On December 2, the Supreme Court will consider constitutional challenges to "assault weapon" bans in Connecticut and Cook County, Illinois, that cover widely owned rifles, including the AR-15. As the plaintiffs in those consolidated cases see it, such laws plainly violate the Second Amendment because they prohibit arms in common use for lawful purposes. In briefs filed on Wednesday, Connecticut and Cook County urge the justices to reject that test, saying a weapon's popularity is not dispositive. The relevant question, they say, is whether their rifle restrictions fit a historical tradition of banning "unusually dangerous weapons."

Cook County and Connecticut have the burden of showing that their laws are "consistent with this Nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation," the test established by the Supreme Court's 2022 decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen. On the face of it, that is a daunting challenge.

In the 2008 case District of Columbia v. Heller, the Supreme Court said the Second Amendment protects the right to own "bearable arms" that are "in common use" for "lawful purposes like self-defense." That description indisputably encompasses "AR-15 platform and similar semiautomatic rifles," the firearms at issue in these cases. But Heller also recognized "the historical tradition of prohibiting the carrying of 'dangerous and unusual weapons.'" Cook County and Connecticut argue that the rifles they have deemed intolerable fall into that category.

"There is a robust historical tradition of regulating unusually dangerous weapons that
compromise public safety," Cook County says. "Such regulations, which long
predate the founding, have included outright bans and other restrictions on exceptionally dangerous weapons like launcegays, trap guns, Bowie knives, and slung shots."

Cook County argues that its ordinance is "relevantly similar" to those historical restrictions because it targets "exceptionally lethal weapons that are disproportionate to the end of self-defense." AR-15s are "offensive weapons of war designed for maximum lethality and are not customarily used for self-defense," the brief says. "The purpose and operation of the ban is consistent with our Nation's historical tradition and accounts for the exceptional dangerousness of these technologically advanced weapons."

The ban is "an appropriate contemporary restriction implemented by the legislature in response to dramatic technological change and unprecedented societal concern," the brief says. "It is tailored to respond to the particular dangers presented in areas with mass casualty exposure and acute public safety risk."

Connecticut offers a similar argument. One problem with this defense is the premise that "assault weapon" bans focus on "exceptionally lethal weapons." As critics of such laws have been pointing out for decades, the features they target, such as folding stocks, pistol grips, and barrel shrouds, do not affect a rifle's basic operation. With or without them, a rifle fires the same ammunition at the same rate with the same muzzle velocity. And because AR-15s use intermediate-caliber ammunition, they are arguably less lethal than shotguns and many hunting rifles that are not classified as "assault weapons."

Cook County's emphasis on technological developments is also questionable. Constitutional guarantees establish principles that courts routinely apply to technologies that did not exist at the founding. Although the Framers did not have radio, television, or the internet, for example, the First Amendment nevertheless constrains government regulation of those media.

More specifically, Heller rejected the idea that modern weapons are not covered by the Second Amendment by recognizing a constitutional right to own semiautomatic pistols. The Supreme Court said "the Second Amendment extends, prima facie, to all instruments that constitute bearable arms, even those that were not in existence at the time of the founding." The Court confirmed that point in the 2016 case Caetano v. Massachusetts, which involved a state ban on stun guns.

Cook County also asserts that AR-15s are not suitable for self-defense, a claim that would be hotly contested by many owners of such rifles, who commonly report using them for that purpose. "Plaintiffs have shown that AR-15s are well-adapted for self-defense," U.S. District Judge Peter Sheridan wrote in 2024, when he reluctantly concluded that New Jersey's AR-15 ban was inconsistent with Heller while expressing his dismay at that result. "Evidence has been presented to the Court that the build of the AR-15 makes it well-suited to self-defense because it is 'light weight, [has] very mild recoil, and [has] good ergonomics'; it is a weapon which is 'well suited to younger shooters, female shooters, and other shooters of smaller stature.'"

Sheridan added that "the AR-15's design features—including the effectiveness of its cartridge for self-defense use and its better continuity of fire when used with available magazines—make the AR-15 a good choice for self-defense." And he noted that "the AR-15 has been used recently in several, relatively high-profile self-defense events in Florida, Illinois, Texas, Pennsylvania, and Oklahoma."

Cook County and Connecticut are also wrong in suggesting that self-defense is the only "lawful purpose" that matters. While Heller emphasized the use of handguns "in defense of hearth and home," it did not say that was the full extent of the Second Amendment right. To the contrary, the phrase "lawful purposes like self-defense" implies that the right extends to other uses, such as hunting, pest control, and target shooting. The decision explicitly mentioned hunting as a "reason Americans valued the ancient right."

The briefs are misleading in another way that may prove decisive. They conflate "dangerous and unusual" with "unusually dangerous," which is not the same thing.

During the 19th century, state legislators restricted (and sometimes banned) weapons such as Bowie knives, spears, sword canes, slungshots, and brass knuckles. But the historical evidence suggests those weapons were not targeted simply because they were "unusually dangerous." Legislators were also concerned about how the weapons were typically used.

Solicitor General D. John Sauer, who filed a brief supporting the challenges to the AR-15 bans, notes that the 19th-century laws targeted weapons associated with "duels, brawls, and other criminal activities." And in reviewing those laws, state courts distinguished between arms favored by criminals and arms commonly used for lawful purposes.

In 1871, for example, the Tennessee Supreme Court held that legislators could ban weapons that were "not usual" but could not ban "the usual arms of the citizen." The top courts of Texas, Arkansas, West Virginia, North Carolina, and Michigan concurred that the right to arms encompassed weapons commonly owned by law-abiding people, including rifles.

AR-15s and similar rifles readily pass that common-use test. In January, the National Shooting Sports Foundation, the gun industry's trade association, reported that Americans own more than 32 million "modern sporting rifles," its preferred term for the models covered by "assault weapon" bans. Survey data suggest that somewhere between 16 million and 25 million Americans have owned AR-15-style rifles. Last year, a unanimous Supreme Court described the AR-15 as "the most popular rifle in the country."

According to Cook County and Connecticut, however, none of that matters. "Once it is established that a regulation pursues a legitimate public safety objective in a permissible manner, raw ownership numbers cannot immunize a firearm from regulation," Cook County says. It argues that opponents of its ordinance have misconstrued the significance of the common-use test and misunderstood how it interacts with Bruen.

"When the Second Amendment's plain text covers an individual's conduct, the Constitution presumptively protects that conduct," the Supreme Court said in Bruen. "To justify its regulation, the government may not simply posit that the regulation promotes an important interest. Rather, the government must demonstrate that the regulation is consistent with this Nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation. Only if a firearm regulation is consistent with this Nation's historical tradition may a court conclude that the individual's conduct falls outside the Second Amendment's 'unqualified command.'"

The common-use question, Cook County argues, figures only in the first Bruen step: "the inquiry whether the weapon at issue is one 'the Second Amendment protects.'" But even if ownership of AR-15s is covered by "the Second Amendment's plain text," it says, that does not resolve the question of whether they can be banned, which depends on the historical analysis required by the second step of the Bruen test.

"This Court's decision in Bruen confirms that the Second Amendment's step-two inquiry does not insulate popularly owned firearms from regulation," the brief says. In
Bruen, it was "undisputed" that "handguns are weapons 'in common use' today for self-defense," including "outside the home." But "instead of being the end of this Court's inquiry, that observation was just the beginning." The decision also included an "extended analysis" of the historical laws that New York cited to justify its "proper cause" requirement for carry permits. "If lawful common use alone were enough to forbid regulation," Cook County argues, "there would have been no need to engage in that careful and prolonged analysis."

The question in Bruen was not whether the Second Amendment precludes "regulation." It was whether New York's specific approach, which required residents to demonstrate a "special need" before they were allowed to exercise the right to bear arms, was consistent with the historical tradition. That is why the Court considered (and rejected) the purported historical analogs that New York offered.

Cook County conflates requirements for carry permits, the issue in Bruen, with an outright ban on ownership, the policy it is defending. Connecticut likewise blurs the distinction between carry restrictions and complete prohibition.

"The Bowie knife was 'widely carried by Americans of all stripes,' including 'upstanding citizens and villains' alike," Connecticut's brief says. "The widespread use of Bowie knives and other weapons for lawful purposes did not prevent dozens of States from restricting those weapons." But those laws generally restricted or banned public carry. They rarely made it illegal to acquire or possess a Bowie knife, which is the approach that Connecticut and Cook County have taken with AR-15s.

That policy is hard to reconcile with Heller. I will quote Sheridan again, since his comments made it clear that he would have preferred to uphold New Jersey's AR-15 ban. Under Heller, he said, "a categorical ban on a class of weapons commonly used for self-defense is unlawful." Given "the Supreme Court's clear direction on this point," he concluded, New Jersey's law "is unconstitutional" as applied to "the Colt AR-15 for use for self-defense in the home."

Last July, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 3rd Circuit agreed and went further, extending that conclusion to "the full class of semi-automatic rifles" banned in New Jersey. "Together, Heller and Bruen teach that bans or broad prohibitions on possessing or carrying of a class of weapons in common use for lawful purposes fail to find support in our Nation's tradition of firearm regulation," Judge Arianna Freeman, a Joe Biden appointee, wrote in the majority opinion. "That principle resolves our inquiry here."

To beat back the challenges to their laws, Connecticut and Cook County will have to persuade the justices that the 3rd Circuit's understanding of Heller and Bruen is wrong, meaning they are free to ban firearms in common use for lawful purposes. That seems like a tall order, and Cook County's position is especially puzzling. According to its brief, the fact that a weapon is covered by the Second Amendment does not mean Americans have a right to possess it. The more you think about that claim, the less sense it makes.

The post Defending Its AR-15 Ban, Cook County Urges SCOTUS To Ignore the Rifle's Popularity appeared first on Reason Magazine.

French economist Gabriel Zucman has come to California bearing a familiar French solution to a fiscal problem: another tax.

Once based at the University of California, Berkeley, Zucman is back and campaigning for Proposition 40, which would impose an allegedly one-time 5 percent tax on the net worth of Californians worth more than $1 billion. Zucman, who coauthored the proposition, estimates that the tax could raise about $100 billion and claims that 90 percent of the proceeds would go to health care.

The California Legislative Analyst's office is far more cautious, saying it would raise only "tens of billions" and could cause a long-term loss of income-tax revenue as wealthy people leave the state with the companies they created.

I've written plenty about why wealth taxes are economically destructive, administratively nightmarish, and unlikely to achieve anything close to what their advocates promise. But Zucman's prescription is wrong for a more fundamental reason, as his (and my) native country shows: Raising taxes to fuel ever-larger demands for government spending is a recipe for disaster.

Unless you've been living in a remote cave recently, you've likely seen all the protests and destruction in France. But do you know why it's happening?

As another economist, Paul Krugman, rightly noted back in 2017, "France offers a social safety net beyond the wildest dreams of U.S. progressives: guaranteed high-quality health care for all, generous paid leave for new parents, universal pre-K, and much more."

For decades, France has answered any perceived desire with government spending, then responded to the resulting fiscal problem by seeking new revenue sources. Today, French government spending consumes roughly 58 percent of gross domestic product (GDP).

Krugman gloated that France wasn't suffering social collapse and speculated that it was due to all the spending. He certainly can't say that anymore. In fact, he is now worried that France may be on the precipice of a debt crisis. The truth is that France hasn't done well for some time, even when Krugman cheered its spending.

One of the groups in the street today, young people, has faced widespread unemployment for a long time. The youth unemployment rate in France (ages 15-24) has hovered between 17 percent and 27 percent since 2000. In the second quarter of 2026, it was 21.6 percent, against 14.8 percent in the Eurozone and 9.9 percent in the U.S.

French people also pay some of the highest taxes in the developed world, and they're not happy with the return. The government already takes more than 52 percent of the country's output in revenue, runs deficits exceeding 5 percent of GDP, and has accumulated debt approaching 120 percent of GDP. Nonetheless, French students complain that the government is shortchanging schools, while everyone sees that it is shortchanging its army and police.

The students aren't wrong to feel left out. At The Two Cents Substack, Hoover Institution scholar Hanno Lustig calculates that, between 1995 and 2024, spending on social protection and health (most of which benefits older people) rose from 53.1 percent to 58.7 percent of all French government spending. The share devoted to education, defense, and public order fell from 15.2 percent to 13.7 percent. Transportation fell from 5.3 percent to 3.8 percent.

In other words, France has built an enormous welfare state, much of it devoted to older citizens, while letting other state capacities and basic services fall apart. As transfers of wealth swallow a larger share of the budget, everything else gets squeezed.

That is the fiscal ratchet Californians should worry about when Zucman tells them Proposition 40 is necessary to "save" health care. Proponents claim Washington "cut" Medicaid, but that language is misleading. California's deficit started long before any Washington spending reductions. Besides, federal Medicaid spending isn't falling—not even close. The Congressional Budget Office estimates it will reach $708 billion in 2026, 8 percent more than in 2025. What Washington did in the 2025 budget reconciliation law was reduce Medicaid's future growth relative to previous projections, partly by changing eligibility and enrollment rules and financing arrangements.

This is how the ratchet works. Once the government projects a spending increase, anything less becomes a cut. And once Washington fails to finance the entire projected increase, Californians are told that Sacramento must backfill the missing money. And how should it do that? Conveniently, by creating an entirely new tax.

France has run this experiment for decades. It has an incredibly generous welfare state paid for with very high taxes; it's even tried a wealth tax and has a value-added tax, yet somehow it's never enough. Its welfare state has not eliminated scarcity. It has merely transferred the job of rationing scarce resources to politicians.

Zucman looks at California and sees hundreds of billions of dollars of private wealth waiting to solve a public finance problem. Californians should look across the Atlantic and ask a different question: What happens after politicians decide that every spending adjustment can be delayed until tomorrow by finding another pot of private wealth?

France should not be sending California tax advice. It should be sending a warning.

COPYRIGHT 2026 CREATORS.COM

The post France Is a Warning to California's Tax-the-Rich Crowd appeared first on Reason Magazine.

Defence secretary says Britain must manufacture at scale as Germany’s Rheinmetall opens Midlands factory

For the last 20 years, Britain was unable to put a barrel on its tanks without buying from abroad. Relying on foreign allies seemed like a reasonable choice during years of relative security (for wealthy countries at least) after the end of the cold war.

But Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has changed the calculation – and prompted a scramble to rearm among European countries, including the UK.

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© Photograph: Christopher Thomond/The Guardian

© Photograph: Christopher Thomond/The Guardian

© Photograph: Christopher Thomond/The Guardian

Six years after the Abraham Accords, a new report by a former Israeli intelligence chief outlines a doctrine treating peace deals as temporary and regional instability as an asset. (This the latest chapter of a decades long Israeli strategy)

Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth’s team dropped and damaged a historic World War II-era globe previously used by Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, a source familiar with the incident told The Hill on Thursday. While moving the artifact to the secretary’s office, Hegseth’s staff lost control of the 30-inch floor globe, causing it to crash on its…

Experts say Russia is trying to destroy energy infrastructure before winter and US ‘appeasement and flattery’ will not achieve peace

Russia has carried out a massive “demonstrative” attack on Ukraine, bombarding Kyiv with ballistic missiles just hours after Vladimir Putin said he had agreed to resume trilateral negotiations after talks with the US envoy Steve Witkoff.

Overnight, Moscow pounded the Ukrainian capital, killing at least two people and wounding 22, including four children. Targets included the southern bridge over the Dnipro River, civilian houses, energy infrastructure, an ambulance station, office buildings and a clinic.

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© Photograph: Efrem Lukatsky/AP

© Photograph: Efrem Lukatsky/AP

© Photograph: Efrem Lukatsky/AP

European Union negotiators have reached a provisional agreement to revise the rules governing the bloc’s carbon market, increasing the number of emissions allowances that can remain in reserve before being permanently cancelled.

The agreement, reached by the Council and European Parliament on 20th October and announced the following day, raises the invalidation threshold of the EU Emissions Trading System’s market stability reserve from 400 million to 700 million allowances.

The compromise reached by EU negotiators follows months of pressure from energy-intensive industries concerned about carbon prices, electricity costs and competition from manufacturers operating under less restrictive environmental regimes.

The measure requires formal approval before entering into force and forms part of a wider review of the EU’s principal carbon-pricing mechanism.

A larger reserve for future market disruptions

Established in 2019, the market stability reserve was designed to address the accumulation of surplus emissions allowances that had weakened the effectiveness of Europe’s carbon market.

Under the Emissions Trading System, companies in covered sectors must surrender allowances corresponding to their greenhouse gas emissions. The total quantity available is progressively reduced, creating a financial incentive to cut emissions.

The reserve adjusts the supply of allowances entering the market, withdrawing them when there is a substantial surplus and releasing them under specified conditions when supply becomes scarce.

Existing rules also provide for the permanent cancellation of allowances held above a threshold of 400 million.

Under the new agreement, that threshold would increase to 700 million, allowing a larger stock to remain available for potential future release.

The change does not automatically introduce 300 million additional allowances into circulation. Releases would continue to depend on the reserve’s operating rules and market conditions.

According to the Council, more than three billion allowances have been invalidated since the mechanism began operating in 2023.

The Commission initially proposed ending automatic invalidation indefinitely, while the Council’s September negotiating position envisaged a temporary suspension followed by a higher threshold.

The compromise retains invalidation but increases the amount protected from cancellation.

Industry competitiveness enters climate negotiations

The agreement follows growing concern about the cumulative cost of European climate regulation, particularly for steelmaking, chemicals, cement and other energy-intensive sectors. Manufacturers have warned that carbon costs, combined with relatively expensive electricity and industrial gas, complicate investment decisions and weaken their ability to compete internationally.

Brussels must also consider the consequences of production shifting to jurisdictions with lower emissions-related costs, a phenomenon known as carbon leakage. Earlier this year, EU Today examined the Commission’s consideration of changes to industrial protections under the ETS, including the relationship between free allowances and the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism.

The latest reserve agreement does not directly change the allocation of free allowances, the emissions cap or the obligations imposed on individual industrial installations. Its principal effect would be to preserve a larger buffer that could become available if future market conditions trigger the release mechanism.

For manufacturers planning investments extending into the 2030s, the availability of allowances and the future trajectory of carbon prices influence production costs and the commercial case for decarbonisation technologies.

Carbon market figures reveal changing conditions

The European Commission reported in May that the total number of allowances in circulation during 2025 stood at approximately 1.023 billion.

Its annual market stability reserve calculation provided for approximately 190.5 million allowances to be withdrawn from auctions between September 2026 and August 2027.

These withdrawals reflect the existing mechanism for reducing market surpluses. The proposed higher invalidation threshold concerns how many allowances can subsequently remain in reserve rather than being cancelled.

The overall emissions cap will continue to decline under the legislation already governing the ETS.

Consequently, preserving a larger reserve does not remove the long-term constraint on emissions or guarantee lower carbon prices for European industry.

The agreement also concerns the established ETS covering power generation, industry and certain other sectors, rather than the separate ETS2 regime for emissions associated with road transport and buildings.

The latter has generated its own political controversy, as EU Today reported following the October European Council summit.

Broader ETS reform remains unresolved

The Council and Parliament have agreed that the question of gradually reducing the invalidation threshold should be considered during the broader ETS review.

That exercise will address the carbon market’s operation over a longer period, when the declining supply of allowances could create tighter conditions.

The present agreement therefore provides an adjustment to the reserve mechanism without reopening the entire emissions trading framework. Following legal and technical finalisation, the provisional deal must be endorsed by both institutions and formally adopted.

The new 700 million threshold would apply after the legislation takes effect, while the larger review of the ETS continues through the EU legislative process.

Some speakers at the conference suggested that it is time for Jews to stop accusing Israel critics of antisemitism, and start recognizing that it may be time to cut the cord.

Steve Witkoff’s flattery of the Russian leader could be just the start of a mendacious stratagem from a US president who says Moscow ‘has been fine on Ukraine’

They say the first casualty of war is truth. For the Trump administration, the road to peace with Russia now encompasses some extraordinary lies.

Steve Witkoff delivered one as he sat down with Vladimir Putin in St Petersburg on Wednesday, aiming to close the deal on Russia’s land grab in Ukraine with the White House’s strategy of maximum pressure on Kyiv and saccharine flattery of the Kremlin.

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© Photograph: Pete Kiehart/The Guardian

© Photograph: Pete Kiehart/The Guardian

© Photograph: Pete Kiehart/The Guardian

Russia frees Stephen Hubbard after US request while Steve Witkoff praises Putin, wanted by ICC as war criminal, as a ‘humanitarian’

Vladimir Putin ordered the release of an American man from a Russian jail as he met Donald Trump’s envoy Steve Witkoff in St Petersburg on Wednesday for fresh talks on ending the war in Ukraine, amid increasingly close relations between Moscow and Washington.

Trump had previously asked Putin to free Stephen Hubbard, a 74-year-old former teacher who had spent more than four years in Russian jails on charges of fighting as a mercenary for Ukraine.

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© Photograph: Gavriil Grigorov/Reuters

© Photograph: Gavriil Grigorov/Reuters

© Photograph: Gavriil Grigorov/Reuters

Back in 2024, D. Trump campaigned on cheaper energy; yet, sanctions and other forms of pressure on foreign actors, characteristic of Washington’s foreign policy, took its toll on the US through freight markets and fuel prices, having increased costs for American consumers. This economic blowback deserves more attention than the administration’s production slogans. Additional oil […]

Talks in Oslo have restored diplomatic contact between Kyiv and Washington, but Donald Trump continues to demand concessions from Ukraine while Moscow shows little willingness to compromise. Steve Witkoff’s forthcoming meeting with Russian officials will expose the limits of the American peace initiative.

The latest negotiations over Russia’s war against Ukraine have produced a renewed diplomatic initiative, with US presidential envoy Steve Witkoff preparing to travel to St Petersburg on Wednesday, 21 October, following consultations with Ukrainian and European leaders in Oslo.

President Volodymyr Zelenskyy met Witkoff alongside Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre and Finnish President Alexander Stubb on Tuesday. Jared Kushner, Donald Trump’s son-in-law, participated remotely. The discussions covered territorial questions, security guarantees, sanctions and proposals for a partial ceasefire.

The meeting concluded with cautious expressions of optimism. Stubb suggested that the negotiating process was back on track, while Støre confirmed that Witkoff would present proposals developed by American, Ukrainian and European representatives to the Russian leadership.

However, the diplomatic improvement contrasts with Trump’s renewed public pressure on Zelenskyy, raising questions about Washington’s negotiating strategy and whether Moscow has any intention of accepting the proposed settlement.

Washington’s contradictory signals

Speaking in the Oval Office on Tuesday, Trump again insisted that Ukraine must reach an agreement with Russia, portraying Moscow’s military position as increasingly advantageous.

His remarks closely resembled arguments advanced during earlier disputes with Zelenskyy, when Washington pressed Kyiv to accept territorial concessions rather than increase pressure on the Kremlin.

Meanwhile, Secretary of State Marco Rubio sought to reassure the Ukrainian leadership that American military cooperation had not been deliberately restricted.

Rubio denied that Trump had ordered changes to intelligence-sharing or weapons assistance. Zelenskyy subsequently confirmed that Ukraine was again receiving American early-warning intelligence concerning Russian ballistic missile attacks.

Nevertheless, serious problems remain. Ukraine has reported delays in deliveries of American-made Patriot interceptors purchased by European allies, while restrictions affecting the military Starshield satellite communications system have not been fully resolved.

These difficulties are particularly serious as Russia intensifies attacks against Ukrainian electricity infrastructure, attempting to undermine civilian services ahead of winter.

The conflicting signals leave Kyiv negotiating with an administration whose diplomatic representatives promise continued cooperation while its president publicly demands Ukrainian concessions.

Security guarantees without NATO membership

Among the proposals discussed in Oslo were security arrangements intended to provide Ukraine with protection comparable to NATO’s Article 5 collective-defence provision.

Zelenskyy acknowledged that American representatives had discussed such guarantees, although their precise obligations and enforcement mechanisms remain undisclosed.

The proposal presents a fundamental negotiating problem.

Russia has consistently opposed Ukrainian NATO membership, partly because the alliance’s collective-defence commitments would increase the consequences of any renewed Russian aggression.

An alternative arrangement offering genuinely comparable protection would consequently encounter many of the same Russian objections.

Conversely, guarantees lacking a credible enforcement mechanism would leave Ukraine exposed to another attack after a ceasefire.

Moscow’s record provides little reassurance. Russia violated Ukraine’s internationally recognised borders in 2014 and launched its full-scale invasion in 2022 despite previous commitments to respect Ukrainian sovereignty.

The Kremlin’s objectives extend beyond territory

Washington’s approach appears increasingly concentrated on securing an agreement involving territorial concessions and restrictions on Ukraine’s future security arrangements.

Yet Putin’s objectives have consistently extended beyond the territories occupied by Russian forces.

The Kremlin has demanded constraints on Ukraine’s military capabilities, international alliances and strategic independence. Accepting territorial gains alone would not necessarily satisfy Moscow’s wider political ambitions.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has maintained that Moscow is unwilling to make substantial political concessions, while the Kremlin continues to insist that any agreement must address what it describes as the underlying causes of the conflict.

Those conditions have previously included demands that would substantially restrict Ukraine’s sovereignty.

Consequently, even a Ukrainian willingness to consider elements of Washington’s proposals would not guarantee Russian acceptance.

The political calculation behind an energy ceasefire

One possibility under consideration is a limited ceasefire protecting energy and potentially food-related infrastructure.

Zelenskyy has indicated that Ukraine could suspend attacks against Russian energy facilities if Moscow stopped striking Ukrainian infrastructure.

Such an arrangement could reduce immediate civilian suffering. It would also have military and economic consequences.

Ukrainian attacks against Russian refineries, oil terminals and other energy installations have increasingly targeted infrastructure supporting Moscow’s war economy.

A temporary suspension could allow Russia to repair damaged facilities, restore production and stabilise export revenues. Without credible monitoring and enforcement, Moscow could exploit a limited agreement while leaving the wider conflict unresolved.

Trump has additional reasons to seek a rapid diplomatic result. With American congressional elections scheduled for 3 November, his administration is attempting to contain domestic fuel prices and demonstrate progress towards ending the war.

His recent decision to ease restrictions on Russian diesel exports has already provoked concern in Kyiv and European capitals over the potential financial benefits to Moscow.

The danger for Ukraine is that an agreement presented as a diplomatic achievement in Washington could provide Russia with economic relief without altering its military objectives.

The decision awaiting Washington

Witkoff’s visit to St Petersburg will establish whether Moscow is prepared to engage with the proposals developed in Oslo.

Putin could accept a temporary arrangement, particularly one suspending Ukrainian strikes on Russian energy infrastructure, while postponing discussions over territorial and political questions.

Alternatively, Moscow could reject the initiative and maintain its existing demands.

In either case, Washington will face a decision over the consequences of Russian intransigence.

For Kyiv, continued engagement with the United States remains essential because American intelligence, satellite communications and advanced air-defence weapons cannot readily be replaced.

But the prospects for a negotiated settlement will depend less on further Ukrainian concessions than on whether Russia faces sufficient political, military and economic pressure to abandon its maximalist demands.

The Oslo negotiations have restored cooperation between Ukraine, Europe and American mediators. They have not established that Putin is prepared to end the war on terms compatible with Ukraine’s continued independence.

Advance warnings of missile attacks were seemingly suspended last week by the White House, but Ukraine’s president says: ‘Now it works’

The US has resumed sharing intelligence with Kyiv about Russian missile strikes, Volodymyr Zelenskyy said on Tuesday after a meeting with the US envoy Steve Witkoff in Norway.

He said Ukraine was again receiving advance warnings of ballistic missile attacks, which were seemingly suspended last week by the White House. “Now it works. It’s great,” he said, adding that the US move would save lives.

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© Photograph: Heiko Junge/Pool NTB/AP

© Photograph: Heiko Junge/Pool NTB/AP

© Photograph: Heiko Junge/Pool NTB/AP

Happy Tuesday, and welcome to another edition of Rent Free. This week, we're going to jump right into it with a philosophical question: What is an accessory dwelling unit anyway? 

It's a question that officials in Somerville, Massachusetts, are realizing they didn't know the answer to after learning that a state law allowing ADUs in single-family neighborhoods could also require them to approve three-story backyard mini-apartments. 

As the Boston Globe reported on Sunday, Somerville's "deep ethos in favor of new housing" is being tested by the extent of the state law. Elected officials are describing the potential for three-story ADUs as a "joke," and the area's state lawmakers, including one who voted for the state law, are demanding reforms to stop them. 

The law in question was a statewide accessory dwelling unit (ADU) legalization tucked inside a major housing package of mostly new spending programs that passed in 2024. 

The bill required municipalities to allow ADUs of either 900 square feet or half the size of the primary dwelling (whichever is smaller) anywhere single-family homes are allowed. A subsequent rule issued by state regulators also forbade localities from imposing height and bulk limits on ADUs that are stricter than the limits imposed on primary dwellings. 

That latter rule is what's causing Somerville's freakout. 

Because the town allows triple-decker apartments (a three-story triplex common in New England) in all its single-family zones, the state rule means that it must also allow ADUs to be three stories tall. 

The Globe story notes that the mini-triple-deckers could still only be 900 square feet, meaning each floor of a mini-triple-decker would have to be pretty small. Thus far, no one has proposed building an ADU tower in Somerville. 

Even so, the town is worried that someone will eventually propose one of these "out-of-scale" units that it'll have to approve. Its officials are now agitating for changes to the state law to prevent this. 

On the one hand, one can perhaps understand why Somerville officials feel blindsided. 

The text of the 2024 ADU law allows localities to set "reasonable" height and bulk limits on accessory units. It was state regulators who decided after the law's passage that requiring ADUs to be shorter than the primary unit was "unreasonable." 

On the other hand, allowing a second home on a lot to be as tall as the first house sounds "reasonable" enough. Can one complain about out-of-scale development when the new unit is the same height as an existing home and a little bit smaller?

Somerville is not the first city where people's own colloquial definition of an accessory unit as "a tiny home that doesn't bother anyone" has clashed with official regulatory definitions that allow ADUs to be a fair bit bigger. 

San Diego's ADU Bonus program once allowed a technically unlimited number of ADUs to be built on single-family parcels near transit stops. (Height and bulk regulations imposed practical limits on how many units could fit on a site.) 

That enabled developers to build what were, in effect, ADU apartment complexes on large single-family lots throughout the city. This year, the city imposed new restrictions to stop these "monster" ADU developments, including a per-lot accessory unit cap. 

The latest dust-up in Somerville, like the San Diego controversy before it, provides several lessons about the realities of housing reform. 

The first is that the definition of "accessory dwelling unit" is completely arbitrary. 

In Massachusetts, an ADU is a 900-square-foot home that can be one story or three stories, depending on the town and zoning district it's being built in. 

In Montana, it's a 1,000-square-foot unit. In California, state law can require localities to allow ADUs as large as 1,200 square feet. Under certain conditions, these ADUs can even be sold separately from the main house. 

At a certain point, an accessory dwelling unit is just a dwelling unit. A house is a house. 

The second lesson is that any ADU reform that is actually intended to produce new housing units is going to cause controversy.  

State and local laws allowing ADUs have been one of the more common forms of housing reforms to pass. 

Supply-boosters see them as a way to get a modest number of new units. Supply skeptics don't see much to object to about allowing someone to install a kitchenette and bathroom in their garage.  

If the ADU regulations don't allow much more than the garage conversion, supply-boosters will be disappointed and push for expansions of the law. California passed dozens of ADU laws before they started enabling actual units to be built. 

If an ADU law actually allows more homes, the ADUs will look like homes, and the supply skeptics will be mad. 

No amount of branding or planning will resolve the inherent conflict of some people wanting more development while others oppose it in their neighborhoods. 

Thus far, Massachusetts' ADU law has been modestly productive. The state's ADU survey reports that 2,048 ADU permits have been issued since the state law went into effect in January 2025. About half of those units are attached ADUs (think the garage with the kitchenette). 

That's a little under 10 percent of Massachusetts total housing production during that time, per the Census Bureau's building permit survey.  

At 50 units permitted, Somerville has actually approved the second most ADUs of any jurisdiction in the state. (Boston has only approved 49.) 

But now that it's facing the prospect of allowing ADUs that look like actual homes, it's starting to get cold feet about the new law. 

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Quick Links

• Speaking of Massachusetts, the town of Marblehead (of "are we kind of being pricks?" fame) has at last had its rezoning plan, which allows apartments in more districts, accepted by state officials. 
• While Spain is tightening its tenant protections and rent controls in the face of housing protests, Portugal is trying to remove regulations on its rental housing industry. Either way, housing protesters are clashing with police. 
• Single-family homebuilder confidence continues to drop. 
• The Urban Institute has a new white paper on whether data center development is coming at the expense of housing development. 
• A new report on home construction in Chicago finds that the practice of aldermanic privilege (where individual aldermen can veto projects in their district) is strangling development. 

The post ADU Nihilism appeared first on Reason Magazine.

GOP lawmakers threaten to pull support for president’s agenda after Russia diesel deal and sanctions pause

• US politics live – latest updates

A handful of Republicans have spoken out against Donald Trump’s softening stance on Russia, threatening to pull financial support for his agenda over his “embarrassing” handling of the Ukraine war.

Don Bacon, an outgoing congressman in Nebraska, condemned Trump’s actions – which include a stunning agreement to buy Russian diesel and the pausing of sanctions on Moscow – as “absolutely disgraceful” and accused the US president of cozying up to a “war criminal” in Vladimir Putin, his Russian counterpart.

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© Photograph: Brendan Smialowski/AFP/Getty Images

© Photograph: Brendan Smialowski/AFP/Getty Images

© Photograph: Brendan Smialowski/AFP/Getty Images

Protests rarely remain confined to the grievances that first bring people into the streets. When the citizens believe their concerns are being ignored, a grievance over a particular policy or administrative decision can evolve into a broader challenge to the political authority. Consequently, what begins as a demand for correction becomes a question of accountability. […]

The post In Delhi or Paris, restoring order cannot replace public trust appeared first on Asia Times.

Bringing Order to Anarchy: Governing the World to Come, by Charles Kupchan, Yale University Press, 328 pages, $32.50

In popular rendering, international politics since 1945 has been shaped by the so-called "liberal order." Led by the United States, a bundle of international institutions, rules, and norms intended to limit interstate competition and facilitate cooperation were widely embraced, contributing (per this narrative) to a peaceful and prosperous world. Today, that system seems to be breaking down, leaving policymakers, pundits, and scholars grappling with what a future order should entail and how this system should be orchestrated.

Rivers of ink have already flowed in service of this foundational question. To the mix we can now add Charles Kupchan's Bringing Order to Anarchy. Kupchan, a professor of government at Georgetown University and a senior fellow with the Council on Foreign Relations, is interested in both how the present crisis of order arrived and what should be done about it—as he puts it, "How did we get here?" and "What do we do now?" In his telling, we arrived at this moment because of the diffusion of power abroad, combined with shifts in domestic priorities among key members of the post-1945 order (especially the United States). The post-1945 order, he concludes, is thus irredeemably broken.

Going forward in what he sees as an increasingly multipolar world, Kupchan advocates a "global system of concerts" modeled on the Concert of Europe—the international order established after the Napoleonic wars. His proposed system would prioritize relations among the great powers, creating "informal and flexible steering groups" that would emphasize "building consensus, establishing lateral lines of authority across power centers, and providing top down governance." In practice, influence and authority would devolve to different regions, within which local great powers would play leading roles in shaping regional affairs. Meanwhile, the great powers would meet as part of a global concert, sitting atop regional orders as a kind of deconfliction and organizing body.

The most welcome contribution here is Kupchan's call to accept the end of the post-1945 order and to work within the constraints of a new distribution of power. For all that policymakers and analysts recognize that change is needed, the debate over the future of international order tends to focus on preserving whatever elements of the existing order we can. It also tends to attribute the need for change to shifts in U.S. domestic politics. Kupchan, on the other hand, helpfully reminds us that order depends first and foremost on the distribution of power. States, after all, are the building blocks of any international system, just as relative power affects both what they want and their options for pursuing their interests. The creation and maintenance of an order therefore hinges on whether it broadly reflects the distribution of power, allowing states to get some of what they want, through means most can accept.

It follows that pronounced shifts in the distribution of power require adjustments in the larger system. The greater the shift, the greater the change. And since the power shift underway today is foundational—with China emerging as a peer competitor to the United States, American power in relative decline, and power diffusing away from the West (broadly conceived)—it would be extremely foolhardy to try to preserve an order created at a very different historical moment. With a new distribution of power, Kupchan recognizes, a new system is required. Hard stop.

Still, Kupchan's call for creating a concert to replace the extant order is not entirely convincing. Two problems stand out.

First, the very same power shifts that require change to the current system leave the efficacy of the concert approach open to question. If great powers are to play the leading role in a concert system, it matters both which states constitute the great powers and how their relative power compares to one another. But amid a power shift, these are the very issues that are likely to be intensely contested, if not fundamentally uncertain. It's inauspicious for the envisioned concert, for instance, that scholars of international politics cannot agree whether the world today is unipolar, multipolar, bipolar, or something else altogether. Absent some baseline understanding of the distribution of power, it is difficult to see how a concert would form, gain buy-in, and operate successfully. 

Kupchan's invocation of the Concert of Europe itself alludes to the problem. It is no accident that the Concert formed only after 25 years of warfare clarified the European distribution of power, and waned as power shifted (due heavily to the emergence of Germany). Nevertheless, Kupchan doesn't seriously engage with this core requirement for a concert model when he makes the case for a concert today. The result is a tension between the book's underlying logic and its top-line policy prescription.

Second, and relatedly, it is not completely clear what the concert's remit would actually entail. On one hand, Kupchan argues that the "Global Concert would be a consultative body, not a decision-making one"; it would "tee up decisions that could be taken and implemented" by other ordering bodies. Yet Kupchan also notes that a key virtue of concerts writ large is their ability to "lower the bar to reaching and abiding by agreements"; similarly, he calls for concert diplomacy that would set up "bespoke steering groups to tackle specific challenges," particularly in security affairs. This suggests something grander than a consultative body. "Reaching and abiding by agreements" and setting up ad hoc fora to tackle specific challenges are decisions. Indeed, even "teeing up" ideas and decisions that could be tackled by subordinate international institutions and structures is a kind of decision. 

One gets the sense that Kupchan is not totally comfortable with the implications of his own reasoning. If new great powers are emerging and are poised to dominate international politics, and if these states are to coordinate with one another in small group settings, it seems likely that the concert would be a decision-making body. Alternatively, if the concert is to truly function as a consultative body, it is unclear why new great powers eager to assert influence over the international agenda would sign up and give credence to this exercise.

Beyond the logic of the concert system itself, no review of Bringing Order to Anarchy would be complete without some reflection on the volume's discussion of U.S. politics. The book contains a lengthy list of proposed domestic changes, including calls to encourage civility, forge bipartisan consensus, put the U.S. fiscal house in order, and avoid ideological excesses at home. No doubt many readers would agree with these recommendations. Still, it is not really clear what these proposals do to advance Kupchan's core arguments. Rather than directly affecting the creation or operation of a concert order, the domestic challenges he wants to remedy act as constraints on U.S. power: They impede the translation of U.S. material capabilities into international influence. Accordingly, a concert system could operate even with a domestically dazed and confused United States—the U.S. would simply be a less effective participant. Changing the domestic status quo may be a good thing, but it is not central to the mission of explaining what a future international order entails. The book's domestic discussion ends up being an odd discursion.

Still, this is an important book. In calling for casting the former order aside, Kupchan brings needed clarity to a meandering discussion. By the same token, it is very useful to bring insights from the Concert of Europe into the policy conversation. Whatever gaps there might be in its ideas about the logic and operation of a concert system—or the relationship of domestic politics to a concert—the book raises a new set of options, and that in itself is a valuable contribution to the discussion.

The post After the International 'Liberal Order' appeared first on Reason Magazine.

Anche Roche si aggiunge alle aziende farmaceutiche che stanno riconsiderando i propri investimenti in Germania. In un’intervista pubblicata il 19 ottobre dal quotidiano Die Welt, Daniel Steiners, responsabile delle attività tedesche del gruppo svizzero, ha annunciato la sospensione temporanea di tutte le future decisioni di investimento nel Paese. Una scelta che non riguarda i progetti già approvati, tra cui l’ampliamento del sito bavarese di Penzberg, per oltre 600 milioni di euro, ma che rappresenta un ulteriore segnale delle difficoltà nei rapporti tra industria farmaceutica e governo tedesco.

Al centro delle critiche vi sono le politiche di contenimento della spesa farmaceutica, con cui Berlino punta a ridurre la pressione finanziaria sul sistema di assicurazione sanitaria obbligatoria. Secondo Steiners, anziché intervenire sulle criticità strutturali del sistema, il governo starebbe privilegiando risparmi di breve periodo, trasferendo nuovi oneri sulle imprese e compromettendo la fiducia necessaria a programmare investimenti.

Non solo Roche

Il caso Roche non è isolato. Già a giugno Boehringer Ingelheim aveva annunciato la cancellazione di investimenti programmati in Germania per circa 900 milioni di euro nel periodo 2027-2030, mentre Eli Lilly aveva ridimensionato i propri progetti, dimezzando la quota iniziale prevista, pari a 2,3 miliardi. Il suo amministratore delegato, Dave Ricks, è tornato a criticare le scelte del governo in un’intervista del 2 ottobre all’Handelsblatt, sostenendo che le misure correttive prospettate hanno “tradito la sua fiducia”. Anche Pfizer, attraverso una lettera dell’amministratore delegato Albert Bourla al cancelliere Friedrich Merz, ha annunciato a inizio estate una revisione delle priorità relative ai futuri investimenti nel Paese.

L’indagine statunitense

Alle tensioni tra governo tedesco e industria farmaceutica si aggiunge anche quella con Washington. La Germania, d’altronde, è stata anche il primo Paese europeo a finire direttamente nel mirino dell’amministrazione Trump per le proprie politiche di prezzo dei farmaci. Lo scorso 18 giugno, lo United States trade representative (Ustr) ha avviato un’indagine commerciale ai sensi della Section 301 del Trade act del 1974, per accertare se il sistema tedesco di determinazione dei prezzi dei medicinali innovativi penalizzi le aziende americane. Secondo Washington, i prezzi contenuti e gli sconti imposti alle imprese finirebbero per trasferire sui pazienti statunitensi una quota sproporzionata dei costi globali di ricerca e sviluppo. Nel mirino, proprio le nuove misure di contenimento della spesa farmaceutica previste da Berlino.

Come ricostruito da Politico, Washington punta a ottenere da Berlino un accordo che preveda una maggiore spesa per i medicinali innovativi, sul modello di quanto negoziato con il Regno Unito. In caso contrario, le eventuali ritorsioni commerciali potrebbero colpire anche altri settori, a partire dall’automotive, che nel 2025 ha rappresentato per la Germania oltre 28 miliardi di euro di esportazioni verso gli Stati Uniti.

Dalla Germania all’Italia, il nodo dei prezzi e dell’accesso

A richiamare l’attenzione sulla questione anche nello Stivale, in un’intervista pubblicata oggi dal Sole 24 Ore, Shashank Deshpande, Ceo di Boehringer Ingelheim, ha invitato a prestare attenzione alle conseguenze delle politiche europee di prezzo e rimborso sugli investimenti farmaceutici. In particolare, ha avvertito che il ricorso all’Mfn, rischia di “ridurre l’incentivo a lanciare farmaci innovativi”. L’Ad della casa farmaceutica tedesca ha evidenziato le difficoltà italiane sul fronte dell’accesso alle cure, ricordando come un medicinale sviluppato anche grazie alla ricerca italiana possa arrivare prima ai pazienti cinesi che a quelli italiani. Un ritardo riconducibile, secondo il manager, alla complessità delle procedure regolatorie e di rimborso, che in Italia richiedono mediamente oltre 400 giorni dopo l’approvazione europea, contro i 56 della Germania, “mentre in altre regioni del mondo si moltiplicano i percorsi di approvazione accelerata”. Tuttavia Deshpande ha sottolineato di apprezzare il fatto che “il governo italiano riconosca l’importanza di un approccio olistico alla salute”, e si è detto fiducioso rispetto alla possibilità per il Paese di “riuscire a ridisegnare il proprio quadro di governance, eliminando meccanismi che risultano dannosi non solo per il settore farmaceutico, ma soprattutto per i pazienti”. “La nostra presenza in Italia è solida, e non abbiamo alcuna intenzione di modificarla”, ha aggiunto.

Zelenskyy’s urgent discussion with the US Secretary of State suggests that Washington cannot pursue accommodation with Moscow without confronting opposition in Congress, the requirements of American national security and Ukraine’s continuing dependence on US military support.

The telephone conversation between Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and US Secretary of State Marco Rubio on Tuesday, 20 October, has exposed an increasingly uncomfortable contradiction in American policy towards Russia. While President Donald Trump is easing economic pressure on Moscow and attempting to restrain Ukrainian attacks on Russian energy infrastructure, senior members of his administration are having to address the consequences for Ukraine’s defence.

Zelenskyy raised three immediate concerns: the availability of Patriot interceptor missiles, interruptions to American early-warning intelligence concerning Russian ballistic attacks, and restrictions affecting Starlink and Starshield satellite communications. He described the discussion as constructive, expressing appreciation for Rubio’s willingness to help.

The significance lies less in the diplomatic language than in the circumstances surrounding the call. Washington is attempting to obtain concessions from Moscow while several of its own decisions have weakened confidence in the security arrangements on which Kyiv depends. Rubio’s involvement suggests that these difficulties cannot simply be left unresolved while Trump’s envoys pursue another round of negotiations.

The political cost of concessions to Moscow

Trump’s recent decisions concerning Russian energy exports have brought an existing disagreement over Ukraine into American domestic politics.

The administration has facilitated Russian diesel exports and waived new sanctions under the Graham Act, legislation intended to increase pressure on Russia and its principal energy customers. Rubio has said the president will use a 60-day period to assess the economic consequences of implementing the measures.

For Trump, the immediate attraction is apparent. Rising fuel prices have become a political liability ahead of the 3 November congressional midterm elections. Increasing supplies on international markets offers the administration a potential means of relieving pressure on American consumers.

The difficulty is that concessions to Vladimir Putin carry their own electoral consequences. Moscow remains deeply unpopular among substantial sections of the American political establishment, including Republicans who regard support for Ukraine as a matter of American strategic interest.

That opposition is no longer confined to public criticism. Republican senators have joined Democrats in challenging decisions affecting Ukraine’s military capabilities, creating an additional problem for an administration already facing a difficult electoral environment.

Trump can justify Russian energy concessions as an attempt to protect American consumers. Explaining why Ukraine should simultaneously experience interruptions to critical defence systems is considerably more difficult.

Rubio and the machinery of American foreign policy

Rubio’s position within the administration is particularly important. As both Secretary of State and National Security Adviser, he occupies two offices central to the formulation and execution of American foreign policy.

His conversation with Zelenskyy took place during a diplomatic tour of Uzbekistan and India, demonstrating that the deterioration in relations with Kyiv required attention even while the administration was pursuing other international priorities.

It would be premature to interpret Rubio’s intervention as evidence of an independent foreign policy. There is no indication that he is acting against Trump’s instructions. The more plausible interpretation is that the administration recognises a need to contain the consequences of its recent decisions without requiring the president publicly to reverse his position.

The controversy surrounding Starshield is particularly revealing. Reuters reported that instructions to restrict the satellite service used by Ukrainian forces originated inside the White House. The officials cited did not identify who authorised the order, while the administration has denied Trump’s personal involvement.

Separately, Zelenskyy has reported failures to receive advance warnings of Russian ballistic attacks. The cause of those interruptions remains disputed.

These developments have already attracted congressional scrutiny. Republican Senator Thom Tillis and Democratic Senator Jeanne Shaheen led a bipartisan request for an investigation, warning that failures in communications and intelligence-sharing may have endangered American personnel in Ukraine.

Congress cannot directly manage the administration’s foreign policy. Nevertheless, its powers over expenditure, legislation and oversight make sustained opposition politically consequential, particularly when members of the president’s own party are involved.

Ukraine needs military assistance, not diplomatic promises

The immediate requirements in Kyiv are considerably more specific than the objectives being discussed in Washington’s diplomatic negotiations.

Ukraine needs reliable satellite communications, uninterrupted intelligence concerning incoming missiles and sufficient Patriot interceptors to defend its cities and critical infrastructure. Delays in any of these areas have consequences that cannot be addressed through declarations about a future peace settlement.

The shortage of Patriot missiles is particularly serious. Zelenskyy has complained that American authorisation is delaying deliveries under arrangements financed by European governments. Washington’s commitments elsewhere, including the Middle East, add further pressure to American air-defence inventories.

Meanwhile, preparations for new negotiations in Oslo involving American envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner continue. The involvement of European leaders may broaden the diplomatic discussion, but it does not resolve the central obstacle: Putin has offered no convincing indication that he is prepared to end the invasion on terms acceptable to Ukraine.

Proposals concerning Ukrainian elections, NATO membership or alternative negotiating arrangements remain subordinate to that problem. Without a ceasefire that can be enforced, even an agreement on the political framework for peace would leave fundamental questions of security unanswered.

The limits of presidential power

Trump retains substantial authority over American sanctions, military assistance and diplomatic engagement. Yet his ability to offer Moscow meaningful concessions is constrained by several factors beyond his immediate control.

Congress can challenge further attempts to weaken sanctions or restrict assistance. European governments maintain their own sanctions regimes and are not obliged to follow Washington’s approach. Ukraine retains considerable military capacity, including the ability to attack Russian energy facilities that contribute to financing the war.

Nor can the American president compel Putin to accept a settlement. If Russia calculates that continuing military operations offers greater advantages than negotiations, additional concessions from Washington may encourage Moscow to prolong the conflict rather than end it.

Rubio’s conversation with Zelenskyy therefore suggests that the administration is being forced to confront the practical consequences of its policy. An American president may seek improved relations with Moscow, but the institutional interests of the United States do not necessarily change with his personal diplomatic priorities.

For Kyiv, the question is whether those interests will translate into the continued supply of weapons, intelligence and communications support. Russia’s attacks will continue irrespective of the timetable established for American diplomatic initiatives.

European Union governments have agreed a negotiating position on new agricultural market rules intended to take effect under the bloc’s 2028–2034 budget, advancing reforms to support arrangements for farmers while leaving the most contentious financial questions unresolved.

The Council approved its partial negotiating mandate on Monday, 19 October, covering changes to the Common Market Organisation regulation, which governs agricultural markets across the European Union.

The proposals include new arrangements for wine producers, protein crops and oilseeds, revised marketing standards, changes to the EU school food programme and provisions intended to improve preparedness for agricultural market disruptions.

However, the agreement does not settle future funding allocations or the broader structure of agricultural subsidies, which remain under negotiation as EU governments attempt to reconcile farming expenditure with competing demands for defence, industrial investment and regional development.

Agricultural markets under review

The Council’s negotiating position retains much of the European Commission’s original proposal while introducing amendments intended to accommodate national differences in agricultural production.

Under the proposed arrangements, sector-specific interventions would become mandatory in several areas, including beekeeping, fruit and vegetables and, under certain circumstances, wine production.

The Council has also proposed flexibility for countries where particular sectors are absent or relatively undeveloped.

For the wine industry, governments would be able to seek exemptions from certain obligations where national circumstances justify different arrangements.

This would allow the framework to retain common European rules while avoiding requirements that would be inappropriate for member states with little or no domestic wine production.

Sectoral interventions form part of the mechanisms through which the EU supports agricultural markets and producer organisations. They can cover measures intended to improve competitiveness, manage production and strengthen farmers’ commercial position.

New provisions for protein crops

The Council has endorsed the establishment of a separate sector for protein crops and oilseeds, replacing existing provisions covering dried fodder.

The objective is to encourage domestic production and reduce dependence on imported agricultural inputs, particularly crops used in animal feed and food production.

European livestock producers rely on protein-rich feed ingredients, including soyabeans, that are often sourced internationally.

Greater domestic production could reduce exposure to fluctuations in global commodity prices, transport costs and disruptions to international supply chains.

Under the Council’s proposal, member states would be encouraged to recognise producer organisations specialising in protein crops and oilseeds.

Such organisations can help farmers coordinate production, marketing and investment, although the effectiveness of the proposed measures will depend on how they are implemented nationally.

The proposals follow broader EU efforts to improve supply security in sectors extending from agricultural inputs to critical industrial materials.

School food and product labelling

The negotiating mandate also preserves the EU school scheme, which provides support for the distribution of fruit, vegetables and milk to schoolchildren.

Under the proposed framework, the programme would move from a school-year financing cycle to a calendar-year system, with transitional provisions intended to prevent disruption during implementation.

The Council has maintained the Commission’s objective of encouraging healthier eating habits by limiting products containing high levels of free sugars and fats.

The proposal also opens the possibility of additional marketing standards for several agricultural products, including protein crops, beef, pork, sheepmeat, goatmeat and rice.

These standards could provide consumers with more detailed information about product origins, subject to the final legislation.

Such measures would also have implications for producers and food businesses, which would need to comply with any new requirements concerning classification, marketing and labelling.

The Council additionally supports the harmonisation of rules covering industrial hemp, while retaining safeguards concerning seed certification and the permitted level of tetrahydrocannabinol.

Farming subsidies remain contested

The agricultural market agreement forms part of negotiations over the next Common Agricultural Policy, which will operate within the EU’s new seven-year financial framework.

Under the Commission’s proposed budget structure, several funding streams, including agricultural and cohesion programmes, would be brought together within national and regional partnership plans.

The restructuring has encountered opposition from governments and agricultural interests concerned that farming could lose protected access to EU funding.

As EU Today previously reported, 17 member states have called for agricultural and regional development expenditure to be protected against further reductions.

The Council’s latest position addresses how agricultural markets should operate rather than determining the size of the financial support available to them.

A separate debate concerns the conditions for receiving direct farm payments, including the definition of an active farmer and the degree of discretion granted to national governments.

Those questions remain central to the continuing CAP negotiations, which are due to return to the Agriculture and Fisheries Council on 26–27 October.

Negotiations move to Parliament

The Council’s partial mandate now provides a basis for negotiations with the European Parliament on the agricultural market provisions.

The legislation will still require agreement between the institutions, while its financing will depend on the eventual settlement of the 2028–2034 budget.

Governments must also complete negotiations on the wider CAP framework, including direct income support and the distribution of responsibility between Brussels and national administrations.

The market agreement reached on 19 October therefore establishes important elements of the proposed agricultural rules, but leaves unresolved the level of financial support available to European farmers after 2027.