O envio de milhares de soldados de El Salvador ao Haiti, dias depois do desaparecimento de quatro integrantes salvadorenhos de uma força apoiada pela Organização das Nações Unidas (ONU) durante uma emboscada de gangues, representa o primeiro grande teste internacional das táticas de combate a grupos criminosos do presidente Nayib Bukele.
Cerca de 2 mil soldados salvadorenhos estavam no Haiti na noite de quarta-feira (28), segundo um funcionário da área de segurança ouvido pela Reuters. Duas fontes com conhecimento do assunto disseram que, por enquanto, o contingente será limitado a 2.500 militares. No entanto, as autoridades ainda não esclareceram quem estará no comando das tropas nem quais serão as regras de engajamento, o que alimenta preocupações sobre riscos adicionais para os civis em um país com um longo histórico de intervenções estrangeiras prejudiciais.
Bukele apresentou o deslocamento como uma missão de resgate dos quatro técnicos de aeronaves que integravam a Força de Supressão de Gangues no Haiti, apoiada pela ONU. Eles estão desaparecidos desde que saltaram de um veículo em chamas durante a emboscada em uma área controlada por gangues nos arredores da capital, Porto Príncipe.
Autoridades haitianas e salvadorenhas afirmaram que a principal missão das tropas é resgatar os técnicos desaparecidos. No entanto, a dimensão do contingente — que alcançou em dez dias um número de soldados que a força apoiada pela ONU teve dificuldades para mobilizar ao longo de mais de um ano — levantou questionamentos sobre a possibilidade de os militares integrarem uma operação mais ampla e de longo prazo.
República Dominicana facilita logística a despliegue salvadoreño de más de 2.000 soldados en Haití para rescatar técnicos desaparecidos, mientras crece violencia contra humanitarios en Puerto Príncipe.
El mandatario salvadoreño detalló que el envío de efectivos y equipamiento militar a suelo haitiano se encuentra casi concluido, asegurando categóricamente que la misión no está dirigida contra la población civil.
More than 2,000 Salvadoran troops have been deployed to Haiti after an ambush left four military personnel missing.
El Salvador has deployed more than 2,000 military personnel to Haiti in a mission to recover four soldiers missing since an ambush near Port-au-Prince, with President Nayib Bukele saying the operation could also be used to dismantle the country’s armed gangs.
“If we defeated the gangs here in El Salvador, we can defeat them there,” Bukele told reporters Thursday during an official visit by Peruvian President Keiko Fujimori. He said, however, that El Salvador would withdraw the same day if the four missing military aviation technicians were returned alive.
The Salvadoran Foreign Ministry said Wednesday that the deployment involved more than 2,000 members of the country’s armed forces and was part of a large-scale operation backed by several countries and international organizations.
Pèp ayisyen,
Nou prèske fin deplwaye sòlda nou yo ak ekipman nou yo sou tè Ayiti. Sa a se pa yon operasyon kont pèp ayisyen an, ni yon envazyon peyi Ayiti. Nou pa yon gwo pisans. Nou pa gen okenn enterè ni pou nou vin domine pèp ayisyen an, ni pou nou mete men sou richès Ayiti.… pic.twitter.com/AZ1XvdeJje
Text Reads: Haitian people, We have nearly finished deploying our soldiers and equipment on Haitian soil. This is not an operation against the Haitian people, nor an invasion of the country of Haiti. We are not a great power. We have no interest in coming to dominate the Haitian people, nor in laying hands on Haiti’s wealth. We are a modest country that is developing. The only thing we want is for our four aviation technicians to return home. And we’re giving the gangs a lesson—these gangs that make the Haitian people suffer, that kill people the population loves, that prevent them from living a normal, free life, without fear. It’s almost just us footing the bill for this operation. Even though we receive a bit of logistical help from a few other countries, it’s with our own modest funds that we’re covering 90% of the expenses. It costs us dearly, but we’ve learned from our own suffering: justice and peace have no price. We went through the same suffering that Haiti is going through today. We lived through a nightmare that was even more horrific than what the Haitian people are enduring right now. We know what that means: living in fear, not trusting politicians, not believing anyone who promises to help you. Because no one came to help us, and those who did come didn’t have good intentions in their hearts. But we managed to escape it. After 200 years of suffering, finally we’re living in peace, and today we are the safest country on the continent. We didn’t come to Haiti to make money, because no one is paying us to do it. We came to Haiti to fight against the wicked. But here’s what I’m asking of you: trust us, pray to the one true God, and ask Him to heal Haiti. “If at that time my people, who are called by my name, will humble themselves and pray and seek my face and turn from their wicked ways, then I will hear from heaven, where I am, I will forgive their sin, and I will heal their land.” 2 Chronicles 7:14 Help us help Haiti. And when our mission is finished, we’ll return home. Perhaps the next generation of Haitians will remember us as friends who came to help one day.
Bukele rejected suggestions that the deployment amounted to an invasion, insisting that his government had no intention of occupying Haiti or asserting control over its population. In a post on X earlier Thursday, he said the mission had received authorization at both national and international levels and was focused on rescuing the missing personnel alive.
He also vowed to confront the gangs responsible for their abduction, arguing that Salvadoran forces knew how to deal with criminal organizations of this kind. Bukele described the confrontation as a battle between good and evil, saying his government stood on the side of good.
El Salvador had already been participating in the Gang Suppression Force (GSF), but its involvement in Haiti’s security crisis deepened after an ambush on Oct. 18 on the outskirts of Port-au-Prince. The attack targeted a vehicle carrying four Salvadoran military personnel, who have been missing since the incident.
The Salvadoran contingent includes special forces personnel and represents the largest deployment by a single country in Haiti since the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) ended in 2017. The UN mission operated in the country from 2004 to 2017.
Reports circulated last Saturday that human remains potentially belonging to the four missing personnel had been found. Bukele dismissed those reports.
Bukele has maintained that recovering the four personnel alive is the operation’s primary objective and said their return would prompt the immediate withdrawal of Salvadoran forces.
Haiti has postponed its presidential and legislative elections once again, pushing the first round from December 13 to July 18, 2027, as armed gangs and a decade-long institutional vacuum leave the country with no elected official since 2016.
The move had been expected since the start of the month, when the council extended the deadline for candidate registration to October 31 without setting a new voting date.
The first round of the presidential and legislative elections, together with the constitutional referendum, now falls on July 18, 2027.A second round -including presidential and legislative runoffs and local elections- is scheduled for October 4 of that same year. The campaign, originally due to begin on October 5, will open on April 15, 2027, roughly three months before polling day.
Under the updated schedule, candidate registration will remain open through February 9, 2027, while voter registration is extended to May 20. The council’s online platform shows that nearly 890,000 voters are registered on the electoral roll, far short of the 7.7 million people of voting age.
Despite repeated calendar revisions, candidates have continued to register for the elections. According to the Provisional Electoral Council ’s latest updates, over 7,300 candidates have registered for different elected positions. The provisional list includes 19 candidates for President, 369 for the Senate, 1,293 for the Chamber of Deputies and 5,623 for local elections.
Haïti a de nouvelles dates pour les élections présidentielle, législatives et municipales à venir : 18 juillet 2027 pour le premier tour – 4 octobre 2027 pour le deuxième tour, selon une communiqué du Conseil électoral provisoire. pic.twitter.com/A4raK78ifp
Text reads: “Haiti has new dates for the upcoming presidential, legislative and municipal elections: July 18, 2027 for the first round – October 4, 2027 for the second round, according to a communiqué of the Provisional Electoral Council.”
The Provisional Electoral Council (CEP) framed the decision as an effort to keep the process moving. “The updated calendar aims to facilitate the continuation of electoral operations under conditions that allow the stakeholders concerned to fulfill their obligations in accordance with the provisions of the legal framework,” the council explained in a statement accompanying the new plan.
The body also pledged to move forward “with dialogue, professionalism and rigor,” targeting elections that are inclusive, credible and transparent. It promised to respect “the right of each citizen to participate in the democratic life of the country.”
That language contrasts sharply with conditions on the ground. Haiti has not held an election since 2016, when Jovenel Moïse won the presidency. He took office in February 2017 and was assassinated on July 7, 2021, at his residence in Port-au-Prince.
Since that killing, no elected official has occupied any post in the country’s state structure. Successive transitional governments have cycled through without managing to organize a vote. Prime Minister Alix Didier Fils-Aimé, the current leader, has governed on an interim basis since November 10, 2024.
The elections were first set for August 30 of this year. The political and security crisis, driven by armed gang violence and the failure to restore institutional stability, forced a postponement to December 13. That date has now been abandoned for July 18, 2027.
Gangs Hold the Capital
Armed gangs control most of Port-au-Prince. The main force arrayed against them is the Gang Suppression Force (GSF), created in September 2025 under a UN Security Council mandate and renewed for six additional months when it reached its first anniversary.
The latest delay unfolds as hundreds of Salvadoran soldiers search the Haitian capital for four kidnapped colleagues. Those troops belonged to the GSF and vanished on October 18, when armed gangs ambushed them on the outskirts of Port-au-Prince.
The #GSF confirms that it has received, through a third-party humanitarian organization, remains suspected of being those of the four personnel from the Salvadoran contingent currently missing. At this stage, the GSF is not in a position to confirm that the remains are those of… pic.twitter.com/JvfLg1DfCG
— Gang Suppression Force – Haiti (@GSForceHaiti) October 25, 2026
PM Fils-Aimé presides over a country under siege. He holds no elected mandate himself, and the security conditions that have justified every postponement show no sign of easing.
For Haitians, the wait has now stretched past a decade without a chance to cast a ballot. Each interim administration has promised elections and delivered another delay. The violence cited as the obstacle has, in turn, deepened with every year of institutional drift.
Whether July 2027 becomes a genuine election day depends on factors no schedule can secure: safe streets, working electoral machinery and a minimum of political consensus. As things stand, the only firm date in Haiti is a next postponement.
The foreign ministry of El Salvador said on Wednesday that over 2,000 troops will be dispatched to Haiti to support ongoing U.N. anti-gang operations and rescue four missing Salvadoran aircraft technicians.
Dessinateur hors pair, Ernest Pignon-Ernest pratique, depuis plus d'un demi-siècle le collage in situ — pour troubler les lieux, raviver les mémoires, interroger les consciences. Si son art, qui allie héritage classique et vocation contestataire, a ses racines dans la vieille Europe, entre France et Italie, il s'est aussi déployé en Amérique latine, dans un dialogue fraternel avec les cultures du sous-continent.
Ernest Pignon-Ernest. – « Haïti », Charlemagne Péralte et Jacques Stephen Alexis, Port-au-Prince, 2019
Malgré mon admiration pour Cézanne, il m'arrive de dire que je ne suis pas là pour peindre des pommes. La référence, pour moi, c'est Guernica, depuis que j'ai 12 ans. Un art d'intervention.
Lorsque j'ai tenté de me consacrer à la peinture, au milieu des années 1960, j'ai quitté Nice pour le Vaucluse, un Vaucluse rêvé — Pétrarque, René Char, Pierre Seghers, le Ventoux, une espèce de Toscane. À peine installé, je découvre un cri de révolte artistique : le poème-tract « La Provence point oméga » de Char et un dessin de Picasso dénoncent l'implantation de la force de frappe dans la région. Des silos nucléaires doivent être coulés sur le plateau d'Albion, entre Luberon et Ventoux. D'un côté, la Provence, terre magnifique ; de l'autre, la violence qu'on lui inflige en enkystant cette puissance de mort sous les lavandes.
Dans un premier temps, je pense en faire un thème de peinture. Puis je me rends compte que je ne peux pas, que ce qui se passe là est plus ample. Avec le nucléaire, c'est d'un tournant dans l'histoire de l'humanité qu'il est question : l'homme peut annihiler la vie. Cela appelle un Guernica… Picasso pourrait peut-être, mais pas moi. Je ne peux aborder ce thème au moyen d'un tableau, d'une image autonome, de l'œuvre fermée — celle qu'on met dans une galerie, et qui ne tient pas compte du contexte.
Pour mieux appréhender le danger atomique, cette menace irreprésentable, j'ai beaucoup lu, cherché des documents sur les bombardements de Hiroshima et de Nagasaki. Et j'ai trouvé cette emblématique photographie d'Eiichi Matsumoto qui montre l'ombre, la silhouette d'un passant, littéralement photogravée sur un mur par l'explosion. Persuadé qu'il fallait non plus représenter mais intervenir directement sur le territoire, j'ai, à partir de cette ombre fantôme, élaboré un pochoir que je suis allé imprimer sur les quelques murs, les rochers, les routes qui menaient au plateau d'Albion.
C'est là que se définit, sans que je le sache, ce qui sera désormais mon écriture : me saisir d'un lieu et le travailler en y glissant des images, de la fiction, un élément qui vient en changer l'appréhension, en troubler la lecture. Et révéler la réalité enfouie. Je ne cherche pas à « faire descendre l'art dans la rue », mettre mes œuvres sur les murs pour que tout le monde les voie, comme on l'a parfois dit, et comme l'ont fait certains artistes de ma génération. L'œuvre — si tant est qu'on puisse parler d'œuvre pour ce genre d'intervention — n'est pas mon dessin : c'est le lieu travaillé par l'image que je viens y inscrire. Perturber et modifier un espace en y insérant de la poésie, de l'histoire, de la politique : voilà ce que je tente de faire depuis près de soixante ans. En France, en Italie, en Afrique du Sud, en Palestine. Et aussi, à trois reprises, en Amérique latine.
Le Chili d'Allende, après l'horreur de Prague, ce fut un grand espoir, puis un choc. Peu après le coup d'État de 1973, j'ai lu dans Le Monde que José Balmes, peintre et doyen des beaux-arts à l'université de Santiago, était accueilli par les communistes d'Ivry. Comme beaucoup de réfugiés chiliens, lui et son épouse, Gracia Barrios, étaient arrivés en France sans rien. Il y avait à ce moment-là, à La Ruche, la cité d'artistes où je travaillais à Paris, un atelier vide, qui avait été celui de Chagall. J'ai convaincu les résidents de les recevoir. Et ils sont restés plusieurs années.
On se voyait tout le temps. Un jour, au début des années 1980, Balmes me dit : « Tu sais, les camarades, les artistes qui sont restés au Chili se sentent coupés de tout. On avait un atelier collectif de gravure, à Bella Vista, mais tout s'est arrêté. Peut-être que si tu y allais, ça contribuerait à le relancer… Tu irais ? »
J'ai dit oui et suis parti là-bas, à Santiago, pour aider à réactiver le collectif. Cela a suscité des réunions, des rencontres, créé une petite dynamique. Selon les jours, nous étions trente, quarante ou cinquante. On discutait beaucoup, on dessinait. J'étais invité par les uns et les autres — militants du Mouvement de la gauche révolutionnaire (MIR) ou du Mouvement d'action populaire unitaire (MAPU), communistes, socialistes…
Ernest Pignon-Ernest. – « Pablo Neruda », Santiago du Chili, 1981
Finalement, nous avons cherché à réaliser une image commune. Et la figure de Pablo Neruda s'est imposée. Naturellement. La poétesse est-allemande Eva Strittmatter a écrit : « Les poètes font leur pays. / Et la Grèce, c'est Rítsos qui l'a faite / Et Neruda a fait le Chili » (1). C'est profondément vrai : les grands poètes incarnent leur pays, leur époque, leur peuple. Pasolini concentre et exprime toutes les contradictions de l'Italie du XXe siècle. Maïakovski, toute l'Union soviétique, son génie et son drame. Pour dire le Chili, et en même temps la résistance, je dessine donc Neruda. C'était mon dessin, mais tout le monde a participé à sa conception, à l'impression dans l'atelier. Quand on a tiré les affiches, ce qui sortait était un produit collectif, qui répondait à un besoin partagé. Mon Neruda — notre Neruda — est revêtu d'un grand poncho, il n'est pas en costume. Pour des raisons symboliques, bien sûr, parce qu'il est du côté du peuple d'Amérique. Parce que cela traduit mieux le côté tellurique de cet homme « sorti du roc et de la boue », comme il le dit lui-même. Mais aussi parce qu'on n'était pas certains, alors, de pouvoir coller nos affiches à l'extérieur. On se disait qu'à défaut de placarder le dessin dans les rues on pourrait toujours le distribuer autour de nous, parmi les camarades, dans les associations, et qu'alors les gens s'approprieraient l'image et peindraient dans la grande surface blanche du poncho. C'est ce qui est arrivé : certains ont peint des paysages du Chili, d'autres ont écrit des poèmes…
Ernest Pignon-Ernest. – « Pablo Neruda », Santiago du Chili, 1981
Nous avons malgré tout réussi à coller. Dans les entreprises, grâce à des syndicalistes amis. Et même parfois dans la rue, près de chez Neruda — sans nous faire attraper. Les camarades connaissaient bien les lieux, on faisait très vite. L'un d'entre nous a eu l'idée de plastifier les dessins et leur a fait traverser la ville par le Río Mapocho. L'image de don Pablo a ainsi parcouru la ville en flottant sur l'eau. D'autres sont allés déposer le dessin dans des champs labourés. Avec nos maigres moyens, nous avons essayé de le rendre à nouveau présent. Lui, et la résistance qu'il incarnait.
Un jour, les amis de l'atelier m'ont dit : « Ernest, on ne peut pas faire ça sans le montrer à Matilde. » « Pancho » Brugnoli, le chef, m'emmène alors chez Matilde Urrutia, la veuve du poète. Il sonne, elle ouvre. Brugnoli dit : « Matilde, c'est notre camarade français. » Il disparaît aussitôt et me laisse seul avec elle. Je me retrouve dans la maison, dans une grande pièce, où je déroule mon dessin. Matilde Neruda est au bout, elle regarde attentivement, et pendant longtemps ne dit rien. Je suis impressionné, mal à l'aise. Puis elle laisse tomber : « Pablo n'était jamais comme ça. » En français. « Vous savez, il riait toujours. Même quand on nous a expulsés de France, il a gardé le sourire, il a dit : “Champagne pour tout le monde !” Et là, vous l'avez fait si grave… » Puis elle se reprend : « Grave et résolu ». Elle m'embrasse. « Bien sûr. Maintenant, il y a le fascisme. »
Un matin d'avril 1980, les services diplomatiques cubains à Paris m'appellent. On m'invite. Je ne comprends pas immédiatement ce qu'ils veulent. Est-ce à l'ambassade que je dois me rendre ? Non, non, à Cuba même. Alejo Carpentier, l'écrivain cubain, attaché culturel à l'ambassade, vient de mourir. Son corps va être rapatrié ; je suis convié à ses funérailles ; on tient à ce que je fasse le voyage. Surprise. Je n'avais aucun lien personnel avec Cuba ni avec Carpentier. Même si je l'avais lu et admirais ses livres, je n'aurais jamais osé l'approcher. J'accepte. Me voici dans l'avion avec Régis Debray (aujourd'hui un ami proche, mais que je rencontre alors pour la première fois), les poètes René Depestre et Max-Pol Fouchet, le traducteur Claude Couffon, les journalistes Ignacio Ramonet et Ramón Chao, d'autres encore… La veuve de Carpentier, Lilia Esteban Hierro, demande : « Qui est Ernest ? » Son mari, m'explique-t-elle, avait tellement aimé mon exposition au Musée d'art moderne en 1979 qu'elle a tenu à ce que je sois présent à la cérémonie.
Je me suis souvent demandé ce qui, dans mon travail, avait pu retenir l'attention de ce grand écrivain. Je suppose que c'est cette sorte d'intertextualité que je tente de pratiquer avec mes images. Chez moi, comme chez lui, le temps et la distance n'existent pas, en tout cas ne séparent pas ; le passé rencontre le présent ; des images et des citations anciennes sont réemployées pour en fabriquer de nouvelles ; une culture se glisse dans une autre… C'est le principe même de Concert baroque (1974), ce court récit de Carpentier, saturé de références, où un seigneur mexicain du XVIIIe siècle et son serviteur noir traversent l'Atlantique, rejoignent Venise, prennent part au carnaval, rencontrent Vivaldi, Haendel et Scarlatti, leur font connaître l'histoire de l'empereur aztèque Moctezuma. Au petit matin, après une nuit de bamboche, le groupe va prendre son petit déjeuner près de la tombe de Stravinsky. Et, à la fin du livre, le serviteur, Filomeno, assiste à un concert de Louis Armstrong, où résonnent les échos de l'Ancien Testament. Les barrières temporelles sont abolies, les cultures se mêlent, la frontière entre le réel et l'imaginaire se brouille. Le livre de Carpentier est habité par les œuvres antérieures, truffé d'intertextualité et d'anachronismes. Comme le sont mes dessins.
Ernest Pignon-Ernest. — Détail de « Concert baroque », La Havane, 2024 : Robert Desnos et Alejo Carpentier
J'assiste donc aux obsèques. Je monte même symboliquement la garde autour du cercueil, au pied du mémorial José-Martí. Un immense cortège, à la fois solennel et désordonné, accompagne la dépouille de la place de la Révolution au cimetière. À la fin de la cérémonie, le ministre de la culture nous dit : « Dans quelques jours, c'est le 1er mai. Fidel vous invite à rester. » Je profite de l'occasion. Dans l'intervalle, je découvre La Havane avec le poète Nicolás Guillén. Quotidiennement, je retrouve Claude Couffon pour le petit déjeuner. Un matin, je le vois causer avec un autre type et me glisse dans la conversation. Au fil de la discussion, je comprends qu'il s'agit de Gabriel García Márquez. Stupeur. Pour moi, c'est comme si je me trouvais à côté de Victor Hugo.
Le 1er mai arrive. Foule énorme, air de fête, portrait géant du Che. Je crois me souvenir que la délégation chinoise se lève et s'en va pendant le discours de Fidel Castro. À un certain moment, Fidel descend, vient chercher Guillén, qui est près de moi, lui demande de lire ses poèmes devant la foule. Guillén se lève, monte à la tribune. Était-ce prémédité ? Peut-être. Sur le moment, en tout cas, cela paraissait spontané. J'ai vu un grand poète réciter ses vers devant un auditoire de plusieurs centaines de milliers de personnes.
À mon retour à Paris, je rencontre le musicien Bernard Lubat, qui me propose d'intervenir au festival d'Uzeste. Je décide de m'inspirer de Concert baroque pour ma contribution. Sur les murs du village, je colle des médaillons, comme des fenêtres, où apparaissent des musiciens. Ceux du livre, et bien d'autres, de Berlioz à Jimi Hendrix, en passant par Ravel ou Billie Holiday…
Les années passent, mais Cuba continue de compter, de nous préoccuper. Donald Trump arrive à la Maison Blanche, on sent bien que quelque chose pourrait finir. Avec un groupe d'amis, nous imaginons une création collective — images, musique, conférences — à destination de l'île. Pour ma part, je propose au Musée national des beaux-arts de La Havane une exposition d'estampes, qui ne nécessite pas de gros moyens. La valise diplomatique assure le transport. L'exposition a lieu. Le directeur de la Biennale de La Havane me dit : « Pourquoi venir, exposer au musée et ne rien faire dans la rue ? » Comment répondre à l'invite ? Je travaille dans le temps long, j'aurais besoin de mois, d'années peut-être, pour m'inscrire vraiment dans ces lieux et dans cette histoire. Dans le délai imparti, impossible d'oser envisager une image qui « dirait Cuba ». En outre, je veux éviter l'héroïsation politique. Je ne veux pas faire d'images plus grandes que nature — qui pour moi évoquent toujours la publicité, ou la propagande. Je ne veux pas d'images éternelles, indestructibles, mais des images vulnérables.
La solution qui s'offrait à moi, qui pour moi avait du sens, c'était de suivre et d'approfondir la piste Carpentier, ouverte des années plus tôt. J'avais relu Concert baroque, je pensais l'avoir mieux compris. Je l'avais dans mon magasin mental.
Je choisis le lieu, un mur de la bibliothèque Rubén-Martínez-Villena — un écrivain et militant communiste emprisonné dans les années 1920, en même temps que Carpentier. La grande façade est percée de fenêtres occultées. J'y représente, réunis au balcon, les musiciens de Concert baroque et, tout près d'eux, le romancier lui-même. Poussant plus loin l'interculturalité pratiquée par Carpentier, j'ajoute d'autres figures. Parmi elles : Nicolás Guillén, mon guide cubain ; Desnos, qui m'est si cher, et dont on ignore souvent qu'il a permis à Carpentier, menacé par le régime de Gerardo Machado en 1928, de quitter Cuba pour Paris en lui prêtant ses papiers d'identité ; Joseíto Fernández, le compositeur de Guantanamera ; Bob Marley, autre Caribéen universel.
Je me disais que, sur ce vaste mur, l'image pourrait être prolongée par des artistes cubains de street art. Que peut-être, même, ils mettraient un coup de couleur sur mes bonshommes noir et blanc. Force est de constater que ça n'a pas eu lieu. Si l'œuvre comporte une interrogation, c'est celle-là.
Ernest Pignon-Ernest. – « Haïti », Port-au-Prince, 2019
Dans Concert baroque, Carpentier fait dire à l'un de ses personnages : « Il est nécessaire parfois de prendre ses distances, de mettre entre les choses et soi un océan. » Au début des années 2010, après avoir beaucoup travaillé en France et en Italie, j'ai passé l'océan, pour participer au festival Étonnants Voyageurs, qui se déroulait à Port-au-Prince. Des relations se sont nouées. Lyonel Trouillot m'a fait connaître l'île. C'est lui qui m'a fait découvrir le destin et l'œuvre de Jacques Stephen Alexis.
Fils d'un diplomate, formé comme neurologue à Paris, auteur d'un magnifique roman, Compère général soleil (Gallimard, 1955) — qui fut immédiatement salué et pressenti pour le Goncourt —, ami des grands écrivains de son temps, Alexis aurait pu se contenter de mener une confortable carrière de médecin et d'homme de lettres. Mais — comme avant lui Jacques Roumain, auteur de Gouverneurs de la rosée et fondateur du Parti communiste haïtien — il s'investit dans le mouvement communiste international, crée un parti en Haïti, défie François Duvalier, rencontre Ho Chi Minh, Mao et Che Guevara. Et, pour finir, échafaude un projet de guérilla visant à renverser « Papa Doc » (Duvalier). Inspiré par l'exemple cubain, il débarque une nuit d'avril 1961 sur une plage du nord-ouest de l'île, près de Bombardopolis, avec quelques camarades. Des tueurs l'attendaient. On ne sait pas exactement quel a été son sort. Son corps a disparu. Duvalier n'a jamais revendiqué son exécution. Le tyran n'était pas prêt à affronter le « fracas que fait un poète qu'on tue »…
Ernest Pignon-Ernest. – Étude pour un portrait de Jacques Stephen Alexis, 2019
J'admire l'écriture d'Alexis, j'admire son parcours. J'aime ses vœux, publiés début 1957 dans Les Lettres françaises. « Latino-américain et haïtien jusqu'à la moelle des os », « fils de l'Afrique », « héritier de la Caraïbe et de l'Indien- Américain à cause d'un secret cheminement du sang et de la longue survie des cultures », et en même temps héritier « de la vieille Europe, de l'Espagne, et de la France », il célèbre la « merveille humaine ». « L'humanisme, écrit Alexis, ne se développe pas tout seul, c'est nous qui le faisons avancer. »
Jacques Stephen Alexis est la première figure haïtienne sur laquelle je travaille, la première que je fais réapparaître sur les murs de Port-au-Prince, en 2019. Parce qu'il représente la résistance toujours relancée d'un pays toujours opprimé, terrorisé, tyrannisé. Je dessine aussi d'autres martyrs. Comme Anacaona, « fleur d'or », princesse taïno, poétesse et musicienne, pendue par les envahisseurs espagnols au début du XVIe siècle. Ou Charlemagne Péralte, meneur du mouvement Cacos, qui luttait contre l'occupation américaine et fut assassiné par les marines en 1919. Son cadavre, revêtu d'un simple pagne, fut attaché à une porte et photographié. Le cliché a largement circulé. Devant cette image, on pense immanquablement à la dépouille de Guevara, au Christ de Mantegna, à la crucifixion.
Ernest Pignon-Ernest. – « Anacaona/Assomption, Haïti », Port-au-Prince, 2020
Je m'intéresse aussi au vaudou, sur lequel les envahisseurs se sont longtemps cassé les dents. Jacques Stephen Alexis ne méprisait pas le vaudou. « C'est une grande et belle chose pour un peuple que de conserver vivantes ses légendes », disait-il. Il savait que le merveilleux est l'« imagerie dont le peuple enveloppe son expérience », qu'il y « reflète son espérance ». Je mélange croix catholiques et croix issues de rituels vaudous. La cathédrale de Port-au-Prince est là, immense, ravagée par le tremblement de terre, désertée. C'est une métaphore extraordinaire. J'y installe mes collages, aidé par deux Haïtiens : l'un chrétien, l'autre adepte du vaudou.
Vient un jour où Lyonel Trouillot me met en garde. Il est devenu trop dangereux de coller dans les rues. Je quitte Haïti. En compensation, en attendant, je dessine sur des photographies prises là-bas, pour préparer de futures interventions. Le projet est interrompu. Jusqu'à quand ?
Deux expositions
Le Musée Ziem de Martigues propose une ample rétrospective couvrant l'ensemble de l'œuvre d'Ernest Pignon-Ernest, depuis ses peintures réalisées dans l'Algérie en guerre (1962) jusqu'à ses collages à Haïti (2019). Un large choix de photographies, de sérigraphies et de dessins originaux permet de (re)découvrir ses grandes séries et ses principales interventions, et témoigne de son compagnonnage ininterrompu avec les poètes.
Une seconde exposition, à l'Inguimbertine de Carpentras, présente le travail au long cours effectué par Pignon-Ernest à Naples entre 1988 et 2015.
Les deux expositions, qui ont connu un fort succès public, sont prolongées jusqu'au 31 décembre 2026.
San Salvador, 29 oct (Prensa Latina) El presidente de El Salvador, Nayib Bukele, y el primer ministro haitiano, Alix Didier Fils-Aimé, sostuvieron una conversación telefónica sobre la operación para rescatar a cuatro militares salvadoreños, informó hoy el Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores.
Prosecutors charged a former Walmart employee from Haiti with murder after he allegedly waited outside a Pennsylvania store and shot his estranged wife as she left work.
President Nayib Bukele has ordered a troop deployment to Haiti after the disappearance last Sunday of four Salvadoran soldiers in an area controlled by gangs in Port-au-Prince. As of Friday, at least six aircraft — three Salvadoran and three American — have landed in the Haitian capital with around 100 elite members of the international Gang Suppression Force (GSF) coalition, to carry out search-and-rescue operations.
Haiti Gang Violence Leaves 4 Salvadoran Soldiers Missing
Haiti gang violence has escalated after four Salvadoran soldiers serving with the United Nations-backed Gang Suppression Force, known as the GSF, disappeared following an ambush near Port-au-Prince.
The four men are aviation technicians, not combat troops. They were supporting medical evacuation operations for the international mission.
The soldiers went missing on Sunday, October 18, after armed groups attacked their armored vehicle in the Santo area of Croix-des-Bouquets, northeast of the capital.
According to officials, attackers fired hundreds of rounds and used explosives against the vehicle. The vehicle caught fire, but the four Salvadorans managed to escape.
Contact with the men was lost shortly afterward. Authorities believe they survived the attack and were kidnapped by gangs operating in the area.
El Salvador’s President Nayib Bukele announced on Wednesday, October 21, that his government had launched a military operation to rescue the four men.
He demanded that Haitian gangs release the soldiers “alive and unharmed” and warned of a stronger response if they were not freed.
The Gang Suppression Force confirmed that a new Salvadoran contingent arrived in Port-au-Prince on Thursday to support search and security operations.
The mission said its personnel were operating in close coordination with the Haitian National Police and other partners in the Plaine du Cul-de-Sac area.
The incident is the first major attack against the GSF since the mission began operations in Haiti in April 2026.
The disappearance of the Salvadoran soldiers comes amid a sharp deterioration in Haiti gang violence across the country.
The United Nations reported that 1,123 people were killed and 440 injured between July 15 and October 12 in incidents linked to armed groups.
The UN said security operations accounted for 52 percent of those killed or injured, or 808 people. Among them were 148 people with no links to gangs.
The figures show that civilians continue to pay a heavy price in the conflict between armed groups and security forces.
Gang violence is no longer concentrated only in Port-au-Prince. Armed groups are expanding their attacks into rural areas, worsening displacement and complicating preparations for elections.
The UN warned that the spread of violence into the countryside could deepen the humanitarian emergency and make it harder for authorities to restore basic services.
Haiti has not held national elections since 2016. The country has been governed through a political transition since the assassination of President Jovenel Moïse in July 2021.
Presidential and legislative elections had been scheduled for December 13, 2026. However, the Provisional Electoral Council postponed the vote without setting a new date.
The postponement has prolonged political uncertainty and raised questions about who will govern Haiti after the current transition.
Former President Michel Martelly, who led Haiti from 2011 to 2016, formally registered his presidential candidacy on Friday, October 23.
Martelly is running under the Debloke coalition. His candidacy remains subject to validation by the Provisional Electoral Council.
He has been sanctioned by the United States and the European Union over alleged links to drug trafficking and armed groups. Martelly has denied the allegations.
His registration adds another layer of uncertainty to elections that were already postponed and questioned amid rising violence.
Haiti Gang Violence Deepens Humanitarian Emergency
The humanitarian impact of Haiti gang violence is becoming increasingly severe.
The United Nations estimates that nearly 1.5 million people have fled their homes, including more than 740,000 children.
The displacement represents approximately one-quarter of Haiti’s population and has overwhelmed shelters, health centers and local communities.
The UN says the Haitian economy is expected to contract for the seventh consecutive year.
The country’s 2026 humanitarian response plan requires $880.3 million. As of October 16, it had received only 49.1 percent of the needed funding.
The UN estimates that 6.4 million people need urgent humanitarian assistance.
The funding gap has limited access to food, clean water, medical care, shelter and protection services for displaced families.
The Gang Suppression Force remains understaffed. The mission had 1,563 personnel as of October 12, far below the 5,500 authorized by the UN Security Council.
The Security Council extended the GSF’s mandate until March 31, 2027.
The mission was created to support the Haitian National Police in restoring security and dismantling criminal networks.
However, the kidnapping of the Salvadoran soldiers has exposed the risks facing international personnel and the difficulty of operating in gang-controlled territory.
Search operations in the Plaine du Cul-de-Sac have included air support and coordination with Haitian police units.
The GSF reported that the operations have left at least seven suspected gang members dead and four mission personnel injured.
Haiti’s government said the release of the abducted soldiers is an “absolute priority” and that all necessary resources are being mobilized.
The government held a meeting at the prime minister’s office to assess the interventions and determine measures to strengthen operations.
El Salvador has responded to the crisis by deploying additional troops to Haiti.
The Associated Press reported that 100 Salvadoran special forces soldiers arrived on Thursday, with another 100 expected later that day.
A security source cited by AFP said about 200 Salvadoran soldiers arrived in Port-au-Prince between Thursday and Friday.
Reports also indicated that at least six aircraft—three Salvadoran and three US—landed in the Haitian capital carrying elite personnel.
El Salvador already had approximately 450 military personnel in Haiti before the latest deployment, according to Haitian media.
Bukele has combined military pressure with public warnings directed at Haitian gang leaders.
He described the gangs as “satanic” and said that “God will grant us victory.”
The Salvadoran president also said that the four missing men were not combatants but aviation technicians whose role was to carry out medical evacuations and save lives.
According to The Wall Street Journal, the Bukele government is seeking to open a discreet channel of contact with Haitian gangs to negotiate the soldiers’ release before ordering a broader military response.
The reported approach reflects the difficulty of conducting rescue operations in areas where armed groups maintain strong territorial control.
The incident has also become a test of Bukele’s foreign and security policy.
El Salvador has built its international reputation around its hard-line anti-gang strategy at home, which began with a state of exception declared in 2022.
The Salvadoran Legislative Assembly recently approved the 56th extension of that emergency regime.
The government says the measure has allowed it to dismantle gangs and restore public safety.
Human rights organizations, including Socorro Jurídico, have raised concerns about due process, arbitrary detention and deaths in state custody.
The organization says at least 30,000 detainees are innocent and that more than 500 people have died in custody.
Bukele has rejected those claims and defended the policy as necessary to confront criminal organizations.
Geopolitical Context
The crisis surrounding the missing Salvadoran soldiers has implications for regional security and the future of international intervention in Haiti.
Haiti’s collapse has become one of the most serious security and humanitarian crises in the Americas.
Armed groups control large parts of Port-au-Prince and have expanded their influence into rural areas, weakening the state’s capacity to govern.
The Gang Suppression Force was created by the UN Security Council to support Haitian police, but its limited deployment has restricted its impact.
The kidnapping of foreign personnel could prompt a review of the mission’s security protocols and accelerate the deployment of additional troops.
It could also increase pressure on countries contributing personnel to expand their participation in the mission.
El Salvador’s growing role in Haiti reflects a broader shift in regional security politics. Bukele has positioned himself as a regional reference in the fight against gangs, despite criticism from human rights organizations.
The crisis could strengthen that role, but it also exposes El Salvador to the risks of a prolonged military commitment abroad.
For the United States, Haiti remains a strategic concern because of its proximity, migration pressures and the risk that instability could spread across the Caribbean.
The US has supported the international mission and has been involved in efforts to strengthen Haitian police capacity.
The postponement of elections adds another layer of instability. Without a clear political transition, armed groups may continue to fill the vacuum left by weak state institutions.
The immediate priority remains the rescue of the four Salvadoran soldiers. But the incident underscores a larger challenge: Haiti needs security, humanitarian aid and a credible political process at the same time.
The view from the cockpit of a helicopter flown by members of the Salvadoran contingent of the Gang Suppression Force during an aerial patrol last month over Port-au-Prince, Haiti.
International diplomats maintain that the GSF mission objectives will continue in Haiti even though international forces confront mounting casualties and kidnappings.
On October 18, 2026, an explosive ambush in Croix-des-Bouquets, Haiti, targeted an armored vehicle with four Salvadoran Air Force aviation technicians attached to the UN-backed Gang Suppression Force.
Forced to evacuate after their vehicle caught fire, the four support personnel were kidnapped by Haitian armed groups operating near the capital.
In response, Salvadoran President Nayib Bukele announced a military rescue operation led by Task Force Libertad II, threatening an expanded offensive against Haitian gangs if the hostages are not safely returned.
In addition, the government of Haiti stated that it will work in conjunction with the United Nations Gang Suppression Force (GSF) mission to rescue the kidnapped Salvadorans.
While the Haitian government and international bodies coordinate security protocols, Bukele’s unilateral escalation in a foreign country projects his signature “iron-fist” stance against gangs onto the international stage, all with the backing of the United States.
The UN Security Council established the “Gang Suppression Force” that operates in Haiti. Created in October 2023 as the Multinational Security Support Mission following the Haitian government, the international force was reorganized in October 2025 into the Gang Suppression Force.
As of October 2026, the authorized strength of the Gang Suppression Force stands at 5,550 personnel, though deployed uniformed troops numbered 1,563 as of mid-October.
The Gang Suppression Force mandate focuses on assisting the Haitian National Police, protecting critical infrastructure, and restoring order across urban centers controlled by armed coalitions.
The region where the October 18 ambush took place, Croix-des-Bouquets, is controlled by several prominent armed groups. Security evaluations list the Chèn Méchan, Kraze Barye, and 400 Mawozo groups among the primary organizations holding territorial control over the corridor connecting Port-au-Prince to the Dominican border.
Key leaders of these groups, including Vitelhomme Innocent of Kraze Barye and Lanmo Sanjou of 400 Mawozo, are subject to active sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council and the U.S. government.
Data released by the UN indicates that between January and mid-September 2026, Haitian gang-related violence resulted in more than 5,700 deaths and injuries, alongside more than 230 reported kidnappings. Over 1.5 million residents remain internally displaced due to gang territorial expansion.
Foreign workers, international humanitarian staff, and local civilians have consistently been targeted for kidnapping as Haitian criminal groups use hostages for financial leverage or political concessions.
President Bukele addressed the Haitian gang leaders directly, publishing a message written in Haitian Creole on October 21, 2026. Bukele stated that the four technicians were non-combatant technical personnel and warned that current operations were minor compared to potential future actions.
Addressing the gang leadership, Bukele wrote: “We have already finished with the gangs in El Salvador, and we can finish with you too. Return our four compatriots alive and unharmed, and everything will return to how it was before the kidnapping. The decision is in your hands”.
Reactions from official international bodies followed the announcement of the rescue campaign. At a meeting of the UN Security Council, Mike Waltz, the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, condemned the ambush and affirmed that international search efforts would continue.
Waltz stated that attacks on international contingents would not compel the Gang Suppression Force to withdraw from its mandate. Simultaneously, Salvadoran Ambassador to the UN Egriselda López formally requested international coordination to secure the location and release of the four kidnapped personnel.
The Haitian government also issued an official response regarding the crisis. In an executive statement, Haitian Prime Minister Alix Didier Fils-Aimé announced that securing the release of the four Salvadoran technicians was an absolute priority for the national administration.
Haiti: According to a statement issued on October 18 by El Salvador’s Armed Forces (@FUERZARMADASV), four Salvadoran aviation technicians from Task Force Libertad II were ambushed by armed gangs while returning to their camp in an armored vehicle. The vehicle was set on fire, but… pic.twitter.com/2R2TCCpkJP
The diplomatic and institutional responses to the kidnapping of the four Salvadoran technicians highlight the complex interactions between national military initiatives and international peacekeeping frameworks.
At the institutional level, the United Nations operates under structured protocols regarding force security and hostage negotiation. Officials within the UN framework maintain that search and rescue operations must adhere to rules of engagement established for the Gang Suppression Force to prevent operational conflict among contributing member states.
The Haitian government under Prime Minister Alix Didier Fils-Aimé has aligned its public stance with the international mission, declaring the recovery of the personnel a primary national objective.
However, the administrative capacity of the Haitian state remains restricted, as law enforcement agencies depend on foreign logistical, intelligence, and tactical support to operate within gang-controlled corridors like Croix-des-Bouquets.
Diplomatic representatives from key UN Security Council member states, including United States, have reinforced support for the mission while addressing the threats posed by armed groups. Statements issued during Security Council proceedings reaffirmed that attacks against international contingents will not alter the mandate or compel the withdrawal of the Gang Suppression Force.
To the gang bosses terrorizing Haiti, your days of operating with impunity are numbered. The Gang Suppression Force is coming for you. pic.twitter.com/lkkfJLmiO6
The armored vehicle transporting four aviation technicians from the Salvadoran Air Force was ambushed in Croix-des-Bouquets, a commune located near Port-au-Prince, the capital of Haiti. Following the explosion, the four Salvadoran technicians were forced to evacuate the vehicle and were subsequently kidnapped.
Initial search and rescue efforts of the four Salvadorans faced immediate armed resistance. On October 19, a search helicopter dispatched to locate the personnel was targeted by gunfire.
Subsequent joint counter-offensives conducted by the multinational security contingent and the Haitian National Police in the Plaine du Cul-de-Sac area resulted in severe clashes, leaving several gang members dead and four multinational security personnel injured.
El Salvador deployed the missing personnel to Haiti as part of its specialized military contingent, known as Task Force Libertad II. El Salvador’s initial military involvement in Haiti began after the Salvadoran Legislative Assembly passed a decree on October 30, 2024.
That measure authorized the deployment of Salvadoran Air Force personnel, including pilots, air mechanics, and medical evacuation units, to support international security operations.
In early 2025, eight aviation technicians arrived in Haiti, followed by an additional 70 military personnel. On September 29, 2026, the Salvadoran Legislative Assembly voted to extend the military deployment through October 2027 and expanded the mandate.
The updated legislative mandate lets Salvadoran troops engage beyond medical evacuations, allowing them to deploy personnel based on operational requirements dictated by security needs in the field.
Task Force Libertad II operates under these expanded terms, providing technical aviation logistics, air support maintenance, and operational security inside the country.
The four Salvadoran kidnapped were serving as non-combatant aviation support specialists within Task Force Libertad II. Following days of uncertainty regarding their status, Salvadoran President Nayib Bukele made a public statement on October 21, 2026, confirming that the kidnapping was executed by armed gangs from Haiti.
El Salvador prez announces MILITARY OP to rescue hostages kidnapped by gangs in Haiti
Aviation technicians 'kidnapped in a cowardly manner' — Bukele
'Today's attack is NOTHING compared to what is coming if we do not get all 4 hostages back alive' pic.twitter.com/7WkyhLvuoQ
President Nayib Bukele’s public declaration led El Salvador to escalate its physical military presence in Haiti. On October 22, 2026, the Salvadoran government deployed 100 special forces soldiers to Port-au-Prince to assist in locating and securing the release of the four missing aviation technicians.
This deployment brought additional tactical ground units to support the existing aviation support unit attached to Task Force Libertad II.
Before October 2026, the Salvadoran contingent operated primarily as an air support unit focused on logistics, maintenance, and medical evacuations. The introduction of dedicated special operations personnel expands the operational parameters of the mission, introducing direct combat and search-and-recovery capabilities alongside the Gang Suppression Force and the Haitian National Police.
The deployment of specialized personnel aims to mitigate these conditions through targeted intelligence collection and rapid-response capabilities.
Structural Security Challenges
While the deployment of specialized tactical units and the escalated military posture by El Salvador aim to address the immediate security emergency, long-term stabilization in Haiti depends on addressing broader structural issues.
The proliferation of heavy weaponry, sustained by international trafficking routes, continues to provide armed groups with substantial tactical capacity within urban sectors.
Furthermore, long-standing economic instability, institutional fragmentation, and high rates of poverty create conditions that enable armed organizations to maintain territorial influence despite international security deployments.
Military rescue missions and tactical escalations provide targeted responses to specific security threats, such as the kidnapping of Task Force Libertad II personnel.
However, international observers and analysts emphasize that sustainable security across Port-au-Prince and surrounding communes requires comprehensive institutional reform, economic development, and consistent administrative governance alongside law enforcement actions.
Salvadoran President Nayib Bukele has launched a military rescue operation in Haiti following the abduction of four Salvadoran soldiers by local armed groups. In a stern statement on Wednesday, Bukele demanded the immediate, safe release of the personnel and warned of a severe… pic.twitter.com/QIQS18JGso
Sources: TeleSUR – Al Jazeera – DW – BBC – CNN – La Prensa Gráfica – elsalvador.com – EFE – El Diario de Hoy – RSF – El Faro – presidencia.gov.sv – Asociación de Periodistas de El Salvador – Dialnet – Resumen Latinoamericano.
It was Saturday night and Jean, a Haitian who arrived in the United States nearly 20 years ago, had left his job in Broward, north of Miami, hours earlier. But he never made it home. He wasn’t answering his phone and the location of his AirPods remained in the same place. Around 1 a.m., his doctor—also a family friend—went out to look for him and found the car unattended in a parking lot. At that point, Jean himself called and said he had been detained by immigration and was at a Border Patrol station in Dania Beach.
In late August, President Donald Trump's administration carried out its first deportation flight to Haiti since the Supreme Court allowed it to end temporary protected status (TPS) for the embattled country in June. "There are no extraordinary and temporary conditions in Haiti that prevent Haitian nationals…from returning in safety," the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) claimed in its TPS revocation, describing a country the State Department warns Americans not to visit "for any reason."
The Trump administration has eroded America's humanitarian avenues, including TPS, which shields migrants from deportation. As a result, many noncitizens may become undocumented and could be forced to return to unsafe places.
The DHS secretary may grant TPS for countries facing armed conflicts, natural disasters, or other disruptive events. TPS designations last anywhere from six to 18 months and may be extended. The government has designated 29 countries for TPS since Congress established the status in 1990, offering protection to Salvadorans fleeing a 12-year civil war, Haitians fleeing the 2010 earthquake, and millions of others. The Biden administration repeatedly made and extended TPS designations, but the Trump administration has been working to terminate them.
There were 1.3 million people living in the U.S. under TPS in March 2025, according to the Pew Research Center. By August 2026, the Trump administration had ended TPS for 13 countries, leaving 1 million people without its protections. Once someone loses TPS, he reverts to his previous immigration status, which is often undocumented. Over 600,000 Venezuelans, 330,000 Haitians, 170,000 Salvadorans, and 100,000 Ukrainians had TPS protections as of March 2025, according to the Congressional Research Service.
Critics often point out that TPS isn't really "temporary." That's frequently true: Although some designations have been brief, others have been decades-long. Designations for Haiti, Syria, Honduras, Nepal, Somalia, and El Salvador have all lasted at least 14 years, according to the Migration Policy Institute (MPI).
This says more about the U.S. immigration system and presidential power than it does about TPS. "In the absence of Congress acting to legalize what has become a long-settled unauthorized immigrant population, Republican and Democratic administrations, lawmakers, immigrants, and foreign governments had come to tacitly rely on TPS despite its nominally temporary nature," notes the MPI. Immigration policy is increasingly subject to presidential whims, and due to lengthy processing times and narrow qualifications, more durable immigration pathways such as asylum and refugee status are often inaccessible to eventual TPS beneficiaries. An immigrant-friendly president may use TPS designations to temporarily shield noncitizen populations, but an anti-immigrant successor can also revoke those protections. In either scenario, a TPS holder faces uncertainty.
In a rare bipartisan immigration effort last February, Reps. Laura Gillen (D–N.Y.) and Mike Lawler (R–N.Y.) introduced a bill to extend TPS for Haiti for three years. It passed the House this April and has been languishing in the Senate since. Its future, too, is uncertain.
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