EU ministers have reviewed reforms introduced by Prime Minister Péter Magyar’s administration but left the Article 7 proceedings against Hungary unresolved. The European Commission has acknowledged significant progress while warning that further changes are required to restore the rule of law.

The European Union has maintained its Article 7 proceedings against Hungary despite acknowledging significant improvements in the country’s rule-of-law situation since Prime Minister Péter Magyar’s government took office earlier this year.

Ministers meeting at the General Affairs Council in Luxembourg on Tuesday, 13 October, reviewed reforms introduced by the Hungarian administration and received an updated assessment from the European Commission.

The proceedings, initiated by the European Parliament in September 2018, remain open eight years after concerns over judicial independence, corruption, media freedom and democratic accountability first prompted action under the EU treaties.

No decision was announced to terminate the procedure following the latest meeting.

Brussels acknowledges progress

European Commissioner Michael McGrath said ahead of the discussions that Hungary had made substantial progress towards addressing the institutional problems inherited from the administration of former prime minister Viktor Orbán.

Speaking in Luxembourg, McGrath acknowledged improved cooperation between the Hungarian government and European institutions.

However, he also indicated that the reform process remained incomplete, noting that the new administration had been in office for only several months.

The Commission’s assessment reflects the changing relationship between Budapest and Brussels following Magyar’s election victory and the subsequent introduction of reforms intended to restore judicial and institutional independence.

As EU Today reported in June, the change of government created an opportunity to resolve long-standing disputes over the condition of Hungary’s democratic institutions and the suspension of European funding.

The latest Council discussions indicate that the EU is prepared to recognise reforms already undertaken without automatically treating them as sufficient to close the Article 7 procedure.

An eight-year institutional dispute

The European Parliament initiated the proceedings in 2018 after raising concerns over developments affecting Hungary’s constitutional system, judicial independence, corruption safeguards and civil society.

Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union provides mechanisms for responding when a member state is considered at risk of seriously breaching the Union’s fundamental values.

Under its preventive provisions, the Council can determine whether there is a clear risk of such a breach.

More severe measures, including the possible suspension of certain membership rights, require additional procedures and higher institutional thresholds.

Hungary’s case has remained within the preventive stage, with successive Council meetings examining the country’s legal and political developments.

The Council’s account of the 13 October meeting confirms that Hungarian representatives presented measures intended to address concerns raised by the European Parliament and member states during earlier proceedings.

The Commission also briefed ministers on its latest assessment.

The meeting did not produce a formal finding that the outstanding concerns had been fully resolved.

Magyar faces the consequences of Orbán’s legacy

Since assuming office, Magyar has sought to reverse elements of the institutional structure established during Orbán’s lengthy premiership.

The reforms have included measures concerning public administration, judicial accountability and the relationship between national institutions and European law.

The new government has also attempted to improve relations with Brussels after years of disputes that affected EU budget decisions, sanctions policy and cooperation over Ukraine.

EU Today has previously examined Magyar’s programme of institutional renewal and the political difficulties involved in changing institutions shaped by the previous administration.

Reforming legislation does not necessarily transform the institutions responsible for applying it.

Judicial appointments, regulatory structures, public procurement procedures and anti-corruption enforcement may all require additional measures before the effects of reform can be fully assessed.

The European Commission must therefore consider not only the laws adopted by the new government but also whether the institutions concerned operate independently and effectively.

EU funding remains a separate question

The Article 7 proceedings are closely associated with wider disputes over Hungary’s access to European funding, although the relevant legal mechanisms are different.

During Orbán’s administration, the Commission and Council used financial conditionality procedures to restrict access to certain EU resources because of concerns affecting the protection of the Union’s budget.

Magyar’s reforms have opened the possibility of reversing some of those restrictions.

As EU Today reported in September, the Commission moved towards releasing €4.2 billion following changes intended to address rule-of-law concerns.

The financial decisions involve compliance with conditions attached to EU funding and can proceed independently of the Article 7 mechanism.

Consequently, the release of money does not automatically establish that all the institutional problems identified in the original parliamentary proceedings have been resolved.

Likewise, the continuation of Article 7 does not necessarily prevent the Commission from recognising progress under separate funding arrangements.

Who can end the proceedings?

McGrath addressed the possibility of terminating the procedure during remarks before Tuesday’s meeting.

He explained that the Commission could provide its assessment but did not have unilateral authority to bring the Article 7 process to an end.

In his recorded statement in Luxembourg, the Commissioner pointed to the responsibilities of the European Parliament, which initiated the case, and the Council, which has conducted the subsequent examination.

The institutional arrangements mean that improved relations between the Commission and the Hungarian government cannot by themselves dispose of the proceedings.

The Council must consider the reforms and the remaining concerns within the framework established by the treaties.

Political agreement among member states will consequently be required to determine how the process develops.

A changed relationship with Brussels

The latest discussions take place against a substantially different political background from previous years.

Budapest has recently withdrawn objections to further steps in Ukraine’s EU accession negotiations following Ukrainian legislation addressing educational rights for Hungarian speakers and other national minorities.

The change has removed one obstacle to enlargement negotiations and reflects the government’s more cooperative approach towards other EU institutions.

Nevertheless, Hungary’s position on foreign policy and enlargement is distinct from the assessment of its domestic rule-of-law arrangements.

The Council’s examination remains focused on the institutional concerns that led to the procedure being initiated.

The Irish presidency’s summary of the October Council meeting confirms that ministers received an update rather than reaching a new formal determination.

The proceedings therefore remain open while the Commission and member states continue examining the measures introduced by Magyar’s administration.

The coming decisions will establish how European institutions respond when a new government undertakes reforms intended to reverse the conduct that originally led to action under Article 7.

For Hungary, the outcome will influence its relationship with Brussels well beyond the immediate debate over EU funding. For the Union, it will demonstrate how its rule-of-law procedures operate when political circumstances change and the member state concerned begins addressing previously identified institutional problems.

A few key principles: War as a Foundational State, Primacy of Jewish Identity over Democracy, Rejection of the Independent Existence of Arab States, The US is a declining power...

Maj. Jason Watson was arrested after he participated in a news conference calling for Trump to be removed from office over his launching of military actions against Iran, Cuba, and Venezuela without congressional authorization

Despite admitting mass immigration is damaging the country, the ruling classes fail to secure the border while clamping down on dissent. It's accelerating Britain towards crisis, say David Betz and Michael Rainsborough.

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Major drivers of the repression include pressure from wealthy pro-Israel donors, government interference, and the political loyalties of university administrators and trustees, according to a new report.

The geopolitical aspects of Bab-al-Mandab extends way beyond any narrow view, both historically and contemporarily. So, before the next “maritime security initiative” arrives, ask the 4 main questions the brochure never answers Ethiopia lost its sea, Yemen’s highlands never accepted a master, and this month a Zaydi movement took the strait’s Arabian shore. Every capital […]

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A thought experiment

Imagine that Giorgia Meloni, as Prime Minister, launches an app for newborns through which the government credits 1,000 euros to each child. She does so in an official capacity, via a government website and under a specific name: “Conto Giorgia.” Suppose the campaign promises parents that this capital will grow based on the historical performance of the FTSE MIB – the former MIB30 – provided they invest it on the stock market. Suppose the money comes largely from Italian taxpayers’ money and that the initiative has the blessing of a public statement signed by the nation’s capitalist elite: the Del Vecchio heirs, Marina Berlusconi, Giovanni Ferrero, Francesco Gaetano Caltagirone, and company. Such an initiative would raise an institutional issue even before a political one. Article 97 of the Constitution requires the public administration to act with due diligence and impartiality, and placing a personal brand on newborns’ savings is at odds with both.

In the United States, this is not just a hypothetical scenario. The Trump Accounts, accessible at trumpaccounts.gov, have been operational since July 4, 2026 – a date chosen to mark the 250th anniversary of the Declaration of Independence. They were established by the One Big Beautiful Bill Act, signed by Donald Trump in the summer of 2025: tax-advantaged savings accounts governed by Section 530A of the federal tax code. The Treasury makes an initial contribution of $1,000 for children born during the pilot program period, from 2025 to 2028, and anyone else can add money: parents, relatives, employers, states, and private individuals. By default, the funds are invested in a State Street index fund, the SPDR S&P 500 ETF; among the alternatives that can be selected at a later date, the Treasury has included funds from BlackRock and Vanguard.

The launch followed the ritual one might expect. From the Oval Office, Trump rang the opening bell for the NYSE and Nasdaq, flanked by Michael and Susan Dell, who pledged $6.25 billion: $250 each into the accounts of 25 million children under the age of ten living in areas where the median income does not exceed $150,000. The president joked that those present “aren’t doing this for that reason,” and invited everyone to buy a Dell computer. BlackRock, State Street, Visa, and Mastercard had already joined the summit organized by the Treasury, alongside Dell Technologies and the Dells; the underlying idea is attributed to financier Brad Gerstner. The $1,000 in public funds serves as the initial capital to open the account, while the private funds carry less weight than the scene surrounding them.

What’s the problem?

It’s important to distinguish between what is documented and what is interpretation. The name is documented: the sitting president lends his last name to a government product, hosted on a government domain. There are precedents for policies named after individuals, such as the Roth IRA, named after Senator William Roth, but in that case the person was a lawmaker and the name remained a colloquial label, whereas “Obamacare” began as a controversial acronym and was only later adopted. Here, the name is official. Citizens receive the benefit from a man, not from a law, and with three weeks to go before the November 3 midterm elections, the effect of this personalization is far from neutral.

The chain of interests is also well documented. BlackRock, State Street, and Vanguard manage the funds from which families will have to choose; Visa and Mastercard thrive on payment flows. That they derive a commercial advantage from this is an inference and should be treated as such. The fact remains that their brands appear alongside that of the government in the promotion, and that every dollar deposited into the accounts becomes assets under management. The Treasury, for its part, makes no secret of its ambition: Scott Bessent described the measure as the “greatest merger in history between Main Street and Wall Street,” within a framework – Parallel Prosperity – in which the two grow together.

Then there is the risk, which shifts from the government to families. One thousand dollars left for eighteen years at a nominal annual return of 7% – a theoretical scenario, not a forecast – grows to about $3,400. A useful sum, but one that does not constitute a safety net. The outcome will depend on market conditions in the year the child comes of age, and the family – not the one who made the promise – will bear the responsibility. A promise based on an index’s past performance sells confidence, yet past performance guarantees nothing.

The strongest objection must be taken seriously. The Treasury presents these accounts as a way to make the American Dream accessible to every citizen, and the idea of providing every child with a starting capital is defensible: stock ownership is concentrated among already affluent families, and an account opened at birth brings even those who would never have entered the market into it. This demonstrates that starting capital is a legitimate concept. It does not prove that it must bear the president’s name, nor that the sponsors can be the same as the fund managers, nor that stock capital can replace the guarantees that a welfare state should offer regardless of market conditions.

The Corpse

What remains is the political judgment, which is mine and not based on the facts. When the state links its authority to the name of a single man, entrusts promotion to those who manage savings, and promises newborns a future through the stock market, democracy recedes into the background and ceases to be the guiding principle. To speak of desecrating a corpse is a harsh turn of phrase, but it gets the point across: democratic rhetoric continues to circulate while its bulwarks – the impersonality of institutions and the separation between public and private interests – are being dismantled one by one. Those who exported it for decades through a series of interventions, it seems, left little of it at home.

On a friend’s recommendation, last night I watched Digger, a dystopian and grotesque film starring Goodman and Cruise. You leave the theater with the same impression: the satire, however over-the-top, never quite measures up to reality, and not even two excellent actors can push beyond a caricature that has since become everyday news.

Il Comitato militare della NATO al completo si è appena recato a Kiev. Sta analizzando la guerra in Ucraina come se fosse il proprio banco di prova.

Segue nostro Telegram.

Il 6 ottobre l’ammiraglio Giuseppe Cavo Dragone, presidente del Comitato Militare della NATO, è arrivato a Kiev con i rappresentanti militari di tutti e trentadue gli Alleati. Lo ha scritto lui stesso su X: la delegazione era lì per ribadire un «sostegno incondizionato» all’Ucraina. ANSA ha registrato la notizia come visita ufficiale. Un segnale strategico rivolto anche a Mosca.

I fatti, anzitutto. Il Comitato Militare assiste e consiglia il Consiglio Atlantico, il Comitato di pianificazione della difesa e il Gruppo di pianificazione nucleare; il suo compito è l’indirizzo di politica e strategia militare. È stato invitato dal nuovo comandante supremo delle forze armate ucraine, Mykhailo Drapatyi. Il Comitato tornava a Kiev al completo dopo otto anni e che gli incontri con Drapatyi e con lo Stato Maggiore ucraino servivano a ricevere la valutazione diretta del campo di battaglia, a discutere le priorità militari di Kiev e a portare nell’Alleanza le lezioni di oltre quattro anni di guerra ad alta intensità. Dragone parla di priorità militari e di insegnamenti utili alla prontezza operativa degli Alleati davanti alle minacce di oggi e di domani.

Ora l’interpretazione, che va tenuta distinta dai fatti. Un organo che consiglia il Gruppo di pianificazione nucleare non attraversa un paese in guerra per fare gesti di solidarietà. Va a raccogliere informazioni e a tararci sopra la propria preparazione. Il flusso descritto dalle fonti corre nei due sensi: dall’Ucraina all’Alleanza come esperienza operativa, dall’Alleanza all’Ucraina come indirizzo di priorità. Quando i vertici militari di trentadue Stati si siedono con lo Stato Maggiore di uno dei belligeranti per misurare la propria prontezza sulla guerra in corso, quella guerra ha smesso di essere un fatto esterno. È diventata il banco di prova dell’Alleanza.

La sequenza conferma la direzione. Il 3 giugno il Consiglio Nord Atlantico si era riunito a Kiev, e lì si era tenuto per la prima volta il Consiglio NATO-Ucraina. A ottobre tocca al livello militare. Prima la cornice politica, poi la struttura che la riempie di contenuto operativo, non è una cortesia di passaggio,  è una presenza istituzionale che si ispessisce a ogni tappa.

C’è poi la frase che sposta il discorso fuori dall’Ucraina. A chi ritiene che sabotaggi, attacchi informatici e violazioni dello spazio aereo possano incrinare il sostegno occidentale, Dragone risponde: «State fallendo». Attribuisce alla Russia la piena responsabilità di quei comportamenti e dice che l’unità alleata non è mai stata così salda. Il fronte ucraino e la pressione sotto soglia sul territorio degli Alleati finiscono nello stesso quadro, pronunciati dallo stesso uomo e dalla stessa sede. La distinzione su cui poggia la formula «Ucraina contro Russia», quella tra una guerra là e una tensione qui, viene cancellata dal presidente del Comitato Militare in persona.

Immagini, simboli e significati

Resta l’immagine. Nel video-messaggio registrato a Kiev l’ammiraglio parla con due bandiere alle spalle e lo sfondo, nella comunicazione istituzionale, non si improvvisa, dice chi parla e a nome di chi. Chi si presenta sotto quei simboli non è un mediatore né un osservatore. Le bandiere raccontano la stessa storia delle parole, parole che sono quelle di una scelta precisa e consapevole, ovvero la guerra-per-Kiev, la dedicazione totale ad una causa che con l’Europa non dovrebbe averci niente a che fare.

L’obiezione seria è un’altra, e va accolta. Nessuna delle tre fonti documenta truppe alleate in combattimento, e nessuno Stato membro ha dichiarato guerra alla Russia. La delegazione è venuta a consultarsi e a rendere omaggio al Muro della Memoria dedicato ai caduti ucraini. Il diritto dei conflitti armati distingue tra il sostegno a una parte e la partecipazione diretta alle ostilità, e su quel terreno la differenza esiste, ma la qualificazione giuridica non esaurisce l’analisi geopolitica. Gli Alleati non descrivono più il proprio ruolo come aiuto a un terzo: parlano di prontezza propria, di minacce proprie, di unità propria. Quando un’alleanza commisura la propria preparazione alla guerra di un altro e imputa allo stesso avversario i sabotaggi sul proprio suolo, il confronto ha due parti, e una non è l’Ucraina.

La valutazione, quindi. Sul piano politico-strategico il confronto tra NATO e Russia è diretto, e le fonti lo mostrano con sufficiente chiarezza. Sul piano cinetico le fonti non registrano un coinvolgimento alleato diretto, che viene però costantemente invocato e auspicato, quasi fosse il più grande desiderio della NATO. Il margine tra i due piani, però, si assottiglia a ogni visita di questo tipo. Gli indicatori da seguire sono due: l’eventuale insediamento stabile di strutture alleate sul territorio ucraino e il modo in cui verranno trattati i sabotaggi che l’Alleanza attribuisce a Mosca, mentre Zelensky ordina di bombardare altre raffinerie di petrolio russe e nuovi droni volano su Mosca, nonostante Donald Trump avesse detto di smetterla.

Tutto è fuori controllo, la NATO agisce indipendentemente dalla sfera americana perché ha sposato la causa ucraina come l’ultima guerra mondiale, quella in cui l’Alleanza o vincerà, o non vi sarà più niente da fare.

La formula «Ucraina contro Russia» serviva a contenere la guerra in una cornice rassicurante per le opinioni pubbliche europee. Con 32 rappresentanti militari nella capitale ucraina, e un ammiraglio italiano a guidarli, quella cornice regge sempre meno.

Sia ben chiaro che questa scelta non è casuale, non è una trappola politica e non è nemmeno un errore di valutazione, ma è una dichiarazione di guerra, l’ennesima, ibrida e stilisticamente pietosa dichiarazione contro la Russia. Ce lo stanno dicendo a viso scoperto, mentre siamo distratti a pensare ad altro.

Resta da vedere se i governi lo diranno ai propri elettori. E resta da vedere anche se i coraggiosi generali a quattro stelle si renderanno conto di una saggia verità che il generale prussiano Carl von Clausewitz scriveva nei suoi manuali: “L’errore non consiste nel fare un passo falso, ma nel non saperlo riconoscere e nel volerlo difendere a tutti i costi”.

Non vi è però ragione per rompere l’incantesimo di Kiev, che in questo momento ammalia l’Europa intera, perché come diceva Napoleone – per fare una seconda citazione – “Non bisogna mai interrompere il nemico mentre sta facendo un errore”.

King Felipe VI and Queen Letizia visited Ceuta on Tuesday, 13th October, in a demonstration of Spanish sovereignty over the North African territory following a migration crisis that brought tens of thousands of people across the Moroccan border and sharply increased diplomatic tensions between Madrid and Rabat.

The visit, the first by a Spanish monarch since 2007, took place less than three months after the mass crossings of 30th–31st July, when more than 70,000 people entered or attempted to enter Ceuta from Morocco. The scale of the movement overwhelmed local infrastructure and resulted in substantial loss of life.

Casualty figures differ between available accounts, with reports indicating more than 100 deaths. The royal couple paid their respects at the city’s Muslim cemetery, where many of those who died during the crisis are buried.

The King called for relations with Morocco to be conducted in good faith and with mutual respect, while reaffirming Ceuta’s position within Spain and the European Union.

Territorial dispute returns to the forefront

Ceuta and neighbouring Melilla occupy a politically unusual position. Both are Spanish autonomous cities on the northern African coast, forming part of the European Union despite their geographic location outside continental Europe.

Morocco disputes Spanish sovereignty over both territories, regarding them as territories that should come under Moroccan control. Madrid considers their status settled and maintains that neither city’s sovereignty is open to negotiation.

The July migration crisis has brought these longstanding differences back into the centre of Spanish domestic politics.

Spain has accused Moroccan border authorities of failing to prevent the mass crossings. Questions remain about whether the Moroccan authorities were overwhelmed by events, failed to act adequately or deliberately permitted the movement as a means of applying diplomatic pressure.

Evidence establishing an organised Moroccan operation has not been made public. Nevertheless, the crisis has demonstrated how profoundly Spanish border security depends on the actions of authorities on the other side of the frontier.

The Moroccan monarchy has subsequently indicated that existing migration cooperation with Spain is approaching its limits.

Migration creates pressure on Spanish politics

The consequences extend beyond the immediate border crisis. Ceuta’s population is approximately 80,000, making the number of arrivals during the two-day emergency comparable to the city’s total number of residents.

Temporary shelters were established to accommodate migrants who remained in the territory, including unaccompanied minors. Authorities subsequently undertook operations to clear informal settlements and transfer residents to reception facilities.

Spanish authorities also face questions concerning their handling of the emergency. Allegations of mistreatment involving security personnel are under investigation, while local organisations have criticised hostility towards migrants and difficulties in delivering humanitarian assistance.

Ceuta’s mixed religious and cultural population has made the political atmosphere particularly sensitive. Muslim residents form a substantial proportion of the city, and local community representatives have warned against treating entire neighbourhoods as responsible for the disorder.

Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez’s government has presented the royal visit as a demonstration of national support for Ceuta. Opposition parties have accused the government of failing to defend Spanish interests adequately during the crisis.

The dispute is also unfolding ahead of Spain’s general election scheduled for 29th November, placing migration, sovereignty and relations with Morocco among the central questions facing voters.

A European border controlled through cooperation

For Brussels, the immediate question concerns the effectiveness of Europe’s migration arrangements with neighbouring countries.

The EU relies on cooperation with Morocco to prevent irregular crossings, disrupt migrant-smuggling networks and manage movements towards European territory.

Spain has traditionally supported a close relationship between Brussels and Rabat, recognising Morocco’s importance to migration management, trade and regional security.

Yet the events in Ceuta have demonstrated the vulnerability of arrangements that depend heavily on the continued cooperation of governments outside the Union.

Unlike migration routes crossing the Mediterranean, the Ceuta frontier provides direct land access to EU territory. A sudden deterioration in bilateral cooperation can therefore produce an immediate crisis without requiring migrants to undertake a sea crossing.

Wider consequences for European diplomacy

The dispute also intersects with economic competition around the Strait of Gibraltar.

Morocco has invested heavily in ports and logistics infrastructure, including Tanger Med, while Ceuta and Melilla remain economically dependent on commercial relationships with their surrounding regions.

Spain must manage competing interests: maintaining territorial sovereignty, protecting the security of its borders and preserving cooperation with a country that remains an important economic and diplomatic partner.

The European Commission has an interest in avoiding a confrontation that could undermine wider migration arrangements between the Union and North African states.

At the same time, Brussels cannot treat questions concerning the status and security of territory belonging to an EU member state as exclusively bilateral matters.

The royal couple are scheduled to visit Melilla on Wednesday, extending the political significance of the journey beyond Ceuta.

The immediate migration emergency has subsided, but the underlying disagreement remains unresolved. Spain continues to insist on its territorial sovereignty, while Morocco retains its claims and considerable influence over the practical management of the frontier.

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The European Union is entering an unusually concentrated electoral period, with major national contests in Spain, France, Italy and Poland expected to alter the political composition of the European Council over the coming year.

The elections coincide with negotiations over the EU’s 2028–2034 financial framework, increasing the uncertainty surrounding agreements on common borrowing, defence expenditure, agricultural funding and the Union’s future institutional priorities.

Spain is scheduled to hold a general election on 29th November following Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez’s decision to seek an early mandate. France faces a presidential election in 2027, while major electoral contests in Italy and Poland will also determine the political direction of governments central to European decision-making.

Although national elections do not directly change the composition of the European Parliament, they determine who represents member states in the European Council and influence the balance of negotiations within the Council of the EU.

Spain prepares for an early election

Spain’s election will provide the first major indication of how the electoral cycle may develop.

Sánchez’s Socialist government faces substantial pressure over domestic economic and political disputes, including housing policy, while migration has returned to the forefront of political debate following the crisis in Ceuta.

The opposition People’s Party is seeking to replace the Socialists, with the possible parliamentary role of Vox remaining an important consideration.

The outcome could alter Spain’s position on EU migration arrangements, fiscal policy and aspects of European integration.

Spain is one of the Union’s largest member states and has traditionally supported closer integration in a range of policy areas. A change of government would not necessarily reverse that position, but it could change the priorities Madrid brings to negotiations in Brussels.

Domestic political pressures may also affect the government’s willingness to accept compromises on the EU’s next budget.

France faces a more consequential political transition

France’s presidential election in 2027 carries particularly substantial implications because Emmanuel Macron cannot seek another consecutive term.

The contest will determine the leadership of a founding EU member state that remains central to European defence policy, eurozone economic governance and relations with Germany.

Raphaël Glucksmann has emerged as a prominent candidate from the moderate left following his victory in the social-democratic primary, while the political centre and conservative right are preparing competing candidacies.

The National Rally remains an important electoral force, although questions concerning Marine Le Pen’s legal position complicate predictions about its eventual presidential candidate.

The French election will take place against a difficult fiscal background.

France faces continuing pressure over its public finances, with European officials urging Paris to adopt a credible 2027 budget and provide greater reassurance to financial markets.

Any incoming president will therefore inherit constraints extending beyond domestic spending choices.

France’s position in European negotiations may be influenced by the relationship between presidential authority, parliamentary support and the country’s fiscal commitments.

Italy and Poland add further uncertainty

The contests in Italy and Poland will introduce additional questions concerning relations between national governments and EU institutions.

Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni has combined a firm position on migration with support for Ukraine and participation in European defence initiatives.

Her government’s record demonstrates that parties associated with the nationalist right do not necessarily adopt identical positions on foreign policy, economic governance or defence.

Poland’s political competition similarly includes substantial disagreements over EU institutional authority and domestic reforms, while support for national security and resistance to Russian aggression extend across much of the political spectrum.

Changes in either country’s government could alter negotiating coalitions within the Council.

However, the consequences cannot be reliably inferred from broad political labels alone. Individual governments differ in their positions on agricultural support, industrial policy, common financing and enlargement.

The budget creates an immediate test

The first substantial European policy test is already under way.

Ireland’s presidency of the Council has proposed a revised seven-year EU budget of approximately €1.62 trillion, reducing the Commission’s original proposal by about eight per cent.

The negotiating framework requires agreement among all 27 member states, giving national governments considerable influence over the final settlement.

European leaders are attempting to secure an agreement before the end of 2026, partly to avoid carrying unresolved financial negotiations into a year dominated by elections.

A delayed settlement would risk leaving politically sensitive decisions to new governments that might wish to revise previous commitments.

Implications for Ukraine and EU policy

Support for Ukraine will remain a major issue, particularly as European governments consider future financing, military assistance and the consequences of any diplomatic negotiations involving Russia.

Differences between parties over the extent and financing of European assistance could become more significant if new governments form alternative coalitions within the Council.

Migration policy, the relationship with the United States and EU enlargement will also remain areas of potential disagreement.

Yet the institutional structure of the Union limits the ability of any single election to produce an immediate reversal of policy.

Legislation requires agreement through established procedures, while many foreign-policy decisions continue to depend on consensus or unanimity.

The electoral cycle may consequently produce a gradual realignment of European negotiating positions rather than a sudden institutional transformation.

For Brussels, the immediate priority is securing agreements on the financial framework and legislative programme before domestic campaigns begin to restrict the room available for compromise.

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