Dopo il Vertice di Teheran la palla è interamente nel campo dell’Asia occidentale. Gli Stati Uniti non sono nemmeno in gioco

Segue nostro Telegram.

L’immagine trasmessa è stata sensazionale.

Il ministro della Difesa saudita, il principe Khalid, fratello di MbS; il capo dei servizi segreti turchi, Ibrahim Kalin; e il capo delle forze armate pakistane, il feldmaresciallo Asim Munir, tutti e tre membri a pieno titolo dell’Alleanza di Difesa della Mecca, entrano in una sala sontuosa del proverbiale palazzo persiano per salutare – o baciare l’anello – del potentato, pardon, del segretario del Consiglio Supremo di Sicurezza Nazionale (SNSC), Moshen Rezaee, numero due della struttura di potere iraniana, subito dopo la Guida Mojtaba Khamenei.

Non si trattava dell’Alleanza di Difesa della Mecca che, apparentemente, sfilava in parata – in rappresentanza dei neo-ottomani, degli arabi e dei sudasiatici. Si trattava del Vertice di Teheran – così come definito dai persiani.

L’Iran aveva acconsentito a tenere questo vertice rivoluzionario – in realtà suggerito da Asim Munir durante la sua visita a Teheran la scorsa settimana – solo al di fuori del quadro dell’accordo della Mecca, ed esplicitamente nell’ambito della discussione sulla «sicurezza regionale endogena».

Pertanto, sì, si è discusso di Palestina, Libano, Yemen, sicurezza del Golfo e dello Stretto di Hormuz, nello spirito di ridurre le proverbiali «tensioni regionali» e porre fine alla guerra degli Stati Uniti contro l’Iran e l’Asse della Resistenza.

Il Vertice di Teheran potrebbe alla fine significare l’accettazione – riluttante o meno – delle richieste di sicurezza dell’Iran e dello status definitivo dello Stretto di Hormuz, attualmente in fase di elaborazione tramite l’accordo Iran-Oman.

Tutto dipende, ovviamente, da ciò che la Casa dei Saud deciderà alla fine. E questa decisione è direttamente legata al modo in cui Riyadh risolverà il suo sanguinoso conflitto con lo Yemen.

Teheran è stata esplicita: siamo pronti a mediare e ad assistere nella risoluzione della questione yemenita; tuttavia, spetta a Riyadh affrontare – e accettare – le condizioni di Ansarallah. Altrimenti, la guerra – già in corso – continuerà.

Analisi delle «sette condizioni»

È stato il dottor Ali Bagheri Kani, il vicessegretario dell’SNSC di grande competenza, a fornire la migliore visione dall’interno di ciò che veniva discusso al tavolo delle trattative.

1. Le quattro nazioni hanno identificato Israele come la principale fonte di instabilità regionale, con l’Iran come bersaglio immediato e altri paesi potenzialmente i prossimi (corsivo mio). L’altra fonte sono gli Stati Uniti. Immaginate il principe Khalid che acconsente a tutto quanto sopra.

Un accordo sulla sicurezza duratura in Asia occidentale deve essere costruito dall’interno, senza dipendere da potenze straniere.

Teheran si è posizionata come l’anello centrale (il corsivo è mio) che collega Arabia Saudita, Turchia e Pakistan. Sentitevi liberi di rimanere sbalorditi.

Tutte e quattro le nazioni hanno concordato di proseguire i colloqui. L’Iran coordinerà il prossimo incontro. Non sono ancora state stabilite né la data né la sede.

Aggiunga ora a questo quadro già sbalorditivo uno speciale «Mohsen Rezaee Unplugged»: era decisamente di umore molto più allegro del solito.

Prenda questo passaggio saliente:

«Percepisco la presenza di una nuova atmosfera nella regione. Si è creata grazie alla resistenza del popolo iraniano e alla capacità delle forze armate. Ho avvertito un’atmosfera estremamente positiva nelle discussioni con questi signori».

Pur elogiando «il successo di questa discussione retorica e delle dichiarazioni», Rezaee si è mostrato cauto: «Abbiamo preferito non rilasciare alcuna dichiarazione in questo momento, ma rilasceremo un’unica dichiarazione congiunta in cui concorderemo su questi punti e raggiungeremo un’intesa; l’attuazione di tali questioni sarà concreta e reale, e procederemo in tal senso».

Nel frattempo, rimane un compito sisifeo: come costringere l’Impero della Pirateria a comprendere la diplomazia in Asia occidentale.

Bagheri-Kani: «Gli Stati Uniti devono soddisfare le sette condizioni dell’Iran». Ha poi aggiunto: «Rezaee ha menzionato oggi che il piano di sette giorni potrebbe essere ridotto a cinque giorni o addirittura a quattro».

Analizziamo questi numeri.

Le sette condizioni rimangono le stesse: sono la versione sintetica di quel «gatto morto» ricorrente, il Memorandum d’intesa (MoU), che lo stesso Trump ha strappato e sul quale insiste nel dire che non abbia alcun significato.

Ricapitoliamo: revoca delle sanzioni; cessazione delle minacce militari; riconoscimento del diritto dell’Iran all’uso pacifico dell’energia nucleare; cessazione del sostegno a Israele; riconoscimento dei diritti sovrani dell’Iran sullo Stretto di Ormuz; cessazione delle interferenze negli affari interni dell’Iran; e fornitura di garanzie credibili contro future aggressioni.
Persino i cammelli nel cuore del Nejd sanno che gli «Eccezionali» non adempiranno mai a nessuno di questi impegni.

Ciò che cambia ora è la tempistica. Secondo il piano originale, nell’improbabile eventualità che gli Stati Uniti avessero soddisfatto le condizioni, il sesto giorno lo Stretto di Ormuz sarebbe stato aperto; e il settimo giorno, come per volere divino, sarebbero iniziati i negoziati.
La nuova proposta di Rezaee può essere interpretata solo come una gioiosa provocazione: tutto può essere fatto in cinque giorni o addirittura in quattro, perché no?

Rezaee sta sostanzialmente affermando che tutte e sette le condizioni rimangono valide; ma se Trump fosse davvero interessato ai negoziati (non lo è: vuole una capitolazione), l’Iran non avrebbe bisogno di attendere sette giorni. Ne bastano quattro.

Qualunque cosa accada in seguito – e dopo le elezioni di medio termine negli Stati Uniti potrebbe benissimo verificarsi un attacco militare alla Trump – è Teheran a dettare ancora i tempi. Oltre alle sette condizioni – che costituiscono i prerequisiti per qualsiasi negoziazione. Oltre alla tempistica. Oltre al fatto che, in assenza di progressi, lo Stretto di Ormuz rimarrà chiuso.
Ciò che Bagheri-Kani e Rezaee – i due massimi responsabili della sicurezza – stanno sottolineando è che l’Iran ha presentato una fattura all’Impero della Pirateria. A proposito, ogni singola voce della fattura è già stata approvata dallo stesso Presidente degli Stati Uniti, per quanto egli cerchi di svicolare.

O sicurezza “endogena” o nulla

A prima vista, l’Alleanza di Difesa della Mecca avrebbe dovuto essere vista come un potente allineamento di sicurezza e difesa collettiva guidato dai sunniti.

Eppure l’ultima cosa che l’Impero della Pirateria, strategicamente svantaggiato, si aspetterebbe è che il trio iniziasse a esplorare vie di cooperazione con la nazione che era stato costretto a considerare una minaccia esistenziale.

Non sottovalutate mai i persiani. Dimostrando la loro consueta finezza, ciò che hanno appena fatto è stato ribaltare strategicamente il contenimento dell’Iran.

Nel prossimo futuro l’Iran potrebbe persino prendere in considerazione l’adesione all’Alleanza di Difesa della Mecca – che non pochi studiosi musulmani autorevoli descrivono effettivamente come una blasfemia nei confronti della Mecca.

Prima di ciò, gli «sceicchi del petrolio» – quelle controparti del Golfo Persico dei «chihuahua del Baltico» – potrebbero andare incontro alla loro rovina, qualora si rivelassero incapaci di disinnescare l’incessante incitamento anglo-salafita alle guerre settarie.

Gli iraniani sono devoti della sacra Mecca e di Medina tanto quanto gli yemeniti – poiché entrambi i popoli furono direttamente elogiati dal Profeta (gli iraniani furono indicati come impareggiabili nel discernimento della conoscenza e nella ricerca della saggezza).

E ciò spiega in definitiva perché questo incontro sia stato definito «Vertice di Teheran» – senza alcun nesso con l’idea di un patto della «Mecca».

Per quanto riguarda gli yemeniti, Mohammad Ali al-Houthi, membro chiave del Consiglio politico supremo di Ansarallah, ha posto le cose in chiaro: ha criticato aspramente le affermazioni dell’Arabia Saudita secondo cui la visita del principe Khalid a Teheran mirerebbe a un allentamento delle tensioni nella regione, sottolineando che la retorica diplomatica di Riyadh è in contraddizione con il protrarsi della guerra, del blocco e dell’occupazione dello Yemen.

Dopo il Vertice di Teheran, la Guida Mojtaba Khamenei ha incontrato di persona Mohsen Rezaee. Il Numero Uno che parla con il Numero Due.

Khamenei ha esplicitamente chiesto di porre fine all’attuale stato di «né guerra né pace» garantendo il rispetto delle sette condizioni e «mantenendo il controllo sullo Stretto di Ormuz».

Rezaee ha infatti illustrato a Khamenei l’idea di una sicurezza «endogena» in tutta l’Asia occidentale. Si tratta di una controparte diretta della spinta russa verso l’«indivisibilità della sicurezza» alla fine del 2021, alla quale gli Stati Uniti e la NATO avevano allora risposto con un silenzio elocitante.

Eppure ora la palla è interamente nel campo dell’Asia occidentale. Gli Stati Uniti non sono nemmeno in gioco. Spetta alla Turchia, all’Arabia Saudita, al Pakistan e all’Iran far sì che ciò avvenga.

Trabajadores portuarios de 22 países protagonizan una huelga internacional para exigir el fin de la ofensiva israelí en Gaza y bloquear el transporte de armamento.

Ankara, 30 oct (Prensa Latina) El presidente de Türkiye, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, afirmó hoy que la solidaridad entre los Estados túrquicos constituye una necesidad estratégica ante las crisis y conflictos internacionales y la falta de justicia y confianza en el sistema mundial.

The post Erdogan considera estratégica la solidaridad entre Estados túrquicos first appeared on Noticias Prensa Latina.

Managua, 30 oct (Prensa Latina) Nicaragua y Türkiye reafirmaron su compromiso de fortalecer la cooperación bilateral durante la celebración del aniversario 103 de la fundación de la República turca, realizada en esta capital, trascendió hoy.

The post Nicaragua y Türkiye reafirman voluntad de fortalecer cooperación first appeared on Noticias Prensa Latina.

By Peiman Salehi | The Cradle | October 28, 2026

The presence of Saudi, Turkish, and Pakistani officials in Tehran on 26 October reflected a growing recognition that Iran cannot be excluded from any serious regional security arrangement. Despite the US–Israeli war against Iran, Tehran remains central to the region’s military and political balance.

For Riyadh and its partners, the meeting also exposed the limits of the Mecca defense pact, particularly as Saudi Arabia faces renewed confrontation with the Ansarallah-aligned Yemeni Armed Forces (YAF).

Much of the speculation surrounding the four-country meeting centered on what Iran might be expected to surrender, particularly its relationship with Sanaa. Such expectations rested on the assumption that Saudi Arabia, Turkiye, and Pakistan had established a regional security order into which Iran was now seeking admission, with Tehran potentially offering concessions over Yemen in return.

Yet the political and military circumstances that brought the participants to Tehran suggest a different calculation. Iran has withstood sustained American and Israeli attacks, while Saudi Arabia and its partners have struggled to contain the YAF’s military operations. Any agreement that disregards these realities risks reproducing the confrontations it seeks to resolve.

Iran’s Foreign Ministry had identified Israel’s expansionist policies, Lebanon, and the US war against Iran among the subjects for discussion. Yemen was absent from the announced agenda and the subsequent press statement.

Ali Bagheri, deputy secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, said the gathering also served to congratulate Mohsen Rezaei, the council’s newly appointed secretary, and discuss regional security, including opposition to foreign interference, particularly by Washington. According to information obtained by The Cradle, Yemen was not discussed during the meeting.

On the morning of 27 October, a day after the talks, Rezaei met Yemen’s ambassador, Ibrahim Mohammad al-Dailami, in Tehran. Rezaei praised Yemen’s defense of Gaza and its confrontation with Israel, while the ambassador thanked him and the Iranian government for their positions.

The encounter came amid speculation that Tehran’s diplomatic engagement with Riyadh might come at the expense of its relationship with Sanaa. By publicly reaffirming those ties immediately after the summit, Iran signaled its intention to pursue regional diplomacy while maintaining its existing alliances.

Hossein Shariatmadari, editor of Iran’s conservative daily Kayhan, wrote in a 27 October editorial that “Yemen’s revolutionaries are allies of Islamic Iran.” He warned that the visiting delegations might seek to create the impression that Tehran was distancing itself from Sanaa, offering Washington and its allies “breathing room, however brief” by encouraging expectations of an imminent settlement.

The Mecca pact’s limits

Iran has good reason to approach the Saudi–Turkish–Pakistani framework, commonly known as the Mecca pact, with caution. The agreement brings together three states with substantial military capabilities and extensive relations with Washington, raising questions about whether their security cooperation could eventually be directed against the Axis of Resistance.

For Riyadh, Yemen remains a central concern. Years of confrontation with the YAF have demonstrated Sanaa’s ability to impose high military and economic costs beyond Yemen’s borders. Saudi Arabia’s renewed campaign has again brought its energy infrastructure and military installations within range of Yemeni retaliation, exposing the limits of the kingdom’s reliance on foreign military protection.

In Tehran, closer military coordination among the pact’s members could be seen as an attempt to contain the Axis of Resistance at a time when American security guarantees are becoming increasingly uncertain.

Iran’s participation in talks with the pact’s members carries no commitment to join their alliance. Tehran has made no such announcement, while Rezaei’s explanation of the summit emphasized the establishment of security through regional cooperation, the withdrawal of foreign forces, and an end to outside interference.

These objectives leave considerable differences between the participants. Saudi Arabia, Turkiye, and Pakistan maintain security relationships with Washington, while Iran regards the American military presence as a principal source of regional instability. Their respective positions on armed resistance movements, Israeli aggression, and the obligations of any collective defense arrangement also remain unresolved.

The meeting produced a brief press statement confirming the participants’ intention to continue their dialogue, without setting out binding commitments. Rezaei indicated that further meetings would follow, suggesting that the four governments were exploring the foundations of a wider regional accommodation.

The initiative itself emerged from Pakistani army chief Asim Munir’s visit to Tehran the previous week, according to information obtained by The Cradle. Iranian officials also confirmed Pakistan’s proposal, describing the gathering as an opportunity to advance regional security arrangements based on shared interests and mutual trust.

Riyadh’s security dilemma

The Saudi–Turkish–Pakistani alliance combines considerable military resources, diplomatic influence, and strategic relationships. Its effectiveness, however, depends on the willingness of its members to confront threats that may carry very different consequences for each country.

The limited assistance Pakistan and Turkiye have provided during the renewed confrontation between Yemen and Saudi Arabia illustrates these constraints. Although both countries have pledged support for Riyadh, their involvement has fallen short of the decisive intervention that might alter the military balance with the YAF.

Kayhan was more scathing in its assessment, accusing Turkiye and Pakistan of having “milked Saudi Arabia and done nothing.”

Saudi Arabia’s own account of the visit was more restrained. In a statement following the meeting, Riyadh said the talks formed part of efforts to de-escalate tensions, encourage diplomatic solutions, and support mediation by Qatar and Pakistan. It also reaffirmed the Mecca pact’s role in promoting regional security and stability.

Islamabad and Ankara have also sought to limit their military involvement. Turkish officials have ruled out offensive operations against Yemen, while Pakistan has denied reports that its aircraft carried out strikes on Yemeni forces. These restrictions expose the distance between the pact’s collective defense commitments and its members’ willingness to enter a wider war.

The continuing Yemeni operations against Saudi targets have consequently strengthened the argument for direct engagement with Tehran. Riyadh must weigh the costs of further confrontation against the possibility of reaching an understanding with Iran, whose regional relationships and military capabilities remain central to the wider balance of power.

Despite the damage inflicted during the war, Tehran has retained the ability to influence the course and costs of regional confrontation. Its leverage over the Strait of Hormuz and its capacity to retaliate against military infrastructure have complicated Washington’s efforts to impose a settlement on its own terms.

These developments have strengthened Tehran’s negotiating position, although translating military endurance into a durable security arrangement will require more than the recognition of its regional weight. Tehran must also demonstrate that cooperation with its neighbors can reduce the likelihood of renewed war without undermining the relationships that have helped it withstand external pressure.

For Saudi Arabia, the lesson is equally significant. Its security cannot be guaranteed indefinitely through military partnerships that exclude one of the region’s principal powers, particularly when those partnerships have struggled to prevent attacks on Saudi territory.

Yemen cannot be traded

The suggestion that Tehran might trade its relationship with Ansarallah for concessions from Riyadh overlooks the movement’s independent political interests and roots in Yemen. Ansarallah’s resistance to Saudi intervention grew out of a prolonged struggle over the country’s political future, during which its ties with Iran deepened.

The two sides share important strategic interests, but Yemen’s military and political decisions cannot be reduced to directives from Tehran. The YAF’s intervention in support of Gaza, its confrontation with Israel, and its continuing war with Saudi Arabia reflect calculations shaped by Yemen’s own circumstances.

Iran’s regional relationships have also evolved through years of confrontation with Washington and Tel Aviv. The Islamic Republic’s resistance to American and Israeli pressure has become inseparable from its wider regional security calculations, particularly as the war has intensified the threats facing its allies.

Sanaa has paid a substantial price for its military and political positions, enduring years of bombardment, blockade, and attempts to dismantle its authority. Ansarallah’s survival has given it considerable influence over Yemen’s future, making any settlement negotiated without its participation unlikely to produce lasting results.

The assumption that Tehran could simply secure Yemeni compliance also underestimates the political consequences of such an arrangement. The Sanaa government would have little reason to accept an agreement that disregards its security interests or leaves Saudi military pressure intact.

Rezaei’s meeting with the Yemeni ambassador therefore served an important political purpose. As Tehran opened discussions with the Mecca pact’s members, it reaffirmed a relationship whose continuity remains important to the wider Resistance Axis.

Israel’s declining leverage

The summit’s joint statement made no reference to Israel, but Rezaei’s subsequent account of the talks placed Israeli military operations among the issues discussed. He said the participants had emphasized ending Israeli attacks and securing Israel’s withdrawal from occupied territories in Lebanon, Syria, and Palestine.

Before Operation Al-Aqsa Flood, Saudi–Israeli normalization was a serious diplomatic prospect. Washington sought to advance Israel’s integration into a regional security and economic framework that would strengthen its position while isolating Iran and its allies.

The wars that followed have disrupted those calculations. Israel’s military campaigns across West Asia, alongside the American war against Iran, have exposed the risks associated with a regional order built around Israeli military superiority and US security guarantees.

Rezaei’s public emphasis on Israeli aggression reflects the changing circumstances in which the talks took place. Riyadh has not formally adopted his characterization in the joint statement and maintains its longstanding relationship with Washington, but Saudi security concerns have increasingly brought it into direct contact with Tehran despite years of hostility.

The contrast with 2017 is especially revealing. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MbS) then threatened to take the confrontation inside Iran, reflecting Riyadh’s confidence in its ability to challenge Tehran through regional pressure and military alliances.

Nearly a decade later, Saudi officials are in Tehran discussing regional security with the same government Riyadh once threatened to attack. Years of confrontation have failed to break Iran’s regional influence, while Washington’s ability to shield its allies from another war is increasingly in doubt.

Yemen’s ability to remain a consequential military actor despite years of Saudi-led operations has also shaped this reassessment. Its continued resistance has demonstrated the limits of attempts to impose regional arrangements through military force.

Tehran’s next move

The summit’s lasting significance will depend on whether the participating governments can translate their discussions into practical security arrangements. Iran has an opportunity to advance its longstanding position that West Asia’s security must be determined by the countries of the region, without dependence on foreign military intervention.

Such an arrangement would require Saudi Arabia, Turkiye, and Pakistan to recognize Iran’s security concerns and its existing alliances. Tehran would also have to address its neighbors’ security concerns without compromising those relationships.

The presence of all four countries in Tehran suggests that these questions are now receiving serious attention. Rezaei’s subsequent meeting with Yemen’s ambassador also indicated the basis on which Iran intends to participate: regional cooperation alongside continued support for its established allies.

Any regional agreement must also account for Yemen and the other members of the Axis of Resistance. Their military and political weight cannot be ignored, nor can their futures be decided through negotiations between Tehran and its neighbors.

Iran has emerged from the war with its regional alliances intact and greater room to negotiate. The question now is whether Riyadh and its partners are prepared to reach an understanding with Tehran that recognizes those alliances rather than seeking to dismantle them.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan told US President Donald Trump by phone on 28 October that Türkiye is ready to support efforts to revive Ukraine-Russia diplomacy and end the war that way, the Turkish presidency’s Directorate of Communications said. The same day, a White House official said the US will join the next round of talks with Kyiv and Moscow.

Talks between Ukraine, Russia, and the US have been stalled since winter, and the fight now is over timing. On 27 October, Zelenskyy said Kyiv wants that round before a Putin-Trump-Xi summit, which would leave Ukraine out of the room. Putin proposed that summit, The Wall Street Journal reported. Ankara’s statement names neither track, but Ukraine sits at the table only in the first.

Ankara offers support, but no date or venue

The statement named no date or Turkish venue. In July, Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan said in Kyiv that the Türkiye-mediated Istanbul talks should continue in the same format. Türkiye hosted Russia-Ukraine talks in 2022 and 2025. The 2 June 2025 round in Istanbul ended with a prisoner swap deal but no ceasefire. In March, Zelenskyy named Türkiye among possible venues.

Everyone says soon, but no date is set

On 28 October, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov claimed it was premature to talk about Abu Dhabi: a contact was expected soon and Abu Dhabi had been mentioned as a venue, but Russia was still preparing. Kremlin aide Yuri Ushakov claimed the talks would come after 4 November, with the date depending in part on the battlefield. On 27 October, Ukrainian presidential adviser Dmytro Lytvyn told journalists it was too early for announcements. A day later, Zelenskyy told The Sun that the round could come as soon as 10 November.

The White House official told Türkiye Today that the US “looks forward to participating in the next round of trilateral talks, which will take place soon.” The outlet’s question on whether Istanbul was considered had gone unanswered by publication.

Trump told reporters on 28 October that a meeting with Putin and Zelenskyy would be set up soon. The Kremlin keeps its condition. Ushakov claimed on 27 October that such a contact makes the most sense after the negotiation process ends, and repeated that Zelenskyy should come to Moscow.

Another mediator does not decide which meeting comes first. Kyiv and Moscow have both confirmed Abu Dhabi, Zelenskyy said, so it now depends on the US side. Earlier this month, Trump said he waived new sanctions on Russia so as not to drive Moscow from the talks.

Islamabad, 29 oct (Prensa Latina) El presidente de Pakistán, Asif Ali Zardari, abogó hoy por fortalecer la prolongada asociación de su país con Türkiye mediante una cooperación más estrecha en comercio, inversión, defensa, educación, cultura y otras áreas.

The post Pakistán aboga por afianzar asociación estratégica con Türkiye first appeared on Noticias Prensa Latina.

The ball is entirely on West Asia’s court. The U.S. is not even on the table.

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Contact us: info@strategic-culture.su

The optics were sensational.

The Saudi Minister of Defense, Prince Khalid, brother of MbS; the Turkey head of intel, Ibrahim Kalin; and the military head of Pakistan, Field Marshal Asim Munir, all three full members of the Mecca Defense Alliance, enter a lavish room in the proverbial Persian palace to greet – or kiss the ring – of the potentate, sorry, secretary of the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), Moshen Rezaee, number two of the Iranian power structure right below Leader Mojtaba Khamenei.

This was not the Mecca Defense Alliance ostensibly on parade – representing neo-Ottomans, Arabs and South Asians. This was the Tehran Summit – as defined by the Persians.

Iran had only agreed to hold this ground-breaking summit – actually suggested by Asim Munir during his visit to Tehran last week – outside of the framework of the Mecca deal, and explicitly within the framework of discussing “endogenous regional security.”

So yes, they did discuss Palestine, Lebanon, Yemen, Gulf security and the Strait of Hormuz, in the spirit of reducing the proverbial “regional tensions” and ending the U.S. war against Iran and the Axis of Resistance.

The Tehran Summit may eventually signify the – reluctant or otherwise – acceptance of Iran’s security demands and the final status of the Strait of Hormuz, being elaborated via the Iran-Oman agreement.

It all depends, of course, on what the House of Saud will finally decide. And this decision is directly linked to how Riyadh will solve its deadly clash against Yemen.

Tehran was explicit: we are prepared to mediate and assist in resolving the Yemen dossier; however, it’s up to Riyadh to address – and accept – Ansarallah’s conditions. Otherwise, the – pre-existing – war will keep going on.

Deconstructing the “seven conditions”

It was Dr. Ali Bagheri Kani, the immensely competent Deputy Secretary of the SNSC, who offered the best inside view of what was being discussed at the table.

1.The four nations identified Israel as the main source of regional instability, with Iran as its immediate target and other countries potentially next (italics mine). The other source is the United States. Imagine Prince Khalid agreeing to all of the above.

2. An agreement on lasting security in West Asia must be built from within, without dependence on foreign powers.
3. Tehran positioned itself as the central link (italics mine) connecting Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan. Feel free to be gobsmacked.
4. All four nations agreed to continue talking. Iran will coordinate the next meeting. No date or location yet.

Now add to this already stunning framework a Mohsen Rezaee Unplugged special: he was definitely in a much more cheerful mood than usual.

Take this highlight:

“I feel the presence of a new atmosphere in the region. It has formed thanks to the resistance of the Iranian people and the capability of the armed forces. I have sensed an extremely positive atmosphere in the discussions with these gentlemen.”

Even as he praised “the success of this rhetorical discussion and statements”, Rezaee was cautious: “We preferred not to issue any statement at the present time, but we will issue a single joint statement in which we agree on these points and reach an understanding, and the implementation of these matters will be practical and real, and we will move forward with them.”

Meanwhile, a Sisyphean task remains: how to force the Empire of Piracy to understand diplomacy in West Asia.

Bagheri-Kani: “The United States must fulfill Iran’s seven conditions.” He then added, “Rezaee mentioned today that the seven-day plan could be shortened to five days or even four.”

Let’s deconstruct these numbers.

The seven conditions remain the same: they are the abridged version of that serially dead cat, the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), which Trump himself tore up and insists it means nothing.

Recap: lifting sanctions; ceasing military threats; recognizing Iran’s right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy; ending support for Israel; acknowledging Iran’s sovereign rights over the Strait of Hormuz; halting interference in Iran’s internal affairs; and providing credible guarantees against future aggression.

Even camels in the middle of the Nejd know the Exceptionals will never fulfill any of these commitments.

What changes now is the timeline. According to the original plan, in the unlikely event the U.S. would fulfill the conditions, on the sixth day the Strait of Hormuz would be opened; and on the seventh day, like in an act of divine will, negotiations would begin.

Rezaee’s new proposal can only be interpreted as a joyful tease: everything can be done in five days or even four days, why not?

Rezaee is essentially saying that all the seven conditions remain; but if Trump is really interested in negotiations (he’s not: he wants a capitulation), Iran doesn’t need to wait for seven days. Four will do.

Whatever happens next – and after the U.S. mid-terms might well be a Trumpian military attack – it’s Tehran that still runs the clock. Plus the seven conditions – which are the prerequisites for any negotiation. Plus the timeframe. Plus the fact that if there’s no movement, the Strait of Hormuz will remain closed.

What Bagheri-Kani and Rezaee – the top two security guys – are emphasizing is that Iran has presented an invoice to the Empire of Piracy. By the way, every single item on the invoice has already been signed off on by POTUS himself, however he tries to extricate himself.

It’s “endogenous” security or bust

At first sight the Mecca Defense Alliance was supposed to be seen as a powerful Sunni-led collective security/defense alignment.

Yet the last thing the strategically deprived Empire of Piracy would expect is that the trio would start exploring avenues of cooperation with the nation they were being forced to treat as an existential threat.

Never underestimate the Persians. Displaying their usual finesse, what they have just done is to strategically turn containment of Iran on its head.

In the near future Iran might even contemplate joining the Mecca Defense Alliance – which quite a few serious Muslim scholars actually describe as a blasphemy on Mecca.

Before that, the petro-sheikhs – those Persian Gulf counterparts of the Baltic chihuahuas – may have met their doom, in case they are helpless to defuse the relentless Anglo-Salafi incitement of sectarian wars.

Iranians are as much worshippers of sacred Mecca and Medina as Yemenis – as both were directly praised by the Prophet (Iranians were singled out as unparalleled in the discernment of knowledge and the pursuit of wisdom).

And that ultimately explains why this meeting was defined as the Tehran Summit – with nothing to do with the notion of a “Mecca” pact.

As for Yemenis, Mohammad Ali al-Houthi, a key member of Ansarallah’s Supreme Political Council, laid down the law: he blasted Saudi Arabia’s claims of seeking regional de-escalation through Prince Khalid’s visit to Tehran, emphasizing that Riyadh’s diplomatic rhetoric contradicts the continued war, blockade, and occupation of Yemen.

After the Tehran Summit, Leader Mojtaba Khamenei met Mohsen Rezaee in person. Number One talking to Number Two.

Khamenei explicitly called for ending the current state of “neither war nor peace” by ensuring that the seven conditions are met, and by “maintaining control over the Strait of Hormuz.”

Rezaee actually briefed Khamenei on the idea of “endogenous” security across West Asia. Talk about a direct counterpart to the Russian drive for “indivisibility of security” in late 2021, which was then met by a non-response response by the U.S. and NATO.

Yet now, the ball is entirely on West Asia’s court. The U.S. is not even on the table. It’s up to Turkey, Saudi, Pakistan and Iran to make it happen.

Ankara, 29 oct (Prensa Latina) El presidente de Türkiye, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, afirmó hoy que su país y Kazajistán reforzarán la alianza estratégica mediante nuevas medidas para ampliar la cooperación en comercio, inversiones, energía, transporte e industria de defensa.

The post Türkiye y Kazajistán acuerdan fortalecer su alianza estratégica first appeared on Noticias Prensa Latina.

Senior officials from Iran, Pakistan, Turkey and Saudi Arabia begin a security meeting in Tehran.

By Junaid S. Ahmad | MEMO | October 27, 2026

For nearly half a century, Iran’s adversaries have tried to isolate it, intimidate it, sanction it into submission and bomb it into irrelevance. Now, in a remarkable inversion of regional power politics, three countries historically invested in its containment have arrived in Tehran to discuss their security with the very state they were supposed to marginalise.

The country they could not defeat is becoming the country they cannot afford to ignore.

Yesterday, Saudi Defence Minister Prince Khalid bin Salman, Pakistan’s army chief Field Marshal Asim Munir and Turkish intelligence chief Ibrahim Kalın met Iranian officials in an encounter whose diplomatic courtesies barely concealed its strategic significance.

The Mecca Pact, the joint defence agreement that Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan signed in Mecca in August, was supposed to consolidate a formidable Sunni-led defence alignment. Yet its representatives have come to Tehran confronting an inconvenient reality: Iran cannot be excluded from regional security merely because Washington and its partners find its independence intolerable.

Apparently, the Islamic Republic has become considerably more respectable since demonstrating that it cannot be conveniently eliminated.

This is the distinction between military destruction and strategic defeat that Washington and Israel persistently confuse. Overwhelming firepower can devastate infrastructure, assassinate officials and inflict enormous suffering. It cannot manufacture political submission.

Iran has survived military confrontation, retained retaliatory capabilities and forced neighbouring governments to reconsider the potentially catastrophic consequences of another war.

Survival becomes strategic victory when your adversaries must reorganise their calculations around it.

For Saudi Arabia, the reckoning is particularly humiliating. Riyadh spent decades treating American military supremacy as an insurance policy against Iranian influence. Yemen exposed the bankruptcy of that assumption.

Ansar Allah, Yemen’s Houthi movement, demonstrated that superior arsenals cannot guarantee security against an adversary capable of imposing disproportionate costs. The Saudi monarchy possesses spectacular weaponry, immense wealth and powerful patrons. Yet none of these has eliminated its vulnerability to Yemeni retaliation.

Now Riyadh finds itself seeking Tehran’s cooperation to manage a conflict that its military superiority has failed to resolve.

Evidently, purchasing American weapons is considerably easier than purchasing strategic security.

Pakistan’s predicament is scarcely less revealing. Munir presides over a military establishment accustomed to presenting strategic dependency as diplomatic sophistication. Islamabad’s defence commitments to Riyadh now threaten to entangle Pakistan in confrontations with Iran and Yemen that serve neither its geography nor its national interests.

The Mecca Pact promises collective security. Its less advertised feature is collective exposure to somebody else’s strategic miscalculations.

Munir must now reconcile his obligations to Saudi patrons with the inconvenient realities of Iranian power. It is an awkward assignment for an establishment that has repeatedly mistaken proximity to foreign power for genuine strategic independence.

Türkiye confronts a different calculation but reaches a similar conclusion. Ankara understands that NATO membership, military capabilities and regional ambitions cannot abolish geography. No credible security architecture can be constructed by pretending Iran is dispensable.

The deeper contradiction, however, lies within the Mecca Pact itself.

Its members seek the reassurance of collective defence while attempting to avoid being dragged into another American-Israeli confrontation. An attack on one may formally constitute an attack on all. But such commitments become considerably less attractive when Iranian retaliation, Yemeni escalation and vulnerable Gulf infrastructure enter the equation.

Collective defence sounds magnificent until someone presents the collective bill.

Iran’s achievement is not that its neighbours have embraced its revolutionary worldview. They have not. Saudi Arabia remains deeply connected to Washington, Pakistan continues its elaborate balancing act, and Türkiye remains embedded in NATO.

The significance runs deeper: these governments increasingly recognise that excluding Iran from regional security may expose them to greater dangers than engaging it.

That realisation strikes at the foundations of the American security paradigm.

For decades, Washington cultivated regional dependence on American protection while organising strategic anxieties around Iranian power. Now those same governments are exploring cooperation with the country they were encouraged to regard as an existential threat.

The irony is devastating. Decades of attempting to contain Iran may have helped establish its indispensability.

And Tehran, displaying the composure of a state conscious of its diplomatic leverage, has welcomed its visitors graciously. No triumphalist declarations are necessary. The spectacle speaks adequately for itself.

The Mecca Pact arrived ostensibly to discuss regional stability. What it encountered was the strategic consequence of its own failed assumptions.

Iran did not have to join the alliance. The alliance had to come to Iran.

Machine tools and other equipment from seven countries, led by China, work at Russian plants that make ballistic missiles and their components, Ukraine’s military intelligence (HUR) said on 26 October. The 30 items are a small slice of HUR’s War&Sanctions portal, which lists 1,698 machine tools at 223 Russian plants.

Seventeen of the 30 were made outside China, in Germany, Taiwan, the US, Türkiye, Switzerland, and Italy. One of HUR’s proposals reaches past Russia and China, to the firms that supply parts for Chinese machine tools. The list comes two weeks after the EU blacklisted 1,569 Russian arms suppliers and executives. More than half of those listings hit the ballistic missile supply chain, EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas said. Sanctioning a company, though, does not stop the machines in its workshops.

A Chinese machine at the Iskander plant

HUR’s statement leads with a GX-650 five-axis machining center made by China’s Hyper Machine Tool. Such computer-controlled machines cut complex metal parts from several angles. HUR said it works at the Votkinsk Plant, which the agency described as the maker of 9M723 missiles for the Iskander-M system and the missile section of the Kh-47M2 Kinzhal, an air-launched ballistic missile.

HUR has flagged Votkinsk before. In November 2025, it published hackathon findings showing that Russian companies supplied Chinese and Taiwanese machine tools to the plant after the full-scale invasion began.

Chinese Shtral turning and milling centers work at PEMZ Molot, which builds electronics units for Iskander-M missiles, according to HUR’s statement. At UPKB Detal, which makes altimeters for hypersonic Zircon cruise missiles, HUR found measuring equipment from Germany’s Rohde & Schwarz.

The portal entries paint a broader picture. Only four of the 30 entries list a ballistic missile among the plant’s weapons. Most of the rest list cruise missiles, glide-bomb kits, guided artillery shells, or Geran-2 attack drones. HUR did not publish its evidence, though the portal says partner agencies can request it.

Foreign parts inside Chinese machines

Russian plants use the equipment to make missiles and parts such as altimeters, control surfaces, and gyroscopes, HUR said. The agency noted a growing number of Chinese machine tools, including five-axis models. According to HUR, those Chinese machines contain European, Japanese, and Taiwanese components, from numerical control systems to precision spindles and bearings. In HUR’s assessment, Russia still cannot replace equipment from leading foreign makers with its own.

An animal stepped on a mudbrick while it was still soft and left its paw prints in the clay. The brick went into the wall of a house. The house burned and collapsed. About 4,000 years later, archaeologists pulled the brick out of the rubble, prints still visible. Turkey’s Minister of Culture and Tourism, Mehmet […]

Ankara, 27 oct (Prensa Latina) El presidente del Parlamento de Türkiye, Numan Kurtulmus, afirmó que la causa palestina es justa y defendió el establecimiento de un Estado palestino libre con Jerusalén como capital, divulgó hoy la agencia Anadolu.

The post Un Estado palestino libre es imprescindible, afirma Türkiye first appeared on Noticias Prensa Latina.

La agenda oficial del encuentro abordó las consecuencias del conflicto impulsado por Estados Unidos e Israel, la situación en Palestina y el Líbano, así como el panorama militar en Yemen.

Press TV – October 26, 2026

Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Esmaeil Baghaei says a meeting in Tehran with senior officials from Turkey, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia could lay the groundwork for a regional security framework based on the interests and decisions of countries in the region.

Speaking at a weekly press conference on Monday, Baghaei said Tehran would host Saudi Arabia’s defense minister, Pakistan’s army chief and Turkey’s intelligence chief as part of an initiative to discuss regional security.

He stated that the initiative was proposed during Pakistani Army Chief Asim Munir’s visit to Tehran and was welcomed by the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Responding to a question from IRNA about the purpose and format of the gathering, Baghaei said the participation of senior officials from the three countries reflected efforts to explore mechanisms for regional security.

“From our perspective, the fact that regional countries are seeking to establish, or at least consider, regional security mechanisms based on their own interests and concerns is a welcome development,” he said.

“This meeting could serve as a prelude to further steps toward shaping endogenous security, an issue we have insisted on for decades. We have consistently emphasized that regional security can only be ensured by relying on the will and security considerations of the countries of the region,” Baghaei added.

He noted that developments over the past two years, particularly the past eight months, had demonstrated the importance of cooperation among regional countries.

“Recent events have shown that sustainable and reliable security in our region can only be achieved through building trust and cooperation among regional countries,” the spokesman said.

Baghaei said the visiting officials would hold discussions with the Iranian president and the secretary of the Supreme National Security Council.

As this is the first meeting of its kind, he said, a range of issues would be on the agenda, with regional security challenges expected to feature prominently.

“Such a meeting cannot be held without taking into account the consequences of the United States’ military aggression against Iran for the security of the entire region,” Baghaei said, describing the issue as another important subject that should be considered within the framework of regional security discussions.

Deputy Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Ali Bagheri Kani said the three senior officials are scheduled to meet with SNSC Secretary Major General Mohsen Rezaei and participate in a joint session on Monday.

Regional countries must strengthen capabilities to counter Israel

Responding to reports of disagreements between Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and the Israeli army chief over a possible attack on Iran, Baghaei said such differences would have no impact on Iran’s defensive preparedness.

“Despite possible differences in tactics, this group is united in its aggression and expansionism,” he said, adding that the regime’s actions across the region showed it was pursuing a common course aimed at undermining regional security.

He stressed that regional countries must enhance their capabilities to confront the Israeli regime’s threats and destabilizing actions.

Iran unconcerned about who rules in Israeli regime

Commenting on the upcoming Knesset elections in the occupied territories, Baghaei dismissed the process as a genuine democratic election, describing it instead as competition among rival groups seeking to commit greater crimes.

“For us, it makes no difference who ultimately takes the helm of the Zionist regime,” he said, noting that its record had brought nothing to the region but violence and bloodshed.

Armed forces will firmly counter threats

Responding to reports about the deployment of drone bases near Iran, Baghaei said Iran’s relevant authorities were closely monitoring developments surrounding the country, including reports of drone bases near its borders and Ukrainian activities in Iraq and the Iraqi Kurdistan region.

“Those responsible for monitoring these developments are following the situation carefully and will act whenever necessary to defend the country and repel hostile actions and threats,” he said.

He emphasized that Iran’s armed forces had firmly defended the country whenever threats or hostile activities targeted its territory and would continue to do so.

Europe part of the problem

Baghaei expressed doubt that European countries had genuinely changed their approach toward Iran, pointing out that their renewed emphasis on diplomacy could amount to a political gesture.

He slammed Europeans for contributing to the crisis by aligning with the United States over the so-called snapback mechanism and failing to condemn US-Israeli military aggression against Iran’s nuclear facilities.

Baghaei said Tehran hoped the three European countries would assess regional developments more realistically and adopt an independent and constructive approach toward West Asian affairs.

Brazilian people resisted unfair pressure

Commenting on Brazil’s presidential election and the defeat of the right-wing camp aligned with US President Donald Trump, Baghaei said the outcome demonstrated the Brazilian people’s determination to make independent political choices.

“The people of Brazil showed that they would not submit to misleading narratives and unjustified pressure, and that they would choose what they consider to be in their country’s best interests,” he said.

A Malta-flagged tanker carrying Russian diesel is heading for New York after the fuel deal between US President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin, Reuters reported in an exclusive on 23 October, citing LSEG shipping data. Two weeks earlier, the US Treasury temporarily waived sanctions on Russian diesel.

The tanker is due in the US on 7 November, four days after Americans vote in the midterms. So the first US-bound cargo cannot reach American pumps before the election. Energy analysts also doubt the deal will lower diesel prices meaningfully. US fuel prices rose mainly because the war with Iran disrupted shipping through the Strait of Hormuz. Trump, however, has blamed Ukraine’s strikes on Russian refineries.

Loaded on the day Moscow promised

The medium-sized tanker Agioi Fanendes took on 40,000 metric tons of ultra-low sulfur diesel at the Baltic port of Primorsk on 22 October, shipping data showed. In March, Ukraine’s General Staff said its drones hit the Transneft oil terminal at that same port.

A day before the loading, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak announced that the first tanker would sail for the US on 22 October. He pledged more shipments and said Russia would meet US needs within its capabilities.

From a pledge to a partial lift

On 9 October, Trump wrote that Russia would immediately supply over 300,000 tons of diesel “to the American and Global Marketplace.” Another 500,000 tons would follow in November, then 1 million tons “immediately thereafter.”

Moscow had banned diesel exports on 8 July, after Ukrainian drone strikes shut down refineries and caused fuel shortages inside Russia. The Russian government stated on 10 October that it had partially lifted the ban, clearing 500,000 tons for the world market at this stage. Russian diesel shipments to Türkiye and Brazil have since resumed, boosting Moscow’s war revenue.

Trump has made other moves to cut diesel prices before the vote, Reuters reported. He waived parts of a new sanctions law against Russia. He also threatened Europe with a US diesel export ban unless countries released more fuel from their emergency reserves.

The Cradle | October 23, 2026

Cyprus hosted the leadership of the pro-Israel US lobbying group, the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), in Nicosia on 21 October, pledging to deepen the island’s ties with Israel and the US.

Outgoing AIPAC president Bernard Kaminetsky and his successor, Yehuda Neuberger, led the delegation to the presidential palace for talks with Cypriot President Nikos Christodoulides.

The talks focused on accelerating the 3+1 Mechanism, a partnership binding Cyprus, Greece, Israel, and the US to coordinate on energy, security, and infrastructure.

AIPAC, in return, pledged to keep championing Cypriot interests in Washington.

Meanwhile, pro-Israel lobbies have been embedding themselves inside the Cypriot and Greek parliaments, with Israel Allies Foundation (IAF) launching caucuses in both legislatures to bring lawmakers into line with Israel’s regional agenda.

IAF president Josh Reinstein unveiled the Cypriot caucus on 14 October after meeting Christodoulides, explicitly pitting the initiative against Ankara by branding Turkiye a “common enemy” of Israel and Cyprus.

Cyprus’s main left-wing opposition party condemned the MPs for turning parliament into a lobby for Israel amid its ongoing genocide in Gaza, while in Greece, one left-wing party warned that it would turn parliament into a tool for whitewashing war crimes.

Israel’s deepening ties with Greece and Cyprus have developed over the past decade into a strategic alignment that combines energy cooperation, military coordination, and shared opposition to Turkish maritime claims in the Eastern Mediterranean.

The US has encouraged the relationship through the 3+1 format, which brings Washington into the Israel–Greece–Cyprus trilateral partnership and frames it as a vehicle for regional stability, energy security, and cooperation among “like-minded” partners.

Through the arrangement, Israel gains a gateway to European markets through Greece and Cyprus, along with diplomatic backing in disputes over offshore gas fields.

Athens and Nicosia, in turn, receive Israeli military technology and a partner against Turkiye’s assertive stance on maritime zones, airspace, and the divided island of Cyprus.

Washington, meanwhile, sees the axis as part of a broader effort to anchor energy routes and security cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean while reducing reliance on rival powers, even as the US courts Ankara with offers of F-35 sales and sanctions relief.

Israeli hostility toward Ankara, and its efforts to curb Turkish power, stem from fear that Washington’s growing dependence on Turkiye will erode Israel’s regional dominance.

Despite the friction, Turkiye continued to serve as a conduit for Azerbaijani crude to Israel through the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan Pipeline (BTC) and Ceyhan Port, even after cutting direct trade in May 2024 and throughout Israel’s genocide of the Palestinians in Gaza.

In 160 years of digging at Troy, nobody had found anything you could play. Archaeologists have pulled walls, gates, jewelry, weapons and tableware out of the ground in huge quantities, but never an instrument. This season that changed. The team led by Rüstem Aslan of Onsekiz Mart University in Çanakkale, in northwestern Turkey, recovered a […]

Norway has put into force a new round of sanctions against Russia that hits banks, listed oil refineries, ports, airports, and suppliers of Russia’s military industry, the Norwegian Foreign Ministry announced. The rules mirror the EU’s 21st sanctions package, which Brussels adopted in July.

The EU’s 22nd package, adopted on 12 October, is principally a list of names, while the 21st brought significant new measures, lawyers noted. Among them are new tools against the shadow fleet, the tankers with murky ownership that Russia uses to move oil around sanctions. That fleet also sails along Norway’s coast, and a new Norwegian Coastal Administration report found that it poses a growing threat to security and the environment there.

Banks, refineries, and Sheremetyevo

Norway is not an EU member, but it has joined every EU sanctions package against Russia, with a few exceptions and national adjustments. Oslo backed this one politically on 11 August, and the rules took effect on 21 October. Part of the package was already in force. It placed travel restrictions and asset freezes on 48 people and asset freezes on 168 entities, and it listed 41 shadow fleet vessels on 14 August.

Norway’s transaction ban now covers 33 more Russian credit and financial institutions. A separate ban covers 22 more abroad, including in India, Mongolia, Nigeria, and the UAE.

Another transaction ban reaches listed refineries in Russia and third countries that process Russian oil or help dodge sanctions. A Georgian refinery joins that list on 25 January 2027. The same ban adds two Russian ports and four Russian airports, including Moscow’s Sheremetyevo.

Drone gear and the shadow fleet

Export curbs on dual-use goods now cover 51 new entities that back Russia’s military industry. Some are in China, including Hong Kong, and others are in India, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Türkiye, and the UAE. The banned-exports list adds nickel and beryllium powder, along with drone gear such as jamming and interception systems, launchers, and servo motors.

Oslo can now also list ships that service sanctioned shadow fleet tankers or swap cargo with them at sea. Elsewhere in Europe, France’s navy and UK forces have boarded sanctioned shadow fleet tankers this year.

Ehsan MOVAHEDIAN

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La advertencia de Aliyev contra la influencia extranjera llega en medio de una disputa con los círculos políticos turcos sobre la religión, Karabaj y las relaciones de Azerbaiyán con Israel.

En el octavo congreso del Partido del Nuevo Azerbaiyán, celebrado en Bakú el 2 de octubre, el presidente Ilham Aliyev ofreció una descripción inusualmente directa de lo que denominó la «seguridad ideológica» de Azerbaiyán. Era tan importante como la seguridad física, afirmó, ya que las amenazas ideológicas podían traspasar las fronteras a través de Internet, los ciberataques y la inteligencia artificial (IA).

Hizo un llamamiento a la educación y al patriotismo para defender el espacio político del país, al tiempo que insistió en que Azerbaiyán no necesitaba «ayuda ni patrocinio» extranjeros. Añadió que otros Estados no debían interferir en sus asuntos ni decirle cómo vivir.

Estas declaraciones las realizó el presidente y líder del partido gobernante en un congreso en el que se definió su rumbo político. Aliyev situó el control de la esfera ideológica de Azerbaiyán al mismo nivel que el poder militar, la independencia económica y la toma de decisiones soberana.

No mencionó a Turquía como fuente de ninguna amenaza. Sin embargo, sus palabras se produjeron en medio de críticas en los círculos políticos y mediáticos turcos hacia las políticas internas de Azerbaiyán, especialmente su trato a las estudiantes que llevan hiyab. El 26 de septiembre, el Consejo de Medios de Comunicación y Radiodifusión de Azerbaiyán acusó a círculos no identificados de llevar a cabo una campaña contra el país en los medios turcos y en las redes sociales.

Ese enfrentamiento agudiza aún más la fórmula «una nación, dos Estados». La proximidad política nunca ha eliminado las diferencias en los intereses nacionales. A medida que Ankara y Bakú se han ido acercando, la cuestión de quién define su identidad común —y qué influencia permite— se ha vuelto más difícil de eludir.

Los analistas que hablaron con The Cradle consideran que el discurso de Aliyev es un intento de renegociar la relación, más que de romperla. Azerbaiyán no tiene ninguna intención aparente de renunciar a su asociación militar, económica y cultural con Turquía. Sin embargo, Bakú quiere dejar claro que el parentesco no otorga a Ankara ninguna autoridad sobre la política interna azerbaiyana.

Una advertencia que se ha escuchado en Ankara

Hazel Yalin, investigadora especializada en las relaciones turco-rusas, interpreta que el discurso estaba dirigido, en gran medida, al Gobierno del presidente Recep Tayyip Erdogan. El analista turco Aydin Sezer también percibe un mensaje diplomático indirecto. Según Sezer, Aliyev se dirigió a varios públicos, entre ellos Occidente, Armenia, Rusia e Irán, pero es posible que Ankara se encontrara entre sus principales destinatarios.

El contexto inmediato es la controversia sobre la religión en las escuelas de Azerbaiyán. Una enmienda de septiembre a las normas de vestimenta de las escuelas públicas prohíbe prendas adicionales consideradas incompatibles con la educación laica. La decisión no menciona el hiyab por su nombre, pero las noticias de que se ha impedido a algunas niñas asistir a clase por llevar pañuelo en la cabeza han suscitado objeciones por parte de críticos turcos.

Ankara no ha abordado públicamente el tema con Bakú. Sezer interpreta la exhortación de Aliyev a que otros países se ocupen de sus propios asuntos como una advertencia contra convertir el lenguaje de la hermandad en un derecho a supervisar a Azerbaiyán.

La propia alianza reconoce este límite. La Declaración de Shusha de 2021 celebra «una nación, dos Estados» y formaliza una amplia cooperación, pero también compromete a Ankara y Bakú a respetar la soberanía y la no injerencia en los asuntos internos de la otra parte. La disputa actual ha puesto en contacto esas dos partes de la declaración.

Si los actores políticos turcos reclaman voz en la política religiosa y educativa de Azerbaiyán alegando una nacionalidad compartida, el margen de soberanía ideológica de Bakú se reduce. Si esas cuestiones pertenecen exclusivamente a Azerbaiyán, el lema sigue siendo una expresión de afinidad cultural y solidaridad política, sin otorgar a ninguna de las dos capitales un mandato sobre la otra.

¿A quién pertenece la victoria en Karabaj?

Yalin afirma que los canales de noticias y las cuentas en redes sociales pro-Erdogan han acusado a Bakú de presionar a los musulmanes en materia de prácticas y organización religiosas. Algunos también han presentado la victoria de Azerbaiyán en la Segunda Guerra de Karabaj como algo que debía a Turquía, calificando las políticas laicas de Aliyev de ingratas y exigiendo respeto por las sensibilidades religiosas turcas.

«Este argumento también se ha esgrimido basándose en el lema “dos Estados, una nación”: si los turcos y los azerbaiyanos son miembros de la misma nación, entonces, según este razonamiento, el Gobierno azerbaiyano también debería tener en cuenta la voz de esa nación».

El discurso de Aliyev en el congreso apuntaba en la dirección opuesta. Afirmó en repetidas ocasiones que Azerbaiyán había actuado por su cuenta, había pagado sus armas y se había impuesto sin ningún patrocinador externo. Esta fue su interpretación política de la guerra; no debe interpretarse como una conclusión de que el apoyo turco no desempeñó ningún papel.

De hecho, la Declaración de Shusha recoge explícitamente el agradecimiento de Bakú por el apoyo moral y político de Turquía. La controversia gira en torno a quién puede atribuirse el mérito político del resultado y qué derechos podría otorgarles ese mérito para exigir algo posteriormente.

Para Aliyev, la victoria militar forma parte de un proyecto más amplio de construcción del Estado. Describió la independencia, la fortaleza económica, el poderío militar y la confianza en las capacidades azerbaiyanas como la línea de actuación duradera de su Gobierno. Cuanto más se convierte esa narrativa en el eje central de su legitimidad, menos margen queda para que otra capital se presente como la artífice del éxito de Azerbaiyán.

La implicación es significativa: no se puede permitir fácilmente que un actor externo —ni siquiera uno amigo— se convierta en el artífice político del éxito de Azerbaiyán.

Jafar Haghpanah, profesor de la Universidad de Teherán, sostiene que Bakú ya no quiere ser tratado como un socio subordinado de Turquía. Yalin identifica tres elementos en la postura de Aliyev.

El primero es la preocupación por la presión ideológica: según la interpretación de Yalin, el intento de golpe de Estado de 1995 contra el padre de Aliyev, Heydar Aliyev, dejó una advertencia duradera sobre las posibles consecuencias de la actividad política vinculada a Turquía.

El segundo es la resistencia a las descripciones nacionalistas turcas de Azerbaiyán como un «hermano pequeño». El tercero es la creciente confianza de Aliyev en que Azerbaiyán puede ejercer su propia influencia política en toda la región. Las acusaciones relativas a figuras turcas en el episodio de 1995 no deben confundirse con la responsabilidad por parte del actual Gobierno turco.

Bakú tiene ahora un mayor peso militar y económico que a principios de la década de 2000. La Compañía Estatal de Petróleo de la República de Azerbaiyán (SOCAR) ha ampliado el alcance energético de Azerbaiyán; el país ha establecido profundos lazos con Israel, relaciones estratégicas con China y Estados Unidos, y ocupa un lugar destacado en la Organización de Estados Turcos (OTC). Esas conexiones le dan más margen para rechazar una jerarquía dentro de su alianza más estrecha.

Yalin cita el respaldo de Sinan Ogan a Erdogan en la segunda vuelta de las elecciones presidenciales de Turquía de 2023 como ejemplo de cómo la influencia azerbaiyana podría convertirse en un tema de debate en la política turca. A Ogan se le preguntó si Aliyev había influido en su decisión y lo negó explícitamente, afirmando que Aliyev no le había llamado. La acusación no puede demostrar que Bakú dirigiera su elección. No obstante, su difusión muestra la rapidez con la que la cuestión de la influencia funciona en ambos sentidos.

El alcance de la seguridad ideológica

La advertencia de Aliyev fue más allá de la controversia sobre los uniformes escolares. Su respuesta consistió en reforzar la educación y el patriotismo y, con ellos, el control del Estado sobre cómo se interpretan su historia y sus victorias.

Turquía dispone de medios inusualmente potentes para llegar a ese público: la televisión, las redes sociales, las universidades, las redes religiosas, la cultura popular, las empresas y las instituciones del mundo turco en general. Esas conexiones han ayudado a mantener la alianza. También pueden inquietar a Bakú cuando los debates políticos turcos comienzan a moldear las expectativas sobre el orden interno de Azerbaiyán.

El problema para Aliyev no es que la influencia turca sea uniformemente hostil. Es que incluso una influencia amistosa puede seguir desafiando la autoridad de un Gobierno para definir la identidad y la política nacionales. Su énfasis en la seguridad ideológica sugiere que pretende proteger esa autoridad incluso dentro de la asociación más estrecha de Azerbaiyán.

El lugar de Israel entre los aliados

La relación de Azerbaiyán con Israel añade otra fuente de tensión. Ankara ha condenado la guerra de Israel contra Gaza, mientras que Bakú ha mantenido estrechos vínculos en materia de seguridad y energía con Tel Aviv. Las armas israelíes han constituido una parte importante del arsenal de Azerbaiyán, y el crudo azerbaiyano ha seguido llegando a Israel a través del puerto de Ceyhan, en Turquía, a pesar de las restricciones comerciales declaradas por Ankara. The Cradle ha informado sobre la relación en materia de armas y petróleo y sobre los continuos flujos de petróleo.

El analista del Cáucaso Ahmad Kazemi no considera que las diferencias entre Ankara y Bakú sean lo suficientemente profundas como para amenazar su alianza. No obstante, cree que la confianza de Aliyev se basa en parte en el apoyo israelí.

Según la valoración de Kazemi, «si Bakú se viera obligada a elegir entre Ankara y Tel Aviv, elegiría a Israel». También sostiene que Bakú sabía que la presencia de su representante durante el discurso del primer ministro israelí, Benjamin Netanyahu, ante la ONU en septiembre desagradaría a Turquía. Un análisis de la Agencia Anadolu reveló que Turquía se sumó a la protesta contra el discurso, mientras que Azerbaiyán siguió estando representado.

Kazemi ve otra consecuencia para el Cáucaso. Sostiene que la preocupación compartida por Turquía e Irán respecto a la posición de Israel en Azerbaiyán podría acercar a Ankara y Teherán en algunas cuestiones, incluidos los corredores de transporte regionales. Dicha convergencia tendría que lidiar con la amplia cooperación estratégica y de defensa de Turquía con Bakú.

Haghpanah ofrece una interpretación más contundente del discurso pronunciado en el congreso:

«Aliyev pretendía con su discurso indicar a Turquía que Azerbaiyán es el principal aliado de Israel y que Ankara debería moderar su tono hacia Tel Aviv y evitar adoptar una postura dura contra este país. Predice que Turquía e Israel entrarán en conflicto por los recursos energéticos del mar Mediterráneo, así como por sus intereses geoeconómicos y geopolíticos».

Yalin interpreta de manera similar las referencias de Aliyev a la producción y venta de petróleo de Azerbaiyán como una respuesta a las críticas a su comercio con Israel. Esas observaciones por sí solas no permiten determinar las intenciones de Bakú. Por su parte, Dariush Safarnejad, un destacado experto en el Cáucaso, señala la relación «petróleo por armas», pero espera que la influencia israelí en Azerbaiyán se reduzca en cierta medida si la cooperación directa de Bakú con Washington se intensifica tras la iniciativa de paz con Armenia. También hace referencia al debate sobre unos lazos más estrechos con la OTAN.

Los demás socios de Bakú

Aliyev aprovechó el congreso para describir a China y a EE. UU. como las dos superpotencias mundiales y para destacar las alianzas estratégicas de Azerbaiyán con ambas. El esfuerzo de Bakú por establecer vínculos con centros de poder rivales le proporciona alternativas a la dependencia de un único socio, ya sea turco, ruso, chino u occidental.

Sus comentarios sobre Armenia y Rusia encajan en ese contexto. Yalin llama la atención sobre la afirmación de Aliyev de que Armenia reconoció la integridad territorial de Azerbaiyán en octubre de 2022, con el consiguiente reconocimiento de la soberanía azerbaiyana sobre Karabaj.

Aliyev presentó el restablecimiento del control azerbaiyano como un logro conseguido frente a la presión de las grandes potencias. Yalin considera que esto forma parte del intento de Bakú de reposicionarse tras la guerra.

Azerbaiyán y Armenia rubricaron un borrador de acuerdo de paz en Washington en agosto de 2025, aunque aún no se ha firmado el tratado definitivo. Safarnejad sostiene que unos lazos más estrechos con Washington podrían dar a Bakú más margen para tratar directamente con EE. UU. y, con el tiempo, reducir su dependencia de Israel.

Hermandad sin un socio dominante

Ninguno de los cinco analistas sugiere que sea inminente una ruptura entre Ankara y Bakú. Safarnejad destaca la profundidad de su interdependencia: la cooperación militar, las infraestructuras energéticas, los corredores de transporte, la inversión, las industrias de defensa y las instituciones culturales confieren a la alianza una base sólida.

La OTS refuerza esos lazos. En septiembre, funcionarios turcos y azerbaiyanos seguían debatiendo una cooperación más profunda en materia de defensa y seguridad.

Azerbaiyán sigue queriendo a Turquía a su lado en materia de seguridad, comercio y diplomacia regional. Aliyev marca el límite en lo que respecta a la influencia de Ankara sobre la política religiosa de Bakú, sus vínculos con Israel y sus relaciones exteriores en general. Para él, el lema «una nación, dos Estados» otorga a Azerbaiyán la última palabra sobre sus propios asuntos.

Hasta qué punto Bakú podrá hacer valer esa reivindicación dependerá, en parte, de la política interna de Turquía tras Erdogan, de la durabilidad de la relación de Azerbaiyán con Israel y de su capacidad para gestionar las relaciones con Washington, Moscú, Pekín y Teherán sin perder el apoyo de Ankara.

Para Irán, un Bakú más seguro de su independencia pero más dependiente de Israel difícilmente resultaría tranquilizador. La alianza puede perdurar; la discusión sobre quién establece sus límites ya está en marcha.