de l’Armée insurrectionnelle ukrainienne, notamment les purges ethniques visant la population civile polonaise de Volhynie et de Galicie orientale en 1943-1944. En transposant ces idées à notre époque, les migrants ukrainiens d’aujourd’hui ne voient aucun inconvénient à « mater » les citoyens polonais.

Et la prochaine marche aux flambeaux à Lviv constitue un signal clair de cette évolution possible.

Publié à l’origine par  Stratpol

Por Juan José SALINAS

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Escríbenos: info@strategic-culture.su

Vulgo pelotudez. Vengo de tomar un café con Osvaldo, un amigo entrañable con el que compartimos el temor de estar volviéndonos cada vez menos inteligentes, entre otros motivos porque cada vez delegamos más nuestra memoria a los dispositivos electrónicos, compus, smartphones y nubes.

El llevaba consigo un ejemplar de Moisés y la religión monoteísta y yo un libro mio escrito hace más de dos décadas que le regalé diciéndole que a veces me creo incapaz de volver a escribir algo de esa calidad (sea la que fuere). Antes, él había recordado un comentario mio sobre la película Ideocracy de hace, también, dos décadas atrás. Por que hace tiempo habíamos recordado esta premonitoria pelicula y cavilado sobre la estulticia creciente que venimos detectando. En un momento él se fue al baño y yo abrí su libro en la parte en que Freud conjetura que Moisés era un noble egipcio ¡Que calidad la de su escritura! Recordé la prosa eximia de Trotsky y cuando mi amigo regresó nos preguntamos si las redes sociales y la IA están aplanando notoriamente las mentes, como parece probarlo la existencia de presidentes de las cataduras de Milei y Trump.

De vuelta a casa, me pongo a leer esta nota de otro gran amigo que, justo, qué casualidad, aborda este mismo tema, por suerte con mucha mayor profundidad. Me digo que todo tiene que ver con todo. Y recuerdo a mi amado Luis Alberto Spinetta cuando zahería a los necios del público que no se cansaban de pedirle a gritos que cantara Muchacha ojos de papel: «Tengan cuidado que en un ratito pasa el bobero».

La estupidez contemporánea

El sistema que controla la realidad política y social necesita al estúpido, así como el mercado necesita que la libertad individual se confunda con el acto del consumo. La estupidez que rige el capitalismo destruye fuerzas productivas, atacando capacidad industrial en decenas de países, en función de juegos especulativos. En el escenario de la crisis de 1929, solo el 3% de los estadounidenses estaba vinculado con la especulación bursátil. Ahora es superior al 60%. Y la crisis “in progress” ya no es solamente financiera, sino también energética, alimentaria, psicológica, ambiental.

POR ÁNGEL BECCASINO / LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE

En la Convención Republicana de Dallas (8-9-26), Trump anuncia que comprará votos. Promete 5.000 dólares a cada adulto estadounidense si sus votos permiten a los republicanos retener el control del Congreso en las elecciones de noviembre. ¿Seducirá la oferta a un país que suma millones de familias viviendo en la pobreza, y en el que la inflación está desbocada desde que el gobierno decidió atacar a Irán? Como un adelanto de posible respuesta, los asistentes a la Convención chillan y aplauden gritando “U.S.A!, U.S.A!”, y lanzan ovaciones cuando Trump les promete seguir bombardeando Irán.

Toda elección nos pone delante una foto de la sociedad, una radiografía política-ideológica de un momento dado. En la radiografía actual, el éxito de personajes como Trump, Bolsonaro, Milei, Kast, muestra una sociedad liderada por una identidad política que tiene como denominador común la exclusión violenta de todo aquel que piense diferente. Y también tiene en común algo que Umberto Eco desarrolló en una entrevista que publicó el diario turinés La Stampa, en junio de 2015, que “Las redes sociales le dan el derecho de hablar a legiones de idiotas que antes hablaban sólo en el bar después de un vaso de vino, sin dañar a la comunidad. Ellos eran silenciados rápidamente, pero ahora tienen el mismo derecho a hablar que un premio Nobel. Es la invasión de los idiotas”. Lo redondeó alguna vez el escritor de ciencia ficción Harlan Ellison: “Los dos elementos más comunes en el universo son el hidrógeno y la estupidez.”

“El cibercapitalismo aumenta su control gracias a la guerra neocortical, cuya capacidad para anular la conciencia y la reflexión eleva el grado de sumisión y acrecienta el socialconformismo”, comenta Marcos Roitman Rosenmann, en La democracia, una práctica política venida a menos. Y Arturo Pérez Reverte, sintonizado con aquello que observó el historiador económico Carlo Mario Cipolla, de que la estupidez no se corrige ni con la experiencia, ni con estudios, ni tampoco desaparece con el tiempo, por lo cual “la persona estúpida es el tipo de persona más peligrosa que existe”, aporta: “Yo pensaba cuando era jovencito que lo peor eran los malvados. No. Con el tiempo, la edad, la comprensión de causa-efecto, te das cuenta que lo peor son los tontos. El mayor mal del mundo son los idiotas, que son fácil presa para los malvados. Tú juntas un malvado con cien tontos y tienes 101 malvados. Dando un click en “salvar a las focas” sientes que ya no estás solo, formas parte de un conjunto, de un territorio moral en el cual te sientes arropado y te sientes importante. Es que es muy fácil para un tonto sentirse importante. Las redes sociales te lo facilitan.”

Encerrado en una celda de la Alemania nazi, poco tiempo antes de ser ejecutado por ese régimen el 9 de abril de 1945, el teólogo luterano Dietrich Bonhoeffer reflexionó sobre la imbecilidad de la sociedad de su tiempo, una característica que identificó como más peligrosa que la maldad. Porque la persona estúpida se siente tan segura de sí misma, que con ella no tienen ningún efecto ni los argumentos lógicos ni los hechos objetivos. Heredero de aquella observación, al igual que Pérez Reverte, Cipolla exploró el controvertido tema de la estupidez en un ensayo breve de 1988, titulado Allegro ma non troppo, observando a los estúpidos como un peligro mayor que la mafia o el complejo industrial-militar. Sus conclusiones aplican a la perfección y en múltiples sentidos a un momento en que, como parte de la normalidad, algunos gobernantes conjugan mafia, negocios militares y estupidez, seguros de que la historia los acariciará por haber arrojado toneladas de bombas sobre niños, al tiempo que un ministro israelí celebrado en su patria, aboga por asesinar cada noche 30 o 40 habitantes de Gaza. Y, en la vida cotidiana social, como muestra del poder adquisitivo, en una subasta alguien paga 3,35 millones de dólares por un balón que, como valor añadido, carga el haber sido aquel del gol hecho con la “mano de Dios” encarnada en Maradona, o alguna cifra más o menos similar por los calzones que usó una cantante, mientras miles se arrastran por una limosna en las calles y el hambre grita en el cuerpo de cientos de millones.

La gama de la estupidez contemporánea supera la de todos los tiempos, incluidos en ellos personajes como Calígula o los ideólogos nazis que creyeron ser parte de una raza superior, como la creen hoy los sionistas que llevan adelante el genocidio de palestinos. Estúpido es quien no aprende de lo que ha sufrido, como lo es quien repite errores porque es incapaz de autocrítica, y entonces siempre cree estar en lo correcto. Estúpido es el gobernante que, ante una devastadora tragedia, impide ayuda humanitaria por consideraciones ideológicas. Estúpido es quien no evalúa el efecto de sus decisiones más allá, o no, de lo inmediato. Estúpido es el que en una pandemia difunde consejos falsos, o llama a tener conductas perjudiciales para la salud, como Donald Trump. Estúpidos son quienes promueven discursos negacionistas sobre evidencias históricas, verdades objetivas y consensuadas, el caso de la negación de la tortura y el asesinato de miles de personas en Argentina y Chile por sus actuales gobernantes, aunque su estupidez opere desde el cinismo oportunista que implicaría una funcionalidad.

Estúpidos son quienes se llenaron de temores cuando en mayo del año anterior en el manga japonés El futuro que vi, un vidente, maestro de feng shui, predijo una catástrofe: el 5 de julio se abrirá una grieta bajo el lecho marino entre Japón y Filipinas, cuya consecuencia serán olas tres veces más altas que las que siguieron al terremoto de Tohoku en 2001. Y acto seguido se disparó esa versión de la estupidez que es la superstición, produciendo una crisis en la industria japonesa del turismo: los visitantes desde Hong Kong, Korea y otros países asiáticos se redujeron a la mitad. Porque el algoritmo refleja, y multiplica la reproducción de aquello de lo que más gente está hablando, construyendo certezas por repetición de una versión. En otras palabras, operando una vez más esa ley de la comunicación con intención persuasiva que dice que la clave para el logro del objetivo no es otra que el mensaje más su frecuencia de exposición. Lo cual tiene como segunda versión aquello de que la mentira repetida muchas veces termina siendo percibida como incuestionable verdad. Que es lo que ocurre con las versiones generadas por sectas paranoicas como la norteamericana Qanon que veían pederastas y niños en el sótano de una pizzería, o con aquellos que movidos por sus cámaras de eco, como una jauría de estúpidos tomaron el capitolio de Washington reclamando por unas elecciones que perdió Trump, como los brasileros que intentaron tomarse Planalto en Brasilia cuando ganó Lula. Estúpidos que se hacían selfies destrozando lo que encontraba a su paso, como turistas encandilados con lo que están haciendo, y colgaban las imágenes en tiempo real para que todos sepan que han sido ellos.

 

El gran problema es que cuando se intenta convencer al estúpido de su error, este se atrinchera en su estupidez como si fuera su mayor valor. Así como ocurre cuando se le ridiculiza detonando su resentimiento. Ni la razón, ni la exposición de los hechos, ninguna evidencia sirve para convencer a quien vive en la repetición del relato afín a sus creencias.

El algoritmo depredador de la singularidad

—“Así como un cordón umbilical satisface las necesidades de un feto antes de que pueda comunicarlas, las plataformas tecnológicas se esmeran para asociar nuestros deseos antes de que los hayamos expresado”. Mark Andrejevic, Automated Media.

Así como Google y Wikipedia hicieron desaparecer las enciclopedias, cuando se masificó el uso de smartphones o teléfonos móviles “inteligentes, la posibilidad práctica que ofrecían condujo a la delegación de una amplia gama de funciones cerebrales. Y llegó el confortable sometimiento al algoritmo decidiendo qué deseamos, qué nos interesa, cómo movernos por la ciudad, adónde ir a comprar algo, cuál restaurante elegir para comer, qué modelo de cualquier cosa escoger. Una suerte de vida en piloto automático, siguiendo Google maps.

Si el humano evolucionó por siglos poco a poco, y la sociedad otro tanto a través de la cultura y sus lentos ritmos, con la evolución de la tecnología y sus usos todo se aceleró, y la vida se fue “algoritmizando” velozmente. Respondiendo a las órdenes del algoritmo, y no a la realidad “natural” del mundo, se eliminaron diferencias unificándose mercados, generándose tendencias que estandarizan conductas, y se avanzó en la intervención sobre la biología eliminando particularidades para optimizar la explotación de seres vivos como fuentes de proteína. De orientarnos por nuestro sentido de ubicación y conocimiento del territorio, estando atentos a lo que ocurría a nuestro alrededor, pasamos a movernos obedeciendo al GPS y dejando atrás nuestro vínculo cerebral con la calle. Al igual que los niños delegando la función de sumar 2+2 en una calculadora o una tablet, nos entregamos a la facilidad que proporciona una máquina, y eso mismo ocurrió con nuestra forma de conectar con la información como búsqueda de conocimiento. Información cuyo flujo enorme pasó a ser una parte más del entretenimiento, y por tanto dejó de producir el efecto de atención, reflexión, conciencia que en otros tiempos producía.

No más que dos o tres décadas antes del presente, hablar de “algoritmo” era hablar de matemáticas. Hoy es hablar de tendencias, de conductas, de reacciones sobre lo que nos ocurre, sobre lo que nos interesa. El algoritmo se ha convertido en quien orienta nuestras vidas, ofreciéndonos la convergencia entre lo que buscamos y lo más popular en las búsquedas como guía. Es decir, el algoritmo nos integra a las corrientes dominantes de cada momento, haciéndonos sentir integrados, “parte” de ellas. El algoritmo nos hace sentir pertenencia, identidad. Y lo hace porque conoce de nosotros lo que nos interesa, los lugares donde estamos y donde planeamos estar, lo que hemos venido comprando, los que repetimos en nuestra escogencia  (N. del E.:  Acción y efecto de escoger) y a partir de eso nos hace sentirnos parte, encajar en el mundo. Entonces nos pone delante ofertas en función de nuestras preferencias y nivel económico. Y juega con nuestra ansiedad, diciéndonos que hay otros mirando lo que nos están ofreciendo, amenazándonos con perder las oportunidades. Pero, además, nos gestiona dentro de contextos comerciales, porque no solamente cruza oferta con demanda, sino que evalúa disponibilidad de lo que se busca, la ansiedad que tenemos por llegar a tenerlo, la insistencia en la búsqueda, y en función de eso decide la relación, el precio. Por eso a dos personas de igual característica que preguntan en busca de un resultado, la respuesta les sorprende con dos precios diferentes para alcanzarlo.

Hoy que ya nadie lee la letra pequeña y se universaliza el “acepto término y condiciones”, así como el “acepto cookies” para poder acceder a casi cualquier página, se ha logrado instalar la idea de que la política es una idea pasada de moda y que todos los políticos son la misma cosa, sean de derecha o de izquierda, y que, finalmente, lo único que puede salvarnos somos nosotros mismos, cada uno por su cuenta. Y ahí juega el libre mercado, mostrándonos que ya no se trata de la lucha colectiva por el acceso a mayores niveles de igualdad y distribución de la riqueza, sino que todo depende de cada uno, y para muestra, la exhibición de algunos cuantos que, seg{un nos dicen, se han vuelto millonarios con solo proponérselo y ser constantes en lo que se han propuesto.

Refiriéndose a las plataformas digitales que “controlan todos los flujos de información, lo que en una sociedad digitalizada comprende una buena parte de las relaciones sociales”, en su texto La Sociedad Serializada, Edwin Cruz Rodríguez escribió en Desde Abajo, 19 de julio de 2024 que “dado que se trata de información cuantitativa en grandes cantidades y que circula a gran velocidad, las personas quedan sin posibilidad de dotarla de significado para convertirla en conocimiento, como hacían con los mensajes televisivos o radiales. Solo las grandes empresas tecnológicas disponen de los medios para convertir los datos en conocimiento y solo ellas se benefician de ese enorme poder.” El algoritmo cuenta con toda nuestra data, nuestros movimientos físicos por la ciudad, nuestros movimientos de tarjetas de crédito, nuestras repeticiones de compras, la comida que pedimos al domicilio, los espectáculos por los que nos interesamos, lo que miramos en las páginas, la música que escuchamos… Y así como se controla el consumo, se construyen tendencias en momentos electorales, guiando las decisiones del votante, y en general se gestionan las tendencias de opinión, tanto como de emoción política, en dirección al objetivo de proyectos que cuentan con los apoyos que se requieren para hacerlo.

La situación de los humanos (entre otros avances civilizatorios de la estupidez)

Desde hace décadas la estupidez es una política pública, comenzando por la educación, que forma a los niños priorizando la memorización sobre el pensamiento crítico, reflexivo. Es la biopolítica de la ignorancia, de que hablaba Michel Foucault. Es el trabajo del sistema para neutralizar cualquier rebeldía, cualquier motivación en dirección a cuestionar el sistema, de imaginar otra posibilidad. Y es el resultado de la manipulación sistemática de ese miedo que, como sensación, acompaña a la humanidad quizás desde siempre. Porque ese miedo que para Aristóteles era el resultado del diálogo entre las pasiones y las creencias, y que hacía a John Locke decir que es “la emoción más fuerte que la mente pueda sentir”, y por eso nos mueve más que el deseo, es hoy la máxima herramienta de cohesión social, rigiendo las relaciones de desequilibrio entre quienes tienen y quienes necesitan.

Haciendo equilibrio entre el miedo de Hobbes y esa ansiedad masiva ante la pérdida de control, a la que Montesquieu define como el terror, en medio de la desorientación que produce la rapidez con que cambian las cosas en la escena pública, Alexis de Tocqueville centra su mirada en el miedo político, que observa como algo que afecta a la masa produciendo un estado psíquico colectivo al que el individuo se somete. Entonces escribe que “vivimos en una época y en una sociedad democrática en que los individuos, incluso los más grandes, son muy poca cosa”. Y por eso necesitan de la autoridad para superar la angustia del sentimiento de estar solos. Tocqueville, que cree que cuanto más sentido del yo tiene una persona menos propensa es a sufrir ansiedad, ve en la masa el mal, y afirma en Democracy que un pueblo sumido en la desagradable ansiedad y pretendiendo estabilidad y orden con respecto a las cosas, temeroso del posible irrespeto por la propiedad, en suma, se convierte en un pueblo que aplaude la esclavitud, que deja que le quiten su libertad, y que “incluso con frecuencia la entrega él mismo”.

Hay un elemento nuevo en el territorio del miedo, y es la irrupción de un posible apocalipsis tecnológico como consecuencia del desarrollo de la Inteligencia Artificial y la robótica. En los primeros días de septiembre 2026, Evan Hubinger, jefe de seguridad de Anthropic, una de las empresas líderes en el desarrollo de la Inteligencia Artificial, escribe en X: “Creemos sinceramente que la IA podría acabar con la humanidad”. Días después Darío Amodei, CEO de la misma Anthropic, se manifiesta en el sentido de que es necesario frenar el desarrollo de la IA con el fin de evaluar mejor los riesgos derivados de sus crecientes capacidades que le permitirían “controlar toda internet”, esto es, superar la capacidad humana para controlarla. De inmediato recibe el apoyo de Sam Altman, cabeza de su competidora Open AI, y de Elon Musk, al tiempo que el rechazo de Donald Trump y otros de su círculo, entre ellos el presidente de la Cámara de Representantes, Mike Johnson, que argumenta a CNN que si el congreso intenta regular la IA “perderemos la carrera de la Inteligencia Artificial con China”, y eso no se debe permitir que suceda.

En otras palabras y hablando claro, no importa si la IA toma independencia y decide cualquier desastre sobre el mundo, porque la estupidez indica que lo único importante es la carrera de negocios sobre los usos militares de la IA y el potencial para desarrollar mayor poder destructor.

IA a un lado, Craig Gent, en su libro Cyberboss: TheRise of Algorithmic Management and the New Struggle for Control at Work (Cyberjefes: El auge de la gestión algorítmica y la nueva lucha por el control en el trabajo), observa que el problema para los trabajadores, además de la sustitución por robots, fáciles de ser afectados por el polvo y caros de mantener, y por tanto no tan funcionales en la mayoría de trabajos, es ser dirigidos por ellos mediante la gestión algorítmica. Esto es, el reemplazo del gestor humano como autoridad del sistema informático en la supervisión de la productividad de los trabajadores, tal como funciona en las cadenas de comida rápida o en el servicio de taxis. En los centros de trabajo logístico, tipo Amazon, los algoritmos gestionan a los trabajadores tanto como controlan los procesos de transporte de mercaderías: el trabajador interactúa con una pantalla, que organiza los pedidos, así como en la economía colaborativa interactúa con una aplicación. Las computadoras dirigen a los trabajadores optimizando su rentabilidad, al tiempo que los sustituyen. La tecnología reconfigura el trabajo, lo “optimiza” reorganizando procesos, controlando los tiempos del trabajador. Las computadoras no son humanas, por tanto, el trabajador no podrá exigir por su dignidad, pidiendo que sea respetado y, obviamente, esto conduce a implicancias de inhumanidad.

Por otra parte, de igual modo al que opera para intensificar el trabajo, esto es rentabilizarlo al máximo cuantificando la productividad sobre el tiempo, la gestión algorítmica opera también para incrementar el consumo, al tiempo que trabaja a otros niveles. El objetivo es que las mayorías acumulen cosas, en su mayor parte rápidamente desechables, para que unas mínimas minorías acumulen capital. Y hay cuestiones más de fondo, como lo que también ocurre en aquella “superestructura” de la que hablaba Gramsci, cuando en los Estados Unidos de la eugenesia o el supremacismo blanco anglosajón, se viralizan en las redes sociales mensajes publicitarios como el de American Eagle protagonizado por Sydney Sweeney y el slogan “Good Jeans” jugando con la homofonía entre “jeans” y “genes”, ya que la pronunciación de ambas palabras en inglés es muy similar.

La rubia de cuerpo deseable es portadora de buenos genes, decodifica el consumidor. Y así la marca de los “buenos jeans” marca la cultura aspiracional desde la hegemonía de los “buenos genes”. Y esto mientras millones utilizan diversos robots de asistencia sexual y “conversan” con la IA sobre sus vidas, sus deseos, sus traumas, sus fantasías, y en una nueva versión de la transferencia del psicoanálisis, le consultan qué decisiones les conviene tomar para resolver conflictos afectivos, o cómo resolver sus angustias, su depresión.

La economía de la estupidez

En su trabajo sobre el capitalismo y la contracción del sueño reparador en las personas, Jonathan Crary afirma que el tiempo medio dedicado al sueño en el último siglo ha disminuido dos horas: de ocho horas y media a seis y media. Y se pregunta sobre el efecto que el bombardeo de impulsos electrónicos, independiente del contenido, tiene en la mente humana y su capacidad de discriminar lo verdadero y lo falso, lo conveniente y lo inconveniente. Indiferente ante esto, y desde el pragmatismo que requieren sus intereses, el director general de Netflix, Reed Hastings, declara en una entrevista que el principal competidor de su negocio es el sueño. Si la persona duerme, no ve su oferta de entretenimiento. Como parte del deseo de colonizar horas de sueño por parte de las plataformas de streaming y del comercio en general, ante la fragilidad de la atención y la contracción constante del tiempo disponible para dejarse capturar por un estímulo, se observa la priorización de temas como los asesinos en serie, así como del impacto visual y la simplificación en la oferta de contenidos tanto como en la publicidad. Esto es, nuevos ingredientes para la profundización de la estupidez.

En su escrito sobre el Brutalismo Suprematista Libertario, Franco Berardi recuerda a Mc Luhan, que en 1964 escribió aquello de que cuando la comunicación interhumana pasa de la dimensión lenta de la técnica alfabética a la dimensión rápida de la técnica electrónica, el pensamiento se vuelve inadecuado para la crítica y el pensamiento mitológico se restablece. Ahí observa Berardi que, en la mirada libertaria, la empatía “no es compatible con la economía de la supervivencia; de hecho, es autolesiva.” Y escribe que “Mientras que la justicia social se condena como una intrusión aberrante del socialismo de Estado en la libertad de los individuos, la ferocidad competitiva se naturaliza: en la lucha por la vida, aquellos que no están a la altura de la ferocidad merecen morir.”

Entre el pesimismo de la inteligencia y el optimismo de la voluntad, que mencionaba Gramsci, se ha vuelto normal aceptar que esta será una generación que vivirá peor que la anterior. Lo contrario a lo que venía sucediendo. Un reciente estudio liderado por el Nobel de Economía Joseph Stiglitz, y encargado por la presidencia del G-20, que el mundo está atravesando una “emergencia de desigualdad” derivado de la alta concentración de la riqueza por parte de los más privilegiados. La definición de alta desigualdad que hace el Banco Mundial, aplica al 83% de los países, que representan al 90% de la población mundial, mientras que la riqueza de los multimillonarios equivale ya al 16% del PIB global, alcanzando el nivel más alto de la historia. En términos cotidianos, la situación es que, en el año 2025, 2.300 millones de personas se vieron obligadas frecuentemente a no ingerir alimentos, lo que representa 335 millones más que el registro correspondiente al año anterior a la pandemia Covid19.

«Medir la prosperidad en puntos de PIB es tan absurdo como pretender medir la felicidad en metros cuadrados.»

La prosperidad de los países se sigue midiendo a través de un indicador, el Producto Interno Bruto, que cuando sube se considera que la economía ha crecido, que las cosas están funcionando, que todo va de maravillas, en tanto cuando baja se encienden las alarmas. No entran en estas consideraciones los daños ambientales que genera en muchos países el crecimiento de ese PIB, lo que sugiere que medir la prosperidad en puntos de PIB es tan absurdo como pretender medir la felicidad en metros cuadrados. Entonces aparecen voces críticas que piden políticas de decrecimiento, reducir la producción y el consumo, acabar con la obsolescencia programada, deconstruir la lógica comercial-consumista, para con esto solucionar la crisis climática y otros problemas ambientales. Y se propone optar por una economía que contemple límites, aceptando el vivir bien con lo que tenemos, lo que se traduce en el concepto de simplicidad voluntaria, o de sobriedad feliz, de hedonismo alternativo, como alternativa a la búsqueda individual de más ingresos para así poder comprar más cosas.

El éxito del capitalismo que nos muestran los medios de comunicación a través de «alfombras rojas», vestidos largos, yates y mansiones, concursos de belleza y laureles de artistas, deportistas y monarquías, representa a una muy ínfima parte de la humanidad, menos del uno por ciento. Y nos tratan de convencer de que algún día podremos vivir como ese 1% que posee la mayor parte de la riqueza, y por tanto tiene acceso a las posibilidades de multiplicar esa fortuna de tal forma que algunos cuantos de ellos ganan cada día más de mil millones de dólares mientras, gracias a su poder de influencia, o distintas formas de lobby, casi no pagan impuestos. En tanto un trabajador de un país pobre entrega más de un 30, o un 40% de sus ingresos en impuestos directos o indirectos, los grandes millonarios no pagan más de un 3 o un 5%.

La voracidad capitalista que “optimizando costos” ha ido exterminando derechos laborales adquiridos tras largas luchas, que luego ha pasado a atacar al sistema pensional, que le quita a cada país sus recursos naturales, sus “commodities”, su patrimonio público, después de haberle robado los derechos a su pueblo, se ha enseñado como la lógica que debe regir el mundo. La lógica de la voracidad del deseo de lucro, que en su aprobación del egoísmo regente solo habla de crecimiento y progreso en términos de incremento de ese lucro, jamás de inclusión, de incorporar multitudes humanas a la posibilidad de vivir con lo que necesitan, como el camino para que industria y comercio se expandan.

La lógica de economías en que el Estado se sostiene endeudado y reendeudándose, y a su déficit constante debe sumar el creciente pago de intereses en los que se va la calidad de vida de sus ciudadanos. Un modelo evidentemente insostenible, pero que mientras siga implantado nos seguirá convirtiendo, generación tras generación, en aquellos “hombres degradados” a los que Hegel atribuía impotencia física y espiritual.

Publicado originalmente por  Pájaro rojo

By Hüseyin DOĞRU

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Built to fight foreign interference, Europe’s security apparatus is now turning on its own people. Muslims and critics of Israel are first in line.

On 8 October 2026, the European Parliament passed a deeply Islamophobic resolution on “Islamist entryism”. Behind the text is the hand of the European People’s Party, the conservative bloc that holds sway over EU politics. Backed by the liberals of Renew Europe and the far right, it was put to a vote and passed 381 to 167. The resolution is put forward as a way to shield European democracy from extremists, but its provisions are enough to give pause to anyone with an eye on the future of our rights and freedoms in Europe.

Take for instance the matter of “hatred of Israel”. The resolution puts this undefined notion forward as an indicator of ideological radicalisation, while also sounding the alarm on the “instrumentalisation of anti-discrimination frameworks”. One has to wonder at the implications: does this mean that a campaign against discrimination or even criticism of a state under accusation for war crimes can be subsumed under the EU’s widening net of security threats?

This resolution is more than an assault on a Muslim population already demonised in Europe; it is part of a broader, unexamined shift in the Union where dissent is viewed with suspicion. I am living with the consequences of it.

From foreign interference to domestic dissent

For years, the EU has been building a security apparatus around the alleged threats of disinformation, foreign interference and hybrid warfare.

Central to this is Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI), a framework developed largely in response to “Russian information operations”. The EU’s diplomatic service describes FIMI as a “mostly non-illegal” pattern of behaviour that can negatively affect political processes and values.

The definition is telling in what it leaves out. Political officials, not judicial ones, are left to decide what constitutes a manipulation of European values and what does not. What becomes of political critique and journalism when their arbitrary judgments are applied?

In May 2025, the EU sanctioned me and my media company, red., under its Russia-related hybrid-threats regime. My alleged offence was my journalism, particularly my coverage of Palestine solidarity protests in Germany, which the EU claims supported Russia’s efforts to destabilise Europe. The evidence against me consists of screenshots of factual posts from red. and my personal social media accounts, most of them reporting or criticism of German domestic and foreign policy. Not one page of the evidence dossier so much as mentions Russia.

Without a criminal charge, trial or conviction, my bank accounts were frozen and I was banned from working and travelling.

Then there is the question of administrative sanctions. The EU will say due process is observed since one can take them to court, but by the time a judge is sitting in on the case the damage has been done. Livelihoods are in ruins, bank accounts frozen and lives in disarray, all while the sanctioned individual endures years of expensive and politicised legal wrangling to have restrictions lifted. It is an extraordinary power to wield; the punishment is meted out first and the chance to contest it later, with no need to prove criminality. Violate a sanction and you face prosecution and prison, even if your only offence was buying nappies for your own babies, which could be deemed to have circumvented the rules.

On 8 October, the same day Parliament voted on “Islamist entryism”, the EU Council renewed the sanctions regime I am listed under until October 2027 and reinstated the reasons for my listing. The new text still describes the protesters whose university occupation red. covered as “anti-Israel rioters”. To justify the renewal, the Council cited a Parliament report from September on hybrid threats. One institution supplies the political mood, another uses that mood to put names like mine on a list.

The enemy within

The Islamist entryism resolution takes this logic in another direction. “Entryism” refers to political groups infiltrating established institutions to influence them from within. In this case, the Parliament warns that Islamist networks are using charities, youth organisations, universities and other parts of civil society to gain influence over European politics. The idea was imported from Paris; the resolution leans on a May 2025 report by the French interior ministry, the same ministry that once governed Algeria’s Muslims as colonial subjects.

The threat is no longer just a foreign power supposedly interfering in European affairs. Now the EU is turning its attention to an enemy within.

The phrase has a history. In July 1984, Margaret Thatcher told Conservative backbenchers that Britain had fought the “enemy without” in the Falklands and now faced the “enemy within”. She meant the striking miners.

The way in which the resolution singles out “hatred of Israel” as a sign of radicalisation without defining the term is noteworthy. A couple of paragraphs on it concedes this is not a bar to “legitimate criticism” of the state, yet it offers no guidance on how the line between the two will be drawn, or by whom. Since when has hostility to a government been cause for suspecting extremism? Or are we to assume Europeans must love Israel? One might ask whose interests are really being served. The European Commission tells us the EU was Israel’s top trading partner in 2024, with €42.6 billion in goods. To call for an end to that trade or an arms embargo is not a danger to democracy, but to the business interests of Europe.

Working with other organisations, maintaining certain associations or allegedly misusing anti-discrimination campaigns can also become grounds for suspicion. Among the warning signs the resolution lists are “the recurrence of certain partnerships”, “proximity to already identified networks” and even “the production of activist reports”.¹⁷ The resolution calls for restrictions on institutional access and funding, as well as tighter checks on visas, residence permits and mobility involving people, including academics, linked to individuals designated as “hate preachers”.

Even the European Network Against Racism is cast in doubt, its funding said to raise “serious questions”. When an anti-racism body is conflated with entryism, the whole concept is made to look suspect. Under the terms of the resolution, a professor could be slapped with travel restrictions because of a tenuous association with a so-called “hate preacher”, having broken no law in the process. We have seen this sort of thing before. In 1972, Germany’s Radikalenerlass saw the domestic intelligence service vet some 3.5 million public sector applicants. Communists and others on the left were dismissed or denied their jobs as teachers, postmen or train drivers for who they were rather than any act they had committed.

The resolution also tells us which Muslims Europe is willing to tolerate. It promises support for “Muslim representatives” who defend democratic values and resist “Islamist pressure”.²² The good Muslim, in other words, is the one the state approves of.

Not being legally binding does not make the resolution any less alarming. The Parliament has rubber-stamped the idea that lawful activity is a security risk, laying the groundwork for enforceable restrictions down the line. The same rationale once used to counter foreign interference is now being turned on organisations and people here in Europe.

Repression in the name of democracy

Both the FIMI sanctions regime and the Islamist entryism resolution are justified in the name of defending democracy and protecting European values. Yet the EU is increasingly treating the exercise of those very freedoms as grounds for suspicion.

None of this is happening in a vacuum. Europe is rearming on a scale not seen since the Cold War (the Commission’s ReArm Europe plan alone aims to mobilise up to €800 billion) while standing by Israel through the destruction of Gaza. A state preparing for war needs a quiet home front. Those who object, to genocide abroad or to paying for rearmament with cuts at home, have to be recast as foreign agents or fifth columnists.

What counts as “hatred of Israel”? Who decides when fighting discrimination becomes “instrumentalising” it? When does criticism of EU foreign policy become foreign interference? And how many connections does it take before a journalist, academic or activist is branded a security threat?

These are not abstract questions for those of us already living with the consequences. The EU’s authoritarian turn exposes the limits of its professed liberal values, where freedom of expression and political participation are celebrated until they challenge the interests of capital and the states that serve it. Liberal democracies have always kept a second rulebook in the drawer, for strikers, communists and the colonised.

What began as a campaign against foreign interference is increasingly being turned against dissent at home, with Muslims and critics of Israel, already among the most marginalised and harassed people in Europe, first in the firing line. But they won’t be the last. Trade unionists, climate activists and anyone who stands in the way of the war economy should take note.

While Europe’s political establishment continues to congratulate itself on defending democracy, the machinery for silencing its opponents is being built in plain sight.

Original article:  braveneweurope.com

First published in Deník N.

The lower house of Czech parliament became a nighttime battleground for the future of the country’s public service media at the weekend, when MPs pushed through the abolition of public service media licence fees in the bill’s first reading in the chamber on Saturday (24 October).

Czech MPs voted to pass a bill that lays the groundwork to abolish TV and radio licence fees and move public media under the state budget.

The weekend vote was not yet a vote on the law’s final approval: the government coalition only needed to prevent the bill’s rejection which the opposition had sought.

The controversial vote was scheduled for 4.36am on Saturday – by no means a typical time for such a vote. Opposition parties had failed to postpone the vote, and also did not have enough numbers to reject the bill.

Out of 177 lawmakers present, 96 MPs voted in favour of the bill, while 81 opposition MPs voted to reject it. Prime minister Andrej Babiš did not take part in the vote.

MPs from the Czech Republic’s five opposition parties also failed to pass a proposal to return the bill for redrafting to the coalition formed by ANO (led by the PM) and the far-right parties Freedom and Direct Democracy (SPD) and Motorists to Themselves.

The bill will now go to the parliament’s media and culture committee. This will be followed by lengthy debate at the law’s second reading, where amendments may be submitted. The proceedings will likely last several days.

4.36am vote planned at last-minute

Babiš’s governing majority only added the agenda item for ending licence fees on the Chamber of Deputies’ (lower house of parliament’s) agenda on Friday morning. It even took by surprise the MPs of ANO, SPD and Motorists.

The coalition leadership formed by Babiš and foreign minister Petr Macinka (Motorists) had kept the plan secret all week, so that it would not become public and opposition parties could not prepare obstruction tactics.

Protesters had gathered outside the parliament through the night in the early hours of Saturday morning. Demonstrations carried on throughout the Czech Republic over the weekend.

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Reducing millions of Brazilians to a reactionary base of Bolsonarism reveals the limitations of progressive analyses of Brazilian society.

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Since the first round of the presidential elections, segments of the Brazilian left have intensified their criticism of evangelicals, frequently portraying them as a reactionary force responsible for the rise of the right in the country. This interpretation offers a convenient explanation for progressive electoral failures, but it demonstrates a rather limited understanding of Brazilian social reality. The evangelical phenomenon has historical, cultural, and economic roots that cannot be reduced to Bolsonarism.

The first mistake is treating evangelicals as an organized political bloc. Brazil’s Protestant landscape encompasses historical denominations, Pentecostal churches, independent Neo-Pentecostal organizations, and countless local congregations, often characterized by profound doctrinal differences. There is no central ecclesiastical authority capable of coordinating this entire landscape, nor is there a uniform political orientation shared by its members. Although religious leaders have played an important role in mobilizing voters in favor of Jair Bolsonaro, their positions do not necessarily reflect the convictions of all believers.

Furthermore, the expansion of Brazilian evangelicalism has already shown signs of slowing, according to recent demographic analyses. This demonstrates that the phenomenon has its own dynamics and does not depend exclusively on the political climate. Many Brazilians find networks of solidarity, moral guidance, everyday assistance, and forms of community organization in evangelical churches. Some believers maintain conservative positions on social issues, but support social policies, workers’ rights, and causes that do not correspond to the Bolsonarist agenda. Similarly, some evangelical groups adopt more liberal approaches to cultural issues, as illustrated by the Universal Church, where support for abortion is permitted. Ultimately, this is an extraordinarily complex and broad phenomenon that cannot be reduced to simplistic political labels.

Another mistake is interpreting Brazilian evangelicalism as merely a product of American influence. The activities of foreign missionaries and international funding contributed to the expansion of certain denominations, particularly throughout the twentieth century. However, the Brazilian experience developed distinctive characteristics of its own. Churches adapted their language, practices, and organizational structures to the country’s cultural conditions, developing a form of popular religiosity deeply connected to Brazil’s national religious imagination.

In many contexts, beliefs in direct spiritual intervention, the search for healing, liberation from evil influences, and collective participation in rituals of personal transformation have parallels with practices found in Afro-Brazilian religious traditions and popular Catholicism. This does not mean that these religions are equivalent. Rather, it demonstrates that evangelical growth took place within a society profoundly shaped by syncretism and the continuous reinterpretation of its religious traditions. In practice, Brazilian evangelicalism is a genuine expression of the country’s popular spirituality, not merely an American import.

The urban dimension of this process must also be considered. For decades, the growth of Brazil’s urban peripheries and major cities created social needs that traditional institutions struggled to meet. Despite its historical importance, the Catholic Church failed to maintain a pastoral presence in every territory commensurate with the pace of urbanization. Evangelical churches occupied part of this space, establishing communities close to residents, providing everyday support, and building lasting social ties.

This presence is particularly important in favelas, peripheral neighborhoods, and prisons. These are environments where churches can offer a sense of belonging, community discipline, material assistance, and opportunities to rebuild one’s life. This reality has considerable political significance, especially because many of these same territories constitute traditional electoral strongholds of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and the Workers’ Party (PT).

This apparent contradiction exposes the limitations of the categories employed by segments of the left. A worker may vote for Lula because of his economic policies while attending a conservative church. Another may support progressive social programs while rejecting certain cultural positions held by the left. Political and religious identities do not have to coincide entirely.

Bolsonarism has managed to establish important alliances with evangelical leaders, mobilizing religious symbols and moral discourse as part of its electoral strategy. This does not give it ownership of the evangelical phenomenon. Confusing these two realities prevents the left from understanding the needs, aspirations, and contradictions of millions of Brazilians.

To build a lasting political alternative, progressives must abandon the tendency to classify entire communities as ideological enemies. Brazilian evangelicalism is plural, socially rooted, and culturally autonomous. Ignoring this complexity means giving up on understanding a decisive segment of Brazilian society.

Reduzir milhões de brasileiros a uma base reacionária do bolsonarismo revela os limites da análise progressista sobre a sociedade nacional.

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Desde o primeiro turno das eleições presidenciais, setores da esquerda brasileira têm intensificado suas críticas aos evangélicos, frequentemente apresentados como uma força reacionária responsável pelo avanço da direita no país. Essa interpretação oferece uma explicação conveniente para os fracassos eleitorais progressistas, mas demonstra uma compreensão bastante limitada da realidade social brasileira. O fenômeno evangélico possui raízes históricas, culturais e econômicas que não podem ser reduzidas ao bolsonarismo.

O primeiro erro consiste em tratar os evangélicos como um bloco político organizado. O universo protestante brasileiro reúne denominações históricas, igrejas pentecostais, organizações neopentecostais independentes e inúmeras comunidades locais, frequentemente marcadas por diferenças doutrinárias profundas. Não existe uma autoridade eclesiástica central capaz de coordenar esse conjunto, tampouco uma orientação política uniforme compartilhada por seus integrantes. Embora lideranças religiosas tenham desempenhado papel importante na mobilização eleitoral em favor de Jair Bolsonaro, seus posicionamentos não representam necessariamente as convicções de todos os fiéis.

Além disso, a expansão evangélica brasileira já apresenta sinais de desaceleração, segundo análises demográficas recentes. Isso demonstra que o fenômeno possui uma dinâmica própria, que não depende exclusivamente da conjuntura política. Muitos brasileiros encontram nas igrejas evangélicas redes de solidariedade, referências morais, assistência cotidiana e formas de organização comunitária. Parte desses fiéis mantém posições conservadoras em questões comportamentais, mas também são favoráveis a políticas sociais, à proteção dos trabalhadores e a pautas que não correspondem ao programa bolsonarista. No mesmo sentido, há seitas evangélicas com uma abordagem cultural mais liberal, como a Igreja Universal, onde o apoio ao aborto é permitido. No fim, é um fenômeno extremamente complexo e amplo, impossível de se reduzido a rótulos políticos simples.

Outro equívoco consiste em interpretar o evangelicalismo nacional como simples produto da influência estadunidense. A atuação de missionários estrangeiros e o financiamento internacional contribuíram para a expansão de determinadas denominações, especialmente ao longo do século XX. Entretanto, a realidade brasileira adquiriu características próprias. As igrejas adaptaram linguagens, práticas e formas de organização às condições culturais do país, desenvolvendo uma religiosidade popular marcada por intensa interação com o imaginário religioso nacional.

Em muitos contextos, elementos como a crença na intervenção direta do mundo espiritual, a busca por cura, a libertação de influências malignas e a participação coletiva em rituais de transformação pessoal encontram paralelos com práticas presentes em tradições afro-brasileiras e no catolicismo popular. Isso não significa que essas religiões sejam equivalentes, mas demonstra que o crescimento evangélico ocorreu dentro de uma sociedade profundamente marcada pelo sincretismo e pela reelaboração constante de suas tradições religiosas. Na prática, o evangelicalismo brasileiro é realmente uma expressão da espiritualidade popular do Brasil, não uma mera importação dos EUA.

A dimensão urbana desse processo também precisa ser considerada. Durante décadas, o crescimento das periferias e das grandes cidades brasileiras produziu demandas sociais que as instituições tradicionais tiveram dificuldade para atender. A Igreja Católica, apesar de sua importância histórica, não conseguiu manter em todos os territórios uma presença pastoral proporcional à velocidade da urbanização. Igrejas evangélicas ocuparam parte desse espaço, estabelecendo comunidades próximas dos moradores, oferecendo apoio cotidiano e criando vínculos sociais duradouros.

Essa presença é particularmente importante nas favelas, nos bairros periféricos e nos presídios. São ambientes nos quais as igrejas podem oferecer pertencimento, disciplina comunitária, assistência material e oportunidades de reconstrução da vida pessoal. Trata-se de uma realidade politicamente significativa, sobretudo porque muitos desses mesmos territórios constituem bases eleitorais tradicionais de Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva e do Partido dos Trabalhadores.

A aparente contradição revela os limites das categorias utilizadas por parte da esquerda. Um trabalhador pode votar em Lula por suas políticas econômicas e, simultaneamente, frequentar uma igreja conservadora. Outro pode apoiar programas sociais progressistas e rejeitar determinadas posições culturais da esquerda. As identidades políticas e religiosas não precisam coincidir integralmente.

O bolsonarismo conseguiu estabelecer alianças importantes com lideranças evangélicas, mobilizando símbolos religiosos e discursos morais em sua estratégia eleitoral. Isso não lhe confere propriedade sobre o fenômeno evangélico. Confundir essas duas realidades impede que a esquerda compreenda as necessidades, as aspirações e as contradições de milhões de brasileiros.

Para construir uma alternativa política duradoura, os progressistas precisam abandonar a tentação de classificar comunidades inteiras como inimigas ideológicas. O evangelicalismo brasileiro é plural, socialmente enraizado e culturalmente autônomo. Ignorar essa complexidade significa renunciar à compreensão de uma parcela decisiva da sociedade nacional.

Public security, rejection of the woke agenda, and the defense of traditional values help explain the Brazilian right’s electoral strength.

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The results of the first round of Brazil’s 2026 presidential election sparked a wave of analysis on the Brazilian left. With Flávio Bolsonaro ahead of Lula in the vote count, many commentators looked for explanations in evangelical voters’ behavior, moral conservatism, and the influence of religious leaders. These factors matter, but they do not explain everything. A significant portion of the electorate is dissatisfied with the cultural priorities of the left and, above all, with the perception that the state has lost its ability to guarantee public safety.

Public security occupies a central place in this debate. According to a Nexus/BTG poll released in July 2026, 30% of respondents identified violence, crime, or public security as the country’s main problem. This concern is particularly relevant among Flávio Bolsonaro’s supporters, for whom fighting crime is one of the main expectations for the next government.

The situation in Rio de Janeiro illustrates the scale of the problem. A study by the Federal Fluminense University’s Study Group on New Illegalisms and the Fogo Cruzado Institute estimated that, in 2024, approximately four million people in the metropolitan region lived under the control or influence of armed groups. This represented 34.9% of the region’s population. Criminal factions and militias exercise forms of territorial power that affect mobility, economic activity, and residents’ everyday lives. Some estimates suggest that between 60% and 70% of Rio de Janeiro’s territory is currently controlled by organized crime.

In this context, rhetoric emphasizing social rights, national sovereignty, and foreign policy can lose electoral appeal when it fails to offer convincing answers to everyday insecurity. Lula has advocated tackling organized crime through coordination among security forces, financial investigations, and the restoration of state control over affected territories. Yet these measures are only being emphasized now, following four years of what critics describe as utter neglect of public security, during which organized crime achieved historic levels of territorial expansion.

Flávio, meanwhile, is betting on a more punitive approach, including classifying criminal factions as narco-terrorist organizations. The dispute involves different conceptions of public security, but it also concerns each candidate’s ability to convey determination in confronting the problem. Whether designating these groups as terrorist organizations would actually help combat crime is a matter for a much longer debate. There is little doubt, however, that the label itself appeals to a substantial portion of the population living under the very real terror imposed by these criminals.

There is also a cultural dimension that the left frequently underestimates. Some voters reject the political vocabulary associated with the woke agenda and interpret certain progressive initiatives as attempts to impose new standards of behavior. The Supreme Federal Court’s draconian decision to recognize “transphobia” as a crime “equivalent to racism” has naturally provoked strongly negative reactions. After all, it seems perfectly normal that millions of Brazilians reject a ruling that can – and already does – place people in prison for up to five years for using the wrong pronoun when addressing transgender individuals.

Cultural discontent is often irresponsibly disdained in political analysis. Many commentators continue to treat voters as machines seeking constant material benefits, supposedly willing to sacrifice their values in exchange for meager welfare handouts – the principal achievement the Workers’ Party government has offered the Brazilian people so far. This analysis is mistaken. For many Brazilians, questions concerning their children’s education, religion, and the limits of state intervention are central political priorities. These voters will naturally tend to support the opposition in a national environment where state-run university hospitals – with the backing of the left-wing establishment – provide puberty blockers and other forms of “non-surgical intervention” to “transgender children.”

Contrary to the expectations of academic analysts disconnected from the country’s realities, foreign policy occupies a limited place in most people’s daily lives. Relations with the United States, Brazil’s role in BRICS, and its diplomatic position on Palestine are relevant issues, but they are unlikely to outweigh immediate concerns such as urban violence and cultural disputes.

Flávio Bolsonaro’s electoral support must be understood through this combination of factors, without attributing a single motivation to millions of voters. Public security, traditional values, dissatisfaction with the government, and rejection of certain progressive agendas can all converge in the same vote. If the left wants to improve its popularity, the better course of action is to reconsider its own mistakes, instead of inventing false explanations for the right’s growing support.

Pepe LUENGO

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En los últimos años alguien está poniendo el mundo patas arriba. Los gobiernos ya no gobiernan; delinquen. Los médicos ya no curan; hacen de la enfermedad un negocio. Los jueces ya no juzgan; manipulan la justicia. Los científicos ya no hacen ciencia; hacen pseudociencia. Los medios de comunicación ya no informan; desinforman. Las religiones ya no predican amor, sino odio… Y así podríamos seguir con una lista interminable.

¿Te has parado a pensar en que todo lo que nos enseñaron desde pequeñitos puede que sea una gran mentira? Hay una evidencia: la gente que se atreve a cuestionar las cosas llega a la conclusión de que absolutamente todo nuestro sistema esta cimentado sobre mentiras. Da igual por donde empieces (Estado, gobierno, democracia, sistema financiero,…), todo es una farsa. Y los acontecimientos que estamos viviendo últimamente, como la reciente “pandemia”, el cambio climático antropogénico, la invasión de Ceuta o cualquiera de las guerras actuales, más de lo mismo.

Todo lo que nos contaron sobre la necesidad incuestionable de someternos a un gobierno, sobre la función que desempeña el sistema financiero, sobre el papel del Estado, incluso sobre la libertad que supuestamente disfrutamos en las democracias occidentales son flagrantes mentiras. Mentiras, por otra parte, que nos fueron inculcadas por padres y educadores sin ser conscientes de que nos contaban una milonga. Sin embargo, estas mentiras son mantenidas y acrecentadas por políticos y medios de comunicación a sabiendas de que son mentiras.

La realidad es que estamos gobernados por una panda de plutócratas, agencias gubernamentales y poderosos lobbies bancarios que manipulan el mundo con total impunidad.

En el transcurso del tiempo, una banda de banqueros internacionales ha creado un sistema de control financiero privado para dominar la política de cada país y la economía mundial. Familias de banqueros como los Rothschild, Morgan, Warburg, etc., junto con la masonería y otras organizaciones nada transparentes como el Club Bilderberg, el CFR. o el Club de Roma, han establecido un cártel financiero y de poder internacional durante los últimos 200 años.

Siendo los amos del dinero -tomándose muy en serio el lema de “quien controla el dinero gobierna el mundo”- se han hecho los dueños de los respectivos gobiernos que manejan a su antojo.

Los amos del mundo han creado una sociedad disfuncional, donde si no cumples con los estándares establecidos -trabajar y consumir toda una gama de productos innecesarios- eres considerado “persona non grata”, por decirlo de una manera suave. Nos han programado para competir con nuestros semejantes y para que nuestra vida sea un cúmulo de metas profesionales y económicas, donde el fin último es la acumulación de bienes materiales. Luego, cuando te mueres, todas esas metas que conseguiste y los bienes materiales que acumulaste se quedan aquí. Lo único bueno que dejas –si es que lo dejas- es tu legado del conocimiento; el resto, un montón de cosas superfluas. Así que la pregunta es: ¿merece la pena tanto esfuerzo?

La mayoría de la gente que peina canas sabe por experiencia propia que esta es una forma de vida demencial que, sin embargo, se ha extendido por todo el mundo. Porque disfrutar de la vida –y cuando hablo de disfrutar de la vida no me estoy refiriendo a viajar en un crucero de lujo, etc.- no requiere ningún esfuerzo. Basta con deleitarse con las experiencias sensoriales que nos brinda la vida en cada momento, disfrutar de las maravillas de este extraordinario planeta azul y compartir conocimiento y alegría con nuestros semejantes.

Cuando tienes salud, familia y amigos que te quieren, una actividad provechosa y ningún conflicto es que la vida no te va nada mal. Entonces, ¿por qué se empeñan en convencernos de todo lo contrario?

El día que dejemos de escuchar en nuestra mente todas esas retahílas programadas sobre el éxito, la competitividad, la codicia y el miedo a todo lo que no se encuentre dentro de nuestra zona de confort es cuando realmente empezaremos a vivir. Porque la vida no es más que eso que sentimos cada mañana al despertar, y no una programación continua de nuestro tiempo, por parte de otros, que es lo más valioso que tenemos en esta vida.

La nuestra es una civilización profundamente enferma. Una civilización donde se le ha dado la vuelta a todo: hombres que ahora son mujeres y viceversa o delincuentes que tienen derechos y víctimas que no los tienen.

Veamos, a modo de ejemplo, el reciente caso de la invasión de Ceuta. En Ceuta los invasores son protegidos por el gobierno que sufrió la invasión y sus gobernados, los Ceutíes, abandonados a su suerte. Y lo más incongruente: el país invadido da las gracias al país invasor y tilda de fascistas y xenófobos a los invadidos que piden una solución. Esta es la locura a la que hemos llegado en una sociedad distópica, donde se le ha dado la vuelta a todo.

La pregunta es: ¿cómo ha sido posible esto? Pues mediante la contaminación de nuestras mentes a través del relato. Porque quien controla el relato controla nuestro pensamiento; quien controla nuestro pensamiento controla nuestro comportamiento; y quien controla nuestro comportamiento influye en nuestras opiniones, estado de ánimo y, por supuesto, en nuestros miedos. Por lo tanto, llegar a ejercer una influencia de la percepción del mundo que nos rodea se ha convertido en la manera más sutil de ejercer el poder. Por cierto, esto lo hace de maravilla nuestro Presidente de Gobierno, Pedro Sánchez.

Pero las cosas son de esta manera porque la mayoría de la gente ha aceptado voluntariamente la esclavitud, ya que el ser humano es el único animal en la naturaleza que se deja gobernar. La absurda idea de elegir un amo que le controle y domine es lo mejor que ha podido salir de su cabecita. Obviamente, es el gobierno quien desempeña el papel de amo. Por lo tanto, la sumisión al gobierno, y el voto para legitimarlo, hace responsables de la situación actual a todos aquellos que siguen estas prácticas. Y lo más incongruente. Si lo han querido así ellos mismos, ¿de qué coños se quejan?

El “populacho” –pobre e ignorante- parece empeñado en su propia desgracia. Ha perdido su dignidad dejándose despojar de su riqueza y su libertad sin la más mínima resistencia. Y aunque bien es verdad que desde tiempos inmemoriales ha sido pobre e ignorante, es a partir del Covid-19 cuando, además, se ha vuelto extremadamente imbécil. Y así no hay manera.

Italy’s diesel protests reveal class contradictions: productive petty bourgeoisie crushed by costs, metropolitan subproletariat exploding in rage.

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Diesel fuel as an indicator of class struggle

Over the past three weeks, Italy has laid bare—all at once and unfiltered—its fundamental social reality. On one side are truck drivers, farmers, fishermen, steelworkers, and a mass of young people who cannot even put a name to their own anger. On the other is an institutional apparatus that, instead of asking why the real people of the country have taken to the streets, convenes high-level meetings on public order and prepares yet another decree. Anyone familiar with the principles of historical materialism knows that situations like these should not be interpreted through the lens of crime reporting. They should be seen as moments when class contradictions—suppressed for years beneath the surface of managed consensus—become visible to the naked eye.

This article does not intend to provide a chronicle of the clashes, which have already been extensively covered. Instead, it aims to lay out the facts and ask what they reveal about the nature of the Italian state at this stage, about the social composition of those protesting, and about the structural inability of the ruling bloc to offer a response that is not repressive.

It all begins, as is often the case, with a budget item. Decree-Law No. 162 of September 17, 2026, had provided for a temporary reduction in the excise tax on diesel fuel until October 5; once that deadline passed, the government did not extend it. The average price has returned to nearly 2.50 euros per liter. For a small Calabrian truck owner who owns just one truck and works as a subcontractor for large retailers, that figure determines whether the month ends in the black or in the red.

The first spontaneous protests broke out in Calabria in early October. Then came Puglia, starting October 11, followed by Basilicata, Sicily, Campania, Molise, and finally Lazio, with picket lines at ports and blockades on the main thoroughfares. Truck drivers were joined by farmers, then by fishing communities. In front of the fish market in Termoli, a banner appeared featuring a skeleton and the words “You’ve reduced us to the bone”; in San Benedetto del Tronto, fishing boats remained in port. In supermarkets across Abruzzo, Molise, Puglia, Campania, and Calabria, the shelves emptied, and people rushed to stock up as they hadn’t since the COVID-19 pandemic.

Let’s pause to consider who these people are, because the sociology of the protest matters more than the slogans. We are not dealing with the classic industrial proletariat, the one found in large Fordist concentrations. We are dealing with a productive petty bourgeoisie in the process of proletarianization: the small business owner, the independent farmer, the fisherman with his own boat. Marx had precisely described—in Chapter 1 of the Manifesto—the fate of these intermediate strata, crushed between big capital, which absorbs them, and the wage-labor condition into which they ultimately plunge. The trucker blocking the highway today is formally an entrepreneur. In substance, his business is a disguised wage: the client dictates his rates, energy costs dictate his expenses, the state levies the excise tax, and he bears the risk. He is self-employed only in the sense that no one guarantees him anything.

In this sense, diesel fuel is more than just a fuel. It is the point where global oil rent—now spiraling out of control due to the Hormuz crisis—travels down the logistics chain until it is offloaded onto those at the very end. Financial capital speculating on futures, large retailers who refuse to renegotiate transport contracts, and the state collecting excise taxes: three forms of appropriation of value produced by others, all converging on the same social body.

The Second Front: The metropolitan subproletariat

On October 17, the protest changed in nature and geography. A hashtag that appeared out of nowhere on social media, “Italia in piazza,” called for demonstrations against the high cost of living, gas prices, and the tax burden. In Milan, Piazza Duomo became a battlefield; in Turin, a Feltrinelli bookstore was ransacked; in Bologna, clashes broke out in front of the train station involving water cannons and tear gas; the following day, in Milan alone, 271 people were taken to the police station, and as many as 220 were minors—among those detained were 12-year-olds, most of whom were second-generation Italians.

On the same day, in Rome, the CGIL’s national march and two other demonstrations against the high cost of living brought some 25,000 people into the streets without any incidents. This contrast must be kept in mind, because it disproves the government’s favorite myth of a single, violent protest. There are at least two distinct movements: one organized, with union roots and specific demands, and one disorganized, very young, urban, and lacking political leadership.

The second movement is the most interesting from a theoretical standpoint, and the most dangerous from a political standpoint. Marx had a term for the uprooted masses lacking class consciousness who, in times of crisis, can be mobilized by anyone who offers them a role: Lumpenproletariat. Using that word today does not mean insulting those young people. It means recognizing their objective position: children of the suburbs of Milan and Turin, often from immigrant families, excluded from the labor market even before entering it, raised in a world of conspicuous consumption that is never within their reach. It is a cognitive dissonance between imagination and reality, and the risk that this violence will be co-opted for reactionary purposes, as happened with the masses of unemployed and war veterans in the 1920s and 1930s.

The lesson of the 18th Brumaire also holds true in reverse. The underclass has no program of its own, and precisely for this reason it can become raw material for any project: that of those who want to set things ablaze, but also that of those who need an internal enemy to justify austerity measures. It is no coincidence that the government has chosen to speak almost exclusively about them, and almost never about the truck drivers in Gioia Tauro or the workers of the former Ilva plant who, in those same weeks, were striking in Taranto and Genoa to find out if they would still have a factory.

The state as a business committee

Il Manifesto defines modern state power as the committee that administers the common affairs of the bourgeois class. This formulation has often been dismissed as overly simplistic. The last two weeks offer an almost textbook-like illustration of it.

On October 18, following the clashes, the Prime Minister convened a summit on public order to evaluate further measures against those who exploit legitimate demonstrations. The October 19 summit resulted in the announcement of a decree-law that preempts measures from the security bill stalled in the Senate: deferred arrest for group vandalism, harsher penalties for roadblocks, and the strengthening of the “Strade Sicure” initiative in Milan with more military personnel. The League has called for the inclusion of preventive detention for minors as well. This would mark the eighth security package in four years.

Consider the sequence of events. A government that could not find the resources to extend the excise tax discount managed, in forty-eight hours, to find the resources to send the military onto the streets of Milan. An administration that, since March, has been issuing fuel decrees with two- or three-week deadlines—renewed only when the industry threatens a strike—is instead enacting emergency and permanent legislation on repression. Even the 300-million tax credit for the trucking industry, approved in May, still lacked an implementing decree by the end of June, to the point that industry associations were asking for it to be released. Social support arrives late, just in time, and in dribs and drabs; criminal legislation arrives immediately, and is designed to stay.

This does not stem from the malice of individual ministers, and those who think in terms of class need not demonize anyone. It stems from the role the state plays in a peripheral Western social formation, caught between European budget constraints and Atlantic rearmament commitments. We have military spending that will approach 45 billion in 2026 and austerity measures totaling approximately 23 billion. Caught in this vise, the state cannot redistribute wealth without breaking with its external guarantors, and so it does the only thing left to it: it manages the conflict as a matter of public order. Engels wrote this in The Origin of the Family: the state arises where class antagonisms become irreconcilable, as a power that claims to stand above society and that distances itself from it more and more.

The farce of contradictions

While the substance of the institutional response is consistent, its surface is a catalog of absurdities. It is worth listing them, because that is where the crisis of hegemony is most clearly visible.

The first concerns the diagnosis. Justice Minister Nordio spoke of probable criminal infiltration within the truckers’ blockades. Interior Minister Piantedosi, when questioned about the young people in Milan, admitted that there was still no evidence they were being manipulated. Two ministers from the same government: one sees organized crime behind the trucks, the other finds no orchestration behind the looting. Each chooses the interpretation that serves to delegitimize the crowd before them, and neither of them asks how much a full tank of gas costs.

The second issue concerns the passing of the buck. Milan Mayor Sala complained about an inadequate number of officers on the streets; Piantedosi responded by accusing him of being a representative of a “radical chic” left unable to condemn the violent protesters without exception. A group of mayors observed, with unintentional clarity, that pointing fingers at one another won’t lower gas prices. It is a perfect snapshot of a political class in which the majority and the opposition argue over the number of police needed, without either side questioning the system that fuels the anger.

The third issue concerns language. Meloni wrote that protesting against the high cost of living is a civil right, while sending a police officer to the hospital is the work of hooligans. Tajani called it unacceptable for the opposition to fan the flames. On October 22, Tajani himself welcomed the lifting of the strikes by the major trucking organizations, explaining that strikes do not lower diesel prices and only harm citizens and businesses. The right to protest is thus recognized in the abstract but denied in any concrete form that might produce results. You can protest, as long as the protest doesn’t disturb anyone; but a protest that doesn’t disturb anyone is a protest that no one hears. It is the old paradox of formal democracy that Marxist criticism has always denounced: equal freedoms on paper, unequal power relations in reality.

The fourth contradiction is the most serious. The government invokes the rule of law while drafting regulations—such as the preventive detention of 12-year-olds—that even its own commentators deem at risk of being unconstitutional. The state that demands that young people in the suburbs respect the rules is the same one that, to defend itself against them, is willing to violate its own.

The crisis is systemic

Gramsci, in his Quaderni, offered the most frequently cited definition of crisis: the old is dying and the new cannot be born, and during this interregnum the most varied pathological phenomena occur (readers are invited to consult Quaderni, Q. 3, 34). It is difficult to find a more accurate image for Italy in October 2026. The old social contract, founded on household savings, small businesses, and family-centered welfare, no longer holds. There is no new historical bloc. In between lie the pathological phenomena: youth gangs filming themselves as they ransack a jewelry store, ministers accusing one another, and a barrage of decrees.

Lenin, in the second chapter of The Failure of the Second International, way back in 1915, added that a crisis becomes revolutionary when those at the bottom no longer want to live as before and those at the top can no longer govern as before. The first condition is beginning to manifest itself in Italy. The second is evident in the paralysis of an executive branch that oscillates between last-minute extensions and punitive measures. The third element—the decisive one—is missing: a political force capable of transforming discontent into a program. The mass parties have been reduced to opinion-making groups and personal fiefdoms; the parliamentary left is demanding more police officers in Milan; the confederal unions have called for a general strike on November 20—five weeks after the clashes—and tend to meekly comply with government diktats just to keep their now-entrenched privileges intact. Meanwhile, in Milan, an “October 17 Movement” has emerged thatannounces demonstrations every Saturday until the government falls. Without roots, without organization, without theory, it is unlikely to go far. But its very emergence shows just how vast the void left behind is.

Herein lies the crux of the matter. I have argued elsewhere that the struggle today is not horizontal—between the right and the left—but vertical, between the people and the elites, and that those who reduce the conflict to a horizontal plane do so because they do not want people to understand where the problem lies. The events of October confirm this. The government has done everything in its power to transform a vertical conflict—over the cost of living and income distribution—into a horizontal one: Italians versus second-generation immigrants, law-abiding citizens versus hooligans, the productive North versus the South that blocks the roads. The slogan that appeared on the roadblocks, “The South Is Italy Too,” is the simplest response to this maneuver.

A class analysis that stops at national borders would be incomplete. The price of diesel in Cosenza depends on the Strait of Hormuz, and the Strait of Hormuz is closed or choked off because of a war that Italy did not decide on but supported as part of its Atlantic alignment. As early as March, the first fuel decree was justified by the international crisis linked to the war in Iran. Since then, the government has tried to keep up with rising prices through temporary discounts, while continuing to commit to rearmament goals and European austerity.

It is the old Leninist thesis on imperialism, updated to a condition of subordination. A country that does not control its own energy policy or its own foreign policy ends up passing on the costs of other people’s wars to the working classes. Sanctions against Russia have already driven up utility bills; the war in the Gulf is now driving up fuel prices. The bill always lands at the same address: the truck driver, the fisherman, the suburban family watching their grocery cart empty. While defense industry stocks rise, the real country grinds to a halt.

This is why Italy’s social crisis cannot be resolved with yet another extension of the fuel tax. It can be resolved—if at all—by breaking the constraints that make redistribution impossible: the European budget constraint in its current form, the military spending target, and the automatic alignment with wars that Italy endures without having any interest in them. Peace, energy sovereignty, and social justice are not three separate demands. They are the same demand viewed from three angles.

Who is asking for mercy, and from whom?

There is one image that stands out from these past weeks, and it is the skeleton on the banner in Termoli. It is not an image of revolt. It is an image of supplication: a people exposing their emaciated bodies and asking to be seen. The institutions have responded to this plea with the language of the criminal code, with mutual accusations between ministers and mayors, and with a tally of those arrested.

It must be stated clearly, because clarity is a duty of analysis: the devastation of a bookstore or the looting of a jewelry store is not class struggle. They are a symptom of a society that has ceased to offer its young people any sense of belonging, and the left, by romanticizing them, commits the same error as the right, which merely criminalizes them. Both fail to ask themselves how to transform that anger into consciousness. But it is equally clear that a state capable of responding to need only through force has lost its function as a social organism and has been reduced to an apparatus for defending those in power.

Italian history is all too familiar with these developments. Major social crises without political direction have always ended up shifting to the right, with an order imposed from above on the ruins of a fragmented movement. The alternative exists only if someone resumes the patient work that Gramsci called the “construction of hegemony”: organizing truck drivers and young people in the suburbs, fishermen and workers in Taranto, within a single vision that addresses wages, energy, peace, and sovereignty. This is not a task for talk shows or executive orders.

It is a political task in the oldest sense of the term, and institutional Italy, for now, has shown that it does not even want to acknowledge it.

Milano assurge così a paradigma di un Occidente che esclude ed emargina, privo di prospettive, privo di un’autentica volontà di invertire la rotta, votato più o meno consapevolmente all’autodistruzione.

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Martedì 13 ottobre 2026 – mattina

Salone di rappresentanza del Comune di Milano, tra stucchi e affreschi, una composita schiera degli anziani più abbienti della città premia dei loro pari grado per età e per reddito, in mezzo a un effluvio di parole tanto vuote quanto altisonanti, un imbarazzante racconto di una città immaginaria, che esiste solo nelle chiacchiere dei loro ristretti circoli di amici e conoscenti, è tutta una narrazione di frizzi e lazzi, scoppiettanti meraviglie, luminose eccellenze, immancabili successi, se la suonano e se la cantano tra di loro, in mezzo a un tonitruante profluvio di aggettivi tutti superlativi, anzi, ultra – superlativi, un coretto autoreferenziale parossistico ed entusiastico in cui scambiano –  forse inconsapevolmente – lo specchio dentro cui si rimirano felici e beati per una finestra sulla città.

D’altronde si frequentano abitualmente e assolutamente solo tra loro nell’ora dell’aperitivo e della cena e non riescono a vedere null’altro che loro stessi, anche la cameriera che porta i piatti in tavola è una specie di fantasmatica presenza a suo modo sconosciuta ed evanescente, di cui a mala pena ricordano l’esotico nome peruviano o filippino. Sono i campioni della società neo – schiavile[1], inventata con maestria palazzinara dai maggiorenti politici della città, ogni vagonata di cemento, riversatasi su Milano nell’ultimo decennio in quantità impressionanti, ha avuto effetti sociali dirompenti e deflagranti aumentando il divario sociale, costruendo schiere di poveri, lavoratori a basso reddito e pensionati, con i primi spesso a servizio del sempre più ristretto, ma pur considerevole, cerchio dei benestanti.

Domenica 18 ottobre 2026 – pomeriggio

Come non fosse bastata la guerriglia urbana scatenatasi in piazza Duomo e tutto attorno, a margine della manifestazione di sabato 17 ottobre contro il caro – vita, il caro – carburanti, il prezzo sempre più proibitivo dei prodotti alimentari, le bollette aumentate di un terzo e per ciò stesso sempre più intollerabili, almeno per quella metà di milanesi che a fatica arriva alla terza settimana del mese, ecco che ragazzini a mala pena quattordicenni si danno appuntamento in branco per la domenica.

È rabbia pura, scriteriata e distruttrice, è odio per tutto quello che vedono e da cui sono esclusi. Spaccano e rubano, è un esproprio proletario compiuto da masse di ragazzini che non hanno nessuna consapevolezza di essere proletari, ma che in ogni caso si comportano in questo modo perché non vogliono essere proletari, ovvero l’ultimo gradino di una società pesantemente ingiusta, diseguale, escludente, hanno un istintuale desiderio di uguaglianza, ma non la sanno declinare in nessun modo, anche perché tanto è impossibile, il divario sociale non è colmabile, l’ammissione al ristretto circolo dei possidenti che possono permettersi di comprare e possedere quello che vogliono non li riguarda, purtroppo non tocca neppure tutte e tutti quei milanesi che son scesi in piazza pacificamente il giorno precedente.

Questi ragazzini sono fuori da tutto, vittime di una città e di una società in cui gli abbienti organizzano convegni sull’inclusività, in cui volano paroloni e discorsoni pieni di propositi, i quali terminano appunto all’ora dell’aperitivo.

Sono ragazzine e ragazzini cresciuti nelle periferie invisibili, povere, quelle in cui non arriva la metropolitana e gli autobus e i tram sono stati dimezzati negli ultimi anni, non credono in niente e in nessuno. Si muovono in branco, perché solo dentro il branco dei loro pari riconoscono quel minimo di uguaglianza che non trovano da nessuna altra parte.

Odiano la scuola, perché è vuota, perché non offre prospettive, perché usa parole antiche e a volte incomprensibili, perché i professori sono vecchi e hanno l’età dei loro nonni che stanno a Lima, al Cairo, a Manila, perché studiare molto difficilmente potrà permettere loro di emanciparsi dalla povertà, anzi è certamente inutile, perché tanto sanno già benissimo a dodici anni che i loro genitori non avranno mai i soldi per mandarli all’università.

Disprezzano i loro genitori, li disprezzano profondamente, con una rabbia che spesso cancella ogni affetto. Li guardano consumarsi di fatica per portare a casa il pane della sopravvivenza, donne e uomini italiani e più spesso di tutto il mondo che si alzano alle quattro del mattino, il papà per andare a pulire gli uffici degli abbienti, la mamma per sbrigare fino alle sei del mattino le questioni di casa propria e poi prendere anche lei quel bus che non arriva mai per andare a pulire le case di quegli stessi abbienti, per portare a passeggio i loro cani, per stirare le loro camicie e per preparare la loro cena. Gli uomini lavorano anche nell’edilizia, ogni cantiere è una babele di lingue, nell’urbanistica, là dove si rifanno marciapiedi e strade asfaltate si sente solo parlare arabo, chissà se per appalto diretto o subappalto, o purtroppo, come accade non di rado, per subappalto di un altro subappalto, fanno i custodi dei palazzi in cui gli abbienti a mala pena passando la mattina biascicano loro un annoiato “buongiorno”.

Lo schianto tra la città immaginaria, o per meglio dire reale per una ristrettissima minoranza, e quella reale, o per meglio dire dura e povera per la stragrande maggioranza, ha la violenza delle vetrine mandate in frantumi, così la società, come quei vetri sfondati, collassa senza lasciare margine alcuno di ricomposizione.

Un mondo peggiorato dall’individualismo, un universo  che ha perso ogni spazio sociale e collettivo in cui ritrovarsi e confrontarsi, in cui la fatica e il sacrificio sono visti come la condizione dello sfruttato neo – schiavile, non del lavoratore, anche perché il lavoratore riceve sempre meno diritti e meno rispetto e dunque ha sempre meno dignità.

Una società che coltiva il culto della ricchezza e che (auto)premia e (auto)celebra chi l’esibisce, che marginalizza e giudica negativamente chi da quella ricchezza è escluso.

Una società senza pietà, piena di un’arroganza diffusa e cattiva, che ha elevato l’esibizionismo della ricchezza e il disprezzo per chi non la possiede a massima espressione di giudizio verso le altre e gli altri.

Le ragazzine e i ragazzini delle periferie respirano questo clima tossico in cui l’avere è tutto e l’essere gli è totalmente subordinato.

Respirano la violenza del disprezzo che li marginalizza e a loro volta – come detto – hanno fatto proprio quel disprezzo al punto da riversarlo sui loro genitori, li osservano senza capirli, guardandoli schiacciati dalla fatica quotidiana, inginocchiati davanti all’arroganza e alla prepotenza degli abbienti.

I genitori tristi e sconfortati si interrogano mestamente su una società, quella occidentale, così violenta da aver distrutto qualsiasi valore, qualsiasi rispetto, qualsiasi affetto. Amano i loro figli, cercano di mostrare con il loro impegno quell’amore, ma appunto non sono capiti e non sono ricambiati, maturando indicibile interiore dolore.

È una società divaricata, del tutto frammentata e atomizzata, non vi è assolutamente alcun progetto per la costruzione di una città partecipata e condivisa, non esiste alcuna autentica volontà di una ricomposizione comunitaria.

È la deriva finale di una società priva di autentica empatia, di sincero interesse per il prossimo.

Ora il governo italiano vara leggi per la punibilità dei minorenni, aumenteranno i carcerati dei penitenziari minorili, un muro con le sbarre che terrà nascosta per un po’ una minuscola porzione del disagio sociale e giovanile.

Nulla più.

Milano assurge così a paradigma di un Occidente che esclude ed emargina, privo di prospettive, privo di un’autentica volontà di invertire la rotta, votato più o meno consapevolmente all’autodistruzione.

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^[1]      Leggasi quanto già dettagliatamente spiegato in https://strategic-culture.su/news/2025/07/27/beppe-sala-sindaco-di-milano-inventore-della-post-modernita-neo-schiavile/