Pentagon officials have in recent weeks asked several NATO countries to tone down their rhetoric regarding the threat posed by Russia, arguing that some statements by European leaders and officials have undermined continental security, four people familiar with the matter said.

Among the nations that have received messages urging them to keep public statements in check are Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, said the people, who spoke on condition of anonymity. It was not clear if the messages, which were delivered in bilateral meetings, were conveyed to other European governments.

The US requests come as the Trump administration restarts an effort to press for a negotiated end to the full-scale war in Ukraine, now well into its fifth year. The latest push has blended incentives for Russia – including sanctions relief – with pressure on Ukraine to halt its attacks on Russian energy infrastructure.

Asked for comment, a Pentagon official said: “Private conversations among allies are just that, so we will not comment on these allegations.”

Among the comments that have drawn US officials’ attention are suggestions by European leaders that Russia is cornered and resorting to increasingly desperate measures as its invasion of Ukraine slows to a crawl, one of the people said.

Pentagon policy chief Elbridge Colby, a key figure in an ongoing review of US troop levels in Europe, was one of the US officials delivering the message, the people said. Reuters could not determine what other officials were involved.

None of the people, who include three European officials and a US official, suggested the advice was communicated in a confrontational manner.

US urges allies not to provoke Moscow

The US messages reflect a debate within NATO regarding how to publicly address the threat of an increasingly assertive Russia.

Some Western officials have argued that emphasizing the threat posed by Moscow could play into the hands of the Kremlin, which they say seeks to sow fear and undermine support for Ukraine.

Others argue European governments must be transparent to show their electorates that sacrifice and resources are needed to keep Moscow at bay. That is especially true as Russia appears to accelerate a covert campaign of sabotage throughout the continent.

Russia has denied that it is pursuing such a campaign.

Baltic states face pressure over public warnings

One of the people familiar told Reuters that Colby told a Baltic official recently that there should be no “poking” directed at the Russians.

The person said Colby pointed to Europeans publicly suggesting that Russia was “cornered like a rat” as an example of unhelpful rhetoric.

It was not clear what specific statement Colby was referring to. However, Estonian Prime Minister Kristen Michal referred to Putin as a “rat in a corner” in late September, suggesting the Russian leader was resorting to sabotage efforts in Europe as Russia had become increasingly bogged down in Ukraine.

“We are helping you. The Americans are there,” said a separate European official, describing the Pentagon’s recent private messaging. “Just don’t be loud. Don’t make noise.”

In a separate recent meeting, the Pentagon urged an Estonian delegation to be “measured” in its communications, according to a person briefed on the encounter, though the person did not say Pentagon officials complained about any specific statement.

The defense ministries of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia did not respond to requests for comment, while NATO declined to comment.

Russian sabotage fears divide NATO allies

One of the European officials said that the Pentagon’s advice, while cordial, was baffling, given that intelligence services in the Baltic states have in recent months consistently played down the probability of Russia testing NATO’s mutual defense provisions.

Other NATO intelligence services, by contrast, have publicly warned that Russia could dramatically ramp up its sabotage campaign in the near future.

The Pentagon messages to NATO officials come at a fraught time for European security.

Moscow has recently intensified its campaign of deniable attacks on NATO countries, Western intelligence officials have said.

On Wednesday, German prosecutors said two Belarusians were arrested for allegedly planning to set ​fire to a building or critical infrastructure facility ⁠in the Nuremberg area. In September, the German government blamed Russia for an attempted drone attack at Leipzig/Halle Airport, allegations Moscow has denied.

At the same time, US officials have been discussing potential business deals with Russia as part of the Trump administration’s push for peace in Ukraine. Those efforts have drawn mixed reactions from European officials, many of whom are pushing for the Kremlin’s continued economic isolation.

US reviews military presence in Europe

Pentagon planners, meanwhile, are reviewing Washington’s force posture in Europe, a process that could see a sharp drawdown in America’s troop presence on the continent.

US officials have said European NATO members need to assume more responsibility for their own defense, particularly as the US focuses on threats in the Middle East, Latin America and East Asia.

The European Commission urged member states on Thursday to apply for loans from a €21.3 billion ($23.74 billion) pot available through the European Union’s SAFE defence funding programme to boost their own forces and support Ukraine.

The Commission encouraged member states to launch joint procurement programmes with Ukraine, using funds from SAFE’s second round.

Member states should prioritise the urgent needs of Ukrainian and their own armed forces in air and missile defence systems, drones and counter-drone systems, ammunition and missiles, the Commission said.

The Security Action for Europe instrument is a joint borrowing scheme backed by the EU budget aimed at boosting the bloc’s defence capabilities and helping member states meet new, more ambitious NATO spending targets.

A Greek container ship has sunk after being hit by naval drones off Bulgaria on Wednesday, the Bulgarian government said, in the latest of a series of strikes in the western Black Sea this month that have raised concerns about the widening scope of Russia's war in Ukraine.

A Russian drone strike killed at least 14 people on a crowded rail platform in the Ukrainian city of Dnipro on Thursday and five in daytime strikes on two other cities, officials said, even as a local truce in Kherson raised cautious hopes for a resumption of diplomacy.

Two teenage girls were killed on a central street in Chernihiv in northern Ukraine, and three people died in strikes on residential buildings in the central city of Kremenchuk.

“Russia is deliberately hunting civilians: on trains, at stations, in residential buildings,” Ukrainian Prime Minister Sergiy Koretskyi said on the Telegram app.

“There is no justification for this terror, and there never can be.”

The six-day truce brokered with US help applied only to southern Ukraine’s Kherson region, where a humanitarian mission was underway to provide relief to the Russian-held town of Oleshky, marooned in a war zone since the start of Russia’s 2022 invasion.

Elsewhere, Russian drone and missile attacks on critical infrastructure including the rail network have upended civilian life and ravaged the economy. The strikes have exploited an acute shortage of air defence missiles.

BODIES SCATTERED ACROSS PLATFORM

In Dnipro, state railway Ukrzaliznytsia said a jet-powered drone had struck a platform at the city’s main station, where a commuter train was preparing to depart.

Mangled bodies lay scattered across the shrapnel-marked pavement, where patches of bright red blood had pooled up. Police filled black body bags amid the wail of an air-raid siren.

“And for what? What goal are they (Russians) trying to achieve?” said Svitlana Shcherbak, a 67-year-old traveler sheltering underground at the station. “I don’t understand it at all.”

Moscow denies hitting non-military targets, despite a mounting bombing campaign against Ukrainian cities that regularly kills civilians.

NEW STRIKES ACROSS UKRAINE

In Chernihiv, in addition to the two dead teenagers, 23 people including four children were wounded in a drone attack on a busy downtown street.

“Ordinary, peaceful people were attacked who were just going to work, going about their daily business, making plans for the day,” said Dmytro Bryzhynskyi, head of the city’s military administration.

In Kremenchuk, strikes on a residential block and private buildings killed three people and wounded 32, the regional governor said.

Russian drones also struck city buses in three separate attacks on southeastern Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia, wounding six, officials there said.

Thursday’s strikes came amid renewed efforts to revive US-backed peace talks to end Europe’s deadliest conflict since World War Two.

New three-way talks are expected to take place this month, with Ukrainian officials including top presidential adviser Kyrylo Budanov urging new pressure on Moscow from Kyiv’s partners.

“The deliberate mass killing of civilians right on the streets and in residential buildings in several Ukrainian cities in a single day — these are Russia’s ‘arguments’ in negotiations,” he wrote on X.

The crisis in Ukraine over restrictions on the military use of SpaceX’s satellite constellation in the Russia-Ukraine war won’t be readily resolved. US lawmakers and the European Commission have now joined the fray, raising questions about the accountability of Trump administration officials and SpaceX executives. Nobody likes being held accountable, so even lifting the restrictions […]

The post The untold story of Ukraine’s Starlink crisis appeared first on Asia Times.

A top Russian official was en route to the Russian-controlled Ukrainian town of Oleshky on Thursday with a team of US journalists amid a US-brokered ceasefire as the Kremlin said it hoped humanitarian relief would reach the area on Thursday or Friday.

Russia’s human rights commissioner Yana Lantratova said she was taking 4 journalists from the US outlet Newsmax with her as her Ukrainian counterpart, Dmytro Lubinets, also made his way to the Oleshky area.

Neither Ukraine nor Russia has reported any violations so far of the US-brokered six-day ceasefire, which came into effect early on Tuesday to allow evacuations and aid deliveries to Oleshky, where trapped residents have faced regular shelling and severe shortages of food and medicine with Moscow and Kyiv blaming each other for the situation.

“Demining is under way there, and we hope that today or tomorrow residents will be able to receive humanitarian aid safely and without obstruction, and that those wishing to leave will be able to do so,” Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov was cited as saying by the Interfax news agency.

The truce, brokered by US First Lady Melania Trump with the involvement of Pope Leo, applies to the town and surrounding areas, including the wider Kherson region, which has suffered years of near-daily drone and artillery attacks.

The Pentagon’s independent inspector general has declined a bipartisan request to investigate restrictions imposed on Starlink and Starshield satellite communications in Ukraine, leaving unresolved questions about who authorised the disruption, whether Washington was involved, and how much control Elon Musk exercises over infrastructure essential to Ukraine’s defence.

The decision, disclosed by the Associated Press on 28 October, follows complaints from Ukrainian officials that restrictions introduced earlier this month disrupted military drone operations, including attempts to intercept high-speed Russian attack drones.

Nine US senators, comprising five Democrats and four Republicans, had requested an independent investigation into the circumstances surrounding the interruption.

Instead, Pentagon Inspector General Platte Moring III informed lawmakers in a letter dated 27 October that the questions would be better addressed by the US Air Force and Space Force.

The response has intensified a dispute extending beyond Ukraine’s battlefield communications to the relationship between the American government, its defence contractors and the private companies supplying critical military technology.

Senators Demand Answers Over Starlink Restrictions

The investigation was requested by senators Jeanne Shaheen and Thom Tillis, alongside seven colleagues from both parties.

Their 15 October letter sought to establish whether Pentagon officials or other US government representatives had authorised, approved or received advance notice of changes affecting Ukraine’s satellite communications.

The senators also raised concerns about reported disruptions to intelligence-sharing and early-warning arrangements, including allegations that American personnel in Ukraine experienced difficulties reaching shelters during Russian air raids.

They wanted investigators to determine whether these incidents were connected, whether contractual obligations had been breached and whether SpaceX had acted independently.

Shaheen, the senior Democrat on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, criticised the inspector general’s decision.

She argued that contradictory explanations from the Trump administration and SpaceX made an independent examination necessary to establish responsibility and prevent further disruptions.

Mollie Halpern, spokeswoman for the inspector general’s office, defended the decision, saying the congressional request had been carefully considered and that the issues were more appropriately handled within the Pentagon.

She nevertheless left open the possibility of reconsideration if additional information emerged.

Who Ordered the Slowdown?

The controversy began around 14 October, when Ukrainian forces reported that equipment using Starlink and its military-oriented counterpart, Starshield, was losing connectivity when travelling at higher speeds.

The restrictions were particularly damaging to unmanned aircraft.

Ukraine reported communications failures at movement speeds of approximately 130–161 kilometres per hour, limiting the effectiveness of certain strike drones and jet-powered interceptors used against Russian attacks.

According to The Wall Street Journal, Musk personally authorised the slowdown, although accounts differed over whether President Donald Trump or senior administration officials knew about the decision beforehand.

Musk subsequently acknowledged that SpaceX had imposed restrictions on commercial Starlink services, alleging that Ukrainian forces had violated the company’s terms of service by using the network for offensive operations.

Ukrainian representatives disputed that explanation.

Musk also maintained that Starshield was a separate system controlled by the US government, suggesting that decisions affecting its operation ultimately rested with American authorities.

Trump denied ordering the restrictions.

The differing accounts have left unanswered whether the interruption resulted from a corporate decision, an American government directive or a combination of the two.

Trump Intervention and Restoration of Services

The Wall Street Journal reported that Trump contacted Musk on 21 October and requested the removal of the restrictions.

Although some improvement followed, Ukrainian officials initially reported that the systems had not returned to full functionality.

On 24 October, however, Ukraine’s Ministry of Defence confirmed that normal performance had been restored, with stable communications recorded on equipment moving at speeds exceeding 400 kilometres per hour.

President Volodymyr Zelensky subsequently confirmed the restoration and thanked American officials and partners involved in resolving the problem.

The restoration addressed the immediate operational disruption but did not establish who had originally authorised the restrictions.

Private Technology and Military Accountability

The episode has renewed scrutiny of the Pentagon’s dependence on SpaceX, whose satellite networks have become important components of Ukrainian battlefield communications.

Starshield was developed to serve government and national security requirements, including military applications. Nevertheless, the dispute illustrates the difficulty of determining responsibility when essential defence capabilities depend on systems developed and operated by commercial contractors.

The issue has historical precedent.

In 2022, Musk ordered restrictions on Starlink availability in parts of Russian-occupied Ukraine, citing concerns that expanded military use might escalate the conflict.

The latest incident has prompted renewed discussion of whether contractual arrangements provide sufficient safeguards against unexpected interruptions.

Following the October restrictions, Finnish satellite company ICEYE announced discussions with Nokia and Ukraine’s Defence Ministry concerning cooperation on sovereign satellite communications.

Such alternatives could eventually reduce dependence on individual commercial providers, although developing and deploying replacement capabilities would require additional investment and time.

For American lawmakers, meanwhile, the immediate question remains unresolved.

The Pentagon has directed their concerns towards the military services responsible for aspects of satellite communications, rather than opening an independent inspector general investigation.

Whether those services can establish precisely who ordered the restrictions, what authority was exercised and whether contractual safeguards were observed will determine how much accountability emerges from the episode.

For Ukraine, the communications have been restored. The question of who could interrupt them, and under whose authority, remains unanswered.

Washington has selected Poland to host a European servicing centre for PAC-3 interceptors, strengthening the country’s role in NATO’s air defence infrastructure. The investment comes as wars in Ukraine and the Middle East expose the difficulties of sustaining missile stocks during prolonged conflicts.

Poland has been selected to host a major European maintenance centre for Patriot air defence interceptors, marking a further expansion of the country’s role in NATO’s military infrastructure and the transatlantic defence industry.

The decision, announced on 27 October by the United States government and American defence manufacturer Lockheed Martin, will establish a dedicated facility for PAC-3 missiles used in Patriot air and missile defence systems.

The investment is estimated at approximately one billion zlotys, equivalent to around €227 million.

Poland secured the project following competition with Germany, the Netherlands and Norway.

The facility is intended to provide maintenance, repair, refurbishment and technical recertification services to European operators of PAC-3 interceptors.

Its importance extends beyond the immediate economic benefits for Poland.

The wars in Ukraine and the Middle East have exposed pressure on the availability of advanced air defence missiles, raising questions about Europe’s ability to sustain military operations when demand for interceptors exceeds existing supply.

A new role for Poland’s defence industry

Deputy Defence Minister Magdalena Sobkowiak-Czarnecka announced the selection of Poland as the location for the maintenance centre.

According to Lockheed Martin’s official announcement, the facility will support NATO allies operating PAC-3 interceptors through repairs, lifecycle maintenance, refurbishment and recertification.

The centre will also provide testing capabilities intended to improve operational readiness and reduce the time required to return missiles to service.

The exact location and final implementation arrangements remain subject to further negotiations.

Polish officials have indicated that the centre could become operational in approximately a year, although the schedule will depend on the conclusion of agreements and construction or adaptation of the necessary facilities.

The project is expected to create specialised employment and increase opportunities for Polish defence suppliers.

It also reinforces Poland’s position as a manufacturing and logistics centre on NATO’s eastern flank.

Maintenance is not missile production

An important distinction concerns the facility’s actual purpose.

The Polish centre will maintain and service PAC-3 missiles. It is not being presented as a new production line capable of manufacturing large quantities of additional interceptors.

Modern air defence missiles contain complex guidance systems, propulsion components and other equipment requiring specialised inspection and maintenance.

Their operational availability depends not only on the number produced but also on the ability to store, test, maintain and recertify existing stocks.

When these services are concentrated outside Europe, operators may face lengthy transport and servicing arrangements.

Locating maintenance capacity closer to European users should reduce some of those delays.

However, the facility will not independently resolve shortages caused by the consumption of missiles during military operations.

Additional manufacturing capacity, access to components and long-term procurement agreements remain necessary to increase overall inventories.

Ukraine and the Middle East increase demand

Patriot systems have become particularly important because of their role in defending military facilities, population centres and critical infrastructure against aircraft and missiles.

Ukraine has repeatedly requested additional Patriot interceptors to protect cities and energy installations from Russian attacks.

At the same time, the conflict in the Middle East has increased demand for advanced air defence capabilities.

Both theatres place pressure on supply chains whose production capacity cannot be expanded immediately.

Manufacturing sophisticated interceptors involves specialised components, qualified suppliers, extensive testing and demanding certification procedures.

The result is a gap between the speed at which missiles can be expended during sustained operations and the time required to replace them.

The United States has undertaken efforts to accelerate PAC-3 production.

Lockheed Martin announced that it had received a major US government contract in 2026 to support further expansion of PAC-3 MSE manufacturing.

The planned maintenance centre in Poland represents a complementary investment, intended to improve the availability of missiles already held by European forces.

A transatlantic industrial project

Although Poland will host the facility, the project has a wider European dimension.

Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden are expected to participate in important elements of supply-chain integration.

These countries were among the original participants in the industrial cooperation arrangements alongside Poland and the United States.

The structure reflects NATO’s increasing emphasis on dispersing critical maintenance and logistical capabilities across allied territory.

A geographically distributed system can reduce dependence on individual sites and make it easier to sustain equipment during periods of disruption.

It can also help European defence companies develop technical expertise through cooperation with American manufacturers.

However, the arrangement will remain part of a transatlantic supply chain, with significant industrial and technological responsibilities retained by the United States.

The project therefore illustrates both Europe’s expanding defence-industrial role and its continuing dependence on American missile technology.

Poland’s expanding air defence network

The decision complements Poland’s broader investment in integrated air and missile defence.

Under the Wisła programme, Warsaw has been acquiring Patriot systems and associated interceptors as part of a wider modernisation of its armed forces.

Two Patriot batteries reached operational readiness in December 2025, according to Euronews’ reporting on the project.

Poland has also ordered additional batteries and substantial quantities of PAC-3 MSE missiles, with deliveries continuing through the remainder of the decade.

These investments are intended to improve protection against aircraft, cruise missiles and ballistic missile threats.

The maintenance centre should complement those acquisitions by strengthening technical support for the interceptors.

Readiness depends on more than procurement

The Polish investment demonstrates how NATO’s air defence priorities are changing.

For many years, procurement discussions concentrated primarily on purchasing new weapons systems.

The experience of prolonged conflicts has placed greater emphasis on ammunition availability, repair facilities, spare parts, storage and industrial capacity.

Those supporting capabilities determine how long military forces can sustain operations.

The new centre will not eliminate the need for additional missiles, but it could reduce servicing delays and improve the readiness of European stocks.

Its effectiveness will ultimately depend on the scale of operations, access to components and the speed with which maintenance services can be delivered.

For Poland, hosting the facility strengthens its position within NATO’s defence-industrial network.

For the Alliance, it represents an attempt to address one of the practical weaknesses exposed by recent conflicts: acquiring advanced weapons is only part of the challenge; keeping them available for use is equally important.

Russia, the world's largest wheat exporter, has turned to an Arctic World War II shipping route to export grain for the first time as the conflict in Ukraine stalls Black Sea trade and officials warn of risks in the NATO-controlled Baltic Sea.

A planned ceasefire in southern Ukraine held for its first day and night, officials said Wednesday, but Moscow and Kyiv continued to batter each other elsewhere.

A planned ceasefire in southern Ukraine held for its first day and night, officials said Wednesday, but Moscow and Kyiv continued to batter each other elsewhere.

As Ukraine prepares for another winter under Russian attacks, its energy strategy is undergoing a fundamental transformation.

As Ukraine prepares for another winter under Russian attacks, its energy strategy is undergoing a fundamental transformation.

Battlefield robots were once thought of as the stuff of science fiction. But the Ukraine war has put paid to that view, with uncrewed ground vehicles (UGVs) – or ground robots – taking on an increasingly visible role. In September 2026, Mykhailo Fedorov, the former defense minister of Ukraine – who is generally credited with […]

The post Could humanoid robots soon replace soldiers on the battlefield? appeared first on Asia Times.

In an extensive conversation with EU Today publisher Gary Cartwright, Ukrainian-American lawyer and political commentator Askold Lozynskyj delivers a sharply critical assessment of Donald Trump, examines the possibility of a geopolitical bargain with Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping, and explains why November’s American midterm elections could determine far more than the composition of Congress.

There is something peculiarly unsettling about a world in which the leaders of three nuclear powers might gather to discuss the future of smaller nations without troubling to invite the nations concerned. It is a diplomatic arrangement with considerable historical precedent, although not necessarily the sort that ought to inspire confidence.

For Askold S. Lozynskyj, a New York lawyer, former president of the Ukrainian World Congress and regular contributor to EU Today, the prospect of Donald Trump sitting down with Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping raises precisely this concern.

His latest opinion piece, The Thug Summit, published on 23 October, presents an uncompromising interpretation of the proposed trilateral meeting in China. In a wide-ranging conversation with EU Today publisher Gary Cartwright, Lozynskyj expands upon that argument, moving from the peculiarities of Trump’s political personality to the constitutional foundations of American democracy, the future of Europe and the increasingly precarious standing of international law.

The resulting discussion is occasionally caustic, frequently humorous and consistently concerned with a question that extends well beyond the current occupant of the White House: how resilient are democratic institutions when confronted by leaders who regard constitutional constraints as inconveniences?

Watch the full interview with Askold S. Lozynskyj and Gary Cartwright below.

From the Oval Office to the Beverly Hillbillies

The conversation begins with Trump’s political ascent, which Lozynskyj regards as one of the more extraordinary developments in modern American history.

He recalls the incredulity surrounding Trump’s original presidential ambitions and questions how a politician whose personal conduct had attracted considerable controversy managed to secure such enthusiastic support among conservative Christian voters.

Cartwright introduces a lighter comparison, recalling a photograph of Trump surrounded by his senior advisers in the Oval Office.

The only person missing, he suggests, was Jed Clampett, the fictional patriarch of the American television comedy The Beverly Hillbillies.

Lozynskyj is not inclined to defend the administration’s sophistication. Yet behind the humour lies a more serious argument about the disappearance of independent-minded advisers and the consequences of political loyalty becoming the principal qualification for high office.

“Donald Trump is not a conservative. Donald Trump is a thug,” he declares.

It is an unequivocal assessment, characteristic of Lozynskyj’s commentary, although his criticism extends beyond Trump himself to the Republican Party’s willingness to accommodate his leadership.

The elections that could change Washington

Much of the interview centres on the American midterm elections scheduled for 3 November.

Lozynskyj predicts that Democrats will regain control of the House of Representatives and potentially transform the remainder of Trump’s presidency through congressional investigations, subpoenas and impeachment proceedings.

His prediction is emphatic, although the eventual balance of power remains uncertain.

Control of the House would give Democrats substantial investigative authority, although the president would retain his executive powers. Removing him from office following impeachment would still require a two-thirds majority in the Senate.

Nevertheless, Lozynskyj believes the elections could fundamentally alter Washington’s political atmosphere.

“They will tie up Trump like never before,” he argues.

Cartwright raises a more disturbing possibility: could Trump manufacture an emergency to postpone an election or otherwise attempt to prolong his presidency?

“I think he could try, but I don’t believe that he will prevail,” Lozynskyj responds, expressing confidence that America’s constitutional institutions would ultimately resist such an attempt.

The exchange moves naturally towards the events of 6 January 2021, presidential immunity and the effectiveness of the checks and balances upon which the American constitutional system depends.

Ukraine, Europe and the price of great-power diplomacy

For Lozynskyj, whose public career has been closely associated with Ukrainian interests, the implications of Trump’s foreign policy are particularly troubling.

His central concern is that negotiations among Washington, Moscow and Beijing could revive the notion that major powers possess an informal entitlement to determine the political and territorial futures of their neighbours.

In his opinion piece, he raises the possibility that Ukraine and Taiwan could become bargaining instruments in a wider geopolitical settlement. These are his warnings about potential outcomes, not established agreements between the three governments.

Yet his criticism of Washington is accompanied by considerable appreciation for Europe’s role in sustaining Ukraine’s resistance to Russia’s invasion.

“Without Europe, Ukraine could never have survived as long as it has survived,” he tells Cartwright.

He also ventures into the British debate over European integration, arguing that the United Kingdom should return to the European Union.

It is an intervention likely to provoke disagreement, but it reflects his broader conviction that collective institutions provide an essential counterweight to unilateral political power.

Democracy, disorder and the limits of authority

The discussion also examines political unrest in Europe, changing national identities and the relationship between elected governments and the populations they represent.

Cartwright points to social tensions in European cities and the growing importance of regional identity, including the independence debate in Flanders.

Lozynskyj approaches these developments through the history of democratic protest, citing Ukraine’s Orange Revolution, the Revolution of Dignity and more recent demonstrations over the independence of anti-corruption institutions.

For him, public opposition to governments is not necessarily evidence of democracy’s failure. It can also demonstrate that political authority remains subject to popular consent.

The conversation concludes with international law, the International Criminal Court and the difficulty of enforcing common rules when powerful states refuse to accept external constraints.

Lozynskyj’s observations are deliberately provocative, and his forecasts will be tested by events. But the interview offers something more substantial than another exchange of opinions about Donald Trump.

It is a discussion about the relationship between power and restraint, the responsibilities of democratic institutions and the uncomfortable possibility that the international order may be entering another period in which military and economic strength increasingly determine political outcomes.

As the United States approaches its midterm elections and speculation continues over a possible meeting between Trump, Putin and Xi, those questions are unlikely to disappear.

The full conversation with Askold S. Lozynskyj is available in the video above.

President Trump is headed for a showdown with Democrats and members of his party after Election Day over Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth’s future leadership of the Pentagon, the Iran war and the Russia-Ukraine war. Democrats are stepping up their demands that Trump fire Hegseth after the midterm elections and warning they won’t support funding…

President Trump is headed for a showdown with Democrats and members of his party after Election Day over Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth’s future leadership of the Pentagon, the Iran war and the Russia-Ukraine war. Democrats are stepping up their demands that Trump fire Hegseth after the midterm elections and warning they won’t support funding…

Vladimir Putin has a theory of victory in Ukraine. It’s not the Russian president’s first theory – that was a quick, dayslong campaign – nor his second or third, which involved different land offensives in the east that quickly petered out. Instead, Putin’s latest hypothesis is that the relentless bombing of Ukrainian cities will impose […]

The post Polling: scorched earth isn’t driving Ukrainians to sue for peace appeared first on Asia Times.

Vladimir Putin’s insistence that Ukraine surrender its remaining positions in Donetsk is not simply a dispute over territory. It is a demand that could dismantle Ukraine’s principal defensive barrier in the east, hand Moscow a military advantage it has struggled to achieve through years of fighting, and establish a precedent for further territorial concessions. The latest diplomatic contacts with European leaders have brought this question back to the centre of negotiations.

There are two ways for Russia to capture the remaining Ukrainian-held cities of Donbas. One is to fight its way through heavily fortified defensive positions, accepting substantial casualties, equipment losses and an uncertain timetable. The other is to secure their evacuation through diplomatic negotiations.

The second would achieve an important Russian military objective without requiring Moscow to bear the full cost of a prolonged offensive.

This distinction helps explain why Vladimir Putin continues to insist that Ukrainian forces withdraw from the remaining government-controlled territory of Donetsk region before a comprehensive settlement can be negotiated.

It also raises a more consequential question: would surrendering Donbas bring the war closer to an end, or would it improve Russia’s position in any subsequent confrontation?

A diplomatic opening without a strategic concession

The issue returned to prominence on 27 October when Finnish President Alexander Stubb and Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre held a rare telephone conversation with Putin.

According to the Finnish president’s official statement, the call followed discussions in Oslo on 20 October involving Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and US presidential envoy Steve Witkoff.

The Nordic leaders sought to advance preparations for renewed American-mediated negotiations, expected in Abu Dhabi in November. They emphasised that they were acting on behalf of their respective countries rather than representing Europe collectively.

Stubb described the exchange as “frank and substantive”, arguing that direct communication with Moscow was necessary to address the security consequences of the war.

However, the Kremlin’s account offered little indication of movement on the fundamental disagreements.

Moscow insisted that any durable peace must fully accommodate Russian interests. A source close to the Kremlin told Reuters that Putin had reiterated his refusal to compromise on the objective of controlling the entire Donbas.

Following the conversation, Zelenskyy confirmed that the Nordic leaders had briefed him and stressed to Putin the need for concrete measures to reduce attacks on Ukrainian energy infrastructure.

The diplomatic process has therefore resumed without resolving the territorial dispute at its centre.

The military significance of the remaining Donbas

The territory Russia is demanding includes some of Ukraine’s most important surviving defensive positions.

Since fighting began in eastern Ukraine in 2014, Ukrainian forces have constructed and reinforced an extensive defensive system centred on Sloviansk, Kramatorsk, Druzhkivka and Kostiantynivka.

Known as the fortress belt, this network combines urban areas, industrial facilities, transport infrastructure, prepared defensive positions and terrain that complicates offensive operations.

The military importance of this system extends far beyond the administrative boundaries of Donetsk.

According to the Institute for the Study of War, surrendering these positions would allow Russian forces to occupy heavily defended territory without undertaking the prolonged operations otherwise required to capture it.

In its 26 October battlefield assessment, the institute continued to identify the capture of this defensive belt as Russia’s principal military objective in Donetsk. Ukrainian forces retained positions in parts of Kostiantynivka, while Russian operations towards other major cities remained contested.

The implications of a negotiated Ukrainian withdrawal would be substantial.

Russia could occupy the fortified urban corridor, reorganise its forces, establish new logistics routes and potentially redirect formations towards other sectors.

Ukraine, meanwhile, would have to construct or reinforce defensive positions further west, potentially under pressure and in less favourable terrain.

The resulting military imbalance would not necessarily lead to another Russian offensive. But it would change the conditions under which any renewed hostilities might take place.

That is why territory cannot be assessed solely by its surface area. A relatively small section of the front can possess strategic value disproportionate to its size.

Why Moscow prefers a negotiated withdrawal

Russia’s insistence on Donetsk also reflects the limits of what its military has achieved.

Despite years of fighting, Moscow has not secured complete control of the region. Successive offensives have produced territorial gains, but at considerable cost and without the rapid breakthrough originally anticipated.

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio recently acknowledged the central importance of the remaining Ukrainian-held territory.

In an interview published by the US State Department, Rubio characterised the dispute as centred on territory Russia wants but has been unable to capture militarily, while recognising Ukraine’s sovereignty and long-term security concerns.

His remarks demonstrate how Donbas has become the principal territorial obstacle in Washington’s diplomatic calculations.

For Moscow, however, concentrating negotiations on this specific demand offers an additional advantage.

If Ukraine refuses to withdraw, the Kremlin can argue that Kyiv is preventing progress towards peace. If Ukraine agrees, Russia obtains strategically valuable territory without the military costs associated with conquering it.

The demand therefore serves a dual purpose: it establishes a public explanation for the absence of an agreement while offering Russia an immediate military benefit should negotiations succeed on its terms.

The problem with treating Donbas as the final concession

The central weakness in any settlement built around a Ukrainian withdrawal is the assumption that control of Donbas represents the limit of Russia’s territorial ambitions.

Moscow’s previously declared objectives suggest a more complicated picture.

In June 2024, Putin demanded Ukrainian withdrawal from four regions claimed by Russia: Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson. Moscow does not fully control these regions, despite claiming to have annexed them in September 2022.

Russia has also demanded restrictions on Ukraine’s military capabilities and future security relationships.

As EU Today previously reported, renewed diplomatic engagement has not produced a clear abandonment of the Kremlin’s wider objectives.

Consequently, transferring the remaining territory of Donetsk would not necessarily satisfy Moscow’s other demands.

There is a significant difference between conceding territory as part of an enforceable settlement and withdrawing from defensive positions as a precondition for negotiating one.

In the first case, territorial arrangements form part of a wider agreement establishing obligations, verification procedures and security guarantees.

In the second, one party makes a potentially irreversible military concession before knowing whether an agreement will ultimately be reached.

This asymmetry is particularly important where the proposed concession directly affects the withdrawing country’s ability to defend itself.

The strategy of incremental gains

One interpretation of Moscow’s approach is that it reflects a strategy of incremental territorial expansion rather than an attempt to achieve all its objectives through a single decisive offensive.

After Russia failed to capture Kyiv in 2022, its military campaign increasingly concentrated on taking territory through successive, often prolonged operations.

The diplomatic equivalent would involve securing one concession, consolidating the resulting advantage and subsequently presenting additional demands.

Under such a scenario, Russia could obtain control of the remaining Donetsk territory, establish new positions closer to Dnipropetrovsk region and later argue that further territorial or security arrangements were necessary to protect its newly acquired frontier.

Moscow has already used the language of protective buffer zones to justify military operations elsewhere in Ukraine.

There is no evidence establishing that such a sequence would inevitably follow a Donbas settlement. Nevertheless, the possibility must be considered when assessing the military consequences of a withdrawal.

The concern is not merely that Russia might violate a future agreement. It is that the agreement itself could alter the strategic balance in ways that make renewed military pressure more effective.

There is also an internal Ukrainian dimension.

An agreement requiring the evacuation of cities defended for years would create substantial political controversy. Disagreements over territorial concessions, security guarantees and the credibility of Western commitments could complicate domestic political stability.

For Moscow, such divisions might provide another means of influencing Ukraine without immediate military escalation.

Donbas and the wider question of Ukrainian sovereignty

Donbas has considerable political significance for Putin beyond its military value.

The conflict in eastern Ukraine began in 2014, following Russia’s annexation of Crimea. Donetsk and Luhansk became central to the Kremlin’s justification for intervention, and their incorporation into Russia was later proclaimed as part of the 2022 annexations.

Control of the entire region would allow Putin to present a tangible achievement after years of warfare.

Yet the Kremlin’s objectives have never been confined exclusively to Donbas.

Putin has repeatedly questioned Ukraine’s historical and political independence, while Russian negotiating demands have extended to the country’s military posture, international alliances and internal political arrangements.

These positions suggest that territorial control forms part of a broader attempt to determine Ukraine’s strategic orientation.

A settlement that ends fighting in Donetsk without resolving these wider disagreements might therefore suspend the conflict rather than settle its underlying causes.

What the next negotiations must establish

The planned talks in Abu Dhabi will test whether Moscow is prepared to distinguish between its territorial demands and the conditions necessary for a sustainable ceasefire.

An immediate halt to hostilities along existing lines would preserve the military status quo while allowing negotiations to proceed.

Russia has resisted this approach, arguing that a temporary ceasefire could enable Ukraine to rebuild its forces without resolving the conflict.

Ukraine, by contrast, argues that withdrawing from fortified territory without credible guarantees would expose it to renewed attack.

Neither side can be expected to disregard the military implications of the proposed arrangements.

For European governments, the principal question is consequently not simply whether Ukrainian and Russian representatives can be brought back to the negotiating table.

It is whether any agreement can prevent the territorial settlement from becoming the starting position for another war.

Stubb and Støre’s conversation with Putin demonstrated that diplomatic communication remains possible. It did not establish that Moscow is prepared to abandon its existing territorial objectives.

The distinction matters.

Putin’s demand for Donbas offers Russia two potential advantages: a justification for continuing the war if Kyiv refuses, and a substantial military gain if Kyiv accepts.

That does not prove the Kremlin has already decided to resume hostilities after a negotiated withdrawal. It does, however, explain why the terms, sequencing and enforceability of any agreement are as consequential as the territory itself.

The essential question facing negotiators is therefore not only whether Russia can obtain Donbas through diplomacy rather than force.

It is whether the price of that concession would be a lasting peace — or a weaker Ukrainian defensive position if peace fails.

US first lady Melania Trump said on Tuesday that a localized ceasefire between Ukraine and Russia has been expanded beyond Oleshky to allow safe passage for humanitarian supplies.

“Timing was accelerated two days ahead of schedule to protect the safety of civilians and to facilitate the delivery of critical humanitarian aid,” Mrs Trump said in an X post. “The ceasefire’s geographic area has expanded beyond Oleshky, within the Kherson Region, to provide safe passage for the humanitarian convoys.”