EU and Chinese officials agreed a series of trade concessions covering electric cars, rare earths and tariffs that dragged them away from a damaging trade war on Friday (9 October), following two days of crisis talks.

Following two days of talks in Beijing, EU trade commissioner Maroš Šefčovič said that he and China’s commerce secretary Wang Wentao had made a “crucial first step” towards rebalancing EU-China trade relations.

Europe can point to progress on hybrid vehicles, stronger assurances over the supply of critical raw materials, and continued engagement on market access issues in China.

Hours before Šefčovič arrived, Beijing rejected an EU demand for so-called “voluntary export restrictions” on its electric vehicles (EVs). However, in a joint statement on Friday, the two sides said that they had reached an “understanding on trade in hybrid vehicles in a WTO compliant manner”, but without providing further details.

They added that further negotiations on reducing tariffs and minimum pricing deals would allow Chinese EVs to enter the EU at a lower duty rate.

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Beijing’s refusal to restrict shipments of Chinese hybrid vehicles has sharpened a dispute over Europe’s widening trade deficit, with EU Trade Commissioner Maroš Šefčovič seeking concessions during negotiations in China.

China has rejected a European Union request to restrict exports of hybrid cars to Europe, increasing the likelihood of new trade defence measures against Chinese manufacturers as negotiations continue in Beijing.

The disagreement comes during a visit by EU Trade Commissioner Maroš Šefčovič, who is seeking commitments from Chinese officials to address the bloc’s growing trade deficit and improve access for European businesses to the Chinese market.

According to accounts of the negotiations, Beijing has declined the EU’s proposal for voluntary restrictions. The European Commission is consequently considering safeguard measures that could limit hybrid vehicle imports or impose additional tariffs when shipments exceed specified thresholds.

No final decision has been announced, and the precise scope of any restrictions remains under discussion.

The dispute adds another difficulty to EU–China economic relations before European leaders meet in Brussels on 15–16 October, when the bloc’s commercial relationship with Beijing is expected to feature prominently.

Hybrid Vehicles Become New Trade Battleground

The latest confrontation follows the introduction of EU countervailing duties on battery-electric vehicles manufactured in China in October 2024.

Those measures, imposed after an investigation into Chinese state subsidies, did not cover hybrid vehicles.

Chinese manufacturers have since increased their presence in Europe’s hybrid market, offering competitively priced vehicles that combine combustion engines with electric propulsion.

The European Commission previously confirmed that its original anti-subsidy investigation applied specifically to battery-electric vehicles and could not automatically be extended to hybrids.

Consequently, any additional import restrictions must have a separate legal basis.

One option under consideration is a safeguard mechanism that would permit a defined quantity of imports before higher tariffs apply.

Such a measure would differ from the existing anti-subsidy duties, which target alleged unfair financial support provided to manufacturers.

Safeguard restrictions are designed to address injury caused by increased imports. They may also create difficulties for Brussels because measures directed at a particular product can affect suppliers from countries other than China.

Japan, South Korea and Britain could therefore face consequences depending on the structure and legal basis of any proposed restrictions.

Trade Deficit Exceeds €360 Billion

The dispute is taking place against a widening imbalance in goods trade between the European Union and China.

The EU’s annual merchandise trade deficit with Beijing has reached approximately €360 billion, equivalent to almost €1 billion per day.

European officials are particularly concerned about Chinese industrial overcapacity and the export of manufactured goods at prices that European producers struggle to match.

During the latest trade negotiations, Brussels has sought commitments concerning market access, import volumes and restrictions affecting European companies.

Chinese exports of plug-in hybrid vehicles to the EU have reportedly increased by 86 per cent over the past year, while battery-electric vehicle imports have risen by approximately 40 per cent.

This expansion has intensified pressure on European manufacturers already confronting high production costs, weak demand in some domestic markets and substantial expenditure on electrification.

EU Today reported in September that Brussels had requested voluntary restrictions on Chinese hybrid exports as part of a broader effort to rebalance commercial relations.

Beijing’s refusal has now brought the possibility of unilateral European measures closer to consideration.

Germany and France Seek Stronger Protection

Germany and France have increasingly aligned their positions on the need for stronger European instruments to address unfair competition and dependence on Chinese industrial supply chains.

France has long advocated a more interventionist European industrial policy, while German manufacturers have traditionally placed greater emphasis on preserving commercial access to China.

That calculation is changing as Chinese competitors strengthen their position in the European automotive market.

The problem is particularly sensitive for Germany, whose automotive industry depends on extensive supplier networks, skilled employment and exports.

German manufacturers also operate significant businesses in China, meaning that new European trade measures could expose them to retaliation in one of their principal overseas markets.

China has already responded to previous European restrictions with trade investigations and duties affecting agricultural products and alcoholic beverages.

Further measures against Chinese vehicle imports could therefore extend the dispute into sectors unrelated to the automotive industry.

Brussels Faces Difficult Legal Choices

The European Commission must determine whether voluntary arrangements can produce measurable reductions in Chinese exports or whether formal restrictions are required.

The legal distinction between anti-subsidy duties and safeguard measures will be particularly important.

The existing electric-vehicle tariffs were introduced following an investigation that examined subsidies and their effects on European manufacturers.

A safeguard mechanism would require a different assessment, including evidence concerning increased imports and injury to domestic producers.

It would also have to comply with the EU’s international trade obligations.

Meanwhile, Chinese manufacturers are developing production facilities within Europe, potentially reducing their exposure to tariffs imposed on imported vehicles.

EU Today’s earlier examination of the proposed hybrid tariffs considered the broader consequences of Chinese investment in European manufacturing and the bloc’s dependence on critical raw materials.

The negotiations in Beijing are expected to influence whether the Commission proceeds with formal restrictions or continues seeking a negotiated settlement.

The immediate question is whether China is prepared to offer concessions sufficiently substantial to persuade Brussels that additional tariffs are unnecessary.

With EU leaders due to discuss relations with Beijing next week, the dispute has become a test of the Commission’s willingness to use trade defence instruments against one of Europe’s largest commercial partners.

Persuading China that its €1bn daily trade surplus with the EU is not sustainable was always going to be a hard sell for EU trade commissioner Maroš Šefčovič.  

And the early signs are that Šefčovič’s two days of talks with Chinese commerce secretary Wang Wentao, which conclude on Friday (9 October), are not going to deliver the breakthrough demanded by EU leaders when they gather for a summit in Brussels next week. 

“The message around the table was clear: the need to improve access to the Chinese market, while boosting our economic security,” Šefčovič posted on X ahead of the first day of talks. 

But rhetoric aside, three months after the EU Commission set up a series of ‘work streams’ with Chinese officials, with a mandate to address the multi-layered EU-Sino trade dispute, it is hard to see much tangible progress. 

Hours before Šefčovič arrived, Beijing rejected an EU demand for so-called “voluntary export restrictions” on its electric vehicles (EVs). 

In August, data published by Schmidt Automotive Research found that 14 percent of EV sales across Europe this year were Chinese-made, up from 9.4 percent last year. 

That is despite the EU imposing additional tariffs of between 17 and 36 percent on Chinese EVs in October 2024. 

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Mexico's auto exports posted their biggest slump so far this year, data from statistics office INEGI showed on Wednesday, a decline analysts attributed to tariff policies from the US, the biggest market for the Latin American country's top industrial sector.

France and Germany are at odds over how the European Union should define European production under its emerging industrial preference rules, with Paris favouring a narrow EU-only system while Berlin wants trusted trade partners including Britain, Canada and Japan to remain eligible.

France and Germany have reopened a fundamental dispute over the European Union’s “Made in Europe” industrial policy, this time over the question that will determine how far-reaching the programme eventually becomes: which countries should qualify as European suppliers.

The disagreement centres on the Industrial Accelerator Act, under which the EU wants to use subsidies and public procurement to strengthen domestic manufacturing and reduce dependence on Chinese production in strategic sectors.

France is pressing for a restrictive definition centred on manufacturing within the EU’s 27 member states. Germany favours a broader approach that could extend preferential treatment to countries with close trade agreements or reciprocal industrial relationships with the Union.

That could bring Britain, Canada, Japan and potentially Turkey within the system rather than treating their products in the same way as goods from China and other outside suppliers, according to reporting on the Franco-German dispute.

The dispute has important consequences because “Made in Europe” is intended to influence how large amounts of public money are spent.

The Industrial Accelerator Act is designed to introduce European-content requirements into selected subsidy schemes and public contracts in sectors including electric vehicles, batteries and clean technology. The underlying objective is to ensure that European public spending supports European industrial capacity rather than increasing dependence on imported technologies.

EU Today has followed the argument since the proposals began taking shape. In February, it reported that the Commission was preparing local-content rules for strategic technologies. The debate has since moved from whether such preferences should exist to how broadly “European” should be interpreted.

Paris wants the benefits concentrated inside the EU. The French position reflects concern that allowing manufacturers in countries with EU trade agreements to qualify could dilute the purpose of the scheme. If access is too broad, the argument runs, public procurement may do little to increase production or employment within the Union itself.

Germany is more cautious about creating a closed EU system. Its manufacturing economy is embedded in supply chains extending across Europe and into neighbouring markets, including Britain and Turkey. Berlin has therefore argued for a “made with EU” approach under which trusted trade partners could participate if their markets also provide reciprocal access to European industry.

That disagreement has become increasingly important for Britain. British manufacturers, particularly in the automotive sector, remain closely integrated into continental production networks despite Brexit.

A strict EU27 definition could therefore produce situations in which components made in Britain count as foreign content even when they are incorporated into vehicles assembled inside the Union.

France and Germany had appeared to be moving towards a broader industrial compromise last week. Their negotiations combined the “Made in Europe” question with disagreements over vehicle-emission rules and the future treatment of combustion-engine technology. The latest discussions show that one of the hardest questions remains unresolved.

There is also concern among some EU governments that an overly broad system could create routes for companies from countries such as China to obtain favourable treatment indirectly.

The argument mirrors a wider change in EU economic policy. Supply disruptions, Russia’s war against Ukraine and China’s dominance of several strategic manufacturing sectors have pushed Brussels towards a more interventionist approach.

France sees public purchasing power as an instrument for rebuilding production specifically within the Union. Germany is seeking greater flexibility for supply chains involving trusted partners and appears more concerned about the trade consequences of drawing the boundary too tightly.

For Brussels, the problem is now practical rather than theoretical. The narrower the definition, the more industrial support remains inside the EU; the broader it becomes, the easier it is to preserve existing supply chains and relations with allies.

Production: By Europod, in co-production with Sphera Network.

EUobserver is proud to have an editorial partnership with Europod to co-publish the podcast series “Briefed” hosted by Léa Marchal. The podcast is available on all major platforms.

Find the full transcript below: 

Chinese carmakers are taking an increasing share of the European car market, particularly when it comes to electric vehicles. Why are European carmakers now opening their factories to their Chinese competitors?

Until recently, the main concern in Europe was Chinese-made electric vehicles being imported into the EU. That’s why, two years ago, the EU imposed hefty tariffs on Chinese electric cars.

But Chinese manufacturers have found another way into the European market: they are setting up production here. Some are building factories of their own. Others are entering partnerships with European carmakers and using their existing production sites.

That’s the case with Stellantis and Chinese manufacturer Leapmotor. And now Dongfeng is also negotiating to produce cars at the French plant of Rennes La Janais. Because by moving production to Europe, Chinese manufacturers may be losing one of their main advantages, which is cheap labour.

But low labour costs are only one part of their competitive edge.

Chinese manufacturers also continue to benefit from state support. And setting up production in Europe doesn’t necessarily mean building brand-new factories.

In many cases, Chinese companies are looking to partner with European manufacturers and use factories that are already there — factories that are no longer operating at full capacity. That means they can save significantly on investment costs. And they can also rely on their European partners’ existing sales and distribution networks.

So how big is this Chinese presence in Europe becoming? For 2028, there are already 12 projects involving Chinese carmakers setting up production in Europe. Several are in Spain, with others in France, Belgium, Slovakia, Hungary, Sweden and Austria.

Now, why would European manufacturers allow their Chinese competitors to produce cars in their own factories? Part of the answer is that European carmakers are struggling to keep up in electric vehicles sells. And that is contributing to factory closures and job losses.

European manufacturers have to meet EU targets on average CO2 emissions each year. And producing more electric vehicles is necessary to meet those requirements.

So partnerships with Chinese manufacturers can serve two purposes: they can help European companies fulfilling their green cars objectives, while also keeping existing factories and jobs running.

Though there is a longer-term risk for European manufacturers. The more Chinese companies establish themselves in Europe, the more competitive pressure they could put on European brands — potentially even leading to takeovers. That has happened before: Volvo Cars, for example, was acquired by Chinese group Geely in 2010. 

In Germany, carmakers are for now refusing to open the doors of their production sites to the Chinese. But they do have partnerships with Chinese companies to produce vehicles in China, where they can benefit from lower production costs. That explains why they were very much opposed to imposing tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles.

But the situation is now changing. Volkswagen closed its Dresden factory last year, and other German plants are also facing closure risks. Germany’s car industry is therefore increasingly joining calls for stronger protection against Chinese competition.

And that brings us back to the Franco-German paper that is circulating in Brussels, which calls for measures to restrict Chinese access to the European market.

Because this debate goes well beyond cars. The EU is increasingly concerned about Chinese competition and dependence in a range of strategic industries. This will be discussed next week, when EU leaders meet in Brussels.

The European Commission could also present a new so-called “diversification” tool, either at the summit or around it. One possibility would be to require companies not to rely exclusively on China for certain critical materials. Something which could trigger what we call a trade war. I’ll be following that very closely!

The war between the United States and Iran is no longer just a confrontation between Washington and Tehran. A second contest is taking shape alongside and behind it. China is not fighting the United States directly, but its economic, technological and diplomatic links to Iran are complicating Washington’s strategy and ability to win the conflict. […]

The post The China factor behind the Iran war appeared first on Asia Times.

A copper ingot cast somewhere in inland Sardinia during the Bronze Age might, centuries later, turn up in a Scottish tomb or a village in southern Sweden. That is the striking picture drawn by Serena Sabatini, an archaeologist at the University of Gothenburg, in a new paper that pulls together decades of isotopic analyses to […]

Tharangambadi is a fishing village on India’s Coromandel Coast, in the state of Tamil Nadu. Its name means “place of the singing waves,” a nod to the Indian Ocean lapping at its shore. It isn’t much of a tourist stop, and fishing is still its main trade, but anyone who walks its streets runs into […]

Trade Commissioner Maroš Šefčovič and MEP Dirk Gotink (EPP, Netherlands) Photographer: Mathieu Cugnot © European Union

The European Parliament has approved a major overhaul of the EU’s customs system, tightening requirements on e-commerce platforms, introducing a new handling fee for goods ordered from outside the bloc and creating a central EU customs authority.

“This is the biggest reform of European customs since 1968, supporting trade and the enforcement of EU rules,” said MEP Dirk Gotink, (EPP, Netherlands) who steered the legislation through Parliament. Gotink said European customs authorities had been overwhelmed by a “tsunami of Chinese parcels” and that the reform would give customs officers stronger tools to enforce EU standards.

Under the new rules, e-commerce platforms and sellers shipping goods directly from non-EU countries to European consumers will be treated as importers. That will make them responsible for providing customs data, handling applicable charges and ensuring products comply with EU law.

The reform also introduces an EU-wide handling fee on goods ordered directly from non-EU countries, with member states required to begin collecting it no later than 1 November, 2026. The European Commission will determine the amount and review it every two years.

Companies that repeatedly breach EU customs rules could face fines ranging from at least 1% to as much as 6% of the value of goods they imported into the EU during the previous 12 months.

The overhaul will also establish an EU Customs Data Hub, designed to replace at least 111 existing customs IT systems. A new EU Customs Authority, based in Lille, France, will manage the hub and coordinate customs cooperation and risk management across the EU.

The Council has already given the reform its final formal approval, making Parliament’s vote the final step in the legislative procedure.

European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen during her speech in 2025 Photographer: Dati Bendo © European Union, 2025

Ursula von der Leyen is expected to make the case for a more independent and resilient Europe in her State of the European Union address on Wednesday (16 September). But analysts and political groups in the European Parliament are demanding something more concrete: evidence that the Commission can turn its expanding ambitions into results Europeans can see.

The State of the European Union address, commonly known in Brussels as the “SOTEU”, is the Commission president’s annual speech to Parliament setting out priorities for the year ahead. Modeled in part on the US president’s State of the Union address to Congress, the EU version began in 2010 under then Commission president José Manuel Barroso. Von der Leyen will deliver this year’s address at 9:00 tomorrow morning (16 September).

The speech comes as Europe is confronted with an ongoing war in Ukraine, a fragmenting global trading system and the challenge of strengthening defence while reviving competitiveness and financing the green transition. At home, von der Leyen must reconcile political groups that broadly agree on the need for a stronger Europe but differ over what that means.

For Manfred Weber, chairman of von der Leyen’s centre-right European People’s Party group, the focus should be on voters’ economic and security concerns.

“Europe’s priorities must reflect people’s concerns: jobs, the cost of living and economic security,” Weber said. He called for a stronger economy and well-paid jobs, tighter control of Europe’s borders, leadership on AI, continued support for Ukraine and “a strong European defence pillar”.

On the centre-left, Iratxe García Pérez, president of the Socialists and Democrats group, argues that the Commission has relied too heavily on deregulation.

“Europe needs more than announcements,” García Pérez said. “It needs concrete policies backed by the necessary resources.” The S&D wants greater emphasis on affordable food, housing and energy, quality jobs and climate action, alongside European sovereignty in defence and digital technologies.

Renew Europe is also making delivery the benchmark, calling on von der Leyen to present “a credible plan turning European ambition into visible results” and framing the choice as one between united European action and fragmentation.

Analysts at the European Policy Centre see the same challenge extending to Europe’s position in the world.

“Von der Leyen will tell us that the EU is forging new partnerships around the globe,” said Almut Möller, the EPC’s director for European and Global Affairs. Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney’s attendance will reinforce the geopolitical dimension of the speech.

But strategic autonomy goes beyond defence and trade. Georg Riekeles, the EPC’s head of political economy, identifies financial dependence as an overlooked vulnerability. With the international financial system becoming less stable, Europe cannot assume Washington and the US Federal Reserve will play the stabilising role they did in previous crises. Von der Leyen “must therefore address financial sovereignty as a core element of European security”, he argues.

Technology poses another test. Elizabeth Kuiper, the EPC’s head of health and societal resilience, says von der Leyen should “reject the trade-off between competitiveness, technological progress, and the EU’s social model”, particularly as AI affects employment, income security and social cohesion.

Climate policy presents a similar collision between ambition and resources. Stefan Šipka, the EPC’s head of sustainable prosperity, argues that Europe needs “a robust delivery mindset, no more strategies” as it tries to combine defence, decarbonisation and economic security.

The common thread is delivery. Von der Leyen has no shortage of strategic objectives. The harder task on Wednesday will be explaining how they fit together, how Europe will finance them and what takes priority when they conflict.

For EPC policy analyst Eric Maurice, von der Leyen “must provide strategic focus and political clarity”.

“As the midterm in her second term approaches,” Maurice said, “it is time for von der Leyen to present a vision and deliver.”

On 11 September, the European Commission has put forward its proposals to the Council for the signature and conclusion of Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between the European Union and India, seeking authorization for its signature and conclusion. If authorized by the Council, this will be the largest trade agreement ever concluded by both the EU and India.

Once adopted and entered into force, the agreement will improve market access, reduce tariffs, tackle unnecessary barriers to trade, as well as provide predictable rules for trade and investment between the EU and India. The EU and India already trade over €180 billion worth of goods and services per year, supporting close to 800,000 EU jobs. This deal will eliminate or reduce tariffs on 96% of EU goods exports to India. Overall, the tariff reductions will save around €4 billion per year in duties on European products. It will make it easier for European companies to access the Indian market and compete on a more level playing field, while it will ensure consumers can benefit from increased choices and more competitive prices.

The proposal put forward today represents a key step towards ensuring that consumers and businesses can start reaping the benefits of this deal as soon as possible. This is in line with the fast-track procedure laid out by Commissioner for Trade and Economic Security, Maroš Šefčovič earlier this year. The procedure aims at speeding up the implementation of FTA's, which is crucial at a time of geopolitical uncertainty and growing pressure on the global trading system.

The EU-India FTA reflects the EU's commitment to strengthen economic ties with key partners in the Indo-Pacific region. With its proposals, the Commission is seeking Council's approval to sign the agreements which will then require European Parliament's consent, before conclusion and entry into force. The Indian authorities are in parallel going through their own internal ratification procedures.

For more information

Proposal for a Council Decision on the signing of the Free Trade Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of India

Proposal for a Council Decision on the conclusion of the Free Trade Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of India

Questions and answers on the EU-India Free Trade Agreement

From illicit production to smuggling, the illicit tobacco trade continues to pose a serious problem for the EU, as it negatively impacts its finances, public health and security, according to a new report by the European Court of Auditors (ECA). Although the European Commission and EU countries have made efforts to combat this global criminal phenomenon, their action is not robust enough. Illicit production across the EU is increasing, smuggling methods are getting more sophisticated, and new tobacco products are on the rise. Against this backdrop, the auditors criticise poor cross-country cooperation, which suffers from persistent gaps and lacks a concerted EU-wide approach.

The illicit tobacco trade has changed significantly in recent years. Organised crime groups have strategically relocated production from Ukraine to the EU in order to shorten supply chains and access consumers more directly. Although smuggling remains a problem, illicit manufacturing sites have been detected in almost all EU countries, and illicit production has grown across the EU. For instance, in a large-scale illicit cigarette production factory in Belgium, each machine was capable of producing around a million cigarettes per hour. In the largest illicit cigarette factory dismantled in Spain, three million packets of counterfeit cigarettes were seized, i.e. 56 times the height of Mount Everest if the cigarettes were stacked horizontally.

“The EU cannot afford to let its fight against the scourge of illicit tobacco go up in smoke,” said Petri Sarvamaa, the ECA Member leading the audit. “If we are serious about safeguarding citizens’ health, wallets and security, the Commission and member states must up their game to fight criminal activity head-on.”

The illicit tobacco trade deprives EU and member state budgets of €13 billion a year, according to the Commission’s estimate. However, this figure should be treated with caution, as it is based on external studies. The fact remains that the Commission lacks a reliable and independent EU-wide estimate of the illicit tobacco market, its structure and its economic impact, e.g. in terms of lost tax revenues. Such data, however, are crucial for determining the magnitude of the problem and designing an effective response. As it stands, the Commission’s reporting is largely based on seizures, and so does not provide a full picture of the situation.

Over the past decade, the EU and its member states have taken measures to combat the illicit tobacco trade. However, EU law is not harmonised, and member states’ efforts are uneven. For example, key production inputs such as raw tobacco and production machinery, and new types of products such as heated tobacco products and liquids for e-cigarettes, are not treated in the same way across the EU. At the same time, the EU regulatory framework gives member states a free hand in choosing counter-measures, thus leading to enforcement gaps that organised crime groups can exploit. In particular, as national control systems and enforcement approaches differ, such as in the definition of offences and the severity of penalties, this can encourage criminal activities to relocate to laxer jurisdictions. Furthermore, EU countries are inconsistent in the way they exchange information.

In the EU, responsibility for combating the illicit tobacco trade is shared between several stakeholders. However, no single entity has a clear coordinating role, meaning that initiatives are fragmented. The auditors thus call on the Commission to assume a more active role in combating the illicit trade in tobacco products.

Background information

Although overall tobacco consumption has continued to fall, the quantity of illicit tobacco products in the EU has risen in recent years. In 2023, the Commission estimated that the quantity of illicit tobacco products was 8.8 % of total cigarette consumption. Excluding cigarettes, the illicit tobacco market amounts to nearly 21 000 tonnes in the EU. According to estimates, these new products make up 13 % of the market value of tobacco products sold in the EU, and attract younger consumers.

Illicit tobacco products are very attractive for organised crime groups due to their high profitability and comparatively low risk (penalties have traditionally been light and detection rates low). Such illegal activity not only provides a significant source of income for criminals but, by offering cheaper tobacco products, also undermines efforts to reduce tobacco consumption. Ultimately, it leads to losses in terms of customs duties, value-added tax and national excise duties.

The audit assesses the effectiveness of the action taken by the Commission and the member states. The auditors carried out field visits in Belgium, Spain, Poland and Romania, and include examples of illicit manufacturing sites in their report. ECA special report 23/2026 “Combating the illicit trade in tobacco in the EU: Fragmented efforts and persistent gaps” is available in 24 EU languages on the ECA website.

Pakistan and Kyrgyzstan also signed an agreement on scientific and technical cooperation.

The post Pakistan, Kyrgyzstan sign 16 MoUs, agreements to boost bilateral ties appeared first on BOL News.

Pakistan exported about 169,000 metric tons of rice to Saudi Arabia in 2025, worth around $163 million.

The post Pakistan, Saudi Arabia set $3 billion agricultural export target within two years appeared first on BOL News.

In the second quarter of 2026, the EU imported €701.8 billion in goods from non-EU countries and exported €680.0 billion. Compared with the previous quarter, both imports and exports increased, by 9.9% and 5.4%, respectively. Compared with the second quarter of 2025, imports increased by 11.7% and exports by 4.5%.

China was the EU’s largest supplier, accounting for €153.6 billion (21.9% of all imports). The United States came second (€98.7 billion; 14.1%), followed by the United Kingdom (€43.4 billion; 6.2%), Switzerland (€36.9 billion; 5.3%) and Türkiye (€25.5 billion; 3.6%). 

The EU increased imports from the United States (+11.5%), the United Kingdom (+8.8%), China (+7.9%) and Switzerland (+2.1%) compared with the second quarter of 2025, while imports from Türkiye declined slightly (-0.6%).

Click to enlarge

Source dataset: ext_st_eu27_2020sitc

The EU exported €127.7 billion of goods to the United States, making it the EU’s main export destination (18.8% of all exports). The United Kingdom came second with €92.7 billion (13.6%), followed by Switzerland (€60.5 billion; 8.9%), China (€50.3 billion; 7.4%) and Türkiye (€27.3 billion; 4.0%).

Exports to Switzerland rose sharply (+16.1%) compared with the same quarter of 2025. Exports to the United Kingdom (+5.6%) and China (+2.8%) also increased, while those to the United States (-5.6%) and Türkiye (-4.9%) decreased.

For more information

• Statistics Explained article on extra-EU trade in goods - latest developments
• Statistics Explained on the EU trade with the US – latest developments
• Statistics Explained on the EU trade with China - latest developments
• Thematic section on international trade in goods
• Database on international trade in goods
• International trade in goods – a statistical picture

The question of whether brands are an invention exclusive to modern capitalist societies has received a resounding answer from an international team of researchers: they already existed at least 3,200 years ago. A study led by Marta Luciani of the University of Vienna and published in the journal PLOS One has documented how painted pottery […]

Hanoi (dpa) – Vietnam and the European Union on Thursday upgraded ties to a comprehensive strategic partnership, Vietnam’s highest diplomatic tier, amid a tumultuous period for global trade.

In a joint statement, Vietnam and EU stressed “the importance of a partnership based on common interests and shared values of peace, security, and prosperity in a rules-based international order, based on international law.”

Though US tariffs were not explicitly mentioned, at a press briefing held after meeting Vietnamese President Luong Cuong, European Council President António Costa said: “At a moment when the international rules-based order is under threat from multiple sides, we need to stand side-by-side as reliable and predictable partners.”

“Vietnam considers the EU one of its most important partners in the world and wishes to continue promoting and deepening its relationship with the EU,” Cuong said.

Cuong labelled the move a “historic milestone,” coming 35 years after Vietnam and the EU established diplomatic relations. The EU-Vietnam free trade agreement, signed in 2020, has helped drive a 40 percent increase in bilateral trade.

Vietnam is one of the EU’s largest trading partners in South-East Asia, while the EU is Vietnam’s fourth-largest trading partner. In the first 10 months of 2025, two-way trade reached nearly 61 billion Dollar (51 billion Euro), up 8.4 percent year on year.

Vietnam and the EU on Thursday also underscored the need to strengthen cooperation on peace, defence and security, and voiced support for multilateralism and respect for international law, including the UN Charter. (29 January)

Berlin (dpa) – Germany’s Greens are backing the European Union’s landmark trade deal with India, days after the party’s lawmakers in the European Parliament played a key role in challenging the bloc’s agreement with the South American Mercosur countries.

Andreas Audretsch, the party’s deputy group leader in the German parliament, said the deal with India, which was announced earlier on Tuesday, was good for businesses and workers in Germany.

In view of the “destructive rage” of US President Donald Trump, Europe must build new alliances for trade and cooperation, Audretsch argued.

The deal was finalised during an EU-India summit in New Delhi, with European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi proclaiming the agreement on Tuesday.

“The EU and India make history today, deepening the partnership between the world’s biggest democracies,” von der Leyen said.

The latest agreement will not be as comprehensive as the one recently concluded between the EU and Mercosur countries Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay.

Last week, several Green lawmakers in Brussels voted in favour of referring the bloc’s deal with Mercosur to the European Court of Justice (ECJ), which could result in a substantial delay to ratification. Their votes were decisive in passing the motion, prompting severe criticism for the party in Germany, whose export-led economy stands to benefit from the boost to trade.

In a paper, the Green leadership has said that Germany needs “new economic partnerships” to diversify foreign trade. “That is why it is important to provisionally apply the agreement with the Mercosur countries and then ratify it,” the paper continued. (January 27)

Davos, Switzerland (dpa) – German Chancellor Friedrich Merz has blasted the European Parliament for referring the contested EU free trade deal with four countries from the South American Mercosur bloc to court.

“I deeply regret that the European Parliament has put another obstacle in our way,” Merz told political and business leaders at the World Economic Forum in Davos on Thursday. “But rest assured, we will not be stopped. The Mercosur deal is fair and balanced. There is no alternative to it if we want to have higher growth in Europe.”

Merz said he expects the trade deal to be implemented “provisionally” despite the Parliament’s challenge.

The European Parliament voted on Wednesday to have the Mercosur trade deal, which was signed last week following decades of painstaking negotiations, reviewed by the European Court of Justice (ECJ).

Waiting for the court’s opinion could significantly delay the ratification process for the agreement with Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay. It is unclear how long it will take for the judges at the ECJ in Luxembourg to submit their assessment, but previous assessments took between 16 and 26 months.

The agreement, which aims to remove trade barriers and customs duties and boost the exchange of goods and services, would create one of the largest free trade zones in the world. (22 January)