Brussels, 30 October, (Brussels Morning Newspaper) – Gender Equality Week 2026 is drawing attention to women’s leadership, political representation and equal opportunities across the European Union, as the European Parliament continues its work to address inequalities affecting … Read more
A series of demonstrations involving young people across Europe has developed into a wider political phenomenon, as students and younger workers challenge governments over living costs, public services and their expectations for the future.
Protests have taken place in France, Belgium, Italy, Albania and several other countries, while a student-led movement in Serbia has achieved a particularly consequential political outcome.
In Serbia, nearly two years of demonstrations culminated in a parliamentary election victory for a student-backed political movement, ending the electoral dominance of President Aleksandar Vučić’s Serbian Progressive Party.
The outcome, reported by Reuters on 29 October, has given the movement a prospective parliamentary majority, although final certification of the election results remains outstanding.
Elsewhere, protesters have secured fewer immediate political concessions.
Nevertheless, their campaigns share a recurring concern: that conventional channels of political representation have failed to address problems affecting younger generations.
The grievances vary between countries, but housing affordability, insecure employment, education funding and living costs feature prominently.
A European Parliament youth survey published in February 2025 found that 40 per cent of respondents aged 16 to 30 considered rising prices and the cost of living a priority for the EU.
Almost one-third identified economic conditions and job creation as a principal concern, while education also ranked prominently.
More recent figures illustrate the financial pressures confronting younger Europeans.
According to Eurostat data published in June 2026, 24.2 per cent of EU residents aged 15 to 29 were at risk of poverty or social exclusion in 2025.
That compares with 20.9 per cent for the population as a whole.
These figures do not establish that economic hardship is the cause of every protest. They do, however, provide context for the dissatisfaction expressed by participants.
In Brussels, demonstrations have focused partly on the condition of schools and the availability of educational resources.
Students have criticised deteriorating facilities, shortages of teachers and government decisions affecting education funding.
Nineteen-year-old student Maya Gourdel told Reuters that peaceful attempts to draw attention to these concerns had attracted little response from political leaders.
Her account reflects a wider frustration among demonstrators who believe that public attention has increased only after protests became more disruptive.
Belgium’s education system is organised primarily at community level, meaning decisions concerning funding, staffing and school infrastructure are divided among different authorities.
The demands of protesters consequently involve both national political debates and decisions taken by regional and community institutions.
In France, demonstrations concerning the cost of living and public services have involved students alongside trade unions and other organisations.
Recent protests have also been accompanied by violence, including attacks on commercial premises and confrontations with police.
The involvement of younger demonstrators does not mean that every participant supports violent tactics.
Rather, the events illustrate how movements with economic and political grievances can encompass groups with different objectives and methods.
Italy has experienced similar tensions, particularly in Milan, where demonstrations against rising living costs have followed earlier episodes of unrest.
The Italian government has faced pressure over household expenditure, wages and the affordability of essential services.
These disputes have developed against a background of high energy prices and concerns about the broader economic outlook.
In Albania, student-led protests have challenged Prime Minister Edi Rama’s government over alleged corruption, limited employment opportunities and education standards.
Demonstrations that began in Tirana have spread to other cities.
On 29 October, opposition lawmakers disrupted proceedings in parliament following weeks of protests and confrontations between demonstrators and police.
The government has offered measures intended to address economic concerns while condemning violence associated with the demonstrations.
For many younger Albanians, employment prospects are closely connected to the possibility of emigrating.
The perception that professional opportunities depend on political connections or personal networks has become another source of dissatisfaction.
However, the Albanian movement cannot be treated as identical to protests in EU member states, given the country’s different economic conditions and political institutions.
Serbia provides the most substantial example of youth-led protest translating into electoral change.
The movement emerged after the collapse of a railway station canopy in Novi Sad in November 2024, which killed 16 people and prompted allegations of corruption and negligence.
Students organised prolonged demonstrations demanding accountability and institutional reform.
Their campaign subsequently developed into an electoral challenge to the governing Serbian Progressive Party.
Preliminary results from the October 2026 parliamentary election indicate that the student-backed list has secured a majority of seats.
However, electoral certification and the formation of a new government remain incomplete.
The movement now faces a different challenge: converting protest demands into administrative decisions, legislation and economic policy.
Its success will be judged not only by the election result but also by its ability to govern.
It would be misleading to describe Europe’s demonstrations as a unified political campaign.
Participants have different objectives, national circumstances and ideological positions.
Some demand increased public expenditure, while others concentrate on corruption, political accountability or employment opportunities.
What connects them is a recurring concern about whether established institutions respond adequately to younger citizens.
The political consequences will depend on whether demonstrations produce lasting organisations, influence elections or secure changes in government policy.
Serbia suggests that student mobilisation can translate into substantial political change.
For governments elsewhere in Europe, the question is whether the grievances driving these movements can be addressed through existing political institutions before dissatisfaction generates further unrest.
The European Commission has proposed a substantial expansion of Frontex, the European Union’s border and coastguard agency, in a move that would increase its personnel to 30,000, extend its operational responsibilities beyond EU territory and give Brussels a greater role in coordinating the removal of people without permission to remain in Europe.
The legislative proposals presented on 27 October represent a further stage in the EU’s efforts to establish a common system of migration enforcement, following the introduction of new asylum rules and the adoption of legislation allowing migrant return centres outside the Union.
At issue is not simply the size of Frontex but the extent to which responsibility for border enforcement, surveillance and deportation should be exercised at European rather than national level.
Under the Commission’s plan, Frontex would progressively expand its standing corps to 30,000 officers by 2041, including a new reserve of 17,000 personnel available for deployment.
The agency would also gain wider powers to purchase, lease and jointly own equipment, including surveillance systems and technologies using artificial intelligence.
These arrangements are intended to reduce dependence on individual governments for essential equipment and personnel during emergencies.
The proposal follows the extraordinary migration crisis in Spain’s North African enclave of Ceuta, where more than 72,000 people crossed from Morocco during July.
As EU Today previously reported, Spain subsequently requested additional assistance from Frontex, Europol and the European Union Agency for Asylum as its authorities struggled with the consequences of the mass crossing.
The Commission argues that such incidents demonstrate the limitations of a system in which European assistance depends heavily on national requests, available personnel and sometimes lengthy coordination procedures.
A proposed Quick Reaction Force could deploy within 24 hours following an emergency request from a member state.
The most consequential change concerns the agency’s proposed role in returns.
Frontex would receive responsibility for a new Return Coordination Centre, bringing together operational information and supporting the entire removal process, from identifying individuals and arranging voluntary departures to organising deportations and reintegration assistance.
More significantly, it could help conduct returns between two non-EU countries under agreements with the countries concerned.
This would allow European personnel to participate in removal operations that neither begin nor end on European territory.
The development follows the EU’s approval of new legislation permitting return hubs outside the bloc.
The Commission presents the two initiatives as complementary: national governments would retain responsibility for individual immigration decisions, while Frontex would increasingly provide the operational capacity needed to implement them.
The effectiveness of such arrangements would depend on cooperation with third countries, reliable identification procedures and compliance with international legal obligations.
The proposal would establish an Online Monitoring and Response Centre to examine publicly accessible social-media activity for indications of emerging border-security threats.
EU governments would also be required to communicate significant border developments through the EUROSUR information network within 24 hours.
The Commission considers these tools necessary to identify organised migrant movements and potential security incidents before they develop into emergencies.
However, the proposed expansion has also prompted questions about oversight.
According to details of the proposal reported on 27 October, the reform would narrow the responsibilities of Frontex’s internal fundamental-rights watchdog, with certain complaints referred to national authorities.
Dutch Green MEP Tineke Strik has warned that operations in third countries without sufficient oversight could undermine accountability and create uncertainty about the legal responsibilities of European personnel.
These concerns are particularly relevant when activities involve several jurisdictions and different national legal systems.
The Commission has proposed allocating €11.8 billion to Frontex under the EU’s 2028–2034 financial framework, almost twice the allocation envisaged under the current seven-year budget.
That funding remains subject to negotiations.
The legislation must also receive approval from the European Parliament and the Council, where governments will determine how far they are prepared to extend the agency’s mandate.
For national capitals, the central question is whether a larger common force will strengthen their ability to manage migration or progressively transfer operational discretion to an EU institution.
For Brussels, the proposal reflects a different calculation: a common external border requires more than common legislation if national authorities remain responsible for providing most of the capacity.
The negotiations will determine whether Frontex remains principally a supporting agency or becomes the operational centre of a more integrated European border-management system.
Written by Clare Ferguson with Áine Feeney.
As Members gather for the last plenary session before the summer recess, their agenda covers enlargement, foreign affairs, competitiveness, the EU budget, agriculture, social security and the environment. On Tuesday morning, a debate will follow a presentation of the programme of activities of the Irish Presidency of the Council of the European Union, which began on 1 July. On Wednesday morning, Members will hear Council and European Commission statements on the conclusions of the European Council meeting of 18‑19 June 2026.
Bilateral relations between the EU and Mexico have been bolstered by the current framework since 2000. On Tuesday, Parliament is due to decide whether to give its consent to the conclusion of two instruments to update this framework, the EU-Mexico Political, Economic and Cooperation Strategic Partnership Agreement (Modernised Global Agreement, MGA) and an interim Trade Agreement (iTA), both of which were signed by the EU and Mexico in May 2026. Parliament remains in favour of modernising the MGA, with a joint report by the International Trade (INTA) and AFET committees welcoming it as a step towards further economic expansion that could benefit EU companies and farmers. The INTA committee is due to vote on a draft recommendation on the conclusion of the iTA before the plenary vote.
Lower ticket prices and a wider choice of routes are not the only results of air transport liberalisation. On Monday, Members are expected to discuss an agreement to revise the air passenger rights framework to better protect passengers during increasingly common travel disruption. Delayed in the Council for over a decade, Parliament has shown consistent support for measures to protect air passengers and their rights. Parliament negotiators reached a political agreement in conciliation with the Council in June 2026. The agreement maintains the three-hour threshold for compensation for flight delays and strengthens passenger rights including on rerouting options, protection for missed connections and reimbursement for unused vouchers.
A reform of EU social security rules aims to help citizens living or working in another EU country and better distribute responsibilities between EU countries. Members are set to vote on a provisional agreement on the move to modernise the rules on Monday. Parliament’s negotiators maintained mandatory prior notifications for the construction sector in the agreed text, meaning that authorities of the home Member State would be notified if someone works in another Member State. Parliament’s Committee on Employment and Social Affairs (EMPL) confirmed the agreement in April 2026 and Parliament and the Council now need to formally adopt the new social security rules.
The geopolitical situation in East Asia has grown more volatile as the region experiences increased security challenges triggered by authoritarian regimes. On Monday evening, Members are expected to vote on an AFET committee recommendation, which affirms the need to deepen cooperation with partners in the region, including Japan, Korea, ASEAN and Taiwan. Parliament also recommends establishing a comprehensive EU-Taiwan cooperation framework, in addition to strengthening EU engagement with regional security initiatives and diplomatic efforts to prevent further escalation in East Asia.
The crisis in the Middle East and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz has caused an increase in fertiliser prices, placing a significant financial burden on farmers. On Tuesday, Members are set to vote on a proposal for a regulation to provide temporary common agricultural policy (CAP) support, which would offer exceptional support to farmers most affected by the soaring prices, including the possibility of increased advances on direct payments through existing CAP envelopes. Given the urgency, Parliament decided to consider the proposal without preparing a report, to enable farmers to make prompt decisions on buying fertilisers for the year ahead.
The EU’s plans to allow companies to register as an ‘EU Inc.’, recognised across all Member States, under a ’28th regime’, are central to its competitiveness agenda, aimed at simplifying rules for companies to scale up in the single market. Complementing the legislative proposal already on the table, Members are expected to vote on an own-initiative report from the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON), on Thursday, on the feasibility of a 28th tax regime and its potential to support competitiveness by simplifying and harmonising corporate taxation.
Environmental crimes can have a devastating impact, yet they are difficult to detect and prosecute. Parliament has repeatedly called for measures to combat such crimes. On Wednesday, Parliament is scheduled to vote on endorsement of the EU’s ratification of the Council of Europe’s new Convention on the Protection of the Environment through Criminal Law. A report from the Legal Affairs (JURI) Committee recommends ratification, concluding that the convention is consistent with the EU directive. The new convention establishes minimum requirements for the criminalisation of environmental offences related to activities such as pollution, destruction of biodiversity and improper handling of hazardous waste.
To enter a 2025 budget surplus of €2.1 billion as revenue in the 2026 budget, on Tuesday Parliament is set to consider the Council’s position on draft amending budget No 1/2026 (DAB 1/2026). While endorsing the proposal, a report adopted by the Committee on Budgets (BUDG) welcomes that higher own resources are driving the surplus rather than underspending, but reiterates its long-standing view that revenue from fines and fees should strengthen the EU budget instead of lowering national contributions, and calls for more sustainable EU own resources in the next multiannual financial framework.
Enlargement remains a prominent topic at this plenary session. On Tuesday, Members are expected to debate separately three reports prepared by the Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET), on Ukraine, Moldova and Serbia. The report on Ukraine stresses the need for a ‘sustainable’ ceasefire and a peace agreement reached with the participation of the EU, while also recognising Ukraine’s European integration as a strategic priority for the Union.
AFET’s report on Moldova commends the country’s commitment to EU accession, condemning attempts by Russian efforts to destabilise Moldova’s path to accession through interference campaigns.
As a result of political instability in the country, Serbia’s EU accession process remains at an impasse. The AFET report recalls that accession is conditional on respect for EU values and democracy, reiterating the need for Serbia to affirm its geopolitical orientation towards the EU, particularly in the context of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine.
Written by Clare Fergurson and Katarzyna Sochacka.
The session further focused on Europe’s economic independence, digital sovereignty and resilience on artificial intelligence, as well as the EU’s role in promoting peace and stability in the Middle East. Members debated the electrification action plan, the resilience of the European transport sector amid ongoing geopolitical challenges ,and posed questions to the European Commission on its pledge to reduce the reporting burden, especially for small companies. Debates also addressed protecting child safety and mental health online and the importance of children’s right to play, and promoting culture through the Joint Declaration on ‘Culture for Europe, Europe for Culture’ .
Finally, Members attended two formal sittings, during which Jakov Milatović, President of Montenegro, and Andrzej Poczobut, 2025 Sakharov Prize laureate, recently released from prison in Belarus, addressed Parliament.
The annex shows the breakdown by political group on the final roll-call votes on the files decided by ordinary legislative procedure during the session.
Members posed questions to European Commissioner Valdis Dombrovskis regarding the state of play on the Commission’s pledge to reduce red tape for companies, in particular smaller businesses. To date, ten omnibus packages to simplify EU law have been published, with more scheduled, all currently at different stages of the legislative procedure.
Parliament is committed to ensuring that there are robust legal frameworks to regulate artificial intelligence (AI) in the EU. Members debated and adopted a provisional text on the ‘Digital Omnibus on AI‘, a set of amendments to the AI Act. Parliament favoured fixed deadlines for applying high-risk AI rules, and proposes a ban on AI systems that generate non-consensual sexual content. The agreed text upholds Parliament’s position on the generation of non-consensual sexual content and prohibits AI practices generating child sexual abuse material. The vote postpones application of certain parts of the AI Act, without impacting its core provisions and risk-based approach.
Improper management of end-of-life vehicles can damage the environment and lose millions of tonnes of material that could be recycled to the benefit of the EU economy instead. Parliament debated and adopted a provisional agreement on circularity requirements for vehicle design and end-of-life vehicles. The agreement sets out requirements for passenger and light commercial vehicles. Vehicles must include recycled plastic, in line with progressively rising targets and minimum recycled content requirements. Manufacturers and producers will be obliged to clearly label refurbished parts and provide information regarding safe access to, removal, and replacement of parts.
Members adopted at second reading a provisional agreement reached with the Council on the Commission’s proposal on plants obtained by new genomic techniques. This aims at aligning existing EU legislation on genetically modified organisms (GMOs) with new scientific developments. Parliament’s negotiators supported the simplification of rules for low-risk genetically modified plants (NGT1), provided they are similar to conventionally bred plants and do not have certain excluded traits. The agreement also includes provisions intended to address concerns related to market concentration and access to seeds for breeders and farmers.
Despite playing an important role in the food-supply chain, farmers have faced mounting difficulties in recent years. Parliament adopted a provisional agreement on a regulation strengthening farmers’ position in the food-supply chain. Based on a Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development (AGRI) report, Parliament reached agreement with the Council in March 2026. The agreed text aims to ensure that food prices better reflect the production costs borne by farmers, and includes support for the dairy sector, such as the introduction of mandatory written contracts. It also reinforced producer organisations’ bargaining power and includes clarification on labelling to ensure consumer protection and fair competition.
Parliament debated and adopted the trilogue agreement reached on the proposal for two regulations to implement the EU’s tariff commitments under the EU-US Joint Statement. The Committee on International Trade (INTA) adopted its reports in March 2026. The agreement empowers the Commission to suspend the application of the regulation if the US fails to meet its commitments and introduces additional safeguards, including stronger suspension mechanisms and protections against import surges that could harm domestic producers. A comprehensive review of the measures will be conducted in 2029, with the possibility of extension.
Despite applying for accession as far back as 1999, progress towards Türkiye’s EU membership bid has faced numerous delays since accession talks began in 2005. Parliament held a debate and adopted a Foreign Affairs Committee report on Türkiye, which reaffirms Parliament’s appreciation for the majority of Turkish people’s aspiration to EU accession and maintaining Türkiye’s candidate status. It also reiterates Türkiye’s relevance as a NATO ally and a country with which the EU has multi-layered relations. However, the AFET committee regrets that, despite the Turkish government’s repeated statements recommitting to the EU membership goal, serious concerns raised in previous AFET reports regarding shortcomings affecting the accession process remain unaddressed.
The path to accession for new Member States was a key topic at this plenary session, with Members debating and adopting a set of own-initiative reports from the AFET committee on enlargement candidates in the Western Balkans on Tuesday. The AFET report on Montenegro welcomes the country’s progress and encourages sustained momentum on accession negotiations. The committee also commends Albania‘s dedication to EU integration, but expresses concern about the impact of corruption and calls for full implementation of anti-corruption reforms. The AFET report on Kosovo* reaffirms that the country’s future lies with the EU, and stresses inclusion in EU programmes and policies is vital for gradual integration. AFET’s report on Bosnia and Herzegovina expresses support for EU accession and urges political leaders to renew their commitment to EU membership. Similarly, the AFET report on North Macedonia reaffirms its support for the country’s EU membership aspirations, although it regrets the lack of progress since its 2025 report.
* This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244/1999 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo Declaration of Independence.
Members also adopted an AFET committee report on Georgia’s EU accession status. The report deplores the continued democratic backsliding in the country and echoes Parliament’s non-recognition of the legitimacy of the Georgian parliament. It also reiterates calls for the EU to impose sanctions against key officials and regime enablers.
Water scarcity and water bankruptcy are serious global issues, and mitigating violations of the human right to water remains crucial for regional stability and sustainable development. Members adopted a recommendation to the Council, Commission and High Representative regarding transnational water governance. An AFET committee report notes the importance of transnational water governance for conflict prevention and peace, underscoring the growing political and security dimensions of water issues. The report calls on the EU to condemn the weaponisation of water in conflicts and urges an increase in funding for transboundary water management and for the EU to take the lead in advancing the UN Sustainable Development Goal on clean water.
Read this ‘at a glance note’ on ‘Plenary round-up – June 2026‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.
Written by Clare Ferguson with Áine Feeney.
European Union enlargement and competitiveness are prominent issues on the agenda for the European Parliament’s June plenary session. Jakov Milatović, President of Montenegro is expected to address Parliament in a formal sitting on Tuesday. During the question time session, a European Commissioner will respond to Members’ questions on the state of play on its pledge to reduce the reporting burden, particularly for small and medium-sized enterprises. The Council and Commission will also make statements ahead of the European Council meeting taking place from 18‑19 June 2026. Andrzej Poczobut, laureate of the 2025 Sakharov Prize for his defence of freedom and democracy in Belarus, is expected to address a formal sitting on Wednesday following his recent release from imprisonment in that country.
The path to accession for[CF1] new Member States is a key topic at this plenary session, with Members set to debate several own-initiative reports from the Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET) on enlargement candidates in the Western Balkans on Tuesday. The AFET report on Montenegro welcomes the country’s progress and encourages sustained momentum on accession negotiations. The committee also commends Albania‘s dedication to EU integration, but expresses concern about the impact of corruption and calls for full implementation of anti-corruption reforms. The [AC2] AFET report on Kosovo* reaffirms that the country’s future lies with the EU, and stresses inclusion in EU programmes and policies is vital for gradual integration. AFET’s report on Bosnia and Herzegovina expresses support for EU accession and urges political leaders to renew their commitment to EU membership. Similarly, the AFET report on North Macedonia reaffirms its support for the country’s EU membership aspirations, although it regrets the lack of progress since its 2025 report.
Despite applying for accession as far back as 1999, progress towards Türkiye’s EU membership bid has faced numerous delays since accession talks began in 2005. On Tuesday, Parliament is set to consider an AFET report on Türkiye, which reaffirms Parliament’s appreciation for the majority of Turkish people’s aspiration to EU accession and maintaining Türkiye’s candidate status. It also reiterates Türkiye’s relevance as a NATO ally and a country with which the EU has multi-layered relations. However, AFET regrets that, despite the Turkish government’s repeated statements recommitting to the EU membership goal, serious concerns raised in previous AFET reports regarding shortcomings affecting the accession process remain unaddressed.
On Wednesday, Members are also due to consider an AFET report on the status of Georgia’s EU accession status. The report deplores the continued democratic backsliding in the country and echoes Parliament’s position of non-recognition of the legitimacy of the Georgian parliament. It also reiterates calls for the EU to impose sanctions against key officials and regime enablers.
On Monday evening, Parliament is due to consider the trilogue agreement reached on the proposal for two regulations to implement the EU’s tariff commitments under the EU-US Joint Statement. The Committee on International Trade (INTA) adopted its reports in March 2026. The agreement empowers the Commission to suspend the application of the regulation if the US fails to meet its commitments and introduces additional safeguards, including stronger suspension mechanisms and protections against import surges that could harm domestic producers. If adopted, a comprehensive review of the measures will be conducted in 2029, with the possibility of extension.
Parliament is committed to ensuring that there are robust legal frameworks to regulate artificial intelligence (AI) in the EU. On Monday evening, Members are expected to consider adoption of a provisional text on the ‘Digital Omnibus on AI‘, a set of amendments to the AI Act. Parliament favours fixed deadlines for applying high-risk AI rules, and proposes a ban on AI systems that generate non-consensual sexual content. The co-legislators reached a provisional agreement in May 2026, since approved by the Committees on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO) and Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) jointly. The agreed text upholds Parliament’s position on the generation of non-consensual sexual content and prohibits AI practices generating child sexual abuse material. If adopted, application of certain parts of the AI Act will be postponed, without impacting the act’s core provisions and risk-based approach.
Despite playing an important role in the food-supply chain, farmers have faced mounting difficulties in recent years. On Tuesday, Parliament is expected to consider a provisional text on a regulation strengthening farmers’ position in the food-supply chain. Based on a report by the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development (AGRI), Parliament reached agreement with the Council in March 2026. The agreed text aims to ensure that food prices better reflect the production costs borne by farmers and includes support for the dairy sector, such as the introduction of mandatory written contracts. It also reinforced the bargaining power of producer organisations and includes clarification on labelling to ensure consumer protection and fair competition.
Similarly, on Wednesday, Members are due to consider regulations on horticulture. A provisional agreement reached with the Council on the Commission’s proposal on plants obtained by new genomic techniques, aims at aligning existing EU legislation on genetically modified organisms (GMOs) with new scientific developments. Parliament’s negotiators supported the simplification of rules for low-risk genetically modified plants (NGT1), provided they are similar to conventionally bred plants and do not have certain excluded traits. The agreement also includes provisions intended to address concerns related to market concentration and access to seeds for breeders and farmers. The Committee on Environment (ENVI) is expected to vote on the provisional agreement on 15 June 2026, which could be put to a plenary vote during the same week if it is approved without amendment.
Water scarcity and water bankruptcy are serious global issues, and mitigating violations of the human right to water remains crucial for regional stability and sustainable development. On Wednesday, Members are set to consider a recommendation to the Council, Commission and High Representative regarding transnational water governance. An AFET committee report notes the importance of transnational water governance for conflict prevention and peace, underscoring the growing political and security dimensions of water issues. The report calls on Parliament to condemn the weaponisation of water in conflicts and urges the EU to increase funding for transboundary water management and to take the lead in advancing the UN Sustainable Development Goal on clean water.
The improper management of end-of-life vehicles can damage the environment and lose millions of tonnes of material that could be recycled to the benefit of the EU economy instead. On Thursday morning, Parliament is due to consider a provisional agreement on circularity requirements for vehicle design and end-of-life vehicles. The agreement sets out requirements for passenger, commercial, and heavy-duty vehicles. Each vehicle type must include recycled plastic, in line with progressively rising targets and minimum recycled content requirements. Manufacturers and producers will also be obliged to clearly label refurbished parts and provide information regarding safe access to, removal, and replacement of parts.
* This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244/1999 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo Declaration of Independence.
European Parliament Plenary Session June 2026 – agenda
By Hüseyin DOĞRU
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Built to fight foreign interference, Europe’s security apparatus is now turning on its own people. Muslims and critics of Israel are first in line.
On 8 October 2026, the European Parliament passed a deeply Islamophobic resolution on “Islamist entryism”. Behind the text is the hand of the European People’s Party, the conservative bloc that holds sway over EU politics. Backed by the liberals of Renew Europe and the far right, it was put to a vote and passed 381 to 167. The resolution is put forward as a way to shield European democracy from extremists, but its provisions are enough to give pause to anyone with an eye on the future of our rights and freedoms in Europe.
Take for instance the matter of “hatred of Israel”. The resolution puts this undefined notion forward as an indicator of ideological radicalisation, while also sounding the alarm on the “instrumentalisation of anti-discrimination frameworks”. One has to wonder at the implications: does this mean that a campaign against discrimination or even criticism of a state under accusation for war crimes can be subsumed under the EU’s widening net of security threats?
This resolution is more than an assault on a Muslim population already demonised in Europe; it is part of a broader, unexamined shift in the Union where dissent is viewed with suspicion. I am living with the consequences of it.
From foreign interference to domestic dissent
For years, the EU has been building a security apparatus around the alleged threats of disinformation, foreign interference and hybrid warfare.
Central to this is Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI), a framework developed largely in response to “Russian information operations”. The EU’s diplomatic service describes FIMI as a “mostly non-illegal” pattern of behaviour that can negatively affect political processes and values.
The definition is telling in what it leaves out. Political officials, not judicial ones, are left to decide what constitutes a manipulation of European values and what does not. What becomes of political critique and journalism when their arbitrary judgments are applied?
In May 2025, the EU sanctioned me and my media company, red., under its Russia-related hybrid-threats regime. My alleged offence was my journalism, particularly my coverage of Palestine solidarity protests in Germany, which the EU claims supported Russia’s efforts to destabilise Europe. The evidence against me consists of screenshots of factual posts from red. and my personal social media accounts, most of them reporting or criticism of German domestic and foreign policy. Not one page of the evidence dossier so much as mentions Russia.
Without a criminal charge, trial or conviction, my bank accounts were frozen and I was banned from working and travelling.
Then there is the question of administrative sanctions. The EU will say due process is observed since one can take them to court, but by the time a judge is sitting in on the case the damage has been done. Livelihoods are in ruins, bank accounts frozen and lives in disarray, all while the sanctioned individual endures years of expensive and politicised legal wrangling to have restrictions lifted. It is an extraordinary power to wield; the punishment is meted out first and the chance to contest it later, with no need to prove criminality. Violate a sanction and you face prosecution and prison, even if your only offence was buying nappies for your own babies, which could be deemed to have circumvented the rules.
On 8 October, the same day Parliament voted on “Islamist entryism”, the EU Council renewed the sanctions regime I am listed under until October 2027 and reinstated the reasons for my listing. The new text still describes the protesters whose university occupation red. covered as “anti-Israel rioters”. To justify the renewal, the Council cited a Parliament report from September on hybrid threats. One institution supplies the political mood, another uses that mood to put names like mine on a list.
The enemy within
The Islamist entryism resolution takes this logic in another direction. “Entryism” refers to political groups infiltrating established institutions to influence them from within. In this case, the Parliament warns that Islamist networks are using charities, youth organisations, universities and other parts of civil society to gain influence over European politics. The idea was imported from Paris; the resolution leans on a May 2025 report by the French interior ministry, the same ministry that once governed Algeria’s Muslims as colonial subjects.
The threat is no longer just a foreign power supposedly interfering in European affairs. Now the EU is turning its attention to an enemy within.
The phrase has a history. In July 1984, Margaret Thatcher told Conservative backbenchers that Britain had fought the “enemy without” in the Falklands and now faced the “enemy within”. She meant the striking miners.
The way in which the resolution singles out “hatred of Israel” as a sign of radicalisation without defining the term is noteworthy. A couple of paragraphs on it concedes this is not a bar to “legitimate criticism” of the state, yet it offers no guidance on how the line between the two will be drawn, or by whom. Since when has hostility to a government been cause for suspecting extremism? Or are we to assume Europeans must love Israel? One might ask whose interests are really being served. The European Commission tells us the EU was Israel’s top trading partner in 2024, with €42.6 billion in goods. To call for an end to that trade or an arms embargo is not a danger to democracy, but to the business interests of Europe.
Working with other organisations, maintaining certain associations or allegedly misusing anti-discrimination campaigns can also become grounds for suspicion. Among the warning signs the resolution lists are “the recurrence of certain partnerships”, “proximity to already identified networks” and even “the production of activist reports”.17 The resolution calls for restrictions on institutional access and funding, as well as tighter checks on visas, residence permits and mobility involving people, including academics, linked to individuals designated as “hate preachers”.
Even the European Network Against Racism is cast in doubt, its funding said to raise “serious questions”. When an anti-racism body is conflated with entryism, the whole concept is made to look suspect. Under the terms of the resolution, a professor could be slapped with travel restrictions because of a tenuous association with a so-called “hate preacher”, having broken no law in the process. We have seen this sort of thing before. In 1972, Germany’s Radikalenerlass saw the domestic intelligence service vet some 3.5 million public sector applicants. Communists and others on the left were dismissed or denied their jobs as teachers, postmen or train drivers for who they were rather than any act they had committed.
The resolution also tells us which Muslims Europe is willing to tolerate. It promises support for “Muslim representatives” who defend democratic values and resist “Islamist pressure”.22 The good Muslim, in other words, is the one the state approves of.
Not being legally binding does not make the resolution any less alarming. The Parliament has rubber-stamped the idea that lawful activity is a security risk, laying the groundwork for enforceable restrictions down the line. The same rationale once used to counter foreign interference is now being turned on organisations and people here in Europe.
Repression in the name of democracy
Both the FIMI sanctions regime and the Islamist entryism resolution are justified in the name of defending democracy and protecting European values. Yet the EU is increasingly treating the exercise of those very freedoms as grounds for suspicion.
None of this is happening in a vacuum. Europe is rearming on a scale not seen since the Cold War (the Commission’s ReArm Europe plan alone aims to mobilise up to €800 billion) while standing by Israel through the destruction of Gaza. A state preparing for war needs a quiet home front. Those who object, to genocide abroad or to paying for rearmament with cuts at home, have to be recast as foreign agents or fifth columnists.
What counts as “hatred of Israel”? Who decides when fighting discrimination becomes “instrumentalising” it? When does criticism of EU foreign policy become foreign interference? And how many connections does it take before a journalist, academic or activist is branded a security threat?
These are not abstract questions for those of us already living with the consequences. The EU’s authoritarian turn exposes the limits of its professed liberal values, where freedom of expression and political participation are celebrated until they challenge the interests of capital and the states that serve it. Liberal democracies have always kept a second rulebook in the drawer, for strikers, communists and the colonised.
What began as a campaign against foreign interference is increasingly being turned against dissent at home, with Muslims and critics of Israel, already among the most marginalised and harassed people in Europe, first in the firing line. But they won’t be the last. Trade unionists, climate activists and anyone who stands in the way of the war economy should take note.
While Europe’s political establishment continues to congratulate itself on defending democracy, the machinery for silencing its opponents is being built in plain sight.
Original article: braveneweurope.com
Those concerns intersect with a European Parliament resolution adopted on October 8th calling for a coordinated response to what MEPs describe as “Islamist entryism”. The connection concerns overlapping organisations and questions of influence, not an established explanation for the violence.
The chronology matters. Parliament adopted its resolution nine days before the October 17th violence described in France. The vote was therefore not a response to those events. It reflected an existing concern among a parliamentary majority that Islamist networks could use associations, educational initiatives and institutional partnerships to build political influence within Europe.
Tabled by the European People’s Party, the resolution passed by 381 votes to 167, with 15 abstentions. It calls for closer scrutiny of EU funding, stronger checks on institutional partnerships and an assessment of whether individuals or entities linked to the Muslim Brotherhood meet the legal criteria for inclusion on the EU terrorist list.
The clearest organisational overlap is the Forum of European Muslim Youth and Student Organisations, or FEMYSO. On October 9th, the organisation publicly supported students demonstrating in France and Belgium, calling for better educational conditions, adequate funding and protection of peaceful assembly. Its statement framed the mobilisation as a campaign over education and fundamental rights.
FEMYSO also features explicitly in Parliament’s resolution. MEPs criticised its invitation to the European Parliament on September 21st by members of The Left and the Greens. They called for organisations they associate with the Council of European Muslims, including FEMYSO, to be denied access to EU institutions, removed from the EU Transparency Register and excluded from institutional events where participation could legitimise alleged Brotherhood-linked influence strategies. These are Parliament’s assessments and demands, rather than judicial findings.
In France, the Washington Examiner has reported that Étudiants Musulmans de France, or EMF, repeatedly promoted the demonstrations through social media. The newspaper describes EMF as a FEMYSO member and reports allegations of Muslim Brotherhood connections, which EMF denies. Its reporting places the organisation within the debate over mobilisation and ideological influence.
The resolution’s significance lies partly in its focus on networks rather than formal membership alone. Parliament argues that political influence can operate through recurring partnerships, opaque financing, associated organisations and structures reconstituted under new names. It wants a common European methodology for identifying such patterns, rather than relying solely on whether an organisation formally declares an affiliation.
For the European Commission, the principal requests concern money and transparency. MEPs want an overview of EU funds awarded to people or entities suspected of Brotherhood or political-Islam links, alongside greater traceability through funding chains and stronger checks on partners and beneficiaries. Parliament also calls for scrutiny of foreign funding and transnational partnerships, particularly those involving actors linked to Qatar or Türkiye.
Those requests must be distinguished from decisions already taken. The non-binding resolution does not itself ban the Muslim Brotherhood, designate FEMYSO as a terrorist organisation or automatically withdraw funding. It asks the Council to assess possible terrorist listings under the applicable legal criteria and urges the Commission to use existing financial safeguards. Further action would require separate institutional decisions.
The European debate does not remove the French government’s responsibility to explain its handling of the unrest. Reuters reports that Prime Minister Sébastien Lecornu acknowledged intelligence and deployment failures, while Interior Minister Laurent Nunez also accepted a share of responsibility. Authorities have assigned 200 investigators to identify those involved in the violence, and parliament is establishing an inquiry into the disorder.
Nor does scrutiny of ideological networks resolve the grievances behind peaceful mobilisation. Student demands over educational conditions and public funding remain substantive political questions. Treating all demonstrators as participants in an Islamist project would obscure the diversity of the movement and make it harder to distinguish legitimate advocacy from attempts at political exploitation.
Parliament’s own resolution draws an important boundary: it states that Islam must not be equated with political Islamism and that protecting Muslim citizens from discrimination is a democratic obligation. That distinction should guide any investigation of organisations, funding or institutional access. Scrutiny must concern identifiable conduct and demonstrable relationships, not religious identity.
France’s unrest and Parliament’s vote meet at a question of accountability: how should democratic institutions examine organisations seeking influence within legitimate social movements, and what evidence should justify restrictions on funding or access?
The answer cannot rest on association alone. Investigators must establish who committed or directed violence; EU institutions must examine funding and partnerships against clear legal standards; and governments must address the public-service grievances that brought peaceful demonstrators onto the streets.
The October 8th vote gives political weight to closer European scrutiny of alleged Brotherhood-linked networks. France’s unrest makes careful scrutiny more urgent—but also makes precision more important. A credible response must distinguish political advocacy from covert influence, and both from criminal responsibility.
The fact-finding mission, scheduled for 26th and 27th October, will examine how Amazon organises work, measures employee productivity and uses automated systems in warehouses. MEPs will meet management, employees, works councils and trade union representatives, with particular attention to whether technological changes are affecting workers’ health and their ability to exercise employment rights.
The investigation comes as the European Commission prepares its Quality Jobs Act, which is expected to address algorithmic management, occupational safety and working conditions across the European economy. Amazon’s extensive logistics network makes the company a prominent example of the questions legislators must resolve.
The delegation is led by Li Andersson, chairwoman of Parliament’s Employment and Social Affairs Committee, and includes Belgian MEPs Liesbet Sommen and Estelle Ceulemans, alongside representatives from several other political groups.
According to the European trade union federation UNI Europa, MEPs will inspect facilities in Dortmund and Mönchengladbach on Monday before travelling to Poland on Tuesday.
The German visits will cover older warehouse operations and newer facilities incorporating robotics, allowing parliamentarians to compare different approaches to handling orders and managing employees. The Polish programme includes a major returns facility in the Katowice area.
The visit follows several years of strained relations between Amazon and the European Parliament.
In February 2024, Parliament withdrew permanent access badges from Amazon representatives following disagreements over the company’s participation in hearings and requests for visits to its warehouses.
Amazon disputed suggestions that it was avoiding scrutiny, maintaining that it had offered alternative arrangements for parliamentary visits during periods when its logistics operations were particularly busy.
Company executives eventually appeared before the Employment and Social Affairs Committee in January 2026, where they defended Amazon’s employment policies and workplace practices.
At the centre of the dispute is the increasingly widespread use of electronic systems to monitor productivity.
Warehouse employees commonly use handheld scanners, while automated systems can help allocate tasks, coordinate movements and identify delays in processing orders.
These technologies allow employers to manage substantial logistics operations with considerable precision. They also make it possible to collect detailed information about individual workers’ activities throughout their shifts.
Trade unions argue that such monitoring can create unreasonable performance pressure, particularly where targets are adjusted automatically or workers cannot challenge assessments generated by software.
The concerns are not confined to Amazon.
A European Commission survey examined by EU Today earlier this month found that 42 per cent of surveyed smaller and medium-sized businesses already used artificial intelligence or algorithmic management systems.
However, 49 per cent of respondents expressed distrust of automated systems making decisions about employees, illustrating the distinction between using technology to support management and delegating consequential decisions to algorithms.
Amazon has already faced formal European regulatory scrutiny over workplace monitoring.
France’s data protection authority imposed a €32 million fine on Amazon France Logistique in December 2023, announcing the decision in January 2024. The regulator concluded that certain employee monitoring practices were excessively intrusive and breached data-protection requirements.
The investigation examined the collection and retention of detailed information from warehouse scanners, including productivity indicators and periods of inactivity.
Amazon rejected the regulator’s conclusions and subsequently appealed the decision. The penalty therefore needs to be distinguished from any final judicial determination of the dispute.
The case nevertheless demonstrates that workplace monitoring falls within existing European privacy legislation, independently of proposals for new employment rules.
EU Today has also reported on the application of European data-protection law to automated employment decisions, including the question of whether meaningful human review is available when software affects a person’s ability to work.
Amazon maintains that its warehouse technology is intended to improve operational efficiency, safety and the reliability of deliveries.
In its January parliamentary testimony, the company defended its investment in employee training and insisted that workers have the right to join trade unions.
It also pointed to engagement with works councils and employee representative bodies across its European operations.
Trade unions contest the adequacy of those arrangements, particularly in Germany, where the ver.di union has repeatedly sought a collective agreement covering Amazon employees.
These competing positions will form part of the parliamentary delegation’s assessment.
The Commission’s Quality Jobs initiative addresses several questions raised by the Amazon dispute, including algorithmic management, psychosocial risks and the effectiveness of collective bargaining.
Legislators must determine how far employers should be required to disclose the operation of automated monitoring systems, how employees can contest decisions and what safeguards should apply when performance targets are generated by software.
Rules must also accommodate legitimate requirements for stock management, security and workplace safety.
The parliamentary visit will not itself establish whether Amazon has breached employment legislation. It is a fact-finding exercise intended to inform future policy discussions.
Its importance lies in giving legislators direct access to warehouse operations and employee accounts before deciding how European labour law should respond to increasingly automated workplaces.
The visit, taking place from 26th to 28th October, comes three weeks after parliamentary elections exposed persistent divisions over Bosnia’s political direction and its prospects of joining the European Union.
The mission is being conducted by Parliament’s Special Committee on the European Democracy Shield, chaired by French MEP Nathalie Loiseau. Its purpose is to assess vulnerabilities to disinformation, cyberattacks, economic pressure and other forms of hybrid interference, and to identify measures that could strengthen Bosnia’s institutional resilience.
According to the European Parliament’s announcement, the delegation will meet government officials, parliamentary representatives, civil society organisations, journalists and researchers. Joining Loiseau are Finnish MEP Mika Aaltola, Portugal’s Ana Catarina Mendes and Romania’s Cristian Terheş.
The investigation comes at a politically sensitive moment. Bosnia’s general election on 4th October confirmed the persistence of competing political priorities between the country’s constituent entities, with pro-Russian politician Milorad Dodik’s Alliance of Independent Social Democrats retaining considerable support in Republika Srpska.
As EU Today reported following the election, parties favouring closer European integration also performed strongly, particularly in the Bosniak-Croat Federation. The resulting political balance will influence the formation of new administrations and their ability to implement reforms demanded by Brussels.
The European Parliament’s investigation extends beyond conventional disinformation campaigns.
MEPs intend to examine how foreign actors may exploit weaknesses in electoral administration, cybersecurity, political financing and the country’s wider economic relationships. They will also consider the role of digital platforms in distributing manipulated information and the legislative gaps that could make interference difficult to identify or prosecute.
The distinction matters in Bosnia, where political influence cannot be separated from the country’s complicated constitutional arrangements.
Under the Dayton peace settlement, the state operates through institutions that distribute authority between the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republika Srpska and the central government. Political disagreements can therefore obstruct decisions requiring cooperation between different levels of administration.
External actors seeking influence may exploit those divisions, although identifying a political relationship with a foreign government is not, by itself, evidence of unlawful interference.
The European Union has repeatedly expressed concern about Russia’s activities in the Western Balkans, particularly its relationships with political forces opposing closer integration with European institutions. Chinese investment and economic relationships also raise questions about strategic dependence, although legitimate commercial activity must be distinguished from coercion or covert political operations.
The delegation’s task is to establish which vulnerabilities can be substantiated and whether existing safeguards are adequate.
Bosnia received EU candidate status in December 2022. In March 2024, European leaders agreed in principle to open accession negotiations, but progress has remained conditional on institutional and legal reforms.
Following the October election, EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas and Enlargement Commissioner Marta Kos issued a joint statement calling for the prompt formation of new administrations and progress on judicial reform.
The Commission also highlighted shortcomings identified by international election observers, including technical difficulties, complicated voting procedures and concerns about ballot secrecy.
Those findings do not automatically establish foreign interference. They do, however, demonstrate why the integrity of electoral institutions remains central to Bosnia’s relationship with Brussels.
The Sarajevo mission follows the EU’s decision on 13th October to include enlargement partners in the European Centre for Democratic Resilience.
The initiative is intended to improve cooperation on election security, information manipulation, crisis management and institutional protection before candidate countries enter the Union.
EU Today has previously examined the European Democracy Shield’s proposed mechanisms, including closer coordination with technology companies and improved systems for identifying foreign information operations.
Bosnia now offers a practical opportunity to examine whether those instruments can operate effectively in a country where political authority is fragmented and accession remains incomplete.
The delegation’s findings could inform recommendations on institutional cooperation, election safeguards and support for independent media. Any substantial improvement, however, will depend on the willingness of Bosnia’s authorities to implement reforms and enforce existing legislation.
For Brussels, the immediate issue is whether its emerging framework for democratic resilience can provide practical protection to candidate countries while respecting their political sovereignty and the freedoms it is intended to defend.
The European Parliament has called for the possible deployment of an EU naval operation in the Black Sea following a series of deadly attacks on civilian merchant vessels near the Romanian and Bulgarian coasts. The resolution, adopted on 22 October 2026 by 432 votes to 52, with 88 abstentions, reflects mounting concern over the expansion of maritime threats towards NATO’s south-eastern flank.
The parliamentary resolution urges EU member states to consider establishing a naval mission to protect commercial shipping, while calling on NATO to examine a complementary regional initiative, provisionally described as Black Sea Sentry.
On 23 October, a drone struck the Comoros-flagged cargo vessel Khoryv, approximately 13 nautical miles from Romania’s port of Constanța. The vessel caught fire and sank, leaving one sailor confirmed dead and three missing. Nine crew members were rescued. The ship was carrying 13 Ukrainian and Azerbaijani sailors. According to information attributed to Romanian maritime authorities, difficult weather complicated rescue efforts.
Romanian President Nicușor Dan blamed Russia for the attack, which followed at least seven other strikes on commercial vessels during October. Across the incidents, approximately 30 sailors have been reported dead or missing, although the confirmed death toll is considerably lower.
The escalation began on 5 October when the Royad Mammadov, a Turkish-owned grain carrier sailing under the flag of Saint Kitts and Nevis, sank in Romania’s exclusive economic zone. Two sailors died and eleven were rescued. The vessel had departed the Ukrainian Danube port of Izmail carrying corn destined for Ravenna, Italy. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy attributed the sinking to Russian drones, although Romanian authorities did not initially establish responsibility.
The following day, two merchant ships were attacked approximately 70 nautical miles east of the Bulgarian coastal town of Byala. As EU Today reported, the Togo-flagged Alfa Watan sank after sustaining severe damage, while the Palau-flagged Able caught fire. All 18 sailors aboard the latter vessel were rescued, but the crew of the Alfa Watan remained unaccounted for.
The Bulgarian authorities confirmed that both aerial and maritime drones had been involved. Further attacks followed on 13 October, when the HS Dignity sank near Shabla, leaving eleven sailors missing, while the Chelsea-3 was struck near Byala. All 15 crew members of the latter vessel were evacuated.
Two chemical tankers, the Yara J and Wine Trader, were subsequently attacked near the Sulina Canal, a strategically important route connecting the Danube with the Black Sea. The incidents exposed the vulnerability of shipping corridors connecting Ukraine with international markets.
Romania has responded by strengthening surveillance and authorising direct military action against drones entering its airspace. On 17 October, two Romanian F-16 fighter aircraft intercepted and destroyed hostile drones over Romanian territorial waters.
According to the Romanian Ministry of National Defence, the aircraft were scrambled from Borcea Air Base after radar systems detected aerial targets approaching from the direction of Snake Island. The drones, identified as jet-powered Geran-family attack aircraft, entered Romanian airspace before being destroyed southeast and east of Sulina.
The ministry disclosed that, during the preceding week, its radar systems had detected eight separate incidents involving aerial targets near the Romanian border, including four brief incursions into national airspace. On 14 October, Spanish F-18 aircraft operating under NATO air-policing arrangements were scrambled after drones approached Romanian airspace.
Bulgaria has taken a more reserved position concerning responsibility for the attacks. Although Prime Minister Rumen Radev acknowledged their seriousness, his government maintained that investigations must establish the origin of the drones before definitive conclusions could be drawn. Sofia nevertheless strengthened maritime surveillance, deployed rescue resources and requested assistance from European and NATO partners.
In August, a drone crossed into Bulgarian airspace from Romania and exploded near infrastructure associated with the Trans-Balkan Gas Pipeline. According to the Bulgarian government’s account, the aircraft was not detected by either national radar systems or NATO’s Combined Air Operations Centre in Torrejón, Spain. The European Parliament has now urged Sofia to accelerate participation in NATO’s counter-drone initiatives.
The European Parliament’s proposals include establishing an EU naval operation, improving early detection of hostile drones, accelerating the development of a Black Sea Maritime Security Hub and providing additional defence funding to Romania and Bulgaria. MEPs have proposed using resources under the EU’s SAFE defence financing instrument to support regional capabilities.
The proposed hub would facilitate intelligence-sharing, maritime surveillance and protection of critical infrastructure. Romania and Bulgaria have requested EU satellite imagery to improve their awareness of maritime threats, while the European Maritime Safety Agency has offered additional support.
At their October summit, EU leaders condemned attacks on civilian shipping and called for safe passage for vessels transporting agricultural products. The European Council’s conclusions addressed Black Sea and Danube shipping routes. However, the parliamentary resolution does not authorise a naval deployment: such an operation would require agreement among EU governments on its mandate, resources and rules of engagement.
NATO has responded by examining additional maritime surveillance and defensive measures, including patrol aircraft, radar systems and unmanned platforms. Romania has proposed stronger regional command arrangements involving NATO’s Black Sea members.
An existing framework provides a basis for cooperation. In July, Romania, Bulgaria and Türkiye agreed to expand the responsibilities of their joint mine countermeasures task group to include protection of critical underwater infrastructure. The agreement announced by Romania’s Defence Ministry extended cooperation beyond detecting and neutralising drifting mines.
Protecting commercial vessels against aerial and maritime drones would require broader capabilities. NATO must also operate within the restrictions of the 1936 Montreux Convention, which regulates passage of warships through the Turkish Straits and limits deployments by non-Black Sea countries. Romania, Bulgaria and Türkiye would therefore play central roles in any sustained maritime security operation.
Ukraine’s maritime export corridors remain essential to agricultural shipments following repeated Russian strikes on ports and logistics infrastructure. Attacks on commercial vessels can increase insurance costs, discourage shipping companies and disrupt trade even when port facilities remain functional.
The sinking of merchant vessels near allied territory, combined with repeated drone incursions into Romanian airspace, increases the possibility of military confrontation arising from an individual incident. The legal and military circumstances differ depending on whether an attack occurs in territorial waters, an exclusive economic zone or international waters.
The European Parliament’s proposal raises questions extending beyond maritime patrols: how civilian shipping can be protected, what military responses are authorised and how responsibility for attacks will be established. The sinking of the Khoryv on 23 October illustrates how the western Black Sea has become an increasingly exposed part of Europe’s security frontier.
The parliamentary position was approved by 454 votes to 34, with 93 abstentions, following negotiations over the future of the EU’s principal education, training and student mobility programme.
MEPs are seeking approximately €6.56 billion more than the Commission’s proposed €40.83 billion allocation, arguing that existing financial support does not adequately reflect rising living costs and the expense of studying abroad.
The decision establishes Parliament’s negotiating position but does not represent final approval of the funding. The programme remains subject to negotiations with national governments and agreement on the EU’s next seven-year budget.
Erasmus+ allows students, apprentices, teachers and other participants to study, train or gain professional experience in another participating country.
Although widely associated with university exchanges, the programme also supports vocational education, schools, adult learning, youth organisations and sporting activities.
Participation often involves substantial personal expenditure, particularly for accommodation, transport and everyday living expenses.
These costs vary considerably between European destinations, creating financial difficulties for students whose Erasmus grants cover only part of their expenses.
The European Parliament is consequently calling for support mechanisms that account for differences in housing and living costs between host countries, regions and cities.
The proposal is intended to make participation more accessible to people who cannot rely on additional financial assistance from their families.
The European Parliament’s research service has identified unequal access, financial limitations and administrative complexity among the challenges facing the programme.
The proposed legislation would also establish a target under which at least 20 per cent of participants in mobility activities would be people facing fewer educational or economic opportunities.
The parliamentary proposal provides for approximately €47.39 billion in current prices over seven years.
The Commission originally proposed approximately €40.83 billion, combining funding for Erasmus+ with activities currently administered through the European Solidarity Corps.
According to the report prepared by Parliament’s Committee on Culture and Education, the revised programme would include more explicit financial allocations for different activities.
Education and training would account for approximately 74.6 per cent of the proposed financial envelope, while youth and volunteering would receive around 15 per cent. Sport would receive approximately 4.1 per cent.
The proposed allocation structure is intended to provide greater certainty for organisations planning longer-term educational projects and cross-border partnerships.
Polish MEP Bogdan Andrzej Zdrojewski, of the European People’s Party, is Parliament’s rapporteur on the legislation. His report calls for greater transparency over expenditure and more predictable funding arrangements.
The programme would continue supporting European university alliances, international educational cooperation and initiatives intended to improve professional skills.
One proposed change concerns the integration of the European Solidarity Corps into the wider Erasmus+ framework.
The Solidarity Corps currently offers young people opportunities to participate in volunteering and community activities, including projects addressing social and humanitarian needs.
The Commission has proposed bringing these activities within the new programme in an attempt to simplify administration.
However, parliamentarians want safeguards to ensure that volunteering remains identifiable and accessible within the broader funding structure.
The parliamentary position also seeks to extend mobility opportunities across vocational training, adult education and sport.
These activities would allow a wider range of participants to benefit from international placements, including people outside conventional university education.
Additional attention is being given to the financial circumstances of participants and the administrative requirements faced by smaller educational organisations.
The Erasmus+ negotiations are taking place against the background of a wider dispute over the European Union’s 2028–2034 financial framework.
Member states are debating the overall size of the budget and the competing demands of agricultural policy, regional development, defence, research and education.
As EU Today recently examined, the negotiations have exposed disagreements over whether the EU should expand its financial commitments or constrain expenditure during a period of pressure on national finances.
Parliament’s Erasmus+ proposal will therefore depend not only on agreement over educational priorities but also on the final distribution of resources across the wider EU budget.
Some governments may support broader participation while resisting the full increase requested by MEPs.
Negotiations must establish the programme’s final budget, eligibility rules and the arrangements governing grants after 2027.
The Council has already developed a negotiating position on aspects of the programme, although financial questions remain connected to the broader budget settlement.
Erasmus+ will mark its 40th anniversary in 2027, shortly before the new framework is scheduled to begin.
More than 17 million people have participated in the programme and its related activities since its establishment.
The outcome of the current negotiations will determine whether the next generation of participants receives more financial support and whether the programme can expand without increasing the proportion of costs borne by students and their families.
The decision follows pressure from European governments, energy companies and the United States, which have warned that implementing the regulations under the existing timetable could complicate fossil fuel supplies to the European market.
MEPs approved the amendments by 341 votes to 225, with six abstentions. The revised deadlines must now be negotiated with EU governments before they can become legally binding.
The parliamentary position also extends some postponements to European oil and gas producers, going beyond the Commission’s original proposal.
The EU Methane Regulation, adopted in 2024, established requirements intended to reduce methane emissions associated with fossil fuel production, transportation and imports.
Methane is a greenhouse gas with a considerably greater warming effect than carbon dioxide over shorter periods. Emissions occur throughout the oil and gas supply chain, particularly through leaks, venting and incomplete combustion.
Under the existing legislation, new monitoring, reporting and verification requirements for imported fossil fuels were scheduled to begin on 1 January 2027.
However, the Commission proposed amendments on 14 October 2026 to give companies additional time to comply.
The European Parliament has now supported a longer postponement than the Commission requested.
Under the parliamentary amendments, importers of crude oil, natural gas and coal would have until 31 May 2031 to demonstrate equivalent monitoring, reporting and verification arrangements for relevant supplies delivered in 2030.
The requirements would cover supply contracts concluded or renewed since 4 August 2024. Older contracts would remain subject to separate reporting requirements concerning efforts to obtain compliance.
Energy security concerns have been central to the debate. The United States has become Europe’s largest supplier of liquefied natural gas, particularly following the reduction of Russian pipeline gas deliveries after Moscow’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
American officials have argued that certain provisions of the methane legislation could create substantial compliance difficulties for exporters and potentially disrupt gas deliveries.
France, Italy and the Czech Republic have also supported adjustments to the timetable, reflecting concerns about energy costs, administrative burdens and the availability of alternative supplies.
European industrial consumers remain sensitive to fluctuations in natural gas prices, while the continuing conflict in the Middle East has increased uncertainty in international energy markets.
For importers, the principal concern is obtaining reliable information about emissions generated by suppliers operating outside EU jurisdiction.
European companies must demonstrate compliance using data collected throughout production and transportation networks that they do not necessarily control.
Parliament’s position includes extensions for certain reporting obligations affecting oil and gas operators within the European Union.
Verified reports combining measurements of methane emissions at individual sources and production sites would be subject to revised deadlines.
For assets operated directly by reporting companies, the proposed deadline would move to February 2030. Certain non-operated assets would be covered by a later deadline in August 2031.
The amendments would also permit continuous monitoring systems to replace separate measurement campaigns where the equipment meets the required technical standards.
Independent verification would remain necessary. Romanian MEP Virgil Popescu, a former energy minister, supported the longer timetable, arguing that companies require additional time to make investments in monitoring infrastructure.
Environmental organisations have opposed further postponements, arguing that delays could prolong avoidable emissions and weaken the regulatory framework established in 2024.
Parliament also supported an exception preventing fossil fuel supplies covered by relevant EU import sanctions from benefiting from the extended deadlines.
Importers would be required to identify the affected volumes, including where restricted-origin fuels form part of mixed shipments.
The exemption would not authorise trade already prohibited by EU sanctions.
A further amendment would require the European Commission to review implementation readiness by July 2029, including the availability of accredited verifiers and potential risks to energy supplies.
The Commission would then be able to propose additional legislative changes if substantial implementation problems remained.
Thursday’s vote does not repeal the methane legislation or automatically postpone its requirements.
The adopted amendments represent the European Parliament’s negotiating position. The Council of the European Union must agree to any changes before the revised legislation can enter into force.
The outcome forms part of a broader debate over European industrial competitiveness and the economic consequences of environmental regulation.
As EU Today recently reported, Brussels is already adjusting parts of its climate-policy framework in response to pressure from energy-intensive industries.
Negotiations over methane reporting will now determine how far those adjustments extend into Europe’s international energy supply chains and whether the EU can preserve the regulation’s emissions objectives under a longer implementation timetable.
The resolution, adopted on Thursday, 22nd October, received 414 votes in favour, 79 against and 90 abstentions.
It seeks greater financial assistance for regions bordering Russia, Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova, as well as territories along the Black Sea, under the EU’s 2028–2034 financial framework.
The proposals include higher EU contributions towards infrastructure projects, additional investment in local economies and targeted assistance for communities experiencing declining investment, population losses and increased security costs.
However, the resolution is not binding legislation and does not itself allocate new funding. Its provisions must be incorporated into future budget agreements and individual EU spending programmes.
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has significantly changed economic conditions across the EU’s eastern frontier.
Border restrictions, disrupted trade routes, increased defence activity and uncertainty over regional security have affected investment and commercial activity.
The pressures are particularly apparent in Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria.
According to a European Parliament research briefing published in September, these regions face overlapping challenges involving economic decline, depopulation, inadequate infrastructure and higher expenditure on security.
Some communities previously depended on cross-border trade with Russia or Belarus, much of which has declined sharply following sanctions and restrictions introduced since 2022.
Other regions have experienced increased transport demand linked to Ukrainian refugees, military logistics and the movement of goods towards Ukraine.
The European Commission has recognised that conventional regional development programmes may not adequately address the combination of economic and security pressures.
The resolution calls for up to 10 per cent of funding within relevant EU instruments to be earmarked for eligible eastern border regions.
This does not mean that 10 per cent of the entire EU budget would automatically be transferred to those areas.
Instead, Parliament wants targeted allocations within programmes covering regional development, agricultural policy, transport, industrial competitiveness and infrastructure.
MEPs also propose significantly higher EU contributions towards eligible projects.
Under the parliamentary position, certain projects could receive up to 95 per cent EU co-financing, reducing the amount that national or local authorities would have to contribute.
Projects connected with security, resilience or critical infrastructure could potentially receive funding covering 100 per cent of eligible costs.
Additional pre-financing would help local administrations begin projects without having to provide substantial initial expenditure.
The proposals are particularly relevant to municipalities with limited budgets and regions where private investment has declined.
Parliament has also proposed broadening the geographical criteria used to identify eligible territories.
The resolution covers regions bordering Russia, Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova, as well as regions with access to the Black Sea.
The proposed framework would use the EU’s NUTS 2 regional statistical classification.
For borders with Russia and Belarus, the parliamentary proposal includes geographical thresholds concerning the length of land or maritime frontiers.
For Romania, the revised approach could extend support to regions connected with Moldova, Ukraine and the Black Sea.
The proposals would also have implications for transport corridors linking Ukraine with the EU, including railways, ports, roads and border-crossing facilities.
Such infrastructure serves both civilian trade and military mobility requirements.
The Commission has already introduced measures intended to support Europe’s eastern regions.
Its February 2026 strategy identified security, economic growth, connectivity, local industries and demographic resilience as principal areas requiring action.
A proposed investment initiative, EastInvest, is intended to facilitate financing through European and national financial institutions, with the potential to mobilise up to €28 billion by the end of 2027.
This would principally involve lending and investment support, rather than direct grants equivalent to the total facility value.
The Commission has also identified approximately €5.6 billion in cohesion funding redirected towards eastern border regions under the current financial framework.
Those reallocations form part of approximately €34.6 billion redirected towards new priorities across participating member states.
Parliament’s latest demands concern the period after 2027 and would operate separately from these existing arrangements.
The proposal places additional pressure on governments negotiating the EU’s next long-term budget.
Agricultural policy, regional development and industrial investment are already competing for funding alongside increased European defence expenditure.
As EU Today reported in its coverage of the agricultural budget negotiations, member states remain divided over the allocation of resources under the next financial framework.
Eastern border governments are likely to argue that infrastructure and economic development in their territories contribute directly to the EU’s wider security.
Other member states may resist dedicated allocations if these require reductions in existing regional development programmes elsewhere.
Parliament has proposed that additional assistance should not come at the expense of support for other less-developed regions.
The negotiations will determine whether that position is financially achievable.
The next stage will involve discussions over the overall EU budget and the individual programmes through which eastern border assistance could be delivered.
For now, Thursday’s vote establishes Parliament’s demand for a larger and more clearly defined financial commitment to Europe’s eastern frontier, without creating an immediate entitlement to additional EU funding.
On Thursday, the European Parliament called on the European Union (EU) to define a timetable to progressively abandon fossil fuels and assume a leading role in the COP31 negotiations, which will be held in November in Turkey.
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The resolution was approved after the 27 member states adopted a common position for the climate summit, in which they recognize that the goal of limiting global warming to 1.5 degrees faces increasing difficulties.
MEPs called for more ambitious action to reduce emissions and avoid further increases in temperature, insisting on the need to accelerate the energy transition.
The text urges the EU to promote an international treaty on the non-proliferation of fossil fuels and to establish concrete timetables to gradually eliminate subsidies and production of oil, gas and coal.
The European Parliament also requested that the EU itself adopt a clear strategy to abandon these energy sources in all sectors of the economy and serve as an international reference.
Ahead of COP31 climate talks in Türkiye, Parliament calls for speeding up the global exit from fossil fuels, increasing climate financing and making it fairer for vulnerable countries, and delivering on adaptation and loss-and-damage pledges.
— European Parliament (@Europarl_EN) October 22, 2026
Learn more➡️ https://t.co/vfWVJhvC8G pic.twitter.com/IaRuSAQ8Om
The parliamentarians stressed that dependence on fossil fuels represents a risk in a context of geopolitical tension and considered that decarbonization strengthens European strategic autonomy.
The resolution warns that Europe is the continent that is warming the fastest, which is why it considers it essential to maintain climate commitments and avoid a setback in environmental policies.
In addition, the European Parliament called for increasing international financing for climate adaptation, compensation for loss and damage, and support for the most vulnerable countries against the effects of climate change.
A delegation of fifteen MEPs will participate in COP31 to champion these priorities, which include strengthening climate finance and promoting greater protection of ecosystems and biodiversity.
From Greece to France: Education Protests Sweep Europe
— teleSUR English (@telesurenglish) October 21, 2026
Thousands of students, teachers, and public-sector workers marched through Athens and across Greece on Wednesday, demanding urgent funding for public education, filling teaching vacancies, and relief from a mounting housing… pic.twitter.com/ti3ovtByO3
teleSUR: JP
Source: EFE
In its latest statement, Parliament condemns Houthi missile and drone attacks against Saudi Arabia and the movement’s military offensive in Yemen. Its demand for a terrorist designation signals pressure for a tougher European response. But the distance between a parliamentary declaration and an effective security policy remains considerable. europarl.europa.eu
The underlying case extends beyond disrupted trade. Civilian seafarers have paid with their lives. EU Today’s reporting on the fatal attack against the True Confidence documented how the maritime campaign crossed a deadly threshold in March 2024. Merchant crews became targets in a conflict over which they had no control. That history gives Parliament’s initiative a compelling human dimension.
Yet a terrorist listing is a specific legal instrument. Parliament’s demand does not itself impose one. Under the EU’s counterterrorism sanctions framework, listing requires an earlier decision by a competent national authority. The Council determines additions to the list, with measures including asset freezes and restrictions on making funds or economic resources available. Political resolve must therefore become a defensible legal case.
If adopted, designation could strengthen pressure on financial intermediaries and commercial networks supporting the movement. Its practical value would depend on identifying assets, tracing transactions and coordinating enforcement across jurisdictions. A designation that changes compliance procedures without materially constraining procurement would deliver less than its advocates expect.
The operational problem is equally demanding. Financial restrictions cannot intercept an incoming missile or accompany a vulnerable tanker. Europe must sustain protection at sea while pursuing disruption ashore through sanctions enforcement, intelligence cooperation and diplomacy.
As Defence Matters examined in its analysis of Operation Aspides reinforcement, additional warships bring requirements for trained crews, weapons, aviation, maintenance and replacement deployments. The mission’s defensive mandate protects civilian shipping, but effective coverage depends on what deployed vessels can sustain. Fleet totals alone offer an incomplete measure of European capacity.
This exposes the strategic imbalance. Attackers can impose uncertainty across a shipping corridor without controlling every mile of it. Defenders must reassure commercial operators repeatedly. Even successful interceptions may leave insurers and shipowners questioning whether the next voyage is worth the risk.
The threat also reaches beyond the immediate approaches to Yemen. EU Global’s coverage of the tanker incident west of Yanbu explained the potential implications for Saudi Arabia’s alternative oil-export route. The Houthis claimed responsibility, while the maritime warning did not identify the attacker. That distinction matters: sound policy requires separating verified incidents from claims designed to amplify a movement’s apparent reach.
For Europe, the implication is broader than naval security. Pressure on shipping and energy infrastructure can transmit regional instability into freight costs, delivery schedules and business confidence. Protecting maritime access is an economic responsibility as well as a defence commitment.
There is also a humanitarian test. Measures intended to constrain Houthi leadership must preserve legitimate assistance to civilians living under its authority. The EU framework already contains humanitarian exceptions allowing specified organisations to undertake necessary transactions. Implementation must give banks and aid agencies sufficient clarity to use them.
Otherwise, excessive caution by intermediaries could obstruct permitted activity. European governments should anticipate that risk through clear guidance and working arrangements with humanitarian organisations, while maintaining scrutiny against diversion.
Parliament has raised the political stakes. Governments now face a more demanding task: combining legal pressure with resources and measurable objectives. Success should mean fewer attacks, safer crews, disrupted support networks and reliable humanitarian access.
A terrorist designation could contribute to those outcomes. Its credibility will ultimately depend on whether Europe can turn a forceful institutional statement into sustained action across finance, diplomacy and the sea.
Announcing the decision in Strasbourg on Thursday, 22 October, European Parliament President Roberta Metsola said the award reflected the European Union’s commitment to multilateralism and international institutions.
Metsola praised the Court for its work in upholding international law and justice. The announcement was met with a standing ovation in the parliamentary chamber.
The decision comes amid an escalating confrontation between the European Union and the administration of US President Donald Trump over the ICC’s jurisdiction and independence.
On 9 October, the United States imposed sanctions on the ICC as an institution, extending measures previously directed against individual judges and prosecutors.
The restrictions place the Court under the US Treasury’s sanctions regime, limiting financial transactions involving American individuals, businesses and institutions. Washington has issued several temporary and limited exemptions intended to allow specified operations to continue.
The measures followed earlier sanctions against senior ICC officials, including Court President Tomoko Akane, and form part of Washington’s campaign to prevent the tribunal from exercising jurisdiction over American personnel.
US Secretary of State Marco Rubio has argued that the ICC threatens American sovereignty by asserting authority over nationals of countries that have not accepted its founding treaty.
The Court rejected the latest restrictions, describing them as an attempt to obstruct the administration of international justice.
Established under the Rome Statute, the ICC operates independently of national governments and investigates serious international crimes where its jurisdictional requirements are satisfied.
Neither the United States nor Israel is a party to the Rome Statute.
The dispute with Washington has intensified since the ICC issued arrest warrants in November 2024 for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former Defence Minister Yoav Gallant over alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity connected with military operations in Gaza.
Israel rejects the Court’s jurisdiction and disputes the allegations. Washington has similarly opposed the proceedings against Israeli officials.
The ICC has also pursued investigations into Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. In March 2023, its judges issued arrest warrants for Russian President Vladimir Putin and Maria Lvova-Belova, Russia’s commissioner for children’s rights, over the alleged unlawful deportation and transfer of Ukrainian children.
Further warrants followed in 2024 against senior Russian military commanders and officials in connection with attacks on Ukraine’s civilian infrastructure.
The proceedings demonstrate the geographical scope of the Court’s investigations, although its ability to secure arrests depends heavily on cooperation from individual states.
The ICC has no independent police force and relies on national authorities to execute its warrants.
The ICC’s nomination for the Sakharov Prize was submitted by the Socialists and Democrats group in the European Parliament.
Its selection comes as European lawmakers examine how the EU should respond to American sanctions affecting the Court and organisations supporting its activities.
The October restrictions have raised practical questions about access to banking, technology services and other infrastructure required by the tribunal.
European governments must also consider how to support an institution established through an international treaty while maintaining relations with Washington.
The Sakharov Prize carries no legal authority to reverse American sanctions or compel governments to cooperate with ICC investigations. Nevertheless, the award represents an explicit institutional endorsement of the tribunal at a time when its operations face increasing external pressure.
The ICC was selected from three finalists announced earlier this month.
The other nominees were Tanzanian opposition leader Tundu Lissu and Iranian sisters Taraneh and Romina Rahimi, whose cases have attracted international attention over political persecution and judicial proceedings.
The Sakharov Prize, established by the European Parliament in 1988, is named after Soviet physicist, dissident and Nobel Peace Prize laureate Andrei Sakharov.
It recognises individuals and organisations defending human rights, freedom of expression and fundamental liberties. The award includes €50,000.
Previous recipients include Nelson Mandela, Malala Yousafzai and imprisoned journalists.
In 2025, the prize was awarded jointly to Belarusian journalist Andrzej Poczobut and Georgian journalist Mzia Amaglobeli.
The formal presentation of the 2026 prize is scheduled for 16 December at the European Parliament in Strasbourg.
The award places the ICC alongside previous Sakharov laureates while drawing further attention to the unresolved dispute between Washington and European governments over international criminal jurisdiction.
The Council of the European Union adopted its negotiating position on Wednesday, 21st October, clearing the way for negotiations with the European Parliament once MEPs establish their position.
The measures form part of the European Commission’s Digital Omnibus package, introduced in November 2025, and represent one of Brussels’ most substantial attempts to simplify the regulatory obligations imposed on businesses operating across the single market.
The proposed reforms would modify several provisions of the GDPR, which has governed the processing of personal data across the EU since May 2018.
Rather than replacing the legislation, the Council wants to clarify existing obligations, particularly those concerning pseudonymised information, requests for access to personal data and the use of information in scientific research.
The agreed position retains the existing definition of personal data while introducing provisions intended to clarify when pseudonymised information can be linked to an identifiable individual.
Companies would also benefit from simplified procedures for handling manifestly unfounded or excessive data requests and from reduced information requirements in certain low-risk circumstances.
Another proposed change would extend the deadline for notifying authorities of personal data breaches, while establishing more consistent reporting templates across the EU.
For multinational companies, which currently navigate different interpretations of data protection obligations by national authorities, these provisions could reduce compliance costs and administrative duplication.
However, the changes have raised concerns among European privacy regulators.
In a joint opinion published in February, the European Data Protection Board and European Data Protection Supervisor warned that parts of the Commission’s original proposal could create legal uncertainty and undermine existing protections.
They were particularly concerned about proposals affecting the definition of personal data and the Commission’s potential role in determining when pseudonymised information falls outside GDPR requirements.
The Council’s decision to retain the existing definition addresses part of that debate, although the final legislative text remains subject to negotiations.
One of the most visible changes would affect the consent notices encountered by Europeans when visiting websites.
Under the Council’s proposal, additional categories of cookies and similar tracking technologies could be used without obtaining explicit consent, provided the relevant legal conditions are satisfied.
The proposed exemptions include technologies necessary to deliver a service, maintain device security or conduct audience measurement.
For website operators, publishers and online businesses, the changes could reduce the number of consent requests displayed to visitors and simplify technical compliance.
The current system has generated extensive legal disputes over whether consent is genuinely voluntary and whether tracking technologies collect information beyond what users have authorised.
EU Today has previously examined the enforcement of these obligations, including a Belgian court ruling concerning the legality of the advertising industry’s consent framework.
The latest proposal would not abolish consent requirements for commercial tracking or behavioural advertising. Technologies falling outside the permitted exemptions would remain subject to the applicable privacy rules.
The package also addresses the growing number of reporting obligations imposed on European businesses under overlapping cybersecurity legislation.
The Commission originally proposed a single European reporting mechanism for certain data and cybersecurity incidents.
Member states have instead agreed to establish national entry points, supported by an EU-level information system and provisions for coordinating cross-border notifications.
The Council’s position would also clarify the legal grounds for certain uses of personal data in artificial intelligence systems and introduce safeguards for processing sensitive information in specified circumstances.
These provisions follow increasingly complicated disputes over the application of European privacy legislation to AI development and automated decision-making.
As EU Today reported in its coverage of a major GDPR enforcement case involving Uber, automated processing already presents substantial compliance risks for companies operating within the bloc.
The Commission estimates that its wider digital simplification initiative could save European businesses up to €5 billion in administrative costs by 2029.
The initiative reflects pressure from European governments and business organisations to reduce the regulatory fragmentation that makes operating across multiple EU jurisdictions more expensive.
The Digital Omnibus is part of a broader legislative programme influenced by the competitiveness reports produced by former Italian prime ministers Enrico Letta and Mario Draghi.
Under the Council’s negotiating mandate, several existing data-related rules would also be consolidated, while provisions governing the protection of trade secrets would be strengthened.
The European Parliament must now determine its negotiating position before formal discussions between the institutions can begin. Until the legislation is agreed and adopted, existing GDPR, cookie consent and cybersecurity requirements remain in force.
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