If Democrats win the House, and possibly the Senate, a result nonpartisan analysts call plausible, they would gain the power to bring new Ukraine aid to a vote and to push back on President Donald Trump’s deals easing pressure on Russia, Reuters reports in an analysis of how US foreign policy could shift.
The stakes are concrete. Trump has largely halted direct US aid to Ukraine, which lawmakers of both parties had backed, and its current supplies run from packages passed under his predecessor.
Weeks ago, he also waived the sanctions on Russian energy that Congress had written into law and struck a deal to bring Russian diesel back to the market, angering Republicans and Democrats alike.
With both chambers, Democrats could put new Ukraine aid on the floor, and given the bipartisan support such aid has drawn, it could pass with the two-thirds majorities needed to override a Trump veto.
Other steps could be taken, too. Representative Gregory Meeks of New York, in line to chair the House Foreign Affairs Committee if his party wins control, has already introduced bipartisan legislation to block Trump’s plan to return Russian diesel to the global market.
Democrats are also readier than Trump’s Republicans to rein in military spending. They blocked his request for an unprecedented 67% rise in the military budget, to $1.5 trillion, in the Senate, and many say they will try to restore the foreign aid he has withheld or canceled.
The leverage has limits. Even with both chambers, Democrats would still face a president who can veto, and overriding him would require two-thirds of each chamber. The pattern has already been visible in Iran: Trump launched that war on 28 February without congressional approval, and when a War Powers resolution passed with a handful of Republican votes, his administration ignored it.
The US midterms could restore Ukraine’s American aid and curb Trump’s Russia deals, if Democrats win Congress
© Illustration: Ella Baron/The Guardian
© Illustration: Ella Baron/The Guardian
© Illustration: Ella Baron/The Guardian
Last week, the Liberty Justice Center (the public interest group I worked with on the case challenging Trump's earlier IEEPA tariffs, which led their invalidation by the Supreme Court) filed the first lawsuit challenging President Donald Trump's massive Section 338 tariffs against a variety of Canadian imports. Three days later, Trump exempted some previously covered Canadian products from the tariffs, probably to help Maine Sen. Susan Collins and other congressional Republicans fearful of voter backlash in the upcoming midterm election:
President Donald Trump signed a proclamation on Friday that removes some Canadian products from tariffs imposed under Section 338 of the Tariff Act of 1930 and adds others, the White House said. The changes take effect Oct. 30.
Plywood sheets, some paper products, certain machinery and refrigeration equipment, and certain packing crates and boxes come off the list. Some valves, along with carpets, waste products and other goods, take their place.
The tariffs, set at 50% according to CNBC, apply whether or not a good originates under the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement….
The fact that American businesses and consumers in states like Maine are suffering from the tariffs gives the lie to the notion that only foreigners are burdened by them. Trump's action here also underscores how the tariffs have become highly unpopular, and a drag on GOP prospects in the upcoming election.
While Trump may have (perhaps only temporarily) lifted some of the Section 338 tariffs, most remain in place. As noted above, he imposed additional tariffs on some goods, even as he lifted them on others. And the Section 338 tariffs are still still illegal for a variety of reasons I summarized in my previous post on the LJC lawsuit against them, as well as earlier writings:
I have previously written about why Trump's Section 338 tariffs are harmful and illegal. See my recent Montreal Economic Institute paper on this topic, and earlier pieces here, here, and here. To briefly summarize, the tariffs on Canada are illegal because 1) Section 338 has been superseded by later legislation, 2) even if Section 338 is still operative, Trump's tariffs do not meet its requirements because the Canadian actions they supposedly respond to do not "discriminate" against US goods, as the law requires, 3) Trump's tariffs do not "offset" the Canadian actions (as Section 338 also requires), but go far beyond that, 4) the administration's interpretation of Section 338 runs afoul of the "major questions" doctrine, and 5) if Section 338 is operative and does authorize the Trump actions, it would violate the constitutional nondelegation doctrine (which restricts delegation of legislative power to the executive).
The LJC complaint advances all five of these arguments. To prevail, they need win on only one.
Trump has also used Section 338 to ban some Canadian imports entirely. That too is illegal, though the bans (unlike the tariffs) are not directly at issue in the LJC case. They may well be challenged in future litigation, however.
In addition to illegally usurping congressional power over taxation, the Trump trade war against Canada damages our economy and poisons relations with a key ally. Courts should strike it down, just as they did with the IEEPA tariffs and the more recent Section 122 tariffs. They should also invalidated the massive Section 301 "forced labor" tariffs, which have been challenged in three cases currently before the US Court of International Trade.
UPDATE: It's worth reiterating that giving one person the power to impose and lift tariffs whenever he feels like it is an affront to the rule of law.
The post Trump Exempts Some Canadian Products From Section 338 Tariffs—But His Illegal Trade War Continues appeared first on Reason Magazine.
After nearly 10 months abroad, María Corina Machado, the anti-Chavista opposition leader and Nobel Peace Prize laureate, has returned to Venezuela. “I am here, with you,” the opposition figure wrote on social media on Sunday morning.
© Vente Venezuela (EFE)
Europe is searching for someone capable of negotiating with Vladimir Putin. Yet the question confronting European capitals is considerably more difficult than identifying a politician with sufficient experience, authority and diplomatic skill. It is whether Europe possesses the political unity and strategic independence to negotiate with Moscow on equal terms.
According to diplomatic accounts published on 22nd October, five European leaders have emerged as possible representatives: Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, Finnish President Alexander Stubb, Czech President Petr Pavel, Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen and Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre.
No appointment has been announced, and a group of negotiators may ultimately prove more acceptable than a single representative. The initiative reflects concern that Washington’s negotiations with Moscow could produce arrangements affecting European security without sufficient European influence over their terms.
The European Commission insists that the EU is already participating in diplomatic consultations, including discussions held in Oslo on 20th October. But participation in preliminary meetings is not the same as possessing the authority to determine the outcome.
Europe’s predicament contains an extraordinary contradiction. The European Union is among Ukraine’s principal financial supporters. Its governments provide military assistance, maintain sanctions against Russia and control decisions affecting Moscow’s future access to European markets. Nevertheless, European capitals remain concerned that the decisive political framework for ending the war could be negotiated principally between Washington and Moscow.
This anxiety has intensified under President Donald Trump, whose transactional approach increasingly treats diplomatic settlements as exchanges of economic concessions and strategic advantages.
As EU Today recently examined, proposals involving sanctions relief, renewed energy cooperation and commercial opportunities raise the possibility of arrangements that depend upon European consent but are negotiated elsewhere.
Washington can discuss reopening economic relations with Russia. It cannot independently reverse European sanctions, guarantee Ukraine’s accession to the EU or decide the continent’s future security arrangements. The European Council explicitly reaffirmed this distinction in its conclusions of 16th October, insisting that decisions affecting the Union’s security and responsibilities belong to Europe itself.
The central issue is therefore not whether Europe has influence, but whether it can organise that influence into a coherent negotiating position.
An equally important weakness would arise if European governments selected their representative without making Kyiv an integral participant in the decision.
Ukraine is not merely the geographical subject of negotiations. Its government controls whether a proposed settlement can acquire political legitimacy, while its armed forces determine much of what can be implemented on the ground.
A negotiated agreement rejected by Kyiv could neither reliably end the war nor provide the security arrangements that Europe seeks.
European security, moreover, can no longer be considered independently of Ukraine’s military capabilities. Ukrainian forces possess extensive operational experience against Russia, including in drone warfare, electronic warfare and long-range strikes.
Any future continental defence architecture that excludes this experience would disregard one of Europe’s most consequential military assets.
An effective European representative would therefore require a mandate developed jointly with Ukraine, rather than simply endorsed by European governments after the event.
The proposed candidates illustrate the difficulty of combining political authority with negotiating credibility. Meloni possesses a working relationship with Trump and considerable influence within European conservative politics. Stubb combines experience of Russia’s immediate neighbourhood with access to Washington. Pavel brings military expertise and an understanding of NATO’s command structures. Yet none could independently commit Europe’s governments to financial, military or territorial-security obligations.
This is the fundamental weakness of the proposed office. A negotiator requires more than access to powerful leaders. The ability to make commitments, withhold concessions and impose costs is what gives diplomatic representation substance.
Europe possesses potentially significant instruments: sanctions, industrial capacity, financial assistance and growing defence expenditure. But these remain distributed across institutions and national governments with differing strategic priorities.
Poland, the Baltic states and Nordic governments approach Russian security threats differently from several Western and Southern European capitals. Reconciling those positions is not an administrative exercise. It is a prerequisite for meaningful diplomacy.
The search also reflects European concern about a return to great-power bargaining over the continent’s political geography.
The historical comparison frequently invoked is Yalta in 1945, when Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin discussed Europe’s post-war settlement. Munich in 1938 offers another warning about negotiating territorial concessions at the expense of directly affected states. Neither precedent precisely describes the present situation.
Unlike the countries subjected to Soviet domination after the Second World War, today’s European states possess established institutions, substantial economic resources and collective defence arrangements. Ukraine, meanwhile, has demonstrated that Russia cannot simply dictate its political future through military superiority.
Nevertheless, the danger lies in accepting the underlying principle that powerful states possess a privileged right to determine the sovereignty and security choices of their neighbours.
Moscow’s demands concerning NATO, Ukrainian territory and Europe’s wider security arrangements extend beyond any conventional ceasefire negotiation.
A European representative would have to challenge that premise rather than merely negotiate the geographical limits of Russian influence.
The debate inevitably leads to Europe’s military dependence upon the United States. An American withdrawal from NATO is not inevitable. Indeed, US legislation restricts unilateral presidential withdrawal. But Washington could substantially reduce its military commitments without formally abandoning the alliance.
Europe must therefore consider how much independent military capacity it requires to support its diplomatic positions. That entails coordinated procurement, integrated military planning, sustainable defence production and deeper cooperation with Britain, Norway, Canada and Ukraine. Recent security challenges in the Black Sea illustrate the difficulty of converting European diplomatic commitments into effective collective action.
These developments would not automatically create a European army or replace NATO. They could, however, give European governments greater freedom to act if American priorities diverge from their own.
The relationship between military capability and diplomacy is particularly important in dealing with Moscow. European representatives cannot expect Russia to revise its demands simply because Brussels has selected a more prominent interlocutor.
Russia would have to conclude that continued aggression carries greater costs than a settlement respecting Ukraine’s sovereignty. Europe’s diplomatic standing would then derive not from the personality of its representative but from the collective resources and political commitments behind that individual.
The immediate search for a negotiator may appear a limited diplomatic initiative. Its implications are considerably larger.
For decades, European security rested upon an arrangement in which American military power compensated for Europe’s fragmented strategic authority. The present negotiations are exposing the limitations of that model. The decisive question is not whether Meloni, Stubb, Pavel or another European leader can secure a place at the negotiating table. It is whether Europe can establish a common position, backed by Ukraine’s consent and by sufficient economic and military power, that neither Washington nor Moscow can disregard.
Without those foundations, a European envoy risks becoming a participant in decisions made by others. With them, the appointment could mark the beginning of a substantially different European role in international security.
Teheran è convinta che Israele e Stati Uniti si stiano preparando al terzo grande attacco su vasta scala contro la Repubblica islamica in 16 mesi, motivo per cui sarebbe in una “fase avanzata” la pianificazione da parte dell’Iran di attacchi contro funzionari statunitensi. Il timore all’interno dell’amministrazione Trump viene ribadito dal New York Times, che cita due fonti iraniane – tra le quali un ufficiale dei Guardiani della Rivoluzione, i Pasdaran – secondo cui tra gli obiettivi possibili ci sarebbero effettivamente diplomatici e personale americano, obiettivi che hanno detto di considerare “legittimi” dopo le operazioni militari dei mesi scorsi di Usa e Israele contro l’Iran. Osservazioni sulla portata delle capacità iraniane a parte, il conflitto in Medio Oriente, è la sintesi del giornale, è entrato in una nuova fase in cui una serie di fattori, dalle elezioni in Israele e negli Usa alla possibilità che le parti cerchino pretesti per l’azione, creano livelli di tensione e rischio sempre più elevati.
Funzionari Usa, rilancia il Nyt, affermano di essere concentrati su elementi delle informazioni di intelligence più recenti secondo cui gli iraniani potrebbero tentare di uccidere ambasciatori americani in Medio Oriente e funzionari americani in territorio Usa, quello che il quotidiano sottolinea essere un vecchio obiettivo dell’unità 840, unità d’élite iraniana, ricordando come “la storia insegni che le ambizioni dell’Iran sono spesso superiori alle sue capacità“. Fonti americane e alleati europei, evidenzia ancora il giornale, hanno sottolineato come le notizie di intelligence su possibili attacchi siano aumentate dopo i fatti nel Regno Unito, dopo l’allarme nella base Raf Fairford usata dalle forze Usa. E le fonti citate hanno precisato che le informazioni di intelligence valutate da ufficiali di alto livello includono la pianificazione da parte dell’Iran di un’eventuale risposta a possibili operazioni di Usa o Israele. In questo contesto, stando a una fonte, ci sarebbero prove che gli iraniani abbiano agenti negli Usa “che non sono semplicemente cittadini iraniani“.
Dal punto di vista politico, il ministro degli Esteri iraniano Abbas Araghchi ha portato l’attenzione sullo stretto di Hormuz, dove la situazione non tornerà “allo stato in cui si trovava prima delle due recenti guerre”. Il conflitto in corso, ha proseguito, “ha cambiato tutto. Le rotte attraverso lo Stretto di Hormuz non saranno più quelle di un tempo”. Araghchi ha inoltre aggiunto che l’Iran ha sottolineato agli intermediari che la guerra deve cessare su tutti i fronti della regione, “altrimenti la pace rimarrà irraggiungibile”. Riferendosi a recenti dichiarazioni del presidente statunitense Donald Trump, che non ha escluso l’ipotesi di nuovi attacchi contro l’Iran, Araghchi ha sottolineato: “Si parla di una nuova guerra, ma io sto già pensando al periodo successivo alla guerra. Indipendentemente dal fatto che una guerra scoppi o meno, le nostre politiche rimangono invariate. Se prevarrà un minimo di razionalità, non tenteranno nuovamente un’aggressione militare contro l’Iran. Ci hanno già provato due volte e hanno visto come è andata a finire. Se dovessero tentare ancora una volta, sanno bene che il risultato non sarà diverso da quello che hanno sperimentato in passato”.
L'articolo Nyt: “Teheran pronta a colpire personale Usa, sono considerati obiettivi legittimi” proviene da Il Fatto Quotidiano.
Durante i viaggi ufficiali, solitamente i ministri o i diplomatici si concedono dei momenti privati per visitare determinati siti o luoghi d’interesse nei Paesi che li stanno ospitando. Il segretario di Stato Usa, Marco Rubio, ha tenuto fede a questa tradizione durante la sua recente visita in India. A destare curiosità è stata però la meta scelta: la raffineria di Jamnagar, nello Stato indiano nordoccidentale di Gujarat. Il funzionario statunitense ci è arrivato dopo la tappa compiuta a Mumbai, capitale finanziaria del subcontinente, un itinerario che fa capire la natura soprattutto economica del suo viaggio nel Paese asiatico.
Prevedere un programma di questo tipo è servito all’amministrazione Trump per due scopi principali: primo, evitare tensioni politiche con l’India in una fase di grande vicinanza tra Stati Uniti e Pakistan, arcinemico del gigante asiatico. Ulteriore dimostrazione di questa volontà è il fatto che Rubio non abbia incontrato il primo ministro indiano, Narendra Modi, ma solamente il suo omologo, Subrahmanyam Jaishankar. Secondo, in questa fase di avvicinamento alle ormai prossime elezioni statunitensi di midterm, l’attenzione della Casa Bianca è tutta dedicata alla necessità di ottenere risultati che gli elettori Usa possano toccare con mano.
E qui si arriva all’impianto di Jamnagar, controllato dalla famiglia del multimiliardario Mukesh Ambani attraverso la società Reliance Industries. La raffineria è la più grande al mondo, al punto da essere in grado di produrre fino a 1,4 milioni di barili di petrolio al giorno, quasi il 2% globale. Un’altra sua particolarità è la capacità di raffinare anche greggio ultra-pesante, come quello che ad esempio esce dai pozzi petroliferi del Venezuela, che richiede cicli di lavorazione molto sofisticati e approfonditi prima di poter essere immesso sul mercato come carburante. Il riferimento al Paese sudamericano non è casuale. Già attualmente l’India è il secondo principale acquirente di greggio proveniente dal Venezuela dietro agli Stati Uniti, che sostengono il governo ad interim che guida Caracas dopo la cattura di Nicolas Maduro del gennaio scorso.
Non sono trapelate dichiarazioni ufficiali dopo la visita di Rubio all’impianto, ma è chiaro come l’obiettivo statunitense sia far sì che l’India aumenti ulteriormente le importazioni di petrolio dal Paese sudamericano e continui a immettere sul mercato diesel a basso costo per calmierare i prezzi a livello globale. C’è da dire che Jamnagar opera già quasi al massimo della sua capacità di raffinazione, ma in ogni caso un maggiore acquisto di petrolio venezuelano potrebbe ridurre le importazioni indiane di greggio russo, uno dei fattori che negli ultimi mesi ha causato maggiori attriti lungo l’asse Washington-Nuova Delhi. Certo, recentemente il presidente Usa Donald Trump ha cambiato tono nei confronti di Mosca – sempre guardando alla riduzione del prezzo del diesel – ma anche solo la diversificazione delle rotte di approvvigionamento favorisce la calma sui mercati internazionali.
Un altro tema che probabilmente è stato affrontato è quello dell’investimento di Reliance Industries sul territorio statunitense. A marzo scorso Trump ha annunciato che la conglomerata indiana avrebbe realizzato una raffineria nei pressi di Brownsville, in Texas, ma da quel momento non sono emersi altri dettagli. Una situazione che ha portato molti osservatori a mettere in dubbio la volontà degli Ambani di procedere. Un tentennamento legato probabilmente anche alla grande vicinanza dell’imprenditore indiano al primo ministro Modi che potrebbe spingere Reliance a tenere in stand-by l’operazione come leva politica nei confronti degli Stati Uniti in una fase di tensione anche sul fronte economico.
Durante la sua visita nel subcontinente, Rubio ha però affermato che la definizione dell’accordo commerciale tra India e Stati Uniti è “incredibilmente vicina”, un’intesa che dovrebbe regolamentare a 360 gradi gli scambi tra i due Paesi e scongiurare l’introduzione di dazi da parte di Washington. Apparentemente, quello del segretario di Stato Usa è stato un viaggio interlocutorio, ma in vista del midterm per Trump ogni sforzo può essere decisivo.
L'articolo Rubio visita la più grande raffineria del mondo in India. Trump vuole un accordo con Nuova Delhi per abbassare ancora il prezzo del gasolio proviene da Il Fatto Quotidiano.
Brazil, Israel, Serbia and the US are holding elections within the space of 10 days. Will the authoritarian right cement its global gains, or can pro-democracy forces make a comeback?
Four elections on four continents within 10 days could profoundly reshape global politics, propelling the world further along its current authoritarian trajectory or marking a limited comeback for democratic norms.
In all four contests, basic democratic norms are at stake at a time when autocracy is advancing worldwide at an alarming rate. According to the Sweden-based V-Dem Institute, which uses multivariable assessment tools, the democratic freedoms enjoyed by the average global citizen are down to levels last seen in 1978 – long before the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of communism in Europe.
Continue reading...
© Illustration: Guardian Design/Getty Images
© Illustration: Guardian Design/Getty Images
© Illustration: Guardian Design/Getty Images
Han pasado 640 días desde que Donald Trump prestó juramento en el Capitolio en un discurso grandilocuente en el que proclamó: “La Edad de Oro de Estados Unidos comienza justo ahora. A partir de hoy, nuestro país prosperará y volverá a ser respetado en todo el mundo”. Casi dos años después, si los sondeos no fallan, está a punto de sufrir una histórica derrota en las elecciones de medio mandato que se celebran el próximo 3 de noviembre debido al descontento de las familias estadounidenses sobre la situación económica. La inflación, los aranceles y la guerra contra Irán explican la gran decepción que se extiende desde una costa a otra de Estados Unidos. Un sentimiento que ha contagiado a las zonas rurales del Medio Oeste y el Sur del país, donde los demócratas no gobiernan desde hace casi un siglo, como Kansas o Mississippi. El malestar de los estadounidenses con la situación económica contrasta con las grandes cifras que sitúan al país como una de las potencias que más crece.
La inteligencia artificial está protagonizando la mayor revolución económica de la historia. Nunca se había destinado tanto dinero en tan poco tiempo a desarrollar una nueva industria, ni siquiera en la revolución del ferrocarril de finales del siglo XIX o en la era de la burbuja de las puntocom. La inversión estimada que los grandes laboratorios de IA hasta 2032 ascenderá a 10,3 billones de dólares, una cantidad que representa el 3,6% del PIB, según un reciente estudio del Stijn van Nieuwerburgh, publicado por la Brookings Institution.
El Mapa de Centros de Datos de Estados Unidos, que recopila la información sobre esta actividad, tiene registrados 5098 instalaciones y proyectos en el país: 3172 operativos, 400 en construcción y 1199 planificados, con una capacidad de 395,1 GW. Se prevé que solo este año, la inversión en IA alcance en Estados Unidos el 1,9 % del PIB, según estimaciones de Goldman Sachs.
El sector está teniendo un impacto evidente en la economía, pero también ha provocado malestar social por los efectos nocivos que suponen estas instalaciones. “La mayor parte del gasto de capital, que este año podría alcanzar los 800.000 millones de dólares, va destinada a la construcción de enormes centros de datos”, remarca Jared Franz, economista de Capital Group. “Este nivel de inversión ofrece un fuerte impulso a la economía estadounidense. De hecho, creo que no estamos valorando en su justa medida el impacto que podría tener el auge de la inteligencia artificial”.
Franz cree que se podría estar infravalorando el crecimiento del PIB entre 0,5 y 1 punto porcentual. Las grandes compañías están inmersas en una alocada carrera de inversiones, que está llevando a la industria a protagonizar algunas a Bolsa más rimbombantes de la historia. Los analistas empiezan a hablar del riesgo de burbuja, con un ecosistema de empresas endeudadas y con estrechos vínculos entre ellas.
Las autoridades, sin embargo, tienen depositadas muchas esperanzas en los robustos aumentos de productividad que supondrá la inteligencia artificial cuando la industria esté plenamente desarrollada.
© KENT NISHIMURA (AFP / GETTY IMAGES) (EL PAÍS)
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