A senadora Teresa Leitão (PT), líder do governo no Senado, afirmou, nesta terça-feira (27), que a neutralidade da governadora reeleita Raquel Lyra (PSD) durante a disputa presidencial não prejudicará a relação institucional entre os governos de Pernambuco e do presidente Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (PT). Em entrevista ao Jornal do Commercio, a parlamentar garantiu que não haverá retaliação política nem interrupção dos investimentos federais no estado após a reeleição do petista.

"Institucionalmente, eu não vejo nenhuma alteração (na relação). Raquel vai continuar sendo recebida pelo presidente, como todos os governadores que assim o quiserem, inclusive os do PL. Não vai haver nenhum boicote a um governador porque ele ficou neutro ou porque ele apoiou Flávio Bolsonaro", afirmou Teresa.

A governadora manteve a neutralidade durante os dois turnos da eleição presidencial, enquanto seu principal adversário na disputa estadual, João Campos (PSB), participou ativamente da campanha de Lula. 

"Os dois candidatos que disputaram o governo, os dois principais, tiveram posições absolutamente diferentes em relação ao Governo Federal. Raquel manteve a neutralidade e João Campos foi para a campanha. Eu acho que isso demonstra um pouco o cenário", disse Teresa.

A senadora afirmou que houve uma mudança na correlação de forças políticas no estado e atribuiu o crescimento da votação de Lula no segundo turno à mobilização em torno da própria candidatura do presidente.

"Houve uma mudança de força muito grande e uma das primeiras questões que eu destaco é que o presidente Lula cresceu no segundo turno por sua própria força", declarou.

Em Pernambuco, Lula obteve 69,20% dos votos válidos no segundo turno, contra 30,80% de Flávio Bolsonaro (PL). O petista recebeu 4.117.513 votos, um crescimento de 563.542 em relação ao primeiro turno, quando havia conquistado 63,45% dos votos válidos.

Apesar das diferenças políticas, Teresa assegurou que o governo federal manterá o atendimento às demandas apresentadas pela gestão de Raquel. A parlamentar destacou que a nova composição do Senado também contará com três representantes pernambucanos alinhados politicamente a Lula: ela própria, Humberto Costa (PT) e Marília Arraes (PDT), eleitos em outubro.

"A bancada de senadores (de Pernambuco) foi uma bancada eminentemente lulista. Então não vai haver problema para Pernambuco continuar recebendo todos os investimentos do governo federal que ele já recebeu", afirmou.

 

Teresa ponderou, entretanto, que o PT precisa acompanhar mais de perto os investimentos federais realizados em Pernambuco. A líder governista mencionou a atuação da base política do partido e dos prefeitos que se manifestaram durante a disputa presidencial, mas ressaltou que a relação institucional com o governo estadual permanecerá preservada.

"O que eu acho que o PT precisa ter é mais atenção a esses investimentos, ver onde de fato a prioridade de uma base que se manifestou, de prefeitos que se manifestaram, é importante, mas a relação institucional está preservada e ela vai continuar", declarou.

Atuação da bancada pernambucana no Congresso Nacional

A senadora também descartou dificuldades na articulação entre os parlamentares pernambucanos no Congresso Nacional diante da chegada de novos deputados ligados à direita e ao bolsonarismo. Segundo Teresa, as diferenças partidárias não têm comprometido a destinação de recursos ao estado. Atualmente, a bancada pernambucana é coordenada pelo deputado federal Augusto Coutinho (Republicanos) e tem Carlos Veras (PT) como adjunto.

"Nunca houve problema de destinação de recursos para Pernambuco através da bancada federal", afirmou.

A parlamentar explicou que a bancada possui um método de trabalho consolidado para discutir a destinação das emendas parlamentares e defendeu sua continuidade na próxima legislatura, independentemente da composição partidária.

"A gente tem um método de trabalho e esse método de trabalho tem funcionado, porque os deputados e senadores têm direito a um montante de emenda, ninguém tem mais do que outro. Então isso facilita a nossa discussão para permanecer", explicou.

Para Teresa, a atuação conjunta deve prevalecer sobre as divergências políticas entre os integrantes da bancada pernambucana na Câmara dos Deputados e no Senado.

"O Estado de Pernambuco, em termos de emenda do PL ou de emenda do PT, o Estado precisa e tem o direito de receber todas essas emendas", concluiu.

© Waldemir Barreto/Ag. Senado

Un financiero amigo de Delcy Rodríguez transfirió los fondos antes de su visita en 2020 Leer

O presidente Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (PT) perdeu em apenas uma cidade do Rio Grande do Norte e de Pernambuco neste domingo (25), quando aconteceu o segundo turno das eleições que reelegeram o mandatário para seu quarto mandato.

No primeiro turno, Lula teve 65,72% dos votos no Rio Grande do Norte, enquanto seu adversário, Flávio Bolsonaro (PL), teve 34,28%. O senador havia vencido em duas cidades: Guamaré e Parnamirim, com 48,34% e 50,92% dos votos, respectivamente.

Já no segundo turno, Flávio teve 51,08% dos votos em Parnamirim, enquanto Lula conquistou 48,92%. Em Guamaré, a diferença foi de 70,30% para o presidente e 29,70% para o senador.

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Em Pernambuco, Lula teve 63,45% dos votos no primeiro turno, enquanto Flávio foi a escolha de 31,03% dos eleitores pernambucanos. Já no pleito do dia 25, Lula atingiu 69,20% dos votos, enquanto Flávio obteve 30,80%.

No âmbito municipal, Flávio ganhou em apenas uma cidade no primeiro e no segundo turnos: Santa Cruz do Capibaribe. O senador teve 52,71% dos votos no município no primeiro turno e 53,60% no segundo.

No pleito geral, Lula foi reeleito com 51,79% dos votos válidos a nível nacional, o que representa cerca de 64 milhões. Já Flávio venceu em 48,21% das urnas, um total de 59 milhões de votos.

Antônio Severino de Souza, de 40 anos, foi preso no próprio local de trabalho, em um hospital do Recife, por crimes que não cometeu. Depois de passar 12 dias encarcerado, ele conseguiu a liberdade e agora tem direito a receber R$ 30 mil por danos morais, conforme sentença da Justiça de Pernambuco. O governo estadual, no entanto, recorreu da decisão.

Auxiliar de serviços gerais terceirizado no Hospital Eduardo Campos da Pessoa Idosa, na zona oeste da capital pernambucana, Souza foi detido em 9 de janeiro de 2025. A prisão ocorreu diante de colegas de trabalho, superiores, pacientes e visitantes. No dia seguinte, ele foi levado ao Centro de Observação e Triagem Professor Everardo Luna (Cotel), em Abreu e Lima, na região metropolitana do Recife.

O período na unidade prisional deixou marcas. Em relato sobre os dias de encarceramento, Souza descreveu as condições da cela onde ficou com outros detentos.

“Cheguei naquele lugar, com 183 homens dentro de uma cela. Eu dormi no chão, deitava lá no chão, no esgoto, a água caindo em mim”, contou.

Investigação confundiu dois homens

A prisão teve origem em uma investigação sobre um ataque a tiros ocorrido em 15 de dezembro de 2022, no bairro de Nova Descoberta, na zona norte do Recife. Segundo a denúncia do Ministério Público de Pernambuco, dois homens armados atiraram contra duas pessoas durante uma disputa territorial ligada ao tráfico de drogas. Uma delas morreu e a outra ficou ferida.

Souza foi apontado como um dos autores dos disparos e associado ao apelido de “João Capeta”. Ao contestar a prisão, sua defesa alegou que a investigação o havia identificado equivocadamente como suspeito dos crimes.

Após ser provocada pela defesa, a Polícia Civil produziu um relatório que reconheceu a possibilidade de a vítima sobrevivente ter confundido Souza com o verdadeiro suspeito. O documento identificou semelhanças entre os dois homens, incluindo características físicas e o fato de morarem na mesma comunidade.

Outro ponto destacado foi a semelhança entre os nomes das mães dos dois, que se diferenciavam pela presença do sobrenome “Silva” em um deles. Segundo o relatório policial, porém, o verdadeiro suspeito tinha qualificação e histórico diferentes dos de Souza.

Ele deixou a prisão em 21 de janeiro de 2025. Ao recordar o momento, descreveu a soltura como um recomeço.

“Foi como se eu nascesse de novo, voltasse ao mundo novamente”, afirmou. Ele também disse que, mesmo sabendo que era inocente, chegou a perder a esperança de sair da cadeia.

Justiça reconhece danos morais

A sentença foi assinada em 28 de setembro pelo juiz Breno Duarte Ribeiro de Oliveira, da 4ª Vara da Fazenda Pública da Capital, vinculada ao Tribunal de Justiça de Pernambuco. O magistrado considerou que a prisão indevida provocou danos que ultrapassaram os transtornos comuns do cotidiano.

Na decisão, ele destacou o constrangimento de Souza ter sido detido diante de outras pessoas no trabalho e depois encaminhado a uma unidade prisional.

O trabalhador havia pedido R$ 500 mil de indenização por danos morais. O juiz, entretanto, considerou o valor desproporcional e fixou a reparação em R$ 30 mil. Entre os fatores considerados estava o reconhecimento do erro pela autoridade estatal após a defesa questionar a prisão.

O Estado de Pernambuco sustentou no processo que a medida havia sido baseada em informações fornecidas pela vítima sobrevivente à polícia. Argumentou ainda que a atuação ocorreu no exercício regular das funções policiais e judiciais, sem abuso de poder ou intenção de causar dano.

Governo recorre da condenação

A Procuradoria-Geral do Estado apresentou recurso em 13 de outubro. Na apelação, defendeu que a investigação foi corrigida pela própria Polícia Civil e que eventuais equívocos na coleta de indícios não significam, por si só, que houve conduta passível de indenização.

O órgão afirma que a prisão não decorreu de dolo, má-fé ou erro grosseiro indenizável. A Secretaria de Defesa Social informou que a Corregedoria-Geral instaurou um procedimento preliminar para apurar o caso.

Além dos efeitos emocionais, Souza afirma que a prisão teve consequências na vida profissional. Ele foi demitido em abril de 2026 e acredita que o desligamento está relacionado ao período em que ficou preso.

Desempregado, diz que deseja voltar a trabalhar com carteira assinada e recuperar a estabilidade para sustentar os filhos. Sua defesa também avalia recorrer da sentença para tentar elevar o valor da indenização.

The post Homem preso por engano deve receber R$ 30 mil de indenização do Estado pernambucano appeared first on Diário da Manhã - O Jornal do leitor Inteligente.

EU leaders met Thursday (15 October) for their first face-to-face talks on the 2028–2034 budget, killing the latest negotiation proposal put forward by Ireland.

Dublin, which holds the symbolic EU Council presidency, proposed cuts of up to €141bn from the long-term budget,  about eight percent less than the commission proposal. But it failed to make anybody happy, for different reasons. 

And now, EU Council president António Costa has been tasked to deliver a new compromise before EU leaders meet again on 26 November in Brussels, with the goal of striking a deal during the summit in December. 

An EU official said Costa deemed the deal in December as “essential,” urging EU capitals “to assume their responsibility”.

For Denmark, for example, it is important to have more funds for defence, borders, illegal migration, and competitiveness. “It will probably be as difficult as it was last time or even more difficult,” said Danish prime minister Mette Frederiksen ahead of the meeting.

“We need unanimity in the Council. We are far from that unanimity,” also said German chancellor Friedrich Merz before meeting counterparts.

The EU is divided into two camps. The so-called Frugals (Germany, Austria, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, and Sweden) want “several hundred billion” more to be cut, mostly from agriculture and cohesion funds, while 17 EU member states (self-named as Friends of Cohesion) criticise the savings. 

But time is of the essence to reach a deal this year, especially for French president Emmanuel Macron. France will hold presidential elections in the spring, and if Marine Le Pen, leader of the far-right National Rally party, wins, reaching an EU deal would become far more difficult.

Le Pen has pledged that, if she comes to power, she will halve France’s contribution to the EU budget.

And Macron reportedly said in the room with EU leaders that from January onwards, there will be no political room for reaching an agreement.

‘Easier to give up what you don’t yet have’

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As EU leaders gather in Brussels on Thursday and Friday (15-16 October) to discuss, among other things, the issue of Europe’s southern border, countless Moroccan families cling to the hope they may see their children again after they entered the Spanish enclave of Ceuta in north Africa in July. 

“Ayoub left on 30 July at 2PM. Since that day, I haven’t heard anything from him, apart from the fact that he went to Ceuta,” his brother said.

Ayoub Elkhamlichi was 27 when he left the north of Morocco for the nearby border with Ceuta, a half-hour drive from his home. 

In the commotion that accompanied the rush of an estimated 72,000 mostly Moroccans into the enclave over 30 and 31 July 2026, 141 people were reported to have lost their lives while attempting the crossing. 

Those that have not been heard of since that deadly July remain innumerable. 

Among them is Ayoub, who had been working in a local konafa shop before leaving.

His brother Mohamed Ali laments that he’d forgotten his ID card, which will reduce the chances he’ll be identified if he’s ever found. 

“The border with Ceuta was opened, so everyone left Morocco, because the city of Tetouan offers few job opportunities,” Mohamed Ali told EUobserver, from his home in one of Morocco’s closest cities to the Spanish border. 

“Ayoub managed to find a job, but the pay was low. So he went to Ceuta,” he said. His family, meanwhile, “are in a state of anxiety and fear.”

It has been 11 weeks since Khaled’s dad Said has also seen his son, 26, who left for Ceuta from Tidass, a small Moroccan town, which Said said “has its problems.”

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Last Saturday, the Irish presidency of the EU proposed cutting nearly €160bn from the EU’s next seven-year budget against the European Commission’s proposal, a bid to bring the wealthiest, frugal member states on board. The deepest cuts fall on competitiveness (€75bn), external action (almost €38bn) and the EU’s administration costs (€10bn).

What the plan leaves alone is the borrowing.

The Irish text, known in Brussels as the negobox, keeps all three of the commission’s borrowing programmes that sit outside the budget’s normal limits: Catalyst Europe, a €150bn lending facility; a crisis mechanism of up to €395bn for major unforeseen shocks; and support for Ukraine of up to €100bn.

Add loans for defence and lending to other non-EU countries and, by our estimates, joint borrowing could still equal around 44 per cent of the new budget, about €800bn at current prices, up from 41 per cent under the Commission’s proposal. The budget shrinks, but the borrowing hardly changes. 

Ireland’s proposed budget is too small for Europe’s mounting common challenges, and its borrowing approach is too ad hoc and risky. 

Excluding the distorting effects of NextGenerationEU (NGEU), the Covid recovery fund, the Commission’s budget proposal is already far smaller than the headline figures suggest, and Ireland’s proposal would make it smaller still.

That matters because, as the Draghi report argued, Europe’s shared challenges such as Ukraine, rearmament and competitiveness require European public goods because no single member state captures their full benefits.

A budget worth just over one percent of the EU’s gross national income (GNI) is a poor match for that responsibility.

By comparison, total government expenditure across EU countries comes to close to half of their combined GNI. Keeping most fiscal capacity at national level, while expecting such a modest EU budget to finance increasingly vital continental priorities, is a bad use of public resources. 

A stronger common budget needs more of its own revenue, at least what the Commission proposes in its Own Resources Decision, which Parliament broadly supports and which would raise nearly €60bn extra a year.

The Irish plan’s acceptance of five new resources is encouraging. But it has to survive the negotiations, and the details of the final reform will decide whether it means anything.

The Council’s approach to common borrowing remains haphazard, lacking a permanent framework and relying on crisis-driven compromises. Governments may not like it, but a more European approach is coming, and the €800bn is likely to grow.

Support for Kyiv, to be provided outside budget ceilings via the Ukraine Reserve and policy loans, is capped at €100bn for the whole period. This is already looking tight given the accelerating rate of disbursements to Ukraine seen in recent years.

And a successor to SAFE, the EU’s defence loan scheme, is widely expected, since €150bn has proved far from enough for Europe’s rearmament.

France has just shown what it costs to borrow alone. Its yields recently hit a 24-year high, and the state now pays more to borrow than some major French companies. Sharing the effort through the common budget, including prudent joint borrowing, would help spread that risk.

Yet Europe has no clear, sustainable plan for borrowing. To date, EU governments have reluctantly signed up to each new borrowing instrument and called it an exception.

European borrowing capacity has been assembled one crisis at a time, starting with the euro area crisis and accelerating since the pandemic.

NGEU was accepted by fiscally cautious states as a one-off decision to deal with the Covid-19 emergency. Then the war in Ukraine and the need to fund rearmament produced new exceptions.

This year, EU governments used enhanced cooperation, a procedure that lets a subset of member states go ahead without the rest, to approve the €90bn Ukraine Support Loan, the EU’s largest foreign loan ever.

For defence, they reached for Article 122, the treaties’ emergency clause, to set up SAFE. Parliament, which felt sidelined, decided to sue the Council before the European Court of Justice.

There is a catch though.

These exceptional programmes are guaranteed by the so-called budget headroom, the margin between the EU’s revenue ceiling and the spending limits in the seven-year budget, rather than by money set aside in advance.

In barely five years, headroom-backed exposure has climbed to €681bn (see Figure 1), 82 percent of all EU debt.

The European Court of Auditors has warned that if a Ukraine loan guaranteed this way goes bad, future EU budgets, and the national contributions that fund them, would have to cover the loss.

Frugals vs Friends of Cohesion

EU capitals remain divided over the new budget and over joint borrowing. Net contributors, sometimes referred to as the Frugal Six, want deep cuts in the commission’s proposal, argue that new common borrowing is not the solution and have misgivings about the creation of new own resources.

By contrast, a group of sixteen southern and eastern countries, that call themselves the “Friends of Cohesion”, are much more open to joint borrowing and back an approach closer to the Commission and Parliament on the budget and own resources.

Ireland’s plan largely reflects the influence of the frugal countries, yet one diplomat has already dismissed it as “not even close to a landing zone.”

Europe needs an ambitious budget, backed by at least the Commission’s proposed new own resources, so it relies less on national contributions based on GNI. Joint borrowing should become a permanent, predictable part of it, with safeguards.

First, it should fund loans, not grants, as the Commission suggests. Second, riskier exposures, especially to non-EU countries, should be at least partly backed by money set aside in advance, as the Court of Auditors recommends.

Where it makes sense, the headroom guarantee could be topped up with national guarantees in proportion to each country’s size, as under SURE, and like-minded partners outside the EU could sometimes take part.

Stronger capital at institutions such as the EIB, or at any future defence-financing vehicle, would also let Europe borrow more together without putting its creditworthiness at risk.

Governments should also consider deferring repayment of the NGEU bonds, as the Draghi report suggested, especially if the own-resources reform falls short. It would protect priority spending when it is needed most.

Sustained joint borrowing brings a bonus: more common safe assets in euros, which strengthens the euro’s international role. The demand is already there.

Last month Piotr Serafin, the EU’s budget commissioner, flew to Seoul and Tokyo to meet investors. Asian buyers’ share of EU bond syndications has risen from 5 per cent to 9 per cent in the second half of 2025.

Wobbles in US bond markets, which partly reflect doubts about America’s fiscal health, its reliability as a partner and the dollar’s safe-haven status, give the euro an opening.

But it can only take it if EU governments put their own fiscal houses in order.

Ongoing tensions in the French bond market provide a clear warning. Putting France’s finances on a sustainable path would do more than reassure markets about the euro. It would restore French debt as a safe euro asset.

EU leaders meet on Thursday and Friday in Brussels. Whatever they discuss (and later decide) on the budget, Europe should keep borrowing together, and in large amounts.

The task now is to give that borrowing a coherent plan: a permanent framework, money set aside in advance and safeguards that cautious capitals can accept.

The European Commission is promising more support to Egypt, even as Egyptian warplanes reportedly bomb in Sudan and authorities carry out a campaign of violence against the refugees it hosts.

The civil war in Sudan includes reports of genocide, chemical-weapons use, mass rape, and starvation, forcing some 1.2 million Sudanese people into Egypt, which was described as a priority migration-busting partner by commission president Ursula von der Leyen on Tuesday (13 October), who also promised continuing support for Cairo.

In a letter sent to the 27 heads of state and government ahead of an EU summit on Thursday in Brussels, she spoke of “offering protection and durable solutions in … host countries”, as well as further aid for Sudanese people who had returned to parts of the country, now deemed relatively safe.

But her warm words stand in sharp contrast to internal EU documents on Sudan, released by the London-based group Statewatch earlier this month, and which speak of an Egyptian-led campaign of violence against the Sudanese it is tasked to help.

“The Egyptian authorities have continued arbitrary arrests, detention and deportation campaign against migrants, asylum seekers and refugees, with a sharp escalation of forced deportations being observed since January 2026,” said the Irish EU presidency, in an internal document written in September.

Estimates suggest Egypt hosts over nine million migrants and refugees.

Some 80 percent are Sudanese, Syrian, Yemeni, and Libyan nationals. Of those, just over 1 million are officially registered as refugees. Most come from Sudan.

And Egypt’s crackdown also comes amid a massive 74 percent funding cut for the UN’s refugee agency in the country, even as the EU’s financial support to Cairo increases, already totalling €5bn.

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EU leaders meeting next week in Brussels for the usual post-summer European Council are rehashing conclusions on migration, echoing almost word-for-word statements since at least 2015.

“The European Council has developed a strategy aimed at stemming the unprecedented migratory flows Europe is facing,” they announced in December 2015, following a summit.

“It is indispensable to regain control over the external borders,” they also said, noting the perceived threat to the EU’s internal border-free Schengen zone.

And they voiced fear over the low number of deportations, insisting on “concrete measures to ensure the actual return and readmission of people not authorised to stay.”

Eeleven years later and the 15 October summit in Brussels next week is now asking almost the same thing, including to what extent previous conclusions on migration have been implemented.

Although draft conclusions can change, and likely will, the current wording essentially repeats the same demands spanning over 50 EU summits since at least 2015, when over a million Syrians entered Europe to seek protection.

Out of the 52 published conclusions since 2015, over half dealt with migration in some shape or form. The latest draft dated 5 October and seen by EUobserver is among those.

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