L’Iran et le Pakistan sont pleinement engagés dans la construction d’un ordre financier post-américain à la croisée du Moyen-Orient et de l’Asie du Sud.

Allons droit au cœur du sujet : après avoir soigneusement examiné l’échiquier, les dirigeants politiques et militaires de Téhéran sont déjà parvenus à la conclusion qu’une attaque conjointe américano-israélienne, dont la planification avance à un rythme effréné, est inévitable.

Ils se positionnent donc désormais comme un cobra lové, prêt à frapper et à injecter son venin mortel au premier signe d’une menace imminente du syndicat Epstein — sans même attendre une attaque effective.

Cette offensive préventive, dont les contours sont déjà tracés, sera dévastatrice ; elle s’étendra au-delà des bases américaines au Moyen-Orient vers d’autres cibles régionales, et pourrait notamment inclure les infrastructures énergétiques du Golfe ainsi que les câbles sous-marins (ce qui, dans ce cas, affecterait principalement le Golfe et l’Inde, bien plus que les États-Unis et l’Europe).

Nous sommes en présence d’un danger clair et immédiat : une opération militaire américano-israélienne destinée à exercer une pression sera certainement interprétée à Téhéran comme le début d’une attaque.

Ainsi, la pression en faveur de la guerre exercée par le «culte de la mort» et par Trump se heurte désormais à un seuil de tolérance iranien dangereusement bas. Les options de frappe du Pentagone vont des installations nucléaires iraniennes aux infrastructures énergétiques.

Il va sans dire que le «sociopathe en chef» — déjà en pleine panique face à la débâcle imminente des élections de mi-mandat — est une proie facile pour le puissant lobby sioniste pro-guerre et ses donateurs. Le danger stratégique suprême réside donc dans le fait que cette pression incessante puisse envoyer un signal que Téhéran interpréterait comme une attaque imminente, même si Washington affirme publiquement qu’aucune frappe n’aura lieu avant les élections de mi-mandat.

Le Yémen fait passer la situation à un niveau supérieur

Parallèlement, des sources privilégiées à Islamabad confirment le succès d’un essai de missile pakistanais à Mach 7, d’une portée de plusieurs milliers de kilomètres. Cette nouvelle capacité a tout ce qu’il faut pour modifier concrètement l’équilibre des pouvoirs au Moyen-Orient, en renforçant la portée dissuasive du Pakistan et sa capacité à influencer tous les calculs de sécurité régionaux, tout en approfondissant les liens du Pakistan avec la Chine, l’Iran et les pétro-monarchies du Golfe.

Et voici une autre exclusivité : des membres des services de renseignement militaire israéliens, notamment un général de division, ont quitté Riyad après que MbS, dans un prétendu moment de lucidité, eut dit «non» à l’offre d’»assistance» de la secte de la mort. Et pourtant, plus de 100 membres du CENTCOM sont toujours sur place.

La décision de MbS lui a peut-être été imposée par la Turquie et le Pakistan — les deux autres signataires de l’Alliance de défense de La Mecque, qui se sont soudainement retrouvés dans la même salle de crise à Riyad, côte à côte avec des agents de la secte de la mort.

Si leur départ a peut-être écarté un risque d’escalade, les agents américains restent révélés : toute frappe, d’où qu’elle vienne, faisant des victimes américaines entraînera immédiatement Washington dans la guerre entre l’Arabie saoudite et Ansarallah.

La guerre entre l’Arabie saoudite et Ansarallah atteint en effet un nouveau niveau de volatilité. Le mélange explosif constitué par l’interception d’un missile de croisière au-dessus de la province de Médine, les interceptions de drones ailleurs en Arabie saoudite et les frappes de missiles des forces armées yéménites contre le complexe présidentiel du gouvernement fantoche d’Aden n’est qu’un début.

Ce qui s’est passé après qu’Ansarallah a pris pour cible Najran — l’une des provinces du sud de l’Arabie saoudite volées au Yémen en 1934 par les Britanniques — est tout à fait stupéfiant.

Un porte-parole saoudien a accusé Ansarallah d’avoir lancé un missile de croisière sur Médine. La réponse du porte-parole emblématique des forces armées yéménites, le général Yahya Saree, a été cinglante : «Nous n’avons mené aucune opération militaire visant le territoire saoudien aujourd’hui. Par conséquent, l’affirmation de l’ennemi saoudien selon laquelle Médine aurait été prise pour cible est une pure invention et un mensonge grave».

Traduction : le Yémen frappe l’une de ses anciennes provinces ; les Saoudiens se lancent dans des fausses informations à outrance, inventant de toutes pièces une attaque contre l’une des deux mosquées sacrées — sans doute en préparation d’une opération sous faux pavillon ; puis le Yémen nie aussitôt avoir frappé quelque (italiques de ma part) territoire saoudien.

Cela signifie que Sanaa déclare subtilement, pour que tout le monde comprenne, qu’elle ne mène plus d’opérations à l’étranger (italiques de ma part) sur les trois provinces : Jizan, Najran et Asir. Elle prépare déjà — psychologiquement et opérationnellement — le terrain pour récupérer son territoire volé.

Tout cela se résume dans cette analyse yéménite succincte de la déconstruction de la fastueuse Maison des Saoud :

«Le Yémen sape les piliers ultra-fragiles de l’économie non pétrolière sur lesquels les pirates du désert ont fondé tous leurs espoirs : l’image, les investissements (IDE), l’évasion de la réalité, ainsi que l’impunité et l’invulnérabilité face au terrorisme à l’étranger».

Comment le Pakistan et l’Iran contournent le FMI

Prêtez maintenant attention à un événement assez surprenant qui s’est produit en milieu de semaine à Bangkok, lors de la réunion annuelle du FMI et de la Banque mondiale — dûment accueillie par des manifestations de rue en Thaïlande.

Le gouverneur de la Banque centrale d’Iran, Abdolnaser Hemmati, a rencontré le gouverneur de la Banque centrale du Pakistan, Jameel Ahmad, en marge de ce rituel annuel de premier plan à la gloire du dollar américain.

Le Pakistan est soumis à la poigne de fer des ajustements structurels imposés par le FMI et la Banque mondiale — et, pour couronner le tout, menacé de sanctions américaines parce qu’il entretient des relations commerciales avec l’Iran.

Le fait que le Pakistan et l’Iran discutent de facto de la dédollarisation au cœur même de la tanière du lion — le temple du dollar américain — n’a donc pas de prix.

L’infrastructure est en place depuis 2023, grâce à un accord de swap de devises utilisant le rial et la roupie à la place du dollar américain. Le troc est géré par les deux banques centrales, et les flux bancaires transitent par la Banque Melli en Iran et la Banque Mellat au Pakistan. Leurs marchés frontaliers — au moins six d’entre eux — sont en plein essor : des routes commerciales physiques qui contournent complètement le dollar américain.

Ce dont ils discutaient à Bangkok en début de semaine, c’est la manière d’étendre ce système : ils se moquent éperdument des sanctions secondaires américaines. D’autant plus que Téhéran offre à Islamabad ce que le système américain ne peut tout simplement pas offrir : la souveraineté, pas de changement de régime, pas d’austérité, pas de leçons de morale et, surtout, pas d’ajustement structurel.

Sans compter que le Pakistan a cruellement besoin du gaz iranien — et des routes commerciales de la nouvelle Route de la soie rendues possibles par la Chine.

L’Iran a bâti toute une économie en contournant complètement le FMI — et capable de survivre à un tsunami de sanctions, à un blocus et à la guerre.

Aujourd’hui, l’Iran et le Pakistan sont en pleine construction d’un ordre financier post-américain à la croisée du Moyen-Orient et de l’Asie du Sud — avec des swaps de devises, du troc, des marchés frontaliers en plein essor et des canaux bancaires adaptés, tournant ainsi en dérision les sanctions secondaires.

Soit dit en passant, cela se produit au moment même où un immense train iranien, chargé de pétrole brut — et le premier d’une longue série —, s’apprête à partir pour… la Chine via l’Asie centrale, sur la ligne ferroviaire de la «nouvelle Route de la soie» construite par la Chine.

Le cobra lové est peut-être prêt à frapper. Mais le cobra, depuis des temps immémoriaux, adore aussi faire des affaires.

Traduction:  Reseau International

As Secretary of State Marco Rubio heads to Uzbekistan, Washington is hoping the high-level diplomatic engagement translates into concrete economic and security cooperation. 

Iran and Pakistan are deep into building a post-American financial order in the intersection between West Asia and South Asia.

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Contact us: info@strategic-culture.su

Let’s get right into the heart of the matter: carefully examining the chessboard, the political and military leadership in Tehran has already reached the conclusion that a joint U.S.-Israeli attack, with planning advancing at a feverish pace, is inevitable.

So they are now positioned themselves as a coiled cobra, ready to strike and inject deadly venom at the first whiff of an imminent Epstein Syndicate threat – even without waiting for an actual attack.

The preemption drive, already delineated, will be devastating, extending beyond U.S. bases in West Asia to other regional targets, and potentially including Gulf energy infrastructure and undersea cables (in this case mostly affecting the Gulf and India, much more than the U.S. and Europe).

We are into clear and present danger territory: a U.S.-Israeli military movement intended as pressure certainly will be interpreted in Tehran as the opening of an attack.

So the death cult/Trumpian pressure for war now meets a dangerously low Iranian threshold. Pentagon strike options range from Iranian nuclear installations to energy infrastructure.

It goes without saying that the Sociopath-in-Chief – already freaking out with the imminent mid-terms debacle – is an easy prey to the powerful pro-war Zionist lobby/donors. The supreme strategic danger then is that this non-stop pressure may produce a signal that Tehran interprets as an imminent attack, even while Washington publicly maintains that no strike will happen before the mid-terms.

Yemen is taking it all to the next level

In parallel, privileged sources in Islamabad confirm a successful Pakistani missile test at Mach 7, with a range of several thousand kilometers. This new capability has all that it takes to materially alter West Asia’s balance of power, strengthening Pakistan’s deterrent reach and how it will be able to influence every regional security calculation, and adding to Pakistan’s deepening interconnection with China, Iran and the Gulf petro-monarchies.

And now for another esclusive: Israeli military intelligence personnel, including a Major-General, have left Riyadh after MbS, in an alleged moment of lucidity, said “No” to the death cult’s offer of “assistance”. And yet more than 100 CENTCOM personnel remain.

MbS’s decision may have been forced on him by Turkiye and Pakistan – the other two signatories of the Mecca Defense Alliance, who suddenly found themselves in the same war room in Riyadh side by side with death cult operatives.

Now their departure may have removed one escalation risk, but U.S. operatives remain exposed: any strike, wherever it comes from, generating U.S. casualties will immediately draw Washington into the Saudi-Ansarallah war.

The Saudi-Ansarallah war, in fact, is hitting the next – volatility – level. The toxic mix of a cruise-missile interception over Medina province; drone interceptions elsewhere in Saudi Arabia; and Yemeni Armed Forces missile strikes on Aden’s puppet government presidential complex is just the start.

What happened after Ansarallah targeted Najran – one of the southern Saudi provinces stolen from Yemen in 1934 by the British – is total eyebrow-raising territory.

A Saudi spokesman accused Ansarallah of launching a cruise missile at Medina. The response by iconic spokesman for Yemeni Armed Forces, Gen Yahya Saree, was a killer: “We did not carry out any military operation targeting Saudi territory today. Therefore, the Saudi enemy’s claim that Medina was targeted is an outright fabrication and a grave falsehood.”

Translation: Yemen hits one of their former provinces; the Saudis go for total fake news, fabricating an attack on one of the two sacred mosques – no doubt as preparation for a false flag; then Yemen promptly denies striking any (italics mine) Saudi land.

That means that Sana’a is subtly declaring, for everyone to understand, that they no longer conduct foreign (italics mine) operations on the three provinces: Jizan, Najran and Asir. They are already – psychologically and operationally – setting the stage to recover their stolen territory.

All that gells into this succint Yemen-based analysis of the deconstruction of the bling-bling House of Saud:

“Yemen is nuking the uber-fragile pillars of the non-oil economy on which the desert Pirates placed all their hopes: Image, (FDI) Investments, Escapism, and Impunity & Invulnerability from terrorism abroad.”

How Pakistan and Iran bypass the IMF

Now pay attention to something quite startling that happened mid-week in Bangkok, during the annual IMF/World Bank meeting – duly greeted by Thai street protests.

The head of Iran’s Central Bank, Abdolnaser Hemmati, met the head of Pakistan’s Central Bank, Jameel Ahmad, on the sidelines of the foremost annual ritual in praise of the U.S. dollar.

Pakistan is under the fierce structural adjustment clutches of the IMF/World Bank – and on top of it threatened with U.S. sanctions because it trades with Iran.

So Pakistan-Iran de facto discussing de-dollarization right inside the lion’s den – the U.S. dollar temple – is beyond priceless.

The infrastructure is in place since 2023 – via a currency swap agreement using the rial and the rupee instead of the U.S. dollar. Barter is managed by both Central Banks, and banking channels run through Bank Melli in Iran and Bank Mellat in Pakistan. Their border markets – at least 6 of them – are booming: physical trade routes completely bypassing the U.S. dollar.

What they were discussing in Bangkok earlier this week is how to expand the whole thing: they couldn’t give a damn to U.S. secondary sanctions. Especially because Tehran is offering Islamabad what the American system simply cannot: sovereignty, no regime change, no austerity, no lecturing and most of all no structural adjustment.

Not to mention that Pakistan badly needs Iranian gas – and China-enabled New Silk Road trade routes.

Iran built a whole economy completely bypassing the IMF – and capable of surviving a tsunami of sanctions, a blockade, and war.

Now Iran and Pakistan are deep into building a post-American financial order in the intersection between West Asia and South Asia – complete with currency swaps, barter trade, booming border markets and appropriate banking channels, making a mockery of secondary sanctions.

By the way, this is happening just as an immense Iranian train, loaded with crude oil – and the first of many – is ready to depart to… China via Central Asia, on the New Silk Road railway built by China.

The coiled cobra may be ready to strike. But the cobra, since times immemorial, also loves to do business.

Former ENRC Chief Executive Says Unresolved Financial Obligations Could Raise Questions About Kazakhstan’s International Business Reputation.

Following his interview with EU Today, Felix Jeff Vulis discusses his outstanding financial claims, his relationship with Kazakhstan and why he intends to bring the matter to the attention of President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev.

For more than three decades, Felix Jeff Vulis has maintained close professional ties with Kazakhstan, a country whose transformation into a major international mining and industrial economy he witnessed firsthand.

His relationship with Kazakhstan began in the 1990s, when he helped introduce the country’s economic potential to American investors. In 2001, he joined Eurasian Natural Resources Corporation (ENRC), eventually becoming Chief Operating Officer and then Chief Executive Officer.

Under his leadership and that of his colleagues, ENRC expanded internationally, listed on the London Stock Exchange in 2007 and entered the FTSE 100, becoming one of Kazakhstan’s most prominent industrial companies.

But the relationship between Vulis and the group that subsequently became Eurasian Resources Group (ERG) has taken a different direction.

In a September interview with EU Today, Vulis described his years at ENRC, the challenges of corporate governance and the impact of the British Serious Fraud Office investigation, which ended in 2023 without charges.

He also raised a question that had remained largely outside public discussion: financial and contractual obligations that he believes ERG and related entities have failed to honor.

The first interview concluded with Vulis maintaining that ending a corporate position would not eliminate previously established financial obligations.

Now, in this proposed continuation, Vulis addresses the outstanding claims more directly and explains why he intends to seek the attention of Kazakhstan’s highest political authorities.

The unresolved financial questions

EU Today: In your previous interview, you spoke about financial obligations that you believe remain outstanding. What exactly are you referring to?

Felix Vulis: Throughout my many years with ENRC, I held significant executive responsibilities and worked under various contractual and financial arrangements.

My position is that certain obligations arising from those arrangements have not been fulfilled. These matters include remuneration and other financial entitlements associated with my professional relationship with the group.

I believe the relevant documentation should be reviewed and the legitimate outstanding obligations settled.

EU Today: Are we talking about a substantial amount of money?

Felix Vulis: I would prefer not to discuss specific figures publicly at this stage. There are financial calculations, contractual documents and correspondence that need to be considered.

This is not simply about a number. It is about respecting agreements and commitments.

EU Today: Has ERG been given an opportunity to resolve these matters privately?

Felix Vulis: My preference has always been to resolve outstanding issues through professional discussions rather than public confrontation.

I believe that an agreement remains possible if the relevant parties are prepared to examine the documentation and engage constructively.

But after so many years, I also believe that unresolved obligations cannot simply remain unanswered indefinitely.

Why the president of Kazakhstan?

EU Today: You have indicated that you intend to bring this matter to the attention of Kazakhstan’s President, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev. Why?

Felix Vulis: Because Kazakhstan is not an ordinary country in my professional life.

My relationship with Kazakhstan began long before I joined ENRC. I have spent decades working with its industries, institutions and people.

I have enormous respect for the country and its economic achievements.

At the same time, the Republic of Kazakhstan is an important shareholder in ERG. I believe that shareholders, particularly those representing a sovereign state, have a legitimate interest in ensuring that companies associated with them respect their financial and contractual commitments.

I intend to inform President Tokayev about my situation and explain why I believe these outstanding obligations deserve attention.

EU Today: Are you asking the President to intervene personally in a private financial dispute?

Felix Vulis: I am not asking the President to act as a judge or to assume responsibility for obligations that legally belong to a corporate entity.

I am asking for attention to a matter that I believe deserves a fair and professional review.

Kazakhstan has worked hard to establish itself as a reliable destination for international investment. That reputation depends, among other things, on confidence that legitimate business commitments will be respected.

EU Today: Do you believe the matter could damage Kazakhstan’s international reputation?

Felix Vulis: I sincerely hope it does not.

Under President Tokayev, Kazakhstan has made important efforts to strengthen its international standing, attract foreign investment and build confidence among its economic partners.

I recognize and appreciate those efforts.

However, when a former chief executive of one of the country’s most internationally recognized industrial groups raises unresolved financial claims, questions can arise about corporate governance and the treatment of contractual obligations.

I believe the best way to avoid unnecessary reputational questions is to examine the matter fairly and resolve legitimate claims.

The international dimension

EU Today: You are an American citizen. Could this matter also be raised in the United States or Europe?

Felix Vulis: As an American citizen, I have the right to protect my legitimate financial and contractual interests through the appropriate legal channels.

If a reasonable settlement cannot be reached, I intend to explore every lawful avenue available to me, including bringing the matter to the attention of relevant European institutions in Brussels and appropriate authorities in the United States.

That may include the US Department of State and the US Department of the Treasury, where there is a relevant basis for doing so.

I would much prefer that such steps prove unnecessary.

EU Today: Would you also approach European political institutions?

Felix Vulis: I reserve the right to raise the matter with appropriate European institutions, including the European Council, through lawful procedures and established channels.

My objective would be to explain my position and seek appropriate consideration, not to turn a private commercial matter into an international political confrontation.

EU Today: Some people might interpret these statements as pressure on ERG. How would you respond?

Felix Vulis: I am simply explaining the options that may be available to someone seeking to protect his contractual rights.

I have no interest in harming Kazakhstan or creating unnecessary difficulties for its international partners.

But I also do not believe that a person should be expected to abandon legitimate financial claims simply because the other party is a large and influential corporation.

Kazakhstan beyond ERG

EU Today: Has this experience changed your opinion of Kazakhstan as a place to do business?

Felix Vulis: No. My respect for Kazakhstan remains unchanged.

I still believe it has extraordinary economic potential, particularly in mining, critical minerals, energy, infrastructure and industrial development.

Its strategic position between Europe and Asia creates opportunities that extend far beyond the extraction of natural resources.

The country has the industrial experience, human capital and geographic advantages necessary to attract significant long-term investment.

That is precisely why I believe questions of contractual reliability and corporate governance matter so much.

EU Today: What message would you like President Tokayev to take from your letter?

Felix Vulis: That I remain a friend of Kazakhstan.

I am proud of the work we accomplished there, and I appreciate the efforts of the President to strengthen the country’s international credibility.

I hope the relevant parties will examine my claims seriously and help facilitate a fair resolution within the appropriate corporate and legal framework.

The strongest message Kazakhstan can send to international investors is that legitimate commitments are respected and contractual obligations are fulfilled.

The final question

EU Today: What would you say directly to ERG’s leadership today?

Felix Vulis: I would say that there is still an opportunity to resolve these matters professionally.

We have a long shared history. I spent an important part of my life helping build this company into an internationally recognized industrial group.

I would prefer to conclude our outstanding business through dialogue, mutual respect and fulfillment of legitimate obligations.

But I also intend to protect my rights.

I believe the responsible course is to sit down, review the facts, address the outstanding financial questions and reach a fair conclusion.

EU Today: What would you say to your former employees in Kazakhstan?

Felix Vulis: Thank you.

People sometimes talk about corporations as if corporations build factories.

They don’t.

People build factories.

People operate furnaces. People go underground. People run power stations. Engineers solve problems at three in the morning.

Whatever disagreements exist today cannot erase what those people accomplished.

I remain extremely proud of having worked with them.

EU Today: After years of silence, why should ERG believe that this time is different?

Felix Vulis: Because I am speaking now.

For years I chose discretion.

That was a conscious choice, not an inability to speak.

I continue to believe that a negotiated solution is better for everybody: for me, for ERG, for its shareholders and for everyone associated with our shared history.

But negotiation requires two sides.

EU Today: What exactly do you want?

Felix Vulis: A table.

The appropriate representatives.

The documents.

A serious discussion about everything that remains outstanding.

And then a comprehensive settlement that allows everybody to close this chapter.

EU Today: An apology?

Felix Vulis: No.

A solution.

EU Today: Revenge?

Felix Vulis: Absolutely not.

Revenge is emotional.

This is business.

EU Today: And if ERG refuses?

Felix Vulis: Then I will continue to defend my rights through every lawful mechanism available to me.

And where I am legally entitled to speak about my own experience, I reserve the right to do so.

EU Today: Is that a threat?

Felix Vulis: No.

It is clarity.

There is still an opportunity to resolve this privately and professionally.

I would prefer that.

After more than twenty years of shared history, I think sitting around a table is a much more intelligent ending than spending the next several years sitting opposite each other in courtrooms.

EU Today: If the people running ERG read only one sentence from this interview, what should it be?

Felix Vulis: Call me.

Let’s sit down and finish this properly.

Highlighting stories by Melanie Challenger, Eve Livingston, M.R. O’Connor, Gordon Peake, and Blair Braverman.

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio heads to Uzbekistan this weekend for talks with five Central Asian countries as the Trump administration seeks to strengthen commercial ties and expand Washington's strategic presence in the region.

By Muhammad Hamid ad-Din – New Eastern Outlook – October 15, 2026

The Gaza Ceasefire Is Falling Apart. And So Is the American Plan to Expand the Abraham Accords.

The Gaza Ceasefire That Is Killing Palestinians

The ceasefire in Gaza, which took effect on October 10, 2025, was supposed to stop a two-year war. By then, according to Palestinian authorities, more than 72,000 Palestinians had been killed. A year after the document was signed, the picture was no more peaceful. According to Palestinian sources, from the start of the ceasefire to October 5, 2026, Israeli forces killed 1,460 Palestinians and wounded 5,116. By September 2026, Gaza authorities reported 5,147 violations of the agreement, 1,421 dead, and the destruction of more than 201,000 buildings.

The second phase of negotiations—the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the enclave and the disarmament of Palestinian factions—stalled almost immediately. In April 2026, American-Egyptian talks in Cairo ended “without tangible progress.” Hamas links disarmament to the end of the occupation. Israel demands disarmament as a precondition for any further step. Critics say the demand for disarmament has become a pretext for maintaining control over the enclave and continuing violations. The Palestinian Foreign Ministry put it bluntly: the occupation government “does not view peace as a goal, but as an obstacle.”

Diktat Instead of Diplomacy

Against this backdrop, the Trump administration is forcing the expansion of the Abraham Accords. In May 2026, the U.S. president publicly demanded that Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Pakistan, Egypt, Jordan, and Turkey join the accords. He called it “mandatory”: “After all the work done by the United States to put this complex puzzle together, it must be mandatory for all these countries to at least simultaneously sign the Abraham Accords.” Pakistan publicly refused. The others remained silent.

Washington’s main interest is Saudi Arabia. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman said at the White House in November 2025: “We want to be part of the Abraham Accords. But we also want to be sure that we secure a clear path to a two-state solution.” Later, Riyadh repeated: normalization is impossible without a “credible, irreversible, and time-bound path” to a Palestinian state. The Israeli government rejects this prospect. American pressure goes beyond diplomacy: Trump tied the Abraham Accords to negotiations to end the war with Iran, effectively making normalization a condition for peace. According to Axios, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Pakistan were “caught by surprise.”

Mutual Influence: Gaza as Leverage and as an Obstacle

Gaza and the reshaping of alliances are directly connected. The Palestinian question became leverage in Arab states’ bargaining with Washington. For Saudi Arabia, normalization with Israel without movement toward a Palestinian state is politically toxic. Riyadh is using the fragile ceasefire to postpone an unpopular step. Qatar, a key mediator, took an equally tough position. Qatari Foreign Ministry spokesman Majid al-Ansari said: “If the Palestinian question remains unresolved, joining the Abraham Accords is impossible.” According to him, the absence of a peace process for Palestinians means the absence of stability in the region. Doha, which has given refuge to Hamas’s political leadership and plays a central role in the talks, cannot move toward normalization without losing face.

There is also a reverse dependency. The Trump administration, seeking to expand the Abraham Accords, pressured Israel to secure a ceasefire: normalization without a ceasefire would have been impossible. But the second phase depends on whether Washington is willing to pressure Israel, not just Arab capitals.

Bombs Instead of Peace

The result of U.S. and Israeli policy looks increasingly contradictory. Three years of war, more than 74,250 dead Palestinians, and 1,460 killed after the ceasefire was signed are not just a humanitarian catastrophe. They are a verdict on America’s strategy in the Middle East. Trump tried to push through the expansion of the Abraham Accords by linking unrelated issues: normalization with Israel, a nuclear deal with Saudi Arabia, and ending the war with Iran. In July 2026, he stated directly that a U.S.-Saudi civil nuclear agreement “will depend entirely on Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords.” Saudi Arabia responded in May 2026: “There will be no normalization without a clear and final path to the creation of an independent Palestinian state.” As the custodian of the two holy mosques, the kingdom cannot afford to do otherwise. Qatar refused. Pakistan publicly rejected it. Egypt, Jordan, and Turkey remained silent.

Criticism of Washington goes far beyond diplomatic missteps. The U.S. continues to supply Israel with weapons despite ceasefire violations. In September 2026, the Trump administration proposed a $2.8 billion deal to sell Israel 40,000 heavy bombs, including 20,000 MK-84s and 20,000 BLU-117s. Senator Chris Van Hollen vowed to block the transfer: “Trump is sending $2.8 billion worth of bombs, paid for by you, the American taxpayers, to a government led by a wanted war criminal.” Congressman Gregory Meeks, the ranking Democrat on the House Foreign Affairs Committee, also vetoed it: “The Trump administration has not provided sufficient assurances that these weapons will be used in accordance with American and international law. Therefore, I will not approve this sale.” Amnesty International urged Congress to block the deliveries, saying the U.S. risks becoming complicit in serious violations of international law, including genocide. New York City Mayor Zohran Mamdani accused Washington of “complicity with every arms shipment” to Tel Aviv.

What Next: The Results of U.S. and Israeli Policy Against the Arab Region

Washington’s paradox is that it wants to expand the Abraham Accords but continues to support the Israeli occupation, which makes normalization politically impossible for Arab states. The U.S. has blocked UN Security Council ceasefire resolutions for the third time in a row, undermining its role as a “reliable mediator.” Public opinion in the Arab world is sharply opposed to normalization. Polls show that 89% of Moroccans oppose recognizing Israel. Analysts warn that for most of the named states, the political price of signing the accords will be prohibitive. The war in Gaza has strengthened this sentiment, not weakened it.

The main question is whether the ceasefire will hold. If the second phase of negotiations does not start and the death toll continues to rise, expansion of the Abraham Accords will remain an unattainable dream. Saudi Arabia will wait. Qatar will mediate. The UAE will increase oil production. Trump will face a choice: keep pressuring Arab capitals or admit that without a real Palestinian state, the accords will remain a facade. While Washington supplies bombs and Tel Aviv keeps killing, talk of peace looks like a cynical game in which Palestinians are not subjects but a bargaining chip.

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Muhammad Hamid ad-Din is a well-known Palestinian journalist.

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Written by Ahmed Adel, Cairo-based geopolitics and political economy researcher

Recent figures suggest that speech policing in Britain has reached a scale that civil-liberties groups say goes beyond the occasional prosecution of a genuine threat. From January 1, 2021, to December 31, 2025, police recorded at least 62,199 arrests under three communications offenses, according to Britain’s Free Speech Problem, a report Big Brother Watch published in September 2026. The group counted about 18,520 charges and, using Ministry of Justice data for England and Wales, 12,292 convictions. By those figures, roughly one in five arrests results in a conviction.

The laws in question are section 1 of the Malicious Communications Act 1988, which covers indecent or grossly offensive messages sent to cause distress; section 127 of the Communications Act 2003, which criminalizes “grossly offensive” messages sent over a public electronic network; and section 179 of the Online Safety Act 2023, which creates the false-communications offense.

Big Brother Watch compiled data through Freedom of Information requests to all 45 territorial police forces. Several forces returned no data or only partial data. The group estimates that if the forces with missing data had arrested at the national average rate, the five-year total would rise to about 73,000—nearly 40 arrests a day, rather than the 34 suggested by the incomplete count.

Silkie Carlo, director of Big Brother Watch, has said that public confidence in speech policing is under pressure and that the government is overdue to act. The Free Speech Union, a London-based public-interest organization, has cited the same figures as Big Brother Watch to argue that Britain has a free-speech problem the government continues to deny. Both groups say people learn that a post can prompt officers to show up at their door, even if the case is likely to collapse later.

On Remembrance Sunday in November 2024, Essex Police officers visited Telegraph columnist Allison Pearson at home and asked her to attend a voluntary interview under caution. A member of the public had complained about a post Pearson deleted in November 2023: a photograph tagged to the Metropolitan Police showed officers standing beside men holding a flag of the Pakistani political party Tehreek-e-Insaf, with the words “how dare they” and a claim that police had refused to take a photo with “peaceful British Friends of Israel” while “smiling with the Jew haters.”

Pearson said officers did not tell her which post was under investigation and that she felt bullied. Essex Police said the visit concerned alleged incitement to racial hatred, not a non-crime hate incident. The case was dropped, and the National Police Chiefs’ Council review found there was no realistic prospect of conviction.

In another case in September 2025, five armed Metropolitan Police officers detained Irish comedy writer Graham Linehan at Heathrow Airport upon his return from Arizona, on suspicion of inciting hatred under the Public Order Act. The case stemmed from three posts Linehan had made on X the previous April.

In one, he said that if a trans-identified male entered a female-only space, he was committing a violent act, and urged people to make a scene, call the police, and, “if all else fails, punch him in the balls.” Another post described an image of a protest as “a photo you can smell.” In a third, he wrote, “I hate them,” referring to “misogynists and homophobes.”

Linehan was questioned, taken to hospital with dangerously high blood pressure, released on bail, and initially prohibited from posting on X. Backed by the Free Speech Union, he sued for wrongful arrest. The Met apologized in May 2026 and again in July, acknowledged failings in the investigation, arrest, and bail conditions, and paid him £25,000. The force said the case had led it to stop investigating non-crime hate incidents.

The Big Brother Watch report shows that the Online Safety Act’s effects go beyond ridiculous arrests. Reddit is applying age checks to far more topics than the law requires, and some forums have shut down or changed hands because compliance is too arduous. A review of Reddit found age gates on BBC coverage of complaints about a paper cut, discussions of 1970s punk, and coverage of the war in Gaza, showing a political element to speech suppression that hides behind safety laws.

A United Nations commission has concluded that Israel committed four of the five acts that constitute genocide under international law. Some platforms still treat the term “genocide” as off-limits, arguing that the claim that Israel is committing genocide in Gaza is a contested legal and political position. But the claim is not, by itself, hate speech or antisemitism. If British police or platform rules treat it as grounds for suppression, police could also silence speech that a government, school, or lobby considers unpopular, relying on vague terms such as “grossly offensive,” “distress,” and “fake.”

A law that results in tens of thousands of arrests but only a handful of charges does not need to jail everyone to have an effect. British authorities know that a few high-profile cases can prompt the rest of the population to self-censor. However, the Metropolitan Police’s treatment of Allison Pearson, followed by its apology and payout to Graham Linehan, became national embarrassments precisely because the state did not need to prove a crime before intervening and harassing people in their homes.

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Large-scale protests broke out in different parts of Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) province on Monday, October 12, after the federal government dismissed its elected government and imposed the centralized Governor’s rule.

The federal government also declared an emergency in 12 out of 40 of KP’s districts, citing a law-and-order situation. The imposition of the emergency under article 232 of Pakistan’s constitution means the suspension of citizen’s fundamental rights.

Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) which was ruling the KP government, called the dismissal of its government a “direct assault on the democratic mandate of the people.” PTI is currently leading a large march to Pakistan’s capital, Islamabad, demanding the release of its jailed leader and former prime minister, Imran Khan,

Several of its leaders and activists protested the federal government’s decision in different parts of the province on Monday and Tuesday, despite the repression unleashed by security forces.

The federal government has deployed the armed forces in large numbers across the province, closed down all the educational institutions and blocked all access routes to the capital Peshawar with shipping containers in order to prevent large protests.

Chief Minister Sohail Afridi was also arrested on Monday, along with several of the elected members of the provincial legislative council, with PTI claiming his whereabouts were unknown.

Afridi, who was leading the march to Islamabad since October 4, had, on Saturday, dared the federal government to dismiss his government, claiming the imposition of federal rule by dismissing “the only truly elected government” in the country would be a brutal repression of popular will.

The PTI has called for large-scale protests against the move in the coming days. It has also filed a petition demanding the revocation of the Governor’s rule and production of its elected members, arrested since Sunday.

“Unpardonable crime“

Reacting to the dismissal of the PTI government, Ammar Ali Jan, leader of the leftwing Haqooq-e-Khalq Party (HKP) called it “one of the darkest chapters” in the country’s history.

“All those responsible, including the PMLN [Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz, the ruling party], PPP [Pakistan Peoples Party, part of the ruling coalition] & the establishment [the Army] have committed an unpardonable crime against our people,” Ali Jan said, asking people to “revolt against this tyranny.”

Several other groups and parties opposed the federal government’s move, calling it an attack on people’s basic rights.

HKP called it a brazen disregard for the will of the people which will further increase the gap between the people and the government “in the midst of unprecedented security, economic and regional challenges” faced by Pakistan.

The left-wing Mazdoor Kisan Party (MKP) and Awami Workers’ Party-Marxist also opposed the move, calling it an example of authoritarianism. The MKP dismissed the justification about the PTI government’s failure to maintain law and order and curb terrorism as just excuses to undermine the popular mandate.

The federal government, led by Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif of the PMLN, has long accused the KP government of failing to secure law and order in the province, citing rising cases of “terrorist attacks.”

It claimed the PTI-led government has “deliberately disengaged with the fight against terrorism” as justification for its dismissal on Sunday.

Pakistan’s Information Minister Attaullah Tarar also claimed on Monday that the move has been welcomed by the people of KP as the PTI government was sympathetic and even supportive to “terrorist” groups.

The dismissal of the PTI government in KP is largely seen as a result of the persistent political tensions between the PTI and the ruling coalition.

The PTI is the largest opposition party in the country’s National Assembly. Khan, despite being in prison for the last three years, still has a large popular following.

Khan and the PTI have maintained that the ruling coalition, in collaboration with the country’s armed forces, conspired and rigged the 2024 elections to deprive them of power after Khan spoke against the latter’s interference in the democratic governance.

The PTI was denied its symbol during the national elections, forcing it to run its candidates as independents, while Khan was disqualified to contest in the elections and denied permissions to campaign. He was put in prison and charged with scores of cases related to corruption, misuse of power, and violence.

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Le 26 juillet 2025, à Pabianice, Donald Tusk annonçait qu'il fallait se préparer à un affrontement majeur avec la Russie dès 2027 (Blue News, d'après PAP). Le 5 novembre, devant le Sénat, le chef d'état-major des armées, le général Fabien Mandon, demandait de « se préparer à un choc d'ici trois, quatre ans » (Public Sénat). Le 11 décembre, à Berlin, Mark Rutte, secrétaire général de l'OTAN, était plus net encore : « Nous sommes la prochaine cible de la Russie », qui « pourrait être prête à employer la force militaire contre l'OTAN d'ici cinq ans » (Anadolu). En juin dernier, l'inspecteur général de l'armée allemande assurait que les trente-deux alliés s'accordaient sur une date : 2029 (National Security Journal).

Hier, à Varsovie, le commandant suprême des forces alliées en Europe a présenté publiquement le plan par lequel l'Alliance briserait une invasion russe. En quinze mois, la guerre avec la Russie a reçu un calendrier. Elle a désormais un plan de bataille.

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Le calendrier des avertissements

Ces avertissements ne viennent pas de nulle part, et il faut commencer par le reconnaître. La Russie a tiré près de deux mille missiles balistiques sur l'Ukraine cette année, selon le commissaire européen à la défense (EU Perspectives). Des drones ont franchi l'espace aérien polonais et roumain. Des sabotages ont été signalés en Estonie et en Allemagne, que Moscou dément.

Le 24 septembre, le service de renseignement militaire danois, le FE, a publié l'évaluation la plus précise du lot. Il prévoit une escalade de la guerre hybride « dans les mois qui viennent » et juge « faible mais croissant » le risque d'une attaque militaire limitée contre un pays de l'OTAN voisin de la Russie : frappes isolées à longue portée contre des infrastructures qui servent à soutenir l'Ukraine, attaque sous faux drapeau avec des drones de fabrication ukrainienne, petites unités sans insignes franchissant une frontière (Nordic Defence Sector).

Le même service ajoute qu'il ne voit aucun signe de préparation d'une invasion, laquelle demanderait au moins six mois. Mark Rutte lui-même a reconnu, début octobre, qu'aucun élément ne laissait présager une invasion conventionnelle imminente (Business AM). Le général Grynkewich ne juge le conflit « ni imminent ni inévitable ».

Pouvoir n'est pas vouloir

Toute la difficulté tient dans un verbe. Les évaluations sérieuses parlent de ce que la Russie pourra faire en 2029. Le discours public dit ce qu'elle va faire. Le passage de l'un à l'autre ne se fait dans aucun rapport ; il se fait à la tribune, entre la note des services et la phrase du ministre. On ne prépare pas un budget de défense avec un conditionnel.

Je ne soupçonne personne de mentir. Une capacité qui se reconstitue est une menace réelle, et un gouvernement qui ne s'y préparerait pas manquerait à son premier devoir. Mais une date annoncée à voix haute produit des effets que la prudence aurait dû peser. Elle fixe un horizon aux budgets : être prêt en 2030, dit l'Union. Elle en fixe un aussi à l'adversaire. Si l'Europe sera prête en 2030, celui qui veut l'éprouver sait qu'il a intérêt à le faire avant. En 1914, l'état-major allemand raisonnait exactement ainsi devant le réarmement russe annoncé pour 1917. La prophétie d'une guerre à date fixe travaille à se réaliser.

Ce que prévoit la riposte

Le plan présenté hier tient en trois verbes : bloquer l'invasion au point d'attaque, l'émousser par les drones et les capteurs, puis la briser en frappant « tout ce qui soutient, alimente et commande cette force » (Stars and Stripes). Il est présenté comme défensif, et il l'est dans son déclenchement : rien ne bouge avant une attaque.

C'est la troisième phase qui change la nature de l'affaire. Selon Meduza, elle prévoit des missiles à longue portée contre les postes de commandement et les défenses aériennes russes de la région de Kaliningrad, des environs de Saint-Pétersbourg et de Biélorussie. Il s'agit du territoire russe. Or la doctrine nucléaire russe, révisée en novembre 2024, admet l'emploi de l'arme en cas de « menace critique » contre la souveraineté ou l'intégrité territoriale de la Russie ou de la Biélorussie, et range parmi les situations dangereuses l'isolement d'une partie de son territoire (Carnegie). Kaliningrad est une enclave. Le plan de l'OTAN vise précisément les lieux que la doctrine adverse a désignés comme intolérables.

Il faut y ajouter un mot prononcé à Bruxelles. En décembre 2025, l'amiral Giuseppe Cavo Dragone, qui préside le comité militaire de l'Alliance, envisageait qu'une « frappe préemptive » puisse être tenue pour une « action défensive » face aux attaques hybrides, tout en concédant que l'idée s'écartait « de notre façon normale de penser » (Kyiv Independent, d'après le Financial Times). La préemption frappe une attaque imminente. La prévention frappe une menace future, et la Charte des Nations unies l'interdit. Dans la guerre hybride, où personne ne sait dire le jour où une invasion commence, la frontière entre les deux tient à l'appréciation d'un état-major.

Le scénario qui devrait inquiéter

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The imposition of emergency rule in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, an opposition-controlled province, raises disturbing questions about the relationship between Pakistan’s civilian government and its powerful military establishment. Is this a legitimate response to terrorism, or another calculated assault on democracy?

There is an old saying in Pakistan that most countries have an army, but in Pakistan the army has a country. It is a cynical observation, certainly, but one that has survived successive governments, constitutional crises and military interventions with remarkable durability.

The latest developments in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the northwestern province governed by the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) party of imprisoned former Prime Minister Imran Khan, suggest that the observation may be as relevant today as ever.

President Asif Ali Zardari’s decision to impose emergency rule in the province, ostensibly in response to deteriorating security conditions, has prompted an obvious and deeply uncomfortable question: is Pakistan witnessing another military coup, albeit one conducted without tanks surrounding parliament or generals appearing on television to announce the suspension of democracy?

The answer depends largely upon how one defines a coup.

A constitutional manoeuvre with political consequences

Under Pakistan’s constitutional framework, federal authorities possess emergency powers that can, under specified circumstances, override provincial administrations.

Such powers are not inherently illegitimate. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa has experienced serious violence involving the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), and the federal government has a responsibility to protect citizens against terrorist attacks.

Nevertheless, the timing of the intervention demands scrutiny.

The province represents one of the most significant remaining political strongholds of Imran Khan, whose imprisonment and continuing confrontation with Pakistan’s political establishment have generated considerable unrest.

Suspending an elected provincial administration in these circumstances inevitably raises suspicions that national security has become a convenient instrument for achieving political objectives.

The crucial distinction is between responding to a genuine emergency and exploiting that emergency to neutralise an inconvenient opposition.

Pakistan’s authorities must demonstrate not merely that a security threat exists, but that the removal of elected provincial leadership is necessary and proportionate.

The army that never really left politics

Pakistan’s military has exercised an extraordinary degree of influence over the country’s political development since independence in 1947.

General Ayub Khan seized power in 1958. General Zia-ul-Haq overthrew Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s government in 1977. General Pervez Musharraf removed Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in 1999.

These were unmistakable military coups, involving direct intervention against civilian authority.

Yet Pakistan’s experience also demonstrates that generals need not formally assume the presidency to dominate political affairs. The military establishment has long maintained substantial influence over national security, relations with India, Afghanistan policy and, at various moments, the composition and survival of civilian governments.

Under Field Marshal Asim Munir, the relationship between the armed forces and civilian political authority has again attracted intense scrutiny. The central question is therefore not simply whether Pakistan’s generals have seized power. It is whether elected politicians retain sufficient independence to exercise it.

Imran Khan and the price of political defiance

Imran Khan’s political trajectory illustrates the extraordinary volatility of Pakistan’s relationship between civilian leadership and military power.

Once widely regarded as enjoying the establishment’s favour, Khan subsequently became one of its most prominent critics. His removal through a parliamentary no-confidence vote in April 2022 marked the beginning of an increasingly bitter confrontation.

His subsequent imprisonment, the prosecution of PTI figures and restrictions affecting the party’s political activities have fuelled allegations that Pakistan’s democratic institutions are being manipulated to exclude a popular opposition movement.

The authorities reject accusations of politically motivated persecution, while Khan’s supporters insist that his treatment demonstrates the extent to which democratic competition has been compromised.

Against this background, emergency intervention in a PTI-governed province cannot reasonably be viewed in isolation. It forms part of a wider struggle over who ultimately controls Pakistan’s political future.

A coup without the traditional trappings?

The latest emergency is particularly significant because Pakistan’s civilian government and military leadership appear aligned in their criticism of PTI.

According to Reuters reporting on 11 October, the province will be administered by a governor for an initial six months, with troops deployed to support security operations.

Hundreds of activists and three of Khan’s sisters have reportedly been detained ahead of opposition demonstrations.

PTI spokesperson Zulfikar Bukhari has characterised the emergency as a disguised coup. Even Maulana Fazlur Rehman, whose party has been involved in mediation efforts, condemned the intervention as an attack on democracy.

Yet evidence that the military directly ordered the takeover remains absent from the public record. Accusations of military involvement should be investigated rather than treated as established fact.

Nevertheless, a coup need not always involve soldiers removing a prime minister. Democratic institutions can also be progressively hollowed out through ostensibly lawful decisions that concentrate authority and deprive opposition parties of meaningful power.

A dangerous precedent for Pakistan

For Pakistan’s international partners, including the European Union, the implications extend beyond an internal constitutional dispute.

Pakistan benefits from preferential access to European markets under the EU’s GSP+ trading arrangement, which is linked to commitments concerning human rights, democratic governance and international conventions. Brussels should therefore be watching developments closely.

If emergency powers become a mechanism for suppressing political opposition rather than protecting public security, the European Commission will face legitimate questions about Pakistan’s adherence to its international obligations.

The immediate crisis may not constitute a conventional military coup. But the more troubling possibility is that Pakistan’s political system is evolving towards a form of government in which elections continue, civilian politicians remain in office, and the military’s influence is sufficiently powerful to determine the boundaries of democracy.

For Imran Khan‘s supporters, that distinction may offer little consolation.

Pakistan’s generals have seized power openly before. The question now is whether they need to do so again.

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