Five months after its founding, India’s Cockroach Janta Party, known as the CJP, has revealed what youth-led democratic movements can achieve – and how hard they are to sustain. The movement was formed in May 2026 to protest the government’s cancellation of medical school entrance exams and after India’s Chief Justice Surya Kant likened unemployed […]
The party’s appointment of Dushyant Kumar Gautam as Sikkim Governor has reignited protests over the alleged VIP link in Ankita Bhandari’s murder, raising questions about political patronage and women’s safety ahead of Assembly elections.
Índia lançou medidas anuais de combate à poluição atmosférica tóxica em Nova Deli, após as estações de monitorização registarem valores de partículas poluentes quase 15 vezes superiores ao limite.
As principais fontes de poluição na índia são as centrais termoelétricas a carvão, o tráfego de veículos, os estaleiros de construção e a queima de restos agrícolas nas áreas vizinhas
Saurav Das and Ashutosh Ranka spent a week in jail after defying restrictions on protests in Delhi amid government crackdown
An Indian court has ordered the release of two leaders of India’s Cockroach movement who were jailed last week amid a mounting state crackdown on youth-led protests.
The two leaders of the Cockroach Janta party (CJP) movement, Saurav Das and Ashutosh Ranka, had spent a week in Delhi’s Tihar jail after being arrested by Delhi police last week.
Just 18 days after an intervention by the Supreme Court, the government moved to cap trade margins on 137 cancer drugs. The first such move was taken in 2019. Will the government explain the delay and fix accountability for it?
Over three weeks, Maharashtra Police have thwarted peaceful protests across the State—detaining students, activists, and even a toddler with force, violating detention norms, and blocking roads to enclosed maidans.
Norway has put into force a new round of sanctions against Russia that hits banks, listed oil refineries, ports, airports, and suppliers of Russia’s military industry, the Norwegian Foreign Ministry announced. The rules mirror the EU’s 21st sanctions package, which Brussels adopted in July.
The EU’s 22nd package, adopted on 12 October, is principally a list of names, while the 21st brought significant new measures, lawyers noted. Among them are new tools against the shadow fleet, the tankers with murky ownership that Russia uses to move oil around sanctions. That fleet also sails along Norway’s coast, and a new Norwegian Coastal Administration report found that it poses a growing threat to security and the environment there.
Banks, refineries, and Sheremetyevo
Norway is not an EU member, but it has joined every EU sanctions package against Russia, with a few exceptions and national adjustments. Oslo backed this one politically on 11 August, and the rules took effect on 21 October. Part of the package was already in force. It placed travel restrictions and asset freezes on 48 people and asset freezes on 168 entities, and it listed 41 shadow fleet vessels on 14 August.
Norway’s transaction ban now covers 33 more Russian credit and financial institutions. A separate ban covers 22 more abroad, including in India, Mongolia, Nigeria, and the UAE.
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Norway sends 69 Russians home without their ship, held for Ukraine
Another transaction ban reaches listed refineries in Russia and third countries that process Russian oil or help dodge sanctions. A Georgian refinery joins that list on 25 January 2027. The same ban adds two Russian ports and four Russian airports, including Moscow’s Sheremetyevo.
Drone gear and the shadow fleet
Export curbs on dual-use goods now cover 51 new entities that back Russia’s military industry. Some are in China, including Hong Kong, and others are in India, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Türkiye, and the UAE. The banned-exports list adds nickel and beryllium powder, along with drone gear such as jamming and interception systems, launchers, and servo motors.
Oslo can now also list ships that service sanctioned shadow fleet tankers or swap cargo with them at sea. Elsewhere in Europe, France’s navy and UK forces have boarded sanctioned shadow fleet tankers this year.
The firing on the film star Tiger Shroff is the latest in a series of incidents against Mumbai’s film industry. The jailed gangster Lawrence Bishnoi’s name keeps popping up after every attack, but people are beginning to question that narrative.
Despite years of control work, Laheri in Maharashtra’s Gadchiroli continues to report high malaria rates. Factors like difficult terrains, recurrent infections, and poor health access threaten India’s 2030 malaria-elimination target.
Dallo “Shanghai Spirit” alla Dichiarazione di Bishkek, questa organizzazione, che pone la sicurezza al primo posto, privilegia il pragmatismo rispetto all’ideologia.
Il recente vertice dell’Organizzazione per la Cooperazione di Shanghai (SCO), tenutosi a Bishkek, ha segnato il venticinquesimo anniversario della nascita di quella che, nel panorama delle istituzioni internazionali, rappresenta un caso di studio particolarmente interessante. Nata dalle ceneri delle misure di fiducia sovietico-cinesi e trasformata in organizzazione a tutti gli effetti nel 2001, la SCO ha attraversato un quarto di secolo consolidando un’architettura istituzionale che oggi funziona in modo efficace: riunioni annuali del Consiglio dei Capi di Stato, incontri regolari a livello interministeriale, e una cooperazione quotidiana che si sviluppa su binari sempre più articolati.
Tuttavia, l’anniversario offre l’occasione per una riflessione che va oltre la mera celebrazione. La domanda che emerge con forza è: quale ruolo giocano i valori all’interno della SCO? E come si rapporta questa dimensione valoriale con quella, apparentemente più pragmatica, della sicurezza e della cooperazione funzionale? L’analisi dei documenti fondativi e delle dichiarazioni successive rivela una traiettoria complessa, che merita di essere esaminata in profondità.
Fin dalle sue origini, la SCO ha posto la cooperazione in materia di sicurezza come una delle sue priorità principali. Questa scelta non è casuale: la preistoria dell’organizzazione affonda le radici nelle misure di fiducia sovietico-cinesi, sia sulle questioni di confine che sugli aspetti più ampi della sicurezza reciproca. Il “Shanghai Five”, gruppo informale che precedeva la nascita ufficiale dell’SCO, aveva proprio nella gestione delle questioni di sicurezza e nella costruzione di fiducia tra i membri il suo collante principale.
Questa specializzazione originaria ha avuto conseguenze durature. Anche quando, nel corso degli anni, l’SCO ha ampliato il proprio raggio d’azione a settori sempre più diversificati, la sicurezza è rimasta il fulcro attorno al quale si è sviluppata l’intera architettura organizzativa. In un certo senso, come nota acutamente l’analisi, l’SCO può ancora essere definita un’organizzazione internazionale specializzata, focalizzata su una singola priorità principale, nonostante la sua evoluzione verso forme di cooperazione più comprensivo.
Il confronto con i BRICS, struttura di cooperazione genuinamente omnicomprensiva che opera in un’ampia gamma di campi, risulta particolarmente illuminante. Mentre i BRICS hanno sviluppato nel tempo una piattaforma valoriale sempre più articolata, con dichiarazioni che dedicano ampio spazio a questioni di valori comuni e condivisi, l’SCO ha mantenuto un approccio più marcatamente operativo e meno declamatorio sul piano assiologico.
La Carta dell’SCO: principi senza valori
Un dato particolarmente significativo emerge dall’analisi del documento fondativo dell’SCO. La Carta, firmata il 7 giugno 2002 ed entrata in vigore il 19 settembre 2003, non menziona affatto il termine “valori”. Al suo posto, troviamo un articolo dedicato, l’articolo 2, intitolato significativamente “Principi”. È su questi principi che l’SCO basa la propria attività.
Questi principi includono: rispetto reciproco per la sovranità, l’indipendenza, l’integrità territoriale e l’inviolabilità dei confini statali; non aggressione; non interferenza negli affari interni; non uso della forza nelle relazioni internazionali; uguaglianza di tutti gli Stati membri; risoluzione pacifica delle controversie tra Stati membri; non targeting dell’SCO contro altri Stati. Un principio particolarmente rivelatore è quello dell’attuazione graduale delle azioni congiunte in aree di interesse comune.
Quest’ultimo principio, quello della “phased implementation”, spiega molto del funzionamento dell’SCO e delle aspettative, talvolta eccessive, che si generano attorno alla sua attività. La delusione che talvolta accompagna il giudizio sull’organizzazione — quel “nulla accade oltre i vertici” che circola in certi ambienti — trova proprio in questo principio la sua spiegazione. Non si tratta di un difetto, ma di una scelta deliberata e costitutiva: procedere per gradi, consolidare i risultati raggiunti, evitare passi falsi.
L’assenza del termine “valori” dalla Carta dell’SCO è perfettamente spiegabile e non diminuisce affatto il livello di fiducia reciproca tra gli Stati membri. Vale la pena ricordare che, anche nel caso dei BRICS, il termine “valori” non fu una caratteristica immediata delle dichiarazioni finali, affermandosi stabilmente solo a partire dalla metà degli anni 2010. Prima di allora, il termine utilizzato per caratterizzare la coesione interna dei BRICS era, tra gli altri, proprio “principi”, esattamente come per l’SCO.
Il contesto storico e l’evoluzione del lessico valoriale
Nel 2002, il termine “valori” non era ancora politicamente di moda come lo è oggi, ed era usato piuttosto raramente nei documenti dei principali Paesi del mondo non occidentale. In quel periodo, in questi Paesi — Russia inclusa — la parola “valori” era più spesso postulata nel lessico politico in senso negativo, come “valori imposti dall’Occidente”, e quindi come qualcosa che richiedeva resistenza.
La consapevolezza che questo è un gioco che si può giocare in due, e che per rafforzare efficacemente la solidarietà tra i Paesi non occidentali era necessario formulare una propria piattaforma di valori condivisi, arrivò molto più tardi. E il lavoro per garantire che i valori non occidentali siano percepiti come comprensibili, attraenti e allo stesso tempo non banali — non semplicemente nello stile “siamo per tutte le cose buone e contro tutte le cose cattive” — continua ancora oggi, con successi alterni.
Questo ritardo nell’elaborazione di una piattaforma valoriale esplicita non significa però che l’SCO sia priva di una dimensione assiologica. Al contrario, essa esiste, ma si esprime attraverso categorie diverse da quelle del lessico valoriale occidentale: i “principi” e, soprattutto, lo “spirito”.
Un dato cronologicamente significativo emerge dall’analisi comparata dei documenti dell’SCO e dei BRICS: rispetto a un termine particolare — e alla sua rilevanza sostanziale — l’SCO ha notevolmente anticipato i BRICS. Si tratta del termine “spirito”.
Nelle dichiarazioni dei vertici annuali dei BRICS, il termine “spirito dei BRICS” e i suoi elementi costitutivi apparvero per la prima volta durante la presidenza cinese del 2017. Lo “spirito” scomparve poi dai documenti dei BRICS per diversi anni. Il termine ritornò nel 2022, ancora una volta durante la presidenza cinese. Ma successivamente, in tutte le dichiarazioni dei vertici BRICS del 2023-25, i cui progetti iniziali furono preparati da altri Paesi, il termine “spirito dei BRICS” fu costantemente presente.
Nel caso dell’SCO, invece, il termine “spirito” apparve nella primissima dichiarazione successiva al vertice di Shanghai del 15 giugno 2001, quando lo “Shanghai Five”, precedentemente esistente come raggruppamento informale, fu trasformato in un’organizzazione internazionale a tutti gli effetti. In questa dichiarazione, lo “spirito di Shanghai” fu menzionato come punto separato, caratterizzato da fiducia reciproca, beneficio reciproco, uguaglianza, consultazione reciproca, rispetto per la diversità culturale e aspirazione allo sviluppo condiviso.
È evidente che il termine “spirito” affonda le sue radici, innanzitutto, nella tradizione politica cinese contemporanea, poiché in ogni caso è apparso per la prima volta in documenti di anni in cui i vertici si tenevano in Cina. Questa è, in un certo senso, una peculiarità cinese. Detto questo, il termine “spirito”, anche se non immediatamente, si è poi stabilmente affermato nelle dichiarazioni dei BRICS; e nel caso dell’SCO, un anno dopo, nel 2002, quando il vertice si tenne non in Cina ma a San Pietroburgo, il termine “spirito” entrò nel preambolo della Carta dell’SCO.
Nella Carta, tuttavia, l’epiteto “Shanghai” scomparve in relazione allo spirito; lì si fa riferimento semplicemente allo “spirito di fiducia reciproca, beneficio reciproco, uguaglianza, consultazione reciproca, rispetto per la diversità culturale e aspirazione allo sviluppo condiviso”.
L’approccio civilizzazione e la sua evoluzione
Di particolare rilevanza per l’ideologia politica odierna è l’approccio civilizzazionale riflesso nella Dichiarazione di Shanghai del 2001. Essa notava specificamente il “rispetto reciproco e la fiducia reciproca tra Stati appartenenti a civiltà diverse e portatori di tradizioni culturali differenti”. Un anno dopo, tuttavia, la menzione delle civiltà scomparve dal preambolo della Carta dell’SCO.
Questo movimento di apparizione e scomparsa del lessico civilizzazionale è significativo. Da un lato, riflette la sensibilità cinese per le questioni di identità culturale e di diversità; dall’altro, mostra la cautela degli altri membri nell’adottare un linguaggio che potesse essere percepito come troppo marcatamente ideologico o potenzialmente divisivo.
Se esaminiamo il preambolo dell’attuale Dichiarazione di Bishkek del Consiglio dei Capi di Stato dell’SCO del 1° settembre 2026, troviamo che essa enfatizza il “fermo impegno verso gli obiettivi e i principi sanciti nella Carta dell’SCO, nonché verso il ulteriore rafforzamento del buon vicinato, dell’amicizia e dell’efficace cooperazione multilaterale”. Inoltre, questa dichiarazione impiega ancora una volta proprio il termine “spirito di Shanghai”, che è incarnato nei principi esposti nel preambolo della Carta dell’SCO.
È chiaro che, poiché gli elementi costitutivi di questo spirito dell’SCO sono fissati nel testo legale della Carta, le loro formulazioni rimangono incrollabili anche a venticinque anni di distanza. Qui sta la differenza tra lo spirito dell’SCO e lo spirito dei BRICS, dove, di anno in anno, vari elementi di questo spirito vengono aggiunti o rimossi dai Paesi che esercitano la presidenza, a seconda delle loro particolarità nazionali. E la definizione dello spirito dei BRICS risulta, ogni anno, almeno leggermente diversa.
Nel caso dell’SCO, invece, è significativo che l’epiteto “Shanghai” sia ritornato — un epiteto che, a differenza dello spirito stesso, non è legalmente fissato. Questo ritorno segnala una volontà politica di rivendicare l’eredità originaria dell’organizzazione, in un momento in cui la competizione tra potenze per la definizione dei valori globali si fa sempre più intensa.
Quanto pesa questo anniversario
Se rileggiamo passo passo le dichiarazioni dei vertici dell’SCO rivela variazioni significative nel trattamento della dimensione valoriale. L’attenzione particolare dedicata nella Dichiarazione di Bishkek all’impegno dell’SCO verso lo spirito di Shanghai e i principi dell’SCO non è particolarmente tipica delle altre dichiarazioni dei vertici degli ultimi anni.
Per esempio, nelle dichiarazioni successive ai vertici “non anniversari”, il preambolo è praticamente assente, e la descrizione della situazione internazionale e delle sfide alla sicurezza inizia fin dall’inizio. Nelle dichiarazioni emesse ad Astana nel 2024, a Delhi nel 2023 e a Mosca nel 2020, né lo “spirito di Shanghai” né semplicemente lo “spirito” sono menzionati (sebbene la dichiarazione di Mosca contenga il termine “spazio SCO”). Nelle dichiarazioni emesse a Tianjin nel 2025 (naturalmente), a Samarcanda nel 2022 e a Bishkek nel 2019, c’è una menzione dello “spirito di Shanghai”, ma essa è collocata non all’inizio del testo ma in profondità nella prima sezione.
È chiaro che il carattere specifico dell’attuale dichiarazione è spiegato dalla sua natura anniversaria; la dichiarazione emessa a Dushanbe per il precedente anniversario — il ventesimo, nel 2021 — fu composta esattamente allo stesso modo, con un lungo preambolo che menziona lo spirito di Shanghai e l’impegno verso i principi. Questo è altamente significativo: gli anniversari offrono l’occasione per un’affermazione più esplicita dell’identità valoriale dell’organizzazione, mentre nei vertici ordinari prevale un approccio più pragmatico e orientato alle questioni contingenti.
Il contributo indiano e la prospettiva dei “4 M”
In questo quadro, assume particolare interesse la prospettiva indiana sull’SCO. Le iniziative dell’India nell’Organizzazione per la Cooperazione di Shanghai si sono concentrate su questioni economiche, riflettendo il desiderio di costruire cooperazione economica con gli Stati dell’Asia Centrale al fine di migliorare il proprio posizionamento regionale e rafforzare il multilateralismo.
Secondo Anil Trigunayat, l’SCO può senza dubbio contribuire alla collaborazione regionale aderendo al principio delle “4 M”: i membri devono abbracciare il Rispetto Reciproco (Mutual Respect), l’Interesse Reciproco (Mutual Interest), la Sensibilità Reciproca (Mutual Sensitivity) e il Beneficio Reciproco (Mutual Benefit) affinché il gruppo possa emergere più forte e più rilevante.
Questa formulazione è significativa perché mostra come, dal punto di vista indiano, la dimensione valoriale dell’SCO non risieda tanto in una piattaforma ideologica esplicita, quanto in un insieme di principi operativi che guidano la cooperazione quotidiana. L’India, con la sua tradizione di non allineamento e la sua sensibilità per la sovranità nazionale, si trova naturalmente a proprio agio in un’organizzazione che privilegia i principi sui valori, e che evita di imporre una visione ideologica comune.
Verso un prospero futuro
L’analisi della dimensione valoriale dell’SCO a venticinque anni dalla sua fondazione rivela un quadro complesso e sfumato. Da un lato, l’organizzazione non ha mai sviluppato una piattaforma valoriale esplicita paragonabile a quella dei BRICS o di altre strutture di cooperazione. Dall’altro, essa possiede una solida base di principi, sanciti nella Carta, e uno “spirito” che, pur non essendo definito in termini valoriali, costituisce un potente collante identitario.
Questa configurazione non è un caso, ma riflette la storia e la natura dell’organizzazione. Nata come strumento di costruzione di fiducia in materia di sicurezza, l’SCO ha privilegiato la concretezza dei principi operativi rispetto all’astrattezza delle dichiarazioni valoriali. La sua specializzazione funzionale, il suo carattere istituzionalizzato, e il principio della attuazione graduale hanno contribuito a mantenere l’organizzazione ancorata a una dimensione pragmatica, evitando le derive ideologiche che talvolta caratterizzano altri consessi internazionali.
Tuttavia, il ritorno dello “spirito di Shanghai” nella Dichiarazione di Bishkek, in occasione del venticinquesimo anniversario, segnala una crescente consapevolezza dell’importanza della dimensione identitaria e valoriale. In un’era di competizione globale sempre più intensa, in cui la definizione dei valori e dei principi che devono guidare l’ordine internazionale è essa stessa oggetto di contesa, l’SCO si trova a dover bilanciare la sua tradizionale prudenza con la necessità di affermare con maggiore chiarezza la propria identità.
L’analisi terminologica dei testi, e delle piattaforme valoriali che essi riflettono, non è che un tassello del quadro molto più ampio della cooperazione pratica tra i Paesi dell’SCO realizzata in questi venticinque anni. Ma è un tassello significativo, perché rivela come un’organizzazione nata per la sicurezza sia progressivamente divenuta anche un laboratorio di elaborazione di un linguaggio comune, di principi condivisi e di uno spirito collettivo. E in un mondo in cui la battaglia per la definizione dei valori globali è destinata a intensificarsi, questo laboratorio potrebbe rivelarsi più importante di quanto non appaia a prima vista.
La sfida per l’SCO, nei prossimi venticinque anni, sarà quella di preservare la propria specificità — la concretezza dei principi, la gradualità dell’azione, la centralità della sicurezza — senza rinunciare a elaborare una visione del mondo che, senza essere ideologica, sia capace di attrarre e di unire. Un compito non facile, ma che l’organizzazione ha dimostrato, in questi primi venticinque anni, di poter affrontare con successo.
Protests rarely remain confined to the grievances that first bring people into the streets. When the citizens believe their concerns are being ignored, a grievance over a particular policy or administrative decision can evolve into a broader challenge to the political authority. Consequently, what begins as a demand for correction becomes a question of accountability. […]
In May, William Tharien, a 19-year-old student, made his second attempt at passing NEET, India’s national entrance exam for would-be medical students. Passing the test was the only way William would be eligible to study to be a doctor, surgeon, dentist or vet and he was competing with about 2.2 million other students for one of about 130,000 places in medical schools around the country. What makes the test even more nerve-wracking is that only half of these places are available at heavily subsidized state-run colleges, rather than expensive private institutions.
It can take students up to two years to prepare for these exams, with parents going into debt to pay fees at tuition centers entirely devoted to cracking the test. Days after William, and millions of others, took the test on May 3, authorities discovered that the paper had likely been leaked and circulated on social media platforms like Telegram. The results were voided.
Around the same time, the Chief Justice of India’s Supreme Court compared young people “who don’t get any employment and don’t have any place in a profession” to cockroaches and parasites. In a country with the largest population of 15- to 29-year-olds in the world (nearly 370 million people) and high levels of youth unemployment, particularly amongst the educated, the judge’s remarks struck a raw nerve.
It led to the formation of the Cockroach Janta Party — a mocking reference to India’s governing Bharatiya Janata Party, led by prime minister Narendra Modi — initially as a satirical meme. But the cancellation of NEET gave the Cockroach Janta Party real-life relevance and made it an outlet to channel the extensive frustration and anger of India’s youth.
In neighboring Nepal, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, so-called Gen Z protests between 2022 and 2025 had toppled governments.
In June, William joined tens of thousands of students in Jantar Mantar, an iconic venue for public protest in the Indian capital Delhi, to call for the resignation of Minister of Education Dharmendra Pradhan over the NEET debacle. The demonstrations lasted for weeks, even as the Delhi Police resorted to tear gas, pellet guns, electric shock devices, and lathis (nearly six-foot-long bamboo sticks) to disperse the crowds. William was a regular.
“I always felt watched,” he told us. At metro stations, on his way to the protests, he said he repeatedly encountered the police. “They made sure that we saw them and that we should feel intimidated by their presence and their numbers.”
As journalists, we covered the June-July protests, including on July 20 when the police brutality reached an ugly peak as protesters marched towards the Indian parliament. Artificial intelligence-enabled CCTV cameras installed under Delhi’s “Safe City” project lined the streets in and around Jantar Mantar. A permanent surveillance tower stood at the center of the protest site, recording around the clock. Multiple drones circled overhead. Photographers hired by the police moved through the crowd. Some officers carried body cameras, and at least one police officer was seen wearing Ray-Ban Meta smart glasses.
Two police surveillance vehicles were parked just outside the entrance to Jantar Mantar. One was Ikshana (the Sanskrit for, literally, the act of seeing), an AI-powered police van with eight cameras that used facial recognition technology to match faces to police databases in real time. The other was a mobile command center.
According to William, the surveillance was not limited to the protest site. “I saw police detaining students at the metro station,” he said. “They were recognizing students from footage, identifying them by their bags, or style of mask or sunglasses.”
Even after the protests stopped, with the July 25 resignation of Pradhan, the education minister, William said the police paid visits to students in their neighborhoods. They were tracking down protesters. On August 3, he said, two police officers showed up at his lodgings. He was alone. “We have photos of you,” the police told him, “in colour. You’ve been seen going to the protest site on multiple days and also seen at the metro station.” Insisting that attending protests was a democratic right, William refused to let the police into his room without a warrant.
According to the Indian Express, the Delhi Police used surveillance footage accrued during the NEET protests in the summer to identify at least “2,800 people with a criminal background” who would be be prevented from protesting against Gyanesh Kumar.
Aishe Ghosh, a prominent student activist and national office holder at the left-wing Students’ Federation of India, has challenged the Indian government and the Delhi Police in court over the indiscriminate use of surveillance technology. Not only were the authorities documenting the protests, she alleges, they were using the footage to threaten protesters with public exposure.
Long an object of surveillance, Ghosh, who was a leader of the NEET protests, said the police entered the Communist Party of India (Marxist) headquarters in Delhi to arrest her in August on the basis of protests she had attended five years earlier in 2021. Describing the attempt to arrest Ghosh as a “continuing witch hunt against student protesters,” the CPI(M) added that it was evidence of “the Modi government’s escalating assault on democratic rights.”
Ishan Tankha
Modi’s surveillance state
Hearing Ghosh’s litigation, the Delhi High Court appeared to suggest that the urgency to examine her specific allegations had dissipated since the NEET protests had concluded. The judges suggested that she file a more general petition.
The NEET protests proved only to be the start of the Cockroach Janta Party’s precipitous rise as serious, youth-led opposition to the Modi government, in power since 2014 and seemingly determined to use every arrow in its quiver, from opaque sources of funds to the takeover of independent institutions to the use of surveillance technology, to stifle dissent. In October, the “cockroaches” poured into Delhi’s streets again.
This time, they wanted the resignation of Gyanesh Kumar, India’s Chief Election Commissioner, a constitutional role meant to be entirely independent, apolitical and focused on maintaining the integrity of the Indian electoral process. An investigation by the Indian Express newspaper revealed that despite 14 objections in the last 10 months from the two other members of the election commission, Kumar had allegedly illegally taken unilateral decisions that resulted in voters being left off electoral rolls. India is currently undertaking an extensive revision of its voter lists that has controversially already disenfranchised 130 million people and potentially swayed state elections in favour of the governing BJP.
Kumar has not directly addressed the Indian Express’s findings. And while Modi too has remained typically silent — in his 12 years as prime minister, he has yet to call a single press conference — the Delhi Police has once again used violence and arbitrary arrests to crack down on still ongoing protests. Jantar Mantar, the de facto site of protests in Delhi since 1993, has been officially shut down. Prominent protesters, including Aishe Ghosh and the founders of the Cockroach Janta Party, have been detained. The opposition led by Congress Party scion Rahul Gandhi — the son, grandson and great-grandson of former Indian prime ministers — has been galvanized.
But India’s next general election is not until 2029 and the next major state legislative election is not until February 2027 at the earliest. Maintaining momentum is a task Gandhi has yet to show he can manage.
Meanwhile, the BJP continues to use friendly mainstream television media, alongside its heavy-handed policing, to argue that the protests are marginal, paid for by foreign sources and disliked by the large majority of Indians.
Fallible facial recognition tech
Technology researcher Srinivas Kodali told Coda that India’s efforts to modernise its policing system were stepped up after terrorist attacks in Mumbai in November 2008. Police stations across the country were connected, with access to criminal records and a tracking database. If someone attends a protest somewhere in India, Kodali explained, and has a police report filed against them, that information will be available to every police department in the country. He described the approach as “360-degree profiling,” pulling data together from facial recognition technology, surveillance towers, phone records, social media activity, and government databases including electoral records.
Delhi Police has said its use of technology and AI is meant to maintain law and order and identify people who already have a criminal record and not to randomly profile protesters. However, privacy researchers and lawyers warn that sophisticated surveillance systems can make participation in protests traceable long after the crowds have dispersed.
Much of the technology for this work is supplied by a growing group of private companies. Ikshana, the AI-powered police van used to monitor protesters in Jantar Mantar back in July, is one example. Rahul Bhardwaj, the Chief Growth Officer at analytics firm Intozi based in Gurugram, a tech hub on the outskirts of Delhi, said the company provides the software layer behind Ikshana’s system. Intozi processes video feeds through AI applications designed for tasks including crowd monitoring, detecting weapons and identifying people against police databases.
Intozi has previously deployed its facial-recognition technology for government security operations at high profile international summits in Delhi. Asked specifically whether its technology was used at Jantar Mantar this summer, though, Bhardwaj cited confidentiality obligations.
The company said that its role ends after its system is installed on police infrastructure, and that it does not retain the database or continue to access the system once it has been handed over to the police. “Images of people who are not in the police database,” Bhardwaj said, “are automatically blurred within seconds, while records associated with people already registered in police databases are retained by the police.”
That places responsibility for the technology and its subsequent use with the police.
Innefu Labs, whose AI Vision facial-recognition software has been used by Delhi Police in criminal investigations, declined to answer questions about data retention, legal safeguards or its operational relationship with police.
Another company, AjnaLens, confirmed its direct role in live policing. Kuldeep Pathak, Associate Director at AjnaLens said the company had supplied AI-enabled smart glasses to Delhi Police, first used in January 2026 in security operations during India’s Republic Day celebrations. The company confirmed that its glasses were used again during the NEET protests in Jantar Mantar. According to Pathak, their system was given access to a police database containing around 65,000 people with criminal records. He said 14 people were arrested after being recognized through the glasses.
Experts we spoke to questioned what authorises private vendors to access and process police databases, or whether an independent authority audits the system.
Ishan Tankha
Surveillance without accountability
“What statutory regime operates in this context?” asked Menaka Guruswamy, a senior lawyer who is involved in litigation in the Supreme Court over the use of facial recognition technology at Jantar Mantar. “Where is this information hosted? Is it hosted by the private vendor, the state or the police? We know nothing.”
Guruswamy said tenders and contracts between the state and private companies should make it possible to establish what data each party is permitted to access and retain.
Disha Verma, AI researcher at Tech Global Institute and Ashoka University, claims these private vendors get access to police datasets that help them train their AI systems. “They (vendors) did not need to buy training datasets from anywhere,” she says. “They didn’t need to test their product anywhere else. They ended up with a curated, very accurate facial-recognition system.” The data provided by the police, she added, would help vendors sell their product for profit to other companies that want to make use of surveillance technology.
“What I am most concerned about is how much impunity and data and power this gives the private vendors,” Verma said, calling it a “parallel police state.”
And then there’s the accuracy of the technology, little of which has been subject to question or scrutiny.
In response to Right to Information requests made by the digital rights group Internet Freedom Foundation (IFF) in 2022, the police said it considered facial-recognition results with an accuracy score of 80 percent or above as a positive match. Only results below the 80 percent threshold were “subject to further verification using corroborative evidence.”
But the distinction between technical facial recognition matches and actual verified identifications became harder to ignore after the NEET protests in Jantar Mantar in the summer. Delhi Police said its facial recognition system identified 2,873 people with previous criminal records at the protest between July 20 and 26. But at least 25 of those people were actually in jail at the time they were supposed to be protesting.
Intozi’s own description shows why that distinction is not always straightforward. Bhardwaj told us that the company’s recognition threshold is “generally kept above 70 to 80%” and once that threshold is crossed, “it is a 100 percent match for us.” This is why, argues Guruswamy, the Supreme Court lawyer, a statutory framework is necessary. “There is no foolproof system,” she said. “That is why you need accountability, a legal regime, data protection and safeguards governing how these interactions take place.”
Nearly six years ago, Ahmed* (name changed on request) experienced the pitfalls of the Delhi Police’s then fledgling facial recognition technology and surveillance system. He was identified by AI-assisted video analysis as being present during deadly communal violence in northeast Delhi in 2020. Ahmed spent around 18 months in jail, accused of killing a police official during the riots. He insisted that the man seen in the footage used as clinching evidence was someone else.
“My hair was cropped short, and I had different shoes. Only the white shirt and dark trousers matched. But that does not make anyone wearing those clothes me,” Ahmed told us. He said he had shut his shop around noon on the day of the violence and gone home. Footage from one security camera showed him near the lane where he lived. But police later said it had used Amped FIVE, a video and image analysis tool, and AI Vision, facial recognition software made by Indian company Innefu Labs, to place Ahmed at the scene of the crime.
In September 2021, Ahmed was released on bail. The court noted that several people in the area wore similar clothes to those shown in the footage and that the video analysis identifying Ahmed across different recordings would have to be tested at trial.
By then, though, the damage to Ahmed’s life had already been done. Before his arrest, Ahmed ran a garments shop and employed a couple of workers. The shop did not survive his incarceration and, while on bail, he now works at a street stall, barely surviving on his meagre income.
Facial recognition systems turn facial features into numerical data and compare them with stored images, producing a similarity score or a list of possible matches. In a one-to-many search, a single face from a protest can be compared against an entire database.
“It's able to recognize a face the way an iPhone camera might,” Disha Verma, the Ashoka University researcher said. An iPhone's front camera works because everyone looks at it from roughly the same angle in consistent light, she added; but a police station is often dimly lit, angles vary, and the camera used to take the photo might be old and pixelated. "The system the police are using usually has a very large error rate, just inherently," Verma said.
Katie Kinsey, Chief of Staff and Tech Policy Counsel at the New York University School of Law’s Policing Project, told us that broad accuracy claims tell little about how a facial recognition system might work once it leaves controlled testing conditions. “A model tested on one dataset may behave differently when the cameras, lighting, image quality and population change,” she said.
Live video presents an additional difficulty because the images are less controlled and officers may be acting on alerts as events unfold. Kinsey said systems should be tested under the actual conditions in which police intend to use them.
Verma also raised concerns about biases affecting facial recognition systems. “If the police think a criminal looks like a dark-skinned bearded young man,” Verma said, “that is the data they will collect and that is what will train the AI.” It would, she added, create a feedback loop in which technology does not remove police prejudice but reproduce and legitimise it instead.
India has constitutional privacy protections and general data protection legislation, but no dedicated law for the use of facial recognition technology. Basically, “you won’t know you are on a watch list,” researcher Srinivas Kodali told us.
We reached out to the Delhi Police Cyber Cell with questions about the use of live facial recognition technology and other surveillance systems during protests, but did not receive a response.
Some jurisdictions have tried to place clearer limits on this type of power. For example, under the European Union’s AI Act, real-time remote biometric identification by law enforcement in public spaces is generally prohibited, with narrow exceptions. Even then, its exceptional use is subject to necessity and proportionality requirements and generally requires prior judicial or independent authorization.
Police in India have long maintained categories of people they consider suspects or potential troublemakers. For instance, in the south Indian state of Telangana, police have a category called “rowdy sheets” for people considered habitual offenders or threats to public order. With facial recognition technology, these categories have only widened.
Lawyer Menaka Guruswamy wondered what might happen when someone photographed at one protest is then seen at another protest. “Are we being criminalized simply for attending protests?”
Verma said that one of the significant shifts that she has witnessed over the years is how the technologies once associated with borders and the military have moved to civilian policing. The militarization of the Delhi Police has been evident as paramilitary personnel dressed in camouflage have been assaulting and detaining protesters.
Still, the protesters come.
William Tharien told us that despite being a known face to the Delhi police, despite his fears and struggles with his mental health, despite the monitoring of his social media, he is not going to stop protesting.
And with Delhi’s cockroaches still calling for the resignation of India’s chief election commissioner, still warning of the danger posed to Indian democracy by the Modi government’s authoritarian tendencies, how, William said, could he give up the fight now?
Western governments are rebuilding ties with India even as they accuse it of foreign interference and of running intelligence operations against people on their soil. The contradiction was on display October 13, when Canada’s Prime Minister, Mark Carney and India’s Prime Minister, Narendra Modi, reaffirmed plans to expand trade and security cooperation, though underlying security […]
60,000 security personnel were deployed across India’s national capital on October 10. This included the police of Delhi and neighboring states, as well as paramilitary forces pulled from regions of India affected by armed insurgencies.
They sealed off central Delhi to stop protesters opposing the mass disenfranchisement of 130 million voters from reaching Jantar Mantar, the designated protest site on Parliament Street.
The railways cancelled over 250 trains to Delhi. “So far as I remember, it has never happened in the history of Indian Railways that so many trains were cancelled just because of a protest or agitation,” said Shiv Gopal Mishra, general secretary of the All India Railwaymen’s Federation (AIRF).
Scores of activists already travelling to the national capital from other states of India were detained on moving trains and forced to alight at numerous railway stations in multiple states. Many grassroots activists in several other states were placed under preventive detention in their homes ahead of the protest. Paramilitary forces were deployed at checkpoints on Delhi’s borders, where vehicles were searched for any signs of protesters, placards, etc.
Within the national capital, 45 metro train stations were closed. Internet and telecommunications were down in the four-kilometer radius of Jantar Mantar. Around Parliament Street alone, where Jantar Mantar is located, over 3,000 security personnel were deployed, with multi-layer barricades, each manned by about a hundred.
Evading this anticipated hurdle, hundreds of activists from the Students Federation of India (SFI) and the Democratic Youth Federation of India (DYFI) had already positioned themselves the previous night just over three kilometers northeast of Jantar Mantar at HKS Surjeet Bhavan.
A memorial to the freedom fighter and veteran communist leader, HKS Surjeet, it serves as an education center of the Communist Party of India (Marxist) [CPIM] and also hosts SFI’s Central Committee office.
The Delhi Police's midnight attempt to intimidate students at the SFI Central Committee office in HKS Surjeet Bhawan was promptly rebuffed by the CPI(M) party leaders there. pic.twitter.com/x45gOglsCk
“But the police knew we were there,” recalled SFI activist Asikul. The police had tried over the last two nights to enter the premises to take stock of the preparations, but were stopped. Activists worried the police could barricade the gates and stop this mobilization of hundreds from stepping out to protest the following morning.
Quietly, after midnight, student activists slipped out of HKS Surjeet Bhavan in groups of five, one after another, with cover stories for travel reasons if intercepted on the way. By six in the morning, about 250 of them had relocated to the CPIM’s national headquarters, AKG Bhavan, to the west of Jantar Mantar.
Back at HKS Surjeet Bhavan, where hundreds more stayed behind, barricading began between 10 and 10:30 am, just 100 meters from its gate, recalled Aman Saini, the Delhi State Secretary of the DYFI.
About 300-350 activists stormed out of the gates and made it through before the barricades could cut them off. Waving red flags and holding placards calling for the dismissal and arrest of the Chief Election Commissioner (CEC), Gyanesh Kumar, they marched barely a kilometer before facing a police cordon. The police lined up shoulder to shoulder, batons held horizontal to block the protesters’ way forward.
Continuing to march, the protesters headed straight into the cordon. A tussle ensued amid chorus chants of ‘vote chor, gaddi chhod’, demanding the “vote thief” CEC’s resignation. As the protesters in the front line grappled with the police – each engaging multiple officers by dropping to the ground and resisting detention – others broke through the cordon and sprinted ahead.
Barely 300 meters ahead, a line of barricades blocked the road. Protesters stormed ahead and engaged the police. Slipping through the tussle, “I pulled the barricade from below and shoved its top. Thaad! – it fell over,” explained Aman.
Wrangling themselves free from the security personnel, many more dashed ahead, several slashing their feet against the metal of the fallen barricade, only to turn left on Minto Road and drop another barricade.
They had covered nearly half the distance to Jantar Mantar, reaching within 150 meters of the Connaught outer circle, one curve away from Parliament Street hosting the protest site.
“But the barricade there was re-enforced. We had almost managed to pull one down when the police charged at us with batons,” added Aman. Having lost numbers at each of the previous barricades, “we were only about 50 left. So they managed to detain us and shove us into buses. At least six of us were injured.”
Those who had evaded detention at the previous barricades, but were unable to push ahead, regrouped outside HKS Surjeet Bhavan and started sloganeering. Police, accompanied by paramilitary, charged with batons and detained them, and even allegedly tried to break into the premises, but were held back at its gate.
Paramilitary at the party gates
The contingent of activists who had relocated to AKG Bhavan under the cover of darkness did not have it any easier. They had only managed to stretch the security personnel and their barricades across two fronts. A paramilitary force began assembling outside its gates around 10 am, roughly the same time as the barricading began at HKS.
Several members of CPIM’s Central Committee (CC) and Politburo, including current and former Members of Parliament, many of them grey-haired, were staying at the AKG Bhavan for a CC meeting. They joined the students as they marched out.
“Some 20 people were detained right outside the gate – almost the whole frontline. The rest of us behind them pushed through. We kept running,” recalled Asikul.
About 15-20 minutes into the march, SFI activist Noel was detained. “I was not taken to a detention bus, where others were held. I was held alone in a bus used to transport the police. There I was beaten for two hours,” he said, sharing pictures of the injuries he sustained on his face.
“Two of my comrades realized that I was being held alone. So they intentionally got themselves detained near my bus and joined me. They also got beaten up,” he added. Later, when the police started marching them to the detention bus, allegedly prodding them forward by jabbing the blunt ends of their batons into their backs, “we managed to escape.”
Meanwhile, others had pushed ahead. Among them were SFI National Joint Secretary Aishe Ghosh and the DYFI’s national president, AA Rahim. They marched about a kilometer from AKG Bhavan before being apprehended at the roundabout near Gurudwara Bangla Sahib. The SFI alleged that “Aishe Ghosh was assaulted by male police personnel in the absence of women officers.”
A showdown ensued. Dropping to the road and bracing in a huddle, Aishe and other female activists held ground as female police personnel who arrived later grappled with them, eventually dragging them away to detention buses, about 1.5 km away from Jantar Mantar.
Other activists, including Asikul, had strode ahead, breaking through three barricades, and reaching within 400 meters of Jantar Mantar. “We were not able to break through the fourth. We were only about 35 left,” said Asikul.
“Using chokeholds and baton charges, they detained us. Some managed to escape detention by breaking out through a bus window,” an increasingly popular mode of resistance by the younger generation of activists, determined to make detentions as costly and as strenuous as possible.
Police detaining student activist and SFI president Adarsh M Saji. Photo: CPIM
Detention at the stadiums
Asikul and the rest of the detainees were driven almost 50 km to Bawana in northwest Delhi and held at the Rajiv Gandhi stadium, where hundreds more were already being held. Among them was 77-year-old Manik Sarkar, a senior communist leader and Tripura state Chief Minister from 1998 to 2018. He was accompanied by the northeastern state’s current opposition leader, Jitendra Chaudhury. Veteran trade unionist and former Member of Parliament (MP) Tapan Sen, along with other ex-legislators, were also held there.
“There was not a drop of water in any tap in the toilet. We were not even provided with clean water to drink. When we demanded, we were asked to drink from” an old, ill-maintained leaky tank in the premises, said SFI activist Utkarsh, who was also held here. “We challenged the police to drink that water. They refused.”
When detainees began falling sick, Utkarsh and other activists warned the senior police officer in charge of this detention of consequences for mistreating a former Chief Minister and ex-MPs. They reminded him of his responsibility if one of these elderly political leaders fell seriously ill. Only then did the police “finally provide us with water and some snacks.”
Seven other stadiums in the city, along with several other public facilities, were reportedly turned into detention centers that day, when security personnel detained over 7,000 people from the streets of the national capital, including protesters, journalists and even pedestrians suspected of being protesters.
More than 7 km south of Jantar Mantar, near the INA market, outside barricaded central Delhi, police detained protesting activists of the All India Students’ Association (AISA), led by Neha Bora, one of the most recognizable faces of the protest movement.
Detentions were also reported in Raj Ghat, about 4.5 km northeast of Jantar Mantar, where the Revolutionary Workers’ Party of India (RWPI) and its affiliated mass organizations had organized a protest.
At the airport, almost 15 km to the southwest of Jantar Mantar, the police boarded a plane as soon as it landed from Mumbai – even before the passengers could disembark – to detain Abhijeet Dipke, Saurav Das, and Ashutosh Ranka from their seats. They are the top leaders of the Cockroach Janta Party (CJP).
“Cockroaches”
The pressure group started as a satirical protest on social media in May, after the Chief Justice of India said: “There are youngsters like cockroaches, who don’t get any employment or have any place in profession. Some of them become media, some of them become social media, RTI activists and other activists.”
The CJP has since become a material force, playing a key role in the protest against exam paper leaks that forced the Union Education Minister to resign in July.
About two months after his resignation, an investigation by the Indian Express newspaper exposed irregularities in the conduct of the Chief Election Commissioner (CEC), Gyanesh Kumar. Several times, his two fellow election commissioners had flagged their concerns about his potentially illegal and unconstitutional decisions.
These pertained to the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls, still underway after already deleting the names of 130 million people from India’s voter rolls – in an unprecedented shrinking of India’s electorate. Opposition parties have long alleged that this exercise is meant to help the ruling far-right Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), led by Prime Minister Narendra Modi, consolidate its hold on power.
Earlier this month, on the birth anniversary of Gandhi on October 2, protests began, calling for the scrapping of the SIR and the CEC’s resignation. On October 7, the CJP called on youngsters to take Jantar Mantar again on October 10.
In response to its call, thousands of youngsters, most in their late teens and early 20s, kept arriving in small groups to central Delhi throughout the day, only to be whisked away by the police.
Detention as deterrence
“These youngsters, who were not part of any cadre-based organization, were particularly harassed by police because they identified them as vulnerable. They were threatened, their phones and keys were snatched,” said DYFI’s Delhi State Vice President, Rikta Krishnaswamy, who was held with hundreds of them at a makeshift detention center in Jafar Kalan, over 45 km west of Jantar Mantar.
Bundled into a bus at the final barricade reached by the march from HKS Bhavan that morning, Rikta was brought here by midday, when “the electrician was still installing the fan. We were held until evening with nothing to eat – not even a cup of tea. The police are trying to make detention as much of a deterrent as possible.”
But the protesters were not deterred. The very next day, DYFI activists, including several central committee members, gathered at Connaught Place, a 15-minute walk from Jantar Mantar, which remained cordoned off, even as the overall restrictions on movement in central Delhi had eased.
Custodial torture, sexual harassment
Soon after they began staging a protest, security personnel swarmed in. The detained protesters “were not taken to any police station,” according to a petition alleging custodial torture, filed in the Supreme Court by AA Rahim, the youth organization’s national president and an MP.
“Instead, while still near Connaught Place, the bus was driven to a closed and heavily guarded space in front of the Daryaganj restaurant, away from public view, out of the reach of the media and without any CCTV cameras. There, the detainees were sorted according to gender and then forcibly shifted into a specialized police van divided into five separate cells.”
These vehicles “functioned as unrecorded, mobile places of detention, wholly outside the safeguards of the Constitution,” added the petition. “Inside the cells of the van, the detainees were beaten on the face, kicked on the backbone with boots and struck on the head. Several of the personnel wore no name badges.”
At a press conference on October 12, women activists of the SFI showed bruises and alleged sexual harassment by security personnel.
But even the alleged custodial torture and sexual harassment has not deterred the protests, which are widening, drawing in more sections of society into the agitation.
Farmers and workers to join the agitation
Representatives of India’s largest and oldest farmers’ union, the All India Kisan Sabha (AIKS), the All India Agricultural Workers’ Union (AIAWU), the Centre of Indian Trade Unions (CITU), the All India Democratic Women’s Association (AIDWA), along with SFI and DYFI leaders, met at the HKS Surjeet Bhavan on October 14.
Several public intellectuals and artists also participated in this meeting of mass and class organizations’ leaders, where they jointly formed the All India Platform of People Against SIR. This platform announced October 23 as a Nationwide Street Action Day Against SIR.
Condemning the central government’s denotification of Jantar Mantar as a designated protest site on October 12, the platform gave a slogan to turn every street and every village into Jantar Mantar.
Nerendra Modi intende forgiare un nuovo cittadino indiano, un nazionalista di Bharat, il nuovo e al contempo antico nome che ha imposto all’immensa e plurale nazione, prima al mondo per abitanti e terza per capacità economica, deciso a realizzare tale chimerica utopia, non disdegna di utilizzare tutte le leve del potere, anche in modo spregiudicato.
Arrestare settemila studenti è certamente un segno di debolezza, il tutto con un dispiegamento di cinquantamila soldati delle forze dell’ordine e militari, come a inizio ottobre 2026 a Delhi e in altre città a fronte del movimento di protesta che ha saldato insieme i giovani scesi da mesi nelle piazze per rivendicare un futuro e non l’insulto di “scarafaggi”, loro tributato dal ministro all’istruzione poi costretto alle dimissioni, termine trasformatosi nella definizione del loro movimento politico, il Partito del Popolo degli Scarafaggi, unitosi con i rappresentanti di tutti gli altri partiti dell’opposizione, decisi a rigettare i nuovi elenchi elettorali che hanno fatto sparire, è vero, alcuni indiani deceduti, ma anche molti del tutto vivi e vegeti, eppure sgraditi, spesso perché musulmani, con la capziosa giustificazione che non sarebbero cittadini indiani, quando lo sono da sempre, registrati nell’anagrafe nazionale e in quella elettorale, impropriamente accusati di essere immigrati bengalesi che si camuffano da indiani.
Le manifestazioni sono state aperte, in testa ai cortei, dai “resuscitati”, ovvero i presunti morti, in realtà in ottime condizioni fisiche e mentali, insomma quasi un gogoliano ribaltamento delle celebri “Anime morte”, infatti in questo caso non si contano nei censimenti i morti, ma si fanno sparire i vivi.
Delhi resta in stato d’assedio, le manifestazioni sono state generalmente vietate, tuttavia Nerendra Modi, dopo quasi tre lustri di potere incontrastato e di politiche di totale deregolamentazione neoliberista e ultra – induista, deve fare i conti con l’insofferenza ogni giorno crescente e manifesta di ampi settori della società.
D’altronde tanto accanimento interno contro gli oppositori è inteso a ovviare anche alla modesta estate del primo ministro, il vertice dei BRICS organizzato nella capitale indiana è stato un mezzo fallimento. Nessuno degli attuali promotori del multipolarismo si fida di lui, essendo un amico fraterno di Israele, nonché in combutta economica e militare con gli emiratini, a loro volta al servizio dell’imperialismo occidentale contro gli iraniani e in Sudan e Burkina Faso in azione contro i governi legittimi e contro i progetti di cooperazione di quelle nazioni con Cina e Russia.
Le politiche di Modi sono tutte orientate ad abbandonare la storica vicinanza alla causa palestinese dei tempi del non – allineamento indiano, privilegiando piuttosto la cooperazione nel settore degli armamenti con l’entità statuale israeliana, amplificata, come emerso dal trionfale discorso di Modi alla Knesset nel febbraio 2026, dalla profonda affinità tra il sionismo e l’estremismo induista propugnato dal Bharatiya Janata Party.
Al vertice kirghiso dello SCO, l’Organizzazione per la Cooperazione di Shanghai, di fine agosto Modi è stato relegato ai margini della fotografia ufficiale, mentre il presidente ospitante si stringeva al centro con il primo ministro pakistano, oltre ovviamente a Vladimir Putin e a Xi Jinping.
L’indiana Via del Cotone poi, visti i conflitti che incendiano tutta l’Asia Occidentale, sono sempre più aleatori, buoni soltanto per la mistificazione mediatica messa in campo dai media europei in funzione anti – cinese.
Le manifestazioni hanno per altro rovinato la festa per l’avvento, un quarto di secolo fa, il 7 ottobre 2001, al potere di Modi nel Gujarat, continuazione della parossistica celebrazione del suo 76° compleanno lo scorso 17 settembre, festeggiato con manifestazioni e pellegrinaggi.
La stampa d’opposizione ha insistito piuttosto nel ricordare come, solo un anno dopo il suo insediamento nel 2002, Modi abbia scatenato nel Gujarat una caccia al musulmano senza precedenti, un’ondata di violenza che ha mietuto almeno un paio di migliaia di morti, fatti la cui brutalità è rimasta tragicamente e traumaticamente nel ricordo collettivo.
Il vero dato che spaventa il primo ministro è il fatto che mobilitazioni di così grande portata non attraversano il vasto paese dai tempi di Jawaharlal Nehru e successivamente di sua figlia Indira Gandhi, tuttavia quelle erano manifestazioni a sostegno e non contro il capo di governo, nel primo caso per sostenere il Movimento dei Non Allineati, nel secondo per sottolineare la soddisfazione popolare per l’alleanza con i sovietici, volta a trasformare l’India in una potenza atomica.
Il nazionalismo indù del BJP, ovvero Bharatiya Janata Party, di Nerendra Modi sta invece tentando una rottura netta con tutto quel passato, immagina la nazione come capace di proporre sullo scenario internazionale una propria egemonia, se non esattamente imperialistica, certamente verso un mondo indiano – centrico. Anche in questo caso le aspettative di Modi si scontrano con la modestia delle relazioni stabilite con le vicine nazioni nello spazio eurasiatico e ugualmente negli altri continenti, mentre la proposta multipolare sino – russa risulta largamente condivisa dalle nazioni del Sud Globale.
La narrazione ufficiale di un Nerendra Modi quale figlio di un venditore di tè dalle origini estremamente umili, è parallela alla lunga militanza nel Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, ovvero la Lega Nazionale dei Volontari, organizzazione ultra – induista fondata nel 1925, nota per la sua feroce adesione al sistema delle caste, molto prossimo ai criteri di discriminazione dei sistemi fascisteggianti della prima metà del XX secolo. È stata quella infatti la scuola sociale e politica nella quale da giovane si è formato, rafforzando la devozione che tanto lui quanto i dirigenti e i militanti del suo partito portano verso l’assassino del mahatma Gandhi, ovvero Nathuram Godse, il quale proprio grazie a Modi dal 2020 ha un santuario che ne ospita le ceneri e che è meta di pellegrinaggio per tutti gli attivisti del Bharatiya Janata Party, lo stesso primo ministro si è recato più volte a Pune, mostrando convinta adesione alle ragioni nazionalistico – induiste, anti – pakistane e anti – musulmane che hanno ispirato quel gesto omicida compiuto il 30 gennaio 1948 a Nuova Delhi.
Alcune iniziative promosse dai suoi sostenitori nel corso dei festeggiamenti di settembre – ottobre più che aumentare la considerazione del primo ministro, hanno rasentato il ridicolo, nel piccolo stato del Tripura il governatore locale Manik Saha ha imposto, con vivo disappunto delle famiglie, alle bambine e ai bambini di tutte le cinquemila scuole di partecipare a concorsi di disegno e di scrittura in lode di Nerendra Modi. Il risultato è che dopo un decennio di egemonia induista lo stato di Tripura ha tutta la possibilità di tornare ad essere governato dal Fronte di Sinistra, guidato dal Partito Comunista Indiano – Marxista (CPI-M) e dai suoi alleati. Tuttavia questo fenomeno può apparire estremo, ma non isolato, in Rajasthan, lo storico partito dei Gandhi, il Congresso, oggi all’opposizione, ha criticato le direttive rivolte a studenti e insegnanti di tutti gli istituti scolastici statali e privati per la partecipazione alle celebrazioni per il primo ministro.
Proprio il Congresso sottolinea e documenta ampiamente come sia imbarazzante investire tanti denari pubblici per celebrazioni fuori luogo, quando, a detta dello stesso primo ministro, ancora molte siano le aree, non solo rurali, in cui mancano i servizi igienici e il collegamento, almeno per i villaggi più remoti, alla rete elettrica, il tutto mentre gli indiani scendono in piazza per protestare e al contempo gli attivisti del Bharatiya Janata Party scorrazzano in bus collettivi e motociclette da Varanasi a Vadnagar, città natale di Modi nel Gujarat, con gigantografie del primo ministro ed enormi bandiere arancioni.
Anche i conflitti in corso in ogni landa del pianeta stanno assestando un duro colpo alla dottrina ultra – liberista di Modi, il quale fondandosi sulla massima deregolamentazione e la più spregiudicata libertà per i capitali, con il drammatico risvolto di scarsissime tutele per i lavoratori, non rispettando mai le organizzazioni sindacali e le normative ambientali, ha accresciuto il Prodotto Interno Lordo prima del Gujarat, poi di tutta l’India, con una crescita ancora al 7% per l’anno fiscale 2025/2026, tuttavia è abbastanza evidente che l’economia nel 2026/2027 segnerà un brusco ridimensionamento, complicando di molto la vita di quel terzo di indiani che vivono di un lavoro nel settore precario o in quello informale, già molto poco avvantaggiati dalla crescita degli anni passati, tra questi lavoratori molti sono musulmani, cristiani, dalit, ovvero appartenenti alla casta degli intoccabili, e adivasi, i popoli nativi che quasi nessuno conosce e ricorda, ma sommano nell’insieme almeno cento milioni di persone, non è un caso che la modesta lotta alla povertà abbia visto piuttosto accrescere profonde e pesanti divaricazioni sociali, con una ristretta minoranza sempre più abbiente.
Il governo per altro è stato ferocemente contestato per quasi tutto il 2026 anche dagli agricoltori, il movimento dei lavoratori della terra è infatti riuscito a impedire l’introduzione nel settore di leggi smaccatamente liberiste e penalizzanti i produttori diretti.
I venti di opposizione non appaiono impensierire per il momento il governo, tuttavia l’epoca dei trionfalismi, come quando nel gennaio 2024 Modi ha presieduto la sfarzosa inaugurazione del colossale tempio di Ram nella città di Ayodhya, anche in questo caso come altre volte edificato sul luogo di una preesistente moschea, appaiono se non irripetibili, del tutto lontani.
Around 1200 BC, the eastern Mediterranean fell apart. The great empires of the Bronze Age collapsed, many cities were destroyed or emptied, writing disappeared from much of the region, and long-distance trade shrank to almost nothing. Archaeologists call what came next the dark age, and the name is earned: with few texts and almost no […]
Hacia el año 1200 a.C. el mundo del Mediterráneo oriental se vino abajo. Cayeron los grandes imperios de la Edad del Bronce, se destruyeron o se vaciaron muchas ciudades, se perdió la escritura en buena parte de la región y el comercio a larga distancia se redujo a lo mínimo. Los arqueólogos llaman a lo […]
More than 25,000 police officers were deployed across New Delhi recently to prevent demonstrations led by India’s new youth-led political movement, the Cockroach Janta Party (CJP). Government authorities had denied the CJP permission to protest on public-order grounds. The ensuing security operation saw the authorities shut one in six metro stations in the capital, barricade […]
India’s largest initial public offering (IPO) opens October 21, and investors in Tokyo, Singapore and Hong Kong are being asked a simple question: What is a Jio customer’s monthly bill worth? Jio Platforms, the Reliance-owned mobile carrier with some 524 million India-based customers, is selling 270 million new shares at 1,065 to 1,119 rupees each […]
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