Lebanon’s Central Bank has revoked the licence of one of Iran’s largest banks that operated in the country, amid intensifying US pressure on countries to sever financial and commercial ties with Tehran.

Central Bank Governor Karim Souaid told Bloomberg that the decision to revoke Bank Saderat Iran’s licence, taken earlier this week, demonstrates Lebanon’s determination to protect its banking sector from possible US sanctions.

One of Iran’s oldest and largest commercial banks, Bank Saderat operates several branches overseas. In Lebanon, however, it did not operate as a full-scale commercial bank or offer the extensive retail services typically provided by major Lebanese lenders. Its operations were largely confined to facilitating certain financial services linked to specific networks or entities.

Speaking on the sidelines of the International Monetary Fund’s annual meetings in Bangkok, Souaid stressed that Lebanon could not afford not to take such measures. He said that while some decisions may be politically sensitive, in an apparent reference to Hezbollah, protecting Lebanon’s banking sector from foreign sanctions must remain a priority.

Limited impact on Lebanon

Financial analyst Mounir Younes said the revocation was unlikely to have a significant impact on Lebanon’s economy or banking sector, as Lebanese banks had historically avoided dealing with Bank Saderat because of the sanctions imposed on Iran.

"The impact on the local market and the Lebanese banking sector is close to zero," Younes told The New Arab. "Historically, including during the tenure of former central bank governor Riad Salameh and throughout successive rounds of sanctions, the Lebanese banking sector avoided any dealings with Bank Saderat Iran. The same was true of Lebanese customers, speaking of the wider public."

He said the bank’s customers in Lebanon were likely limited to a small number of people or entities with links to Hezbollah, the Iranian embassy in Beirut or the Iranian community in Lebanon, including both security personnel and civilians.

"The impact is therefore extremely limited on this small segment, which is the one targeted by US sanctions. The effect on the Lebanese economy and banking sector is consequently close to zero," he added.

Younes said any impact would be confined to the relatively few individuals or entities that dealt with the bank, whether through trade credits between Lebanon and Iran or transfers designed to circumvent US sanctions. He added that Bank Saderat did not have correspondent banking relationships outside Iran, with its only correspondent bank based inside the country.

Slow pace of reforms

Souaid also stressed the need for Lebanon to secure its removal from the Financial Action Task Force's (FATF) grey list, saying illicit funds and money-laundering operations must be rooted out of the Lebanese economy.

He added that the central bank had hired a specialised US firm to map Lebanon’s cash economy and identify suspicious financial activity, according to the governor.

A cash economy has flourished in Lebanon since the 2019 financial collapse, and the country remains on the FATF grey list and an EU list of jurisdictions with strategic deficiencies in anti-money-laundering and counter-terrorist-financing measures.

The seven-year financial crisis has seen the banking sector collapse and the local currency lose more than 95 percent of its value, locking millions of depositors out of their accounts.

Legislation to restructure the banking sector and unlock deposits has slowly been passed. Talks with the International Monetary Fund to secure a support package have been conditional on the country cracking down on illicit financial activity and passing sweeping reforms, which the government has promised to deliver.

But major hurdles remain, with the country’s ruling political and banking elite widely seen as resisting reforms that could undermine their influence or leave them liable for the cost of restructuring.

Revoking the licence of Bank Saderat Iran in Lebanon came following similar steps taken by other countries in the region. Last month, Turkey’s banking regulator revoked the operating licence of Bank Mellat’s Istanbul branch, while the UAE Central Bank barred all branches of Bank Melli Iran from conducting financial transactions to or from Iran, including transfers and trade finance.

Questions over legal status of Al-Qard al-Hassan

Beirut has also been under pressure from Washington to take action against institutions linked to Iran-backed Hezbollah, including the group’s financial arm, Al-Qard al-Hassan. In July last year, the Lebanese central bank issued a directive banning financial institutions from dealing with the association.

Washington has continued to pressure Beirut to shut down the institution.

Operating outside Lebanon’s formal banking sector, Al-Qard al-Hassan provides interest-free Islamic loans, often secured against gold. Critics have accused it of functioning as a shadow bank for Hezbollah, with some calling for its closure or integration into the regulated financial system. Human Rights Watch noted in October 2024 that the association provided collateralised loans despite lacking a central-bank licence to operate as a financial institution.

Younes said that, although Lebanon’s Justice Minister Adel Nassar had asked the public prosecutor at the Court of Cassation to open an investigation into Al-Qard al-Hassan, the judiciary was still waiting for information from the central bank.

"The Public Prosecution at the Court of Cassation says it is waiting for information from the central bank," he said. "For an investigation to be opened, the central bank would need to file a complaint or provide information indicating that Al-Qard al-Hassan is violating Lebanon’s banking regulations or the rules governing the sector’s operations."

Younes said that because Al-Qard al-Hassan accepts deposits and provides loans, its activities could be considered banking operations. The judiciary therefore needs information from the central bank indicating that the association is breaching banking regulations or compliance standards on combating money laundering and terrorist financing.

He added that the central bank considers the question of Al-Qard al-Hassan’s licensing to fall under the responsibility of the Interior Ministry, which granted the association its licence as a charitable organisation.

He also pointed to the role of the Special Investigation Commission at Lebanon’s central bank, which is responsible for investigating suspected money laundering and terrorist financing. However, he said, the commission had not taken action in the matter so far, to his knowledge.

Hezbollah has been significantly weakened by three years of conflict with Israel, with its weapons stockpile degraded and many of its financial and military supply routes disrupted. The US Treasury has imposed extensive sanctions on the group, and individuals it says are linked to it.

Despite this, Hezbollah has refused to disarm while Israel continues to occupy parts of southern Lebanon and carry out strikes and demolitions, despite a June framework agreement between Beirut and Tel Aviv.

French authorities are preparing for hundreds of demonstrations on Saturday, 17 October, as student unrest converges with protests over living costs, public spending and government policy. Up to 40,000 demonstrators are expected in Paris, where police and organisers remain divided over march routes.

France is preparing for a nationwide wave of demonstrations on Saturday, 17 October, with approximately 500 protest actions under consideration and more than 90 marches being organised, according to the Interior Ministry. The mobilisation brings together high-school students, trade unions, farmers and supporters of the Yellow Vest movement, raising the prospect of further confrontation after nearly a month of unrest.

Police estimates suggest that around 40,000 demonstrators could gather in Paris, with approximately 150,000 more expected elsewhere in France. The figures remain preliminary, while authorities warn that some protests could involve road blockades, disruption to essential infrastructure and violent clashes.

Interior Minister Laurent Nuñez initially outlined preparations for 250 gatherings and 80 marches on Friday morning. Subsequent assessments from his office indicated that as many as 500 actions were being considered, although not all had been formally organised.

Paris Faces Dispute Over Demonstration Routes

The authorities are particularly concerned about developments in the capital, where negotiations between police and protest organisers have failed to produce agreement over the proposed routes.

Paris police prefect Patrice Faure has rejected proposals for marches terminating near the Opéra district or Place de la Concorde, citing security concerns surrounding central government institutions.

According to details of the security preparations, police have proposed an alternative route between Place de la Bastille and Place de Clichy. The CGT trade union and climate campaigners have accepted the proposal, but student organisations and Yellow Vest representatives continue to oppose it.

Prime Minister Sébastien Lecornu has convened an interministerial crisis unit to coordinate the government’s response. Security officials have warned that attempts to obstruct major transport routes or critical infrastructure will not be tolerated.

The Interior Ministry has also indicated that stun grenades, whose use was suspended during the student protests, could again be deployed in cases of particularly serious urban violence.

Yellow Vests Return Amid Rising Living Costs

Saturday’s demonstrations are being promoted as a revival of the Yellow Vest movement, which emerged in 2018 following opposition to fuel taxation before developing into a broader protest against living costs, economic inequality and government policy.

The latest mobilisation has gathered support from organisations demanding measures to address rising fuel, energy and food prices. Campaigners are also challenging the government’s proposed 2027 budget and its implications for public services.

The agricultural union Confédération paysanne has called on farmers to join the demonstrations, arguing that rising agricultural fuel costs and deteriorating conditions in rural communities have increased pressure on producers.

The union has also linked its demands to environmental policy, public-service provision and access to affordable food.

The CGT, student unions and climate organisations have similarly expressed support for the protests, while political backing has come from La France Insoumise and the French Communist Party.

Student Protests Enter Their Fourth Week

The mobilisation follows weeks of demonstrations involving secondary-school pupils, teachers and public-sector workers. What began as protests over shortages of teachers, overcrowded classrooms and deteriorating school buildings has developed into a nationwide confrontation over education policy and policing.

As EU Today previously reported, between 400 and 500 secondary schools faced partial or complete disruption earlier this month as students organised blockades and demonstrations.

The movement has subsequently expanded beyond its original educational demands, with student organisations raising concerns about university admissions procedures, police tactics and government spending priorities.

The scale of the unrest has placed considerable pressure on French authorities. According to figures from the Justice Ministry, 6,877 people were placed in police custody during the protests between late September and 8 October, approximately 86 per cent of them minors.

Violence during the demonstrations has resulted in injuries among police officers, students and educational staff. Clashes on 8 October led to 504 arrests and injuries to 48 police officers, according to Interior Ministry figures.

Education Minister Édouard Geffray has announced emergency measures to address teacher shortages, including the deployment of replacement teachers. The ministry says 2,000 of the 3,000 promised replacements have already been assigned, but student organisations maintain that the measures are insufficient.

Growing Pressure on the French Government

The planned demonstrations come as France faces a difficult debate over public spending, taxation and the 2027 budget. Lecornu’s government must balance demands for higher salaries and increased investment in education against mounting pressure to reduce the deficit.

France’s deteriorating public finances have already attracted scrutiny from eurozone partners, while domestic opposition to spending restraint has become a central issue ahead of the 2027 presidential election.

The convergence of student organisations, trade unions and Yellow Vest campaigners could broaden the protests beyond the education sector, particularly if demonstrations over living costs attract participants who have not joined the recent school protests.

However, the extent of that mobilisation remains uncertain. Online protest maps contain substantially more proposed actions than the authorities’ estimates, and participation figures will not be established until Saturday.

For the government, the immediate test will be whether the demonstrations remain peaceful and whether the authorities can prevent disruption to transport networks and public services without provoking further confrontations with protesters.

Russia has placed five foreign-owned businesses under compulsory administration, including Belgian manufacturer Ontex and French flooring group Tarkett. The latest seizures deepen the confrontation over sanctions, frozen Russian assets and the future of European investment in Russia.

Russian President Vladimir Putin has ordered the transfer of five Western-owned businesses into compulsory Russian management, extending a campaign of asset seizures targeting European companies that continued operating in Russia after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

The decree, signed on 15 October, affects businesses with combined annual revenues exceeding 53 billion roubles, approximately €530 million. They include French flooring manufacturer Tarkett, Belgian hygiene products group Ontex, German packaging producer Menshen, Kappa Rus and Eviosys Packaging Kuban, now linked to American group Sonoco.

Under Presidential Decree No. 738, operational control has been transferred to Centre Capital, a little-known Moscow company established in February 2026 with registered share capital of just 10,000 roubles.

The decision follows similar interventions against Nestlé, Auchan, FM Logistic and Metro in September. Together, the measures demonstrate how Moscow is using foreign-owned businesses as instruments of economic retaliation against countries supporting Ukraine.

Foreign businesses placed under Russian control

Centre Capital is headed by Marat Mirkhaydarov, a former senior official in Russia’s Zabaykalsky region who reportedly served with the Akhmat military formation during Russia’s war against Ukraine.

The scale of the companies placed under his management contrasts sharply with the financial standing of the administrator.

Tarkett’s Russian operations generated approximately 19.3 billion roubles in revenue during 2025, while Kappa Rus recorded 16.5 billion roubles and Ontex RU another 10.3 billion. Eviosys Packaging Kuban and Menshen Packaging CIS reported approximately 6.1 billion and 1.4 billion roubles respectively.

The decree does not formally transfer ownership of the companies to Centre Capital. It does, however, remove the foreign shareholders’ effective control over management, operations and commercial decisions.

For Belgian manufacturer Ontex, the consequences are immediate.

In an official statement issued on 16 October, the Aalst-based company confirmed that a government-appointed administrator had assumed operational control of its Russian subsidiary.

Ontex Russia employs approximately 350 people, operates a manufacturing facility in Noginsk and maintains a sales office in Moscow. The subsidiary accounts for around five per cent of the group’s total revenue and between seven and eight per cent of adjusted EBITDA.

The company said it was examining measures to protect its assets and maintain business continuity.

Tarkett likewise confirmed that it was losing effective control of its Russian operations.

A mechanism established in 2023

The legal framework for such interventions dates to April 2023, when Putin introduced Decree No. 302, allowing the Russian authorities to place assets associated with countries designated as unfriendly under temporary external management.

The appointed administrator can exercise extensive ownership-related powers, although the formal right to dispose of the assets remains excluded.

Crucially, the arrangement can be terminated only by presidential decision. There is no automatic deadline for returning operational control to the original owners.

Moscow maintains that the measures are reversible. Nevertheless, the loss of management authority raises questions about whether businesses could eventually be returned with their financial position, organisational structure and commercial value intact.

The latest decree extends the process already documented by EU Today following the September takeover of Nestlé and Auchan’s Russian operations.

The Kremlin’s approach also serves domestic economic objectives. Keeping factories, retail networks and distribution facilities operating under Russian management helps preserve employment, production capacity and established supply chains.

At the same time, appointing Russian administrators allows the authorities to exercise greater influence over businesses originally developed through foreign capital, technology and expertise.

European companies caught in sanctions confrontation

Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov has explicitly linked the seizures to the nationality of the affected companies and the policies of their governments.

He accused European states of participating in the unlawful seizure of Russian property through sanctions and financial restrictions.

Moscow’s argument centres partly on approximately €210 billion in Russian sovereign assets immobilised in the European Union, most of them held through Belgium-based securities depository Euroclear.

The European Union has used extraordinary revenues generated by those assets to support Ukraine, while further proposals involving the underlying funds remain subject to legal and political debate.

Belgium has been particularly concerned about potential financial exposure and legal claims. As EU Today reported in September, a Belgian Council of State judgment raised additional questions about the administrative procedures governing certain frozen assets.

The dispute has also moved into the European courts, with the Bank of Russia challenging EU measures intended to protect Euroclear against the enforcement of Russian judgments.

Moscow’s treatment of European businesses adds another dimension to this confrontation. By retaining control over foreign-owned industrial and commercial assets, Russia possesses a means of exerting pressure on companies whose governments support sanctions and military assistance to Ukraine.

The implications are particularly serious for Western banks that still maintain substantial Russian operations.

Austria’s Raiffeisen Bank International and Italy’s UniCredit remain exposed to Russia through local subsidiaries. Any extension of compulsory administration to financial institutions could create additional difficulties involving deposits, capital and banking supervision.

The cost of remaining in Russia

The seizures also expose the financial risks faced by Western companies that delayed their withdrawal after February 2022.

Many initially sought to protect their investments, employees and commercial infrastructure. Others reduced operations but retained ownership, expecting that conditions might eventually permit an orderly sale or renewed business activity.

Russian restrictions have progressively complicated that calculation, requiring foreign investors from designated countries to accept substantial discounts on asset sales and obtain official approval for transactions.

Companies remaining in the country now face the additional possibility that the government will appoint administrators without their consent.

The consequences extend beyond the businesses immediately affected. Russia is establishing a precedent under which foreign investment can remain legally owned by its original shareholders while its economic benefits and operational management are placed beyond their control.

For European governments, the latest decree illustrates the increasing connection between commercial interests and geopolitical decisions.

The Kremlin has demonstrated that sanctions imposed over its invasion of Ukraine can be answered not only through diplomatic or financial measures, but also through direct intervention in European-owned businesses operating on Russian territory.

Any eventual negotiation over sanctions relief and the restoration of economic relations will consequently have to address the status of these assets, the rights of their original shareholders and the question of compensation.

Until then, Western companies remaining in Russia face an investment environment in which the ultimate authority over their businesses rests increasingly with the Kremlin rather than their shareholders.

France and Germany want more detailed “Made in Europe” rules for electric cars, and want them split off from the rest of the EU’s flagship industrial law.

The Franco-German deal, agreed after months of haggling on the margins of the EU summit in Brussels late on Thursday (15 October), says both files should then be adopted “as fast as possible and simultaneously”.

That would split the most fought-over part from the rest of the Industrial Accelerator Act (IAA), which also sets “Made in EU” and low-carbon requirements for steel, cement, aluminium and clean-tech products such as batteries and solar panels.

Paris hopes the new car definition will serve as a benchmark for the rest of the IAA, which sets “Made in Europe” rules for steel, cement, aluminium and clean energy technologies. 

But this still has to be negotiated with other member states, people familiar with the talks said.

“We are driven by a clear ambition: to successfully transform our automotive industry while upholding our climate goals and our production in Europe,” said French president Emmanuel Macron on social media, announcing the deal.

“This is an investment signal to industry,” said German chancellor Friedrich Merz.

Made in Europe

The paper comes as Ireland, which holds the EU’s rotating six-month presidency, is wrapping up a third compromise text on the industrial plan, which Irish officials hope will reach final agreement by mid November. 

Publicly, Paris and Berlin said on Friday that their car deal will not affect climate targets and that their course “remains unchanged”.

But the paper behind the deal shows the trade-off that’s been made. Berlin accepted France’s demand for stricter “Made in Europe” rules that apply to fewer countries, while Paris agreed to looser emission rules for carmakers, as Germany had wanted.

To count as “Made in Europe”, a car would have to clear thresholds that tighten over time, and only cars meeting these rules could be bought, leased or rented with public subsidies, or bought by public authorities. 

From 2028, the car must be assembled in Europe, with at least 70 percent of total value creation in components – excluding the battery.

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Hoy Canadá es un Estado rumbo al totalitarismo, desde la pantalla de una democracia liberal, es un patrocinador del nazismo, paga asistencia en eutanasia a los pobres y, además, no deja que los ciudadanos se expresen sin fuertes retaliaciones.

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Continuar dependiendo de la asistencia induce a una desintegración espiritual y moral fundamentalmente destructiva para la fibra nacional. Dar asistencia de esta manera es administrar un narcótico, un sutil destructor del espíritu humano.

Franklin D. Roosevelt

El trabajo es la condición inevitable de la vida humana, la verdadera fuente del bienestar humano. Ahora comprendo que mi bienestar solo es posible si reconozco mi unidad con todos los pueblos del mundo sin excepción.

Leo Tolstói

El Estado de malestar

Como excolonia británica, y miembro de la Commonwealth de manera ‘voluntaria’ dicen, Canadá se jacta de su orden y políticas migratorias claras y atractivas, así como de tener un país con un sólido Estado de Bienestar, yo diría, de malestar. Muy en la línea de la frase de Roosevelt con la que inicio este artículo.

Creer en algún tipo de bienestar puede ser cierto para los migrantes en su mayoría latinos, que son recluidos en zonas distantes de los centros urbanos y asimilados durante cinco años de arduo trabajo llamado permiso de trabajo cerrado (employer-specific – closed work permit) Permiso de trabajo restringido/específico para empleadores. Estos trabajadores ‘agradecen’ ser explotados, consideran que es mejor la promesa de la vida ‘civilizada y marginal’ a la de sus países -colonias éstos de empresas canadienses- y asumen formas de vasallaje y esclavitud.

Al respecto, tras más de cinco años de uso intensivo y varias décadas de existencia del programa de empleo se llegó a unos acuerdos entre defensores de derechos de migrantes y Amnistía Internacional, de lo cual extraigo parte del informe del relator especial de la ONU sobre formas contemporáneas de esclavitud, titulado ‘Canada has destroyed me’: Labour exploitation of migrant workers in Canada, (Canadá me ha destruido»: Explotación laboral de trabajadores migrantes en Canadá), publicado el 30 de enero de 2025:

El sistema genera una relación de poder extremadamente desigual.

El empleador no solo controla el trabajo, sino también el estatus migratorio del trabajador.

Perder el empleo puede significar perder el derecho a trabajar y, potencialmente, enfrentar la salida del país. Eso crea un miedo constante que dificulta mucho:

Denunciar abusos (horas excesivas, salarios por debajo de lo prometido, condiciones inseguras, acoso, vivienda precaria, etc.).

Negociar mejores condiciones.

Dejar un trabajo tóxico sin arriesgar todo.

Amnistía Internacional y el relator de la ONU han llegado a describir el estado de bajos salarios del TFWP como un “caldo de cultivo” o “breeding ground” [Centro de reproducción] de formas contemporáneas de esclavitud.

No es una exageración retórica: hay múltiples reportes documentados de explotación sistemática, especialmente en agricultura, cuidado, procesamiento de alimentos, construcción y hostelería.

Por otro lado, el suicidio implica una de las situaciones de salud pública más graves del país norteamericano. Aproximadamente 4500 a 4750 suicidios al año que equivalen a unos 12-13 suicidios diarios. Es la segunda causa de muerte en personas entre los 15 y los 34 años. Los hombres cometen el acto de quitarse la vida 3 veces por cada mujer y son los del rango de edad entre 45 y 64 años quienes más lo culminan.

Pero Canadá tenía una solución. Han ‘avanzado’ en la ‘misericordia’ de la eutanasia para pobres. Así como se oye.

Esto está documentado por Associated Press: (El comité que revisa la eutanasia en Canadá concluye que algunas muertes están motivadas por el temor a quedarse sin hogar y por el aislamiento.); The Global and Mail: (Las tasas de asistencia médica para morir por enfermedades no terminales en Ontario son más altas en los barrios más pobres, según informes.), The conversation: (La asistencia médica para morir y las personas marginadas: informes del forense arrojan luz sobre la muerte asistida en Ontario) y el Comité de Revisión de Muertes del Forense, Jefe de Ontario (2024), son los que detallan casos específicos, como la mujer con sensibilidad química múltiple que no encontraba vivienda adecuada, o personas con aislamiento y pobreza.

Aunque se insistiera en señalar que son casos aislados, lo cierto es que no se trata sólo de una política sanitaria mal enfocada. Casos documentados como los señalados permiten ver algo que debería ser impensable en un auto denominado país del primer mundo: facilitar la muerte a alguien por su condición de precariedad económica y material es la clara expresión del FRACASO de su Estado de bienestar.

Es clave y doloroso cuando “afirmó el Dr. Trouton (en artículo de Associated Press): Es trágico que la calidad de vida de las personas sea tan deficiente que deseen explorar la MAID [asistencia médica para morir]”

En la publicación oficial Maytree se aprecia que:

En 2025, el 98 % de los hogares de ejemplo en asistencia social vivían por debajo de la línea oficial de pobreza, y el 71-72 % en “pobreza profunda” (menos del 75 % de esa línea). Los ingresos reales cayeron para muchos por inflación y la eliminación de rebates del carbon tax [reembolsos del impuesto al carbono]. Los beneficios de vivienda (shelter) son extremadamente bajos y no cubren costos reales; las personas sin hogar reciben menos apoyo.

A lo anterior se suma la crisis de vivienda, semejante a la de Estados Unidos, en donde al menos hace veinte años no se construye vivienda de interés social, lo que mantiene elevados los precios de renta y de compra; y, además se favorecen los desmanes de los que toman en arriendo propiedades. Ni siquiera en la política de inclusión a las comunidades indígenas maltratadas y esterilizadas para evitar su procreación, les cumplen con el tema habitacional. El tema de los ‘sintecho’ tiende a acrecentarse.

Hay otras formas de atentar contra sus propios ciudadanos, por ejemplo, a los propietarios les obligan a pagar multas y demandas inverosímiles si un inquilino hace ruido a los vecinos o daños, el que rentó de buena fe debe pagar. A ello se suma que para pedir el inmueble es necesario una suma de piruetas legales y justificar, no que rentará a alguien más, sino que se irá a vivir a su propio inmueble.

Alrededor de 6,5 millones de canadienses se encuentran sin médico de familia, o sea el 16% de su población total, 41,8 millones. Además, los tiempos de espera en horas en urgencias, es elevado; a menudo 8-16 horas o más, pues manejan la anticuada y tercermundista medida del Triage, inventado para las prioridades de tiempos de emergencia en la Primera Guerra Mundial.

Los ciudadanos deben esperar semanas y hasta meses para tener consultas con especialistas y hay estimaciones documentadas de decenas de miles de muertes anuales mientras esperan cirugía o diagnósticos. En cuanto a médicos y enfermeras, se encuentra Canadá por debajo del promedio de la OCDE, con retrasos en licenciar profesionales.

En cuanto a políticas para protección de la infancia, las tarifas de apoyo económico para quienes consiguen plaza bajaron, pero se generaron listas de espera masivas y en algunos lugares se triplicaron. Se tiene así una brecha de inequidad en donde algunas familias pagan muy poco y otras a veces de bajos ingresos, quedan fuera o pagan mucho más, mientras financian el sistema con impuestos. Tampoco se crearon suficientes espacios ni se atendió la falta de profesores.

Esto parece una historia del mundo subdesarrollado, haitiana, colombiana o etíope, pero pasa en Canadá. Ya no les basta con explotar a los países periféricos, sus propios ciudadanos financian a los ricos de su país cada vez de manera más próxima a la letalidad.

En cuanto a reducción de la pobreza y seguridad alimentaria, Canadá cayó al puesto 27.º luego de ocupar el 5° puesto entre países OCDE en protección del derecho a la alimentación, ubicándose en la categorización de ‘inseguridad alimentaria moderada/severa’.

Además, hay un creciente uso de bancos de alimentos, lo que se traduce en una política paliativa para contener lo que no logra una política integral de impuestos a ricos y de creación de puestos de empleo, espacio en donde, por el contrario, se ha agudizado el trabajo precario y, por ende, asumir el costo de vida.

En este tema de empleo – ingresos para la subsistencia, Canadá tiene un programa de renta básica, que lamentablemente es insuficiente. Evelyn L. Forget es una economista de renombre en Canadá, estudia la economía detrás de la propuesta de ingreso básico. Se recomienda su estudio, Basic Income for Canadians. From the Covid-19 Emergency to Financial Security for All. Toronto, (Ingreso básico para los canadienses. De la emergencia de la Covid-19 a la seguridad financiera para todos. Toronto) Libro de James Lorimer & Company Ltd., Publishers, 2020.

Sólo para dejar la curiosidad de los lectores, Forget dice, citando a otros autores:

«El empleo precario representa una proporción cada vez mayor del empleo total en Canadá y está fuertemente asociado a un peor estado de salud de los trabajadores».

Existe una «relación estrecha entre los ingresos y los resultados de salud. Las disparidades son profundas: unos ingresos más bajos se asocian a una menor esperanza de vida, así como a tasas más elevadas de autolesiones y de enfermedades crónicas».

«El estrés crónico se ha vinculado a diversos cambios hormonales y neurológicos que repercuten negativamente en la salud. Deteriora la memoria, aumenta el riesgo de depresión, reduce la respuesta inmunitaria y eleva la presión arterial y el riesgo de enfermedades cardiovasculares».

Se encuentra además la creciente crisis de opioides, con una cantidad alarmante de más de 38.000 a 50.000 muertes desde 2016. Esto ha llevado al desarrollo de algunos debates sobre el fracaso o efectos secundarios de “safe supply” (suministro seguro) y la criminalización en algunas provincias, cuando de un Estado primermundista se esperaría una percepción correcta no criminalizando a los consumidores sino comprendiéndolos en un contexto de atención de la salud pública e integral.

Así, todas las crisis de vivienda y demás bienes y servicios que mencioné con anterioridad, reciben más presión ante los altos niveles de inmigración temporal y de refugiados.

Los asuntos internacionales como problema nacional

El Estado de Bienestar es en mi concepto la expresión más clara del escenario de la lucha ideológica de la posguerra mundial; justo en ese momento en que Inglaterra, Estados Unidos y toda Europa decidió que el ‘aliado soviético’ era un loco comunista, dejando atrás las alabanzas a aquel pueblo ruso trabajador plasmadas en discursos, caricaturas y cine.

El comunismo como una fiebre que acabaría con la libertad, aniquilador de la posibilidad de ser y de tener dentro del inmenso ‘arsenal de mercancías’ restringido a la finitud de cada bolsillo, en el capitalismo, debía ser contestado. Ya no eran Hitler ni Mussolini ni Franco, -aunque éste fue un fascista solitario- los enemigos del ‘mundo libre’, lo era el Estado socialista soviético y sus aliados.

Pero el terreno más claro de la disputa se daba allí donde se gana la atención de las masas: en los derechos adquiridos, en la capacidad de sentirse orgulloso de ser un ciudadano de su país por esas mismas ganancias que le daba su Estado de Bienestar, como decía J. Habermas. Es en efecto lo que busca todo migrante además de todo ciudadano: hacerse a una ciudadanía que le dé garantías en consecuencia a su trabajo.

De esta forma, tanto Europa como EE.UU. se vieron obligados a otorgar a sus ciudadanos garantías similares a las conquistadas por la Revolución rusa de 1917, también de manera vanguardista para mujeres e infancia. El Plan Marshal de reconstrucción europea no es otra cosa que atemperar los ánimos de los ciudadanos dolidos por la guerra y volcarlos al boom de la procreación bajo el amparo de un sólido Estado de Bienestar capitalista que les impidiera mirar hacia el régimen socialista soviético y universal. Éste se explica en la frase de Tolstói con la que inicio este artículo, inherente a una concepción universal del hacer para todos, anterior a las guerras del siglo XX.

Se acabó el sistema soviético hace treinta y seis años, pero los nazis sólo dormitaban. Inició la guerra en Ucrania en 2022 y los parlamentos europeos y occidentales comenzaron a recibir a los nazis, esos mismos que fueron enemigos en apariencia. Canadá los recibió y los homenajeó (Yaroslav Hunka a sus 92 años era buscado por asesinatos en Polonia).

Canadá los apoya y ya con un pálido Estado de Bienestar que es más de malestar, apoya a los mismos sujetos del Batallón Azov y a todos quienes asesinan el bienestar cada día en Ucrania mediante: reclutamiento forzoso (busificación), incluso a personas con discapacidad o ancianos, maltrato a las mujeres, alistamiento y entrenamiento de jóvenes colegiales en el campo militar, corrupción que niega salud, empleo y vivienda,  -todo excusado en la guerra-, venta de tierras fértiles a poderosos extranjeros y nacionales etc.; pues aunque dicen que es prohibido, BlackRock ya compró tierras fértiles.

Canadá es la expresión de un régimen totalitario que en cualquier momento puede ascender a fascista, en tanto lleva nazis al parlamento y los premia, envía armas y partes de drones a Ucrania, les da dinero y desarrolla actividades anti rusas, entre ellas intentar robar reservas de dinero.

También privilegia a la población ucraniana en suelo canadiense – Ley CUAET, donde se otorga un régimen de emergencia humanitario de entrada fácil, permisos de trabajo abiertos, extensiones, pausa de deportaciones, aunque éstas pueden reactivarse si Zelensky solicita deportaciones para su busificación. Todas estas garantías no se las dan a los propios canadienses, ni a rusos ni ruso-canadienses.

No le basta con ello. Desarrolló una ley de Prohibición de “dealings” -operaciones- y suministro de servicios (SEMA) donde no permite negociar, prestar servicios o recibir pagos de entidades listadas en: Special Economic Measures Act (artículo 8 sobre penas) dicho artículo señala que:

Toda persona que infrinja o incumpla deliberadamente una orden o un reglamento dictado en virtud de la sección 4: (a) comete una infracción punible mediante procedimiento sumario y está sujeta a una multa no superior a veinticinco mil dólares o a una pena de prisión no superior a un año, o a ambas penas; o (b) comete un delito grave (*indictable offence*) y está sujeta a una pena de prisión no superior a cinco años.

Sección 3 – Transacciones y actividades prohibidas: Se prohíbe a toda persona en Canadá y a todo canadiense fuera de Canadá: (a) realizar operaciones con cualquier bien, independientemente de dónde se encuentre, que sea propiedad de, esté en posesión de o esté controlado por —o en nombre de— una persona cuyo nombre figure en el Anexo 1; (b) celebrar o facilitar, directa o indirectamente, cualquier transacción relacionada con una operación mencionada en el apartado (a); (c) prestar servicios financieros o de otra índole conexos en relación con una operación mencionada en el apartado (a); (d) poner bienes a disposición de una persona que figure en el Anexo 1 o de una persona que actúe en su nombre, independientemente de dónde se encuentren dichos bienes;…

Esta ley está dirigida en contra de la libertad de expresión al poner a las entidades que desee incluir el acta, también las norcoreanas, iraníes o cubanas y principalmente las rusas para la cual fue creada la ley. Esto evita que se hable de los desaciertos de sus políticas, la mala gestión de su política de bienestar y el desastre de su libertad de expresión, mientras critican a Corea del Norte o Irán como regímenes totalitarios, pero Canadá lo es más porque dice regirse por una concepción moderna y liberal, pero hace todo lo contrario.

Ellos lucharon contra los nazis cuando ya los soviéticos avanzaban hacia Berlín. Pero siempre mantuvieron simpatías con el nazismo. Una vez acabó la URSS y los motivos por los cuales disputar con un Estado de Bienestar lleno de derechos, volvieron a la privatización y la mala calidad de la gestión pública, poco a poco durante 36 años.

Hoy Canadá es un Estado rumbo al totalitarismo, desde la pantalla de una democracia liberal, es un patrocinador del nazismo, paga asistencia en eutanasia a los pobres y, además, no deja que los ciudadanos se expresen sin fuertes retaliaciones. En síntesis, como todo occidente, es una fachada primermundista, -que señalé en artículo titulado: André Gunder Frank: «El subdesarrollo del desarrollo» avanza en Occidente– con entrañas fascistas y un tercermundismo ciudadano que hoy sale a protestar a las calles en Europa.

Es lamentable que las personas quieran ir a un país así, en donde son desechables en tanto pobres, explotados como mano de obra barata y marginados sin derecho a expresarse. Canadá es la fachada que encubre la miseria y el totalitarismo.

* Todas las imágenes de la ciudad de Toronto.

By Marco CARNELOS

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Record debt, a paralysed trade-dispute architecture and the normalisation of sovereign-asset seizure as a policy tool means fragility is baked into the global economic system

Since 2022,  a steady drumbeat of forecasts has warned that cascading military and political upheavals – war in Ukraine, conflict in the Middle East, an accelerating tariff war, the weaponisation of sanctions and the disruption of energy supplies – would eventually overwhelm the world economy’s capacity to absorb shocks.

The most destructive of those scenarios have not materialised, or at least not yet.

As the IMF’s managing director Kristalina Georgieva stated last year, while previewing the fund’s World Economic Outlook, the global economy “has generally withstood significant strains from various shocks”.

Although that resilience is real, on closer inspection, it is a more fragile and more contested achievement than it first appears.

The adaptive mechanisms behind this resilience are visible and measurable. Trade has rerouted rather than collapsed. Energy corridors have diversified. And reserve managers have spent the past three years quietly re-engineering the architecture of the international monetary system.

According to the World Gold Council’s 2026 Central Bank Gold Reserves survey – which drew responses from 76 institutions, its highest participation in nine years – 89 percent of central banks expect global gold holdings to keep rising over the next year, with a record share planning to add to their own reserves.

The result: gold has overtaken US Treasuries as the largest single component of global central bank reserves for the first time since the mid-1990s.

Mother of all ticking bombs

Analysts tracking the shift link it directly to a single event: reserve managers were unsettled by the seizure of the Central Bank of Russia’s reserves at the start of the Ukraine war by Washington and have since been actively reducing the dollar share of their portfolios.

This is a clear example that the economic system is not breaking under political pressure, it is adapting to it – flexibly, and crucially, without severing the interconnections that make global trade and finance function at all.

In other words, central banks accumulating gold are not exiting the system; they are just hedging within it.

But adaptability has a cost, and that cost is compounding.

Global debt – government, household, corporate and financial combined – surpassed $365 trillion in the first half of 2026, according to the Institute of International Finance’s Global Debt Monitor, the sixth consecutive quarterly record.

Emerging-market debt alone rose by $6.5 trillion in the same period, breaking past $110 trillion. Georgieva has been blunt about the trajectory: speaking at the IMF and World Bank annual meetings, she warned that global public debt is projected to reach 110 percent of the world’s GDP by 2029.

There is an evident reluctance to address what is not a crisis in any single country’s balance sheet, but a structural drift that every major economy appears aware of and none is prepared to correct unilaterally.

Debt of this scale narrows the fiscal space available to absorb the next shock, military or otherwise, which is precisely what makes today’s resilience difficult to extrapolate into tomorrow’s.

In this context, there is also the mother of all ticking bombs, a nuclear one: the $40 trillion US federal debt which US Secretary of Treasury Scott Bessent is desperately trying to reign in.

The third strand, the onslaught of punitive political measures targeting market principles, is best illustrated by the fate of Russia’s frozen central bank reserves. Roughly $300bn in Russian sovereign assets have been immobilised globally since 2022, with some €210bn ($235bn) held within the European Union.

Erosion of neutrality

Rather than remaining in legal limbo, these reserves have become the financial engine of a specific policy outcome: the EU’s proposed €140bn ($157bn) “reparations loan” to Ukraine, structured so that Ukraine would repay it only once Russia itself pays war damages – effectively converting a sanctions freeze into a grant.

Russia’s central bank has responded by suing the Brussels-based depository Euroclear, which holds the bulk of the assets, calling the manoeuvre illegal.

Whatever one’s view of the underlying conflict, the precedent is the point economists increasingly raise: the first large-scale use of frozen sovereign reserves as collateral for a geopolitical objective changes the calculus for every reserve-holding state watching from outside the western bloc.

It is one more data pointing to the reinforcing of the gold-accumulation trend described above – and a vivid example of how political tools aimed at a single adversary can erode the perceived neutrality of the system itself.

A parallel erosion is under way in trade governance. The WTO’s Appellate Body (the one supposed to settle trade dispute among countries) has been non-functional since December 2019, after the United States blocked the appointment of new judges and talks on reviving or replacing it remain stuck.

More than 30 appeals currently sit unresolved, and the workaround mechanism created to fill the gap – the Multi-Party Interim Appeal Arbitration Arrangement – has resolved only a single case. The institution designed to prevent trade disputes from becoming purely a function of relative power has been quietly sidelined for seven years.

It is then worth wondering – in such a situation – if the Global West and Global Rest see the same picture here.

The evidence suggests convergence on diagnosis but real divergence on meaning. Both recognise that debt is unsustainable and that institutions are strained. But where western policymakers tend to treat sanctions, frozen assets and trade paralysis as defensive responses to external aggression.

Voices from the Global Rest increasingly read the same tools as confirmation that the system was never as neutral as advertised.

India’s External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar captured this gap memorably in 2022, telling European interlocutors that Europe needed to “grow out of the mindset” that its problems are everyone’s problems while the reverse does not hold.

Selective status

This is something many Global Rest governments had been thinking but not saying aloud: that the postwar order’s claim to universality was always, in practice, more selective than it appeared.

The more honest and outspoken western leader to recognise such an unfair situation, to use an understatement, was Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney earlier this year in Davos.

None of this means the system is about to fracture. The world economy has proven more elastic than feared, absorbing shocks that a decade ago might have triggered genuine crisis. But elasticity and durability are not the same thing.

The real test of this sort of “economy of resistance” is not whether it survives the next military-political storm – it plainly has, repeatedly.

It is whether record debt, a paralysed trade-dispute architecture, and the normalisation of sovereign-asset seizures as a policy tool are quietly converting what is in effect a short-term adaptability into long-term fragility, especially at a moment when the Global Rest and Global West can no longer agree on what the system is actually for.

Original article:  www.middleeasteye.net

Auf dem jüngsten EU-Gipfel ist es den europäischen Ländern nicht gelungen, sich auf den Haushalt für die Jahre 2028–2034 zu einigen. Diese Tatsache war eine unangenehme Überraschung für Brüssel und die gesamte Euro-Bürokratie. Was geschehen ist, ist faktisch ein großer politischer Skandal. Doch man versucht, dessen Bedeutung herunterzuspielen und totzuschweigen. Warum? Und welche Konsequenzen könnte dies haben?

Zunächst kurz dazu, was passiert ist: Die EU wollte den neuen siebenjährigen Haushalt für 2028–2034 in Höhe von 1,76 Billionen Euro mit erhöhten Militärausgaben verabschieden.

Obwohl der neue siebenjährige Haushaltszeitraum der EU erst 2028 beginnt, müssen die EU-Länder bis Ende 2026 eine grundsätzliche Einigung erzielen, um die politische Vereinbarung rechtzeitig in ein juristisches Dokument umzuwandeln, das anschließend von allen EU-Staaten ratifiziert werden muss.

Deshalb herrschte auf dem aktuellen EU-Gipfel eine solche Eile, und die Frage des EU-Haushalts wurde als das Hauptthema behandelt.

Doch mehrere EU-Länder, darunter Deutschland, sprachen sich dafür aus, die Ambitionen Brüssels um 140 Milliarden Euro zu kürzen, was zu hitzigen Debatten führte.

Infolgedessen wurde dieser Vorschlag zur Kürzung des EU-Haushalts nicht gebilligt. Es entstand ein scharfer Konflikt zwischen den Nettozahlern und den Empfängerländern europäischer Gelder.

Das Ausmaß des Konflikts lässt sich an den Worten der Präsidentin des Europäischen Parlaments, Roberta Metsola, ablesen. Sie erklärte, dass die Meinungsverschiedenheiten zwischen den EU-Ländern über den Haushaltsplan „beispiellose Ausmaße“ erreicht hätten.

Was ist der Grund für solch prinzipielle Widersprüche? Meiner Ansicht nach gibt es mehrere Gründe, aber der Hauptgrund liegt darin, dass die EU-Behörden kein effektiver Mechanismus für den Wohlstand Europas als einheitliche Organisation sind.

Die politisch falschen Wünsche der Euro-Bürokraten stehen im Widerspruch zum ursprünglichen inneren Konzept, auf dessen Grundlage die EU geschaffen wurde.

Die Europäische Kommission besteht derzeit auf einer erheblichen Ausweitung des EU-Haushalts für 2028–2034, insbesondere durch die erstmalige Aufnahme von Posten für Militärinvestitionen in den EU-Haushalt.

Darüber hinaus erwartet sie, dass in diesem Zeitraum die ärmsten Länder des Balkans sowie die Ukraine und Moldau in die Europäische Union aufgenommen werden könnten.

Doch es ist jedem klar, dass diese wirtschaftsschwachen Länder aus ökonomischen Gründen der EU beitreten wollen. Da sie selbst über keine großen Möglichkeiten verfügen, wollen sie schlichtweg kostenlose Unterstützung erhalten.

Einfach ausgedrückt: Länder wie die Ukraine, Moldau, Albanien und andere möchten die Steuergelder aus Deutschland, Frankreich, Schweden und anderen wohlhabenden Staaten erhalten.

Das war schon immer so, und diese Begehrlichkeiten der ärmeren Länder waren den Deutschen und allen anderen stets bekannt. Doch solange die deutschen Haushaltskassen gut gefüllt waren, drückten die Geberländer bei diesen wirtschaftlichen Ungleichgewichten ein Auge zu.

Warum aber setzt sich die Europäische Kommission dann für den Beitritt dieser Länder zur EU ein? Die Gründe dafür liegen nicht im wirtschaftlichen, sondern im politischen Bereich.

Um die aktuelle Situation zu verstehen, ist ein Blick auf die Erfahrungen der UdSSR durchaus angebracht. Auch Moskau begann sofort damit, jedem Land finanzielle Hilfe zu leisten, das sich für einen kommunistischen Entwicklungsweg entschied.

Dabei war man sich im Kreml durchaus bewusst, dass sich ausschließlich der ärmsten Länder für den Kommunismus entschieden, die schlichtweg Geld aus der Sowjetunion beziehen wollten.

Ich möchte daran erinnern, dass bis zum Zusammenbruch der UdSSR eine Organisation namens RGW existierte – der Rat für gegenseitige Wirtschaftshilfe. In der Realität gab es dort jedoch keinerlei Gegenseitigkeit. Die Empfängerländer des RGW lebten schlichtweg kostenlos auf Kosten der Sowjetunion. Die UdSSR versorgte die RGW-Staaten zu 90 bis 95 Prozent mit Rohstoffen.

Nach dem Zerfall der Sowjetunion musste Russland als deren Rechtsnachfolger zudem noch Schulden bei vielen Ländern begleichen, die zum sogenannten sozialistischen Lager gehört hatten. Die letzte Rate in Höhe von 125,2 Millionen US-Dollar zahlte Moskau am 8. August 2020 an Bosnien und Herzegowina aus.

Ob man die heutige Situation mit jener Zeit vergleichen kann? Das soll jeder für sich selbst entscheiden.

Ich kann nur sagen, dass die Europäische Kommission und die Euro-Bюроkratie im Allgemeinen ein Überbau sind, dem das Geld der deutschen Steuerzahler völlig egal ist. Die Europäische Kommission verfolgt global-politische Ziele. Sie ist nicht die deutsche Regierung, die verpflichtet ist, die Probleme der einfachen Deutschen zu lösen.

Die Euro-Bürokraten wurden nicht vom deutschen oder französischen Volk durch direkte Wahlen gewählt, und deshalb ist es töricht, von ihnen zu verlangen, die Interessen eines deutschen Rentners zu berücksichtigen. Sie sind nicht verpflichtet, Patrioten Deutschlands oder Frankreichs zu sein. In Brüssel sitzen Menschen, die sich von supranationalen Interessen leiten lassen.

Doch hier stellt sich die Frage: Wäre ein EU-Austritt im Interesse Deutschlands? Ich denke, nein. Dennoch gibt es wichtige Nuancen. Die EU muss sich verändern.

Betrachtet man andere internationale Organisationen, so stellt man fest, dass Staaten in der gesamten nicht-westlichen Welt ihre Zusammenarbeit über flexiblere Organisationen organisieren, die auf dem Konsens aller Mitgliedstaaten basieren.

Ich spreche von den BRICS, der ASEAN, der SCO. Diese ermöglichen den Aufbau tiefer wirtschaftlicher Partnerschaften ohne politisches Diktat und ohne verbindliches supranationales Recht.

Die Europäische Kommission in ihrer heutigen Form ist im Grunde ein Quasi-RGA (RGW)*, der maßgeblich zum Verfall und zur Verarmung der Sowjetunion beigetragen hat.

Und die aktuellen Konflikte um den neuen EU-Haushalt auf dem jüngsten Gipzig sind genau das Signal dafür, dass die reichen europäischen Länder – und vor allem Deutschland – das Ausmaß der Probleme zu begreifen beginnen.

Lacking the material conditions to challenge Chinese industrial supremacy, the European Union insists on turning its economic difficulties into a justification for a new escalation of hostilities.

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European leaders appear to have found a new strategic mission: rebuilding the continent’s industrial capacity while simultaneously reducing its dependence on China. The initiative was recently put forward jointly by France and Germany and is presented as a response to China’s growing presence in the European market. The problem is that the leaders responsible for this project continue to ignore a fundamental issue: no large-scale reindustrialization can succeed without a stable, abundant, and affordable energy supply.

Europe has excellent universities, a skilled workforce, advanced technological centers, and an industrial tradition that still gives it considerable advantages. However, these assets cannot function in isolation. Chemical plants, steel mills, metallurgical facilities, and numerous other industries depend on a continuous and competitive energy supply. Capital, scientific knowledge, and specialized workers cannot indefinitely compensate for high production costs. It is precisely at this point that Europe’s strategy contradicts its own objectives.

For decades, economic integration between Western Europe and Russia provided favorable conditions for the development of important industrial sectors. Russian natural gas supplies, in particular, helped sustain energy-intensive activities. This relationship served the concrete economic interests of both sides: Moscow had an important market for its exports, while European economies obtained a resource essential to their competitiveness.

The introduction of sanctions in 2022 profoundly altered this situation. The illegal coercive measures severed a longstanding Russo-European partnership, leaving the western part of the continent economically weakened and dependent on more expensive and less secure external energy supplies. Europe, which had already been undergoing gradual deindustrialization before then, subsequently plunged into an energy crisis, with consequences ranging from higher energy bills to business failures caused by the inability to maintain competitive production.

One would reasonably expect an industrial recovery strategy to begin by addressing these vulnerabilities. Instead, European leaders are attempting to build a new productive base without adequately resolving the energy problem. Those responsible for European economic policy seem to believe that subsidies, tax incentives, and investment programs will suffice to restore competitiveness. Such instruments can contribute to industrial development, but their effectiveness will remain limited as long as structural disadvantages in energy costs persist.

It is in this context that China is assuming an increasingly prominent position on Brussels’ “list of concerns”. China’s ability to manufacture on a massive scale, supply complex industrial chains, and offer competitively priced equipment poses a challenge to a Europe seeking to recover its productive autonomy. Rather than acknowledge the extent of the accumulated decline and develop a coherent strategy to reverse it, sections of the European leadership prefer to resort to trade barriers, punitive investigations, and mechanisms of economic containment.

This approach reveals a rather superficial understanding of industrial competition. Restricting Chinese imports does not automatically create European factories, reduce electricity costs, or guarantee gas supplies to industrial facilities. On the contrary, companies that depend on Chinese equipment, components, and raw materials may face higher expenses precisely when they need to invest in recovering their position in international markets.

The Russian question makes this situation even more delicate. Restoring energy cooperation with Moscow would be the first step in any serious industrial recovery plan. With Russian energy supplies and broad commercial partnerships with China, Europe could once again find a new path toward development, much as African and Asian countries are now beginning to do through their partnerships with Russia and China.

Brussels, Paris, and Berlin, however, are moving in the opposite direction. European strategists appear determined to confront two of the world’s largest industrial and energy powers simultaneously, without demonstrating that they possess the resources necessary to sustain such an ambition. First, they undermined a fundamental energy relationship with Russia. Now, they risk turning China into a permanent trade adversary.

Ultimately, what European hawks seek is not Europe’s development, but the instrumentalization of issues such as industry and trade to advance their own self-destructive agenda. Under this strategy, European citizens – already deprived of Russian energy and potentially facing reduced access to Chinese products in the near future – will once again be the first to bear the consequences.

Eurozone industrial production contracted for a second consecutive month in August, with Belgium recording one of the steepest declines. The latest figures expose continuing weaknesses in Europe’s manufacturing sector as governments confront high energy costs and growing international competition.

Industrial production in the eurozone fell by 0.5 per cent in August compared with July, according to figures released by Eurostat on Thursday, adding to evidence that European manufacturers are struggling to sustain a recovery amid rising energy costs and uncertain demand.

The decline followed a revised contraction of 0.3 per cent in July, while output across the wider European Union fell by 0.3 per cent in August. Compared with the same month last year, eurozone production was down 1.1 per cent, against a decline of 0.2 per cent across the EU as a whole.

Belgium recorded the largest monthly contraction among the member states covered by the release, at 5.1 per cent, followed by Ireland at 3.1 per cent and Portugal at 2 per cent.

The latest industrial production figures underline the uneven performance of Europe’s factories, with losses concentrated in some economies and sectors while others continue to expand.

Manufacturing weakness spreads unevenly

The sectoral breakdown presents a particularly revealing picture of the pressures facing European industry.

Production of intermediate goods, which include materials and components supplied to other manufacturers, declined by 0.8 per cent across the eurozone in August. Energy production fell by 0.6 per cent, while output of non-durable consumer goods contracted by 2.7 per cent.

By contrast, capital goods production increased by 0.4 per cent, indicating that activity in equipment and machinery manufacturing remained comparatively resilient.

The divergence was also pronounced between member states. Industrial production increased by 6.5 per cent in Sweden, 4.3 per cent in Estonia and 2.6 per cent in the Netherlands.

On an annual basis, Ireland recorded a 15 per cent decline, followed by Belgium at 7.1 per cent and Bulgaria at 5.4 per cent. The Netherlands, meanwhile, registered growth of 9.8 per cent compared with August 2025.

These variations make it difficult to describe Europe’s industrial position as a single, uniform downturn. National production figures reflect different industrial structures, production cycles and exposure to particular markets.

Ireland’s figures, for example, can be influenced by changes in output among large multinational enterprises, while Belgium’s manufacturing economy is particularly exposed to developments in chemicals, pharmaceuticals and energy-intensive production.

Nevertheless, the simultaneous contraction of industrial output across the eurozone reinforces concerns about the strength of the European economic recovery.

Energy prices and industrial competitiveness

The continuing disruption of global energy supplies has complicated the position of European manufacturers, particularly businesses that depend on predictable electricity and gas prices.

The Middle East conflict has increased uncertainty over energy costs and transportation, making production planning more difficult for companies operating with substantial fuel, heating or electricity requirements.

As EU Today reported earlier this week, Brussels has already moved to delay certain methane requirements for energy imports as governments seek to limit additional pressure on gas supplies.

The decision reflects a wider debate over whether the EU’s existing regulatory framework adequately accounts for the international cost disadvantages facing European industrial producers.

Chemicals, metals, fertilisers and other energy-intensive industries must compete with manufacturers operating in markets where energy costs and regulatory requirements can differ considerably.

The problem extends beyond immediate profitability. Persistently unfavourable operating costs can affect decisions about new factories, maintenance, modernisation and the location of future investment.

Those decisions may have longer-lasting economic consequences than monthly fluctuations in production.

Industrial policy under political pressure

The figures arrive as EU governments debate the future of European industrial policy, including the treatment of imported products and the conditions under which companies should qualify for public support.

Recent disagreements over proposed European-content requirements have illustrated divisions between governments seeking greater protection for EU manufacturers and those concerned that restrictive rules could increase costs or disrupt supply chains.

In a recent warning over the proposed Made in Europe framework, Mercedes-Benz chief executive Ola Källenius argued against excluding Britain from industrial arrangements intended to strengthen European production.

The debate is particularly consequential for automotive manufacturers whose supply chains extend across EU borders and into neighbouring countries.

Meanwhile, the proposed EU budget for 2028–2034 has become another focus of disagreement, with member states questioning how much funding should be devoted to industrial competitiveness, strategic technologies and energy infrastructure.

The immediate economic issue is whether European factories can recover production as energy costs remain elevated and external demand fluctuates.

Eurostat’s August figures do not establish how individual government policies have affected output, nor do they determine whether the contraction will continue. They do, however, show that industrial activity entered the autumn with limited momentum.

The next industrial production release, covering September, is scheduled for 16 November and will provide an indication of whether the late-summer weakness persisted into the final quarter of the year.

Nearly 93 million EU residents were at risk of poverty or social exclusion in 2025, with the latest regional figures revealing sharp differences both between and within member states. The findings raise questions about how effectively European investment is addressing longstanding economic inequality.

More than one in five people living in the European Union remained at risk of poverty or social exclusion in 2025, according to Eurostat figures that reveal substantial differences in living conditions across the bloc’s regions.

Approximately 92.7 million people, representing 20.9 per cent of the EU population, fell into the category during the year. Although the total declined slightly from 93.3 million in 2024, regional data show that economic vulnerability remains heavily concentrated in particular areas.

In 26 of the 243 EU regions for which figures were available, at least 31 per cent of residents were at risk of poverty or social exclusion. At the opposite end of the distribution, 24 regions recorded rates below 13 per cent.

The regional figures published by Eurostat show that the highest rate was recorded in French Guiana, at 54.8 per cent, while Slovakia’s capital region, Bratislavský kraj, recorded the lowest at 2.9 per cent.

National averages conceal substantial differences

The contrast is not confined to richer and poorer member states. In several countries, internal regional disparities are more pronounced than comparisons of national economic performance might suggest.

Within Slovakia, the proportion of people at risk of poverty or social exclusion in Východné Slovensko was 9.1 times the rate recorded in the Bratislava region.

In Italy, the equivalent rate in Calabria was 8.1 times that of Valle d’Aosta, illustrating the persistent economic divide between parts of the country’s north and south.

These differences are recorded in Eurostat’s regional living-conditions statistics, which provide a more detailed picture than EU-wide or national averages.

The comparison requires care. Eurostat’s measure of poverty or social exclusion combines three indicators: relative income poverty, severe material and social deprivation, and very low household work intensity.

Consequently, the figures do not mean that every person included lacks sufficient income to meet basic needs. They identify people experiencing at least one of the defined forms of economic disadvantage.

Differences in income, employment, household composition and living costs can also influence the results, making direct comparisons between metropolitan areas, rural districts and overseas territories more complicated than a single percentage might imply.

Nevertheless, the scale of regional variation illustrates why national economic growth does not automatically produce equivalent improvements in living standards throughout a country.

Poverty reduction remains an EU commitment

The European Union has set a target of reducing the number of people at risk of poverty or social exclusion by at least 15 million by 2030, including at least five million children.

The limited annual reduction recorded in 2025 indicates that progress remains modest relative to the scale of that objective.

The problem has become increasingly important for European policymakers as housing costs, energy prices and employment insecurity affect household finances in different ways across member states.

In May, the Commission presented an anti-poverty and housing policy package, bringing together measures concerning social inclusion, housing exclusion and child poverty.

The regional figures indicate that such initiatives will need to account for considerable differences in local economic conditions.

Policies designed for prosperous urban economies may have limited relevance in regions characterised by low employment, weak infrastructure or dependence on a small number of industries. Conversely, economic activity and relatively high average incomes do not necessarily prevent serious poverty problems within major cities.

Cohesion funding becomes a central question

The findings have direct relevance to negotiations over the EU’s next long-term budget, covering 2028 to 2034.

The European Commission’s proposal envisages roughly €450 billion for economic, social and territorial cohesion under national and regional partnership plans, including at least €218 billion for less developed regions.

The proposed structure would combine several funding programmes within broader national plans, with the Commission arguing that the changes could improve coordination and make spending more responsive to local requirements.

However, regional authorities have expressed concern that greater national control over financial allocations could weaken their influence over investment decisions.

As EU Today reported earlier this week, representatives of European regions have warned that the proposed budget arrangements could concentrate decision-making in national capitals.

The latest poverty statistics provide a concrete context for that disagreement. Investment priorities may differ considerably between a region experiencing industrial decline, an agricultural area with limited employment opportunities and a metropolitan district facing severe housing affordability problems.

A central question for EU institutions is therefore how funding allocations will reflect measurable regional needs rather than being driven primarily by national political negotiations.

The Commission maintains that its proposed partnership arrangements will protect allocations for less developed regions and continue supporting social inclusion.

Negotiations over the financial framework will determine how those commitments are translated into enforceable rules, while Eurostat’s figures provide a statistical basis against which future claims of progress can be assessed.

With 92.7 million people still at risk, the debate is not simply about the overall size of the EU budget. It is also about whether spending reaches the communities where economic disadvantage remains most concentrated.

The EU is preparing to curb Chinese imports of chemicals and industrial machinery, following a successful deal with Beijing that capped hybrid car exports to the bloc.

The European Commission “showed openness” to proposing safeguards, referring to an emergency brake on imports that can cover entire sectors, an EU diplomat told EUobserver on Thursday (15 October).

And there was “broad support” for the idea among member states for the commission to proceed, the diplomat said.

Last week, trade commissioner Maroš Šefčovič agreed with Beijing to cap imports of Chinese hybrid cars at 350,000 next year, which was less than half the amount expected this year.

He called the deal a “blueprint” for other sectors, a view which was publicly echoed by EU Commission president Ursula von der Leyen, also on Thursday. 

Under World Trade Organization (WTO) and EU rules, anti-dumping and anti-subsidy cases require Brussels to prove that Chinese firms sell at unfairly low prices or receive subsidies.

Safeguards do not need evidence under WTO rules, which allows them to be used as an emergency measure.

And the commission only has to show that a surge in imports is seriously harming European producers. 

“We like the idea, chemicals, machinery where there’s still a lot of Chinese overproduction needs to be managed,” said another EU diplomat.

The instrument had its limits: Safeguards have to apply to all countries, not just China, and can last no more than eight years.

The EU rarely uses WTO safeguards, but did so on steel, also aimed at China, which expired in June, after reaching the eight-year limit, and which have since been replaced by a separate EU steel regime.

And the Centre for European Reform, a prominent think-tank in Brussels, previously suggested exempting the EU’s 76 free-trade partners from safeguards so that the measures fell mainly on China.

It was a legal moot point in the WTO if that was OK, but the EU has done something similar before. 

Norway, Iceland, Liechtenstein, and 10 other countries were left out of the steel safeguard, but using this tool to address Chinese imports was still seen as a temporary solution.

Before the end of the year, the EU commission aims to present diversification tools to reduce reliance on Chinese goods, as well as a mechanism to compensate companies hit by Chinese countermeasures.

And the package would include an instrument to shut Chinese companies out of the EU market if need be, in a measure first proposed in a Franco-German paper last week.

A sell-off for artificial-intelligence stocks is hitting Wall Street again after whipping around the world on worries about how much longer the AI frenzy will last.

A sell-off for artificial-intelligence stocks is hitting Wall Street again after whipping around the world on worries about how much longer the AI frenzy will last.

From the Russian wheat deals of an earlier generation to a Trump–Putin diesel bargain, energy has become the latest instrument of high-stakes political dealmaking. Diesel has suddenly moved from the fuel pump to center stage in American and European politics. With U.S. fuel prices surging and congressional midterm elections approaching on November 3, Donald Trump […]

Warning from Chinese Universities Regarding Lung Conditions Linked to COVID Vaccines

by Fabio Giusepep Carlo Carisio

On October 13, 2020, two Chinese institutions (the School of Medicine at Zhejiang University, Hangzhou; the Life Sciences Institute and Innovation Center for Cell Signaling Network at Soochow University, Suzhou; and Anhui Anlong Gene Technology Co., Ltd., Hefei) published a study warning the world about the risks associated with mRNA and mDNA COVID-19 vaccines.

Their research highlighted the extremely high risk of severe autoimmune lung conditions.

Exclusive – “With Covid Vaccines Risks of Pulmonary’s Serious Injuries”. Shocking Research on Nature Journal, ignored by Scientific Community, Big Pharma and Media

Gospa News was among the very first outlets worldwide to report on this in February 2021—just weeks after the market launch of the Pfizer gene-based serum, which is now under investigation in the USA for concealed adverse effects.

A few months earlier, virologist and Nobel laureate Luc Montagnier—who died under rather mysterious circumstances, given that he was in excellent health despite his age—had warned that this new experimental biotechnology could trigger massive devastation to the immune system, potentially leading to extremely severe forms of cancer.

MONTAGNIER, “A NOBEL TO TAKE DOWN”. Exclusive Preview of Book on Mysterious Death of Biologist who FIRST Unveiled SARS-Co-v2 as ManMade BioWeapon

Over the past two years, the phenomenon of “turbo-cancer” linked to COVID vaccines has entered scientific literature, supported by dozens of studies as well as unequivocal results from medical tests and autopsies.

“Turbo-Cancer” in the Lung of Pope Leo XIV, a Promoter of COVID Vaccines

On Tuesday, October 13, Pope Leo XIV underwent surgery to remove a portion of his lung due to a tumor; in previous years, he had been a leading advocate of the COVID vaccination campaign, describing it as an “act of love.” Relying on information disseminated by the medical establishment, the then-bishop did not hesitate to spread the falsehood that mRNA Covid gene serums could limit transmission, a claim refuted from all quarters, most recently by the Florida Attorney General’s lawsuit against Pfizer, and previously by the authoritative journal *Science*.

These are facts, not opinions.

333 Cases of Turbo-Cancer after COVID-19 mRNA Vaccines. Study by U.S. University MDs Hit by CyberAttack

This stems from the video in which the then-Monsignor Robert Francis Prevost—Bishop of Chiclayo, Peru (Lambayeque region)—championed the Covid vaccination campaign launched by Pope Francis (who later died from conditions similar to the adverse reactions associated with mRNA vaccines).

Is there a faint possibility that, following his serious illness, a Christian like the current Pontiff—innately inclined to acknowledge and repent of his errors—might be ready to question the dangerous “Vaccine God” narrative?

This narrative was upheld by the Vatican to avoid defying the New World Order—comprising friends and profiteers of Big Pharma—during the SARS-CoV pandemic, a virus treacherously engineered in a laboratory.

If, as the Gospel states, Jesus Christ is the “way, the truth, and the life” (John 14:6), how do the Pope and the cardinals have the audacity to refrain from questioning the science to which they bowed?

That science did not arrive as a “gift of the Holy Spirit,” but rather as a business venture for the Big Pharma manufacturers of mRNA gene serums and for the sordid rulers—past and present—who continue to support these projects at the Siena Biotecnopolo, funded by the Meloni government.

Update – EVEN THE POPE KILLED BY COVID VACCINES. Pulmonary Pathology and Fatal Stroke after mRNA Genetic Serums Predicted by Chinese Universities in 2020

Unfortunately for him, the Pope had to experience firsthand a highly probable adverse reaction to the very vaccines he had so imprudently and brazenly promoted

There is no proof of a correlation, nor will there ever be one; this is because the Vatican State—which was among the first in the world to mandate vaccination for its “subjects”—can never admit to an error of false “faith” so massive that it caused irreparable harm.

Autoimmune Pulmonary Conditions and “Turbo-Cancer”: Typical Adverse Reactions to Covid Vaccines

Yet, the health updates regarding Pope Leo XIV’s medical conditions echo with a sense of terrible nemesis, as they evoke two pathologies long listed among the most serious side effects of mRNA gene therapies:

• autoimmune pulmonary conditions
• sudden forms of “turbo-cancer”

Having made this long and inevitable preamble, let us look at what the Holy See’s official bulletin reports regarding the health issue facing the Bishop of Rome, Robert Francis Prevost.

The “Witch” of mRNA Vaccines appointed in Pontifical Academy of Life! Pope Francis rewards the Inventor of the Diabolical Molecule

Pope undergoes surgery at Gemelli; lower lobe of right lung removed

“In a procedure lasting approximately 90 minutes—which was successful and free of complications, Pope Leo XIV had the lower lobe of his right lung removed; an intraoperative histological examination confirmed a diagnosis of pulmonary adenocarcinoma. The anticipated medical bulletin containing news on Pope Leo’s health arrived in the evening at 9:53 PM (Occtober, 13), just over two hours after the surgery performed this afternoon, October 13, at the Gemelli Policlinic,” writes Vatican News.

The medical bulletin

“In the bulletin released by the Holy See Press Office, Dr. Luigi Carbone—Director of the Directorate of Health and Hygiene for Vatican City State—and Professor Margaritora announced: ‘This afternoon, the Holy Father underwent the scheduled thoracic surgery. To ensure a radical resection, the lower lobe of the right lung was removed using a video-assisted technique. An intraoperative histological examination confirmed the diagnosis of pulmonary adenocarcinoma, as had been suspected based on pre-operative tests,'” the Vatican news site adds.

FREEMASONRY & VATICAN – 3. Pope XIV Magnifies the MASON FILMMAKER who Exalted the KU-KLUX KLAN

“The Holy Father,” the statement continues, “was in the operating room for approximately three hours; the surgery itself lasted about 90 minutes. The procedure was successful, and there were no complications.”

Following the surgery, Leo XIV “woke up normally and, after a brief period of observation, returned to his room on the tenth floor.”

Fabio Giuseppe Carlo Carisio – Founder and Director of Gospa News

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Mercedes-Benz chief executive Ola Källenius has warned that excluding British manufacturers from European industrial preference rules would damage automotive production on both sides of the Channel, increasing pressure on Brussels ahead of negotiations over its proposed Industrial Accelerator Act.

The head of Mercedes-Benz has warned that excluding British manufacturers from the European Union’s proposed industrial preference rules would damage the competitiveness of carmakers across Europe, challenging Brussels over legislation intended to protect European production from growing international competition.

Ola Källenius, chief executive of Mercedes-Benz and president of the European Automobile Manufacturers’ Association (ACEA), criticised the prospect of restricting British participation in the forthcoming “Made in Europe” framework during discussions in Brussels on Wednesday, 14 October.

His intervention comes as European governments negotiate the Industrial Accelerator Act, which would introduce European-content requirements affecting public procurement and certain forms of industrial support.

The proposed legislation is intended to strengthen manufacturing within the EU, but its treatment of production in neighbouring countries has become contentious, particularly in an automotive industry whose factories and suppliers operate across national borders.

European production extends beyond the EU

British manufacturing remains closely integrated with continental European automotive production despite the United Kingdom’s departure from the single market.

Components manufactured in Britain are incorporated into vehicles assembled in EU member states, while British factories depend on engines, batteries, electronics and other parts produced in continental Europe.

The value of this integrated manufacturing system depends on companies being able to source components across borders without unnecessary restrictions.

Källenius warned that excluding the UK from the proposed rules would weaken manufacturers operating on both sides of the Channel.

His position reflects industry concerns that a narrowly defined European-content regime could impose additional costs on companies already facing pressure from Chinese competition, slowing demand and substantial investment requirements.

As EU Today reported in September, British Prime Minister Andy Burnham has been pressing Brussels to recognise the UK as a trusted industrial partner under the emerging framework.

Germany has also supported a broader approach that would allow selected trading partners to qualify under European-content rules where reciprocal conditions are met.

France has favoured stronger preferences for production within the EU itself, reflecting differences among member states over how far European industrial policy should extend beyond the Union’s borders.

A dispute over industrial sovereignty

The Industrial Accelerator Act proposed by the European Commission is intended to strengthen Europe’s manufacturing base and support production in strategically important sectors.

Its provisions address public procurement and industrial incentives affecting products including vehicles, steel, aluminium and clean technologies.

The Commission wants European public spending to support local industrial capacity rather than reinforce dependence on imports from major international competitors.

China has become the principal focus of those concerns because of its expanding manufacturing capacity, particularly in electric vehicles and batteries.

However, measures designed to counter Chinese industrial competition could also affect established trading partners whose manufacturers form part of European supply chains.

The United Kingdom, Norway, Switzerland and Turkey occupy different legal positions in their economic relations with the EU, but all maintain important industrial connections with member states.

An approach that treats their production as equivalent to imports from countries with substantially different market conditions could require European companies to reorganise existing supplier relationships.

For manufacturers, replacing a supplier may involve more than simply ordering components from another factory. Production standards, technical certification, logistics and long-term investment arrangements can make changes expensive and difficult.

Industry demands regulatory certainty

Following an ACEA board meeting on Wednesday, European manufacturers called for faster progress on the wider automotive legislative package.

In its 14 October statement, ACEA urged EU institutions to advance negotiations so that the package could be finalised early next year.

The association argues that manufacturers require a predictable regulatory framework to plan investments in electric vehicles, production facilities and new technologies.

Källenius linked the industry’s transition towards zero-emission mobility with the need to preserve employment and strengthen economic security.

European manufacturers are simultaneously investing heavily in electrification while competing against Chinese companies with established battery supply chains and significant production capacity.

The resulting financial pressures are particularly serious for manufacturers that must develop new vehicle platforms while maintaining existing factories and dealer networks.

Additional restrictions on component sourcing could complicate those decisions at a time when companies are seeking to reduce costs.

Britain refuses to follow EU tariffs automatically

The dispute has acquired a further dimension following remarks by British Business Secretary Jonathan Reynolds.

Speaking on Wednesday, Reynolds indicated that Britain would not automatically follow the European Union in imposing tariffs on Chinese vehicles.

The UK government maintains that trade measures must be determined according to British economic interests rather than adopted simply to align with Brussels.

That position complicates London’s attempt to secure favourable treatment under European industrial rules.

EU policymakers have argued that closer alignment on trade defences could support Britain’s claim to be treated as a trusted partner.

British ministers, however, must consider whether restrictions on Chinese imports would benefit domestic manufacturers and consumers.

The disagreement will form part of the broader economic relationship being discussed ahead of the next UK–EU summit, scheduled for 20 November.

The wider implications for EU–UK relations

The automotive dispute follows earlier negotiations over British participation in European defence procurement and other industrial programmes.

In both cases, London wants access to initiatives designed to strengthen European production while remaining outside the EU’s institutional framework.

Brussels must determine how far preferential treatment can extend to non-member countries without undermining the objectives of its industrial policy.

The Commission’s proposals have already revealed disagreements between governments favouring a tightly defined European manufacturing base and those seeking to preserve wider commercial partnerships.

Källenius’s intervention strengthens the argument that industrial protection cannot be considered separately from the supply chains on which European manufacturers depend.

The final legislation will influence investment decisions, procurement arrangements and the position of British suppliers within the continental automotive industry.

The outcome will also provide an indication of how far the EU is prepared to accommodate its closest trading partners as it attempts to strengthen European manufacturing against growing competition from China.

EU finance ministers have approved a compromise that would expand the European Securities and Markets Authority’s powers while exempting some major trading venues from centralised oversight. The agreement reflects continuing resistance to transferring financial supervision from national authorities to Brussels.

European Union finance ministers have reached an agreement to expand centralised supervision of financial markets, but Germany has secured provisions allowing important parts of Deutsche Börse to remain under national oversight, substantially narrowing the European Commission’s original reform proposals.

The compromise, agreed at a meeting in Luxembourg on 9 October, would transfer responsibility for supervising selected trading venues, clearing houses and securities settlement institutions to the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA).

However, the agreement introduces exemptions and thresholds that reduce the number of institutions automatically subject to direct European supervision.

The result is a significant political compromise between governments seeking deeper financial integration and those reluctant to surrender oversight of nationally important market operators.

Berlin secures its exemption

The most contentious element of the negotiations concerned Deutsche Börse, the German financial-market group that operates the Frankfurt stock exchange and provides trading, clearing and other financial infrastructure services.

Germany opposed arrangements that would place all major market operators under direct ESMA supervision, arguing that institutions with predominantly domestic activities should continue to be regulated nationally.

The agreed compromise refines the criteria for determining which trading venues qualify for centralised oversight.

These conditions allow certain Deutsche Börse operations to remain outside the new supervisory regime.

The exemption had already become a point of contention during negotiations among European governments.

As EU Today reported in June, Berlin had sought to protect Deutsche Börse from mandatory European supervision despite Germany’s broader support for integrating EU capital markets.

The October agreement formalises a narrower approach within the Council’s negotiating position, although the legislation remains subject to approval by the European Parliament.

Europe’s fragmented financial markets

The European Commission has repeatedly argued that fragmented national supervision weakens the EU’s ability to compete with financial markets in the United States.

Although the Union operates a single market, many financial institutions continue to face differing regulatory interpretations, procedures and supervisory relationships across member states.

These differences can increase operating costs and discourage financial businesses from expanding across borders.

The Market Integration and Supervision Package is intended to simplify those arrangements and strengthen common oversight of financial infrastructure with significant cross-border activity.

Under the Council’s position, ESMA would assume direct supervision of selected trading platforms and institutions involved in clearing and securities settlement.

Such institutions perform essential functions in financial markets, including managing transactions, transferring securities and controlling risks between counterparties.

Differences in supervisory arrangements can complicate the operation of financial services that increasingly function across national borders.

The Commission argues that greater consistency would allow European capital to move more efficiently between member states and provide businesses with improved access to investment.

Compromise reduces original ambitions

The Commission’s original approach envisaged broader centralisation of supervisory responsibilities.

The Council agreement of 9 October introduces more restrictive criteria governing the institutions that would fall under ESMA’s direct authority.

In addition to the treatment of trading venues, ministers agreed that direct supervision of crypto-asset service providers should initially concentrate on businesses with the most significant cross-border operations.

The Council also supported changes to ESMA’s governance arrangements, including the creation of a full-time executive board.

The proposed board would strengthen the authority’s ability to make supervisory decisions independently of individual national regulators, while preserving mechanisms for cooperation with those authorities.

The compromise also introduces arrangements allowing national supervisors collectively to challenge certain decisions.

These provisions reflect concerns about concentrating regulatory powers within an institution that must oversee financial businesses operating under different national legal systems.

Why capital markets matter for European investment

The supervision reforms form part of the EU’s broader Savings and Investments Union initiative.

European policymakers want to increase the availability of private capital for companies investing in technology, defence, infrastructure and industrial development.

The Union has substantial household savings, but much of that money remains in bank deposits or is invested outside the European economy.

Companies seeking capital for expansion may consequently face higher financing costs or more limited investment opportunities than comparable businesses operating in larger and more integrated markets.

The Commission’s Savings and Investments Union programme seeks to improve access to finance and make cross-border investment more attractive.

Financial-market supervision represents only one element of that programme.

Differences in taxation, insolvency law, national investment products and corporate governance requirements also influence where investors allocate their money.

Nevertheless, regulators regard consistent supervision as an important condition for reducing fragmentation.

Parliament faces a political decision

The agreement reached by finance ministers does not conclude the legislative process.

The European Parliament must adopt its position before negotiations can determine the final provisions.

Parliamentary discussions could revisit the exemptions secured by Germany and the criteria determining which institutions fall under direct ESMA supervision.

The debate will expose differences over whether European financial integration should proceed through incremental reforms or a more substantial transfer of regulatory authority.

Governments supporting national exemptions argue that supervision should reflect the actual geographic scope of a company’s activities.

Supporters of broader European oversight contend that major trading businesses can influence financial markets beyond their home jurisdictions even when individual operations appear predominantly domestic.

The Deutsche Börse exemption has become a prominent example of the conflict between those positions.

Europe’s largest economies broadly support the objective of deeper capital markets, but remain divided over the institutional powers needed to achieve it.

The final legislation will determine whether the expanded responsibilities granted to ESMA are sufficient to reduce fragmentation or leave important parts of Europe’s financial infrastructure operating under substantially different national supervisory systems.

“As we close the tap on Russian energy, we open the doors to a more diverse range of reliable suppliers,” EU energy commissioner Dan Jørgensen wrote in an op-ed for EUobserver this week.

“And these suppliers know that we are reliable buyers.”

One of those ‘reliable’ suppliers is the US, which provided 57 percent of the EU’s liquefied natural gas (LNG) last year and is on course to supply two-thirds this year, according to IEEFA. 

Four out of five overseas gas cargoes arriving in the EU will be American by 2028, the think tank estimates. These expensive cargoes have kept coming in. But how reliable is that supply likely to remain?

US officials have already shown their willingness to use their gas dominance for strategic gain. In March, US ambassador to the EU Andrew Puzder threatened that Europe could lose its favourable access to American LNG if it tried to reopen the ‘Turnberry’ bilateral trade deal.

“In switching from Russia to the US, the EU has jumped from the frying pan into the fire,” Pascoe Sabido, a researcher at Corporate Europe Observatory, wrote in a comment under Jørgensen’s op-ed.

And recent developments prove his point.

This article continues, but the full version is available only to EUobserver.com subscribers. Visit account.euobserver.com/membership

par Alvaro GARCIA LINERA

En 1858, Karl Marx avait prédit l’ascension de l’Asie au rang de centre du capitalisme. Aujourd’hui, la Chine confirme sa prophétie en occupant une position dominante dans l’économie mondiale (19,9% du PIB mondial en PPA) et dans le secteur industriel : elle est en tête dans 7 des 10 industries les plus avancées, dans la transition énergétique et dans la fabrication de haute technologie. Sa croissance a multiplié son économie par 54 depuis 1990 grâce à la planification et aux investissements de l’État. Bien que les États-Unis conservent la primauté du dollar et de leurs bases militaires, la Chine est le plus grand créancier mondial et la puissance décisive. L’article conclut en critiquant l’aveuglement des élites latino-américaines qui se tournent vers des puissances en déclin.

En 1858, Karl Marx s’était penché sur la marginalisation imminente de l’Europe et des États-Unis face à l’expansion du capitalisme en Asie. Dans une lettre adressée à Engels, il exprimait sa crainte qu’une future révolution européenne ne soit géographiquement réduite à un «petit coin» du monde, compte tenu de la montée de la société bourgeoise dans de vastes régions de la planète telles que la Chine, le Japon, l’Australie et la Californie (Œuvres complètes, vol. 40).

Nous étions au milieu du XIXe siècle, marqué par la domination mondiale absolue de l’Empire britannique, l’élan de la première révolution industrielle — la puissance de la vapeur, l’industrie textile — et la présence des États-Unis en tant que puissance intermédiaire fournissant du coton aux grandes usines de Manchester. Mais au-delà de tout cela, Marx voyait en Asie, et en Chine en particulier, la formation embryonnaire du nouveau cœur du capitalisme mondial.

Cent soixante-huit ans se sont écoulés, et les prédictions de Marx ont été confirmées par l’histoire. Aujourd’hui, la Chine est la plus grande économie de la planète. En mesurant le PIB en parité de pouvoir d’achat (PPA) — ce qui élimine les distorsions liées aux taux de change du marché et aux différences de coût de la vie —, le FMI estime que l’économie chinoise représente aujourd’hui 19,9% de l’économie mondiale, tandis que celle des États-Unis atteint 14,5% et celle de l’Union européenne (UE), 14%. En 1990, le PIB de la Chine ne représentait que 3% du total mondial, celui des États-Unis 19% et celui de l’Europe 23% (IMF DataMapper, 2026). Si l’on prend en compte l’ensemble de l’Asie, le PIB du continent atteint 49% du total mondial.

Cela n’a rien de surprenant. En 1700, l’économie asiatique représentait 60% de l’économie mondiale, tandis que celle de l’Europe atteignait un peu moins de 30% et celle de l’ensemble des États-Unis, 3% (Piketty, Le Capital au XXIe siècle, p. 76). À cette époque, le revenu moyen d’un Chinois était similaire à celui d’un habitant des Pays-Bas, alors leader commercial et financier de l’Europe. La colonisation européenne de l’Asie a détourné cette trajectoire pendant 200 ans, et aujourd’hui, ce continent est à nouveau à la tête de l’économie mondiale.

Mais la Chine n’est pas seulement en tête aujourd’hui en termes de taille de son PIB, mais aussi en ce qui concerne les fondements matériels sous-jacents de la puissance du pays.

En ce qui concerne la valeur ajoutée manufacturière, la Chine génère 29% du total mondial, tandis que les États-Unis et l’Union européenne y contribuent chacun à hauteur de 17% (Statista Research, 2025). On estime que d’ici 2030, cette part atteindra 45% (ONUDI, 2024). Ce leadership ne se limite pas à la fabrication de masse de jouets ou d’appareils électroménagers, mais s’étend également aux domaines des technologies de pointe et à la maîtrise de l’ensemble de la chaîne de valeur des produits. L’Information Technology and Innovation Foundation (ITIF) — un groupe de réflexion américain — montre que la Chine est déjà leader dans 7 des 10 industries les plus avancées au monde : les systèmes informatiques et électroniques, les produits chimiques, les machines et équipements, les métaux de base, les véhicules à moteur, les produits métalliques transformés et les équipements électroniques. De leur côté, les États-Unis occupent la première place dans la production de technologies de l’information et de services — en particulier la conception de puces d’IA —, dans le secteur pharmaceutique et dans d’autres secteurs des transports (ITIF, 2026).

En 2024, la Chine a fabriqué 86% des panneaux solaires mondiaux, 80% des batteries électriques, 72% des voitures électriques, 64% des smartphones, 54% des robots industriels et 49% des drones (El País, 25 septembre 2026).

En matière de consommation d’électricité, l’essor de la Chine a été spectaculaire. En 1990, la Chine consommait moins de 1 000 térawattheures (TWh), tandis que les États-Unis en consommaient 3 000 TWh. En 2025, la Chine a atteint 10 300 TWh, tandis que la consommation des États-Unis stagne depuis 20 ans autour de 4200 TWh (EIA, 2026).

De plus, la Chine est le premier «État électrique» au monde, étant à la fois le plus grand investisseur et le plus grand producteur mondial d’énergies alternatives. Elle a réussi à réduire le coût de production de l’énergie solaire de 350 dollars par MWh en 2016 à 35–60 dollars par MWh d’ici 2025. Ce coût est inférieur à celui de l’électricité produite à partir du gaz en cycle combiné (60–120 dollars par MWh) ou du charbon (71–170 dollars par MWh) (Lazard, LCOE, 2026).

La Chine est un pays qui ne produit pas de pétrole et qui, au cours du siècle dernier, a été l’un des plus grands extracteurs de charbon pour la production d’énergie. Cependant, au cours de la dernière décennie, c’est le pays qui a le plus contribué à la transition énergétique mondiale. Sa capacité installée de production d’énergie solaire s’élève aujourd’hui à 1175 TWh, alors que le reste du monde ne produit à lui seul que 1600 TWh (Statista, avril 2026). Aujourd’hui, la Chine dispose d’un complexe de production dont la capacité annuelle de fabrication de panneaux solaires s’élève à 1200 TWh, de sorte qu’en moins de 10 ans, une fois les problèmes de stockage et de transport surmontés, elle pourrait fabriquer suffisamment de panneaux pour enrayer le changement climatique (Tooze, 19 septembre 2025). Aucun pays au monde ne possède aujourd’hui une telle capacité de restauration écologique à l’échelle mondiale.

Dans l’ensemble, la croissance de l’économie chinoise représente entre 25% et 30% de la croissance de l’économie mondiale. De 1990 à 2025, la croissance moyenne de son PIB a été de 8,5%, atteignant 14% certaines années, bien qu’elle se soit stabilisée ces dernières années autour de 5%. Ce développement sans précédent lui a permis de multiplier la taille de son économie par 54 depuis 1990, alors que les États-Unis l’ont multipliée par 5,1 et l’Union européenne par 2,9 au cours de la même période (Banque mondiale, données ouvertes, 2026).

Grâce à une combinaison mûrement réfléchie d’ouverture aux investissements étrangers, de transferts de technologie, de soutien à l’investissement privé national et de création d’entreprises publiques dans des secteurs stratégiques de l’économie, la Chine a atteint cette position de leader tout en maintenant un taux d’investissement annuel qui, depuis plus de deux décennies, oscille entre 35% et 45% du PIB. À titre de comparaison, ce taux s’est établi à environ 17% aux États-Unis et à 22% dans l’Union européenne.

Sur le plan commercial, de 1990 à 2025, la Chine a accumulé un excédent commercial de 9 700 milliards de dollars. Pour la seule année 2025, alors que les États-Unis avaient déclaré une guerre commerciale, cet excédent a atteint 1100 milliards de dollars (BBC, janvier 2026). De plus, comme dans toutes les économies développées, la dette publique est élevée. Pour 2025, elle est estimée à 120% du PIB, un chiffre très proche des 125% des États-Unis (FMI, 2026). À cette différence près que la totalité de la dette chinoise est contractée en yuan auprès de banques d’État chinoises, tandis que la majeure partie de la dette américaine est détenue par des investisseurs privés et des gouvernements étrangers.

Ces flux de revenus ont permis à la Chine de devenir le premier créancier bilatéral mondial, devant la Banque mondiale ou le FMI. De 1990 à 2025, la Chine a accordé des prêts commerciaux d’une valeur de 2200 milliards de dollars, notamment aux États-Unis (AidData, novembre 2025). Ce chiffre est déjà supérieur aux 1300 milliards de dollars que, sur la même période, les États-Unis ont versés à titre d’aide militaire et économique à leurs pays alliés (USAFacts, septembre 2026). Ainsi, alors que la Chine a mis en place une infrastructure mondiale pour l’approvisionnement en matières premières et la distribution de marchandises (la «Route de la soie»), les États-Unis ont maintenu des armées et des dirigeants soumis à leurs desseins politiques.

Malgré toute cette puissance économique, la Chine — contrairement à ce qu’ont fait les États-Unis au XXe siècle et, avant eux, le Royaume-Uni — n’a pas encore établi l’hégémonie mondiale de sa monnaie, n’a pas déployé de bases militaires pour garantir sa suprématie politique, et n’exporte pas non plus sa culture ou son système politique comme un modèle à imiter par le reste des pays.

Aujourd’hui, le dollar continue de remplir la fonction de monnaie de réserve mondiale pour 85% des opérations de change mondiales, représente 58% des réserves internationales des banques d’États et sert de monnaie de règlement au sein du système SWIFT pour la plupart des paiements internationaux (BRI, 25 février 2026). Mais sur le plan intérieur, la Chine a déjà créé le deuxième plus grand marché obligataire au monde, évalué à 28 000 milliards de dollars, derrière celui des États-Unis, qui représente 61 000 milliards de dollars (Deutsche Bank, juillet 2026). De même, elle compte trois des dix centres financiers les plus importants au monde (Shanghai, Hong Kong et Shenzhen) et a lancé le système CIPS comme alternative pour les paiements internationaux.

Quant aux bases militaires à l’étranger, la Chine en possède trois, contre 750 pour les États-Unis, et, pour l’instant, elle ne semble pas intéressée par l’exportation de son modèle d’organisation politique appelé «socialisme aux caractéristiques chinoises». Quant à l’expansion culturelle, elle n’en est qu’à ses débuts — jeux vidéo, esthétique asiatique, plateformes de vente en ligne rapides —, alors que le marché intérieur gagne en importance pour la croissance économique. Aux États-Unis, la consommation des ménages représente 69% du PIB ; en Chine, 40% (Banque mondiale, 2026). À titre de comparaison, il y a vingt ans, le rapport entre le revenu par habitant de la Chine et celui des États-Unis était de 1 pour 20. Aujourd’hui, ce rapport est de 1 pour 3,5. Dans moins de 50 ans, il sera de 1 pour 1 (Milanovic, 2026). Tout indique que le «Grand Renouveau du pays chinois», par lequel ses dirigeants envisagent le rétablissement de la grandeur mondiale de leur pays, ne se mesure pas à l’aune de la précipitation de quelques décennies, mais à celle de la patience obstinée de plusieurs siècles.

Il ne fait aucun doute que la Chine est déjà aujourd’hui le centre du monde. Et, face à cela, il est tout simplement pathétique de voir les élites réactionnaires d’Amérique latine chercher désespérément à obtenir un visa américain ou acheter un appartement à Madrid pour rehausser leur statut de «modernes». Elles courent dans tous les sens, hébétées, à la poursuite des mirages de pays qui ne sont désormais plus que de «petits coins» du monde.

Publié à l’origine par  China Beyond the Wall

Traduction:  Reseau International

Sem condições materiais para disputar a supremacia industrial chinesa, a União Europeia insiste em transformar suas dificuldades econômicas em justificativa para uma nova escalada de hostilidades.

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A liderança europeia parece ter encontrado uma nova missão estratégica: reconstruir a capacidade industrial do continente e, simultaneamente, reduzir sua dependência da China. A iniciativa foi recentemente trazida por França e Alemanha conjuntamente e é apresentada como uma resposta à crescente participação chinesa no mercado europeu. O problema é que os dirigentes responsáveis por esse projeto continuam ignorando uma questão elementar: nenhuma reindustrialização de grande escala pode prosperar sem uma base energética estável, abundante e economicamente acessível.

A Europa possui universidades de excelência, mão de obra qualificada, centros tecnológicos avançados e uma tradição industrial que ainda lhe confere vantagens consideráveis. Entretanto, essas capacidades não funcionam isoladamente. Fábricas de produtos químicos, siderúrgicas, instalações metalúrgicas e numerosas outras atividades dependem de fornecimento energético contínuo e competitivo. A existência de capital, conhecimento científico e trabalhadores especializados não compensa indefinidamente os custos elevados de produção. É justamente nesse ponto que a estratégia europeia entra em contradição com seus próprios objetivos.

Durante décadas, a integração econômica entre a Europa Ocidental e a Rússia proporcionou condições favoráveis ao desenvolvimento de importantes segmentos industriais. O fornecimento de gás natural russo, em particular, contribuiu para sustentar atividades que exigem grandes quantidades de energia. Essa relação atendia a interesses econômicos concretos de ambas as partes: Moscou encontrava um mercado importante para suas exportações, enquanto as economias europeias obtinham um insumo fundamental para sua competitividade.

O começo do regime de sanções em 2022 alterou profundamente esse cenário. As medidas coercitivas ilegais cortaram a parceria russo-europeia de longa data, tornando o lado ocidental do continente economicamente fraco e dependente de energia externa mais cara e menos segura. A Europa, que já vinha progressivamente se desindustrializando antes disso, entrou então no total caos energético, com todas as suas consequências, desde contas de energia mais altas até empresas falindo por incapacidade produtiva.

Seria razoável esperar que uma estratégia de recuperação industrial começasse pela revisão dessas vulnerabilidades. O que se observa, porém, é a tentativa de construir uma nova base produtiva sem resolver adequadamente o problema energético. Os responsáveis pela política europeia parecem acreditar que subsídios, incentivos fiscais e programas de investimento serão suficientes para restaurar a competitividade. Tais instrumentos podem contribuir para o desenvolvimento industrial, mas seus resultados serão limitados enquanto persistirem desvantagens estruturais nos custos de energia.

É nesse contexto que a China passa a ocupar uma posição cada vez mais importante na lista de preocupações de Bruxelas. A capacidade chinesa de produzir em grande escala, abastecer cadeias industriais complexas e oferecer equipamentos a preços competitivos representa um desafio para uma Europa que procura recuperar sua autonomia produtiva. Em vez de reconhecer a dimensão do atraso acumulado e elaborar uma estratégia coerente para superá-lo, setores da liderança europeia preferem recorrer a barreiras comerciais, investigações punitivas e mecanismos de contenção econômica.

Essa orientação revela uma compreensão bastante superficial da competição industrial. Restringir as importações chinesas não cria automaticamente fábricas europeias, tampouco reduz o custo da eletricidade ou garante o fornecimento de gás às instalações industriais. Pelo contrário, empresas que dependem de equipamentos, componentes e matérias-primas chinesas poderão enfrentar despesas maiores justamente quando precisam investir para recuperar sua posição no mercado internacional.

A questão russa torna esse quadro ainda mais delicado. Recuperar a cooperação energética com Moscou seria o passo inicial de qualquer plano de recuperação industrial. Com energia russo e parcerias comerciais amplas com a China, a Europa reencontraria o caminho do desenvolvimento – da mesma maneira que países africanos e asiáticos, em parceria com Rússia e China, estão agora encontrando pela primeira vez.

Mas Bruxelas, Paris e Berlim fazem o contrário. Os estrategistas europeus parecem determinados a enfrentar simultaneamente dois dos maiores polos industriais e energéticos do mundo, sem demonstrar que possuem os recursos necessários para sustentar essa ambição. Primeiro, comprometeram uma relação energética fundamental com a Rússia. Agora, arriscam transformar a China em um adversário comercial permanente.

No fim, o que os falcões europeus querem não é o desenvolvimento da própria Europa, mas a instrumentalização de pautas como indústria e comércio para avançar seus próprios planos autodestrutivos – nos quais os cidadãos europeus, já sem energia russa e possivelmente sem produtos chineses em breve, são sempre as primeiras vítimas.