School choice in Ohio has taken a big hit. On Thursday, a panel of the state's 10th District Court of Appeals unanimously ruled the state's Educational Choice Scholarship, or EdChoice, program unconstitutional.

Vouchers Hurt Ohio (VHO), a coalition of public school districts, banded together in 2022 to sue the state over the EdChoice program, which uses public funds to finance scholarships for K-12 students to attend private schools. Under EdChoice's "Traditional Plan," which has been around since 2005, students can receive annual scholarships as high as $6,166 for elementary and middle school and $8,408 for high school. The scholarship's "Expansion Program," which state lawmakers created in 2013, awards maximum scholarship amounts identical to the Traditional Plan, "but scale based on a family's income," according to EdChoice, an educational freedom nonprofit. The organization says the scholarship program supports more than 100,000 Ohio families.   

The VHO argues that the EdChoice scholarship program drains funding from the public school system, depriving Ohio students of much-needed resources. Its website states "private school vouchers create a system of state-funded discrimination" and that school choice is a "myth." Interestingly, the Court of Appeals of Ohio's 10th Appellate District largely concurred.

The court's ruling came down to Article VI, Section 2 of the Ohio Constitution, which says that the state must secure a "thorough and efficient system of common schools."

The panel held that the EdChoice voucher program violates this mandate by funding a "competing system of uncommon schools." Writing for the court, Judge David Leland took the argument further, contending that EdChoice schools "actually end up depriving families of choice." He cited private schools' selective admissions process and urban concentration, calling the defendants' appeals to choice "a fundamental misnomer," because the choice to admit students rests with the schools, not the families.

Keith Neely, an attorney at the Institute for Justice who represents families using EdChoice in the case, argues that the program funds families rather than a competing school system.

He also challenges the court's rationale that the state's obligation to fund public schools implicitly prohibits them from funding other forms of education. "I think that's just fundamentally wrong as a matter of constitutional interpretation and also just as a matter of public understanding," he tells Reason.

The court "seemed to take the view that any dollar spent on other educational programs like scholarships is a dollar that could be spent on public schools instead, but that's not how budgeting works," he says. 

Neely says that public education funding is separate from the scholarship program and that every funding decision has tradeoffs. If the court finds that EdChoice's school voucher program violates the state's obligation to fund public schools, what stops it from reaching the same conclusion for other programs, like the Jon Peterson Special Needs Scholarship or the Cleveland Scholarship program, which provides private school tuition scholarships for K-12 students living in the Cleveland Municipal School District?

Neely also points to Simmons-Harris v. Goff (1999), where the Ohio Supreme Court partially reversed a lower court's ruling and found that school choice was constitutional under the same public-education clause. The court invalidated the Cleveland scholarship program in question, finding that it was "improperly enacted by the legislature," according to the Institute for Justice. However, the Ohio Legislature later reenacted the program.

The families using the EdChoice scholarship program—as well as the state's attorney general—plan to appeal to the Ohio Supreme Court, and Neely is optimistic that history will repeat itself in this case. He tells Reason, "When you look at what the Constitution says, and you look at what the court said in Simmons-Harris, I think the only conclusion that the Ohio Supreme Court can walk away with is that programs like the Educational Choice Scholarship program are constitutional." Families will be able to keep their scholarships while the litigation is pending.

This case is just one battle in a nationwide war on school choice. A recent report from Reason Foundation, the nonprofit that publishes Reason, found that 80 percent of public-school students live in states with "weak or ineffective open enrollment laws." These laws "allo[w]  students to transfer to public schools other than their residentially assigned one, provided space is available," writes Jude Schwalbach, senior policy analyst at Reason Foundation. Several states are also holding out against the Education Freedom Tax Credit, a new federal tax credit that offers a dollar-for-dollar tax refund for donating to K-12 scholarship programs. 

The court's decision reflects the broader rationale fueling that opposition: that education dollars going to anything other than public schools are taken from ordinary students. For decades, policymakers have invested in that premise, yet student outcomes have little to show for it. The real myth isn't school choice; it's that giving families more options means betraying students' education.

The post Ohio Court Strikes Down a Scholarship Program That Supports More Than 100,000 Families appeared first on Reason Magazine.

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President Donald Trump on Thursday called off plans to livestream the December 3 military execution of Nidal Hasan after the announcement generated widespread disgust.

Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth announced last week that the U.S. government would livestream the firing-squad execution of Hasan, a former Army major who shot and killed 13 people at the Fort Hood Army base in 2009. A court-martial jury sentenced Hasan to death in 2013.

It would have been the first public execution in the United States since a hanging in Missouri in 1937, though the last well-known public execution occurred a year earlier in Kentucky. Rainey Bethea, a black man, was hanged before a crowd of roughly 20,000 people in Owensboro. Kentucky became the last state to outlaw public executions two years later.

The plan to livestream Hasan's execution drew comparisons to the Taliban. The U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops called it "a barbaric promotion of a culture of death." Writing at The Lamp, an orthodox Catholic journal, Matthew Walther noted that it would be the "first ever government-sanctioned snuff film in American history."

However, Trump and Hegseth didn't trip over just liberal and religious pieties, but a deep-rooted American aversion to bloody displays of state power that goes back to the colonial era.

Lynn Novick, the director of Ken Burns' upcoming PBS documentary series Crime and Punishment in America, tells Reason that public executions "haven't been a regular part of American life since the Colonial time in the early years of the Republic, and there's really good reasons for that."

One of American colonists' many complaints about oppressive British rule was England's expansive criminal code, known derisively as the "bloody code" because it contained more than 200 capital crimes.

"In Colonial America, [an execution] was an everyday occurrence," Novick says. "There were executions all the time, and one of our scholars told us that most people would have seen someone executed in their lifetime."

Excessive capital punishment also ran contrary to emerging theories by leading Enlightenment thinkers that punishment should be proportional to the crime and not driven by revenge or bloodlust.

Perhaps more importantly, public executions were disorderly affairs that, rather than reinforce the power of the state, inflamed the passions of the mob to a dangerous degree. "In many cases, crowds would become very boisterous, riotous, angry, excited," Novick says. "There were sometimes violent outbursts at these events."

As a result, many of the Founding Fathers saw frequent public executions as disruptive to the fragile social order. The early American republic's move away from sanguinary spectacle was driven by a desire to create a stable, virtuous citizenry and sever itself from the European continent's tradition of public torture and execution.

As Reason described in a recent cover story, the result of this was the invention of the American penitentiary in the early 1800s, which was sold as a humane and rehabilitative replacement for the whipping post and gallows.

States transitioned from public to private hangings behind their newly built prison walls in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, before switching to the use of the electric chair. This was not done out of entirely humanitarian concerns, especially in the South, where public executions often became quasi-religious ceremonies, with the condemned declaring their ultimate victory over death (and the state) through Jesus Christ.

"Executions had contested meanings," Michael Ayers Trotti wrote in The End of Public Execution. "They were moments of justice, of state power; but they were also moments of religion, exceptional moments that transcended normal life."

The main reason that public executions disappeared over the long term, though, is obvious to anyone who's not a sociopath: It's weird and dehumanizing to gather in a crowd to watch someone else be killed, to participate in the government's promotion of its power to take a human life.

Rachel Abbott, who witnessed Bethea's 1936 hanging when she was 5 years old, told WKU Public Radio in 2016 that she had nightmares about it years later.

"I remember it well, but I didn't want to," she said. "I tried to get away from it because it was hurting me so bad. I started having me nightmares after I was older. It's like his spirit was just hanging all around me. The first thing you'd know I'd start crying because I felt he wanted me to help him get buried, get sent back to his gravesite by his father. I still have tears running when I think of it."

The post America Abandoned Public Executions for a Good Reason appeared first on Reason Magazine.

Civil war has returned to Yemen.

The ceasefire of 2022 is over and open warfare has returned to the country. The Iran-backed Houthis have ceased large areas of the western coast and are encircling the city of Taiz. The Saudi-backed government has now launched its counteroffensive, but can they defeat the Houthis?

This week on The New Arab Voice podcast, we explore the recent clashes between the Houthis in Yemen and Saudi Arabia and what impact the war will have on the country. Can either side win on the battlefield? What effect are the Houthi strikes on Saudi Arabia having? And will the two sides be willing to negoiate?

Joining us to explain what the Houthi are doing and why, we speak with Maysaa Shujaa al-Deen (@maysaashujaa), senior researcher at the Sanaa Centre (@SanaaCenter). 

And to tell us the story of Saudi thinking and calculations we speak with Allison Minor (@AllisonMinor_) senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (@CSISMidEast) and the former U.S. Deputy Special Envoy for Yemen. 

This podcast is written and produced by Hugo Goodridge (@hugogoodridge).

Theme music by Omar al-Fil with additional music from Audio Network.

To get in touch with the producers, follow then tweet us at @TNAPodcasts or email podcast@newarab.com

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By Ted SNIDER

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Events of the last few days will have limited economic impact but bring political benefits for Russia.

While Ukraine’s negotiating team was meeting with the U.S. envoys Jared Kushner and Steve Witkoff last Friday, they were blindsided by President Donald Trump’s announcement that he had made a deal with Russia’s President Vladimir Putin.

Trump announced that Moscow had agreed to lift its export ban on diesel fuel and immediately supply 300,000 tons to the American and global market, followed by another 500,000 in November, then a further 1,000,000, and, eventually, another 3,000,000. To facilitate these imports, the U.S. would provide a sanctions waiver, and the U.S. Treasury would issue a temporary general license for Russia to sell diesel on the global market through April 7, 2027.

Kiev reacted with fury. The Ukrainian negotiators left Miami, flying home without attending the planned second day of talks. A senior Ukrainian official said that the deal “completely” ruined trust between Kiev and Washington. Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelensky complained, “It is certainly not how partners should treat each other.” Hours later, Ukraine struck a Russian oil refinery, as senior officials in Kiev had threatened it would do.

Trump and his supporters say the deal will lower diesel prices for the U.S. and the world. Ukraine, Europe, and Trump’s detractors say the deal will send more money into Moscow’s war machine. The deal will have less of an impact on either front than both sides claim—but that doesn’t mean it won’t prove significant.

Though it provides the appearance of a quick fix and may have briefly reduced oil prices, such effects could only be brief and trivial. Russia is now set to export 1.8 million tons of diesel fuel over the next few months and, eventually, another 3 million. But the world uses 3.5 million to 4 million tons a day, and the U.S. alone burns through half a million.

The deal won’t do much to boost the Russian economy, either, which is still functioning despite massive Western sanctions. Russia’s diesel production has apparently been running at a surplus for a while, and its own ban on exporting diesel would probably have been lifted shortly anyway. Exports to Central Asia were up dramatically last month. Though Europe may still refuse to purchase Russian diesel under the U.S. waiver, world demand is acute, and Russia would easily have found a market for its diesel amid a general supply crunch caused by the Iran War.

But the deal is symbolically and politically significant. It comes amid plummeting popular support in Ukraine for Zelensky. Trust in the Ukrainian leader and desire for him to stay on as president after the war are sinking. Polls show that he would likely lose the next election. The deal only worsens Zelensky’s political challenges, forcing him to either abide by Trump’s wishes for Ukraine to cease strikes on Russian oil refineries or risk further inflaming tensions with Washington. So far, Zelensky is choosing the latter.

When Ukraine struck another refinery after the announcement of the deal, Trump reacted with fury. “Do whatever you want, but don’t hit the diesel fuel,” Trump says he told Zelensky. “So, what does he do? He goes and hits refineries…. He’d better damn well stop.”

This rupture is the worst crisis in Zelensky’s relationship with Trump since their public confrontation in the Oval Office in February of last year. This summer, Trump seemed to be swinging in Zelensky’s favor—but not anymore. Zelensky said Trump’s deal was “not fair and not honest.” He accused Trump of using talks with Ukraine “as a smokescreen” while the U.S. cut “backroom deals” with Russia, and he said the episode demonstrated Trump’s weakness to the world.

Trump shot back. “I think it’s time for Ukraine to get a new president,” he said. “I suggest they get a new leader who can make a deal because he could have made many deals, but for some reason, he never does.”

As the rift widened, Witkoff and Kushner warned the Ukrainian team that crucial intelligence-sharing could be cut off if Kiev doesn’t fall in line with Washington’s demands. On Monday night, when Kiev was struck by Russian ballistic missiles without warning, it was unclear if the U.S. had followed through on the threat. “Regarding this strike,” Zelensky said, “unfortunately, there was no warning from our partners.” But Ukraine’s Foreign Minister Sybiha said Ukraine is still receiving U.S. intelligence and that the failure was not due to policy but to the difficulty of tracking “specific type of weapons used by the Russian side.” Trump has since said intelligence sharing has not stopped. But on Tuesday night, Kiev was once again bombarded by ballistic missiles, and Zelensky again said his government had received “‌no advance warning from our partners.”

Adding to the danger for Ukraine, Elon Musk, whose Starlink satellites are crucial for the Ukrainian armed forces’ battlefield communications, tracking of Russian troops, and selections of targets, backed Trump’s call for Zelensky to be replaced, posting that “Zelensky has gone too far.” On Wednesday, Ukrainian officials said that SpaceX, Musk’s company, “had introduced a limit ‌on some Starlink services within the country, disrupting combat drone missions for which the technology is crucial.”

The significance for Moscow is that it has managed to make an economic deal with Washington that required no Russian concessions in peace negotiations with Ukraine. It is this unshackling of U.S.–Russia diplomacy from the war, not any financial windfall for American’s or Putin’s war machine, that is the true victory for Russia.

The events of the past few days, centering around the Trump–Putin diesel deal, will not have the economic effects the media is focusing on, but they have already brought significant political consequences for both Russia and Ukraine.

Original article:  www.theamericanconservative.com

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By Marco CARNELOS

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Record debt, a paralysed trade-dispute architecture and the normalisation of sovereign-asset seizure as a policy tool means fragility is baked into the global economic system

Since 2022,  a steady drumbeat of forecasts has warned that cascading military and political upheavals – war in Ukraine, conflict in the Middle East, an accelerating tariff war, the weaponisation of sanctions and the disruption of energy supplies – would eventually overwhelm the world economy’s capacity to absorb shocks.

The most destructive of those scenarios have not materialised, or at least not yet.

As the IMF’s managing director Kristalina Georgieva stated last year, while previewing the fund’s World Economic Outlook, the global economy “has generally withstood significant strains from various shocks”.

Although that resilience is real, on closer inspection, it is a more fragile and more contested achievement than it first appears.

The adaptive mechanisms behind this resilience are visible and measurable. Trade has rerouted rather than collapsed. Energy corridors have diversified. And reserve managers have spent the past three years quietly re-engineering the architecture of the international monetary system.

According to the World Gold Council’s 2026 Central Bank Gold Reserves survey – which drew responses from 76 institutions, its highest participation in nine years – 89 percent of central banks expect global gold holdings to keep rising over the next year, with a record share planning to add to their own reserves.

The result: gold has overtaken US Treasuries as the largest single component of global central bank reserves for the first time since the mid-1990s.

Mother of all ticking bombs

Analysts tracking the shift link it directly to a single event: reserve managers were unsettled by the seizure of the Central Bank of Russia’s reserves at the start of the Ukraine war by Washington and have since been actively reducing the dollar share of their portfolios.

This is a clear example that the economic system is not breaking under political pressure, it is adapting to it – flexibly, and crucially, without severing the interconnections that make global trade and finance function at all.

In other words, central banks accumulating gold are not exiting the system; they are just hedging within it.

But adaptability has a cost, and that cost is compounding.

Global debt – government, household, corporate and financial combined – surpassed $365 trillion in the first half of 2026, according to the Institute of International Finance’s Global Debt Monitor, the sixth consecutive quarterly record.

Emerging-market debt alone rose by $6.5 trillion in the same period, breaking past $110 trillion. Georgieva has been blunt about the trajectory: speaking at the IMF and World Bank annual meetings, she warned that global public debt is projected to reach 110 percent of the world’s GDP by 2029.

There is an evident reluctance to address what is not a crisis in any single country’s balance sheet, but a structural drift that every major economy appears aware of and none is prepared to correct unilaterally.

Debt of this scale narrows the fiscal space available to absorb the next shock, military or otherwise, which is precisely what makes today’s resilience difficult to extrapolate into tomorrow’s.

In this context, there is also the mother of all ticking bombs, a nuclear one: the $40 trillion US federal debt which US Secretary of Treasury Scott Bessent is desperately trying to reign in.

The third strand, the onslaught of punitive political measures targeting market principles, is best illustrated by the fate of Russia’s frozen central bank reserves. Roughly $300bn in Russian sovereign assets have been immobilised globally since 2022, with some €210bn ($235bn) held within the European Union.

Erosion of neutrality

Rather than remaining in legal limbo, these reserves have become the financial engine of a specific policy outcome: the EU’s proposed €140bn ($157bn) “reparations loan” to Ukraine, structured so that Ukraine would repay it only once Russia itself pays war damages – effectively converting a sanctions freeze into a grant.

Russia’s central bank has responded by suing the Brussels-based depository Euroclear, which holds the bulk of the assets, calling the manoeuvre illegal.

Whatever one’s view of the underlying conflict, the precedent is the point economists increasingly raise: the first large-scale use of frozen sovereign reserves as collateral for a geopolitical objective changes the calculus for every reserve-holding state watching from outside the western bloc.

It is one more data pointing to the reinforcing of the gold-accumulation trend described above – and a vivid example of how political tools aimed at a single adversary can erode the perceived neutrality of the system itself.

A parallel erosion is under way in trade governance. The WTO’s Appellate Body (the one supposed to settle trade dispute among countries) has been non-functional since December 2019, after the United States blocked the appointment of new judges and talks on reviving or replacing it remain stuck.

More than 30 appeals currently sit unresolved, and the workaround mechanism created to fill the gap – the Multi-Party Interim Appeal Arbitration Arrangement – has resolved only a single case. The institution designed to prevent trade disputes from becoming purely a function of relative power has been quietly sidelined for seven years.

It is then worth wondering – in such a situation – if the Global West and Global Rest see the same picture here.

The evidence suggests convergence on diagnosis but real divergence on meaning. Both recognise that debt is unsustainable and that institutions are strained. But where western policymakers tend to treat sanctions, frozen assets and trade paralysis as defensive responses to external aggression.

Voices from the Global Rest increasingly read the same tools as confirmation that the system was never as neutral as advertised.

India’s External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar captured this gap memorably in 2022, telling European interlocutors that Europe needed to “grow out of the mindset” that its problems are everyone’s problems while the reverse does not hold.

Selective status

This is something many Global Rest governments had been thinking but not saying aloud: that the postwar order’s claim to universality was always, in practice, more selective than it appeared.

The more honest and outspoken western leader to recognise such an unfair situation, to use an understatement, was Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney earlier this year in Davos.

None of this means the system is about to fracture. The world economy has proven more elastic than feared, absorbing shocks that a decade ago might have triggered genuine crisis. But elasticity and durability are not the same thing.

The real test of this sort of “economy of resistance” is not whether it survives the next military-political storm – it plainly has, repeatedly.

It is whether record debt, a paralysed trade-dispute architecture, and the normalisation of sovereign-asset seizures as a policy tool are quietly converting what is in effect a short-term adaptability into long-term fragility, especially at a moment when the Global Rest and Global West can no longer agree on what the system is actually for.

Original article:  www.middleeasteye.net

Sacrifica ciò che è scomodo, mai il progetto. Il “pal-washing” in azione.

Segue nostro Telegram.

Un copione già noto

Il 9 ottobre 2026 il Comitato norvegese per il Nobel ha assegnato il Premio per la pace a Navanethem Pillay, giurista sudafricana di 85 anni, già giudice della Corte penale internazionale e Alta commissaria Onu per i diritti umani. La motivazione parla di una persona che ha aperto la strada a un ordine giuridico globale più completo. Il presidente del Comitato, Jorgen Watne Frydnes, ha aggiunto che il premio è un messaggio per chi attacca e mina il sistema internazionale e le sue istituzioni. Il verdetto è dichiaratamente politico, ed è su questo piano che va discusso.

La stessa figura che nel 2011 avrebbe «abbattuto» Gheddafi, spianando la strada al saccheggio del petrolio libico e alla schiavitù dei migranti africani, ora «abbatterebbe» Netanyahu, e preparerebbe così la riabilitazione di Israele. Il filo logico non sarebbe la morale né la pace, ma l’agenda dell’Open Society di George Soros: sacrificare i soggetti diventati scomodi, mai l’essenza del progetto. Qualcuno l’ha battezzata «pal-washing». La domanda di fondo è seria, perché chiede se dietro premi e giurisdizioni dell’ordine liberale ci sia una regolarità.

Occorre sottolineare che il copione è già noto. Vi ricordate quando Barack Obama ricevette il premio Nobel per la pace, inaugurando guerre su guerre? O vi ricordare i personaggi in cerca d’autore come Machado, Mohammadi, o i difensori dei criminali Ucraini? Ma andiamo per ordine.

 

Atto Primo: la Libia

Nel febbraio 2011 Pillay, Alta commissaria, chiese al Consiglio per i diritti umani un’azione vigorosa per fermare le violenze e chiamare i responsabili a risponderne; il Consiglio condannò le violazioni e istituì una commissione d’inchiesta. Il passaggio successivo toccò al Consiglio di sicurezza: il rinvio alla CPI con la risoluzione 1970, poi la 1973, approvata con dieci voti favorevoli e cinque astensioni (Brasile, Cina, Germania, India, Russia). Nessuno sostiene che Pillay abbia deciso la guerra. Conta la sequenza: il linguaggio dei diritti umani aprì la porta, quello della protezione dei civili autorizzò la forza, e l’operazione scivolò verso il cambio di regime. Già in aprile Lavrov accusava la NATO di eccedere il mandato, e un ministro francese ammetteva che il cambio di regime avrebbe richiesto un nuovo voto.

Poi i costi. Nel 2017 l’OIM documentò aste di migranti subsahariani nel sud della Libia, venduti per somme tra 200 e 500 dollari. Il nesso con il crollo dello Stato dopo il 2011 è la lettura più plausibile, benché la fonte documenti il fenomeno e non la sua causa. Il prezzo lo pagarono la Libia e i migranti; la cornice giuridica ne uscì, sul piano formale, intatta, anche se la controversia sul mandato avrebbe poi pesato sui veti di Mosca e Pechino in altri dossier.

Atto Secondo: Bibi

Il 21 novembre 2024 la Camera preliminare I della CPI emise mandati d’arresto per Netanyahu e per l’ex ministro della Difesa Gallant, per crimini di guerra e crimini contro l’umanità. Pillay aveva lasciato la Corte nel 2008, ma ha presieduto la Commissione d’inchiesta Onu che il 16 settembre 2025 ha concluso che Israele ha commesso genocidio a Gaza. Qui il «pal-washing» trova il suo meccanismo. Il diritto penale internazionale lavora su persone: un imputato, un’imputazione, un periodo. Se il caso si chiude con la sorte di un leader, si apre una cesura narrativa, il prima e il dopo di un uomo, dopo la quale lo Stato può presentarsi come reintegrato. La Libia offre l’analogia: là il caso si chiuse con la caduta di un uomo.

I limiti del percorso giocano a favore della lettura. La Corte non ha una polizia e l’esecuzione dei mandati dipende dagli Stati parte; la Commissione non è un tribunale e non parla a nome dell’intera Onu; lo stesso Comitato, riferisce AFP, ha detto che spetta a una corte stabilire se vi sia genocidio. Il premio non produce effetti giuridici, lo sappiamo, però produce legittimazione per un circuito che promette giustizia e non può garantirla.

Dobbiamo, poi, considerare che dinamiche del genere le abbiamo già viste più volte all’interno dell’ordine globalista che domina in Occidente. L’Open Society Foundations si presenta come il maggiore finanziatore privato al mondo di gruppi per giustizia, democrazia e diritti umani, attivo in oltre cento paesi, e Pillay ha ricevuto lo Stockholm Human Rights Award, lo stesso che nel 2011 è andato a Soros e a Neier. Sembra proprio che si ripeta di nuovo il pattern della agenda sorosiana, fatta di fondazioni, ONG, tribunali, commissioni e burocrazie che condividono un lessico e un orizzonte, quello di un ordine liberale da perfezionare e mai da rimettere in discussione. Chi opera dentro quel lessico può denunciare un governo, un leader, perfino uno Stato, ma non può contestare i presupposti dell’ordine che gli dà legittimità.

Alcuni obietteranno che la Commissione di Pillay attribuisce la responsabilità a Israele come Stato, non soltanto ai suoi leader, il che contraddice l’idea di un’operazione puramente personalizzante. Il secondo è la reazione. Netanyahu ha accusato il Comitato di aver perso la bussola morale, il Ministero degli Esteri israeliano ha parlato di una grottesca strumentalizzazione del premio, e Washington ha annunciato sanzioni contro la CPI poche ore dopo l’annuncio. Tutto vero. Ma avrebbe senso e valore se il sistema occidentale non fosse marcio fin dalle sue fondamenta, se il suo sistema giuridico funzionasse, ma così non è, sotto nessun aspetto (e abbiamo avuto già sufficienti dimostrazioni – non scordiamoci anche il caso Epstein).

Se nei prossimi dodici mesi la caduta politica di Netanyahu verrà presentata come chiusura del caso, anziché come una tappa di un procedimento che riguarda lo Stato, il «pal-washing» guadagnerà peso. Se i procedimenti proseguiranno oltre la sua persona, e se gli Stati parte eseguiranno i mandati, forse ne perderà. Allo stato delle prove la tesi è plausibile e, fino a smentita comprovata, questo è l’ennesimo Nobel della non-Pace, che non possiamo chiamare “guerra”.

Uma portaria publicada esta sexta-feira, 16 de outubro, clarifica as competências das entidades regionais de turismo e das secretarias regionais de turismo na seleção de eventos, contratualização e pagamento dos apoios financeiros. O regulamento estabelece um limite de 500 mil euros por entidade gestora dos planos regionais de eventos e determina novos procedimentos de acompanhamento e prestação de contas.

Nearly 93 million EU residents were at risk of poverty or social exclusion in 2025, with the latest regional figures revealing sharp differences both between and within member states. The findings raise questions about how effectively European investment is addressing longstanding economic inequality.

More than one in five people living in the European Union remained at risk of poverty or social exclusion in 2025, according to Eurostat figures that reveal substantial differences in living conditions across the bloc’s regions.

Approximately 92.7 million people, representing 20.9 per cent of the EU population, fell into the category during the year. Although the total declined slightly from 93.3 million in 2024, regional data show that economic vulnerability remains heavily concentrated in particular areas.

In 26 of the 243 EU regions for which figures were available, at least 31 per cent of residents were at risk of poverty or social exclusion. At the opposite end of the distribution, 24 regions recorded rates below 13 per cent.

The regional figures published by Eurostat show that the highest rate was recorded in French Guiana, at 54.8 per cent, while Slovakia’s capital region, Bratislavský kraj, recorded the lowest at 2.9 per cent.

National averages conceal substantial differences

The contrast is not confined to richer and poorer member states. In several countries, internal regional disparities are more pronounced than comparisons of national economic performance might suggest.

Within Slovakia, the proportion of people at risk of poverty or social exclusion in Východné Slovensko was 9.1 times the rate recorded in the Bratislava region.

In Italy, the equivalent rate in Calabria was 8.1 times that of Valle d’Aosta, illustrating the persistent economic divide between parts of the country’s north and south.

These differences are recorded in Eurostat’s regional living-conditions statistics, which provide a more detailed picture than EU-wide or national averages.

The comparison requires care. Eurostat’s measure of poverty or social exclusion combines three indicators: relative income poverty, severe material and social deprivation, and very low household work intensity.

Consequently, the figures do not mean that every person included lacks sufficient income to meet basic needs. They identify people experiencing at least one of the defined forms of economic disadvantage.

Differences in income, employment, household composition and living costs can also influence the results, making direct comparisons between metropolitan areas, rural districts and overseas territories more complicated than a single percentage might imply.

Nevertheless, the scale of regional variation illustrates why national economic growth does not automatically produce equivalent improvements in living standards throughout a country.

Poverty reduction remains an EU commitment

The European Union has set a target of reducing the number of people at risk of poverty or social exclusion by at least 15 million by 2030, including at least five million children.

The limited annual reduction recorded in 2025 indicates that progress remains modest relative to the scale of that objective.

The problem has become increasingly important for European policymakers as housing costs, energy prices and employment insecurity affect household finances in different ways across member states.

In May, the Commission presented an anti-poverty and housing policy package, bringing together measures concerning social inclusion, housing exclusion and child poverty.

The regional figures indicate that such initiatives will need to account for considerable differences in local economic conditions.

Policies designed for prosperous urban economies may have limited relevance in regions characterised by low employment, weak infrastructure or dependence on a small number of industries. Conversely, economic activity and relatively high average incomes do not necessarily prevent serious poverty problems within major cities.

Cohesion funding becomes a central question

The findings have direct relevance to negotiations over the EU’s next long-term budget, covering 2028 to 2034.

The European Commission’s proposal envisages roughly €450 billion for economic, social and territorial cohesion under national and regional partnership plans, including at least €218 billion for less developed regions.

The proposed structure would combine several funding programmes within broader national plans, with the Commission arguing that the changes could improve coordination and make spending more responsive to local requirements.

However, regional authorities have expressed concern that greater national control over financial allocations could weaken their influence over investment decisions.

As EU Today reported earlier this week, representatives of European regions have warned that the proposed budget arrangements could concentrate decision-making in national capitals.

The latest poverty statistics provide a concrete context for that disagreement. Investment priorities may differ considerably between a region experiencing industrial decline, an agricultural area with limited employment opportunities and a metropolitan district facing severe housing affordability problems.

A central question for EU institutions is therefore how funding allocations will reflect measurable regional needs rather than being driven primarily by national political negotiations.

The Commission maintains that its proposed partnership arrangements will protect allocations for less developed regions and continue supporting social inclusion.

Negotiations over the financial framework will determine how those commitments are translated into enforceable rules, while Eurostat’s figures provide a statistical basis against which future claims of progress can be assessed.

With 92.7 million people still at risk, the debate is not simply about the overall size of the EU budget. It is also about whether spending reaches the communities where economic disadvantage remains most concentrated.

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