Russia has started installing magnetometers in the tails or tail fins of its Geran attack drones, Vladyslav Vlasiuk, the Ukrainian president’s commissioner for sanctions policy, said on Facebook on 28 October.

Russia uses its Shahed-Geran series drones in massive daily attacks on Ukraine. Ukrainian forces jam Gerans’ satellite navigation to push them off course, and Russia keeps hardening the drones against it, already fitting them with adaptive antennas. The magnetometer appears designed to go further, giving the drone a heading that doesn’t depend on satellites at all. Earlier this month, Ukrainian military intelligence reported a US-made magnetometer in the upgraded Geran-4.

A new jamming device, and Western parts at the core

Vlasiuk posted photos from a site where Ukraine studies Russian weapons and their components. He said he takes the findings for Ukraine’s sanctions work. He did not say which Geran models carry the magnetometer.

At the same time, Ukraine is studying how a new jamming device works. Vlasiuk did not say where it was found or what it targets.

“Western electronics are at the core everywhere,” Vlasiuk wrote.

Geran-4 already flew with a US-made sensor

On 5 October, Ukraine’s Defense Intelligence (HUR) said the upgraded Geran-4 carries a new “MOKh” unit built around a PNI5GA magnetometer made by US firm PNI Sensor. The unit works with the SADRA inertial navigation module to cut gyroscope drift and make the drone’s autonomous navigation more accurate.

HUR said Russia also added an electro-optical navigation system called Susanin to the upgraded Geran-4. It compares camera images with a reference image stored in memory to keep the drone on its route to the target. The new K5 version of the Geran-5 uses a similar system.

Presidential adviser Serhii “Flash” Beskrestnov warned on 28 October that if Russia starts using Susanin en masse on Geran-5s and other drones and missiles at night, Ukraine may have to go back to switching off lights, especially on roads.

• NATO has provided new details about its AI model for predicting Russian drone strikes on the front lines.
• Called Initiative 13 or Model 13, it works for about 31 miles behind the line of contact.
• The AI gives commanders a map showing the next day's expected Russian drone activity.

A new NATO artificial intelligence model gives Ukraine's forces a frontline map of where Russian drone activity is expected the next day, per the alliance's innovation center.

The system, called Initiative 13 or Model 13, "turns an array of disparate data into a clear map of expected activity" for commanders to plan their next day of operations, a spokesperson for NATO's Joint Analysis, Training, and Education Center, or JATEC, told Business Insider.

Business Insider reported on Ukraine's announcement of the program earlier this month, but JATEC is now providing new details on how it works.

Initiative 13 covers areas 5 to 50 km, or roughly 3 to 31 miles, of Ukrainian territory behind the line of contact, and divides that space into geographical cells, per JATEC.

"For each cell, the system determines the expected intensity of strike and reconnaissance activity of UAVs, the level of threat, the trend of its change, and the range of possible values," its spokesperson said.

The map shows a forecast for the next day, helping commanders to highlight risk areas so they can better deploy their forces and equipment, they said.

They added that the AI model is trained on battlefield data and considers previous Russian drone activity, what types of drones were used, when and how they were deployed, weather conditions, terrain, and distance to the line of contact.

"Initiative 13 does not replace data from the current situation and commander's decisions," the JATEC spokesperson added. JATEC is NATO's joint organization with Ukraine, based in Poland, that aims to glean lessons and innovations from the war.

Ukraine's defense ministry said in mid-October that Initiative 13, which it called Model 13, was "ready for integration into the Armed Forces of Ukraine's situational awareness systems."

The AI model, it said, could predict Russia's drone strikes with "high probability."

Kyiv's forces use a battlespace management system called Delta, which feeds data from the front lines onto an interactive map that commanders can access via laptop, phone, or tablet.

The drone-predicting AI was developed by Ukraine's forces and NATO's Allied Command Transformation, with support from JATEC.

Ukraine's defense ministry said in its initial announcement that another AI model, dubbed No. 32, for planning artillery deployments was also in the works but is still in prototype stages.

Artificial intelligence has increasingly been making its way into Ukraine's war, from helping mid-range attack drones identify and strike targets to sending uncrewed ground vehicles to autonomously complete supply runs.

Romanian intelligence services say a Russian-directed network was responsible for a fire near an arms manufacturing facility in Brașov. Investigations involving Germany and Poland have exposed what authorities describe as a wider operation targeting military and industrial defence infrastructure across Europe.

Romania has accused Russia of coordinating a cross-border sabotage network responsible for an industrial fire near an arms manufacturing facility, prompting a diplomatic confrontation with Moscow and investigations involving several European countries.

Romanian intelligence and prosecutors announced on 26th October that they had identified three foreign nationals allegedly involved in the operation, which caused a fire on an industrial site in Brașov on 14th September.

The suspects, two Belarusian nationals and one Ukrainian, are alleged to have participated in a network directed by individuals operating from Russia.

Two suspects have been detained in Germany, while a third has been located in Poland.

Romania is seeking their extradition as investigators examine possible connections to other attempted attacks against military and industrial installations.

Russia has rejected the allegations.

The case has drawn attention to the security of European defence production facilities at a time when NATO governments are seeking to increase military manufacturing capacity and sustain assistance to Ukraine.

Fire near a Romanian arms manufacturer

The investigation concerns an industrial complex in Brașov, a city with an established defence manufacturing sector.

The fire occurred on 14th September at premises situated close to CARFIL SA, a subsidiary of Romania’s state-owned defence company ROMARM.

According to the Romanian Intelligence Service, the incident was caused by individuals belonging to a sabotage network coordinated from the Russian Federation.

The fire damaged premises occupied by several commercial businesses.

Although the industrial site is associated with the CARFIL complex, authorities have not established publicly that the arms manufacturing facility itself sustained damage.

That geographical distinction is important when assessing the consequences of the operation.

CARFIL manufactures military equipment and ammunition and has pursued partnerships involving drones, explosives and other defence technologies.

Its proximity to the incident has heightened concerns about the security of industrial facilities supporting Romania’s armed forces.

Suspects identified in three countries

Romania’s Directorate for Investigating Organised Crime and Terrorism, known as DIICOT, says the evidence connects three individuals to the incident.

According to Romanian national news agency AGERPRES, the Bucharest Court of Appeal issued European arrest warrants following the investigation.

Two suspects were detained in Germany while allegedly preparing similar operations.

The third was located in Poland, where authorities received a further European arrest warrant issued on 26 October.

Romanian prosecutors are pursuing extradition procedures.

The nationalities of the suspects do not establish responsibility on the part of Belarus or Ukraine. Romanian authorities attribute the alleged coordination to individuals based in Russia.

The investigation also indicates that the Brașov incident may not have been an isolated operation.

Romanian intelligence claims the network’s potential targets included government-owned and private arms manufacturers, military-related facilities and other strategic industrial sites in several European countries.

Those claims remain subject to ongoing criminal investigation.

Bucharest summons Russian ambassador

The Romanian government escalated the matter diplomatically on 27th October.

Foreign Minister Dan Neculăescu summoned Russia’s ambassador, Vladimir Lipaev, to deliver a formal protest concerning the alleged operation.

According to the Romanian Foreign Ministry’s account reported by AGERPRES, Bucharest stated that evidence gathered during the investigation demonstrated Russian responsibility.

The ministry described the operation as part of a broader pattern of hostile activity affecting European states.

President Nicușor Dan also condemned the alleged sabotage, linking it to attempts to undermine European security and solidarity.

Moscow rejected the accusations.

The Russian Embassy maintained that the allegations were unfounded and disputed Romania’s account of the evidence presented during the diplomatic meeting.

The conflicting positions mean the attribution remains contested, notwithstanding the conclusions announced by Romania’s intelligence authorities.

A recruitment model designed for deniability

The Romanian Intelligence Service has provided details about how it believes the wider network recruits and directs participants.

According to its statement, recruitment can begin through social media with offers of payment for apparently minor activities, such as photographing or observing particular locations.

Subsequent assignments may become more serious, involving property destruction, arson or other acts of violence.

Individuals may be targeted because of financial difficulties or other personal vulnerabilities.

The service also identified methods allegedly used to conceal movements, payments and communications.

These include encrypted messaging applications, telephone numbers registered outside the country of operation and accommodation or transport arrangements booked under other identities.

Such methods can complicate investigations because the individuals physically carrying out an operation may have limited knowledge of the organisers.

Romanian authorities emphasised that individual indicators should be assessed in context and do not themselves prove involvement in sabotage.

Defence factories become a security concern

The case has implications beyond Romania.

European governments are investing in ammunition production, air defence systems and military technologies, partly in response to the continuing war in Ukraine.

The resulting expansion of manufacturing capacity creates additional infrastructure requiring protection.

Industrial sites may be vulnerable not only to direct attacks but also to disruption affecting nearby businesses, transport networks, power supplies and specialist contractors.

The Brașov investigation illustrates how an incident outside a defence factory’s perimeter can nevertheless raise questions about the security of the wider industrial complex.

It also demonstrates the importance of cooperation between European intelligence services and criminal investigators.

The detention of suspects in Germany and the identification of another in Poland show that investigations into alleged sabotage may cross several jurisdictions.

The wider European response

Romania’s allegations come amid growing concern over hostile activities involving cyberattacks, disinformation, surveillance and physical sabotage.

Attributing such incidents to a foreign government requires intelligence assessments, criminal evidence and international cooperation.

The public allegations against Russia do not replace the judicial process concerning the three suspects.

However, the investigation has already prompted a diplomatic response and additional scrutiny of industrial security.

For European governments seeking to expand their defence industries, the immediate challenge is protecting production facilities and associated infrastructure without allowing relatively small-scale disruptive operations to undermine wider manufacturing programmes.

The outcome of Romania’s criminal proceedings will be important in establishing the responsibility of those accused and clarifying how the alleged network operated across national borders.

Main Image: By MAPN – http://www.mapn.ro/fotodb/20051020_expomil?page=1, CC BY-SA 3.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=14997305

Europe has already learned to better recognize hybrid threats, which is definitely a good thing, but recognition alone is not enough and doesn't serve as sufficient deterrence.

European officials have grown accustomed to scenarios where a cyberattack disrupts public services and critical infrastructure, drones appear over sensitive sites,

Men before a British court charged under the National Security act over an alleged, attempted Iranian state-backed guerrilla attack.

The post First Alleged RAF Fairford American Base Plotters Appear Before Court appeared first on Breitbart.

Battlefield robots were once thought of as the stuff of science fiction. But the Ukraine war has put paid to that view, with uncrewed ground vehicles (UGVs) – or ground robots – taking on an increasingly visible role. In September 2026, Mykhailo Fedorov, the former defense minister of Ukraine – who is generally credited with […]

The post Could humanoid robots soon replace soldiers on the battlefield? appeared first on Asia Times.

German defense AI firm Helsing has unveiled Contra, an AI-run air defense system and two interceptor missiles designed to chase Russia’s jet-powered Geran drones, the company announced on 26 October. Officials pitch it as cheap, but it won’t reach the market this winter.

That leaves Ukraine on its own defenses as Russia shifts to jet drones. By early October, jet models made up about 40% of Russian drone launches, and Ukraine’s own interceptors for them won’t arrive in needed numbers before late November, Air Force Deputy Commander Yurii Cherevashenko said.

Two missiles, one AI brain

Contra is the command layer of air defense: it links radars and other sensors, tracks incoming drones and missiles, and assigns a weapon to each target, while people keep control over decisions, Helsing said. Besides the company’s own missiles, it can also use other firms’ interceptors, lasers, guns, or nets. AD-1 Inferno is jet-powered and designed to loiter, swarm, and re-engage targets, while AD-2 Ambush, a solid-fuel rocket, is designed to reach Mach 2.5, over twice the speed of sound, and a range of more than 20 km, the company said.

Inferno, with a 700 km/h speed and a 20-km range, would be the everyday shooter. Ambush would handle “leakers,” drones about to hit the ground, said Maxwell Adams, Helsing’s senior product director. Each shot should cost under $100,000, company officials said.

Built for the faster Gerans

Ukraine once downed 90% of Russia’s slower, propeller-driven Gerans, copies of Iran’s Shahed, Defense News reported. Russia has since fielded thousands of jet Geran-4s and Geran-5s flying at 400–700 km/h, and almost half now get through, Helsing co-founder and co-CEO Gundbert Scherf said.

Ukraine’s own nightly rates swing widely. On 28 September, President Zelenskyy put the shoot-down rate for jet drones at 57%. Overnight on 7 October, it exceeded 82%, National Security and Defense Council Secretary Ihor Klymenko said. Russian output of the two models has reached 4,000 a month, Helsing said, citing unspecified intelligence reports.

Explore further

German company introduces AI-powered HX-2 drone for Ukrainian military

Helsing has signed one Contra contract, Scherf said, but the system is still in testing, and he expects it on the market in the second half of 2027. Ukraine already uses Helsing’s HX-2 strike drones. Scherf said they should be integrated into a system like Contra.

No single Argentine capability shaped British planning during the 1982 South Atlantic conflict more than the pairing of the Dassault Super Étendard strike fighter and its deadly AM39 Exocet anti-ship missile. Against that threat, the British launched a series of special forces operations, all with the same objective: kill the Argentine pilots and destroy their aircraft and missiles before they could be used again. Together, the strike fighter and missile pairing had proven to be the biggest threat to the Royal Navy task force that had been sent to recapture the islands.

Five Super Étendard aircraft and five AM39 Exocet missiles had been delivered to Argentina before a French embargo took hold. The jets were flown by the Argentine Navy’s 2nd Naval Fighter and Attack Squadron out of Río Grande, on Tierra del Fuego, a region at South America’s southernmost tip, shared by Chile and Argentina. The Super Étendard/Exocet combination had already cost the British the destroyer HMS Sheffield on May 4 and the container ship Atlantic Conveyor on May 25.

The special forces operations were broken down into four phases — named PLUM DUFF, MIKADO, KETTLEDRUM, and IMPI — the last of which is the least well-documented, and the focus of this article.

PLUM DUFF was the insertion phase and was a reconnaissance mission. On May 16, an RAF Hercules airdropped eight special forces troops onto RFA Fort Austin to form a recce party. On the night of May 17/18, a Sea King HC4, ZA290, lifted off from the aircraft carrier HMS Invincible for a one-way flight to Tierra del Fuego, where the men were to observe Río Grande and report back. The patrol was set down far from the objective and never completed the reconnaissance; the helicopter crew flew on into Chile, where the aircraft was deliberately burnt to try and hide the evidence, while they tried to evade capture.

MIKADO was the planned attack phase, and it depended on that missing intelligence. Two Hercules were to air-land up to 70 men of B Squadron, 22 Special Air Service (SAS), directly on Río Grande — the air operation order of May 19 also named Río Gallegos, further up the Argentine coast, as an alternative. The men would destroy the Super Étendards and their Exocets on the ground, kill the pilots, and then withdraw overland into Chile. Commander Task Force 317, at Northwood, accepted from the outset that the mission could well cost both Hercules.

The aircrew did not refuse the task, but they were blunt about what it demanded: formation landing by two heavy transports on a possibly heavily defended, icy military runway, with a probable 20-knot tailwind, at night and on passive night-vision goggles in minimum light levels, with intelligence that was inadequate to support any air-land option at all. The RAF planning team recommended an airdrop as the better way to maintain a covert posture, and the Senior Air Staff Officer at Headquarters 38 Group warned the Air Commander to watch for overambitious schemes coming out of the SAS.

The U.K. Ministry of Defense formally cancelled MIKADO on June 4.

KETTLEDRUM was planned as the third of the set. It was aimed at Puerto Deseado, Santa Cruz Province of Argentina, and would have inserted a Special Boat Service party (SBS, the Royal Marines’ special forces unit) from the submarine HMS Onyx — a boat that will reappear before the end of this story.

None of the three was executed as planned.

Less well-known is that the cancellation of MIKADO produced a fourth project: Operation IMPI, named after a Zulu fighting force.

Cancelling MIKADO did not mean the wider operation was over. Also on June 4, the U.K. Ministry of Defense tasked CTF 317 to produce a new plan for special forces to destroy the combat effectiveness of the Super Étendards.

CTF 317’s staff went to work on what became IMPI. The planning document, Ops 1/3, is dated June 14 — the day of the Argentine surrender in the islands. In broad terms, the objective was to be attacked by special forces arriving both by air and by sea.

That much has been known, in fragments.

What has not been published until now is the fact that the operation had already been resourced.

At 2240Z on June 12, Maj. Gen. Jeremy Moore, commanding the land forces as CTG 317.1, signalled Rear Admiral Sandy Woodward’s battle group (CTG 317.8), with Admiral Sir John Fieldhouse at Northwood (CTF 317) and Commodore Michael Clapp’s amphibious group (CTG 317.0) as information addressees. The message called for B Squadron, 22 SAS, to be made available for operations as soon as possible: cover was needed against rapid developments of an unfavorable nature in West Falkland (Gran Malvina), and the theatre’s existing special forces assets were fully absorbed supporting the battle for Stanley — and IMPI. Operation IMPI, Moore noted in passing, was by then self-sufficient.

Examining two lines of routine signal traffic settles several things at once. Forty-eight hours before the surrender, IMPI was not a staff study but an operation that had been resourced, and that was enough to consume the theatre’s special forces and justify calling a fresh SAS squadron forward. It is also the only contemporary, operational-level reference to IMPI released so far: everything else comes from a narrative written years afterwards.

As that later narrative describes it, the concept behind IMPI was much leaner than MIKADO. Against two Hercules and 70 men, the air element of IMPI rested on a single RAF Hercules.

The aircraft was to fly from Ascension Island, refuel in flight, and then track east of the Falkland Islands and south of Cape Horn before making a low-level approach below Argentine radar cover for a night landing of special forces at the airfields codenamed San Jose and Arco Iris. Other special forces would have been inserted by sea. That air element, as will be seen, is the most questionable part of the entire file.

The routing is worth attention, because it rules out the intuitive picture of a direct run south from Ascension. Instead, the aircraft would have entered from the least-covered and least-expected direction, coming around the bottom of the continent rather than from the northeast.

The precise identities of San Jose and Arco Iris are not established in the declassified record.

The most likely reading is that they stand for Río Grande and Río Gallegos — the airfields at which the planned navigation ended, and the two named in MIKADO’s air operation order a month earlier. For a document circulating through restricted channels, encrypting the names of the two targets was an elementary precaution, although it should be noted that an operational order would more commonly have designated them simply as Target One and Target Two.

None of this rules out Chilean participation in other phases of the operation; if anything, it suggests it’s more likely. The narrative survives inside a folder classified Top Secret and restricted to the Chief of the Air Staff, whose declared subject is cooperation with Chile. That setting contrasts with the earlier stage of the planning, when mounting and recovering a special forces insertion from a Chilean airfield was considered and expressly discounted on political grounds — much as the use of an Antarctic strip was discounted after the New Zealand High Commission advised that the Antarctic winter precluded safe trans-polar flight.

The maritime half of IMPI can be traced in the records of those who were there.

Navigational support for the final phase was to come from the nuclear attack submarine HMS Conqueror. On June 9, 1982, Conqueror was off Bahía Camarones, working as an advanced picket and hunting targets of opportunity that ventured outside the 12-nautical-mile limit of Argentine territorial waters, with authority to sink any civilian vessel judged to be running to the Falklands/Malvinas; that same morning the sub had in fact entered Argentine territorial waters trying to locate the Argentine Navy’s Task Group 79.2.

That day, Conqueror received preparatory information on IMPI. The sub’s task was to come to periscope depth and act as a radio beacon, giving the Hercules a radio reference against which to refine a navigation that, low and at night, allowed no error. The resulting picture is an odd one: a nuclear submarine deployed on interdiction off the Patagonian coast, turned into a navigation aid for a transport aircraft.

The insertion itself fell to HMS Onyx, the Oberon class diesel-electric boat that had already taken part in Operation KETTLEDRUM and the only conventional submarine Britain deployed to the South Atlantic. On June 14, at 0815Z, lying in San Carlos Water, Onyx embarked a party of 10 men from B Squadron, 22 SAS and the SBS for the mission. The timing matches Moore’s signal of two days earlier almost exactly.

The plan called for the submarine to surface some two nautical miles offshore at night. The troops would close the beach in Gemini inflatables and destroy the objective — aircraft and missiles, if any were there — using anti-tank weapons and demolition charges.

What happened next illustrates the inertia of military machinery. The Argentine surrender in the islands came on that same June 14, hours after the party had gone aboard Onyx. Even so, preparations did not stop at once: on June 15 the embarked troops carried out practice landings from a Gemini. That does not mean IMPI was ever executed — it was not — but it does show that with the strategic outcome already settled, the machine was still rehearsing.

The British record closes the matter with administrative dryness: the surrender of the Argentine forces in the Falkland Islands and the cessation of hostile activity by Argentine aircraft resulted in the operation being cancelled.

The air part of the mission is another matter entirely and is where IMPI becomes more uncertain.

The only link between IMPI and an aircraft is a single paragraph in an RAF historical narrative. The folder that holds it was opened on April 18, 1986 — four years after the war — as an eyes-only briefing file for the Chief of the Air Staff, and the pages appear to be a working draft rather than a finished submission, carrying pencil amendments throughout.

Had a Hercules been earmarked, there is no doubt which unit would have provided it. The Special Forces Flight that runs through the whole chapter — five crews, commanded by a squadron leader, exercising regularly with SAS and SBS Sections — appears with its squadron number blanked out, yet the number surfaces a few paragraphs later, where two of its crews are described training on the probe-fitted Hercules C1P. The unit was No. 47 Squadron, RAF, home-based at Lyneham, and it would keep the special forces air support role for decades afterward.

The men who were at Ascension with that detachment, however, say they had nothing to do with it. Reliable sources with direct knowledge of the flight’s activity state that they never saw the codeword at the time, had never heard of the operation until this file surfaced, and consider it inconceivable that a special forces Hercules and crew could have been earmarked for a mission of this kind without the flight — a community of five crews that has stayed in touch ever since — learning of it at some point in the intervening four decades. By June 14, at most one aerial-refueling-qualified special forces crew was at Wideawake.

That skepticism is reinforced by the way the same narrative handles events those crews lived through. Its account of their own work-up does not survive contact with their logbooks.

For example, a practice infiltration into RAF Laarbruch in Germany that the narrative describes as successful had in fact been detected; the Hercules was notionally shot down about two miles out on the approach. The ramp toes (attachable extension plates located at the very end of the rear cargo ramp) it describes as droppable at 20 to 30 knots were never meant to be lowered with the aircraft moving, which would have been unsafe and risked the airframe. There are other anomalies, too.

A document that misstates the squadron’s own exercises is thin evidence on which to place that squadron over Tierra del Fuego.

What is not in question is what the Special Forces Flight could have done, had it been asked.

By mid-May the flight had two crews qualified in air-to-air refueling — one deployed to Ascension, the other held in the United Kingdom to train the others — flying Hercules C1s fitted with probes and, where the task required it, additional fuel tanks in the fuselage. It had rehearsed stream landings and rapid offloads, parachute insertion below radar cover to a pinpoint coastal feature, as well as flying on ANVIS goggles at 250 feet over sea and land. The goggles themselves were fitted to the crews’ helmets by RAE Farnborough specialists in a single day in mid-April. The reach was demonstrated on May 16, when the sortie that dropped the PLUM DUFF party stayed airborne for 24 hours and five minutes, with Victor tankers refueling some 1,800 miles from Ascension. Almost none of it was routine: nearly everything the force did during the conflict was improvised, at speed, in a matter of weeks.

What never had an answer — not for MIKADO, and not for whatever IMPI intended — was the other end of the problem. Putting men ashore deep inside Argentine territory was the solvable half. Getting an aircraft and its passengers out again after a direct action, from a strip in range of the Argentine Air Force, was not.

All of the above is reconstructed from lateral references: the RAF’s narrative in file AIR 20/13036 at the National Archives, unit records, submarine logs, operational signal traffic, and the accounts of participants.

The specific file — the one holding the complete plan with its annexes, the identification of the airfields and the execution sequence — remains closed. It is DEFE 71/980, titled Operation Corporate (Falklands Conflict): Operation IMPI, retained at the National Archives at Kew with no announced opening date. Until it is released, the air element of IMPI cannot be settled either way.

Forty-four years after the conflict, the last British special operation of the war is still, in essence, a document the British state is not prepared to show. That is not a trivial detail: the files touching on cooperation with Chile have consistently been the most reluctantly opened of all.

What remains is an operation of two halves. One of them is solid: a resourced plan, declared self-sufficient on June 12, with a nuclear submarine briefed to act as a beacon, 10 men of the SAS and the SBS embarked in a conventional submarine in San Carlos on the morning of the surrender, and rehearsals continuing the following day. The other half — a lone Hercules coming round Cape Horn to land on a codenamed strip — rests on one paragraph of a flawed staff narrative and is rejected by the only men who could have flown it.

Either way, the obsession is the same.

Between June 4 and June 14, 1982, while the final battle for Port Stanley/Puerto Argentino was being fought and the Argentine land campaign was collapsing, part of the British planning effort was still revolving around five French-built aircraft, their 10 aircrew, and their missiles. That the plan carries the date of the surrender itself, that it was still being rehearsed the following day, and that it remains classified today says a good deal about how far the British were prepared to go to destroy the Super Étendards and their Exocets.

Contact the editor: thomas@thewarzone.com

Mariano Sciaroni holds a master’s degree in Strategy and Geopolitics as well as a postgraduate diploma in Contemporary Military History, both earned at the Argentine Army’s Military Academy. Sciaroni has published five books and numerous articles on military and naval history. He is also an active member of the Argentine Institute of Military History and serves as a sub-lieutenant in the Argentine Army Reserve (Army Aviation Reserve Squadron). You can find out more about his books here.

The post Britain’s Final Plan To Kill Argentina’s Super Étendards Attack Jets appeared first on TWZ.

Russian troops are trying to drag Radkivka, a village on the northern edge of Kupiansk in Kharkiv Oblast, into the gray zone so their infiltration groups can keep reaching the city, Viktor Trehubov, spokesperson for Ukraine’s Joint Forces Grouping, said on national television on 27 October, Ukrinform reported. Russian forces made three attempts to advance toward Radkivka on 26 October, Ukraine’s General Staff reported.

Russia has tried for more than a year to retake Kupiansk, a city on the Oskil River, largely by slipping small groups through a disused gas pipeline under the river. They kept using it even after Ukraine said in September 2025 that it had flooded three of the four pipe strings, until Ukrainian troops went into the pipes themselves in Operation Veles, announced on 22 October.

Russian groups now have to move above ground

The pipe Russian groups used to seep toward Kupiansk has been put out of action, so they now have to go through Radkivka or neighboring Holubivka, Trehubov said. They move along the bank of the Oskil and a nearby tree line, but the foliage will soon be gone, which will make that much harder.

On the western bank of the Oskil, Russian forces took losses from Ukraine’s Khartiia Corps and in Operation Veles, and their logistics have “suffered noticeably,” Trehubov said. Advancing there is now harder for them than it was a month ago, he added.

Everything now depends on how the fights for Holubivka and Radkivka end, Trehubov said.

“If Ukrainian control can finally be established there, the Russians will have nowhere much to crawl through,” he said.

Several dozen Russian soldiers remain in low-rise buildings in northern Kupiansk, and Ukrainian forces are working to cut off their rotations, Trehubov said on 23 October.

Each side wants the other off its bank of the Oskil

On the eastern bank, Russian forces keep pushing toward the village of Podoly and Kupiansk-Vuzlovyi, a railway junction town southeast of Kupiansk, aiming to wipe out Ukraine’s foothold there, Trehubov said. Ukraine wants to destroy the Russian foothold on the western bank.

“For that, we will need to at least somehow throw them out of Dvorichna,” Trehubov said, referring to a town north of Kupiansk.

The US-based Institute for the Study of War (ISW) assessed that Russian forces conducted no offensive operations on the Kupiansk axis on 26 October, likely because Ukraine now controls the pipeline, a view at odds with the General Staff’s report for that day.

Ukraine reported confident control of Kupiansk as early as February, yet Russian groups kept slipping into the city for months afterward. Trehubov’s latest assessment stops short of declaring that threat over: Russia will still try to advance, he said.

A new video transmitter for Wild Hornets’ drones, including its STING interceptors, has passed state tests, the Ukrainian drone maker told Militarnyi. The module sends a drone’s camera feed to its pilot. The company expects it to widen its interceptors’ operating radius.

Russia launched 140 Shahed-type drones at Ukraine overnight on 26 October and 280 the next night, when its main target was Kyiv, Air Force figures as of the morning show. Interceptor drones, which cost dozens of times less than the Shaheds they hunt, are one of Ukraine’s answers. The STING alone downed more than 3,000 drones in its first seven months of use, Wild Hornets says. If the company’s estimate holds, a 30 km radius would let each ground station cover more than twice the area it covers at 20 km.

What the testers checked

Specialists from the State Research Institute for Testing and Certification of Arms and Military Equipment and the Defense Ministry’s State Quality Assurance Directorate confirmed the module’s declared characteristics on three drone types, the company said. The three were the STING interceptor, the Queen of Hornets cargo platform, and the 10-inch Wild Hornets Digital anti-aircraft drone.

Some of the drones’ figures exceeded the values the company had set for them, Wild Hornets told Ukrainian defense outlet Oboronka, without saying which ones. Those figures will enter the official specifications after further field tests, it said.

More than double the power

The module, called HV VTX Pro, is part of an upgrade to Wild Hornets’ Hornet Vision digital video system. It more than doubles the transmitter’s maximum power, to 4 W. That sends a clear picture farther and makes the feed steadier in crowded airwaves and under electronic jamming, the company said.

Wild Hornets first described the module in August, when it was already in serial production. Its interceptors’ operating radius would grow from around 20 km to 30 km, the company said at the time. That estimate assumed good line of sight and the 360-degree antenna on its ground stations, according to a company statement Interfax-Ukraine quoted. Interception could also become at least 20% more effective against targets flying extremely low, the statement said.

Wild Hornets is a Ukrainian company that designs and builds drones, from strike FPV drones and cargo platforms to the STING, which the company says flies at up to 280 km/h to hunt Shaheds. Its drones serve with more than 100 units of Ukraine’s Defense Forces, from the army and the National Guard to military intelligence, the Air Force, and the border guard, according to Interfax-Ukraine.

• Ukraine downed about 74% of Russia's turbojet Shaheds while Starshield was throttled, ISW says.
• That's about 3 percentage points lower than its typical interception rate of about 77%, analysts said.
• Much of Ukraine's air defense against turbojet Shaheds now relies on fighter jets like the F-16.

Ukrainian data shows its air defenses largely held up against one of Russia's most prominent new threats despite a 10-day Starshield slowdown.

Though high-speed interceptor drones were hindered by the reported throttling, Kyiv's forces managed to intercept 74% of Russian jet-powered Shaheds from October 14 to 24, compared with a typical rate of 77%, according to analysts at the Washington-based think tank Institute for the Study of War.

The organization bases its analyses on interception data released by Ukraine's air force, which said Russia had launched hundreds of the turbojet attack drones over the 10-day period.

The drop of three percentage points, or roughly 3.8%, translates to a "still relatively high interception rate" but doesn't mean Ukraine can rest easy, the ISW analysts wrote.

Many interceptons were owed to Ukrainian fighter jets countering Russian jet Shaheds with air-to-air missiles or guns.

For months, fighter aircraft have been Ukraine's primary and most successful air defense so far against jet Shaheds — an assessment that Ukrainian air force spokesperson Col. Yuriy Ihnat repeated to local media on Monday after Starshield services returned to normal.

"We are counting on the aviation component," he told RBC Ukraine, referring to helicopters and fighter jets.

One of Ukraine's main aircraft in this fight is the F-16 Fighting Falcon, which Ihnat said in April could shoot down 10 Russian Shaheds each in a single night. The F-16 carries the M61A1 Vulcan, a six-barrel, Gatling-style rotary cannon that fires 20mm rounds.

Kyiv requisitioned more than 50,000 of these rounds from Denmark last week in a scramble to bolster its air defenses while Starshield, the military version of Starlink that its interceptor drones rely on, was limited by a speed cap. That many rounds is enough for roughly 100 sorties.

The F-16 pillar can't last forever

But ISW analysts wrote that the F-16 strategy poses a few complications for Ukraine. Using its gun to shoot down jet Shaheds, for example, "requires a high pilot skill level and increases the risk to the airframe and pilot," the wrote.

The practice also increases maintenance demands for Ukraine's already-strained fighter jets and distracts them from other missions they could be needed for, the analysts added.

"Supplementing the Ukrainian air defense umbrella with interceptor drones is Ukraine's best chance at developing a robust air defense umbrella capable of sustaining high interception rates of Russian jet-powered drones over the long term," the analysts wrote.

Indeed, before Russia began surging launches of jet-powered drones, Ukraine had reported much higher interception rates of over 90% against propeller Shaheds in some months.

These had been largely boosted by Ukraine's mass adoption of interceptor drones, or small drones that cost just a fraction of traditional interceptor missiles.

But Russia's increased use of turbojets on its attack drones, the more advanced of which can fly at speeds of up to 370 mph, meant Ukraine has to radically evolve its designs to keep up. While it now has several types of drones capable of catching and destroying jet-powered Shaheds, the new interceptor effort as a whole is still in early stages.

Many of these new interceptors became ineffective during the 10-day slowdown of Starshield, which Ukraine said stopped working when a drone flew faster than 100 mph.

The reason for the connectivity problems is still unclear. They emerged as President Donald Trump and SpaceX CEO Elon Musk both openly criticized Ukraine for strikes on Russian energy infrastructure as the White House sought to lower gas prices.

Trump and Musk have separately said they were not responsible for the slowdown to Starshield, which is owned and operated by the US government.

Musk, while maintaining that the US controls Starshield, later also accused Ukrainian forces of breaching civilian network Starlink's terms of service by using it for drone strikes.

On Saturday, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said Starshield services were restored.

Meanwhile, some Ukrainians are already bracing for a new threat from Russia through cheap, mass-producible cruise missiles. One such missile, the Filin, has been listed by Russia as capable of flying as fast as 500 mph.

The US needs to creatively combine two counter-drone capabilities it already has and do it quickly to deal with swarm attacks of drones and cruise missiles. The Russians are already doing it. Counter-drone warfare is changing as the push for solutions gains momentum in the United States and worldwide. In modern combat scenarios, drones are […]

The post Combo interceptors best bet for US drone and missile defense appeared first on Asia Times.

Journalists from 17 European public service broadcasters, coordinated by the European Broadcasting Union’s (EBU) Eurovision News Spotlight network, published an interactive map on 23 October 2026. It documents hybrid incidents linked to Russia across 17 European countries between 1 April and 15 October. Journalists compiled a database of hundreds of reported incidents, categorizing each by type and the source and strength of its alleged links to Russia, then verifying them through open-source research.

The map comes as officials warn the campaign is growing. On 28 September, EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas said in Brussels that Russia was planning more acts of sabotage to divide societies and intimidate them into abandoning their support for Ukraine. The points on the map represent an incomplete list of publicly known cases attributed to Russia or suspected of being linked to it, the report states.

The map covers airspace violations, sabotage attempts, “disposable” agents with no formal intelligence training, migration used as a weapon, and Russian military activity near or across European borders. It excludes cyberattacks, influence operations, and espionage by trained intelligence officers.

The EBU calls the result a very conservative estimate, not an official tally. Russia has consistently denied responsibility for the incidents. Many single points represent several incidents of the same type in one area or in quick succession. In Moldova, for example, Defense Minister Anatolie Nosatîi said on 30 September that the government had recorded 84 drone incursions.

Four German incidents are on the map, out of many more

The map shows four incidents in Germany, according to BR.

• On 2 August, German authorities arrested a 33-year-old Ukrainian man in Thuringia on suspicion of photographing a Bavarian weapons manufacturer for a foreign intelligence service as part of an alleged sabotage plot.
• On 4 August, a drone carrying explosives and a detonator struck the wing of a Ukrainian An-124 cargo plane at Leipzig/Halle Airport but failed to explode.
• On 3 September, attackers threw firebombs from a car onto a construction site next to defense firms in Munich, and German security authorities suspect Russian intelligence.
• On 14 September, investigators learned of a crashed drone found near the Bundeswehr’s Wunstorf air base.

Internal papers from the new Joint Hybrid Defense Center, seen by Correctiv, record 163 suspected sabotage cases in 2026 up to 19 August. The targets included rail lines, military facilities, substations, and radio masts. The same papers record 1,034 drone overflights of critical infrastructure, military sites, and defense companies, and 25 espionage investigations. The papers cover possible attacks by Russia, China, and Iran, and media did not report a breakdown of the sabotage cases by country.

European leaders sound the alarm over Russian hybrid attacks

On 15 April, Swedish civil defense minister Carl-Oskar Bohlin said pro-Russian groups had moved from denial-of-service attacks to attempts at destructive cyberattacks, including one on a Swedish power plant in 2025. On 1 September, German Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul named Russia as the perpetrator of the Leipzig attack and accused Moscow of “blatant hostility” toward Germany.

On 18 September, French President Emmanuel Macron said Russia’s hybrid attacks would not go unanswered and ordered a plan to protect France’s critical infrastructure. On 1 October, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz said Germany was preparing for new hybrid attacks, “including serious ones.” NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte on 14 October called the attacks a sign of Russian weakness at a press conference in Tallinn and said NATO would react where needed without being “rattled.”

An investigation involving 17 European public-service news organisations has documented hundreds of suspected hybrid attacks across Europe in just over six months, revealing the scale of a security challenge that increasingly extends beyond conventional espionage and cyberwarfare.

The investigation, coordinated by the European Broadcasting Union, examined incidents reported between 1st April and 15th October 2026, including sabotage attempts, arson, airspace violations, suspicious drone activity and the exploitation of migration routes along the European Union’s eastern borders.

Published on 23rd October, the resulting interactive map provides a geographical picture of incidents publicly linked to Russia by intelligence agencies, law-enforcement authorities, government officials or reporting. The degree of attribution varies considerably, however, and many incidents remain under investigation.

The findings point to a fundamental problem for European security: hostile activities can be conducted across national boundaries without necessarily triggering the legal, military or political mechanisms designed to respond to conventional aggression.

Sabotage Without Conventional Warfare

Among the cases examined is an incident in Munich in September, when two Bulgarian nationals allegedly threw incendiary devices from a moving vehicle onto a construction site near several defence companies.

Police arrested the suspects after a witness reported the incident. Bavarian Interior Minister Joachim Herrmann and regional criminal investigators subsequently indicated that political motives were being considered. Investigators reportedly suspected possible involvement by Russia’s military intelligence service, the GRU, although the allegations have not been established in court.

The case illustrates growing concern about so-called disposable agents: individuals recruited to undertake relatively limited operations without formal intelligence training or a longstanding relationship with an intelligence service.

Such arrangements can complicate investigations. Even where perpetrators are identified, establishing a legally demonstrable connection between their actions and a foreign intelligence organisation may prove considerably more difficult.

Germany’s Federal Criminal Police Office has registered a mid-three-digit number of suspected sabotage and reconnaissance cases since the beginning of 2026, according to information provided to investigators involved in the European mapping project.

Only a small proportion have been publicly attributed to Russia. Four German incidents were included in the map, demonstrating the distinction between a broad national caseload and cases meeting the investigation’s publication criteria.

Europe’s Eastern Borders Under Pressure

The geographical distribution reveals substantial activity along NATO’s eastern flank, particularly around the Baltic states, Belarus and the Black Sea.

Incidents include repeated airspace violations, suspected reconnaissance operations and attempts to facilitate unauthorised border crossings. Lithuanian authorities have accused Belarus of deliberately exploiting migration as an instrument of political pressure.

Commercial shipping has also become increasingly exposed. Drone attacks involving vessels near Romania and Bulgaria have raised concerns about the extension of the war’s consequences into maritime areas adjoining EU and NATO territory.

These developments reinforce earlier warnings about Russia’s expanding sabotage campaign, particularly the difficulty of distinguishing isolated security incidents from coordinated operations intended to test national responses.

Teija Tiilikainen, director of the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats, identified Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as an important factor behind the increasing pressure. According to her assessment, Moscow’s objectives include weakening Western unity and undermining continued support for Ukraine.

The Legal and Institutional Challenge

The central difficulty is not simply the absence of criminal legislation. Arson, espionage, sabotage and unlawful interference with critical infrastructure are already punishable under national laws.

Rather, the challenge involves establishing foreign direction, coordinating investigations across jurisdictions and identifying when a series of apparently separate offences constitutes a wider hostile campaign.

Germany’s domestic intelligence chief, Sinan Selen, has described the environment as a grey area between war and peace. German foreign intelligence chief Martin Jäger has similarly identified Russia as the country’s most dangerous adversary.

European governments are beginning to address these difficulties collectively. At their 15th–16th October summit, EU leaders condemned intensifying hybrid attacks and called for stronger resilience, greater use of existing countermeasures and accelerated work on drone security.

On 8th October, the Council also extended sanctions targeting Russian destabilisation activities until October 2027. The restrictions cover 80 individuals and 20 entities.

Meanwhile, a European Commission research initiative, published on 23rd October, proposes combining anticipation, active defence and retaliatory measures into a more coherent deterrence strategy.

From Individual Incidents to Collective Security

The investigation’s significance extends beyond the number of incidents recorded. By bringing together information previously dispersed among national authorities and separate investigations, it makes possible a wider assessment of the methods, geographical concentration and recurring characteristics of suspected hostile operations.

Nevertheless, the map does not establish Russian responsibility for every incident it records, nor does it constitute a complete European database. Russia has repeatedly denied conducting the hybrid attacks attributed to it.

For European governments, the unresolved question is how to move from recognising a pattern of hostile activity to demonstrating responsibility and responding effectively.

As EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas has warned, the consequences already extend beyond infrastructure disruption to risks affecting civilian lives.

The emerging security challenge therefore concerns not only the detection of individual perpetrators, but also Europe’s ability to connect incidents across borders, establish responsibility and prevent successive operations from becoming an accepted feature of the continent’s security environment.

• A Ukrainian drone maker was surprised by how much explosive weight soldiers loaded onto one of its drones.
• A drone's payload is limited by the weight of its battery, camera, and other equipment.
• Drone makers push technical limits, but Ukrainian soldiers often go even further.

A major drone maker said Ukrainian soldiers surprised it by packing one of its drones with more explosives than the company ever thought it could carry.

When loading up an attack drone with explosives, combat units are limited by how much weight it can carry and still fly. Batteries, cameras, and other essential equipment also take up some of that capacity. That doesn't stop soldiers from pushing the equipment to its limit.

"One of the most surprising videos I've seen recently is that one of the units has managed to put the huge explosive part on our drone," Oleg, an executive at TechEx, told Business Insider.

The drone was carrying "something like five or seven kilos, and they managed to fly into the building and put it completely to the ground with one single FPV."

"I was like, 'How do you literally put this amount of explosives on one single FPV?' But it managed to carry this on and did the mission," the TechEx exec said, speaking on the condition that he be identified only by his first name for security reasons.

TechEx lists a maximum payload of two kilograms for three of its NATO-codified fiber-optic drones: the Stalker XO-10 China-Free, Stalker XO-15 MAX PRO, and Stalker XO-13.

Weight is a major constraint for Ukraine's drone makers, who are constantly trying to accommodate more firepower and bigger batteries, as well as heavier weapons and cameras. It's a constant trade-off, with every gram mattering.

Soldiers fighting for survival often push beyond advertised limits. Last year, a sergeant major in a heavy bomber company told Army Inform, Ukraine's defense ministry media, that while a Bat drone can fly up 8 kilometers and carry up to 12 kilograms, his unit pushed it to fly a little farther and carry a little more.

Weight is an important consideration for TechEx drone development. The company advertises its "ultralight fiber optic reel" as one of its product advantages. Last year, Ukraine's Ministry of Defense characterized TechEx's Stalker series as having a "record-low spool weight among Ukrainian fiber-optic drones."

The struggle with weight is particularly acute for fiber-optic drones because, in addition to gear like batteries, they have to carry the spool containing the fiber-optic cable that trails behind them, maintaining a connection with the drone operator. The cable makes them resistant to enemy jamming, but the added weight limits how many explosives they can carry. The cable spool can weigh several kilograms on some drones.

Olha, a TechEx representative, told Business Insider that the company developed its own technology to reduce spool weight, making "tiny tweaks and changes" to how the spool is assembled and the fiber is wound into it. Those adjustments allow the company to keep the spool lightweight while maintaining a stable connection and minimizing the risk of the cable breaking during flight.

The company needs the "perfect balance" to make sure it stays reliable and durable, as not all drone pilots have a wealth of flying experience, Oleg said.

The company faces trade-off decisions. Extending the range of its fiber-optic drones, for instance, would require larger cable spools, potentially leaving less room for explosives, Olha said. But not every drone needs a heavy payload. For some, speed and agility matter more.

Ukraine's soldiers often surprise the manufacturers of their weapons with how they use and adapt their gear, with troops sometimes repairing and modifying equipment near the front lines and experimenting with new tactics.

Kuldar Väärsi, the founder and CEO of Estonian ground robot maker Milrem Robotics, previously told Business Insider that Ukrainian soldiers used the company's technology in ways it was not expecting, including adding and attaching things to the robots. "Ukrainian troops are really creative, and they really find very simple ways how to get even more out of the equipment," he said.

How gear is used in the field often informs how Ukraine's defense companies update and modify their products. Soldiers give feedback to firms like TechEx every day, and companies send their own employees close to the fight to gather feedback and make changes.

Oleg said that TechEx receives direct feedback from soldiers constantly, resulting in weekly changes to its products. Without changes, a product in Ukraine "within three months, it will be outdated, and nobody will use it, because the industry is moving extremely fast," he said.

TechEx encourages soldier experimentation, including by making its drones with parts that are interchangeable. Soldiers can swap components to repair damaged drones or combine parts to create configurations the company never designed.

"Part of what I think TechEx is really great at is the ability to customize," Olha said.

• Drones in Ukraine act as flying communications bridges between operators and mission drones.
• They repeat the operators' signal to allow drones to fly farther while staying connected.
• The signal-repeating drones make other drones more resistant to Russia's electronic warfare.

Ukraine has created drones that act as flying relay towers, allowing its drones conducting missions to fly farther while making them harder for Russia to jam.

In a war where drones gather intel and account for more than 95% of Russia's front-line losses, Ukraine wants its operators to keep control of their drones over longer distances with stronger signals that are harder for Russia to break.

One solution is the signal repeater drone, a flying signal booster that operates between a pilot and a mission drone, relaying commands to the aircraft and sending back video and intelligence to the operator. Able to fly much higher than a ground antenna, airborne repeaters can extend a drone's range and help preserve the connection under pressure.

It increases the mission drone's operational range by extending how far it can fly while staying connected to its pilot. It's a similar principle to how wifi repeaters work.

Ukrainian arms maker Twist Robotics makes a signal-repeating drone, born from its Saker Scout drone.

Rostyslav Olenchyn, the company's co-founder and chief information officer, told Business Insider that the drone was widely used for reconnaissance and strike operations, but this war changes rapidly, with arms and warfighting technology quickly becoming obsolete. And without updates, this drone was at risk of falling victim to that pattern in the cat-and-mouse technology race.

Drones needed to be effective at longer ranges, and the Saker Scout's range was "not enough" for many missions. So, the drone was redesigned "for another objective. It became the signal relay station," Olenchyn said.

The Saker Scout, able to also be used in other combat roles, can extend the operational range of drones by more than 50 kilometers, according to the company.

The concept of using aircraft as signal middlemen isn't new. Militaries have used helicopters and planes to relay communications between assets and forces disconnected by the terrain, though usually troops rather than drones. These crewed aircraft, however, struggle to operate over Ukraine, but while such air assets are few and far between, drones are prolific.

Large crewed aircraft cannot "necessarily survive in the heavy saturated air of the battlefield," where drones and air defenses are a threatening presence, Olenchyn said. "So the small, versatile platform was a solution." He said that serial production of the Saker Scout with this function started in 2023.

The company's strike drone, the Signal Hunter, can also be used as a relay.

Other Ukrainian companies are also working in the space, with some updating existing drone types and some designing new ones. Roboneers, for example, developed a version of its Wardog drone that can carry relay equipment weighing up to three kilograms, and Skyriper makes the Skyriper-R Airborne Repeater, a dedicated drone with the single function of acting as an airborne repeater.

Volodymyr Zinovskyi, the CEO of the Ukrainian defense firm TAF Industries, told Business Insider that his company started making relay drones last year at the request of units, describing the technology as going from optional to essential.

Brave1, Ukraine's state-backed innovation platform, wrote last year that "the use of UAVs over long distances or in difficult terrain requires the use of repeaters - special devices that help increase the range of a stable signal several times."

Some Ukrainian drones are built for this relay mission, while others can be fitted with add-on repeater equipment.

Beyond overcoming geographical challenges, airborne repeaters also help counter Russian electronic warfare by strengthening the communications link between operators and mission drones, making it harder to disrupt, though Russia can still target the relay itself.

An analysis published by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a US think tank, last year described the creation of relay systems as a response to growing electronic warfare tactics, including the ability that both sides have to trace drone control signals back to their source for strikes on operators, priority targets in this war.

Dmytro "Liber" Zhluktenko, a former drone operator who now serves as a lessons-learned analyst with Ukraine's 413th Unmanned Systems Regiment "RAID," told Business Insider that Ukrainian forces are "keeping somewhat a stable radio link by mass utilizing signal repeaters."

He said that some uncrewed repeater aircraft are fixed-wing drones, while some are repurposed bomber-type drones. Instead of bombs, it just carries the signal repeater," he said.

"We optimize those signal repeater carriers to just stay in the air for an extremely long time, like one hour plus," he said. "That's their only job: to be in the air." Working with strike drones, they give operators a "great radio link over the target."

Oleksiy, the commander of the 2nd UAV engineer platoon of the International Defense Legion of Ukraine, told ArmyInform, the official information agency of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, last year that his unit uses repeaters on drones to expand the radio horizon of the drones they want to use and fly further to target Russia.

Russia is using the technology too, including to help attack drones fly deeper into Ukrainian territory.

And these lessons aren't limited to the Ukraine war. The US military is also experimenting with ways to extend drone operations and keep operators connected from farther away. The Marine Corps, for instance, has experimented with using helicopters as FPV motherships, as well as handing off control after launch.

Though different from Ukraine's airborne repeater work, both address a similar battlefield problem, which is that drones are only useful if operators can launch them, control them, and keep receiving information at tactically relevant distances.

Olenchyn said that updates, like the signal repeating ability, are critical in combat. He said that every two weeks, the company has "a new update, new kinds of techniques, new kinds of drones or functionality which are released."

The violence accompanying France’s October protests has revealed how foreign influence networks can exploit domestic grievances to undermine governments and European support for Ukraine. New evidence suggests Russian-linked operations were active before the riots, raising questions about whether information manipulation is moving beyond propaganda towards the mobilisation of political unrest.

France’s violent protests have exposed a vulnerability in European security that conventional policing cannot easily address: the ability of foreign information networks to exploit domestic political crises, amplify social divisions and transform legitimate grievances into instruments of geopolitical pressure.

President Emmanuel Macron has acknowledged foreign manipulation of information surrounding the disturbances of 17–18 October but insists there is no evidence that foreign actors organised the violence itself. His assessment reflects the evidence currently available, although new investigations indicate that Russian-linked networks were actively exploiting the protest movement weeks before the worst disorder began.

On 24 October, France deployed approximately 70,000 police officers and gendarmes to prevent further violence. Yet the security operation addresses only the physical consequences of a crisis whose online dimension extends across national borders.

Russia’s operations began before the riots

An investigation published on 22 October by Alliance4Europe provides evidence that Russian-linked information networks were exploiting French discontent well before the disturbances.

Researchers examined 547,471 posts and articles across nine languages. They identified 639 coordinated messages attributed with high confidence to Russia’s Doppelgänger operation, generating approximately 7.4 million views in the six weeks preceding 17 October.

The campaign used genuine concerns about living costs and public expenditure to promote a particular political argument: money allocated to Ukraine was being taken from European citizens.

This was not a random selection of grievances. France’s budget difficulties, public-service pressures and disagreements over defence expenditure provided material through which Moscow could seek to weaken support for Kyiv.

The researchers found that the operation targeted pro-European and pro-Ukraine politicians across the political spectrum. It praised selected proposals associated with Jean-Luc Mélenchon while also promoting nationalist narratives, illustrating a strategy driven less by ideological consistency than by opposition to existing European policies.

From manipulating opinion to encouraging mobilisation

An earlier investigation by EK Strategies, published on 8 October, identified an additional development.

Russian-linked channels were not merely commenting on existing demonstrations. They were circulating protest dates, identifying organisers and encouraging French audiences to follow the example of demonstrators in Germany.

On 28 September, the International Reporters network published an appeal urging French audiences to take to the streets. Other channels subsequently reproduced information about planned school blockades and demonstrations.

In one instance, a channel identified as Gavroche published rhetoric encouraging an attack on France’s Education Ministry.

Such activity goes beyond retrospective propaganda. It attempts to influence participation and behaviour while events are developing. Nevertheless, evidence that a network encouraged protests does not establish that it controlled the organisers or directed subsequent violence.

The original demonstrations arose from domestic grievances over schools, prices and government policy. The significance of the foreign activity lies in attempts to redirect and intensify an existing movement.

How France’s crisis was rewritten abroad

Once violence erupted, the information campaign acquired an international audience.

Alliance4Europe found that claims blaming migrants or Islam for the disturbances appeared in approximately one in 33 French-language posts, compared with nearly one in five English-language posts.

False allegations that immigrants had burned Limoges town hall circulated substantially more frequently in English than in French.

The same report identified 1,018 articles distributed through 28 websites associated with the Russian Pravda network. Their rapid republication across languages enabled a common narrative to reach audiences far beyond France.

The operation also presents a longer-term technological problem. Repeated publication of manipulated accounts can contaminate material subsequently retrieved or reproduced by artificial-intelligence systems, allowing false narratives to persist beyond the original campaign.

The political effects were visible when President Donald Trump and other foreign leaders portrayed France’s unrest principally through immigration and cultural conflict.

Speaking in Qatar on 21 October, Macron rejected these portrayals and criticised the circulation of fabricated AI-generated images. His remarks identified foreign manipulation after the riots but stopped short of alleging foreign responsibility for their organisation.

The Heritage Foundation and transatlantic networks

The transcript raises a more substantial allegation: that the American Heritage Foundation and Russia’s FSB have participated in a coordinated effort to destabilise France.

There are documented connections between the Heritage Foundation and political institutions associated with Hungary’s former prime minister Viktor Orbán.

A 2026 investigation into Hungarian-funded international influence networks established that the Danube Institute had channelled substantial public funding towards foreign researchers and commentators. The institute also maintained a formal relationship with Heritage.

Heritage has acknowledged its cooperation with Hungarian conservative institutions but denied receiving funding or direction from foreign governments.

These relationships demonstrate the development of transatlantic political networks capable of circulating common ideas about sovereignty, migration and European integration.

They do not establish operational cooperation with Russian intelligence. Nor has credible evidence emerged connecting Heritage to the organisation or financing of France’s October riots. Ideological convergence, institutional cooperation and participation in a clandestine operation require separate evidential assessments.

The implications for European security

The European Union’s response has exposed a regulatory problem.

Under the EU’s Digital Services Act, major online platforms must address systemic risks arising from their services, including the amplification of illegal content and threats to public security.

On 23 October, the French government announced enhanced cooperation with digital platforms. More than 100 priority reports had been submitted ahead of the weekend demonstrations, approximately half resulting in account suspensions.

These measures targeted unlawful online activity, particularly incitement to violence and looting. They did not constitute findings that the suspended accounts belonged to foreign intelligence networks.

The European Commission has likewise refrained from activating emergency measures under the Digital Services Act without sufficient evidence connecting foreign manipulation to the violence.

The broader security concern is that foreign operations can exploit the interval between the emergence of social unrest and the establishment of reliable information about its causes.

Russia need not organise an entire protest movement to advance its strategic interests. By amplifying domestic grievances, promoting hostility towards support for Ukraine and circulating distorted accounts internationally, it can attempt to convert France’s internal political difficulties into pressure on European policy.

With France approaching its 2027 presidential election, these operations warrant continuing scrutiny. The central investigative question is no longer simply whether foreign networks spread false information after violence occurred, but whether their activities before and during demonstrations materially influenced mobilisation, radicalisation or political responses.

The evidence currently demonstrates organised manipulation and attempts at amplification. Establishing direct responsibility for violence would require a further evidential step, involving financial records, communications, operational instructions or connections with identifiable perpetrators.

France’s experience illustrates how contemporary information warfare can operate within a democratic society without necessarily directing events on the ground. Its immediate objective may be to alter the political interpretation of a crisis; its longer-term consequence may be to influence the policies adopted in response.