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Senate Democrats warn that the Trump administration is hiding a damning surveillance report

27 October 2026 at 21:08

Happy Tuesday! Here’s your Tuesday Tech Drop, the past week’s top stories from the intersection of technology and politics.

Dems want damning surveillance report

A pair of Democratic senators are accusing President Donald Trump’s administration of hiding a report that “details serious abuses of Americans’ rights under Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.” Sens. Ron Wyden, D-Ore., and Adam Schiff, D-Calif., are trying to pry loose a report they say the administration is legally required to make public after a FISA court opinion detailed abuses of the program in March.

Since retaking office, Trump has expanded the federal government’s arsenal of creepy surveillance tools en route to building what appears to be an unprecedented spy machine that can track Americans. It’s in that context that Democrats — with some GOP help — tanked a vote in June that would have extended the controversial FISA powers that give the government broad latitude to sweep up data, including information belonging to Americans.

In a letter to Director of National Intelligence Jay Clayton and Attorney General Todd Blanche, the two Senate Democrats said the damning FISA report from on alleged surveillance abuses should have been released already — and demanded that it be released now so lawmakers can consider whether to extend FISA powers next year.

They wrote:

The administration has now had over seven months to declassify and release this opinion. It is time to stop violating the law and finally release this opinion. And if this administration won’t follow this simple statutory directive, it is unclear why Congress or the American people should trust this administration to follow any of the other legal limits to Section 702.

Read more at Gizmodo.

AI bots’ banking break-ins

Artificial intelligence bots are increasingly gaining unauthorized access to people’s bank accounts, according to new reporting from Axios. The report homes in on concerns among bank officials about security in the age of AI.

Read more at Axios.

Massive Meta judgment

A judge ordered Meta to pay $25 billion after the company lost a lawsuit alleging that the company broke New Mexico’s consumer protection laws and jeopardized its users after the Cambridge Analytica scandal nearly a decade ago. Meta has vowed to appeal the ruling.

Read more at MS NOW.

Republican outcry over Colom ad

After Mississippi’s Republican attorney general issued legal threats last week, the state’s Democratic Senate nominee, Scott Colom, deleted an ad using AI tools to mock his Republican opponent, Sen. Cindy Hyde-Smith. I wrote about how it seems like Republicans are fretting over this race in a deep-red state.

Read more at MS NOW.

Pro-ICE activist reportedly faces deportation

Samuel Sey, a popular right-wing influencer known for supporting Trump’s racist anti-immigrant crackdown, reportedly has been detained by immigration officials and is now facing deportation after allegedly overstaying a temporary visa.

Read more at The Roys Report.

What AI guidelines?

The good news is the Pentagon apparently has some guidelines around the development of AI tools to avoid the risk of escalating wars or harming civilians and troops. The bad news? Defense officials aren’t always adhering to these rules, according to a congressional report.

Read more at NPR.

Anthropic bots get alarming access

Anthropic says its AI tool accessed Georgia voting data typically only available to people who pay for it. The company and Georgia’s secretary of state said no individual voter records were accessed, but the intrusion marks yet another disturbing security breach involving AI. A new report explains why “the company’s statements about what its bot accessed raise more questions.”

Read more at The Atlanta Journal-Constitution.

Alpha School shortcomings

An investigation from The New York Times suggests that Alpha School, the network of AI-fueled private schools that have been backed by the Trump administration and vow to offer a superior learning experience, is failing to live up to its promises.

Read more at The New York Times.

MAGA influencer meddling fails

Several MAGA influencers have recently been in Brazil and Serbia, hoping to sway elections in both countries — but the pro-authoritarian candidates they supported flamed out over the weekend. Now, especially when it comes to Brazil, Trump and a bunch of extremely online conservatives are pushing lies about the election being rigged, as my colleague Brandy Zydrozny explained.

Read more at MS NOW.

The post Senate Democrats warn that the Trump administration is hiding a damning surveillance report appeared first on MS NOW.

Why Putin Demands Donbas: The Territorial Ultimatum That Could Shape Ukraine’s Next War

27 October 2026 at 18:07

Vladimir Putin’s insistence that Ukraine surrender its remaining positions in Donetsk is not simply a dispute over territory. It is a demand that could dismantle Ukraine’s principal defensive barrier in the east, hand Moscow a military advantage it has struggled to achieve through years of fighting, and establish a precedent for further territorial concessions. The latest diplomatic contacts with European leaders have brought this question back to the centre of negotiations.

There are two ways for Russia to capture the remaining Ukrainian-held cities of Donbas. One is to fight its way through heavily fortified defensive positions, accepting substantial casualties, equipment losses and an uncertain timetable. The other is to secure their evacuation through diplomatic negotiations.

The second would achieve an important Russian military objective without requiring Moscow to bear the full cost of a prolonged offensive.

This distinction helps explain why Vladimir Putin continues to insist that Ukrainian forces withdraw from the remaining government-controlled territory of Donetsk region before a comprehensive settlement can be negotiated.

It also raises a more consequential question: would surrendering Donbas bring the war closer to an end, or would it improve Russia’s position in any subsequent confrontation?

A diplomatic opening without a strategic concession

The issue returned to prominence on 27 October when Finnish President Alexander Stubb and Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre held a rare telephone conversation with Putin.

According to the Finnish president’s official statement, the call followed discussions in Oslo on 20 October involving Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and US presidential envoy Steve Witkoff.

The Nordic leaders sought to advance preparations for renewed American-mediated negotiations, expected in Abu Dhabi in November. They emphasised that they were acting on behalf of their respective countries rather than representing Europe collectively.

Stubb described the exchange as “frank and substantive”, arguing that direct communication with Moscow was necessary to address the security consequences of the war.

However, the Kremlin’s account offered little indication of movement on the fundamental disagreements.

Moscow insisted that any durable peace must fully accommodate Russian interests. A source close to the Kremlin told Reuters that Putin had reiterated his refusal to compromise on the objective of controlling the entire Donbas.

Following the conversation, Zelenskyy confirmed that the Nordic leaders had briefed him and stressed to Putin the need for concrete measures to reduce attacks on Ukrainian energy infrastructure.

The diplomatic process has therefore resumed without resolving the territorial dispute at its centre.

The military significance of the remaining Donbas

The territory Russia is demanding includes some of Ukraine’s most important surviving defensive positions.

Since fighting began in eastern Ukraine in 2014, Ukrainian forces have constructed and reinforced an extensive defensive system centred on Sloviansk, Kramatorsk, Druzhkivka and Kostiantynivka.

Known as the fortress belt, this network combines urban areas, industrial facilities, transport infrastructure, prepared defensive positions and terrain that complicates offensive operations.

The military importance of this system extends far beyond the administrative boundaries of Donetsk.

According to the Institute for the Study of War, surrendering these positions would allow Russian forces to occupy heavily defended territory without undertaking the prolonged operations otherwise required to capture it.

In its 26 October battlefield assessment, the institute continued to identify the capture of this defensive belt as Russia’s principal military objective in Donetsk. Ukrainian forces retained positions in parts of Kostiantynivka, while Russian operations towards other major cities remained contested.

The implications of a negotiated Ukrainian withdrawal would be substantial.

Russia could occupy the fortified urban corridor, reorganise its forces, establish new logistics routes and potentially redirect formations towards other sectors.

Ukraine, meanwhile, would have to construct or reinforce defensive positions further west, potentially under pressure and in less favourable terrain.

The resulting military imbalance would not necessarily lead to another Russian offensive. But it would change the conditions under which any renewed hostilities might take place.

That is why territory cannot be assessed solely by its surface area. A relatively small section of the front can possess strategic value disproportionate to its size.

Why Moscow prefers a negotiated withdrawal

Russia’s insistence on Donetsk also reflects the limits of what its military has achieved.

Despite years of fighting, Moscow has not secured complete control of the region. Successive offensives have produced territorial gains, but at considerable cost and without the rapid breakthrough originally anticipated.

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio recently acknowledged the central importance of the remaining Ukrainian-held territory.

In an interview published by the US State Department, Rubio characterised the dispute as centred on territory Russia wants but has been unable to capture militarily, while recognising Ukraine’s sovereignty and long-term security concerns.

His remarks demonstrate how Donbas has become the principal territorial obstacle in Washington’s diplomatic calculations.

For Moscow, however, concentrating negotiations on this specific demand offers an additional advantage.

If Ukraine refuses to withdraw, the Kremlin can argue that Kyiv is preventing progress towards peace. If Ukraine agrees, Russia obtains strategically valuable territory without the military costs associated with conquering it.

The demand therefore serves a dual purpose: it establishes a public explanation for the absence of an agreement while offering Russia an immediate military benefit should negotiations succeed on its terms.

The problem with treating Donbas as the final concession

The central weakness in any settlement built around a Ukrainian withdrawal is the assumption that control of Donbas represents the limit of Russia’s territorial ambitions.

Moscow’s previously declared objectives suggest a more complicated picture.

In June 2024, Putin demanded Ukrainian withdrawal from four regions claimed by Russia: Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson. Moscow does not fully control these regions, despite claiming to have annexed them in September 2022.

Russia has also demanded restrictions on Ukraine’s military capabilities and future security relationships.

As EU Today previously reported, renewed diplomatic engagement has not produced a clear abandonment of the Kremlin’s wider objectives.

Consequently, transferring the remaining territory of Donetsk would not necessarily satisfy Moscow’s other demands.

There is a significant difference between conceding territory as part of an enforceable settlement and withdrawing from defensive positions as a precondition for negotiating one.

In the first case, territorial arrangements form part of a wider agreement establishing obligations, verification procedures and security guarantees.

In the second, one party makes a potentially irreversible military concession before knowing whether an agreement will ultimately be reached.

This asymmetry is particularly important where the proposed concession directly affects the withdrawing country’s ability to defend itself.

The strategy of incremental gains

One interpretation of Moscow’s approach is that it reflects a strategy of incremental territorial expansion rather than an attempt to achieve all its objectives through a single decisive offensive.

After Russia failed to capture Kyiv in 2022, its military campaign increasingly concentrated on taking territory through successive, often prolonged operations.

The diplomatic equivalent would involve securing one concession, consolidating the resulting advantage and subsequently presenting additional demands.

Under such a scenario, Russia could obtain control of the remaining Donetsk territory, establish new positions closer to Dnipropetrovsk region and later argue that further territorial or security arrangements were necessary to protect its newly acquired frontier.

Moscow has already used the language of protective buffer zones to justify military operations elsewhere in Ukraine.

There is no evidence establishing that such a sequence would inevitably follow a Donbas settlement. Nevertheless, the possibility must be considered when assessing the military consequences of a withdrawal.

The concern is not merely that Russia might violate a future agreement. It is that the agreement itself could alter the strategic balance in ways that make renewed military pressure more effective.

There is also an internal Ukrainian dimension.

An agreement requiring the evacuation of cities defended for years would create substantial political controversy. Disagreements over territorial concessions, security guarantees and the credibility of Western commitments could complicate domestic political stability.

For Moscow, such divisions might provide another means of influencing Ukraine without immediate military escalation.

Donbas and the wider question of Ukrainian sovereignty

Donbas has considerable political significance for Putin beyond its military value.

The conflict in eastern Ukraine began in 2014, following Russia’s annexation of Crimea. Donetsk and Luhansk became central to the Kremlin’s justification for intervention, and their incorporation into Russia was later proclaimed as part of the 2022 annexations.

Control of the entire region would allow Putin to present a tangible achievement after years of warfare.

Yet the Kremlin’s objectives have never been confined exclusively to Donbas.

Putin has repeatedly questioned Ukraine’s historical and political independence, while Russian negotiating demands have extended to the country’s military posture, international alliances and internal political arrangements.

These positions suggest that territorial control forms part of a broader attempt to determine Ukraine’s strategic orientation.

A settlement that ends fighting in Donetsk without resolving these wider disagreements might therefore suspend the conflict rather than settle its underlying causes.

What the next negotiations must establish

The planned talks in Abu Dhabi will test whether Moscow is prepared to distinguish between its territorial demands and the conditions necessary for a sustainable ceasefire.

An immediate halt to hostilities along existing lines would preserve the military status quo while allowing negotiations to proceed.

Russia has resisted this approach, arguing that a temporary ceasefire could enable Ukraine to rebuild its forces without resolving the conflict.

Ukraine, by contrast, argues that withdrawing from fortified territory without credible guarantees would expose it to renewed attack.

Neither side can be expected to disregard the military implications of the proposed arrangements.

For European governments, the principal question is consequently not simply whether Ukrainian and Russian representatives can be brought back to the negotiating table.

It is whether any agreement can prevent the territorial settlement from becoming the starting position for another war.

Stubb and Støre’s conversation with Putin demonstrated that diplomatic communication remains possible. It did not establish that Moscow is prepared to abandon its existing territorial objectives.

The distinction matters.

Putin’s demand for Donbas offers Russia two potential advantages: a justification for continuing the war if Kyiv refuses, and a substantial military gain if Kyiv accepts.

That does not prove the Kremlin has already decided to resume hostilities after a negotiated withdrawal. It does, however, explain why the terms, sequencing and enforceability of any agreement are as consequential as the territory itself.

The essential question facing negotiators is therefore not only whether Russia can obtain Donbas through diplomacy rather than force.

It is whether the price of that concession would be a lasting peace — or a weaker Ukrainian defensive position if peace fails.

Libya's maritime deal: Why Haftar is turning towards Turkey

27 October 2026 at 16:45

Tripoli, Libya - Six years ago, Libya’s Benghazi-based House of Representatives (HoR) unanimously rejected the 2019 maritime memorandum of understanding (MoU) between Tripoli and Ankara.

Under Resolution No. 6/2020, the House severed political ties with Turkey and accused the former prime minister, foreign minister, and interior minister of high treason, referring them to the Attorney General.

Yet on 20 October 2026, the eastern-based HoR abruptly reversed its position, unanimously approving the maritime deal.

Parliament did not ratify the accompanying security pact, nor did it repeal the 2020 treason referrals - leaving it unclear if the Attorney General will act on a dormant mandate while the accused officials live openly in Tripoli.

The 2019 Istanbul agreements were born of an existential crisis for the Tripoli-based Government of National Accord (GNA). As Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA) advanced within 10 kilometres of the capital, Ankara provided a vital military lifeline at a heavy political price.

The package comprised two parallel instruments: a security pact deploying drones and mercenaries to rout the LNA, and a maritime MoU securing Turkey’s Eastern Mediterranean ambitions.

Both pacts sparked immediate outrage, with critics arguing a besieged GNA could not bargain freely. One Libyan border expert, who wished to remain anonymous, told The New Arab that the arrangement was a clear “case of blackmail” of a desperate government.

Others, however, reject that description. Mohamed Taher Siala, Libya’s foreign minister at the time and one of the agreement’s signatories, told The New Arab that criticism of the deal would only be fair “if it fails to serve the [Libya] country's national interests”.

In his view, Tripoli conceded nothing to Ankara. Instead, it secured a substantial expansion of its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), unlocking vital offshore oil and gas reserves.

That perspective is shared by Baghdadi Saleh, a retired Libyan border expert, who verified that the maritime MoU does not deprive Libya of a single square meter of territory. Speaking to The New Arab, Saleh noted that the deal effectively “does not infringe” on Libya’s rights.

Yet, despite these potential territorial gains, the circumstances of 2019 have rendered both MoUs deeply controversial. Besides the HoR’s rejection, regional countries including Greece, Egypt, and Cyprus rejected the maritime boundaries as a direct violation of their own rights, while the European Union declared the deal legally null and void.

This history makes the HoR’s ratification of the deal all the more striking, raising the central question: what has changed in 2026 to make former adversaries embrace an agreement they once condemned as high treason?

Haftar's shift towards Turkey

Between 2019 and 2026, two developments help explain the HoR’s reversal. The first is the change in its leadership, with Al-Salhin Abdulnabi replacing Aguila Saleh, who had occupied the speakership since 2014.

The second, and likely the most important, is the recent pragmatic rapprochement between Haftar’s camp and Turkey.

Seven years after the military conflict, the former adversaries are moving closer. Ankara has consolidated its position in western Libya while increasingly engaging with Saddam Haftar, who is not only deputy to his father but also hoping to become president of Libya one day. Closer relations with Ankara could certainly serve his ambitions.

For Khalifa Haftar, meanwhile, cultivating ties with Turkey offers a way to advance his family’s political influence, even if his own long-standing ambition of governing Libya remains unrealised.

The 2019–2020 LNA military campaign on Tripoli was accompanied by a bitter war of words that makes today’s rapprochement all the more striking.

At the time, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan branded Haftar a “putschist,” while Haftar denounced Turkey as an occupying power and called for mobilisation against a “Turkish invasion”.

Egypt, meanwhile, backed Haftar fully. In June 2020, as Turkish-backed forces advanced toward Sirte, President Sisi declared the city a “red line” and threatened direct military intervention - a move publicly backed by then-HoR Speaker Aguila Saleh.

This confrontation went far beyond maritime boundaries, with Ankara and Cairo backing opposing camps and raising the spectre of a wider regional conflict.

Regional tensions

Reactions to the HoR’s reversal came quickly, led by Greece and Egypt, which rejected not only the agreement but also the legal effect of its ratification.

The Greek Foreign Minister declared that “the memorandum will not be implemented under any circumstances” because “it is illegal.” Cairo stated that the ratification had no “legal consequences for Egypt”.

The European Union followed, with European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and European Council President António Costa reiterating the bloc’s opposition and expressing solidarity with Greece and Cyprus.

Meanwhile, the EU’s foreign policy chief, Kaja Kallas, issued a further statement reiterating the EU’s rejection. Israel also strongly condemned the ratification while accusing Ankara of destabilising the region.

Washington’s response was more restrained. On 22 October, a US State Department spokesperson urged all parties to resolve maritime disputes through negotiations. Greece briefed the UN Security Council on the matter.

The controversy surrounding Turkey’s footprint in Libya is not confined to high-level diplomatic calculations or military bases - it extends directly into daily life in the capital.

In Tripoli’s Zawiyat al-Dahmani neighbourhood, the Turkish Embassy’s long-standing closure of a primary public road has become a persistent local grievance.

Security roadblocks have exacerbated the city’s severe traffic congestion, disrupting local businesses and often obstructing emergency access to the nearby Eye Hospital. The Turkish Embassy was contacted for comment, but no response was received by the time of publication.

The dispute serves as a local microcosm of the broader friction defining the Turkey–Libya relationship: a dynamic where foreign security arrangements regularly override public accountability and everyday Libyan rights.

Maritime ambitions, uncertain returns

In August 2022, then-Oil and Gas Minister Mohamed Aoun expressed approval of the deal, saying it gave Libya access to “vast maritime areas”.

His point is echoed by pro-Haftar commentator Ahmed Alhossein, who told The New Arab that the MoU should be viewed positively “as long as it secures Libya’s interests”.

But for other analysts, the main question is whether Libya is actually ready to exploit this vast maritime area.

Since 2011, the country has been struggling to manage and develop even its less costly onshore oil production and its existing infrastructure, let alone attract the huge investment needed for offshore exploration in disputed waters.

In the politically unstable country, violence could erupt at any moment and “oil production is regularly interrupted and sometimes stopped for months”, the Libyan border expert told The New Arab.

Major oil potential partners are unlikely to commit millions of dollars to contested offshore areas in this environment of instability.

The agreement has also put Libya at odds with Greece and Cyprus, backed by the European Union. The dispute could ultimately end up being decided through international legal proceedings, which are often lengthy, adding further uncertainty for investors.

Many Libyans argue that their country, already deeply weakened, needs fewer disputes, not more, particularly with its immediate neighbours and trading partners such as the EU.

Any potential gains from offshore resources must be weighed against the diplomatic, legal, and investment risks the agreement could create.

The question is not simply what Libya might gain, but whether those potential benefits will outweigh the problems the agreement could bring.

Mustafa Fetouri is an award-winning Libyan journalist, columnist, author, and translator, with contributions to major outlets like Middle East Monitor, Al-Monitor, and Washington Report, and a focus on North Africa and the Sahel region

Follow him on X: @MFetouri

Edited by Charlie Hoyle

DAILY UPDATE: Latest essential news on Palestine, Israel, & region

Tuesday is election day in Israel ■ Israeli army kills 5, burns displacement camp in Gaza, leaving 800 homeless ■ Almost 4,000 Palestinians displaced in West Bank, as demolitions continue ■ "Antisemitism" hits hockey game

Today, we hand over the newsletter to you, our readers

27 October 2026 at 15:48


This is the Oct. 27, 2026 edition of “The Tea, Spilled by Morning Joe” newsletter. Subscribe here to get it delivered straight to your inbox Monday through Friday.

Hello, “Morning Joe” family!

We love hearing from you. Here’s what was on your mind this week. As always, you can write to us anytime.

CALLING THE MORNING JOE FAMILY: MIDTERMS MAILBAG

On Election Day, the “Morning Joe” family will answer reader questions about the midterms in the newsletter. Do you have a question to ask? Send it to us here.

LETTERS FROM OUR READERS

I don’t have a question, just a comment. I enjoy watching “Morning Joe” when I get the chance. I have been experiencing some health issues. The Morning Tea gives me a chance to catch up. I’m not always able to get to my computer, so that is why I fall behind. Oh one more thing … Go Brewers!!

—Joe W., Weston, Wis.

No question — just thanks for the wonderful interview with Amy Acton and recap in The Tea. Ad was as low as it could go — a disgrace … I hope Amy succeeds.

— Georgie H., N.J.

I see a lot of similarities between Trump brushing aside the notion that the ad against Amy Acton crosses a line and the seemingly callous way in which Michael Dukakis answered the debate question about why he would still be against the death penalty even if his wife were brutally raped. Not to say those things are on par, but do you think the complete lack of empathy for a child rape victim will stick to Trump and become a major part of his legacy the way the debate response sunk Dukakis?

— Wendy B., Fort Wayne, Ind.

I don’t generally agree with judging people by what group they identify with, but it’s hard not to judge the Republican Party as more corrupt, lying, and hateful than I’ve seen in my life and I’m an old man. Can we the people sue these politicians for lying about us in these ridiculous campaign ads and then doubling down when proved wrong? Are we so far gone in this country that defamation lies can never be prosecuted? Of course even if prosecuted they will bankrupt us through the process and that may even be their plan … all of course with impunity.

— Keith M., Stamford, Conn.

My daughter who is a senior in college asked me yesterday: Why isn’t Election Day a national holiday? Wouldn’t that make it more likely for more people to vote? They could even make it a holiday every other year; midterms and presidential election years. Could alternate that day off with Columbus Day, almost make it a floating holiday. Israel has it this way, where everyone is off that day.

— Matt R., Arlington Heights, Ill.

One week to Election Day. Wow. I’m finding I’m getting more and more excited with each day that passes. I feel I should be feeling more and more anxious, but I’m not.

— Scott, an MS NOW Member

Not a question honestly, but a huge thank you for all of your insight and knowledge. It is what gets me through this nightmare. I so enjoy you ALL! Thank you!

— Cyndi M., Kennebunkport, Maine

[And a happy early birthday to Cyndi!]

The post Today, we hand over the newsletter to you, our readers appeared first on MS NOW.

Israeli media analysis: 2 Paths to War With Iran Loom Over Israel’s Election

Behind the scenes, Netayahu has been waging a fight against Israel’s defense establishment & the US administration. He recently made a huge effort to reignite the war with Iran, which sparked a direct clash with the Israel Defense Forces' top brass… If Netanyahu's opponents win they must make it clear that they won't allow the outgoing government to embark on any last-minute military adventures and embroil the country in more wars before a well-thought-out strategy has been developed…

The high-stakes Montana court race flying under the radar

27 October 2026 at 13:21

This is an adapted excerpt from the Oct. 24 episode of “Connect with Jacob Soboroff.”

With just days until Election Day, the truism “all politics is local” feels especially relevant this year. Some of voters’ most consequential choices will be the bubbles they fill in for statewide ballot measures and local races. These contests will have a direct effect on their communities — like in Montana, where a highly consequential race has been flying somewhat under the radar.

On Nov. 3, voters there will choose a justice for their state Supreme Court. Two district judges are running: Amy Eddy and Dan Wilson. While the race is officially nonpartisan, Eddy is generally viewed as liberal-leaning, backed by labor unions and conservation groups. Wilson is generally viewed as conservative-leaning, backed by the Montana Republican Party.

The Associated Press says the fight over this court “ranks among the most intense” of the nearly two dozen states also electing justices this fall. Millions of dollars are being spent to win this one seat.

Montanans are trying to fight dark money in politics once again.

Montana’s Supreme Court currently leans liberal, 4-3, but if Wilson wins, that majority flips. In just the past several years, Montana’s Supreme Court has issued major rulings protecting legislation around climate, reproductive rights and democracy.

On climate, the court ruled 6-1 in 2023 in favor of 16 young people who sued the state, arguing that its promotion of fossil fuels violated their right to a clean and healthful environment under the Montana Constitution. It was the first ruling of its kind in the country.

On abortion, Montana’s Supreme Court responded to the Dobbs decision by turning to its own state constitution to expand abortion access. That’s the power of state courts: They can protect certain rights even when the federal courts no longer guarantee them.

On voting, in 2024 a 4-3 ruling from the court struck down four voter suppression laws, including one that would have ended Election Day registration. The court held that those laws impermissibly interfered with the right to vote. It noted, “The record shows that more than 70,000 Montanans have utilized election day registration to vote since 2005 and that many electors would be disenfranchised without the availability of election day registration.”

Republicans in the state didn’t love those decisions, which is probably why there’s so much attention and money going into this race.

To be clear, the money flows from both sides. According to the Brennan Center, two political action committees — Montanans for Freedom and Responsibility and Justice Watch — have spent a combined $1.8 million on ads against Wilson. And the PAC More Jobs, Less Government has spent about $460,000 on television ads against Eddy.

According to the Google Ads Transparency Center, another PAC targeting Eddy is the First Principles PAC, which is linked to none other than Leonard Leo. At least one anti-Eddy ad funded by First Principles PAC can be found on YouTube.

Leo, a right-wing money man and longtime Federalist Society chairman, is the same man who helped handpick the conservative supermajority on the U.S. Supreme Court. Leo’s network has been involved in state court races across the country.

Now, you may be asking: Why is this particular state race so important to Leo, who doesn’t live anywhere near Montana?

Just consider those decisions noted above. Montana is the fifth-largest coal-producing state in the country, and its court handed down the nation’s first constitutional climate ruling. On abortion, Montana’s state constitution continues to protect access after Dobbs. Meanwhile, Leo’s network has poured millions into anti-abortion groups pushing for bans all over the country.

If this story feels like déjà vu, it’s because we’ve seen a version of it. In Wisconsin last year, more than $100 million from both sides of the aisle was spent on a single state Supreme Court seat, a national record. Elon Musk spent at least $20 million on the candidate backed by Republicans. He tried to promise $1 million checks to those who voted. The liberal candidate won anyway, by about 10 points.

But here’s some fun history: Montana has, in fact, lived through this before. In the early 1900s, wealthy industrialists known as the Copper Kings bought legislators, judges and even a U.S. Senate seat.

In 1912, Montana voters fought back through a ballot initiative, banning corporate spending in elections outright. That law stood for a century until 2012, when the U.S. Supreme Court struck it down, citing Citizens United.

Now Montanans are trying to fight dark money in politics once again. On the ballot this year is a measure that would bar corporations, unions and dark money nonprofits from spending on elections in the state, which President Donald Trump won by almost 20 points.

The Montana Chamber of Commerce sued to keep the measure off the ballot and lost. The state Republican Party, of course, opposes it. But former Republican Gov. Marc Racicot supports it, calling the measure a “brilliant idea.” He added, “If we get this done, it’s going to spill over and be an example for every other state in the nation.”

Here’s where we come full circle. The ballot measure would target exactly the kind of money that funds most PACs: anonymous dollars routed through nonprofits. And if the measure passes, expect a legal fight, one that could land before the Montana Supreme Court — the very court Leo’s PAC is spending money to flip.

This November, Montana voters will answer two consequential questions on a single ballot: who sits on their highest court and whether corporations get to keep spending money to influence their elections.

That’s why you should never overlook these downballot races. The billionaires writing those checks in back rooms aren’t just trying to shape outcomes in Washington, D.C., they’re working to extend their influence all the way down to your state government and local communities.

Allison Detzel contributed.

The post The high-stakes Montana court race flying under the radar appeared first on MS NOW.

The Memo: El-Sayed allies argue Trump’s anti-Muslim attacks will backfire

26 October 2026 at 23:05
President Trump is intensifying his anti-Muslim attacks on Abdul El-Sayed in the final stretch of campaigning before Election Day. At a Sunday rally in Michigan, Trump unleashed a volley of Islamophobic comments against El-Sayed, the Democratic nominee who is seeking to become the first Muslim senator in history. Trump said El-Sayed is “on the side…

Instagram is clearly jealous of YouTube — and is introducing a bunch of changes

26 October 2026 at 21:10
NEW YORK, NEW YORK - MAY 04: (L-R) Mark Zuckerberg and Adam Mosseri attend the 2026 Met Gala celebrating "Costume Art" at the Metropolitan Museum of Art on May 04, 2026 in New York City. (Photo by Kevin Mazur/MG26/Getty Images for The Met Museum/Vogue)
Meta's Mark Zuckerberg and Adam Mosseri are betting on long-form.

Kevin Mazur/MG26/Getty Images for The Met Museum/Vogue

  • Instagram is opening its arms to long-form video again.
  • Adam Mosseri, Instagram's top exec, said longer videos will help the app stay "relevant."
  • Instagram is testing tools for creators making episodic content. But will it pay for them?

Instagram's top executive, Adam Mosseri, has a plan to keep the platform "culturally relevant" — by making it more like YouTube.

Meta-owned Instagram unveiled an overhaul of long-form video features on Monday, including a test of horizontal videos called "Features." Taken together, the changes make the app feel a lot more like YouTube.

"We want to be the most culturally relevant platform," Mosseri said in an interview with content creators and founders of Press Publish, Colin Rosenblum and Samir Chaudry. "To do that, we just need to show up where people are."

The context: YouTube has become a major hit on TV screens, and there's a growing appetite for Instagram-native shows with recurring episodes.

"Subway Takes," hosted by Kareem Rahma, is a prime example of Instagram's strengths and limits. The show started in 2023 as a short-form interview series and, as it grew, expanded with longer-form cuts on YouTube and the streaming platform Tubi. Instagram, however, is where Rahma's show still has its largest audience of 2.4 million followers.

Instagram doesn't want people to go to YouTube or Tubi to see longer versions of shows like "Subway Takes." That's leaving ad revenue and user engagement on the table. Its new tools are designed to entice creators and viewers to stay on its platform.

Here are Instagram's latest video tools and how creators can use them:

  • "Features" keep viewers within the Instagram ecosystem. Instead of leaving Instagram to watch the extended version of an interview or episode, it'll be relatively seamless to stay on Instagram and watch that longer-form content. Instagram's "Features" can be as long as 90 minutes, although the new format is, for now, only available to a limited number of creators in the US and Brazil.
  • Instagram is feeding more content to its TV apps. Instagram is also pushing its "Instagram for TV" app further. The app will feature various video content on TV services like Samsung, Amazon Fire TV, Google TV, and now Apple TV. People can now watch a feed of content their friends are also liking or resharing on TV.
  • Instagram-native shows can label their episodes more clearly with "Series." Within the main Instagram feed, Instagram is testing a way for shows on the app to seamlessly connect episodic content. Eligible creators can add videos to a Series, and a label appears over the content indicating that there are additional episodes. People can then watch those episodes in order from the start. This test is expanding to more countries through the end of the year.
  • Clips can directly drive engagement back to the original video. Instead of clipping content and praying that the audience will go the extra mile of clicking on an account and finding the original, longer-form video, Instagram is letting creators link up to 8 clips to one long video.
Instagram is launching more video tools.
Instagram is expanding its offerings for long-form video content.

Meta

This isn't Instagram's first time dabbling in long-form content.

In 2018, it launched IGTV, a long-form video format and stand-alone app. In 2020, Instagram rolled out a program that let creators earn money from those videos on IGTV. Four years after launching, the company sunset the IGTV app and shifted its video efforts to Reels.

There are a few key elements missing from Instagram's big leap (back) into long-form video.

You can't watch the video while continuing to scroll through Instagram, or multitask by opening other apps while keeping the Instagram content in a picture-in-picture pop-up. There also aren't automated transcripts and subtitles yet. A spokesperson for Meta told Business Insider that there are plans for these features.

Will creators get a slice of the ad revenue pie?

For creators, one key question and pain point looms: Will Meta share the honeypot?

Mosseri told Rosenblum and Chaudry that Instagram is thinking about ways to test pre-roll and mid-roll ads that could lead to a revenue split. However, he said previous attempts by Instagram to build a creator monetization system comparable to YouTube's Partner Program didn't prove beneficial for the platform.

"We spend more money than we make back by a long shot," Mosseri said of Instagram's previous efforts at broad revenue-sharing programs.

Mosseri said that in its previous iterations of content monetization, creators typically didn't produce more content than they already did for free, and the content they did create tended to be lower quality.

Still, Instagram will need to "figure it out" as it tries to crack longer-form content, Mosseri said.

"I don't think of platform payments or performance-based incentives or bonuses as a revenue driver," Mosseri added. "I'd be psyched to scale them up for any of these formats — as long as we're breaking even."

Read the original article on Business Insider

Rubio uses social media to urge Cuban turncoats to work with CIA

26 October 2026 at 20:42

Donald Trump’s seemingly endless quest to isolate the U.S. on the world stage continued last week when his secretary of state openly promoted the CIA as a tool for destabilizing foreign governments.

Here’s Marco Rubio in a post on X from Friday, encouraging Cubans — whose suffering the Trump administration has compounded with sanctions designed to fuel a national uprising — to “create the change you desire” by partnering with the CIA.

To those who seek to create positive change in Cuba – now is the time.

The disappointment of failed promises, corruption, and the privileged lives of only a few; seize this opportunity to create the change you desire through a discrete partnership with the CIA.

— Secretary Marco Rubio (@SecRubio) October 23, 2026

That sure sounds like “Come work with the CIA to help us topple your government,” which explains why the negative replies were replete with Bay of Pigs references and other “coup” talk.

It’s not exactly a secret that the CIA has been used by U.S. governments to undermine foreign governments and activist groups. But there’s a kind of brazen idiocy in thinking it was a good idea to offer such partnerships in such a public fashion.

Think about it: Even Cubans who might be open to such an offer would be wise to question the judgment of an administration that would so willingly broadcast it for all to see on Elon Musk’s pornography- and racism-filled platform.

And anyone not legally in the U.S. who agrees to help the administration topple Cuba’s government will need to acknowledge the harsh reality that aiding Trump’s CIA wouldn’t necessarily stop the president’s immigration officials from targeting them down the line.

And as former U.S. Ambassador Michael McFaul noted, Trump’s support for authoritarian figures elsewhere should give pause to any Cubans considering Rubio’s offer.

Your decision to back autocrats and oligarchs in Venezuela instead of democracy should give pause to anyone hoping you are committed to democracy in Cuba.

No better way to inspire Cuban democrats than to support democracy in Venezuela. https://t.co/zATr8OAVqa

— Michael McFaul (@McFaul) October 24, 2026

Trump does not care about upholding democratic principles in the Western Hemisphere, or anywhere for that matter. His administration has aligned itself with authoritarian-style leaders across Central America and South America. Now, it’s eyeing regime change in Cuba — and looking to draft confederates in one of the most glaring ways possible.

The post Rubio uses social media to urge Cuban turncoats to work with CIA appeared first on MS NOW.

In Mississippi’s Senate race, GOP targets Democratic candidate’s ad

26 October 2026 at 18:39

Mississippi Republicans’ newfound objection to AI-generated ads is the latest sign that MAGA world is fretting over the state’s U.S. Senate race.

The Democratic candidate, Scott Colom, said late last week that his campaign would delete an ad created with the help of artificial intelligence tools that depicted his Republican opponent, Sen. Cindy Hyde-Smith, hurrying away from reporters, as she has done before. The ad has been online for weeks, but Mississippi’s Republican attorney general demanded that Colom’s campaign take it down.

According to Mississippi Today:

Republican Attorney General Lynn Fitch said Friday that Scott Colom, the Democratic nominee for U.S. Senate, likely violated state law with a digital ad that featured an artificial intelligence-generated depiction of Republican Sen. Cindy Hyde-Smith running away from reporters.

Colom told Mississippi Today he would delete the post because he didn’t want Fitch to launch litigation with taxpayer money. That came after Fitch sent Colom a complaint letter demanding that he remove that ad from his social media accounts. If he did not, the complaint said, the attorney general’s office could file an injunction against him.

“As violations of this election integrity law can carry criminal penalties, Attorney General Fitch has also asked Scott Colom and his campaign to preserve all records related to this matter so as not to obstruct justice,” the statement reads.

The article quotes Colom as saying Hyde-Smith is “clearly desperate” and that her allies are attempting to “weaponize the justice system to distract from the real issues, which is that she has sold out our farmers, sold out our small businesses, and sold out our families.”

You can judge for yourself whether you believe the Mississippi GOP truly cares about the scourge of AI-generated political ads, but the party’s fierce support for President Donald Trump — whose social media feeds have become cesspools of political AI slop — raises doubt in my mind.

What seems more likely to me is that Mississippi Republicans are trying to undercut Colom’s campaign, which has already garnered laughter for another ad targeting Hyde-Smith — in a midterm race the GOP didn’t think would be competitive.

Republicans have reportedly voiced concerns that Hyde-Smith’s Senate seat appears to be in play for Democrats in next week’s election, amid backlash toward Trump and the GOP. The fact that the president scheduled a rally in Mississippi one week out from Election Day reflects such concerns, despite forecasters giving Hyde-Smith the edge in their estimates of how the race will shake out. The GOP candidate has said Trump would come campaign for her “if I get in trouble,” and it looks like that’s what’s happening.

Short of a victory, one could argue that Colom improving on Democratic Senate nominee Mike Espy’s 2020 election numbers would be a remarkable feat for liberal activists in Mississippi, which boasts the largest percentage of Black eligible voters out of any state in the country but has — with help from decades of racist voter suppression — remained almost exclusively under control of white conservatives.

Colom is looking to change that. His ads prove that his campaign has the GOP’s attention — and help support Georgia Democratic Sen. Raphael Warnock’s argument that Democrats need to invest more heavily in Southern states.

The post In Mississippi’s Senate race, GOP targets Democratic candidate’s ad appeared first on MS NOW.

What Israel's election could mean for the West Bank's future

26 October 2026 at 17:51

Ramallah - Driving in the occupied West Bank, motorists are confronted with a barrage of campaign billboards for the Israeli elections.

The messages are geared towards Israeli settlers in the territory, not the Palestinians barred from voting.

Many of the posters express support for National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir’s far-right Jewish Power party, as he draws his core voter base from settlers.

But there are also numerous posters for Prime Minister Netanyahu’s Likud party, including an ominous ad along the road to Jerusalem featuring Zohran Mamdani and Ayatollah Khomeini, warning against the power of Palestinian allies.

Against this radicalised backdrop, Israelis will head to the polls on Tuesday in an election that many hope will spell the end of Netanyahu’s 19-year non-consecutive rule as prime minister.

The election comes in the wake of growing domestic resentment against Netanyahu over reports of his advanced knowledge of the 7 October attacks. 

Netanyahu’s Likud is seemingly facing an uphill battle against a bloc of four Jewish opposition parties that have joined forces to defeat him: the Yashar party, the Democrats, the Yisrael Beitenu party, and the Together alliance.

After the bloc’s establishment, the parties announced their goal was to “preserve and strengthen Israel as a Jewish and democratic state”. 

The elections are projected to be a near deadlock with no bloc winning an absolute majority. That outcome would trigger a period of negotiations and coalition building, where different parties must agree to come together to form a government.

But as settler violence reaches record levels in the West Bank, many Palestinians are left wondering: will any electoral outcome change the facts on the ground?

West Bank violence surges ahead of election

Approximately 750,000 Israelis live in settlements in the occupied West Bank and East Jerusalem today, illegal under international law.

The settlers comprise a disproportionately powerful bloc in Israeli politics, despite accounting for around 7-8% of the total Israeli population.

Under Netanyahu’s current administration, which has brought settlers from the far-right fringes into a governing coalition, the settlers’ political influence has coincided with a rapid acceleration of settlement expansion.

But it’s unlikely that another government would slow the pace of settlement building.

“In order to ameliorate pressure from the settler lobby, the left often are tempted to expand settlements even more than the right,” Shaiel Ben-Ephraim, a political commentator and former Israeli diplomat, tells The New Arab.

“It [the opposition winning] might even lead to an increase in settlement construction in order to pay them off for concessions.”

As settlements expand, so does the pressure on Palestinians living nearby. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) recorded an average of six settler attacks per day this year thus far.

Those numbers were released before the autumnal olive harvest commenced, when violence dramatically escalates as settlers launch coordinated attacks against Palestinian farmers in their olive groves.

And after two Palestinian gunmen opened fire on an Israeli checkpoint on 23 October, Ben-Gvir suggested that Palestinians should be barred from driving on the roads in the West Bank - or the land of Judea and Samaria, as he refers to it.

The Israeli army subsequently launched a collective punishment operation and began home demolitions across the neighbourhood where the shooters hailed from, displacing 400 families thus far.

Netanyahu has promised the biggest military occupation in the West Bank since 1967, though many experts say he may be bluffing to bolster support for Likud ahead of the elections. 

The election will now take place against a backdrop of expanding settlements, escalating settler violence, and increasingly severe restrictions on Palestinian movement, fuelling fears that tensions across the West Bank are near boiling point.

“There are a lot of people in the Israeli security forces who want Palestinians to have a better quality of life, just so that the West Bank doesn't explode into another Intifada,” says Ben-Ephraim.

Projected electoral outcomes

Netanyahu’s main rival, Gadi Eisenkot of Yashar!, is seen as the leading centrist alternative for Prime Minister.

Eisenkot has promised to rein in settler violence while firmly opposing a two-state solution. Once the Israeli army Chief of Staff, Eisenkot was the architect of the Dahiyeh Doctrine in 2006, which advocates "disproportionate force” against Israel’s perceived enemies. 

“None of the Israeli governments that would come is going to give a Palestinian state to the Palestinians, but change may come, depending on how you define change,” Muhanned Qafesha, a Palestinian journalist from Hebron, tells The New Arab.

An Eisenkot government could mean greater restrictions on settler violence and a slight change in settlement policy, without fundamentally interfering with the settler project.

Alternatively, if Netanyahu secures another term or temporarily heads a caretaker government if a stalemate arises, the settlers in his administration may feel their time is limited and accelerate their existing plans for the annexation of the West Bank.

As it stands, neither major political bloc is projected to secure the 61 seats needed for a majority in Israel’s 120-seat parliament.

While the opposition bloc has sworn not to form a coalition with either of the Palestinian parties on the ballot - the left-leaning Joint List and the United Arab List (Ra’am) - that pledge may not hold, as they could be a potential lifeline to forming a government.

“The two Arab parties can maybe win like 15 seats or something, and this will make a huge difference because if they can make a coalition with the opposition, they can kick out Netanyahu and Ben-Gvir,” Qafesha tells The New Arab.

“I do believe that the opposition in Israel is saying they won’t form a coalition with the Arabs because they want to get as many votes from the Jewish community as possible. But if they need the Arab parties to form a coalition to kick out Netanyahu, they might do it,” he adds. 

But any coalition will also depend on parties that oppose Palestinian statehood, and thus a fundamental shift in Israel’s approach to the occupation is virtually impossible.

Even if Eisenkot eventually forms a government, his fragile coalition across the ideological spectrum would struggle to agree on significant changes towards settlement policy in the West Bank. 

Will the opposition improve life in the West Bank?

The 3.4 million Palestinians living in the West Bank under military occupation cannot vote in Israeli elections, but Palestinian citizens of Israel can.

Arab voters have long boycotted Israeli elections, but there has been a recent push for their participation - with a record turnout for the group anticipated.

The vast majority of Palestinians in the West Bank want Palestinian citizens of Israel to vote in the elections to improve their daily lives, explains Qafesha, who himself cannot vote.

He believes an administration without settlers at the helm may alleviate some of the daily struggles in the West Bank.

“We live in hell. We just want to breathe,” Qafesha says. 

But if Netanyahu finally goes down, some Palestinians believe Western governments may attempt to rehabilitate Israel’s image under a new administration - and lift the recent round of European sanctions against settlements that were years in the making.

“The upcoming election is between fascists and ultra-fascists. If Netanyahu loses the chance to lead the next government, his loss can be used to alleviate the pressure that is just starting to build from the international community,” Mazin Qumsiyeh, Director of Palestine’s Natural History Museum in Bethlehem, tells The New Arab.

Yet Qafesha remains adamant that the reality on the ground is more important than the views of the international community, which could promote a new government as an example of Israel’s return to democracy.

“Over the past three years, Israel has killed more than 100,000 Palestinians in Gaza. What has the world done for us? Has anything changed in our life? I don't want the view of the world to change at the expense of the blood of Palestinian children, whether it's in Gaza, West Bank, or Jerusalem,” says Qafesha.

An opposition government less reliant on far-right parties could potentially curb some of the policies driving unchecked violence and forced displacement, ameliorating a few of the numerous obstacles to a dignified life under occupation. But any improvement would likely be limited in scope.

“If the opposition wins, the intensity of the ethnic cleansing will probably somewhat lessen, but it's only temporary,” concludes Ben-Ephraim.

“I think that the Israeli public opinion has turned so far in favour of genocide and ethnic cleansing that it will just be a respite at best.”

Kate McMahon is a freelance journalist and foreign correspondent focused on the Middle East and South Asia. She reports on environmental change, human rights, and geopolitical conflicts

Follow her on Instagram: @katemontanaa

Edited by Charlie Hoyle

DAILY UPDATE: Latest essential news on Palestine, Israel, & region

Israel kills at least 8 in Gaza, displaces thousands in West Bank ■ Ben Gvir says "don't let them eat cake" ■ Netanyahu needs Trump's help? ■ News from the region ■ More

How long will Turkey keep its troops in Syria and Iraq?

26 October 2026 at 15:13

Turkish Defence Minister Yasar Guler has clarified that Turkey will retain its military presence in Iraq and Syria until certain conditions are met.

The original justifications for Turkey’s cross-border deployments have dwindled in recent years. Now, analysts believe Ankara is offering new justifications for its open-ended military presence in these neighbouring states.

“We are maintaining our military presence in Iraq and Syria,” Guler said in a recent interview.

“When we assess that the necessary conditions have been met in terms of regional and border security, the status of our base areas and our presence in the region will be reconsidered.”

Open-ended conditions

Turkey sent troops into Syria in 2016. Its cross-border operations primarily focused on targeting the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).

The SDF were a coalition formed by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)’s main Syria affiliate, which became an invaluable ad hoc US ally against Islamic State (IS).

Early this year, following a Turkish-backed offensive by the new Syrian government of interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa, the SDF agreed to integrate its fighters into the new Syrian military.

Complete SDF integration could remove Turkey’s decade-long justification for retaining troops in much of northern Syria.

“Ankara conditions its decision to withdraw from Syria not only on border security and the elimination of the terrorist threat in Syria, but also on the al-Sharaa government’s ability to establish state authority throughout the country,” Suleyman Ozeren, a lecturer at the American University and senior fellow at the Orion Policy Institute, told The New Arab.

“This condition could signal Ankara’s desire to maintain a Turkish military presence and use it as leverage against, for example, Israel if tensions in southern Syria escalate into military confrontation between Syria and Israel.”

Consequently, Turkey’s military presence in Syria may continue even if there is a successful Kurdish peace process in Turkey.

“There may be mainly two minimal conditions: the total and actual disarmament of the PKK-linked groups in both Iraq and Syria, and the absence of Israeli military pressure on Syria,” Ozeren said.

In Iraq, Turkey has made repeated forays into northern Iraq’s Nineveh province and Iraqi Kurdistan as part of the conflict with the PKK. Turkey has had bases in these areas since the 1990s.

In the second half of the 2010s, it advanced deeper into the mountains of Iraqi Kurdistan, establishing and maintaining a vast network of outposts and forward-operating bases in strategic areas to relentlessly pressure the Kurdish fighters.

Now, with a major peace effort underway aimed at having the PKK lay down its arms for amnesties and a conclusive end to the conflict possibly on the horizon, Turkey’s justifications for these bases could become defunct.

Muaz Al-Abdullah, Middle East Research Manager at the conflict-tracking organisation Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED), specified that Guler’s remarks aren’t a withdrawal signal.

Rather, he was merely articulating the “latest version of an open-ended condition” which Ankara adjusts as events change.

“In 2024, Turkey tied any exit from Syria to a new constitution, elections and full border security. Earlier this year it said the Damascus-SDF deal was still not enough,” Abdullah told The New Arab.

“Withdrawal is possible, because the presence is costly for Turkey economically and politically, but it will be slow and conditional.”

He also outlined how the minimum conditions for withdrawal differ by country.

“In Iraq, the PKK must be disarmed and out of Sinjar and Qandil,” Abdullah said.

“Since the (Turkey-Pakistan-Saudi Arabia) Mecca alliance, Ankara’s concerns now also include the weapons of the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) and the threat they pose to Turkey’s ally Saudi Arabia, including PMF drone attacks on the Kingdom,” he added.

“In Syria, the minimum is a completed SDF integration, PKK cadres out of the northeast, and a Syrian army able to hold the border on its own.”

Reality on the ground

ACLED data has documented a rapid decrease in Turkish strikes in Iraqi Kurdistan in the past two years since the latest PKK peace talks began. In 2024, Turkey executed 4,861 strikes in the region. That fell rapidly to 634 in 2025, then to zero so far in 2026.

“The security case for staying is weakening, but the political conditions are not yet met,” Abdullah said.

In September, Turkey agreed to gradually withdraw from the Bashiqa base in Nineveh in tandem with Iraq’s removal of PKK-affiliated fighters from Nineveh’s Sinjar, the homeland of the Yazidi minority subjected to the 2014 IS genocide.

Abdullah described Turkey’s willingness to hand over Bashiqa as a “low-cost concession” rather than the start of any strategic withdrawal. Turkey only established its presence there a decade ago to train local forces battling IS. It is also the furthest base from Turkey’s border.

Nevertheless, it’s important since it is linked to a network of forward bases along the border that support Turkey’s broader counter-PKK mission.

“The handover is also a trade, not a gesture,” Abdullah said. “In return, Baghdad committed to establishing full state authority in Sinjar and removing PKK-linked groups."

The agreement also specifies a “gradual handover” tied to security steps taken on the Iraqi side. As a result, the withdrawal timeline is wide open to delay.

“The real test is on the ground,” Abdullah said. “An Iraqi commander expects Bashiqa to be vacated by the end of this year. If it is, that is a genuine signal. A phased withdrawal begins only when the forward bases start closing, not Bashiqa.”

Therefore, statements and agreements don’t reflect reality on the ground. What would be considered a clear signal that the Turkish withdrawal has begun, the ACLED expert added, is an “actual withdrawal on the ground rather than another statement of agreement between the two sides.”

Syria's status quo

Turkey’s support for Syrian government forces in their January offensive against the SDF proved vital. Ankara is still supporting Syrian government forces in their efforts to establish complete authority in hitherto SDF-controlled areas.

The situation remains unsettled, with ACLED’s Abdullah pointing to reports of armed groups, including the PKK-affiliated Revolutionary Youth Movement, opposed to the Damascus-SDF agreement still operating in those areas. Still, Turkey-Syria collaboration isn’t limited to the SDF. 

“Basically, while the Turkish concerns are mainly related to the SDF/PKK activities in Syria, it is also related to the IS activities in Syria,” Abdullah said.

“So yes, the nature of the Syrian-Turkish relationship has changed mostly from cross-border operations and military support on the ground to more of intelligence and training collaboration.”

In his interview last week, Guler noted that Turkey has established “close coordination in the field of security” with Syria’s post-Assad authorities and seeks to “strengthen the capacity” of the new armed forces “to ensure the security of our borders.”

“While the al-Sharaa government has been pushing to take full control of the northern border and end Turkish military control there, Ankara has been pushing for at least a measured understanding with Damascus that would allow Turkish military presence to continue,” Ozeren said.

The Orion Policy Institute’s senior fellow contends that if the present Kurdish resolution process ultimately results in the PKK’s total disarmament and the return under amnesty of ex-PKK fighters to Turkey, then Ankara’s pretext for its military presence in Iraq will become unviable.

“However, two developments could alter the security landscape across the region: an expansion of the Saudi-led conflict with Iran-backed Houthis into a regional conflict, and an escalation of the US and Israel war against Iran into ground operations,” Ozeren told The New Arab.

“Such developments would force non-state actors, including PMFs in Iraq and PKK-linked groups in Iran and even Iraq, to reconsider current arrangements.”

That possibility could especially become a reality if Turkey decides to “pursue military involvement” through its commitments under the Mecca Defence Pact.

"If, and this is a big if, Damascus establishes full governance across the country, Turkey’s security- and defence-oriented influence may diminish, as the al-Sharaa government has tried to diversify its defence and military engagements with other actors,” he said.

In September, President al-Sharaa said that his country is “now entering the stage of giving legal status to the Turkish bases in northwestern Syria,” subject to the approval of the Syrian People’s Assembly.

He clarified that Syria does not have a long-term need for such foreign bases but also wants to “maintain diplomatic relations and mutual respect with neighbouring and friendly countries.”

ACLED’s Abdullah assesses that Sharaa’s statement implies that Syria doesn’t want any long-term Turkish presence on its soil to avoid turning the country into an arena of regional conflict.

That is especially urgent considering the growing tension between Turkey and Israel, which could transform Syria into a flashpoint between these two regional heavyweights.

Israel’s repeated targeting of Syrian airbases that Turkey evaluated for potential use demonstrated how quickly Turkey’s presence could potentially draw Syria into a regional confrontation.

“At the same time, Damascus cannot yet do without Turkish support,” Abdullah said. “As-Suweida remains unresolved, and IS and other groups may expand their activity.”

“Legal status for the bases is Damascus’s way of regulating Turkey’s presence now, so it can reduce that presence later."

In early August, Syria reached a memorandum of understanding on the future conditions of Russia’s access to the coastal naval and air bases of Tartus and Hmeimim under which the bases will become joint training centres after a three-month transitional process.

While Abdullah anticipates that’s the direction Damascus is pushing regarding the Turkish presence, he stressed that any comparison with Russia has significant limits.

“Russia’s presence is two bases far from Syria’s borders, and their value to Moscow is regional reach," he said. “Turkey’s presence sits on a 900-km land border and is tied to a security concern Ankara considers existential. That makes it much harder to reduce to a residual training mission.”

“Expect a smaller footprint over several years, but not a Turkey that fully leaves northern Syria.”

Paul Iddon is a freelance journalist based in Erbil, Iraqi Kurdistan, who writes about Middle East affairs.

Follow him on Twitter: @pauliddon

Edited by Charlie Hoyle

Could Syria help Saudi Arabia fight the Houthis without troops?

26 October 2026 at 11:46

Reports have continued to circulate about a possible deployment of Syrian fighters to Yemen despite Damascus' denials.

But analysts who spoke to The New Arab said such a move was unlikely given Syria’s own domestic security challenges, and suggested that any military support to Saudi Arabia against the Houthis could take other forms, without involving troops on Yemeni territory.

Citing unnamed Yemeni intelligence sources, Lebanese newspaper Al-Akhbar reported that Riyadh and Damascus had held talks on transferring up to 10,000 Syrian fighters to Yemen.

It said a Syrian military delegation had recently visited the Saudi capital and the kingdom’s southern regions to assess the proposed deployment.

According to the newspaper, Brigadier General Khaled Khattab, formerly leader of the Ansar al-Tawhid faction and now commander of the 82nd Division in the new Syrian army, spent four days in the southern Saudi regions of Asir and Najran, accompanied by Saudi officers. The delegation reportedly visited sites being prepared to receive Syrian fighters.

Meanwhile, Brigadier General Haitham al-Ali, also known as Abu Muslim, commander of the army’s Third Corps and a former Hayat Tahrir al-Sham commander, was said to have met Saudi officers at the defence ministry in Riyadh to discuss the costs of transferring around 10,000 fighters, financial arrangements, benefits and their expected military role. Al-Akhbar said the delegation had finalised logistical preparations for the transfer.

The New Arab could not independently verify Al-Akhbar’s claims.

Could Syria support Riyadh without entering Yemen?

Muaz al-Abdallah, a Syria analyst at the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED), told The New Arab that any Syrian military support to Saudi Arabia would not necessarily involve deploying troops inside Yemen.

He said one possibility was that Syrian forces could be sent to help protect Saudi Arabia’s southern border, rather than take part directly in the fighting against the Houthis on Yemeni territory. Al-Abdallah said this statement left open the possibility of military cooperation with Riyadh, even if Damascus maintained that it had not deployed forces inside Yemen.

"Damascus has said it has not sent forces to Yemen, while also expressing support for Saudi security and saying military cooperation would take place through official channels and bilateral agreements," Al-Abdallah said.

He added that deploying Syrian personnel to the Saudi side of the border would not necessarily contradict the government’s denial that it had sent forces to Yemen, but could instead represent another way of supporting Riyadh.

Al-Abdallah suggested that Saudi Arabia could increase its financial assistance and investments in Syria’s reconstruction in return for military support.

Syrian drone expertise could help Saudi Arabia

Al-Abdallah also pointed to the potential for Syria to offer expertise in drone operations, particularly given its forces' experience operating drones during the war against Bashar Al-Assad’s regime. He said drones had played an important role in the lightning rebel offensive that toppled Assad, giving Syrian forces considerable experience in their use.

That expertise could prove useful to Saudi Arabia amid its confrontation with the Houthis, particularly if cooperation were to involve training or the use of smaller attack drones.

Al-Akhbar also reported that Syrian drone specialists were already involved in training forces in Saudi Arabia and Yemen, and that Syrian operators had helped establish drone units within Saudi emergency forces. However, these claims have not been independently verified.

Despite the reports, Al-Abdallah said ACLED had not documented evidence of Syrian fighters currently operating in Yemen. The organisation had found no reports of Syrian casualties, captured fighters or funerals linked to a deployment there, he said, noting that such evidence had helped establish the presence of Syrian fighters in other conflict zones, including Libya.

Al-Abdallah also questioned reports, including those published by Axios, that Syria could send its 84th Division to Yemen. He said the division was deployed around Suweida, in southern Syria, which remains largely outside the central government’s control after last year's sectarian clashes.

"Given the situation there, and reports of heavy Israeli arming of the National Guard and a possible escalation with the Syrian government, I don’t see how this division would leave Suweida," he said.

Syria's unresolved issues make deployment unlikely

The prospect of Syria deploying fighters to Yemen remains unlikely given the transitional government’s security challenges at home, according to Benjamin Schmida, a Middle East researcher at the Institute for the Study of War (ISW).

Schmida told The New Arab that Saudi Arabia likely requested that Syria send forces to Yemen, but Damascus appears to have declined.

"It does not seem like these discussions proceeded very far beyond consulting CENTCOM," he said, adding that the Syrian government’s public rejection of the request suggested the talks had not continued.

Schmida said it remained unclear what forces Syria could realistically deploy, given the security challenges facing the country, including Kurdish areas in the northeast, Druze militia control over Suweida, sporadic Islamic State group attacks, and repeated Israeli incursions in the southwest.

He also cautioned against assuming that foreign fighters integrated into Syria’s military would be available for deployment abroad.

"Foreign fighters, such as Uyghur Turkistan Islamic Party fighters that are integrated into the Syrian Defence Ministry, represent some of Syria’s most elite units," he said.

"The Syrian government likely views integrated foreign fighters, including the Uyghurs, as vital assets for Syria's defence and internal security that must remain in Syria in the event of a future crisis."

Would Syrian fighters change the balance in Yemen?

The possibility of transferring foreign fighters to Yemen was also raised in Al-Akhbar's report, which suggested that Uyghurs, Uzbeks, Tajiks, Afghans, and Chechens who joined Syrian opposition factions before Assad’s fall could be among those considered for deployment.

However, Schmida said the potential impact of any Syrian deployment would depend on the number of fighters sent and where they were integrated into the conflict.

Axios recently reported that Syria could send between 10,000 and 20,000 fighters. Schmida said this would represent a sizeable proportion of Syria’s total army manpower and could meaningfully bolster forces loyal to Yemen’s internationally recognised government, whose forces he estimated at around 100,000.

But he noted that the Houthis are a much larger force, while government-aligned fighters remain spread across several frontlines, including Taiz, Marib, and Jawf.

More importantly, he said, sending additional fighters would not necessarily address the divisions undermining the Yemeni government’s war effort.

"Merely sending more fighters - though they may be experienced - is unlikely to solve one of the primary challenges for the Yemeni government in its war against the Houthis: its own internal disunity," Schmida said.

He pointed to the political fragmentation and poor military coordination among government-aligned forces, warning that they could struggle to integrate Syrian fighters effectively, limiting their ability to change conditions on the battlefield.

Ultimately, Schmida said a meaningful Syrian deployment was unlikely "at this time or in the foreseeable future," as the government’s focus on domestic stability took precedence over Saudi requests.

While Riyadh could potentially use aid and investment to encourage Damascus to provide military support, he warned that doing so "could risk souring the Syrian-Saudi relationship and pushing Syria closer to Turkey or Saudi rivals like the UAE".

Louay Faour is a journalist at The New Arab focusing largely on the Levant, with a particular interest in Lebanese affairs

Follow him on X: @LouayFaour 

Vučić Has Lost Serbia’s Election. His System May Be Harder to Remove

26 October 2026 at 09:12

Serbia has achieved something that appeared improbable only months ago. Aleksandar Vučić, who dominated the country’s political institutions for more than a decade, has acknowledged electoral defeat. A movement born from student demonstrations against corruption is now preparing to take power. Yet the most consequential struggle may only be beginning.

The parliamentary election of 25 October represents more than the rejection of an increasingly centralised political leadership. It raises a fundamental question about the Serbian state: whether the institutions shaped by Vučić’s Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) can function independently of the political organisation that controlled them.

According to preliminary figures released by Serbia’s Republic Electoral Commission, the Student List secured 52.54 per cent of the vote against 39.29 per cent for Vučić’s United Serbia coalition, with 8,077 of 8,392 polling stations counted. Projections give the students approximately 140 seats in the 250-member National Assembly, enough to govern without coalition partners.

Vučić had resigned from the presidency in September, hoping to return to power as prime minister. Instead, the election deprived him of the parliamentary majority necessary to complete that manoeuvre. His concession has substantially reduced the immediate prospect of a disputed transfer of power, although the election results still require formal certification.

But losing an election and losing control of a political system are not necessarily the same thing.

The political inheritance of the 1990s

Vučić’s political career provides important context for understanding the significance of his defeat.

He entered politics through the ultranationalist Serbian Radical Party, led by Vojislav Šešelj, and served as information minister in Slobodan Milošević’s government from 1998. During that period, Serbian authorities employed restrictive media legislation against independent newspapers and broadcasters, imposing substantial financial penalties and limiting critical reporting.

After Milošević’s removal in 2000, Vučić remained politically active. His subsequent association with the Serbian Progressive Party, formed in 2008 following a split within the Radical Party, allowed him to reposition himself as a politician promising economic modernisation and European integration.

This transformation proved remarkably successful.

The SNS came to power in 2012, and Vučić subsequently served as prime minister and president. Serbia attracted foreign investment, undertook major infrastructure projects and maintained its formal ambition of joining the European Union. At the same time, political authority became increasingly concentrated around Vučić and his associates.

The distinction between Serbia under Milošević and Serbia under Vučić should not be overlooked. The former governed during the violent disintegration of Yugoslavia and pursued policies that brought international isolation. The latter operated through electoral institutions, international economic partnerships and a declared European orientation.

Nevertheless, Vučić’s political career illustrates a continuity in personnel and political methods that Serbia’s post-2000 democratic transition never entirely resolved.

The OSCE’s assessment of Serbia’s 2023 parliamentary elections documented advantages enjoyed by the governing party, political pressure on public employees, media bias and the misuse of state resources. These findings demonstrated how electoral competition could continue while the conditions under which parties competed became increasingly unequal.

The Student List has now broken that pattern at the ballot box. Whether it can prevent its reconstruction remains uncertain.

Why the students succeeded

The immediate origins of the political upheaval lie in the November 2024 collapse of a railway station canopy in Novi Sad, which killed 16 people.

The disaster became a symbol of wider concerns about public procurement, construction oversight and political accountability. Demonstrations demanding responsibility subsequently developed into a nationwide movement challenging the government’s legitimacy.

As EU Today previously examined, the protests exposed a deeper conflict between Serbian society and institutions widely perceived by demonstrators as serving political interests rather than the public.

Unlike established opposition parties, the student movement did not depend on a familiar political leader or traditional party machinery. It mobilised university communities, academics, professionals and citizens who had previously remained outside organised political activity.

Its central demand was institutional accountability rather than a comprehensive ideological programme.

That distinction was crucial. By concentrating on corruption, democratic standards and the functioning of the state, the movement attracted voters with differing views on nationalism, foreign policy and European integration.

However, the same diversity that helped it win the election could complicate governing. Its candidates must now agree on economic priorities, ministerial appointments, foreign relations and the extent of institutional reform.

A protest movement can unite around opposition to a political leader. A government must reach agreement on decisions that inevitably divide its supporters.

Russia’s influence will not disappear with Vučić

One of the most important consequences of the election concerns Serbia’s relationship with Moscow.

Throughout his presidency, Vučić cultivated the image of a leader capable of maintaining productive relations with Brussels, Moscow and Beijing simultaneously.

Serbia continued its EU accession negotiations and benefited substantially from European investment and trade. Yet Belgrade consistently refused to join the principal European sanctions against Russia following its full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

The contradiction was particularly striking because Serbia’s economic relationship with the EU vastly outweighs its trade with Russia.

The European Commission’s assessment found that the EU accounted for 58.3 per cent of Serbia’s total trade in 2024. European markets, investment and regulatory structures have therefore become fundamental to the Serbian economy.

Vučić nevertheless preserved close political links with Moscow, benefiting domestically from nationalist sentiment and Russia’s diplomatic support for Serbia’s position on Kosovo.

He also attempted to demonstrate that relations with Russia did not preclude cooperation with Ukraine.

In June 2025, Vučić travelled to Odesa for the Ukraine–Southeast Europe Summit, where he met President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and reaffirmed Serbia’s support for Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Serbia provided humanitarian assistance to Ukraine but declined to sign the summit’s joint declaration. Its continuing refusal to impose sanctions on Moscow remained the most substantial distinction between Serbian policy and the EU position.

Yet a Student List government would not necessarily reverse that policy.

In September, the movement explicitly declared its opposition to imposing sanctions on Russia, referring to Serbia’s historical experience with international restrictive measures.

Vučić nevertheless predicted during his concession speech that the incoming government would introduce sanctions against Moscow by March or April. He also attributed his defeat to interference by European governments and what he called the American “deep state”, supposedly opposed to President Donald Trump.

His prediction about sanctions was therefore inconsistent with the movement’s publicly stated position.

This exposes an important misconception about Serbia’s political transformation. Opposition to Vučić does not automatically translate into support for every element of EU foreign policy. Serbian public attitudes towards Russia, Kosovo and national sovereignty extend beyond the electorate traditionally associated with the SNS.

The new government may pursue closer integration with European institutions while retaining positions that Brussels considers incompatible with membership.

The economic structures behind political influence

The challenge extends beyond diplomatic relationships.

Russia’s presence in Serbia includes strategic energy interests, notably its controlling shareholding in Naftna Industrija Srbije (NIS), which operates the country’s principal oil refinery.

American sanctions against the Russian-owned company have complicated its operations, while negotiations over the proposed acquisition of the Russian stake by Hungary’s MOL Group illustrate how energy security, foreign ownership and international sanctions have become interconnected.

For an incoming administration, reducing such dependencies will require commercial negotiations, regulatory oversight and alternative energy supplies. Political declarations cannot achieve these objectives on their own.

Equally important will be the examination of public contracts and relationships between political officeholders and businesses that benefited from government decisions.

The European Commission’s 2025 Serbia report identified persistent corruption concerns, insufficient transparency in major infrastructure procurement and weaknesses in institutional accountability.

Any investigation into alleged wrongdoing under Vučić must be independent, evidence-based and subject to judicial scrutiny. Allegations of corruption do not themselves establish criminal responsibility.

A government elected to restore the rule of law would undermine its own mandate if it replaced politically selective justice with prosecutions directed by a new political majority.

The central objective must be to ensure that prosecutors, courts and oversight bodies can investigate former as well as current officials without political interference.

Brussels faces a test of its own

For the European Union, the election provides an opportunity to reconsider its approach towards Belgrade.

For years, European institutions confronted a government that professed commitment to EU membership while resisting reforms considered essential to the accession process.

In July 2026, the European Parliament adopted a resolution stressing that Serbia’s negotiations should advance only when measurable improvements are achieved in the rule of law, judicial independence, media freedom and the fight against corruption. Parliament also called for alignment with EU sanctions against Russia.

The Student List’s victory may improve the prospects for domestic institutional reform, but the disagreement over sanctions remains unresolved. Brussels cannot assume that a new Serbian government will satisfy every accession requirement simply because it defeated Vučić.

Nor should it overlook the political significance of the result.

The movement’s strongest mandate concerns the restoration of public accountability. Supporting independent institutions, transparent procurement and genuinely competitive elections would address both Serbian public demands and longstanding EU concerns.

There is also the unresolved question of Kosovo. A change of government in Belgrade does not remove the political and constitutional difficulties surrounding relations with Pristina. The new leadership will inherit negotiations that have repeatedly stalled under previous administrations.

The EU will therefore need to distinguish between areas where rapid progress is possible and disputes that require more sustained diplomacy.

The difference between victory and democratic transition

Serbia has removed one of the central figures of its post-Yugoslav political order from government. It has not yet demonstrated that the system surrounding him can be dismantled through constitutional means.

The immediate tasks are substantial: forming an effective cabinet, protecting the independence of prosecutors, scrutinising public expenditure, reforming media regulation and ensuring that state institutions no longer operate as extensions of the governing party.

A separate presidential election must also follow Vučić’s September resignation, adding another important stage to the transition.

The greatest danger is not simply that the former governing party could eventually return to office. Electoral competition must allow that possibility in any democracy.

The more consequential danger is that the political methods associated with Vučić’s administration could survive under different leadership.

Serbia’s experience after Milošević demonstrated that removing a dominant political figure does not necessarily eliminate the structures, interests and habits of government accumulated during his rule.

The student movement has now been given an opportunity to confront that unfinished transition.

Its success will ultimately be measured not by the political fate of Aleksandar Vučić, but by whether Serbia develops institutions capable of investigating misconduct, restricting the arbitrary use of power and operating independently of whichever party wins the next election.

That would represent a more fundamental transformation than the defeat of any single political leader.

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Europe’s Search for a Ukraine Negotiator Exposes a Much Deeper Struggle for Power

25 October 2026 at 14:08

European leaders are considering appointing a senior representative to negotiate with Russia over Ukraine. But the search exposes a more fundamental problem: whether Europe can transform its economic strength, military resources and political influence into an independent capacity to shape its own security.

Europe is searching for someone capable of negotiating with Vladimir Putin. Yet the question confronting European capitals is considerably more difficult than identifying a politician with sufficient experience, authority and diplomatic skill. It is whether Europe possesses the political unity and strategic independence to negotiate with Moscow on equal terms.

According to diplomatic accounts published on 22nd October, five European leaders have emerged as possible representatives: Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, Finnish President Alexander Stubb, Czech President Petr Pavel, Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen and Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre.

No appointment has been announced, and a group of negotiators may ultimately prove more acceptable than a single representative. The initiative reflects concern that Washington’s negotiations with Moscow could produce arrangements affecting European security without sufficient European influence over their terms.

The European Commission insists that the EU is already participating in diplomatic consultations, including discussions held in Oslo on 20th October. But participation in preliminary meetings is not the same as possessing the authority to determine the outcome.

The paradox of European power

Europe’s predicament contains an extraordinary contradiction. The European Union is among Ukraine’s principal financial supporters. Its governments provide military assistance, maintain sanctions against Russia and control decisions affecting Moscow’s future access to European markets. Nevertheless, European capitals remain concerned that the decisive political framework for ending the war could be negotiated principally between Washington and Moscow.

This anxiety has intensified under President Donald Trump, whose transactional approach increasingly treats diplomatic settlements as exchanges of economic concessions and strategic advantages.

As EU Today recently examined, proposals involving sanctions relief, renewed energy cooperation and commercial opportunities raise the possibility of arrangements that depend upon European consent but are negotiated elsewhere.

Washington can discuss reopening economic relations with Russia. It cannot independently reverse European sanctions, guarantee Ukraine’s accession to the EU or decide the continent’s future security arrangements. The European Council explicitly reaffirmed this distinction in its conclusions of 16th October, insisting that decisions affecting the Union’s security and responsibilities belong to Europe itself.

The central issue is therefore not whether Europe has influence, but whether it can organise that influence into a coherent negotiating position.

Why Ukraine must help choose Europe’s representative

An equally important weakness would arise if European governments selected their representative without making Kyiv an integral participant in the decision.

Ukraine is not merely the geographical subject of negotiations. Its government controls whether a proposed settlement can acquire political legitimacy, while its armed forces determine much of what can be implemented on the ground.

A negotiated agreement rejected by Kyiv could neither reliably end the war nor provide the security arrangements that Europe seeks.

European security, moreover, can no longer be considered independently of Ukraine’s military capabilities. Ukrainian forces possess extensive operational experience against Russia, including in drone warfare, electronic warfare and long-range strikes.

Any future continental defence architecture that excludes this experience would disregard one of Europe’s most consequential military assets.

An effective European representative would therefore require a mandate developed jointly with Ukraine, rather than simply endorsed by European governments after the event.

The danger of negotiating without leverage

The proposed candidates illustrate the difficulty of combining political authority with negotiating credibility. Meloni possesses a working relationship with Trump and considerable influence within European conservative politics. Stubb combines experience of Russia’s immediate neighbourhood with access to Washington. Pavel brings military expertise and an understanding of NATO’s command structures. Yet none could independently commit Europe’s governments to financial, military or territorial-security obligations.

This is the fundamental weakness of the proposed office. A negotiator requires more than access to powerful leaders. The ability to make commitments, withhold concessions and impose costs is what gives diplomatic representation substance.

Europe possesses potentially significant instruments: sanctions, industrial capacity, financial assistance and growing defence expenditure. But these remain distributed across institutions and national governments with differing strategic priorities.

Poland, the Baltic states and Nordic governments approach Russian security threats differently from several Western and Southern European capitals. Reconciling those positions is not an administrative exercise. It is a prerequisite for meaningful diplomacy.

The historical shadow of Yalta

The search also reflects European concern about a return to great-power bargaining over the continent’s political geography.

The historical comparison frequently invoked is Yalta in 1945, when Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin discussed Europe’s post-war settlement. Munich in 1938 offers another warning about negotiating territorial concessions at the expense of directly affected states. Neither precedent precisely describes the present situation.

Unlike the countries subjected to Soviet domination after the Second World War, today’s European states possess established institutions, substantial economic resources and collective defence arrangements. Ukraine, meanwhile, has demonstrated that Russia cannot simply dictate its political future through military superiority.

Nevertheless, the danger lies in accepting the underlying principle that powerful states possess a privileged right to determine the sovereignty and security choices of their neighbours.

Moscow’s demands concerning NATO, Ukrainian territory and Europe’s wider security arrangements extend beyond any conventional ceasefire negotiation.

A European representative would have to challenge that premise rather than merely negotiate the geographical limits of Russian influence.

From diplomatic representation to strategic authority

The debate inevitably leads to Europe’s military dependence upon the United States. An American withdrawal from NATO is not inevitable. Indeed, US legislation restricts unilateral presidential withdrawal. But Washington could substantially reduce its military commitments without formally abandoning the alliance.

Europe must therefore consider how much independent military capacity it requires to support its diplomatic positions. That entails coordinated procurement, integrated military planning, sustainable defence production and deeper cooperation with Britain, Norway, Canada and Ukraine. Recent security challenges in the Black Sea illustrate the difficulty of converting European diplomatic commitments into effective collective action.

These developments would not automatically create a European army or replace NATO. They could, however, give European governments greater freedom to act if American priorities diverge from their own.

The relationship between military capability and diplomacy is particularly important in dealing with Moscow. European representatives cannot expect Russia to revise its demands simply because Brussels has selected a more prominent interlocutor.

Russia would have to conclude that continued aggression carries greater costs than a settlement respecting Ukraine’s sovereignty. Europe’s diplomatic standing would then derive not from the personality of its representative but from the collective resources and political commitments behind that individual.

The immediate search for a negotiator may appear a limited diplomatic initiative. Its implications are considerably larger.

For decades, European security rested upon an arrangement in which American military power compensated for Europe’s fragmented strategic authority. The present negotiations are exposing the limitations of that model. The decisive question is not whether Meloni, Stubb, Pavel or another European leader can secure a place at the negotiating table. It is whether Europe can establish a common position, backed by Ukraine’s consent and by sufficient economic and military power, that neither Washington nor Moscow can disregard.

Without those foundations, a European envoy risks becoming a participant in decisions made by others. With them, the appointment could mark the beginning of a substantially different European role in international security.

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