Finnish President Alexander Stubb and Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre have spoken directly with Vladimir Putin before briefing Volodymyr Zelenskyy. The initiative, undertaken in consultation with Ukraine, comes ahead of planned negotiations in Abu Dhabi but has drawn criticism from other Nordic leaders.

Finnish President Alexander Stubb and Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre held a telephone conversation with Russian President Vladimir Putin on Tuesday, 27 October, marking an unusual direct diplomatic engagement between Moscow and two European NATO members since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

The conversation, initiated by the two Nordic leaders from Helsinki, was followed by a separate call with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. According to a joint statement released by the Norwegian government, the initiative had been prepared in consultation with Kyiv.

The objective was to communicate directly with Putin about efforts to end the war and the forthcoming negotiations involving Ukraine, Russia and the United States.

Stubb described the exchange as frank and substantive, arguing that Finland and Norway had particular reasons to participate in discussions concerning European security.

“We are neighbouring countries to Russia,” he said, adding that the war’s outcome would directly affect European security.

Both leaders reaffirmed their governments’ continuing support for Ukraine while calling for renewed negotiations. Støre emphasised the humanitarian and economic consequences of the conflict and the need for de-escalation.

Importantly, their statement specified that they were acting as national leaders rather than representatives of Europe collectively.

Zelenskyy briefed after discussions with Moscow

Following the conversation with Putin, Stubb and Støre spoke with Zelenskyy, who confirmed the exchange in a statement issued by his office.

The Ukrainian president thanked them for their detailed briefing and diplomatic engagement.

According to Zelenskyy, the two leaders had communicated Ukraine’s demand for concrete steps to reduce attacks against its energy facilities and other infrastructure.

The discussion also covered preparations for trilateral negotiations involving Ukrainian, American and Russian delegations, provisionally planned for November.

Kyiv’s confirmation that it had been consulted before the Putin conversation is significant. Ukraine has consistently maintained that decisions concerning its sovereignty, territory and security cannot be negotiated without its participation.

Oslo talks establish new diplomatic channel

Tuesday’s telephone diplomacy followed a meeting in Oslo on 20 October involving Zelenskyy, Stubb, Støre and representatives of US President Donald Trump.

American special envoy Steve Witkoff participated in person, while Jared Kushner joined remotely. European and NATO representatives also attended related discussions.

According to the Ukrainian presidency’s account, the consultations addressed possible steps towards ending the war and establishing security arrangements after a settlement.

Witkoff subsequently travelled to St Petersburg on 21 October for discussions with Putin.

The diplomatic contacts have produced plans for another round of talks in Abu Dhabi, expected after 4 November, although the precise date and representation remain subject to confirmation.

The European Commission has also sought involvement. During its 21 October press briefing, the Commission confirmed its participation in the Oslo consultations, which addressed territorial questions, security guarantees and post-war economic arrangements.

As EU Today previously reported, discussions about appointing a European representative to negotiations have exposed disagreements over who should speak for European governments and what authority such a representative would possess.

Moscow maintains its negotiating position

The Kremlin’s account of Tuesday’s conversation offered little indication of a change in Russia’s principal demands.

According to reports citing the Kremlin’s statement, Putin insisted that a lasting settlement would require what Moscow described as full recognition of Russia’s legitimate interests.

He also accused NATO and European Union countries of pursuing confrontational policies that prolonged the conflict.

These statements indicate that the reopening of direct communication has not, by itself, resolved the differences between the negotiating parties.

Russia continues to seek arrangements concerning Ukrainian territory and the European security order, while Kyiv maintains that its sovereignty and territorial integrity must be respected.

Denmark questions independent Nordic diplomacy

The initiative has also revealed differences among European governments over direct engagement with Moscow.

Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen criticised the Finnish-Norwegian approach, saying it had not been coordinated with Denmark and warning against individual European countries pursuing separate diplomatic initiatives.

Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson also expressed reservations about contacts that might undermine a common European position.

Their objections highlight a distinction between consultation with Ukraine and agreement among European governments on the organisation of negotiations.

For Finland and Norway, both of which share borders with Russia, the outcome of the conflict carries direct implications for security in the Baltic Sea region and the High North.

The immediate question is whether their intervention can facilitate substantive negotiations without weakening coordination between Kyiv and its European partners.

With the next US-mediated talks expected in November, Tuesday’s contacts establish another channel of communication with Moscow. Whether that channel produces movement on territorial disputes, security guarantees or an eventual ceasefire remains unresolved.

European leaders are considering appointing a senior representative to negotiate with Russia over Ukraine. But the search exposes a more fundamental problem: whether Europe can transform its economic strength, military resources and political influence into an independent capacity to shape its own security.

Europe is searching for someone capable of negotiating with Vladimir Putin. Yet the question confronting European capitals is considerably more difficult than identifying a politician with sufficient experience, authority and diplomatic skill. It is whether Europe possesses the political unity and strategic independence to negotiate with Moscow on equal terms.

According to diplomatic accounts published on 22nd October, five European leaders have emerged as possible representatives: Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, Finnish President Alexander Stubb, Czech President Petr Pavel, Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen and Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre.

No appointment has been announced, and a group of negotiators may ultimately prove more acceptable than a single representative. The initiative reflects concern that Washington’s negotiations with Moscow could produce arrangements affecting European security without sufficient European influence over their terms.

The European Commission insists that the EU is already participating in diplomatic consultations, including discussions held in Oslo on 20th October. But participation in preliminary meetings is not the same as possessing the authority to determine the outcome.

The paradox of European power

Europe’s predicament contains an extraordinary contradiction. The European Union is among Ukraine’s principal financial supporters. Its governments provide military assistance, maintain sanctions against Russia and control decisions affecting Moscow’s future access to European markets. Nevertheless, European capitals remain concerned that the decisive political framework for ending the war could be negotiated principally between Washington and Moscow.

This anxiety has intensified under President Donald Trump, whose transactional approach increasingly treats diplomatic settlements as exchanges of economic concessions and strategic advantages.

As EU Today recently examined, proposals involving sanctions relief, renewed energy cooperation and commercial opportunities raise the possibility of arrangements that depend upon European consent but are negotiated elsewhere.

Washington can discuss reopening economic relations with Russia. It cannot independently reverse European sanctions, guarantee Ukraine’s accession to the EU or decide the continent’s future security arrangements. The European Council explicitly reaffirmed this distinction in its conclusions of 16th October, insisting that decisions affecting the Union’s security and responsibilities belong to Europe itself.

The central issue is therefore not whether Europe has influence, but whether it can organise that influence into a coherent negotiating position.

Why Ukraine must help choose Europe’s representative

An equally important weakness would arise if European governments selected their representative without making Kyiv an integral participant in the decision.

Ukraine is not merely the geographical subject of negotiations. Its government controls whether a proposed settlement can acquire political legitimacy, while its armed forces determine much of what can be implemented on the ground.

A negotiated agreement rejected by Kyiv could neither reliably end the war nor provide the security arrangements that Europe seeks.

European security, moreover, can no longer be considered independently of Ukraine’s military capabilities. Ukrainian forces possess extensive operational experience against Russia, including in drone warfare, electronic warfare and long-range strikes.

Any future continental defence architecture that excludes this experience would disregard one of Europe’s most consequential military assets.

An effective European representative would therefore require a mandate developed jointly with Ukraine, rather than simply endorsed by European governments after the event.

The danger of negotiating without leverage

The proposed candidates illustrate the difficulty of combining political authority with negotiating credibility. Meloni possesses a working relationship with Trump and considerable influence within European conservative politics. Stubb combines experience of Russia’s immediate neighbourhood with access to Washington. Pavel brings military expertise and an understanding of NATO’s command structures. Yet none could independently commit Europe’s governments to financial, military or territorial-security obligations.

This is the fundamental weakness of the proposed office. A negotiator requires more than access to powerful leaders. The ability to make commitments, withhold concessions and impose costs is what gives diplomatic representation substance.

Europe possesses potentially significant instruments: sanctions, industrial capacity, financial assistance and growing defence expenditure. But these remain distributed across institutions and national governments with differing strategic priorities.

Poland, the Baltic states and Nordic governments approach Russian security threats differently from several Western and Southern European capitals. Reconciling those positions is not an administrative exercise. It is a prerequisite for meaningful diplomacy.

The historical shadow of Yalta

The search also reflects European concern about a return to great-power bargaining over the continent’s political geography.

The historical comparison frequently invoked is Yalta in 1945, when Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin discussed Europe’s post-war settlement. Munich in 1938 offers another warning about negotiating territorial concessions at the expense of directly affected states. Neither precedent precisely describes the present situation.

Unlike the countries subjected to Soviet domination after the Second World War, today’s European states possess established institutions, substantial economic resources and collective defence arrangements. Ukraine, meanwhile, has demonstrated that Russia cannot simply dictate its political future through military superiority.

Nevertheless, the danger lies in accepting the underlying principle that powerful states possess a privileged right to determine the sovereignty and security choices of their neighbours.

Moscow’s demands concerning NATO, Ukrainian territory and Europe’s wider security arrangements extend beyond any conventional ceasefire negotiation.

A European representative would have to challenge that premise rather than merely negotiate the geographical limits of Russian influence.

From diplomatic representation to strategic authority

The debate inevitably leads to Europe’s military dependence upon the United States. An American withdrawal from NATO is not inevitable. Indeed, US legislation restricts unilateral presidential withdrawal. But Washington could substantially reduce its military commitments without formally abandoning the alliance.

Europe must therefore consider how much independent military capacity it requires to support its diplomatic positions. That entails coordinated procurement, integrated military planning, sustainable defence production and deeper cooperation with Britain, Norway, Canada and Ukraine. Recent security challenges in the Black Sea illustrate the difficulty of converting European diplomatic commitments into effective collective action.

These developments would not automatically create a European army or replace NATO. They could, however, give European governments greater freedom to act if American priorities diverge from their own.

The relationship between military capability and diplomacy is particularly important in dealing with Moscow. European representatives cannot expect Russia to revise its demands simply because Brussels has selected a more prominent interlocutor.

Russia would have to conclude that continued aggression carries greater costs than a settlement respecting Ukraine’s sovereignty. Europe’s diplomatic standing would then derive not from the personality of its representative but from the collective resources and political commitments behind that individual.

The immediate search for a negotiator may appear a limited diplomatic initiative. Its implications are considerably larger.

For decades, European security rested upon an arrangement in which American military power compensated for Europe’s fragmented strategic authority. The present negotiations are exposing the limitations of that model. The decisive question is not whether Meloni, Stubb, Pavel or another European leader can secure a place at the negotiating table. It is whether Europe can establish a common position, backed by Ukraine’s consent and by sufficient economic and military power, that neither Washington nor Moscow can disregard.

Without those foundations, a European envoy risks becoming a participant in decisions made by others. With them, the appointment could mark the beginning of a substantially different European role in international security.

Washington is offering Moscow sanctions relief, commercial opportunities and a possible return to European energy markets. Yet the Kremlin’s objectives in Ukraine extend far beyond economic interests, raising questions about whether Vladimir Putin has any intention of accepting a settlement that preserves Ukraine as an independent European state.

The Kremlin has announced plans for renewed negotiations between Russia, Ukraine and the United States in Abu Dhabi during the first half of November, reviving a diplomatic process that has repeatedly failed to produce a settlement to Moscow’s war against Ukraine.

Russian presidential spokesman Dmitry Peskov said on Friday, 23 October, that the discussions would concentrate on post-war security arrangements. He also left open the possibility of eventual European participation, although the initial meeting is intended to remain trilateral.

The announcement follows talks in St Petersburg between Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump’s special envoy Steve Witkoff. Yet the emerging American proposals reveal a fundamental problem: Washington appears increasingly prepared to offer Russia substantial economic incentives, while Moscow has provided little indication that its political objectives in Ukraine have changed.

The economic bargain taking shape

According to details reported on 23 October, citing The Economist, the American proposals involve Ukraine abandoning its ambition to join NATO in exchange for investment, security arrangements and the prospect of European Union membership.

Russia would receive sanctions relief, renewed commercial relations with American companies and potentially the restoration of natural gas exports to Europe. A demilitarised zone in Donbas is also reportedly under consideration.

The commercial dimension extends beyond theoretical proposals.

American and Russian representatives have discussed investment in the Nord Stream pipeline system and possible arrangements involving Lukoil’s international assets. The negotiations surrounding Russian energy infrastructure suggest that Washington regards commercial cooperation as a potential instrument for securing Moscow’s agreement.

There is no established evidence that Witkoff, Jared Kushner or members of Trump’s family would personally benefit from these arrangements. Nevertheless, the involvement of investors in strategically important Russian assets raises questions about whether economic agreements might advance independently of a settlement acceptable to Ukraine.

The Trump administration has already demonstrated its willingness to relax economic pressure. On 16 October, the president waived major provisions of the Graham sanctions legislation, which he had signed into law only four weeks earlier.

As EU Today previously examined, the decision suspended measures designed to increase the economic costs of Russia’s continuing aggression. Washington justified the waiver on the grounds that sanctions could interfere with negotiations.

Why Putin’s objectives are not primarily economic

The central weakness in a settlement built around commercial incentives is the assumption that Putin’s territorial and political demands can ultimately be exchanged for economic advantages.

Russia’s objectives have never been confined to Donetsk, Luhansk or access to Western markets.

In his July 2021 essay on the historical unity of Russians and Ukrainians, Putin advanced a conception of the two nations as belonging to a single historical and cultural space. His interpretation, examined by the Centre for Eastern Studies, challenged the legitimacy of Ukraine’s development outside Moscow’s political influence.

These ideas preceded the full-scale invasion of February 2022. They also followed Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and its intervention in eastern Ukraine.

Putin’s demands therefore concern more than military geography. They involve the extent to which Ukraine can exercise independent political authority, determine its international alliances and integrate with Western institutions.

Even a settlement granting Moscow substantial territory could leave this larger objective unresolved.

An independent Ukraine, increasingly integrated into the European economy and protected by Western security commitments, would remain outside Russia’s political control. For a Kremlin leadership that has repeatedly questioned Ukraine’s separate historical identity, such an outcome would represent a limitation on its wider ambitions.

Putin reinforced this position on 22 October when he again described Ukrainian territory in Donbas as historically Russian.

The advantages of negotiations without compromise

This creates an apparent contradiction. Why would Moscow return to negotiations if its broader objectives remain incompatible with the proposed settlement?

One explanation is that participation itself offers Russia strategic advantages.

Negotiations can preserve diplomatic engagement with Washington, complicate attempts to introduce additional sanctions and maintain American pressure on Kyiv to accept territorial concessions.

They also provide opportunities to negotiate economic arrangements before fundamental security questions have been resolved.

For Putin, the political timetable in Washington is relevant. Trump’s presidency is constitutionally limited to January 2029. Moscow can seek to exploit the present administration’s interest in a diplomatic agreement while continuing military operations.

None of this establishes that Putin has definitively rejected compromise. However, the Kremlin’s willingness to attend negotiations is not equivalent to a willingness to abandon its demands.

Russia continues attacking Ukrainian cities and energy infrastructure. As EU Today reported on 22 October, Russian forces launched 21 ballistic missiles against Kyiv shortly after Witkoff’s discussions with Putin.

The simultaneous pursuit of diplomatic engagement and military pressure allows Moscow to negotiate while attempting to alter conditions on the battlefield.

Europe cannot be treated as an economic bargaining chip

The proposed return of Russian gas exposes another contradiction in Washington’s approach.

The European Union has already adopted binding legislation to phase out Russian gas imports, with full restrictions taking effect during 2027.

The European Commission reiterated on 19 October that it had no plans to reverse its position. Reopening Nord Stream would also face sanctions, infrastructure and political obstacles, particularly in Germany.

Consequently, Washington cannot independently promise Moscow renewed access to European energy markets.

Nor can it guarantee Ukraine’s accession to the EU. Membership requires agreement among the existing member states, completion of accession negotiations and ratification of the relevant treaty.

A settlement negotiated primarily between Washington and Moscow would therefore depend on European decisions over which neither government has unilateral authority.

This helps explain the significance of Peskov’s remarks about possible European participation. Moscow needs European cooperation to secure meaningful sanctions relief and access to markets, even while seeking to negotiate Europe’s security arrangements principally with Washington.

The unresolved question

Trump’s approach rests on the proposition that economic incentives can make a settlement more attractive to Moscow than continued warfare.

Putin’s position presents a different calculation. The Russian president must weigh the benefits of restored commercial relations against the political implications of recognising Ukraine’s durable independence and Western orientation.

Those objectives may prove incompatible.

A settlement that restores Russian energy revenues without credible guarantees against renewed aggression could reduce Moscow’s economic constraints while leaving the causes of the war unresolved.

The decisive test in Abu Dhabi will therefore not be whether negotiators can agree on investment, pipelines or sanctions relief. It will be whether Russia is prepared to accept a Ukrainian state whose sovereignty, political direction and future European integration remain beyond Moscow’s control.

Until that question is answered, renewed negotiations may offer Washington the prospect of a diplomatic achievement while allowing the Kremlin to pursue objectives it has not publicly abandoned.

French arbitration records show that businessman Sasan Ghandehari, a financial supporter of Nigel Farage, invested in a telecommunications venture partly owned by an Iranian foundation subsequently sanctioned by Washington. His representatives deny any wrongdoing.

A French arbitration judgment has revealed that a British businessman who has become a financial supporter of Nigel Farage previously invested in an Iranian telecommunications venture partly owned by a religious foundation subsequently sanctioned by the United States.

Hossein Ghandehari, known as Sasan, was linked through his family’s HP Trust to a project to develop fibre-optic infrastructure in Iran. Documents examined in an investigation published on 22 October show that Ori Group, ultimately owned by the trust, held 49 per cent of Omran Razavi International, with the remaining 51 per cent held by Astan Quds Razavi (AQR).

The disclosures have attracted attention because Ghandehari has pledged substantial financial support for Reform UK. They do not, however, establish that he breached sanctions or that money linked to the Iranian venture was used to fund British politics.

Iranian Venture and Sanctions

The telecommunications project originated in a contract awarded by Iran’s state-owned Telecommunication Infrastructure Company in 2012. Ori Group became a shareholder in the joint venture in 2015, although Ghandehari’s lawyers say the agreement for its stake was signed in December 2014.

AQR, based in Mashhad, administers extensive religious and commercial holdings. On 13 January 2021, the US Treasury imposed sanctions on AQR, describing it as an organisation controlled by Iran’s supreme leader and alleging that its assets benefited senior Iranian officials.

That designation came several years after the venture’s collapse in 2016. Sanctions imposed in 2021 cannot, by themselves, demonstrate wrongdoing in transactions conducted before the designation.

According to the reported arbitration material, AQR took control of the joint venture in 2016. Ghandehari’s representatives maintain that the project was intended to expand internet access and encourage political reform, and that the arrangements received approval from authorities in France and the United States.

His lawyers say the venture ended in asset seizures and persecution by Iranian authorities. They reject suggestions that Ghandehari supported the Iranian leadership, and say AQR had been a necessary local partner for infrastructure work in Iran.

Connections to Reform UK

The disclosures have renewed scrutiny of Ghandehari’s relationship with Farage. In January, Ghandehari paid for accreditation for the Reform UK leader and a member of his staff at the World Economic Forum in Davos.

The House of Commons register of interests records the cost as £50,482.16. This was a declared benefit associated with an overseas visit, not a £50,000 cash donation to Reform UK.

Ghandehari has said he intends to move his tax residence from Switzerland to Britain and make regular substantial contributions to the party. He describes HP Trust as having a portfolio valued at approximately $10 billion, although the trust’s financial position has not been independently established through public accounts.

Farage has repeatedly criticised Iran’s government and supported American military action against Tehran. His public position has brought additional attention to his financial supporter’s historical dealings with an Iranian state-linked institution, although there is no evidence that Farage participated in those arrangements.

Another connection concerns John Richard Simpson, whose company Interior Architecture Landscape donated £200,000 to Reform UK in 2025. Simpson later acquired Orico General Trading, a Dubai-based business previously owned by HP Trust and involved in supplying equipment for the Iranian project.

Simpson says he took over Orico to wind down its operations after the Iranian venture failed. Interior Architecture Landscape has said the Ghandehari family is a client but had no role in its political donations, which it maintains were funded from legitimate British business.

Questions Over Political Funding

The overlapping commercial relationships have brought renewed scrutiny of Reform UK’s financing. They do not establish that Simpson’s company’s donations originated with Ghandehari, AQR or any Iranian state institution.

The Electoral Commission’s rules permit contributions from eligible UK-registered companies carrying on business in Britain, while placing responsibility on political parties to verify their funding sources. The legality of any individual donation depends on its circumstances and the applicable requirements.

EU Today has previously examined Reform UK’s decision to accept cryptocurrency donations and the questions surrounding identification of the original sources of political funding.

The latest disclosures concern a separate issue: historical commercial dealings in Iran, the ownership of connected companies and their subsequent relationships with British political donors. The arbitration material provides a documented chronology, but does not establish improper financing of Reform UK or foreign interference in British elections.

Austria has ordered four Russian diplomats to leave the country after security authorities identified activities incompatible with their diplomatic status, in a further deterioration of relations between Vienna and Moscow.

The Austrian foreign ministry announced the expulsions on Friday, 23 October. Three of the officials were accredited to the Russian embassy in Vienna, while the fourth served at Russia’s mission to the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), where the diplomat worked on military security and arms control. All four have been declared persona non grata.

The decision follows findings by Austria’s security authorities, according to the details of the foreign ministry announcement. Officials have not publicly disclosed the activities involved or brought criminal charges in connection with the announcement. Moscow has indicated that it will retaliate, although the nature of its response has not yet been specified.

Vienna’s diplomatic position

The expulsions are particularly significant because Vienna hosts numerous international organisations and remains one of Europe’s principal diplomatic centres. In addition to the OSCE, the city accommodates United Nations offices and organisations dealing with nuclear policy, international development and arms control.

That concentration of diplomatic missions gives Austria a distinctive position in European security affairs. Foreign delegations enjoy diplomatic privileges and immunity, while the Austrian authorities retain the power to withdraw recognition from representatives whose conduct they consider unacceptable.

Austria’s constitutional commitment to military neutrality has not prevented successive governments from supporting European Union sanctions against Russia or condemning Moscow’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Neutrality limits participation in military alliances; it does not require Vienna to remain politically neutral over the conduct of a war.

Russian missions to international organisations also have a particular role. The OSCE brings together European, North American and Central Asian states, including Russia and Ukraine, and provides a forum for discussions on military transparency and conflict prevention. Its proceedings have become more contentious since the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

Repeated expulsions

Friday’s decision brings the reported number of Russian diplomats expelled by Austria since 2020 to 18. In May 2026, Vienna expelled three Russian diplomats amid security concerns involving antenna installations on Russian diplomatic buildings. Those concerns added to wider scrutiny of possible intelligence-gathering activity in the Austrian capital.

Diplomatic expulsions are a familiar response when governments suspect espionage but do not pursue ordinary criminal proceedings. Under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, a receiving state can declare a diplomat persona non grata without publicly explaining the underlying evidence. The sending state must then recall the official or terminate their functions.

The mechanism is politically consequential but is not in itself a criminal judgment. A declaration of persona non grata establishes that the host government will no longer accept the diplomat’s accreditation; it does not establish guilt in a court of law.

Moscow has regularly responded to expulsions of its diplomatic personnel from European countries with reciprocal measures. Such retaliation can reduce the number of diplomats available for routine consular work and political dialogue, even when wider bilateral relations remain formally intact.

European security implications

The new Austrian action comes as European countries face continuing questions about Russian intelligence networks, attempts to gather military information and suspected interference activities. The circumstances of individual cases vary, and intelligence allegations cannot automatically be treated as proven simply because diplomats have been expelled.

The latest episode nonetheless illustrates how Russia’s war against Ukraine has affected the functioning of diplomacy in European capitals. Vienna must balance its international hosting responsibilities and established channels of communication with the security obligations arising from suspected abuses of diplomatic status.

The decision also comes against the background of wider European efforts to strengthen protection against strategic vulnerabilities and an expanding debate about hybrid threats to critical infrastructure.

For now, Austria has confirmed the expulsions but has not published an account of the conduct attributed to the four officials. The next diplomatic development will be Russia’s response and whether it affects Austrian representatives in Moscow.

 

The Kremlin confirmed Tuesday, September 1st, 2026, that Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping discussed the possibility of a trilateral face-to-face meeting with U.S. President Donald Trump on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit, scheduled for November 18-19th, in Shenzhen, China.

The meeting is still in the planning stages but the American thug-in-chief an indispensable party has already agreed to attend. Few eyebrows have been raised so far because the American component is a habitual liar so what he says and what he does may not correlate. The Summit in China is a month away. But a chance to meet with two of his closest friends  and allies will not be missed by the evil clown in the White House.

The American thug’s most accommodating American accomplice and equally mendacious voice has simply repeated what he has said so often in the past: that it is necessary to speak with your adversaries, thus keeping the American people guessing. In the bizarre world of Donald J. Trump, Putin is not an adversary. Little Marco may still speak differently so as to present a view that most Americans share, but he is a quisling concerned about his own future. That for him is more important than anything else. Fear and ambition are two quite compelling factors.

Trump has characterized the trilateral meeting as intended for a discussion of the need for de-nuclearization among three of the world’s largest nuclear powers. However, this is another one of Trump’s lies. or simply a a cover-up. Putin has insisted for some time that China participate in trilateral talks about the war in Ukraine. Putin has also insisted that Ukraine not be invited to participate. This is simply another example of Trump complying with Putin’s wishes. That is what agents or surrogates do.

The Summit will result in a trade-off but not for Ukraine’s benefit. As far as Ukraine is concerned, it will be a sellout, like all previous summits involving Trump and the Russian thug Vladimir Putin. One can only consider Helsinki in 2018 or Alaska in 2025. The self-proclaimed American master of the deal has repeatedly proven himself incompetent at deal-making. Or perhaps his shameless results are intentional. There will be personal gain from yet another nefarious arrangement.The American thug is silent on this point. Little Marco will spin an excuse for this aberration as well. There will most certainly be some personal benefit for Trump and his family.

The President of Ukraine wakes up each day to a new betrayal by his American “ally,” more death and destruction of his people and land, but with his eyes wide open that Trump is the enemy. President Zelensky is astute and principled, but also a very good actor; he often plays the Biblical “Job,” yet even his patience has its limitations. A trilateral summit of thugs about ending the war in Ukraine without Ukraine is a non starter. Ukraine will not be bullied. The people of Ukraine will not allow that.

The agenda for the axis of evil meeting includes one more item. No one is considering denuclearizing. The power must be distributed between the three behemoths. Ukraine is certain to be sold off. Taiwan may be next. And Cuba may be another victim of the sphere of influence division of the world. Certainly Russia will give up any interest in destitute Cuba in order to take over rich Ukraine. For Russia Ukraine has been the prize for almost four hundred years.

The axis is mutually accommodating. Currently, Russia stayed out of Syria and Iran. It relinquishes Cuba. America purchases Russian diesel, integrates Russia into the world economy at the G20. China retrieves Taiwan, America and Russia agrees to stay out of any China-India conflict. With Ukraine Russia stands at the gates to Europe. America feels secure in its defensive posture by having encroached on Greenland’s military sovereignty. Everyone is happy except for the remaining almost two hundred countries in the world.

The biggest obstacle is Ukraine. The people of Ukraine remain committed to freedom and democracy. Each day I receive several inquiries from Ukraine: “When will this Trump nightmare end?” . The midterm elections remain a beacon of hope for Ukrainians and Americans alike. Trump will attend the November China summit as a lame duck with Congress set to begin his third impeachment. in January. Ukrainians can pray. Americans must vote. Let the hearings and investigations begin. Whether you are a Democrat or a Republican, the commander-in-chief is a traitor and a criminal. It will all come out. We the people have had enough!

The European Union and Turkey are preparing high-level talks before the end of October in an attempt to revive negotiations over Cyprus, following an initiative by United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres.

Cypriot President Nikos Christodoulides announced the planned meeting on 16 October during the European Council summit in Brussels, saying discussions would address both the resumption of negotiations over the island’s division and the possibility of improving relations between Ankara and the EU.

The initiative follows diplomatic contacts in New York involving Guterres, European institutional leaders and the Cypriot government. However, renewed differences over the conditions for negotiations have already cast doubt on whether the process can produce substantial progress.

On Sunday, 18 October, Christodoulides accused Turkish Cypriot leader Tufan Erhürman of imposing preconditions before formal negotiations could resume, particularly concerning arrangements for a rotating presidency in a reunited Cyprus.

The disagreement underlines the difficulties facing an initiative intended to reconnect the UN peace process with the EU’s broader relationship with Turkey.

Brussels seeks a negotiating role

Christodoulides said the planned meeting between the EU and Turkey would examine how to establish the necessary conditions for negotiations to restart within the previously agreed UN framework.

He indicated that any improvement in EU–Turkey relations would be linked to progress over Cyprus.

The president’s announcement in Brussels follows months of diplomatic consultations involving the Commission, European Council and UN.

European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and European Council President António Costa have urged Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to support the renewed peace initiative.

Turkey’s relationship with the EU encompasses trade, customs cooperation, migration and regional security. Ankara remains an EU candidate country, although accession negotiations have been effectively stalled for years.

Cyprus remains one of the principal obstacles to any substantial improvement in that relationship.

The island has been divided since Turkey’s military intervention in 1974. The internationally recognised Republic of Cyprus joined the EU in 2004, but EU law remains suspended in areas where its government does not exercise effective control.

The self-declared Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is recognised only by Turkey.

Disagreement over political equality

The UN has traditionally sought a settlement based on a bizonal, bicommunal federation with political equality between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities.

Negotiations collapsed at Crans-Montana in Switzerland in 2017 amid unresolved disputes over security guarantees, political representation, territory and the presence of Turkish troops.

Erhürman, who became Turkish Cypriot leader in 2025, has expressed support for renewed negotiations within a federal framework. However, he wants assurances about political equality and the structure of future talks.

The latest dispute concerns whether the principle of a rotating presidency between the two communities should be accepted before negotiations resume.

Christodoulides rejected that demand on 18 October, arguing that substantive questions should be negotiated together rather than settled in advance.

The Turkish Cypriot leadership regards rotating executive power as an essential element of political equality, while the Greek Cypriot side objects to making agreement on that arrangement a prerequisite for restarting discussions.

The disagreement has emerged despite recent efforts by the United Nations to improve relations between the communities.

In a statement issued on 13 October, the UN confirmed that Christodoulides and Erhürman had met in Nicosia and agreed to continue discussions, including participation in bicommunal initiatives.

The two leaders subsequently attended a joint event in Pyla, although their public differences persisted.

Turkey’s position remains decisive

A Cyprus settlement would require agreement not only between the island’s communities but also on Turkey’s military presence and the system of security guarantees established at independence.

Ankara has long maintained that Turkish Cypriots require effective political equality and credible security arrangements.

Greek Cypriot leaders argue that the continuation of foreign intervention rights and Turkish military deployments would be incompatible with a fully sovereign and reunited state.

The EU cannot resolve those differences independently of the UN process, but it can influence the economic and institutional framework within which a settlement might operate.

A comprehensive agreement would affect property ownership, trade, customs arrangements, border administration and the application of European law throughout the island.

The European Commission has sought a greater role in supporting the UN-led peace process, reflecting Brussels’ interest in progress towards a settlement.

Negotiations face immediate test

The UN Secretary-General’s personal envoy, María Ángela Holguín, has warned that the opportunity for renewed negotiations may be narrowing.

Disagreements over diplomatic representation, contacts with foreign missions and the status of Turkish Cypriot institutions have complicated relations between the two communities.

Christodoulides has also referred to a series of proposals intended to advance discussions, including the future of the fenced-off area of Varosha. Their full contents have not been publicly disclosed.

The proposed EU–Turkey meeting offers a separate diplomatic channel through which Brussels can assess Ankara’s willingness to support renewed negotiations.

No final date, detailed agenda or list of participants had been publicly confirmed by 18 October.

The immediate test will be whether the parties can agree on the basis for formal talks without attempting to settle disputed constitutional questions before negotiations begin.

Police fired rubber bullets and tear gas during a fifth consecutive day of unrest in Tirana, as student demonstrations over corruption, employment and education developed into a nationwide challenge to the government.

Albania’s political crisis deepened on Saturday, 17th October, as violent anti-government protests continued for a fifth consecutive day, with demonstrators attacking police and public buildings in the capital, Tirana, and demanding the resignation of Prime Minister Edi Rama.

Police used tear gas, water cannon and rubber bullets to disperse protesters outside the Ministry of Education after groups of masked demonstrators threw stones, petrol bombs and fireworks at security forces. The disturbances subsequently spread through the city centre, including areas near the prime minister’s office.

According to the latest figures released by Albanian police, 167 people had been arrested and 132 officers injured during five days of unrest. Seven police officers were also suspended pending investigations into allegations of excessive force.

The demonstrations have become one of the most serious domestic challenges to Rama since his Socialist Party came to power in 2013.

Students transform an environmental protest into a political movement

The current unrest grew out of a campaign known as the Flamingo movement, which began earlier this year in opposition to a controversial luxury tourism development associated with Jared Kushner, the son-in-law of US President Donald Trump.

The development attracted objections from local residents and environmental campaigners concerned about land ownership, planning decisions and potential damage to protected coastal areas.

What began as a dispute over tourism development subsequently expanded into a wider protest against alleged government corruption, unemployment, education standards and the cost of living.

The involvement of high-school and university students has considerably increased both the scale and political significance of the demonstrations.

Students have demanded improvements to educational facilities, additional financial support and better employment opportunities for graduates. Frustration over the limited prospects available to young Albanians has also brought emigration into the debate.

During Saturday’s demonstrations, protesters burned a suitcase outside the Education Ministry, using it as a symbol of the pressure on young people to leave Albania in search of work.

The protests began peacefully before violence erupted when masked participants attacked police positions.

According to accounts from Tirana, government offices, banks and commercial premises have been damaged during several days of confrontations.

Demonstrations have also spread beyond Tirana to other Albanian cities.

Rama refuses to resign

Rama, who is serving his fourth term as prime minister, has rejected demands for his resignation and accused political opponents of encouraging violence to destabilise the government.

He has acknowledged the right of citizens to demonstrate but insisted that attacks on public institutions and private property cannot be treated as legitimate political protest.

The government has pledged to prosecute those responsible for vandalism and assaults on police officers.

National Police Chief Skender Hita has defended the security operation, arguing that officers have faced repeated attacks by masked groups. At the same time, the suspension of seven officers indicates that allegations concerning police conduct are being investigated.

The political opposition has sought to capitalise on the unrest, although the Flamingo movement initially developed outside Albania’s established party structures.

That distinction complicates the government’s argument that the demonstrations are primarily the result of opposition-party activity.

The protests have also exposed tensions between the government’s economic development policies and opposition from communities concerned about corruption, land rights and access to employment.

EU accession adds another dimension

The crisis comes at a particularly sensitive moment in Albania’s negotiations to join the European Union.

On 13th October, just as the demonstrations were gathering momentum, Brussels and Tirana provisionally closed negotiations on enterprise and industrial policy.

The agreement marked another step towards membership, bringing the number of provisionally completed negotiating chapters to four out of 33.

Albania has already opened all 33 chapters, placing it among the more advanced candidates in the Western Balkans.

However, the EU’s negotiating framework makes clear that progress on fundamental reforms, including judicial independence, democratic institutions and the rule of law, determines the overall pace of accession.

As EU Today recently reported, Brussels is considering additional safeguards designed to prevent democratic backsliding following enlargement.

The current protests do not automatically jeopardise Albania’s accession negotiations. Public demonstrations, including those directed against an elected government, are not themselves evidence of a failure to meet democratic standards.

The relevant questions for Brussels concern the authorities’ response, the independence of investigations into police conduct, the treatment of detainees and whether allegations of corruption are properly examined.

These matters fall directly within the EU’s assessment of the rule of law and the functioning of democratic institutions.

A political test ahead of possible EU membership

Rama has made EU membership by 2030 a central objective of his government, presenting accession as the foundation of Albania’s future economic and political development.

The acceleration of negotiations has given his administration a substantial diplomatic achievement. It has not, however, resolved dissatisfaction over domestic governance or living standards.

The growing involvement of students also means the demonstrations are no longer confined to the environmental dispute that originally triggered the movement.

For the European Commission, the immediate challenge is to maintain a credible distinction between technical progress in accession negotiations and its assessment of political developments inside the candidate country.

For Rama, the question is whether he can restore public order without intensifying opposition to a government that has been in office for more than 13 years.

Further demonstrations would place additional pressure on the authorities, particularly if the movement continues to spread beyond the capital and attracts broader support from trade unions, students and other dissatisfied groups.

Diplomats from Belgium, France and Poland were attacked by Israeli settlers during an olive-harvesting visit to the occupied West Bank, prompting calls for further European sanctions and an investigation by Israeli authorities.

The settlers attacked a delegation of European diplomats and Catholic representatives in the occupied West Bank on Saturday, 17th October, assaulting a French mayor and damaging a Belgian diplomatic vehicle during a visit intended to support Palestinian olive farmers.

The delegation included Belgium’s consul general, French and Polish diplomats and representatives of the Catholic Church. The incident occurred near the Palestinian village of Taybeh, where settlers confronted visitors accompanying local residents during the annual olive harvest.

Belgian Foreign Minister Maxime Prévot condemned the violence and announced that Brussels would press for additional European Union sanctions against those responsible. He also called on Israel to meet its obligations as the occupying power and protect Palestinians, journalists and foreign diplomatic representatives.

According to accounts of the incident, Bernard Baudoux, mayor of the French town of Aulnoye-Aymeries, was assaulted while attempting to enter a vehicle bearing diplomatic plates. The attack also involved members of a Catholic delegation, including Archbishop Vincent Dollmann of Cambrai.

Three people were reportedly injured. Belgian diplomatic personnel were confirmed to be safe.

Diplomatic incident draws Israeli condemnation

Israel’s military described the attack as a serious act of violence but said that the delegation’s visit had not been coordinated with the Israeli authorities and that soldiers had not been present when the confrontation occurred.

Israeli police subsequently opened an investigation.

Foreign Minister Gideon Saar publicly condemned the actions of the settlers and said his ministry was in contact with the ambassadors of the countries involved. The Israeli government’s response comes amid mounting international criticism of settler violence against Palestinian communities in the West Bank.

The circumstances are particularly sensitive because the victims included accredited diplomatic representatives from three EU member states. The incident therefore extends beyond the continuing disputes over land ownership and Palestinian access to agricultural areas, raising questions about the protection of foreign officials carrying out recognised diplomatic activities.

For Belgium, the attack has reinforced an existing position in favour of stronger European measures against violent settlers and organisations supporting settlement expansion.

Prévot linked the violence to Israeli settlement policy, arguing that the attacks could not be considered separately from the broader circumstances of the occupation.

A growing dispute over European sanctions

The European Union has already introduced targeted restrictive measures against individuals and organisations associated with serious abuses against Palestinians in the occupied West Bank.

In May 2026, the Council of the EU imposed additional sanctions on three individuals and four organisations, including the Nachala Settlement Movement and the Amana cooperative association.

The measures were adopted under the EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime and included asset freezes, prohibitions on making funds available to designated persons and travel restrictions on listed individuals.

The Council said the sanctioned organisations had supported or facilitated activities resulting in the displacement of Palestinian communities and the loss of property.

However, agreement on broader economic measures against Israel has proved substantially more difficult.

As EU Today previously reported, European governments have considered restrictions on trade involving Israeli settlements, while divisions between member states have complicated attempts to establish a common position.

The latest attack gives Belgium, France and Poland a direct diplomatic interest in the outcome of any further discussion. Whether this produces a new sanctions agreement will depend on negotiations between EU governments, rather than unilateral declarations by individual ministers.

Violence during the olive harvest

The incident occurred amid escalating attacks on Palestinian farmers during the annual olive harvest, an important source of income for communities across the West Bank.

Harvesting frequently involves access to agricultural land situated near Israeli settlements or in areas where Palestinians face movement restrictions. Local farmers have complained of intimidation, destruction of trees and attacks by settlers attempting to prevent them from reaching their property.

According to reporting from the area, the Palestinian Health Ministry said at least four people had been killed and more than 100 injured since this year’s harvest began.

The attack on the European delegation followed another serious incident involving American photojournalist Heidi Levine, who was assaulted while covering attacks on Palestinian olive harvesters.

The violence has attracted criticism from international organisations and foreign governments, including those maintaining close diplomatic relations with Israel.

Wider implications for EU–Israel relations

The diplomatic confrontation comes against a background of longstanding disagreement between Brussels and the Israeli government over settlement expansion and the legal status of the occupied territories.

The European Union does not recognise Israeli sovereignty over the West Bank and regards settlements established there as contrary to international law. Israel disputes the application of this legal interpretation to the territory.

The latest incident is unlikely, by itself, to determine the future of EU–Israel relations. It does, however, strengthen demands from governments already advocating targeted sanctions and more effective measures against settlement-related violence.

For Belgium, France and Poland, the immediate questions concern the safety of their diplomatic personnel, the Israeli investigation and whether the perpetrators will face prosecution.

For the EU collectively, the matter now extends to whether its existing sanctions framework can address continuing attacks against Palestinians and, increasingly, European representatives themselves.

Ukraine was prepared to suspend attacks on Russian oil refineries if Washington supplied anti-ballistic missile systems to protect its energy infrastructure, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has revealed. The proposed compromise was not accepted, despite American pressure on Kyiv to halt its strikes.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has disclosed that Kyiv offered to suspend attacks on Russian oil refineries in exchange for temporary American anti-ballistic missile protection for Ukraine’s energy infrastructure. Washington did not provide the requested systems, leaving Ukraine exposed to continued Russian missile strikes while the United States sought to restrict Ukrainian operations against Russia’s oil industry.

Speaking at a press conference in Brussels on Friday, 16 October, Zelenskyy said the proposal had been presented to Washington as a compromise following President Donald Trump’s agreement with Vladimir Putin on Russian diesel supplies and restrictions on attacks against energy facilities.

The Ukrainian president confirmed that Kyiv had not been consulted before Washington reached its understanding with Moscow. He described the diesel agreement as a surprise and objected to arrangements determining Ukraine’s military actions without its participation. Any agreement concerning Ukrainian strikes on Russian territory, he argued, required consultation with the Ukrainian government.

Nevertheless, Zelenskyy said Ukraine had been willing to accommodate American demands, even under an arrangement that did not require Russia to suspend its own attacks. Instead of insisting on reciprocal restrictions, Kyiv proposed receiving sufficient anti-ballistic missile systems to protect its electricity network for the duration of the requested suspension.

The proposal reflected Ukraine’s immediate security requirements. Russia has repeatedly targeted power stations, substations and other critical infrastructure, while Ukrainian forces have attacked Russian refineries to disrupt fuel production and reduce revenues available to Moscow. Halting the Ukrainian campaign without additional defensive capabilities would have left Kyiv surrendering one means of economic pressure while remaining vulnerable to Russian bombardment.

Zelenskyy said he had asked Washington for a limited number of systems, rather than a substantial new military commitment. The proposed deployment would have lasted only as long as the United States required Ukraine to refrain from attacking Russian refineries. However, according to the president, no such assistance was provided.

US diesel agreement deepens dispute

The disagreement follows the diesel arrangement announced by Trump on 9 October, under which Russia agreed to resume substantial petroleum product exports to American and international markets. Washington also authorised certain transactions involving Russian diesel, easing restrictions previously intended to reduce Moscow’s energy revenues.

The agreement created a direct conflict between American energy policy and Ukraine’s strategy of targeting Russian refining capacity. Washington wants additional diesel supplies to ease pressure on fuel markets, while Kyiv regards attacks on oil infrastructure as a means of weakening Russia’s ability to sustain its invasion.

That disagreement intensified after Ukraine resumed attacks on Russian refineries, including a strike against a facility in the Ryazan region. Trump criticised the operations, accusing Kyiv of contributing to higher global oil prices. Zelenskyy, meanwhile, argued that increased Russian diesel revenues would provide Moscow with additional resources to finance its military campaign.

The Ukrainian president’s proposal also exposed the limitations of the temporary energy ceasefire promoted by Washington. Russia continued attacks against Ukrainian civilian infrastructure, including electricity facilities, despite the American initiative. Kyiv’s proposed compromise would have addressed the resulting imbalance by providing defensive protection rather than relying on Russian restraint.

Russian strikes underline Ukraine’s defensive requirements

The urgency of Ukraine’s request was illustrated by renewed Russian attacks during Zelenskyy’s visit to Brussels. According to the Ukrainian presidency, strikes on 15 October damaged energy infrastructure in several regions, leaving almost 15,000 people without electricity in Volyn and disrupting supplies in parts of Kyiv and the surrounding region.

Ukraine continues to face shortages of the interceptors required to defend against ballistic missiles. Zelenskyy has identified anti-ballistic capabilities as an immediate priority, particularly as Russia intensifies attacks ahead of winter. During talks with NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, he stressed the need for additional missile interceptors and other air defence equipment.

The president also raised these requirements during Friday’s meeting with European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and European Council President António Costa. Discussions covered air defence, protection of energy infrastructure and financial assistance needed to sustain Ukraine’s resistance to Russian aggression.

European leaders support Kyiv’s position

Zelenskyy said European leaders had supported Ukraine’s position in the dispute with Washington. His remarks came as the EU reaffirmed its intention to maintain economic pressure on Moscow despite the Trump administration’s decision to facilitate Russian diesel exports.

As EU Today reported earlier on Friday, von der Leyen and Costa rejected any relaxation of European sanctions while Russia continues its war. The Commission is preparing a further sanctions package, maintaining a policy intended to restrict Moscow’s ability to finance its military operations.

The contrasting American and European positions have become increasingly significant for Kyiv. Washington is seeking to stabilise fuel markets through arrangements with Moscow, while European governments remain committed to reducing Russian energy revenues and strengthening Ukraine’s military and economic resilience.

For Zelenskyy, the unresolved question is whether Ukraine can be expected to limit attacks on Russian oil infrastructure while receiving neither reciprocal guarantees from Moscow nor additional protection against Russian ballistic missiles. His account of the unsuccessful American negotiations indicates that Kyiv was prepared to compromise, but only if its immediate defensive needs were addressed.

Belgian investigators have searched properties associated with relatives and associates of Congolese President Félix Tshisekedi in an inquiry into alleged laundering of mining revenues, bringing renewed scrutiny to financial links between the two countries.

Belgian police have conducted searches at several properties in Brussels and its surrounding areas as part of an investigation into allegations that money diverted from the Democratic Republic of Congo’s mining sector was laundered through Belgium.

The searches, carried out on 15th October, reportedly involved homes associated with relatives and individuals close to Congolese President Félix Tshisekedi. Belgian prosecutors confirmed that searches had taken place but did not publicly identify those concerned, while the Congolese presidency declined to comment.

The investigation follows a complaint lodged in Belgium in 2025 by civil society organisations from Katanga, the mineral-rich region of south-eastern Congo. Their lawyers, Bernard Maingain and Hervé Diakese, allege that mining revenues which should have benefited Congolese communities were instead diverted and channelled through financial arrangements involving individuals with connections to Belgium.

The allegations have not been established in court. The searches form part of an investigation, and their execution does not establish criminal responsibility on the part of the individuals or organisations whose premises were examined.

Mining revenues under scrutiny

Congo is one of the world’s most important suppliers of copper and cobalt, minerals essential to electric vehicles, batteries, electronics and other advanced industrial products. Its mineral resources also occupy an increasingly important position in the European Union’s effort to diversify strategic supply chains.

Yet the financial arrangements surrounding mineral extraction have repeatedly generated controversy over public accountability, the distribution of revenues and the relationship between political authorities and commercial interests.

The Belgian inquiry concerns an especially sensitive question: whether funds originating from Congo’s mining economy were transferred into the European financial system under circumstances that could constitute money laundering.

According to the details of the investigation published on Thursday, the original complainants maintain that money linked to mining operations was diverted from its intended beneficiaries and used to benefit people connected to the Congolese leadership.

The proceedings are particularly significant because Belgian courts can investigate alleged laundering through Belgian financial structures even when the suspected underlying misconduct occurred abroad, subject to the applicable jurisdictional requirements.

Investigators will need to establish the origin of the funds, the route they allegedly followed and whether those involved knew or should have known that the money represented proceeds of criminal activity.

Belgium’s relationship with Congo

The investigation also has a diplomatic dimension. Belgium ruled Congo until independence in 1960, and the countries retain extensive commercial, political and personal connections.

Brussels remains an important centre for Congolese political and business networks, making Belgium a potentially relevant jurisdiction when investigators examine suspected financial movements connected to the country.

At European level, the inquiry comes as the EU attempts to strengthen relationships with mineral-producing countries while reducing its dependence on concentrated supply chains.

The European Commission’s cooperation programme with the Democratic Republic of Congo specifically identifies responsible sourcing, transparency, due diligence and action against illegal trafficking in raw materials as areas for cooperation.

These commitments have practical consequences for European businesses seeking greater access to copper and cobalt. Investment and supply arrangements depend not only on access to mineral deposits but also on the reliability of commercial records, ownership structures and the institutions responsible for supervising mining revenues.

A money-laundering investigation involving politically connected individuals therefore raises questions extending beyond Congo’s internal affairs.

Implications for European financial supervision

Belgium has recently joined other EU member states in adopting additional measures intended to recover criminal assets and strengthen cross-border cooperation against illicit financial activity.

As EU Today reported on 14th October, European governments have endorsed new international arrangements designed to improve their ability to trace and recover assets associated with serious crime.

The Congo investigation concerns an existing criminal inquiry rather than the application of those newly agreed arrangements. Nevertheless, both developments illustrate the importance of financial intelligence, access to ownership records and cooperation between prosecutors when suspected proceeds move across jurisdictions.

For investigators, the central task will be tracing the alleged flow of money and determining whether financial transactions in Belgium conceal proceeds unlawfully obtained elsewhere.

For Congo, the proceedings arrive during a period of serious domestic instability, including renewed armed confrontation in the east of the country and growing political uncertainty surrounding its leadership.

Former president Joseph Kabila’s involvement in a new opposition alliance has intensified that confrontation, complicating Tshisekedi’s political position as his administration faces continuing security and economic pressures.

The Belgian authorities have not announced any findings establishing that President Tshisekedi personally participated in wrongdoing. The next important developments will be whether investigators identify specific transactions, bring charges or expand the inquiry to additional individuals or corporate structures.

Main Image: Kremlin, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=84821955

A former Ukrainian special forces officer has gone on trial in Hamburg over the 2022 Nord Stream explosions, with his lawyers arguing that Russian energy infrastructure used to finance aggression cannot automatically enjoy protection as a civilian installation.

The first criminal trial arising from the destruction of the Nord Stream gas pipelines has opened in Hamburg, confronting German judges with allegations against a former Ukrainian military officer and a dispute over whether Russian energy infrastructure constituted a legitimate wartime target.

Serhii Kuznietsov, 50, is accused of organising an operation that destroyed three of the four Nord Stream pipeline strands in the Baltic Sea in September 2022. German prosecutors have charged him with offences involving explosives, damage to infrastructure and participation in a war crime.

At the opening hearing on 14 October, Kuznietsov’s lawyers sought to have the proceedings dismissed, challenging both the evidence against their client and the prosecution’s classification of the pipelines as protected civilian infrastructure.

According to the account of the opening proceedings, the defence argued that the installations served Russia’s strategic interests and had been used to exert economic and political pressure on European countries.

Kuznietsov denies involvement in the explosions. His lawyers maintain that the prosecution has not established that he participated in, let alone directed, the operation.

German prosecutors allege Ukrainian involvement

The explosions occurred on 26 September 2022, approximately seven months after Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

Underwater detonations near the Danish island of Bornholm ruptured sections of Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2, releasing large quantities of natural gas into the Baltic Sea.

German investigators allege that a group of Ukrainians used a rented sailing yacht, the Andromeda, to transport divers, explosives and equipment to the pipelines.

According to the prosecution, the operation involved military-grade explosive devices and was organised with the knowledge or direction of Ukrainian state authorities.

These allegations remain to be tested in court. Ukrainian officials have denied state involvement, and no German judicial finding has established responsibility on the part of Kyiv’s political or military leadership.

The defendant was arrested in Italy in August 2025 and subsequently extradited to Germany following lengthy legal proceedings.

As EU Today reported following the Italian Supreme Court’s ruling, Kuznietsov’s defence had challenged the legality of his transfer and questioned the evidence underpinning the German investigation.

His appearance in Hamburg now moves the case from extradition disputes to direct examination of the prosecution’s allegations.

Can a gas pipeline be a military target?

The central legal controversy concerns whether the Nord Stream infrastructure was entitled to protection as a civilian installation during an international armed conflict.

Under international humanitarian law, civilian objects are generally protected against attack unless their nature, location, purpose or use makes an effective contribution to military action and their destruction offers a definite military advantage.

Kuznietsov’s defence argues that Nord Stream had served Russian strategic interests by generating energy revenue and providing Moscow with leverage over European governments.

Defence lawyer Nicola Canestrini has described the pipelines as an instrument of Russian economic coercion rather than infrastructure serving an exclusively civilian purpose.

German prosecutors reject the proposition that those circumstances automatically justified their destruction. They maintain that the operation involved attacks against civilian infrastructure and therefore constituted a war crime.

The legal assessment is more complicated than determining who owned the pipelines.

Financial benefits to a belligerent state do not necessarily make every commercial installation a military objective. Equally, civilian ownership or use does not automatically exclude infrastructure from becoming a military target if the conditions established under the laws of armed conflict are satisfied.

The operational circumstances in September 2022 could become important. Nord Stream 1 had already ceased delivering gas, while Nord Stream 2 had never received German certification to begin commercial operations.

The court will therefore have to consider both the pipelines’ strategic significance and their actual contribution to Russia’s military operations at the time of the explosions.

Defence raises questions about state secrecy

Kuznietsov’s lawyers have also argued that his military status restricts his ability to discuss information that could be covered by Ukrainian state secrecy obligations.

According to the opening-day court reporting, the defence contends that these restrictions undermine his ability to challenge the prosecution’s case.

The proceedings also raise questions concerning the legality of his extradition from Italy and the precise offences for which his transfer was authorised.

These are separate from the underlying question of responsibility for the explosions. A procedural objection could affect the conduct of the trial without resolving the factual allegations.

Berlin faces an uncomfortable political dispute

The case has implications for relations between Germany and Ukraine, although criminal responsibility must be determined independently of diplomatic considerations.

Germany remains a major supplier of military and financial assistance to Kyiv. At the same time, German prosecutors are pursuing allegations that Ukrainian personnel damaged infrastructure in which German companies had invested heavily.

The pipelines themselves remain politically contentious. As EU Today previously examined, the owner of Nord Stream 2 has separately challenged the EU’s plans to eliminate Russian gas imports, demonstrating that the commercial and legal consequences of Europe’s former energy relationship with Moscow remain unresolved.

The Hamburg trial will not determine the legality of Russia’s invasion, nor will it establish Ukrainian government responsibility merely because a former officer stands accused.

It will examine the evidence against Kuznietsov and the circumstances in which the destruction of infrastructure connected to an aggressor state can constitute a criminal offence.

Further hearings are scheduled, with the evidentiary proceedings expected to begin on 27 October. The outcome will depend on whether prosecutors can establish the defendant’s alleged role and overcome the legal challenges raised by his defence.

The European Union has adopted an unprecedented package of sanctions against Russia’s military-industrial complex, blacklisting 1,569 companies and individuals involved in supplying weapons for Moscow’s war against Ukraine.

The Council measures announced on 12 October target 826 companies and 743 executives. Unlike earlier sanctions targeting political figures, the latest listings reach deeper into the industrial supply chains needed to manufacture missiles, drones, aircraft and ammunition.

Ballistic missile supply chains

EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas said more than half the new listings concerned ballistic missile production. The Council identified electronics manufacturers, semiconductor suppliers, radar specialists, navigation equipment firms and producers of explosives.

These businesses occupy positions in production networks that enable Russia to sustain the manufacture of weapons despite restrictions on its access to Western technologies. The Council announcement estimates their combined annual turnover at at least €20 billion and employment at more than 250,000.

The move follows intensive Russian missile and drone strikes against Ukrainian cities and energy installations. European governments increasingly seek to undermine Moscow’s operational capacity by identifying businesses that procure or manufacture components for its armed forces.

Enforcement beyond EU borders

Listed firms face asset freezes, while EU businesses and citizens cannot make funds or economic resources available to them. The named executives also face travel restrictions. Suppliers and financial institutions will need to check commercial transactions for links to sanctioned entities.

The actual impact on Russian output remains uncertain. Businesses with few assets in Europe may experience limited immediate disruption. Moscow has developed alternative procurement channels through third countries, some involving intermediaries that acquire electronics or equipment originally manufactured elsewhere.

Sanctions effectiveness therefore depends on customs intelligence, financial due diligence, international cooperation and the willingness of commercial partners to stop dealing with listed companies. Targeting managers individually is also intended to raise the personal costs of directing Russia’s military production.

A test for Europe’s economic pressure

Precision navigation systems, sophisticated electronics and specialised manufacturing technology remain difficult to substitute rapidly. Nevertheless, listing a supplier cannot by itself prevent components from moving through indirect trading routes.

The sanctions coincide with renewed discussion of a possible halt to attacks on energy infrastructure. Brussels is signalling that negotiations about the war’s conduct need not entail relief from restrictions on Russia’s defence economy.

Whether the measures reduce missile production will depend on changes in procurement and output over the coming months. Their immediate significance is the EU’s decision to extend restrictions beyond the most visible weapons producers into the broader industrial networks sustaining Russia’s war.

The imposition of emergency rule in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, an opposition-controlled province, raises disturbing questions about the relationship between Pakistan’s civilian government and its powerful military establishment. Is this a legitimate response to terrorism, or another calculated assault on democracy?

There is an old saying in Pakistan that most countries have an army, but in Pakistan the army has a country. It is a cynical observation, certainly, but one that has survived successive governments, constitutional crises and military interventions with remarkable durability.

The latest developments in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the northwestern province governed by the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) party of imprisoned former Prime Minister Imran Khan, suggest that the observation may be as relevant today as ever.

President Asif Ali Zardari’s decision to impose emergency rule in the province, ostensibly in response to deteriorating security conditions, has prompted an obvious and deeply uncomfortable question: is Pakistan witnessing another military coup, albeit one conducted without tanks surrounding parliament or generals appearing on television to announce the suspension of democracy?

The answer depends largely upon how one defines a coup.

A constitutional manoeuvre with political consequences

Under Pakistan’s constitutional framework, federal authorities possess emergency powers that can, under specified circumstances, override provincial administrations.

Such powers are not inherently illegitimate. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa has experienced serious violence involving the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), and the federal government has a responsibility to protect citizens against terrorist attacks.

Nevertheless, the timing of the intervention demands scrutiny.

The province represents one of the most significant remaining political strongholds of Imran Khan, whose imprisonment and continuing confrontation with Pakistan’s political establishment have generated considerable unrest.

Suspending an elected provincial administration in these circumstances inevitably raises suspicions that national security has become a convenient instrument for achieving political objectives.

The crucial distinction is between responding to a genuine emergency and exploiting that emergency to neutralise an inconvenient opposition.

Pakistan’s authorities must demonstrate not merely that a security threat exists, but that the removal of elected provincial leadership is necessary and proportionate.

The army that never really left politics

Pakistan’s military has exercised an extraordinary degree of influence over the country’s political development since independence in 1947.

General Ayub Khan seized power in 1958. General Zia-ul-Haq overthrew Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s government in 1977. General Pervez Musharraf removed Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in 1999.

These were unmistakable military coups, involving direct intervention against civilian authority.

Yet Pakistan’s experience also demonstrates that generals need not formally assume the presidency to dominate political affairs. The military establishment has long maintained substantial influence over national security, relations with India, Afghanistan policy and, at various moments, the composition and survival of civilian governments.

Under Field Marshal Asim Munir, the relationship between the armed forces and civilian political authority has again attracted intense scrutiny. The central question is therefore not simply whether Pakistan’s generals have seized power. It is whether elected politicians retain sufficient independence to exercise it.

Imran Khan and the price of political defiance

Imran Khan’s political trajectory illustrates the extraordinary volatility of Pakistan’s relationship between civilian leadership and military power.

Once widely regarded as enjoying the establishment’s favour, Khan subsequently became one of its most prominent critics. His removal through a parliamentary no-confidence vote in April 2022 marked the beginning of an increasingly bitter confrontation.

His subsequent imprisonment, the prosecution of PTI figures and restrictions affecting the party’s political activities have fuelled allegations that Pakistan’s democratic institutions are being manipulated to exclude a popular opposition movement.

The authorities reject accusations of politically motivated persecution, while Khan’s supporters insist that his treatment demonstrates the extent to which democratic competition has been compromised.

Against this background, emergency intervention in a PTI-governed province cannot reasonably be viewed in isolation. It forms part of a wider struggle over who ultimately controls Pakistan’s political future.

A coup without the traditional trappings?

The latest emergency is particularly significant because Pakistan’s civilian government and military leadership appear aligned in their criticism of PTI.

According to Reuters reporting on 11 October, the province will be administered by a governor for an initial six months, with troops deployed to support security operations.

Hundreds of activists and three of Khan’s sisters have reportedly been detained ahead of opposition demonstrations.

PTI spokesperson Zulfikar Bukhari has characterised the emergency as a disguised coup. Even Maulana Fazlur Rehman, whose party has been involved in mediation efforts, condemned the intervention as an attack on democracy.

Yet evidence that the military directly ordered the takeover remains absent from the public record. Accusations of military involvement should be investigated rather than treated as established fact.

Nevertheless, a coup need not always involve soldiers removing a prime minister. Democratic institutions can also be progressively hollowed out through ostensibly lawful decisions that concentrate authority and deprive opposition parties of meaningful power.

A dangerous precedent for Pakistan

For Pakistan’s international partners, including the European Union, the implications extend beyond an internal constitutional dispute.

Pakistan benefits from preferential access to European markets under the EU’s GSP+ trading arrangement, which is linked to commitments concerning human rights, democratic governance and international conventions. Brussels should therefore be watching developments closely.

If emergency powers become a mechanism for suppressing political opposition rather than protecting public security, the European Commission will face legitimate questions about Pakistan’s adherence to its international obligations.

The immediate crisis may not constitute a conventional military coup. But the more troubling possibility is that Pakistan’s political system is evolving towards a form of government in which elections continue, civilian politicians remain in office, and the military’s influence is sufficiently powerful to determine the boundaries of democracy.

For Imran Khan‘s supporters, that distinction may offer little consolation.

Pakistan’s generals have seized power openly before. The question now is whether they need to do so again.

Geneva side event sharpens focus on Pakistan’s GSP+ status and rights record

 

The Sudanese army is once again facing mounting international pressure over allegations that it used chlorine-based chemical weapons in its war against the Rapid Support Forces (RSF).

The United States, Germany, Australia, Finland and Belgium pressed Sudan over the allegations at the 113th session of the Executive Council of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), held in The Hague from 6 to 9 October 2026.

The United Kingdom and the European Union also raised Sudan at the session. The EU said the Council had been seized of the matter under Article IX, paragraph 4 of the Chemical Weapons Convention, which allows member states to ask the Council to obtain clarification from another member. 

The statements came a month after The New York Times and The Washington Post published separate investigations on 5 September reporting that the Sudanese army ran a secret programme to develop, test and store chlorine-based munitions. 

The material included around 150 documents, photographs, video clips and voice messages, as well as several thousand text messages taken from the phones of senior Sudanese officers, according to The New York Times. The newspaper reported that voice and text messages involving army chief General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan suggest he had direct knowledge of the programme.

A Sudanese military spokesperson rejected the findings as “baseless and without material foundation” and threatened to sue The New York Times in a US court, according to Semafor. Sudan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs said in July that Washington had presented no evidence for its allegations and that Sudan had repeatedly offered to host US experts for on-site verification.

Belgium Voices Concern

Belgium told the Council that Sudan’s answers so far did not match the seriousness of the allegations. Ambassador Wouter Detavernier, speaking in French on 7 October, said Belgium was concerned by allegations that the army had used chlorine bombs during the civil war, and he asked Sudan’s authorities for more information, according to the Belgian statement.

US Warning

The United States has gone further than the other four countries and imposed two rounds of sanctions on Sudan.

The State Department determined on 24 April 2025 that Sudan’s government had used chemical weapons in 2024, and it announced the finding on 22 May 2025. Washington imposed the first sanctions, restricting US exports and Sudan’s access to US government credit, on 27 June 2025. A second round, which took effect on 20 July 2026, added US opposition to multilateral development bank loans to Sudan, further export restrictions and the suspension of air carrier authority linked to Sudan, according to the Federal Register.

At the Council’s 112th session in July, US Ambassador Nicole Shampaine said Sudan should give the OPCW Technical Secretariat “unhindered, transparent access” and that its national investigative committee could not replace independent verification, according to the Arms Control Association.

This week Shampaine told the Council it must confront Sudan’s continued non-compliance tied to its 2024 use of chemical weapons. She asked regional groups and States Parties to “reject as candidates for this Council those States Parties that remain in noncompliance,” according to the US statement.

Sudan currently holds a seat on the 41-member Council, according to The Standard. In March, the United States warned it would revisit its approach to Sudan’s seat if the matter was not resolved swiftly. Council members are elected by the Conference of the States Parties, which next meets from 23 to 27 November 2026, according to the OPCW calendar.

Germany Points to an Undeclared Programme

Germany’s ambassador, Gudrun Lingner, said new media reporting suggested the 2024 use might have been more than a single incident. “Indications pointing at an undeclared chemical weapons programme have been published,” Lingner said, according to the German statement.

Germany called on Sudan’s government to finish a thorough national investigation, publish it swiftly and cooperate fully and transparently with the OPCW.

Australia Focuses on Storage and Use

Australian Ambassador Gregory French said Australia had noted with alarm media reports that the Sudanese Armed Forces had stockpiled and used chemical weapons. He said Sudan had shared an interim report from its national investigation, and he called on Sudan to give “a genuine and transparent account of any non-compliance with the Convention,” according to the Australian statement.

Finland Seeks Prompt Answers

Finland repeated its serious concern about the allegations and said Sudan’s authorities must address them “in a prompt, objective, and transparent manner,” according to its statement. Finland welcomed the Technical Secretariat’s confirmation that it will monitor the situation.

President Donald Trump announced an agreement with Vladimir Putin on Friday, 9th October, under which Russia will resume substantial diesel exports to American and international markets, despite Washington’s existing sanctions against Moscow over its invasion of Ukraine.

According to Trump’s announcement following the telephone conversation, Russia will immediately release more than 300,000 tonnes of diesel, followed by 500,000 tonnes in November and another million tonnes shortly afterwards. A further three million tonnes could become available once Russian refining capacity permits.

The announcement was accompanied by a temporary authorisation from the US Treasury allowing transactions involving Russian diesel until 7 April 2027. It represents a substantial departure from the administration’s recent sanctions policy, which had sought to restrict Russian energy revenues and strengthen Washington’s negotiating position over Ukraine.

The timing is politically significant. Trump faces congressional midterm elections on 3 November, while diesel prices have become a growing economic concern for American businesses and consumers. The agreement gives the White House an opportunity to present itself as addressing fuel costs, although its practical effect on prices remains uncertain.

Russian diesel cannot resolve the global supply shortage

Trump has linked the proposed Russian deliveries to his administration’s efforts to restore energy flows through the Strait of Hormuz, arguing that the combined measures will produce a rapid reduction in diesel prices.

The disruption of maritime energy supplies following the confrontation with Iran has, however, created a problem considerably larger than the quantities Russia has initially promised.

The first two deliveries amount to approximately 800,000 tonnes. Even including the subsequent million tonnes, the announced volumes are modest relative to global consumption. Their arrival may provide temporary relief in individual markets, but there is little evidence that they could independently reverse the wider shortage.

Russia’s capacity to maintain larger exports is also uncertain.

Ukrainian attacks on Russian refineries have disrupted production and contributed to restrictions on petroleum exports. Moscow has periodically imposed limits to protect domestic supplies, while damaged facilities require repairs before returning to normal operations.

The condition of those refineries is explicitly acknowledged in Trump’s announcement, which makes the proposed additional three million tonnes dependent on their recovery.

This introduces a further contradiction. Washington is seeking Russian diesel at precisely the moment Ukraine is attempting to reduce Moscow’s capacity to refine and export petroleum products.

The economic benefits of the agreement may consequently depend partly on developments in a military campaign that the United States has previously supported through intelligence cooperation with Kyiv.

Zelenskyy rejects sanctions relief without Russian concessions

President Volodymyr Zelenskyy responded critically to the agreement, describing the relaxation of economic pressure as a concession to Putin that had not been accompanied by any meaningful Russian commitment to de-escalation.

In his response to the American decision, Zelenskyy argued that Moscow would exploit renewed export revenues to prolong its war rather than make concessions towards a settlement.

Ukraine has indicated that it remains prepared to consider reciprocal measures concerning attacks on energy infrastructure. Such arrangements would require Russia to stop striking Ukrainian facilities in exchange for restrictions on Ukrainian operations against Russian energy targets.

No comparable undertaking was announced as part of Friday’s diesel agreement.

This distinction is central to Kyiv’s objections. Sanctions relief has traditionally been regarded as leverage to obtain changes in Russian behaviour. In the present arrangement, Moscow stands to receive additional commercial opportunities without publicly agreeing to alter its military campaign.

Lukoil negotiations raise further questions

The agreement also comes amid separate discussions concerning the international assets of Lukoil, Russia’s second-largest oil producer.

A recent account of negotiations involving American investors and Russian officials described proposals involving Lukoil’s overseas oilfields, refineries and distribution businesses.

The discussions have reportedly involved figures connected to Trump’s diplomatic efforts, including Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, alongside Russian representatives.

On Friday, another development complicated the proposed transaction when Carlyle withdrew from the competition to acquire Lukoil’s international assets, previously valued at approximately $22 billion.

The negotiations illustrate the extent to which potential commercial cooperation has entered the broader American-Russian relationship.

There is no verified evidence, however, that the diesel agreement was concluded to facilitate a particular acquisition or benefit individuals connected to Trump’s administration. The commercial negotiations and Friday’s sanctions decision remain separate developments unless further evidence establishes a direct connection.

Washington and Europe move in different directions

The American decision creates an additional complication for European sanctions policy.

On 7th October, EU ambassadors agreed to expand sanctions against Russia’s military-industrial network, approving 1,646 additional designations, many directed at the production of ballistic missiles used against Ukraine.

Britain has also introduced further restrictions on Russian oil-related businesses, tankers and financial intermediaries, reinforcing its stated objective of limiting Moscow’s ability to finance the war.

The contrast with Washington’s diesel authorisation is substantial. While European governments are attempting to restrict Russian petroleum revenues, the United States is providing a temporary legal route for renewed sales.

The development also recalls the difficulties already examined by EU Today in its reporting on sanctions enforcement against Russia’s shadow fleet, where differences in national restrictions and their application have complicated efforts to control petroleum exports.

For Moscow, the significance of Friday’s agreement extends beyond the immediate revenue generated by diesel sales. It establishes that the United States is prepared to relax particular economic restrictions before securing a settlement over Ukraine.

Whether the arrangement ultimately lowers American fuel prices will depend on production, shipping and international market conditions. The diplomatic consequence is already apparent: Russia has obtained an opportunity to restore part of its international energy trade without accepting publicly announced conditions concerning its war against Ukraine.

For Kyiv and European governments, the question is whether this remains a narrowly defined response to an energy shortage or marks the beginning of a broader American policy of separating commercial relations with Moscow from negotiations over Ukraine.

 

For years, the European Union has struggled with a peculiar contradiction in its dealings with China. The EU is one of the largest and wealthiest trading blocs on earth, capable of determining access to a market of some 450 million relatively affluent consumers, yet it frequently conducts foreign policy as though it were the supplicant.

Hilde Vautmans, the Belgian Renew Europe MEP and European Parliament rapporteur on EU-China political relations, is right to challenge this timidity.

Her report, debated this week in Strasbourg, does not advocate severing relations with Beijing. Nor should it. China is too economically important and too influential on questions ranging from climate change to international security for Europe simply to close the door.

But dialogue must not become an alternative to action.

“Europe has economic power. It’s time to use it,” Vautmans told Parliament ahead of the vote. That sentence ought to be pinned above every desk in the European Commission dealing with China.

The figures make the case brutally clear. In 2025 the EU imported €559.4 billion of goods from China while exporting just €199.6 billion in the opposite direction. The resulting deficit was €359.8 billion — almost €1 billion every day.

As EU Today reported recently, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has herself warned of a potential “second China shock”, with subsidised Chinese industrial production threatening European manufacturers.

Fine words. But Beijing has heard fine words before.

The Commission’s preferred formulation remains “de-risking, not decoupling”. There is sense in that distinction. Nobody seriously proposes shutting down trade with the world’s second-largest economy. But de-risking becomes meaningless if every risk identified is followed by another dialogue, another working group and another opportunity to postpone difficult decisions.

Indeed, the Commission acknowledges that European companies operating in China face regulatory obstacles, inadequate intellectual-property protection, restrictions on data flows and pressures associated with technology transfer.

Europe possesses formidable weapons with which to respond: anti-dumping duties, anti-subsidy measures, foreign-investment screening, the Foreign Subsidies Regulation, the Anti-Coercion Instrument, procurement restrictions and controls on strategically sensitive technologies.

These instruments should not be deployed indiscriminately. But neither should they sit polished in the armoury while Beijing exploits European openness.

Vautmans is particularly right to connect economics with security and values. China cannot reasonably expect privileged access to European markets while helping sustain the Russian war machine. The European Parliament’s own research service describes Beijing as a “decisive enabler and dual-use provider”, including through goods entering Russian weapons and drone supply chains.

If Chinese companies materially assist Russia’s ability to wage war against Ukraine, Europe should be prepared to impose a direct economic price. The same principle should apply to human rights.

EU Today has warned repeatedly that Brussels’ ritualised engagement with Beijing risks becoming precisely that: ritual.

We reported earlier that the EU-China Human Rights Dialogue risks losing credibility, pointing to the continuing imprisonment of Swedish citizen Gui Minhai and Uyghur academic and Sakharov Prize laureate Ilham Tohti. After round upon round of discussions, Beijing has learnt that European expressions of “deep concern” are inexpensive things to endure.

The problem is hardly new. Years ago, EU Today highlighted calls for concrete EU action over goods associated with forced labour in China, including demands for tougher restrictions on entities implicated in abuses against Uyghurs.

Yet repression continues. In March this year China adopted its new Law on the Promotion of Ethnic Unity and Progress. The European Parliament subsequently condemned what it described as intensified repression and assimilation affecting Tibetans, Uyghurs and other minorities, by the overwhelming margin of 439 votes to 52.

Europe therefore faces a straightforward question. What is the purpose of economic power if it is never translated into political influence?

The EU should not attempt to bully China. Nor should it abandon diplomacy. Vautmans is correct that channels of communication must remain open. But reciprocity must become something more than a word appearing in communiqués.

Where China closes markets to European companies, Europe should be prepared to restrict equivalent access. Where state subsidies distort competition, Brussels should respond rapidly with trade-defence measures. Where strategic dependencies expose Europe to political coercion, alternative supply chains must be built. Where Chinese entities support Russia’s military-industrial complex, sanctions should follow. And where companies benefit from forced labour or serious human-rights abuses, access to the European marketplace should carry consequences.

That is not protectionism. It is leverage.

Totalitarian states understand leverage perfectly well. China routinely uses access to its enormous market as an instrument of statecraft. Europe, by contrast, too often behaves as though exploiting its own commercial strength would somehow represent a failure of diplomacy. It represents precisely the opposite.

The European Commission has spent years discovering that China is simultaneously a partner, competitor and “systemic rival”. It is time to move beyond discovering the obvious.

Vautmans has identified the essential point. Europe already possesses economic power on a scale few countries can ignore. What it appears to lack is the political confidence to use it.

Main Image: by Valentine ZELER, © European Union 2026 – Source : EP