For 14 years, Serbia’s government kept the country close to Moscow. Now, the opposition “Student List” has won the country’s snap parliamentary election, and President Volodymyr Zelenskyy says Ukraine is ready to deepen its cooperation with Serbia, welcoming the result as “a new page” in a post on X.
The win could end the 14-year rule of President Aleksandar Vučić’s political force and weaken Moscow’s position in the Balkans. Serbia has remained an important Kremlin partner in Europe since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, and Belgrade never joined the EU's sanctions against Moscow.
“A new page”
In his post, written in Ukrainian, Zelenskyy said that "changes have taken place in Serbia, the victory of the Student List, and this is clearly a new page in the history of the country and its people."
“We wish Serbia success, real development, and warm relations with the European community,” he wrote.
He said Ukraine was grateful to Serbia “for the respect shown to our people and our state, our independence,” and added:“We are ready to keep increasing our cooperation, and may all the good hopes of the people of Serbia come true.”
But the winners rule out sanctions on Russia
Vučić had earlier predicted that a new government could impose restrictions on Moscow by March or April, according to Novosti. The Student List says otherwise: it has no plans to align with the EU or to sanction Russia over the war in Ukraine, according to Reuters.
Its candidates frame Serbia’s reliance on Russian gas, with Gazprom as the largest supplier at around 2.2 billion cubic meters a year at below-market prices, as an acute economic dependency rather than a geopolitical alignment.
The movement’s top candidates have also said a future government would end all arms exports to war zones, including sales to Western intermediaries who pass weapons to Ukraine. Around €800 million worth of Serbian ammunition has reached Ukraine through that route since 2022.
Budapest has unexpectedly obstructed the next stage of EU accession negotiations with Ukraine and Moldova, just a week after approving earlier negotiating chapters and days after Prime Minister Péter Magyar pledged to restore relations with Kyiv.
Hungary has blocked a procedural decision needed to advance Ukraine and Moldova’s European Union accession negotiations, raising fresh questions about Budapest’s position under Prime Minister Péter Magyar, whose government had recently agreed to remove longstanding objections to Kyiv’s membership ambitions.
The intervention took place in Brussels on Tuesday, 20 October, during a meeting of the Council of the EU’s Working Party on Enlargement and Countries Negotiating Accession to the EU (COELA). Representatives of the 27 member states were examining the screening results for the final two negotiating clusters, covering environmental policy, transport, agriculture and regional development.
According to diplomats familiar with the discussions, the Hungarian delegation refused to approve the proposed procedural step. When representatives of other member states requested an explanation, Budapest reportedly maintained that its position remained unchanged, without providing further arguments.
An Unexpected Reversal After October Agreement
The obstruction comes only seven days after the EU formally opened two additional negotiating clusters with Ukraine and Moldova.
On 13 October, the Council approved the opening of Cluster 2, covering the internal market, and Cluster 3, dealing with competitiveness and inclusive growth. The decision followed an agreement between Kyiv and Budapest on educational rights for Ukraine’s ethnic Hungarian minority.
Ukraine’s parliament adopted legislative amendments on 12 October extending minority-language education rights, and President Volodymyr Zelenskyy signed the legislation the same day.
The agreement had appeared to remove the principal bilateral obstacle to further negotiations. Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha and his Hungarian counterpart, Anita Orbán, welcomed the development following discussions in Luxembourg.
The diplomatic rapprochement continued on 16 October, when Zelenskyy and Magyar held their first official bilateral meeting in Brussels. Both governments expressed an intention to improve relations after years of disputes under former Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán.
Magyar also invited Zelenskyy to Budapest for commemorations marking the 70th anniversary of Hungary’s 1956 anti-Soviet uprising.
The subsequent Hungarian objection has therefore interrupted a process that Ukrainian and European officials had expected to advance before the end of the year.
Agriculture and Energy Remain the Final Obstacles
Ukraine and Moldova have now formally opened four of the six negotiating clusters required under the EU’s enlargement methodology.
The remaining two are Cluster 4, Green Agenda and Sustainable Connectivity, and Cluster 5, Resources, Agriculture and Cohesion. They cover several of the most economically sensitive areas of prospective Ukrainian membership.
Cluster 4 includes environmental regulation, energy policy and transport infrastructure, while Cluster 5 encompasses agriculture, food safety, fisheries and regional development funding.
Ukraine’s agricultural sector presents particular challenges for the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy. The country’s extensive farmland and substantial grain production could affect agricultural subsidy allocations, market competition and the distribution of EU budgetary resources.
Poland and other agricultural member states have previously expressed concerns about the implications of Ukrainian agricultural integration. Such questions will require negotiation regardless of Hungary’s immediate position.
However, the 20 October meeting was not intended to settle these substantive issues. Its purpose was to advance the procedural preparations for formally opening negotiations on the remaining clusters.
Domestic Politics and the Question of EU Funding
The explanation for Budapest’s latest move may lie in Hungary’s domestic political calculations rather than a new dispute over minority rights.
Diplomatic sources have suggested that Magyar’s government is attempting to avoid accusations from Viktor Orbán’s opposition that it is making excessive concessions to Ukraine.
Although Magyar defeated Orbán in April’s parliamentary elections and has adopted a more cooperative approach towards Brussels, he has consistently opposed accelerated Ukrainian membership.
In an interview conducted on 20 October, Magyar reiterated his opposition to fast-tracking accession, arguing that membership must remain conditional on compliance with EU requirements. He also questioned whether a country at war could join the Union.
Another potential complication concerns Hungary’s financial relationship with Brussels.
The European Commission agreed in May to unlock €16.4 billion in previously frozen funds following reforms introduced by Magyar’s administration. Some disbursements remain subject to conditions, while separate disputes over EU financial penalties continue.
However, there is currently no publicly established evidence that Hungary’s objection on 20 October was intended to secure additional financial concessions. Any connection between the two negotiations remains speculative.
Moldova Caught in Budapest’s Dispute with Kyiv
Hungary’s position also affects Moldova, despite the absence of an equivalent bilateral dispute between Budapest and Chișinău.
The EU has kept the accession negotiations of Ukraine and Moldova politically aligned, seeking to advance both countries through the six negotiating clusters together.
Consequently, an objection directed principally at Ukraine can delay Moldova’s progress even when its own technical preparations satisfy the relevant requirements.
Separating the two accession tracks would allow Moldova to advance independently, but such a move would require political agreement among member states and could raise further questions about the EU’s enlargement strategy.
Ireland Seeks Agreement Before December
Ireland, which holds the rotating presidency of the Council of the EU until 31 December, has made progress on Ukrainian and Moldovan accession a priority.
The disputed procedural decision is expected to return to subsequent meetings of the enlargement working party, with senior EU and national officials still anticipating that the final two clusters could formally open in December.
The latest obstruction does not reverse the four clusters already opened, nor does it terminate accession negotiations. It does, however, demonstrate that the change of government in Budapest has not eliminated Hungary’s capacity or willingness to obstruct individual stages of enlargement.
For Kyiv and Chișinău, the immediate question is whether the 20 October decision represents a short-lived domestic political manoeuvre or the beginning of another prolonged dispute over the conditions of EU membership.
Britain is expected to push for a new post-Brexit trade deal and increased information-sharing on immigration at a UK-EU summit in Brussels next month.
This comes as Andy Burnham, the country’s prime minister, says the post-Brexit “status quo is not good enough for Britain”, in a hint that he might seek to rejoin the European Union.
And, more than a decade after the Brexit vote, he also accused Russia of having meddled in the 2016 British referendum.
The UK leader will meet European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen and European Council president António Costa in Brussels on 20 November.
And Costa has also said that European and British security and prosperity are “closely intertwined”, while a closer relationship could “promote stability in Europe and beyond”.
Made in Europe and immigration
The November summit will be an opportunity to “raise concerns” about ‘Made in Europe,’ Burnham told members of UK MPs on Monday (12 October).
The ‘Made in Europe’ proposal in the Industrial Accelerator Act would require companies to source a certain number of parts from within the EU to be eligible for public money in strategic sectors.
But UK officials are worried the law could hurt British manufacturers, with Burnham expected to seek concessions.
But the British premier also wants to go further in renegotiating his country’s ties with the EU.
“On the table is a trade deal on food and drink products, a deal on emissions trading, progress towards linking our energy systems, a new youth experience scheme, and deeper cooperation on immigration,” he said.
Burnham aims to address an EU import ban on UK meat, seed potatoes, and shellfish and wants to reduce costs for shipping other goods to mainland Europe.
He also hopes for closer work between European and UK border forces on immigration.
“On immigration, we could link up our law enforcement efforts once again [since brexit], sharing more data and criminal records of foreign nationals,” Burnham said.
He may aim to rejoin the Schengen Information System, a database for border management and law enforcement cooperation in Europe.
And he could also pursue greater freedoms for UK citizens to live in the 27 member states.
“It would be a major dereliction of duty to turn away [from the EU]” the UK leader told parliament.
10 years on from Brexit vote
The last EU-UK summit, held in London in 2025, was already branded as a reset in relations across the English channel, with a new defence and security partnership, reciprocal access to fishing waters, and expansion of student exchanges.
And leaders are expected to build on the previous agreements by discussing defence, energy, and climate, as well as trade and migration, at their meeting next month.
But under the terms of the EU and UK’s legal divorce in 2020, the two sides remain bound by complex limitations.
And Burnham told MPs on Monday that renegotiating Britain’s relations with the EU could add over £10bn (€11.8bn) per year to the UK economy by 2040, “with the potential to add significantly more,” even if it did not rejoin.
Russian meddling?
Burnham also told a podcast on 11 October that Russia had meddled in the country’s Brexit vote 10 years ago.
Upon assuming office in July, Burnham asked officials if there had been Russian interference in the 2016 referendum, he told The Rest is Politics, and officials gave him a “clear answer that yes, there was.”
“We haven’t informed people [the general public] sufficiently,” he added, amid similar Russian electoral interference in France, Germany, and further afield in Europe.
For his part, British foreign secretary Stephen Doughty subsequently told the LBC broadcaster: “I don’t think [Russia] succeeded in their efforts to undermine our election”.
And Burnham also rowed back in the parliament debate on Monday when pressed by opposition MPs, by saying the outcome of the Brexit vote remained legitimate.
But he added that Russia’s meddling in the UK’s 2019 general election was a matter of record and that it was “inconceivable that this was the first time”.
Appetite for EU re-entry
Burnham also dropped hints on Monday that Britain could rejoin the European Union.
“One thing I think is true is that public opinion has moved more quickly than political opinion. I think the political class is behind the public on this issue,” he said.
“At every stage, the British public will be the boss,” he added, while promising a “pragmatic approach” to the hot-button issue, which has the potential to enflame right-wing anger in England.
“We need to draw a line on a decade of drift and division [from Europe],” he said.
But questions of a holding second referendum were “jumping ahead too far” according to Burnham.
The Westminster debate came after YouGov polling commissioned by Best for Britain, a pro-EU lobby group, indicated that pushing for closer EU ties would be politically advantageous for Burnham’s ruling Labour party.
The organisation also claimed Britain could reenter the union within five years.
Brexit was “not a sacred cow”, said Emily Thornberry, a fellow Labour MP, on Monday.
Sandro Gozi, an Italian liberal MEP and chair of the UK-EU parliamentary partnership assembly, also said in a statement: “As a former member, and with much of the regulatory framework already in place, I personally do not see any serious reason why an application from the UK would not be achievable.”
“When countries are already closely aligned to EU rules, such as was the case for Sweden and Finland, the process for accession is faster than for applicants essentially starting from scratch,” he said.
Montenegro and Albania will hold separate accession conferences on 12 and 13 October as the European Commission introduces proposals for stronger safeguards against democratic backsliding, linking the next phase of EU enlargement to reforms within the Union itself.
Montenegro and Albania are preparing for another round of European Union accession negotiations this week, with meetings in Luxembourg scheduled to advance their membership bids as Brussels considers substantial changes to the conditions under which future countries will join the bloc.
Montenegro’s 29th accession conference will take place on Monday, 12 October, followed by Albania’s tenth conference on Tuesday. The meetings come less than a week after the European Commission presented a package of proposals intended to prepare the EU for enlargement while strengthening its ability to respond to breaches of democratic standards by newly admitted members.
For Montenegro, the immediate objective is to continue closing negotiating chapters after years of institutional and legal reforms. Albania’s meeting has a more precisely defined agenda: the provisional closure of Chapter 20, covering enterprise and industrial policy.
Both countries have made progress towards membership, but the Commission’s latest proposals indicate that the terms of accession could become more demanding as the EU considers admitting several new members.
Montenegro moves towards the final negotiating stage
Montenegro is widely regarded as the most advanced candidate among the Western Balkan countries.
Accession negotiations began in 2012, and all 33 negotiating chapters have been opened. Progress towards closure has accelerated as the government seeks to complete the process and secure an accession treaty.
At the end of 2025, Montenegro provisionally closed five chapters covering services, capital movements, company law, agriculture and fisheries.
As EU Today reported following that conference, the agreements brought the number of provisionally closed chapters to twelve at that stage, while the EU continued to emphasise the importance of judicial reform and sustained implementation.
The Commission has identified Montenegro as a country capable of concluding accession negotiations by the end of 2026, provided sufficient progress is maintained.
That objective does not mean membership would follow automatically. A completed negotiation must still lead to an accession treaty, which requires approval by all existing member states and ratification under their constitutional procedures.
Outstanding questions include the independence of the judiciary, enforcement of anti-corruption legislation and the capacity of state institutions to apply EU law consistently.
Albania advances in industrial policy negotiations
Albania’s accession process has also gained momentum, supported by renewed EU interest in incorporating the Western Balkans into European political and economic structures.
The chapter concerns the legal and institutional environment in which businesses operate, including industrial competitiveness, entrepreneurship and policies supporting small and medium-sized enterprises.
Provisional closure would represent further progress in Albania’s alignment with EU legislation and policy, although it would not constitute a final agreement on accession.
As with Montenegro, the negotiating framework requires sustained progress on the fundamentals of membership, notably judicial independence, fundamental rights, corruption and organised crime.
The Commission argues that enlargement can be accommodated within the existing treaties, but that the EU will need additional safeguards and improvements to decision-making.
Among the most consequential proposals is the possibility of suspending a new member state’s voting rights in the Council if it commits serious breaches of the Union’s fundamental values or the principle of sincere cooperation.
Such provisions would be incorporated into future accession arrangements, making some membership conditions enforceable after a country has joined.
The proposal reflects concerns that the EU’s existing mechanisms for responding to democratic backsliding can be slow and politically difficult to apply.
The Commission’s October package develops that argument into a broader programme of institutional preparation.
Enlargement beyond the Western Balkans
The debate extends to Ukraine and Moldova, whose membership applications have acquired greater strategic importance following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
The Commission is examining how candidate countries can progressively participate in EU policies and programmes before obtaining full membership.
These arrangements could include greater integration in energy, transport, defence and selected areas of the single market, subject to the implementation of relevant reforms.
Brussels is also considering transitional arrangements affecting agricultural support, financial transfers and sensitive sectors of the economy.
The political challenge is to provide candidate countries with credible membership prospects while reassuring existing members that enlargement will not weaken common decision-making or create unsustainable budget commitments.
For Montenegro and Albania, the October conferences therefore take place at a pivotal point in the accession process.
Both governments are moving through the technical stages of membership negotiations while the EU is still determining how its next enlargement will operate.
The outcome will depend not only on their progress towards meeting accession conditions, but also on whether the existing 27 member states can agree on the institutional changes required for a larger Union.
Nearly three decades after the Dayton Peace Agreement ended the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the country remains deeply divided along ethnic and political lines.
The agreement brought peace, but its complex political system has done little to overcome those divisions. Republika Srpska, the predominantly Serb entity, has pursued an increasingly divergent political course, while Serbia and Croatia maintain close ties with different parts of the country.
And for Christian Schmidt, the international community’s high representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina (2021-26) the main threat is no longer a return to war, but political stagnation and growing frustration.
He says that weak civic engagement, slow progress towards EU membership and the influence of Russia and neighbouring countries are reinforcing Bosnia’s divisions. Young people, he says, are increasingly responding by leaving the country.
In this interview, Schmidt discusses foreign influence, the EU’s role, the legacy of Dayton, and why Bosnia’s future may depend on whether it can build a stronger political community across its ethnic divisions.
A country that remains divided
You started your work in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2021 and were there for five years. It was a period of major changes, with COVID and then the war in Ukraine. What were your experiences of these moments. How has the situation in Bosnia evolved?
I think there has not been sufficient involvement. Civil society in Bosnia and Herzegovina is not very strong. It is, more than just politically, somehow divided on political issues. This prevents a joint political position or commitment from civil society to make more progress in democratic development and European integration.
So far, I don’t see that this has changed very much. It has also not changed that some parties, especially the SNSD, [Serb nationalist Milorad] Dodik’s party, but honestly not only them, are counting on ethnic differences as an argument for supporting their party instead of having a multi-ethnic approach. One can be doubtful about their real pro-European commitment.
Russia and its influence
When civil society is not engaged and when countries are not politically stable, we know that they are prone to interference from other states or political entities. Is this being seen in Bosnia and Herzegovina?
It is evident that neighbouring countries, especially Serbia and Croatia, have a kind of preferred relationship with parts of the country. This is, by the way, also established in the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina [also known as the Dayton Peace Agreement]. So it is not necessarily something that is not in line with Dayton [Agreement].
But there is beyond this more interference if I refer, for example, to Serbia’s reaction on the occasion of the United Nations General Assembly Resolution of 2024 about establishing an international day of commemoration for the Srebrenica genocide. There was a really remarkable attack against this, despite the fact that Serbia was not named in the resolution. There were only named individuals who had committed war crimes or genocide.
But it was used to create a “Pan-Serbian declaration”, which can be seen as a way of bringing cultural issues of the same ethnic group closer together. It has to be seen additionally as a tool to try to gain more political influence in the other part of the country.
You mentioned Croatia and Serbia. Is Russia also playing a role in these interferences?
Yes, but not ethnic interference. It is more through traditional good relations, especially with the Orthodox community, which is basically the Serb Orthodox community, where there are relations and a lot of activities, including in the media and on social media.
They [Russia] try to influence a part of Bosnia and Herzegovina, especially Banja Luka and Republika Srpska, and Dodik is somehow to act as an influencer for Russian interests. This is indeed the case. Dodik has been sitting together with [Russian president Vladimir] Putin for the 11th time since the beginning of the war in Ukraine. This is really remarkable.
How important is Bosnia and Herzegovina and Dodik for Russia and for Putin?
The economic and political-strategic importance is nearly zero. But it can be used as a way of distracting from European and somehow American activities, just by giving them a negative impact on everything. So this is more seen as a tool, rather than an area of influence.
EU— only accession talks?
Does the EU have a role in fighting such interference — Russian, but also the ethnic interference from Croatia and Serbia?
The ethnic relationships are within the framework of Dayton, and they are acceptable. But I think it is very important that the EU makes it clear that European integration is not based on ethnic differences, but on uniting in diversity.
This is something that is very complicated. You cannot do this only with programmes or money. I think these challenges are the typical issues that you can address through European commitment, but in the details, it has not delivered.
Milorad Dodik has a great support even as he has been sentenced to one year in prison and barred from public office for six years in a first-instance verdict for disobeying the decisions of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s international envoy, High Representative Christian Schmidt. Source: EPA/Nidal Saljic.
Unfortunately, maybe the European Union should sit down again and think about more tools and opportunities, especially addressing civil society, to give more attraction to the European idea.
How would that work?
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The European Commission has proposed up to 15 years of post-accession safeguards to punish new member states in case of bad behaviour, in a long-delayed pre-enlargement policy review out on Tuesday (6 October).
The reforms were initially requested by the European Council in June 2024 to be ready by spring 2025, but were delayed several times due to political sensitivities in EU capitals.
They are aimed at frontrunners for future EU membership – Montenegro, Albania, Moldova, and Ukraine – each of whom will get an accession roadmap this month.
EU Commission president Ursula von der Leyen has deemed union enlargement a “geopolitical imperative” amid the war in Ukraine and shift towards a new global order.
By expanding, the EU hopes to promote democracy and strengthen the single market.
But this also comes with fears that countries could misbehave after getting in, prompting the commission’s proposed new guardrails.
The commission suggests that new member states promise “not to oppose EU decisions on future enlargements” due “to bilateral disputes” for an unspecified time.
But Marta Kos, the EU’s enlargement commissioner, said this commitment would be voluntary.
Commissioner dismisses ‘two-tier’ concerns
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