Russia’s Geran-5 jet drones have sped up to 1,000 km/h while maneuvering, Ukraine’s presidential adviser on defense technology Serhii “Flash” Beskrestnov said in Kyiv on 29 October. He added that Chinese engineers help develop Russia’s Geran drones.

When Russia moved to faster Geran versions, Ukrainian developers had to look for new ways to intercept them, Beskrestnov said, and Ukraine must learn to stay a step ahead. From 1 to 26 September, air defenses downed only 55% of Russia’s jet-powered drones. On 29 October, one such drone hit Dnipro’s railway station, and the death toll has since risen to 15. Over the past three months, air defenses downed nearly 60% of the jet-powered Geran-4, the General Staff said on 27 October, noting a shortage of guided anti-aircraft missiles. That update gave no Geran-5 figure.

A peak well above cruise speed

That peak, about 620 mph, came during maneuvers. Ukraine’s military intelligence (HUR) puts the Geran-5’s cruise speed at 450–600 km/h. By Beskrestnov’s count, the earlier Geran-3 flew at 280–300 km/h.

Russia’s best engineers work against Ukraine, and China’s do too, Beskrestnov told journalists. Russia’s Alabuga drone plant sets Chinese engineers tasks such as work on the control module, he said. Key components inside Russia’s Shahed-type drones are Chinese, he said. Meanwhile, China will require licenses for Geran engines from 18 November, Ukraine’s sanctions commissioner Vladyslav Vlasiuk said. Licensing is not a ban, he stressed.

Speed is the easy part

Some interceptors are being designed to match the Geran-5’s cruise speed. US firm CHAOS Industries claims a top speed of 540 km/h for its Vespid Mk 1 interceptor. On 14 October, Ukrainian defense outlet Defense Express judged that may be enough against the Geran-5’s 450–600 km/h cruise speed.

Ukrainian manufacturers have already shown jet-powered interceptor drones, Beskrestnov said. But they have run into problems with control, guidance, automatic target lock, and scaling up production. A model that flies fast is only one part of the job, he said, and an easy-to-use serial product is a different question entirely.

Zhou Qunfei was seated between Elon Musk and Apple’s Tim Cook during a Beijing banquet for Donald Trump’s state visit in May

© AFP/Getty

Zhou Qunfei was seated between Elon Musk and Apple’s Tim Cook during a Beijing banquet for Donald Trump’s state visit in May

© AFP/Getty

The US Federal Communications Commission (FCC) floated new rules to bar telecoms providers on a list of entities deemed national security threats from directly accessing US phone numbers for VoIP calls, a move slammed by Chinese authorities as unreasonable suppression of its enterprises.

Should the rules be approved at an FCC meeting in November and subsequently introduced, the curbs are intended to block access to the numbers from companies on its Covered List. This includes divisions of China Mobile, China Unicom and China Telecom, alongside numerous vendors.

The proposal is part of an ambition by the agency to cut so-called illegal robocalls in the US and is being promoted by the authority as a national security measure.

In comments published by Chinese state news agency Xinhua today (30 October), the country’s foreign ministry representative Guo Jiakun slammed what was described as unreasonable suppression of the country’s enterprises.

He reportedly said the US had “overstretched the concept of national security and abused state power to unreasonably suppress Chinese companies”.

Guo argued such moves seriously impede normal economic and trade exchanges and “do not serve the interests of any party, including US companies and consumers”.

China plans to take measures to safeguard “legitimate rights and interests”, Guo said.

Defensive
FCC chair Brendan Carr unveiled the move on 28 October, saying it would strengthen the nation’s robocall defences.

The plan would require companies to obtain national security-focused certifications to access private numbers, with changes set to be made to US VoIP numbering authorisation rules.

“We are going to enhance the vetting process that all providers must go through before they obtain access to telephone numbers,” Carr said.

“This will make it substantially more difficult for bad actors to operate in our networks. This step is part of our broader effort to look at every portion of the lifecycle of a call and make it more difficult for illegal robocalls to get through.”

The proposal is the latest FCC move targeting enterprises on the Covered List, which is largely made-up of companies from China.

Companies in the crosshairs and authorities in China have repeatedly slated such measures.

The post China slates latest US proposal targeting operators appeared first on Mobile World Live.

A record 33 officials were expelled at this year’s Communist Party plenum

© AP

Una empresa de Singapur de centros de datos, Megaspeed, compra chips a Nvidia, la empresa más valiosa del mundo gracias a sus sofisticados dispositivos que impulsan el boom actual de IA. El Gobierno de EE UU sospechaba desde 2024 que Megaspeed revendía esos chips a Alibaba y otras empresas chinas de manera irregular. Porque desde 2022 Washington restringe la exportación de los modelos más potentes a China.

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Forums for discussion of feminist and LGBTQ+ views face growing intolerance from Chinese state, say experts

Beijing’s annual independent queer film festival has been cancelled after what is understood to have been a campaign of sustained harassment from authorities.

Beijing Queer film festival, which was due to begin on Friday in China’s capital, is one of the country’s oldest independent film festivals.

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© Photograph: Ng Han Guan/AP

© Photograph: Ng Han Guan/AP

© Photograph: Ng Han Guan/AP

A record 33 officials were expelled at this year’s Communist Party plenum

© AP

In November 2023, three engineers left a South Korean semiconductor testing-components company for a Chinese employer offering twice their previous salaries. According to South Korea’s Intellectual Property Office, they allegedly took proprietary probe-card designs, arranged for a Korean design firm to modify them, and used the technology to develop products in China. By December 2025, […]

The post What Taiwan can teach South Korea about China’s chip tech theft appeared first on Asia Times.

Production: By Europod, in co-production with Sphera Network.

EUobserver is proud to have an editorial partnership with Europod to co-publish the podcast series “Briefed” hosted by Léa Marchal. The podcast is available on all major platforms.

Find the full transcript below:

From this Sunday, the EU is imposing a new €2 charge on parcels coming from outside the bloc. It comes on top of the €3 charge on small parcels announced in June.

So why is the EU doing this, and what difference will it make? Let’s start with what’s changing.

From this Sunday, there will be a €2 tax on each product category contained in a parcel coming from outside the EU. This ads up to the €3 tax on small parcels introduced in June this year. So for a parcel of less than €150, you can already count a €5 charge, and that’s if your parcel contains just one category of item.

Say you order four different garments from the Chinese platform Shein. The total charge comes to €20.

Officially, it’s the sellers who are supposed to pay, not consumers. But in practice, they pass the cost on to customers one way or another.

So why this second charge? The €3 charge adopted in June was meant to tackle the flood of small parcels coming from companies like Temu and Shein.

Parcels of very low value, often just a few euros. And that’s not an exaggeration. According to Kristian Vanderwaeren, Belgium’s head of customs, the average value of a parcel before the charge was around €5. And that’s an average, so imagine the number of parcels worth less than €5 that literally come from the other side of the world.

Until now, parcels worth less than €150 were exempt from customs duties. That was a big hole in customs revenue. And at the same time, customs officers had more and more parcels to process. Hence the €3 levy.

Now the new charge is different. It applies to all parcels, not just the smallest ones. Its goal is to raise revenue to cover the cost of checks. Because if the EU wants to fight fraud and make sure products on the market are safe, customs controls have to increase. And that takes time, and therefore money.

We don’t know yet exactly how much the new tax will bring in revenues. What we know, even if the situation is not comparable, is what the €3 tax is starting to bring.

Between June and September, the €3 charge brought in €364mln for Belgian customs. In just three months.

Belgium is a major entry point for parcels bound for the EU, through the port of Antwerp and Liège airport. So we cannot duplicate that figure for other EU countries.

Still, over a full year, the two charges combined, on top of standard customs duties, should raise a significant amount. We can therefore imagine that countries outside the EU are not happy, especially China.

Beijing describes the measure as protectionist. It also argues that the cost will largely be passed on to European consumers, which means, in its view, that the EU is shooting itself in the foot.

But that is, to some extent, exactly what Europeans are hoping for. If Chinese products become more expensive, they become less attractive.

Business groups agree. Comeos, the Belgian federation for trade and services, welcomed the charge as a response to unfair competition.

Think about an everyday product worth less than €100. There is usually a big price gap between the Chinese version and the one made in Europe. When that gap is somewhere between €5 and €20, the charge can tip the balance. It may push you to buy local, or not to buy at all. In both case, this means less money getting out of the EU.

And there are already signs it’s working. Since the €3 charge came in in June, the volume of small parcels arriving at Liège airport has dropped by 60 percent.

The European consumer organisation BEUC has also welcomed the move, saying more border controls mean safer products.

Something that is not immediately visible for citizens, but which has its importance. 

Relatório dos serviços secretos dos EUA mostra a primeira imagem nítida do avião espacial ultrassecreto da China — que anda a largar objetos não identificados por cima da Terra O último relatório “Challenges to Security in Space” da Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) inclui uma foto de satélite desclassificada do avião espacial chinês Shenlong, ou “dragão divino“. A imagem mostra que o veículo ultra-secreto é muito parecido com o X-37B, o seu equivalente americano. O Shenlong está em ação há pouco mais de seis anos. Durante este tempo, a nave reutilizável largou objetos não identificados em órbita baixa. Desde 2022, libertou

Written by Uriel Araujo, Anthropology PhD, is a social scientist specializing in ethnic and religious conflicts, with extensive research on geopolitical dynamics and cultural interactions

Security tensions between Japan and China are escalating while the former strengthens its long-range strike capabilities with American support.

Washington and Tokyo’s latest moves to reinforce their military presence along the so-called first island chain also mark another step in the broader US-China strategic rivalry across the Indo-Pacific region.

Originally conceived as a Cold War US defensive perimeter (stretching from Japan through Taiwan to the Philippines), the first island chain is increasingly becoming the centerpiece of an elaborate American-led military architecture designed to constrain Beijing’s growing maritime power.

The recent agreement between Japanese Defense Minister Shinjiro Koizumi and US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth to implement an “effective denial defense” along that chain illustrates the shift. They also pledged continued cooperation on ammunition production for a potentially prolonged conflict.

During the Keen Sword 2027 exercises now underway, US and Japanese forces plan to deploy mobile missile systems, including American system NMESIS, on Yonaguni Island near Taiwan. Tokyo has already deployed domestically developed long-range (anti-ship) missiles capable of reaching China’s coastal areas.

The wider context is hard to miss. In November 2025 Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi  made a statement linking a Taiwan contingency to Japan’s own survival, which triggered sharp Chinese protests and a cascade of diplomatic, economic, and maritime frictions.

Beijing then restricted dual-use exports to Japan, while coast guard vessels and radar incidents added to the pressure.

As commentator Oliver Griffin puts it, Beijing views Japan’s buildup as a drift toward neo-militarism.

From Tokyo’s perspective, China’s expanding naval reach makes these steps necessary. This is therefore a classic security dilemma. Measures one side takes to feel “safer” make the other feel less secure, prompting further responses.

The first island chain is both a barrier and a gateway. As expert Simone Chiusa  notes, Chinese vessels seeking access to the open Western Pacific must navigate strategic chokepoints through its straits.

The strategic importance of these chokepoints illustrates Alfred Thayer Mahan’s classic sea-power theory: control over key maritime routes and positions remains central to great-power rivalry.

American and Japanese planners see distributed missiles and interdiction systems as deterrence by denial. Beijing sees preparations to restrict its access.

The paradox is clear enough: the more Washington and Tokyo seek to reinforce deterrence, the more Beijing may perceive “encirclement” and accelerate its own capabilities.

Japan’s southwestern islands are thereby becoming an operational frontier of sorts rather than a mere defensive perimeter. An alliance designed primarily to protect Japanese territory then gradually becomes an instrument for projecting power into a Taiwan-related contingency.

As I wrote in May 2026, regarding US missile deployments in the Philippines, Washington’s actions near Taiwan fuel Chinese fears of a containment architecture involving Japan, the Philippines, and Australia. The pattern continues.

China’s maritime-industrial growth has become central to allied planning. As I’ve noted elsewhere, Chinese shipbuilding capacity (measured by gross tonnage) exceeds that of the United States – by a factor of over 200, according to a 2023 US naval intelligence estimate.

Joint Sino-Russian submarine patrols further signal a new maritime era of coordination that certainly complicates American assumptions of uncontested sea control.

Yet the contest is no longer confined to the first island chain. A Japanese Self-Defense Force colonel has proposed a second-island-chain air bridge linking Japan and Australia (with US participation) for logistics and reinforcement – the reasoning being that China’s lengthening maritime strike reach now threatens operations farther into the Pacific.

Some American analysts warn that “pulling back to the second chain” would be strategic folly, while advocates of strategic restraint see a forward approach as intensifying insecurity.

For Japan, the predicament is particularly delicate. Tokyo is becoming more indispensable to Washington’s regional planning at the very moment when Japanese strategists worry about possible US-China accommodation under President Trump’s “transactional” approach.

The alliance security dilemma is real enough: fear of “abandonment” coexists with fear of entrapment in a Taiwan conflict. Japanese policymakers are of course not passive instruments. They act on their own threat perceptions while navigating uncertainty about long-term American commitments.

Gray-zone pressures add another layer. Coast guard patrols and incremental assertions of jurisdiction challenge the utility of high-end missile deployments – designed mainly for conventional scenarios.

Ultimately, efforts to preserve the existing “balance” in the Indo-Pacific may contribute to the very competition that makes that balance harder to sustain.

The American response to China’s rise has largely been to reinforce military alliances and expand forward deployments, risking an increasingly self-perpetuating cycle of militarization rather than fostering regional stability.

Washington is transforming Japan into a more central component of its forward maritime architecture – even as Beijing’s growing capabilities render that very architecture more contested. The risk here is that the cycle of reinforcement and reaction leaves all parties less secure than before.

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MORE ON THE TOPIC:

• Japan Faces Massive Energy Issues Due To US Wars, But Still Sends Troops Near Taiwan
• Cracks In The Coalition: Europe Picks Up The Phone To Moscow
• Iran Unveils Underground Arash Drone Arsenal (Videos)

The post Japan’s Militarization: Washington Fueling Chinese-Japanese Crisis appeared first on South Front.

In Malaysia, U.S. and Chinese tech giants are pouring billions into vast data centers, straining local resources and testing the limits of Washington’s restrictions on advanced chips.

© Ulet Ifansasti for The New York Times

Using sensors developed for self-driving cars, a Chinese start-up claims it can track and destroy tiny flying targets while avoiding people, pets and reflective surfaces.

© Qilai Shen for The New York Times

Islamabad, 30 oct (Prensa Latina) El Hospital de la Amistad Pakistán-China, reinaugurado aquí, ofrecerá atención médica gratuita a pacientes provenientes de todos los rincones del país surasiático, destaca hoy la prensa.

The post Colaboración con China derivará en salud gratis para paquistaníes first appeared on Noticias Prensa Latina.

Beijing, 30 oct (Prensa Latina) El Partido Comunista de China (PCCh) promoverá la construcción del Partido en sectores emergentes, informó hoy el subdirector del Departamento de Organización del Comité Central del PCCh Huang Jianfa.

The post China promoverá construcción del Partido en sectores emergentes first appeared on Noticias Prensa Latina.

El veto del gobierno chino a la retransmisión de los partidos del Real Madrid por el caso Mbappé tiene un antecedente cercano de semejante magnitud. China censuró la emisión televisiva de los encuentros de la NBA durante dos años y medio entre 2019 y 2022 por otro comentario con fondo político. Si en esta ocasión el apagón llega al referirse el delantero francés a Mao Zedong como “dictador”, entonces fue una opinión del director general de los Houston Rockets, Daryl Morey, la que desató la tormenta. “Lucha por la libertad, apoya a Hong Kong”, escribió el directivo en relación a las manifestaciones en dicho territorio a favor de la democracia. China, como ahora sucede con Mbappé, lo consideró un ataque a la identidad nacional y no le tembló el pulso para vetar a un gigante del deporte mundial como la NBA. Tampoco ha dudado actualmente pese a las disculpas del Real Madrid.

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© Clicks Images (Getty Images)

The unprecedented number of empty seats at the fifth plenum – a symbol of expulsions – serve as a symbol for the scale of the purges under Xi Jinping

China expelled a record number of officials from the Chinese Communist party (CCP) as it concluded a major political gathering, which saw an unprecedented number of empty seats indicating the scale of the purges under Xi Jinping.

A record 33 members were expelled at this week’s fifth plenum, a gathering of top officials that takes place roughly once a year.

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© Photograph: Li Xiang/Xinhua/AP

© Photograph: Li Xiang/Xinhua/AP

© Photograph: Li Xiang/Xinhua/AP

A confirmação de que Jason Miller, assessor de presidente norte americano, Donald Trump, teria providenciado as acomodações logísticas para auxiliar na fuga de Flávio Bolsonaro (PL-RJ), aos Estados Unidos levantou questionamentos sobre o impacto dessa postura na diplomacia entre os dois países.

O analista de Internacional da CNN Lourival Sant’Anna explicou durante o CNN Prime Time, que o episódio revela uma estratégia dupla de Trump: por um lado, atender a inclinações ideológicas pessoais; por outro, preservar um canal institucional com o governo brasileiro.

De acordo com o analista, Trump deseja manter uma relação com o Brasil com o objetivo principal de reduzir a influência da China sobre o país.

“Ele ainda acredita que há um caminho para fazer isso em coordenação com Lula, que ele recebeu na Casa Branca em maio, sete dias antes de visitar Xi Jinping, exatamente para demonstrar que é capaz de atrair o Brasil de volta para a órbita americana”, explicou.

A proximidade entre Jason Miller e os Bolsonaros

Jason Miller é descrito como uma figura do movimento MAGA muito próxima de Trump e também dos Bolsonaros.

Sant’Anna lembrou que, em 7 de setembro de 2021, Miller esteve no Brasil para uma Conferência de Ação Política Conservadora junto à família Bolsonaro e acabou sendo interrogado pela Polícia Federal ao sair no aeroporto.

Na ocasião, ele teria telefonado para o ex-deputado federal Eduardo Bolsonaro, que lhe providenciou um advogado. “A relação deles é muito próxima. Dessa vez é ele que providencia um avião para o irmão do Eduardo Bolsonaro”, destacou o analista.

 

Sant’Anna ressaltou que Miller atua desde meados do ano como estrategista de comunicação na Casa Branca, mas não em um cargo institucional — trata-se de uma função de apoio pessoal a Trump.

O analista apontou ainda que a relação de Miller com o Departamento de Estado é “um pouco distante”, e que sua atuação é predominantemente no campo do lobby privado, tendo sido contratado, por exemplo, pelo governo indiano por 1,8 milhão de dólares para melhorar relações comerciais com os Estados Unidos.

Dimensão ideológica, não institucional

Para Sant’Anna, o envolvimento de Miller na contratação do avião demonstra que Trump preferiu manter a questão da relação com Flávio Bolsonaro “num nível mais ideológico, mais pessoal do que institucional”.

O analista ponderou que, se o Departamento de Estado tivesse se envolvido, o episódio teria uma dimensão completamente diferente.

“As relações entre Brasil e Estados Unidos no campo institucional continuam com essa fragilidade reputacional em que Trump ataca o sistema eleitoral brasileiro para não reconhecer que a direita perdeu no Brasil”, afirmou.

Sant’Anna também observou que Trump teria interesse em difundir a percepção de que a esquerda frauda eleições, tanto nos Estados Unidos quanto no Brasil, como forma de não admitir derrotas eleitorais.

Ao mesmo tempo, o analista avaliou que Trump não considera conveniente romper com Lula. “Tudo vai depender de Lula agora, se ele consegue digerir essa relação em que a sua eleição é contestada por Trump”, concluiu Sant’Anna.

Chinese state media outlets issued scathing condemnations of Sanrio, the Japanese company behind characters such as Hello Kitty, over a TV collaboration.

The post China Declares War on Hello Kitty over Japanese TV Collaboration appeared first on Breitbart.