Cassidy Hutchinson had implicated Donald Trump in US Capitol attack during testimony before House committee
The justice department on Tuesday failed to secure a grand jury indictment against a former White House staffer who provided dramatic but disputed testimony against Donald Trump before a House committee investigating the 6 January 2021 US Capitol insurrection, according to two people familiar with the matter.
A grand jury in Washington rejected prosecutors’ request to return an indictment charging Cassidy Hutchinson, said the people, who spoke to the Associated Press on the condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to publicly discuss the case. It’s the latest setback in the justice department’s efforts to charge perceived adversaries of the Republican president.
Páginas na internet de jornais de diversos países repercutiram nesta terça-feira (27) a fuga de Flávio Bolsonaro do Brasil. O embarque escondido para os Estados Unidos, menos de 48 horas após perder as eleições presidenciais, foi noticiado pela agência Reuters.
Um dos primeiros veículos a noticiar a fuga foi o Infobae, da Argentina, que disse haver uma suspeita de que o senador teria embarcado com a família em um jato particular, em Puerto Iguazú, com destino aos Estados Unidos. A versão, porém, não foi confirmada pelo governo da Argentina.
O La Nación, também da Argentina, destaca que fontes próximas ao senador afirmaram que os Estados Unidos estariam diretamente envolvidos na fuga.
O periódico diz ainda que, sob o governo de Donald Trump, o país norte-americano tem se tornado o refúgio do clã Bolsonaro e lembra que Eduardo Bolsonaro, irmão de Flávio, também está nos EUA.
O espanhol El País lembrou que o senador se recusou a aceitar a vitória de Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva logo após a apuração. O jornal relembra que, em 2022, Jair Bolsonaro também não reconheceu a derrota e que viajou aos Estados Unidos antes da posse de Lula, mas acabou voltando ao Brasil.
O inglês The Guardian afirma que Flávio Bolsonaro estaria a caminho dos Estados Unidos e que sua fuga pode selar o destino da extrema-direita brasileira.
A fuga de Flávio Bolsonaro começou a ser noticiada pela manhã, por jornais argentinos. O coordenador de campanha do senador, Rogério Marinho, chegou a negar a informação.
Depois, Marinho disse que não tinha notícias de Flávio Bolsonaro desde às 8h e que o senador teria dito que “queria dar um tempo”.
America’s mid-term congressional elections on November 3rdwill mark the beginning of the final two years of the Trump administration and thus the nearing of a potentially historic moment of reckoning for that country’s estranged allies. The reckoning may seem like a long way ahead, but in what historians will see as just the blink of […]
President Trump renewed calls for Venezuela to be the 51st U.S. state after touting the barrels of oil coming from the South American country. “It will become a prosperous country, and who knows? Maybe someday soon, it will become a prosperous 51st state,” Trump said of Venezuela. “That’s possible. Let’s make it the 51st state.”…
President Trump renewed calls for Venezuela to be the 51st U.S. state after touting the barrels of oil coming from the South American country. “It will become a prosperous country, and who knows? Maybe someday soon, it will become a prosperous 51st state,” Trump said of Venezuela. “That’s possible. Let’s make it the 51st state.”…
Former White House press secretary Katie Zacharia, who was fired from her role after five days following a rocky debut and scrutiny of her legal background, accused reporters of fueling “Trump Derangement Syndrome” in their coverage of President Trump. While Zacharia has remained relatively quiet since her ouster less than two weeks ago, in an…
Former White House press secretary Katie Zacharia, who was fired from her role after five days following a rocky debut and scrutiny of her legal background, accused reporters of fueling “Trump Derangement Syndrome” in their coverage of President Trump. While Zacharia has remained relatively quiet since her ouster less than two weeks ago, in an…
The vote for the 26th Knesset serves as a crucial referendum on the state’s institutions, economy, and military strategy.
The legislative elections for the 26th Knesset, the legislative power, take place at a critical political crossroads for Israel. Scheduled as the first parliamentary contest since the outbreak of hostilities against Gaza following the events of October 7, 2023, these elections serve as a national referendum on the governance model of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.
The outgoing 25th Knesset became the first Israeli legislature since 1988 to complete its full four-year term without early dissolution, surviving despite severe domestic turmoil, mass protests over judicial reforms, and persistent coalition instability.
However, the upcoming vote occurs under international scrutiny and severe domestic polarization. Official data from the Israeli Central Elections Committee shows the number of ballots needed across the country to fill all 120 seats in parliament.
Political analysts note that the campaign reflects deep fractures within Israeli society regarding military strategy, economic priorities, and the future shape of the state’s institutional structure.
Social and Geopolitical Context of the 2026 Elections
The socio-political environment surrounding the current electoral moment is marked by the prolonged attacks on Gaza and wider regional escalations involving Lebanon and Iran.
These conflicts have heavily strained the Israeli economy, accelerated militarization across public life, and deepened existing social divides.
Economic pressures, driven by soaring military expenditures and disruptions across key industrial sectors due to a labor crisis resulting from the movement of Palestinians, the trade blockade, and the brain drain, have intensified Israeli public debate concerning state budgets and resource allocation.
Simultaneously, domestic divisions have intensified around long-standing structural issues, most notably the military conscription exemptions granted to the ultra-Orthodox Haredi population, generating coalition crises and widespread friction between secular citizens and religious factions.
On the diplomatic front, the state faces unprecedented international isolation, underscored by ongoing proceedings at the International Court of Justice and arrest warrants issued by the International Criminal Court against Netanyahu, Prime Minister of Israel, and Yoav Gallant, former Israeli Defense Minister, for alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity.
Despite mounting global pressure and civil society accountability campaigns, the political establishment continues to rely heavily on strategic diplomatic and military backing from Western allies, maintaining an insular focus on security doctrines as voters head to the polls.
Netanyahu escalates racist incitement with false claims of ballot raids by Muslim Brotherhood —— Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu intensified his election-day rhetoric, publishing inflammatory claims on social media that supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood were… pic.twitter.com/Oq6hWpSDku
The Electoral System: Proportional Representation and Coalition Dynamics
Israel uses a closed-list nationwide proportional representation system to elect the 120 members of the Knesset. The entire country forms a single electoral district.
Voters select a political party slate rather than individual constituency representatives. To gain representation in parliament, a party list must clear an electoral threshold of 3.25 percent of the total valid votes.
Because no political party in Israeli history has ever won an absolute majority of 61 seats on its own, every administration requires a multi-party governing coalition.
Following the Central Elections Committee, official vote tallies determine seat allocations using the d’Hondt method, which allocates parliamentary seats among the various candidate lists based on the votes received.
Parties frequently enter formal surplus vote-sharing agreements before election day to capture remaining unallocated seats.
Once results are certified, the President of Israel holds consultations with elected party leaders before tasking a chosen candidate, typically the head of the largest faction or coalition bloc, with forming a government within a 28-day timeframe.
This framework gives smaller sectoral and single-issue parties significant leverage during post-election negotiations. Far-right, religious, and nationalist slates often demand key ministerial posts, policy concessions, or budget allocations in exchange for their critical coalition votes.
Political analysts note that institutional features of the system, combined with state policies, impact electoral participation among Palestinian citizens of Israel. Electoral threshold adjustments and legal challenges against Arab-led party slates continuously shape voter turnout in Palestinian municipalities.
While Palestinian citizens account for roughly 20 percent of the population, their representative parties face ongoing systemic exclusion from executive coalition agreements, restricting their influence within the parliamentary framework.
As Arab voter turnout rises, Israel’s far-right leaders are sounding the alarm. War criminal Netanyahu accused “supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood” of raiding polling stations and “stealing the elections,” saying Israel is “in a war for the home.”
The candidate field for the 26th Knesset reflects a fragmented political landscape divided into distinct ideological camps, which we will detail:
The Right-Wing and Religious Coalition
• Likud: Led by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, the ruling party centers its platform on national defense, state security, and maintaining its long-standing parliamentary dominance.
• Otzma Yehudit: Headed by National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir, this far-right faction advocates for expanded settlements, strict law-and-order policies, and hardline security measures.
• Religious Zionist Party–Zehut: Led by Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich alongside Moshe Feiglin, this nationalist alliance focuses on West Bank administration, land policies, and conservative social programs.
• Ultra-Orthodox Parties: Shas, led by Aryeh Deri, and United Torah Judaism (UTJ), led by Yitzhak Goldknopf, prioritize state funding for religious institutions and maintaining draft exemptions for Haredi seminary students.
The Opposition Alliances
• Together (Beyachad): A political alliance formed by former Prime Minister Naftali Bennett and Yesh Atid leader Yair Lapid. The joint platform focuses on institutional stability, economic reform, and governance changes.
• Yashar: A new political movement launched by former IDF Chief of Staff Gadi Eisenkot. The party presents a technocratic platform focused on national security, military management, and state administration.
• Yisrael Beiteinu: Headed by Avigdor Lieberman, this right-wing secular nationalist party focuses on mandatory military conscription for all demographic groups and civic policy reforms.
• The Democrats: Formed through the merger of the Labor and Meretz parties under the leadership of former IDF Deputy Chief of Staff Yair Golan, this unified center-left party emphasizes judicial independence and social-democratic domestic policies.
Arab-Majority Parties
• Joint List: Re-established by Hadash, Ta’al, and Balad under the leadership of Yousef Jabareen, the alliance campaigns on civil rights equality, an end to house demolitions, legal recognition for unrecognized Bedouin villages, and opposition to military occupations.
• United Arab List (Ra’am): Led by Mansour Abbas, this pragmatic Islamist faction focuses on securing municipal development funds, infrastructure investments, and crime-reduction programs for Arab communities.
Netanyahu: Governance Record, Systemic Corruption, and Legal Jeopardy
Benjamin Netanyahu, with more than 15 years, is the longest-serving Prime Minister in Israel. Netanyahu governance has consistently centered on maintaining military administration over occupied Palestinian territories, expanding West Bank settlements, and privatizing state assets.
Netanyahu administrations restructured national tax policies, deregulated key economic sectors, and prioritized defense spending over social welfare initiatives. Netanyahu’s political trajectory remains deeply entwined with ongoing legal proceedings across both domestic and international courts. In domestic tribunals, he faces active criminal charges across three separate indictments known as Cases 1000, 2000, and 4000.
– Case 1000 involves charges of fraud and breach of trust regarding allegations that he received expensive gifts from wealthy business figures in exchange for political favors.
– Case 2000 includes fraud and breach of trust charges related to negotiations with media publishers to secure favorable press coverage in return for legislation restricting competing news outlets.
– Case 4000 contains the most severe charges, bribery, fraud, and breach of trust, alleging that Netanyahu granted regulatory concessions to telecom giant Bezeq in exchange for positive coverage on the Walla news platform.
Netanyahu consistently denies all allegations, maintaining that the investigations represent a politically motivated campaign by law enforcement authorities. In early 2023, his government introduced a major judicial reform initiative designed to restructure judicial appointments and limit Supreme Court oversight over executive decisions.
Opposition figures and legal experts argued that these proposals aimed to undermine judicial independence and stall his ongoing trial, prompting widespread domestic protests and deep institutional instability.
On the international stage, the International Criminal Court issued arrest warrants for Netanyahu, determining that reasonable grounds exist to hold him criminally responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity in Gaza.
The court cited specific charges, including the deliberate use of starvation as a method of warfare and intentional attacks directed against civilian populations.
Although the Israeli government rejects the jurisdiction of the tribunal, the warrants impose severe diplomatic constraints and travel limitations on Netanyahu across states parties to the Rome Statute.
Voter turnout in Israeli elections as of 16:00 GMT surpassed all votes cast in the 2022, as per data released by the Central Elections Committee.
The final distribution of seats in the 120-member Knesset will determine whether the incumbent coalition or opposition alliances secure the 61-seat majority required to govern.
If the right-wing and religious coalition retains power under Netanyahu’s leadership, the administration is expected to immediately revive paused judicial reform packages to restructure judicial selection processes and restrict legal oversight of executive actions.
Under this outcome, state policy would focus on expanding West Bank settlement infrastructure, maintaining long-term military control over Gaza, and preserving military conscription exemptions for the ultra-Orthodox population to maintain internal coalition stability.
Alternatively, if an opposition alliance formed by figures such as Gadi Eisenkot, Naftali Bennett, or Yair Lapid captures a parliamentary majority, executive authority would shift toward institutional stabilization. An opposition-led government would likely halt proposed judicial overhauls, reinstate traditional oversight mechanisms, and launch official state inquiries into military and intelligence failures.
Regarding military service, an opposition government would attempt to implement universal conscription policies that include Haredi citizens, a move likely to provoke significant resistance from religious sectors.
Striped of executive protections, Netanyahu’s domestic criminal trials would proceed without executive delays, while international legal pressures stemming from International Criminal Court warrants would remain active.
In the event that neither political bloc achieves a clear 61-seat threshold, the Knesset would enter a state of severe parliamentary deadlock. Under Israeli electoral law, Netanyahu would remain in power as caretaker Prime Minister while political factions negotiate prospective coalition agreements or initiate procedures for new legislative elections, extending the prevailing political uncertainty.
Sources: TeleSUR – Al Jazeera – Al Mayadeen – Press Tv – Anadolu Agency – TRT World – RT – The Times of Israel – Reporteros Sin Fronteras – BBC – DW – EFE – AP News – AFP
A little more than a year ago, President Donald Trump publicly demanded that Pam Bondi, then the attorney general, find a crime to pin on former FBI Director James Comey. Trump's underlings have repeatedly tried to do that, first charging Comey with lying to Congress and then accusing him of threatening to assassinate the president. But the first indictment was dismissed because Trump had illegally appointed the prosecutor who obtained it, and the second was doomed right out of the gate because it aimed to punish constitutionally protected political speech.
The Justice Department's latest attempt to follow Trump's marching orders was revealed on Monday, when U.S. District Judge Trevor McFadden unsealed a "criminal information" that claims Comey illegally shared classified information with The New York Times on October 5, 2016. In an attempt to meet the statutory deadline for that charge, prosecutors filed it exactly 10 years after the alleged disclosure. But Comey's lawyers argue that federal law required the government to obtain a grand jury indictment within 10 years of the alleged offense, which it failed to do.
Whatever you make of that dispute, the president has made it clear that he wants to imprison Comey, a longtime nemesis because of his role in the "Russiagate hoax" during Trump's first term, and does not much care about exactly how that happens. Justice Department officials, meanwhile, are keen to pursue Trump's personal vendetta by using their prosecutorial powers as an instrument of his revenge.
The new case "would almost be funny if it weren't such an appalling abuse of the Department of Justice," Comey said in an online video on Monday. "I'm still innocent. I'm still not afraid of these people, and I still believe in the independent federal judiciary."
In the New York Timesstory at the center of the case, Charlie Savage and Nicole Perloth reported that Yahoo had adapted "a system intended to scan emails for child pornography" to comply with a Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court order seeking "messages containing a computer 'signature' tied to the communications of a state-sponsored terrorist organization." Savage and Perloth cited "two government officials who spoke on the condition of anonymity."
Dustin Farahnak, a special U.S. attorney for the District of Columbia, says that story included "first-time disclosures of classified information not intended for the public domain." According to Farahnak, the government has evidence that Comey "directed staff" to discuss "specific accuracy concerns" about a prior Reuters report on the same subject with Savage. In the process of doing that, Farahnak says, those FBI officials "illegally transferred classified information."
Comey's attempt to set the record straight, according to Trump's henchmen, was a felony punishable by up to 10 years in prison under 18 USC 793(d), an Espionage Act provision that applies to an official who "willfully" shares "information relating to the national defense" with an unauthorized recipient when he "has reason to believe" it "could be used to the injury of the United States." Comey also faces a charge of conspiring to violate Section 793, which likewise carries a maximum 10-year sentence.
If Comey's alleged disclosure was such a grave crime, you might wonder, why did it take a decade to charge him? Because two prior investigations of the same incident concluded that criminal charges were not warranted.
Beginning in March 2017, John Durham, the U.S. attorney for the District of Connecticut, looked into the genesis of the Times article. The investigation found that James Baker, then the FBI's general counsel, was one of the anonymous sources. Baker said he had acted under instructions from FBI Chief of Staff James Rybacki, whom he understood to be conveying Comey's wishes. Durham's investigation included interviews, emails, phone records, and consideration of the relevant statutes. In December 2018, Comey's lawyers note, Durham "wrote a classified memorandum outlining the investigation and recommending 'NO prosecution for Baker or anyone else.'"
The following month, the U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia "opened an investigation into the same subject matter," Comey's lawyers say. That investigation "was closed without any charges in February 2020" after the office "declined to prosecute."
Given the outcomes of those two investigations, the decision to charge Comey now stinks of desperation to slake Trump's thirst for revenge. According to Comey's lawyers, the tardiness of the charges also fatally undermines the case.
Federal law generally requires that prosecutors file charges within five years of the alleged crime. But the Internal Security Act of 1950 made an exception for Section 793, saying "an indictment for any violation" of that provision "may be found at any time within ten years next after such violation shall have been committed."
The charges against Comey "should be dismissed as time barred," his lawyers argue: "Section 19 of the Internal Security Act gives the government an extended ten-year limitations period in which to charge Section 793 offenses. But as Section 19 unambiguously states, the government may invoke that extended period only by obtaining a grand jury indictment. A criminal information—which the government can issue unilaterally without grand jury involvement—does not suffice. Because the default five-year statute of limitations for federal felonies has long since elapsed on the alleged offenses, and the government's information does not meet the express statutory requirement for an extended ten-year limitations period, the information is untimely and must be dismissed."
Whichever side prevails on that issue, no one should have any illusions that the Justice Department is pursuing the mission suggested by its name. "It remains unclear what [McFadden] will do with the matter and whether DOJ will even be able to secure an indictment—as required by the Constitution," Cato Institute legal fellow Mike Fox says in an emailed press release. "Should the matter proceed, it is unequivocally clear that this case is a vindictive prosecution—a classic case of lawfare by a weaponized Justice Department."
If ever enacted, proposals by Marine Le Pen and the AfD leader, Alice Weidel, to hollow out EU institutions would be a continental act of self-harm
Following the Brexit referendum in 2016, Marine Le Pen was in a predictably celebratory mood. Britain’s vote to leave the European Union, she told one interviewer, was the first breach in the “Brussels Wall”. Ms Le Pen’s Front National party was at that point committed to taking France down the same path, given the chance. But as the UK’s self-inflicted economic wounds became a cautionary tale for the rest of Europe, the notion of Frexit was put on ice.
Instead, Ms Le Pen now hopes to lead far-right allies in hollowing out the EU from within. This month, both she and the leader of Alternative für Deutschland, Alice Weidel, outlined their visions of a “Europe of nations” in which EU institutions would be stripped of both cash and power. Ms Weidel’s “new deal for Europe” would abolish elections to the European parliament, and seek German opt-outs in areas such as migration, defence and common borrowing. Ms Le Pen’s party, now called National Rally, proposes slashing French contributions to the EU budget by 60% over a five-year presidential term, and ending the role of Brussels in proposing common policies for the 27 member states.
Do you have an opinion on the issues raised in this article? If you would like to submit a response of up to 300 words by email to be considered for publication in our letters section, please click here.
Vladimir Putin’s insistence that Ukraine surrender its remaining positions in Donetsk is not simply a dispute over territory. It is a demand that could dismantle Ukraine’s principal defensive barrier in the east, hand Moscow a military advantage it has struggled to achieve through years of fighting, and establish a precedent for further territorial concessions. The latest diplomatic contacts with European leaders have brought this question back to the centre of negotiations.
There are two ways for Russia to capture the remaining Ukrainian-held cities of Donbas. One is to fight its way through heavily fortified defensive positions, accepting substantial casualties, equipment losses and an uncertain timetable. The other is to secure their evacuation through diplomatic negotiations.
The second would achieve an important Russian military objective without requiring Moscow to bear the full cost of a prolonged offensive.
This distinction helps explain why Vladimir Putin continues to insist that Ukrainian forces withdraw from the remaining government-controlled territory of Donetsk region before a comprehensive settlement can be negotiated.
It also raises a more consequential question: would surrendering Donbas bring the war closer to an end, or would it improve Russia’s position in any subsequent confrontation?
A diplomatic opening without a strategic concession
The issue returned to prominence on 27 October when Finnish President Alexander Stubb and Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre held a rare telephone conversation with Putin.
According to the Finnish president’s official statement, the call followed discussions in Oslo on 20 October involving Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and US presidential envoy Steve Witkoff.
The Nordic leaders sought to advance preparations for renewed American-mediated negotiations, expected in Abu Dhabi in November. They emphasised that they were acting on behalf of their respective countries rather than representing Europe collectively.
Stubb described the exchange as “frank and substantive”, arguing that direct communication with Moscow was necessary to address the security consequences of the war.
However, the Kremlin’s account offered little indication of movement on the fundamental disagreements.
Moscow insisted that any durable peace must fully accommodate Russian interests. A source close to the Kremlin told Reuters that Putin had reiterated his refusal to compromise on the objective of controlling the entire Donbas.
Following the conversation, Zelenskyy confirmed that the Nordic leaders had briefed him and stressed to Putin the need for concrete measures to reduce attacks on Ukrainian energy infrastructure.
The diplomatic process has therefore resumed without resolving the territorial dispute at its centre.
The military significance of the remaining Donbas
The territory Russia is demanding includes some of Ukraine’s most important surviving defensive positions.
Since fighting began in eastern Ukraine in 2014, Ukrainian forces have constructed and reinforced an extensive defensive system centred on Sloviansk, Kramatorsk, Druzhkivka and Kostiantynivka.
Known as the fortress belt, this network combines urban areas, industrial facilities, transport infrastructure, prepared defensive positions and terrain that complicates offensive operations.
The military importance of this system extends far beyond the administrative boundaries of Donetsk.
According to the Institute for the Study of War, surrendering these positions would allow Russian forces to occupy heavily defended territory without undertaking the prolonged operations otherwise required to capture it.
In its 26 October battlefield assessment, the institute continued to identify the capture of this defensive belt as Russia’s principal military objective in Donetsk. Ukrainian forces retained positions in parts of Kostiantynivka, while Russian operations towards other major cities remained contested.
The implications of a negotiated Ukrainian withdrawal would be substantial.
Russia could occupy the fortified urban corridor, reorganise its forces, establish new logistics routes and potentially redirect formations towards other sectors.
Ukraine, meanwhile, would have to construct or reinforce defensive positions further west, potentially under pressure and in less favourable terrain.
The resulting military imbalance would not necessarily lead to another Russian offensive. But it would change the conditions under which any renewed hostilities might take place.
That is why territory cannot be assessed solely by its surface area. A relatively small section of the front can possess strategic value disproportionate to its size.
Why Moscow prefers a negotiated withdrawal
Russia’s insistence on Donetsk also reflects the limits of what its military has achieved.
Despite years of fighting, Moscow has not secured complete control of the region. Successive offensives have produced territorial gains, but at considerable cost and without the rapid breakthrough originally anticipated.
US Secretary of State Marco Rubio recently acknowledged the central importance of the remaining Ukrainian-held territory.
In an interview published by the US State Department, Rubio characterised the dispute as centred on territory Russia wants but has been unable to capture militarily, while recognising Ukraine’s sovereignty and long-term security concerns.
His remarks demonstrate how Donbas has become the principal territorial obstacle in Washington’s diplomatic calculations.
For Moscow, however, concentrating negotiations on this specific demand offers an additional advantage.
If Ukraine refuses to withdraw, the Kremlin can argue that Kyiv is preventing progress towards peace. If Ukraine agrees, Russia obtains strategically valuable territory without the military costs associated with conquering it.
The demand therefore serves a dual purpose: it establishes a public explanation for the absence of an agreement while offering Russia an immediate military benefit should negotiations succeed on its terms.
The problem with treating Donbas as the final concession
The central weakness in any settlement built around a Ukrainian withdrawal is the assumption that control of Donbas represents the limit of Russia’s territorial ambitions.
Moscow’s previously declared objectives suggest a more complicated picture.
In June 2024, Putin demanded Ukrainian withdrawal from four regions claimed by Russia: Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson. Moscow does not fully control these regions, despite claiming to have annexed them in September 2022.
Russia has also demanded restrictions on Ukraine’s military capabilities and future security relationships.
As EU Today previously reported, renewed diplomatic engagement has not produced a clear abandonment of the Kremlin’s wider objectives.
Consequently, transferring the remaining territory of Donetsk would not necessarily satisfy Moscow’s other demands.
There is a significant difference between conceding territory as part of an enforceable settlement and withdrawing from defensive positions as a precondition for negotiating one.
In the first case, territorial arrangements form part of a wider agreement establishing obligations, verification procedures and security guarantees.
In the second, one party makes a potentially irreversible military concession before knowing whether an agreement will ultimately be reached.
This asymmetry is particularly important where the proposed concession directly affects the withdrawing country’s ability to defend itself.
The strategy of incremental gains
One interpretation of Moscow’s approach is that it reflects a strategy of incremental territorial expansion rather than an attempt to achieve all its objectives through a single decisive offensive.
After Russia failed to capture Kyiv in 2022, its military campaign increasingly concentrated on taking territory through successive, often prolonged operations.
The diplomatic equivalent would involve securing one concession, consolidating the resulting advantage and subsequently presenting additional demands.
Under such a scenario, Russia could obtain control of the remaining Donetsk territory, establish new positions closer to Dnipropetrovsk region and later argue that further territorial or security arrangements were necessary to protect its newly acquired frontier.
Moscow has already used the language of protective buffer zones to justify military operations elsewhere in Ukraine.
There is no evidence establishing that such a sequence would inevitably follow a Donbas settlement. Nevertheless, the possibility must be considered when assessing the military consequences of a withdrawal.
The concern is not merely that Russia might violate a future agreement. It is that the agreement itself could alter the strategic balance in ways that make renewed military pressure more effective.
There is also an internal Ukrainian dimension.
An agreement requiring the evacuation of cities defended for years would create substantial political controversy. Disagreements over territorial concessions, security guarantees and the credibility of Western commitments could complicate domestic political stability.
For Moscow, such divisions might provide another means of influencing Ukraine without immediate military escalation.
Donbas and the wider question of Ukrainian sovereignty
Donbas has considerable political significance for Putin beyond its military value.
The conflict in eastern Ukraine began in 2014, following Russia’s annexation of Crimea. Donetsk and Luhansk became central to the Kremlin’s justification for intervention, and their incorporation into Russia was later proclaimed as part of the 2022 annexations.
Control of the entire region would allow Putin to present a tangible achievement after years of warfare.
Yet the Kremlin’s objectives have never been confined exclusively to Donbas.
Putin has repeatedly questioned Ukraine’s historical and political independence, while Russian negotiating demands have extended to the country’s military posture, international alliances and internal political arrangements.
These positions suggest that territorial control forms part of a broader attempt to determine Ukraine’s strategic orientation.
A settlement that ends fighting in Donetsk without resolving these wider disagreements might therefore suspend the conflict rather than settle its underlying causes.
What the next negotiations must establish
The planned talks in Abu Dhabi will test whether Moscow is prepared to distinguish between its territorial demands and the conditions necessary for a sustainable ceasefire.
An immediate halt to hostilities along existing lines would preserve the military status quo while allowing negotiations to proceed.
Russia has resisted this approach, arguing that a temporary ceasefire could enable Ukraine to rebuild its forces without resolving the conflict.
Ukraine, by contrast, argues that withdrawing from fortified territory without credible guarantees would expose it to renewed attack.
Neither side can be expected to disregard the military implications of the proposed arrangements.
For European governments, the principal question is consequently not simply whether Ukrainian and Russian representatives can be brought back to the negotiating table.
It is whether any agreement can prevent the territorial settlement from becoming the starting position for another war.
Stubb and Støre’s conversation with Putin demonstrated that diplomatic communication remains possible. It did not establish that Moscow is prepared to abandon its existing territorial objectives.
The distinction matters.
Putin’s demand for Donbas offers Russia two potential advantages: a justification for continuing the war if Kyiv refuses, and a substantial military gain if Kyiv accepts.
That does not prove the Kremlin has already decided to resume hostilities after a negotiated withdrawal. It does, however, explain why the terms, sequencing and enforceability of any agreement are as consequential as the territory itself.
The essential question facing negotiators is therefore not only whether Russia can obtain Donbas through diplomacy rather than force.
It is whether the price of that concession would be a lasting peace — or a weaker Ukrainian defensive position if peace fails.
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L'administration américaine souhaiterait propulser l'ancien Premier ministre hongrois à la tête des Nations unies, avec l'appui de Moscou et de Pékin. Mais entre les règles de désignation, les résistances européennes...
El despliegue de agentes federales, las amenazas a funcionarios electorales y las demandas contra varios estados alimentan el temor a que la Casa Blanca utilice el aparato del Estado para condicionar los comicios del 3 de noviembre Leer
El despliegue de agentes federales, las amenazas a funcionarios electorales y las demandas contra varios estados alimentan el temor a que la Casa Blanca utilice el aparato del Estado para condicionar los comicios del 3 de noviembre
The war, at the eight-month mark, has spiked gas prices and left voters frustrated, imperiling continued Republican control of Congress after Nov. 3 vote; Trump downplays concerns
I had to be dismissed by the Trump administration in 2025 before I truly understood how fragile the fabric of our society in the United States had become. Values we had long regarded as universal — such as ending world hunger, HIV, malaria, and neglected tropical diseases — suddenly became political bargaining chips. I never imagined the day would come when my country would abruptly and recklessly cut off supplies of medical equipment, emergency food, and rape kits destined for some of the world’s poorest people, with a death toll that is hard to calculate.
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Sei anni dopo la prima battaglia legale, Neil Young torna in tribunale contro Donald Trump o meglio contro la macchina che ne finanzia la politica. Lunedì 26 ottobre il cantautore ha citato in giudizio per 10 milioni di dollari il comitato congiunto di raccolta fondi del presidente, davanti a un tribunale federale della Virginia, sostenendo che il comitato abbia violato un accordo del 2020 usando senza licenza “Rockin’ in the Free World” a un comizio in Ohio.
Secondo l’atto, il brano del 1989 sarebbe stato diffuso senza licenza poco prima che Trump salisse sul palco a Youngstown, in Ohio, il 12 ottobre.
Il difensore del comitato, per ora, tace. Alla richiesta di commento non hanno risposto per il momento né la Casa Bianca, né il Trump 47 Committee, né il Comitato nazionale repubblicano, che ha costituito con Trump il comitato congiunto.
Il querelante sostiene inoltre che l’uso non si sia fermato a quella sera: la registrazione sarebbe stata utilizzata anche in altri comizi repubblicani del 2026, ma il documento non indica quali.
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