© Illustration: Ella Baron/The Guardian
© Illustration: Ella Baron/The Guardian
© Illustration: Ella Baron/The Guardian
Europe is searching for someone capable of negotiating with Vladimir Putin. Yet the question confronting European capitals is considerably more difficult than identifying a politician with sufficient experience, authority and diplomatic skill. It is whether Europe possesses the political unity and strategic independence to negotiate with Moscow on equal terms.
According to diplomatic accounts published on 22nd October, five European leaders have emerged as possible representatives: Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, Finnish President Alexander Stubb, Czech President Petr Pavel, Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen and Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre.
No appointment has been announced, and a group of negotiators may ultimately prove more acceptable than a single representative. The initiative reflects concern that Washington’s negotiations with Moscow could produce arrangements affecting European security without sufficient European influence over their terms.
The European Commission insists that the EU is already participating in diplomatic consultations, including discussions held in Oslo on 20th October. But participation in preliminary meetings is not the same as possessing the authority to determine the outcome.
Europe’s predicament contains an extraordinary contradiction. The European Union is among Ukraine’s principal financial supporters. Its governments provide military assistance, maintain sanctions against Russia and control decisions affecting Moscow’s future access to European markets. Nevertheless, European capitals remain concerned that the decisive political framework for ending the war could be negotiated principally between Washington and Moscow.
This anxiety has intensified under President Donald Trump, whose transactional approach increasingly treats diplomatic settlements as exchanges of economic concessions and strategic advantages.
As EU Today recently examined, proposals involving sanctions relief, renewed energy cooperation and commercial opportunities raise the possibility of arrangements that depend upon European consent but are negotiated elsewhere.
Washington can discuss reopening economic relations with Russia. It cannot independently reverse European sanctions, guarantee Ukraine’s accession to the EU or decide the continent’s future security arrangements. The European Council explicitly reaffirmed this distinction in its conclusions of 16th October, insisting that decisions affecting the Union’s security and responsibilities belong to Europe itself.
The central issue is therefore not whether Europe has influence, but whether it can organise that influence into a coherent negotiating position.
An equally important weakness would arise if European governments selected their representative without making Kyiv an integral participant in the decision.
Ukraine is not merely the geographical subject of negotiations. Its government controls whether a proposed settlement can acquire political legitimacy, while its armed forces determine much of what can be implemented on the ground.
A negotiated agreement rejected by Kyiv could neither reliably end the war nor provide the security arrangements that Europe seeks.
European security, moreover, can no longer be considered independently of Ukraine’s military capabilities. Ukrainian forces possess extensive operational experience against Russia, including in drone warfare, electronic warfare and long-range strikes.
Any future continental defence architecture that excludes this experience would disregard one of Europe’s most consequential military assets.
An effective European representative would therefore require a mandate developed jointly with Ukraine, rather than simply endorsed by European governments after the event.
The proposed candidates illustrate the difficulty of combining political authority with negotiating credibility. Meloni possesses a working relationship with Trump and considerable influence within European conservative politics. Stubb combines experience of Russia’s immediate neighbourhood with access to Washington. Pavel brings military expertise and an understanding of NATO’s command structures. Yet none could independently commit Europe’s governments to financial, military or territorial-security obligations.
This is the fundamental weakness of the proposed office. A negotiator requires more than access to powerful leaders. The ability to make commitments, withhold concessions and impose costs is what gives diplomatic representation substance.
Europe possesses potentially significant instruments: sanctions, industrial capacity, financial assistance and growing defence expenditure. But these remain distributed across institutions and national governments with differing strategic priorities.
Poland, the Baltic states and Nordic governments approach Russian security threats differently from several Western and Southern European capitals. Reconciling those positions is not an administrative exercise. It is a prerequisite for meaningful diplomacy.
The search also reflects European concern about a return to great-power bargaining over the continent’s political geography.
The historical comparison frequently invoked is Yalta in 1945, when Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin discussed Europe’s post-war settlement. Munich in 1938 offers another warning about negotiating territorial concessions at the expense of directly affected states. Neither precedent precisely describes the present situation.
Unlike the countries subjected to Soviet domination after the Second World War, today’s European states possess established institutions, substantial economic resources and collective defence arrangements. Ukraine, meanwhile, has demonstrated that Russia cannot simply dictate its political future through military superiority.
Nevertheless, the danger lies in accepting the underlying principle that powerful states possess a privileged right to determine the sovereignty and security choices of their neighbours.
Moscow’s demands concerning NATO, Ukrainian territory and Europe’s wider security arrangements extend beyond any conventional ceasefire negotiation.
A European representative would have to challenge that premise rather than merely negotiate the geographical limits of Russian influence.
The debate inevitably leads to Europe’s military dependence upon the United States. An American withdrawal from NATO is not inevitable. Indeed, US legislation restricts unilateral presidential withdrawal. But Washington could substantially reduce its military commitments without formally abandoning the alliance.
Europe must therefore consider how much independent military capacity it requires to support its diplomatic positions. That entails coordinated procurement, integrated military planning, sustainable defence production and deeper cooperation with Britain, Norway, Canada and Ukraine. Recent security challenges in the Black Sea illustrate the difficulty of converting European diplomatic commitments into effective collective action.
These developments would not automatically create a European army or replace NATO. They could, however, give European governments greater freedom to act if American priorities diverge from their own.
The relationship between military capability and diplomacy is particularly important in dealing with Moscow. European representatives cannot expect Russia to revise its demands simply because Brussels has selected a more prominent interlocutor.
Russia would have to conclude that continued aggression carries greater costs than a settlement respecting Ukraine’s sovereignty. Europe’s diplomatic standing would then derive not from the personality of its representative but from the collective resources and political commitments behind that individual.
The immediate search for a negotiator may appear a limited diplomatic initiative. Its implications are considerably larger.
For decades, European security rested upon an arrangement in which American military power compensated for Europe’s fragmented strategic authority. The present negotiations are exposing the limitations of that model. The decisive question is not whether Meloni, Stubb, Pavel or another European leader can secure a place at the negotiating table. It is whether Europe can establish a common position, backed by Ukraine’s consent and by sufficient economic and military power, that neither Washington nor Moscow can disregard.
Without those foundations, a European envoy risks becoming a participant in decisions made by others. With them, the appointment could mark the beginning of a substantially different European role in international security.
PM’s plea supported by Angela Rayner, Ed Miliband and business leaders, while some ‘red wall’ MPs voice concern
Andy Burnham’s call for the UK to consider a return to free movement with Europe has been backed by senior cabinet ministers but risked a rift with “red wall” Labour MPs, who say it could jeopardise Brexit-voting seats.
The prime minister made his plea for an “honest discussion” about freedom of movement in an interview with the Sunday Times, making clear that staying out of it would no longer be a red line in talks with the EU.
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© Photograph: Toby Shepheard/Pool AFP/AP
© Photograph: Toby Shepheard/Pool AFP/AP
© Photograph: Toby Shepheard/Pool AFP/AP
James ‘Fergie’ Chambers, in prison in Spain, has applied for asylum as US seeks extradition over alleged Hamas support
US authorities seized wealthy activist James “Fergie” Chambers’s cellphone at some point after Spanish police arrested him in July without notifying him or his attorneys, the Guardian has learned.
Chambers, a US citizen and wealthy donor to leftwing and humanitarian projects, is imprisoned in Madrid. His case is the first known instance of the US seeking to extradite a citizen over alleged support for Hamas, an accusation tied to money Chambers has donated to support Palestinians, including the Sameer Project, in Gaza.
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© Photograph: Chedly Ben Ibrahim/NurPhoto via Getty Images
© Photograph: Chedly Ben Ibrahim/NurPhoto via Getty Images
© Photograph: Chedly Ben Ibrahim/NurPhoto via Getty Images
Prime minister is considering different options for new relationship with Brussels ahead of summit in November
Andy Burnham says he wants an “honest discussion” with the British public about the possibility of a return to free movement between the UK and the EU as part of his plans for a new relationship with the bloc.
The prime minister has been open about his desire to revisit the relationship between Britain and Brussels. He has said a new deal could mean the UK goes “all the way” and rejoins the EU.
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© Photograph: Temilade Adelaja/Reuters
© Photograph: Temilade Adelaja/Reuters
© Photograph: Temilade Adelaja/Reuters
But Elon Musk, whose company SpaceX owns Starlink, accuses Ukrainian military of violating the company’s terms
Ukraine’s military has a “stable connection to Starlink”, the Ukrainian government said, 10 days after its ability to use the satellite communications system was suddenly restricted.
But hours after the announcement, SpaceX CEO Elon Musk, whose company owns Starlink, accused the Ukrainian military of violating the company’s terms. Neither Musk nor the US government, which operates Starshield using Starlink technology, took responsibility for imposing the curbs.
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© Photograph: Sergey Dolzhenko/EPA
© Photograph: Sergey Dolzhenko/EPA
© Photograph: Sergey Dolzhenko/EPA
Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva pledged to bring full-day schooling to every school through the secondary level if re-elected, while opposition candidate Flávio Bolsonaro accused his government of cutting education funding and attacked the president’s family over online gambling.
RELATED: Datafolha Poll Shows Lula and Bolsonaro Tied at 50% Ahead of Runoff
The exchange during an education segment of the presidential debate centered on extended school hours, student assistance and childcare before turning into a personal confrontation over jogo do tigrinho, an online gambling game.
Lula, of the Workers’ Party (PT), challenged Bolsonaro to explain his plans for full-day schooling. Bolsonaro, of the Liberal Party (PL), responded that he would deliver what the current government had failed to achieve, accusing Lula’s administration of cutting federal funding for the program and attempting to conceal the reductions.
Enseñanza de tiempo integral enfrenta a Lula y Bolsonaro en el debate
— teleSUR TV (@teleSURtv) October 24, 2026
🏫 Lula se comprometió a "concluir en el próximo mandato el 100% de las escuelas de tiempo integral en este país hasta la enseñanza media".
🎓 Defendió su gestión y destacó la creación del ProUni. También… pic.twitter.com/DHaNmtcXCo
Text Reads: Full-Day Schooling Pits Lula Against Bolsonaro in Debate
Lula committed to “concluding in the next term 100% of full-day schools in this country up to secondary education.”
He defended his administration and highlighted the creation of ProUni. He also denounced the conditions in which he received the presidency regarding education.
Bolsonaro then shifted the discussion to online gambling, accusing Lula of being responsible for the rise of jogo do tigrinho. He claimed the game was created and authorized in 2022 by those now in government and alleged that its cancellation was being pursued only as the election approached. He also invoked the nicknames Lulinha and Tigrinho in referring to the president’s sons.
Lula responded by pointing to his party’s record on education since it first took office in 2003. He credited former education ministers Fernando Haddad and Camilo Santana with leading what he described as a transformation of Brazil’s education system. If re-elected, he said, he would ensure that all schools offered full-day schooling through the secondary level.
He also pledged to expand Pé de Meia, a financial assistance program designed to keep students in school, making it available to all secondary students and extending it to university students. Lula said the program had helped prevent 66% of participating students from dropping out, arguing that no young person should have to abandon their education.
“Não existe nenhum país do mundo que conseguiu se desenvolver sem antes investir na Educação. A gente tem mais universidades, IFs e escola em tempo integral. A gente cuidou da educação como jamais tinha sido cuidada na história desse país"
— União Brasileira das/dos Estudantes Secundaristas (@ubesoficial) October 24, 2026
– Lula no debate da Globo…
Text Reads: “There is no country in the world that managed to develop without first investing in Education. We have more universities, IFs, and full-time schools. We took care of education like it had never been taken care of in the history of this country” – Lula in the Globo debate
The president further recalled that his administration had inherited 5,600 stalled projects involving daycare centers, schools and federal institutes from the previous government. He contrasted those unfinished projects with the civic-military school model promoted by his predecessors, which he also described as incomplete.
Bolsonaro rejected claims that he intended to abolish Pé de Meia, calling the allegation a falsehood spread by his opponent’s campaign. He pledged to maintain the program and cited measures taken under the administration of his father, former President Jair Bolsonaro, including the cancellation of nearly 99% of the debt owed by students who had completed higher education and a 33% teacher salary increase, which he described as the largest in history.
The opposition candidate also proposed a childcare subsidy for mothers unable to work because they lacked access to daycare. He said more than one million children had no place in the public childcare system and pledged to allow families to enroll them in private facilities where public places were unavailable.
On full-day schooling, Bolsonaro proposed using the additional hours for vocational training and instruction in technology, artificial intelligence and application development. He argued that keeping children closer to school would put them farther from crime.
The candidates presented contrasting approaches to education, with Lula emphasizing universal full-day schooling and expanded financial support for students, while Bolsonaro focused on childcare subsidies and vocational training alongside accusations over education funding and the president’s family.
With public opposition toward data centers growing and midterm elections on the horizon, politicians across the spectrum have introduced overreaching policies to stymie data center development and ease voters' minds. These politicians now include President Donald Trump, who has historically been a staunch supporter of the industry.
"New and large, in some cases gigantic, Data Centers are mandated by me to make their own electricity, and give or sell any excess back to the local community, or grid," Trump declared on Truth Social on Wednesday. "If companies want to make their Data Centers popular, pay the community, and/or individuals within the community, a 'dividend.' I have watched the process closely, and Data Centers that were highly unpopular in a certain area have become extremely popular when a financial deal is struck."
While Trump has suggested that power plants pay for their own power before, these comments are in stark contrast to him saying less than a couple of months ago that "the only reason that communities throughout the U.S.A. should not want Data Centers is if they want to end up being backward and poor." Still, the president is not wrong that the strategy could boost data centers' popularity; polling regularly shows that concerns over higher energy prices are one of the main reasons people oppose data centers in their communities.
However, mandating that these power plants "make their own electricity" is the wrong way to accomplish this objective, in part because generation costs are not the leading factor in higher electricity prices—transmission infrastructure, such as wires and poles, is. And regulatory barriers, as well as a lack of competition in the building of this infrastructure, are mostly to blame.
Regardless, if the goal is to have data center companies produce their own electricity, easing regulations would have more impact than imposing a mandate. As Travis Fisher, director of Energy and Environmental Policy Studies at the Cato Institute, tells Reason, "If a tech company buys electricity from the owner of a power plant, in most states the power plant owner then becomes a public utility (even if the transaction occurs off-grid), which brings heavy scrutiny in the form of economic regulation."
To ease these regulatory barriers, Fisher and other experts have advocated for a Consumer Regulated Electricity model that allows large-load customers to connect directly to unregulated power producers off the grid.
Fisher also notes that lower power costs don't automatically translate into lower utility rates. He tells Reason, "Even if a data center were to bring a matching or beating amount of supply relative to their demand, based on the way retail rates work, I am not convinced that that guarantees that prices will fall."
On top of not solving the main driver of higher electricity prices, the mandate isn't needed because many data centers have already begun to produce their own power. A report from energy research firm Cleanview shows that operating power capacity dedicated to data centers has nearly doubled since June, while capacity under construction has roughly quadrupled. Additionally, companies including Anthropic and Microsoft are already volunteering to cover consumers' electricity costs.
By calling on power producers to make their own electricity, Trump joins the growing chorus of politicians who are convinced that the government, not the market, is best equipped to dictate how data centers grow and operate. And, in typical Trump fashion, a "mandate" on social media without any legal action behind it has left the public and investors to guess what, if anything, is actually coming.
Building power plants requires long-term planning and investments meant to last decades, making Trump's tendency to impose abrupt policy changes less than ideal. "The fact that the rules change, not just every four years, but occasionally overnight via tweet," says Fisher, does not make for "a great investment environment."
The post Trump Wants To Force Data Centers To 'Make Their Own Electricity.' Deregulation Would Work Better. appeared first on Reason Magazine.
Eight years ago, Scott Hancock, then 28, helped a 19-year-old acquaintance, identified in court records as T.G., buy fentanyl. At her request, Hancock, who had been addicted to opioids for years, got in touch with his drug dealer, who gave him five capsules that he handed over to T.G. in exchange for $20. Then Hancock gave the money to his dealer. Because T.G. subsequently died from a fentanyl overdose, Hancock is serving a 20-year sentence at a federal prison in Illinois.
That was the mandatory minimum sentence under 21 USC 241, which prescribes penalties for drug distribution resulting in death. Although that law has been on the books since 1986, the dramatic increase in fentanyl-related deaths during the last decade prompted a surge in federal drug prosecutions involving overdoses, which rose by 44 percent between FY 2019 and FY 2023. Hancock's case was part of that trend, and it prompted his mother, G.D. Hancock, a retired finance professor, to delve into the subject, resulting in a database that sheds light on what happens when the government treats accidental deaths as homicides.
So far, Hancock has identified 2,930 sentences in such cases since 2010. That includes 1,399 federal cases and 1,531 state cases, which rely either on laws dealing specifically with drug-induced deaths or on more general statutes addressing felony murder, "depraved heart" homicide, or manslaughter.
Sentences of 20 years or more were pretty common at the federal level, accounting for 37 percent of the cases, compared to 13 percent at the state level. The vast majority of the cases (84 percent) were resolved by plea deals. That is not surprising, given the potential consequences of going to trial. While the median sentence for defendants who pleaded guilty was nine years, it was 20 years for defendants who insisted on making the government prove its case.
Hancock's tally is based on news reports, court records, announcements by state and federal prosecutors, her own "case files and research," and "cases sent in by families, lawyers and researchers." A separate database compiled by researchers at Northeastern University, drawn from news reports, includes 3,264 cases involving drug-induced homicide from 2011 to 2022.
These prosecutions are morally nonsensical. They treat people who voluntarily consume drugs as helpless victims of supposed predators who gave them the drugs they wanted. By similar logic, bartenders and liquor store owners should be held criminally liable whenever a customer succumbs to alcohol poisoning or the long-term effects of heavy drinking. The main difference is the legal status of the drug, which is arbitrary, politically determined, and historically contingent. And while illegal drugs pose special hazards, that is a result of prohibition, which creates a black market where product composition is highly variable and unpredictable.
Charging people with homicide based on accidental overdoses would be illogical and unjust even if the defendants were limited to actual drug dealers. But you can be charged with drug-induced homicide even if your "trafficking" consisted of nothing more than sharing drugs with a relative, romantic partner, friend, or acquaintance. Based on the information Hancock was able to glean, she counts 241 cases where the person who died from an overdose was the defendant's friend, partner, or family member, and other sources suggest such prosecutions are common.
The Northeastern University researchers analyzed a sample of 213 online news reports from 2000 to 2017. They found that 50 percent of defendants charged with drug-induced homicide were caretakers, family members, friends, or partners of the people who died.
In 2021, when the Pittsburgh Tribune-Review examined Pennsylvania prosecutions for "drug delivery resulting in death" (DDRD), it described a case involving "a Westmoreland County man" who "died from an overdose of drugs he'd gotten from a friend of a friend of a friend." Although "the drugs ultimately came from a man called 'Bee' in Penn Hills," the paper noted, "the three individuals between the victim and Bee were all charged" with DDRD, a first-degree felony punishable by up to 40 years in prison.
The Tribune-Review described several other DDRD defendants, including "a Delmont woman" who "called paramedics when she found her boyfriend unresponsive in their bathroom"; "two friends" who bought heroin for a man who overdosed at a Taco Bell; and "a Monessen woman" who "sent her cousin to buy a brick of heroin" and "sold five stamp bags to a friend, who then sold four bags to an Elizabeth Borough man who died from a fatal overdose."
The Tribune-Review also found that "many facing these charges are relatively low-level dealers." Jonathan Fodi, a defense attorney and former prosecutor, told the paper he and his colleagues had never seen a DDRD case involving a high-level dealer. Given the need to prove a link between the defendant and the person who died, that is not surprising. But that situation compounds the injustice of treating such deaths as homicides, since low-level dealers often do not know exactly what is in the drugs they are selling.
A 2002 analysis of 32 drug-induced homicide prosecutions, published in the New Jersey Law Journal, found that "25 involved prosecution of friends of the decedent who did not sell drugs in any significant manner." According to a 2017 report by a Wisconsin TV station that looked at the 100 most recent prosecutions for drug-induced homicide in that state, "nearly 90% of those charged were friends or relatives of the person who died, or the lowest people in the drug supply chain." When the Chicago Tribune examined drug-induced homicide cases filed between 2011 and 2014, it found "the defendant was typically the last person who was with the person who overdosed."
Even people who support the war on drugs should be able to recognize the injustice of sending people to prison for 10 or 20 years based on their tangential roles in deaths they neither caused nor intended. And far from making such deaths less likely, that policy impedes potentially lifesaving medical assistance because the risk of a homicide charge is apt to discourage bystanders from calling for help. That daunting deterrent undermines the goal of "Good Samaritan" laws that are supposed to shield 911 callers from criminal charges in such situations.
The official justification for these prosecutions is completely disconnected from the reality of the cases. "Deaths from illicit drugs, especially fentanyl, are at historic highs," the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) said in a 2023 press release. Because the DEA is "committed to protecting Americans and saving lives by pursuing those responsible," the agency explained, it aims to "make sure as many drug traffickers involved in those deaths as possible get an appearance in front of a judge."
As an example of that strategy, the DEA cited Scott Hancock's case, describing him as a "trafficker" who was "found guilty of providing the drugs that killed a 19-year-old woman in 2018." Given the details of that transaction, it is hard to see the logic here. Sending someone like Hancock to prison for 20 years has nothing to do with "saving lives."
The post How Helping Someone Buy Drugs Can Send You to Prison for 20 Years appeared first on Reason Magazine.
When the 21st Century ROAD to Housing Act was still a work in progress, the Senate briefly inserted a ban on corporate ownership of single-family rental housing so sweeping that it might well have killed off the small but growing build-to-rent sector.
After furious activism by the housing supply boosters, who had been the main advocates for the law's many other provisions, that investor ban was significantly pared back.
The final version of ROAD, which became law in July, prohibits investors who own 350 single-family rental homes from buying new ones. But it also includes a long list of exemptions for large investor purchases of single-family rentals.
The primary exemptions include homes purchased as part of a build-to-rent project and dilapidated homes that the investor spends significant money renovating.
The new restrictions go into effect this coming January. On Thursday, the Treasury Department released a proposed rule that would create definitions for terms that go undefined in the law and clarify the scope of "excepted purchases" of single-family housing that large investors can still make.
Build-to-rent housing that large investors can still buy is defined as a new single-family home that's never been owned by an owner-occupier, is purchased within 18 months of the home receiving a certificate of occupancy, and is occupied by a renter.
Protected "renovate-to-rent" homes are defined as homes that had major building code violations that were fixed by the large institutional buyer and for which the investor spent at least 15 percent of the home's purchase price on improvements.
The rule also provides definitions for rental homes owned as part of a program to boost homeownership, which is another excepted purchase large institutional investors will be allowed to make. Those programs are generally defined as programs in which the renter has the right of first refusal to buy the home and where the rent receives financial support from the homeowner to purchase the home.
Taken together, the clarified exceptions in the Treasury rule still leave a lot of room for large institutional ownership of single-family homes in keeping with the final text of the ROAD to Housing Act. They won't have to sell the homes they already own. They can still add to the supply of investor-owned rental housing through substantial rehabs and build-to-rent projects.
Nevertheless, the Treasury rules will impose numerous paperwork burdens on investors who'll now have to track and report, for example, precisely how much money they've spent renovating a purchased rental house or else risk a huge fine.
Large investors who purchase a single-family home in violation of ROAD are liable for a maximum civil penalty of $1 million per home purchase.
The proposed Treasury rule highlights what a glaring exception the investor restrictions are to the overall spirit of ROAD. Through a variety of means, the law attempts to reduce the regulatory burden on new housing. Now, large investors will have to absorb significant compliance costs just to prove that they're adding new rental housing supply in precisely the right way.
The post Under Proposed Treasury Rule, Corporate Homebuyers Who Don't Track Their Receipts Face $1 Million Fines appeared first on Reason Magazine.
Multinational ‘anti-war bloc’ uses Istanbul summit to call for a diplomatic solution to Middle East crisis
Foreign ministers at a summit of eight European and Middle Eastern countries have urged the US and Israel not to renews their attacks on Iran, warning a fresh outbreak of fighting would spread conflict and push oil prices even higher.
The development of a new multinational “anti-war bloc” represents a challenge to the increasingly open plans by the US and Israel to relaunch strikes on Iran while talks on Tehran’s nuclear programme remain deadlocked.
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© Photograph: Massimo Percossi/EPA
© Photograph: Massimo Percossi/EPA
© Photograph: Massimo Percossi/EPA
The Kremlin has announced plans for renewed negotiations between Russia, Ukraine and the United States in Abu Dhabi during the first half of November, reviving a diplomatic process that has repeatedly failed to produce a settlement to Moscow’s war against Ukraine.
Russian presidential spokesman Dmitry Peskov said on Friday, 23 October, that the discussions would concentrate on post-war security arrangements. He also left open the possibility of eventual European participation, although the initial meeting is intended to remain trilateral.
The announcement follows talks in St Petersburg between Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump’s special envoy Steve Witkoff. Yet the emerging American proposals reveal a fundamental problem: Washington appears increasingly prepared to offer Russia substantial economic incentives, while Moscow has provided little indication that its political objectives in Ukraine have changed.
According to details reported on 23 October, citing The Economist, the American proposals involve Ukraine abandoning its ambition to join NATO in exchange for investment, security arrangements and the prospect of European Union membership.
Russia would receive sanctions relief, renewed commercial relations with American companies and potentially the restoration of natural gas exports to Europe. A demilitarised zone in Donbas is also reportedly under consideration.
The commercial dimension extends beyond theoretical proposals.
American and Russian representatives have discussed investment in the Nord Stream pipeline system and possible arrangements involving Lukoil’s international assets. The negotiations surrounding Russian energy infrastructure suggest that Washington regards commercial cooperation as a potential instrument for securing Moscow’s agreement.
There is no established evidence that Witkoff, Jared Kushner or members of Trump’s family would personally benefit from these arrangements. Nevertheless, the involvement of investors in strategically important Russian assets raises questions about whether economic agreements might advance independently of a settlement acceptable to Ukraine.
The Trump administration has already demonstrated its willingness to relax economic pressure. On 16 October, the president waived major provisions of the Graham sanctions legislation, which he had signed into law only four weeks earlier.
As EU Today previously examined, the decision suspended measures designed to increase the economic costs of Russia’s continuing aggression. Washington justified the waiver on the grounds that sanctions could interfere with negotiations.
The central weakness in a settlement built around commercial incentives is the assumption that Putin’s territorial and political demands can ultimately be exchanged for economic advantages.
Russia’s objectives have never been confined to Donetsk, Luhansk or access to Western markets.
In his July 2021 essay on the historical unity of Russians and Ukrainians, Putin advanced a conception of the two nations as belonging to a single historical and cultural space. His interpretation, examined by the Centre for Eastern Studies, challenged the legitimacy of Ukraine’s development outside Moscow’s political influence.
These ideas preceded the full-scale invasion of February 2022. They also followed Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and its intervention in eastern Ukraine.
Putin’s demands therefore concern more than military geography. They involve the extent to which Ukraine can exercise independent political authority, determine its international alliances and integrate with Western institutions.
Even a settlement granting Moscow substantial territory could leave this larger objective unresolved.
An independent Ukraine, increasingly integrated into the European economy and protected by Western security commitments, would remain outside Russia’s political control. For a Kremlin leadership that has repeatedly questioned Ukraine’s separate historical identity, such an outcome would represent a limitation on its wider ambitions.
Putin reinforced this position on 22 October when he again described Ukrainian territory in Donbas as historically Russian.
This creates an apparent contradiction. Why would Moscow return to negotiations if its broader objectives remain incompatible with the proposed settlement?
One explanation is that participation itself offers Russia strategic advantages.
Negotiations can preserve diplomatic engagement with Washington, complicate attempts to introduce additional sanctions and maintain American pressure on Kyiv to accept territorial concessions.
They also provide opportunities to negotiate economic arrangements before fundamental security questions have been resolved.
For Putin, the political timetable in Washington is relevant. Trump’s presidency is constitutionally limited to January 2029. Moscow can seek to exploit the present administration’s interest in a diplomatic agreement while continuing military operations.
None of this establishes that Putin has definitively rejected compromise. However, the Kremlin’s willingness to attend negotiations is not equivalent to a willingness to abandon its demands.
Russia continues attacking Ukrainian cities and energy infrastructure. As EU Today reported on 22 October, Russian forces launched 21 ballistic missiles against Kyiv shortly after Witkoff’s discussions with Putin.
The simultaneous pursuit of diplomatic engagement and military pressure allows Moscow to negotiate while attempting to alter conditions on the battlefield.
The proposed return of Russian gas exposes another contradiction in Washington’s approach.
The European Union has already adopted binding legislation to phase out Russian gas imports, with full restrictions taking effect during 2027.
The European Commission reiterated on 19 October that it had no plans to reverse its position. Reopening Nord Stream would also face sanctions, infrastructure and political obstacles, particularly in Germany.
Consequently, Washington cannot independently promise Moscow renewed access to European energy markets.
Nor can it guarantee Ukraine’s accession to the EU. Membership requires agreement among the existing member states, completion of accession negotiations and ratification of the relevant treaty.
A settlement negotiated primarily between Washington and Moscow would therefore depend on European decisions over which neither government has unilateral authority.
This helps explain the significance of Peskov’s remarks about possible European participation. Moscow needs European cooperation to secure meaningful sanctions relief and access to markets, even while seeking to negotiate Europe’s security arrangements principally with Washington.
Trump’s approach rests on the proposition that economic incentives can make a settlement more attractive to Moscow than continued warfare.
Putin’s position presents a different calculation. The Russian president must weigh the benefits of restored commercial relations against the political implications of recognising Ukraine’s durable independence and Western orientation.
Those objectives may prove incompatible.
A settlement that restores Russian energy revenues without credible guarantees against renewed aggression could reduce Moscow’s economic constraints while leaving the causes of the war unresolved.
The decisive test in Abu Dhabi will therefore not be whether negotiators can agree on investment, pipelines or sanctions relief. It will be whether Russia is prepared to accept a Ukrainian state whose sovereignty, political direction and future European integration remain beyond Moscow’s control.
Until that question is answered, renewed negotiations may offer Washington the prospect of a diplomatic achievement while allowing the Kremlin to pursue objectives it has not publicly abandoned.
People in Russian-occupied city facing severe shortages of food, water and electricity, with some reportedly surviving on weeds
The White House has said that Russia and Ukraine have agreed to a ceasefire in the Russian-occupied city of Oleshky, where a deepening humanitarian crisis has left thousands of civilians struggling to survive.
In a statement on Friday, the White House said both sides had agreed to halt all military operations in the city from 27 October to allow humanitarian aid deliveries and preparations for the evacuation of civilians.
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© Photograph: 34th Separate Marine Brigade "Borysfen"/Reuters
© Photograph: 34th Separate Marine Brigade "Borysfen"/Reuters
© Photograph: 34th Separate Marine Brigade "Borysfen"/Reuters
The decision follows pressure from European governments, energy companies and the United States, which have warned that implementing the regulations under the existing timetable could complicate fossil fuel supplies to the European market.
MEPs approved the amendments by 341 votes to 225, with six abstentions. The revised deadlines must now be negotiated with EU governments before they can become legally binding.
The parliamentary position also extends some postponements to European oil and gas producers, going beyond the Commission’s original proposal.
The EU Methane Regulation, adopted in 2024, established requirements intended to reduce methane emissions associated with fossil fuel production, transportation and imports.
Methane is a greenhouse gas with a considerably greater warming effect than carbon dioxide over shorter periods. Emissions occur throughout the oil and gas supply chain, particularly through leaks, venting and incomplete combustion.
Under the existing legislation, new monitoring, reporting and verification requirements for imported fossil fuels were scheduled to begin on 1 January 2027.
However, the Commission proposed amendments on 14 October 2026 to give companies additional time to comply.
The European Parliament has now supported a longer postponement than the Commission requested.
Under the parliamentary amendments, importers of crude oil, natural gas and coal would have until 31 May 2031 to demonstrate equivalent monitoring, reporting and verification arrangements for relevant supplies delivered in 2030.
The requirements would cover supply contracts concluded or renewed since 4 August 2024. Older contracts would remain subject to separate reporting requirements concerning efforts to obtain compliance.
Energy security concerns have been central to the debate. The United States has become Europe’s largest supplier of liquefied natural gas, particularly following the reduction of Russian pipeline gas deliveries after Moscow’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
American officials have argued that certain provisions of the methane legislation could create substantial compliance difficulties for exporters and potentially disrupt gas deliveries.
France, Italy and the Czech Republic have also supported adjustments to the timetable, reflecting concerns about energy costs, administrative burdens and the availability of alternative supplies.
European industrial consumers remain sensitive to fluctuations in natural gas prices, while the continuing conflict in the Middle East has increased uncertainty in international energy markets.
For importers, the principal concern is obtaining reliable information about emissions generated by suppliers operating outside EU jurisdiction.
European companies must demonstrate compliance using data collected throughout production and transportation networks that they do not necessarily control.
Parliament’s position includes extensions for certain reporting obligations affecting oil and gas operators within the European Union.
Verified reports combining measurements of methane emissions at individual sources and production sites would be subject to revised deadlines.
For assets operated directly by reporting companies, the proposed deadline would move to February 2030. Certain non-operated assets would be covered by a later deadline in August 2031.
The amendments would also permit continuous monitoring systems to replace separate measurement campaigns where the equipment meets the required technical standards.
Independent verification would remain necessary. Romanian MEP Virgil Popescu, a former energy minister, supported the longer timetable, arguing that companies require additional time to make investments in monitoring infrastructure.
Environmental organisations have opposed further postponements, arguing that delays could prolong avoidable emissions and weaken the regulatory framework established in 2024.
Parliament also supported an exception preventing fossil fuel supplies covered by relevant EU import sanctions from benefiting from the extended deadlines.
Importers would be required to identify the affected volumes, including where restricted-origin fuels form part of mixed shipments.
The exemption would not authorise trade already prohibited by EU sanctions.
A further amendment would require the European Commission to review implementation readiness by July 2029, including the availability of accredited verifiers and potential risks to energy supplies.
The Commission would then be able to propose additional legislative changes if substantial implementation problems remained.
Thursday’s vote does not repeal the methane legislation or automatically postpone its requirements.
The adopted amendments represent the European Parliament’s negotiating position. The Council of the European Union must agree to any changes before the revised legislation can enter into force.
The outcome forms part of a broader debate over European industrial competitiveness and the economic consequences of environmental regulation.
As EU Today recently reported, Brussels is already adjusting parts of its climate-policy framework in response to pressure from energy-intensive industries.
Negotiations over methane reporting will now determine how far those adjustments extend into Europe’s international energy supply chains and whether the EU can preserve the regulation’s emissions objectives under a longer implementation timetable.
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