Vladimir Putin’s insistence that Ukraine surrender its remaining positions in Donetsk is not simply a dispute over territory. It is a demand that could dismantle Ukraine’s principal defensive barrier in the east, hand Moscow a military advantage it has struggled to achieve through years of fighting, and establish a precedent for further territorial concessions. The latest diplomatic contacts with European leaders have brought this question back to the centre of negotiations.

There are two ways for Russia to capture the remaining Ukrainian-held cities of Donbas. One is to fight its way through heavily fortified defensive positions, accepting substantial casualties, equipment losses and an uncertain timetable. The other is to secure their evacuation through diplomatic negotiations.

The second would achieve an important Russian military objective without requiring Moscow to bear the full cost of a prolonged offensive.

This distinction helps explain why Vladimir Putin continues to insist that Ukrainian forces withdraw from the remaining government-controlled territory of Donetsk region before a comprehensive settlement can be negotiated.

It also raises a more consequential question: would surrendering Donbas bring the war closer to an end, or would it improve Russia’s position in any subsequent confrontation?

A diplomatic opening without a strategic concession

The issue returned to prominence on 27 October when Finnish President Alexander Stubb and Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre held a rare telephone conversation with Putin.

According to the Finnish president’s official statement, the call followed discussions in Oslo on 20 October involving Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and US presidential envoy Steve Witkoff.

The Nordic leaders sought to advance preparations for renewed American-mediated negotiations, expected in Abu Dhabi in November. They emphasised that they were acting on behalf of their respective countries rather than representing Europe collectively.

Stubb described the exchange as “frank and substantive”, arguing that direct communication with Moscow was necessary to address the security consequences of the war.

However, the Kremlin’s account offered little indication of movement on the fundamental disagreements.

Moscow insisted that any durable peace must fully accommodate Russian interests. A source close to the Kremlin told Reuters that Putin had reiterated his refusal to compromise on the objective of controlling the entire Donbas.

Following the conversation, Zelenskyy confirmed that the Nordic leaders had briefed him and stressed to Putin the need for concrete measures to reduce attacks on Ukrainian energy infrastructure.

The diplomatic process has therefore resumed without resolving the territorial dispute at its centre.

The military significance of the remaining Donbas

The territory Russia is demanding includes some of Ukraine’s most important surviving defensive positions.

Since fighting began in eastern Ukraine in 2014, Ukrainian forces have constructed and reinforced an extensive defensive system centred on Sloviansk, Kramatorsk, Druzhkivka and Kostiantynivka.

Known as the fortress belt, this network combines urban areas, industrial facilities, transport infrastructure, prepared defensive positions and terrain that complicates offensive operations.

The military importance of this system extends far beyond the administrative boundaries of Donetsk.

According to the Institute for the Study of War, surrendering these positions would allow Russian forces to occupy heavily defended territory without undertaking the prolonged operations otherwise required to capture it.

In its 26 October battlefield assessment, the institute continued to identify the capture of this defensive belt as Russia’s principal military objective in Donetsk. Ukrainian forces retained positions in parts of Kostiantynivka, while Russian operations towards other major cities remained contested.

The implications of a negotiated Ukrainian withdrawal would be substantial.

Russia could occupy the fortified urban corridor, reorganise its forces, establish new logistics routes and potentially redirect formations towards other sectors.

Ukraine, meanwhile, would have to construct or reinforce defensive positions further west, potentially under pressure and in less favourable terrain.

The resulting military imbalance would not necessarily lead to another Russian offensive. But it would change the conditions under which any renewed hostilities might take place.

That is why territory cannot be assessed solely by its surface area. A relatively small section of the front can possess strategic value disproportionate to its size.

Why Moscow prefers a negotiated withdrawal

Russia’s insistence on Donetsk also reflects the limits of what its military has achieved.

Despite years of fighting, Moscow has not secured complete control of the region. Successive offensives have produced territorial gains, but at considerable cost and without the rapid breakthrough originally anticipated.

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio recently acknowledged the central importance of the remaining Ukrainian-held territory.

In an interview published by the US State Department, Rubio characterised the dispute as centred on territory Russia wants but has been unable to capture militarily, while recognising Ukraine’s sovereignty and long-term security concerns.

His remarks demonstrate how Donbas has become the principal territorial obstacle in Washington’s diplomatic calculations.

For Moscow, however, concentrating negotiations on this specific demand offers an additional advantage.

If Ukraine refuses to withdraw, the Kremlin can argue that Kyiv is preventing progress towards peace. If Ukraine agrees, Russia obtains strategically valuable territory without the military costs associated with conquering it.

The demand therefore serves a dual purpose: it establishes a public explanation for the absence of an agreement while offering Russia an immediate military benefit should negotiations succeed on its terms.

The problem with treating Donbas as the final concession

The central weakness in any settlement built around a Ukrainian withdrawal is the assumption that control of Donbas represents the limit of Russia’s territorial ambitions.

Moscow’s previously declared objectives suggest a more complicated picture.

In June 2024, Putin demanded Ukrainian withdrawal from four regions claimed by Russia: Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson. Moscow does not fully control these regions, despite claiming to have annexed them in September 2022.

Russia has also demanded restrictions on Ukraine’s military capabilities and future security relationships.

As EU Today previously reported, renewed diplomatic engagement has not produced a clear abandonment of the Kremlin’s wider objectives.

Consequently, transferring the remaining territory of Donetsk would not necessarily satisfy Moscow’s other demands.

There is a significant difference between conceding territory as part of an enforceable settlement and withdrawing from defensive positions as a precondition for negotiating one.

In the first case, territorial arrangements form part of a wider agreement establishing obligations, verification procedures and security guarantees.

In the second, one party makes a potentially irreversible military concession before knowing whether an agreement will ultimately be reached.

This asymmetry is particularly important where the proposed concession directly affects the withdrawing country’s ability to defend itself.

The strategy of incremental gains

One interpretation of Moscow’s approach is that it reflects a strategy of incremental territorial expansion rather than an attempt to achieve all its objectives through a single decisive offensive.

After Russia failed to capture Kyiv in 2022, its military campaign increasingly concentrated on taking territory through successive, often prolonged operations.

The diplomatic equivalent would involve securing one concession, consolidating the resulting advantage and subsequently presenting additional demands.

Under such a scenario, Russia could obtain control of the remaining Donetsk territory, establish new positions closer to Dnipropetrovsk region and later argue that further territorial or security arrangements were necessary to protect its newly acquired frontier.

Moscow has already used the language of protective buffer zones to justify military operations elsewhere in Ukraine.

There is no evidence establishing that such a sequence would inevitably follow a Donbas settlement. Nevertheless, the possibility must be considered when assessing the military consequences of a withdrawal.

The concern is not merely that Russia might violate a future agreement. It is that the agreement itself could alter the strategic balance in ways that make renewed military pressure more effective.

There is also an internal Ukrainian dimension.

An agreement requiring the evacuation of cities defended for years would create substantial political controversy. Disagreements over territorial concessions, security guarantees and the credibility of Western commitments could complicate domestic political stability.

For Moscow, such divisions might provide another means of influencing Ukraine without immediate military escalation.

Donbas and the wider question of Ukrainian sovereignty

Donbas has considerable political significance for Putin beyond its military value.

The conflict in eastern Ukraine began in 2014, following Russia’s annexation of Crimea. Donetsk and Luhansk became central to the Kremlin’s justification for intervention, and their incorporation into Russia was later proclaimed as part of the 2022 annexations.

Control of the entire region would allow Putin to present a tangible achievement after years of warfare.

Yet the Kremlin’s objectives have never been confined exclusively to Donbas.

Putin has repeatedly questioned Ukraine’s historical and political independence, while Russian negotiating demands have extended to the country’s military posture, international alliances and internal political arrangements.

These positions suggest that territorial control forms part of a broader attempt to determine Ukraine’s strategic orientation.

A settlement that ends fighting in Donetsk without resolving these wider disagreements might therefore suspend the conflict rather than settle its underlying causes.

What the next negotiations must establish

The planned talks in Abu Dhabi will test whether Moscow is prepared to distinguish between its territorial demands and the conditions necessary for a sustainable ceasefire.

An immediate halt to hostilities along existing lines would preserve the military status quo while allowing negotiations to proceed.

Russia has resisted this approach, arguing that a temporary ceasefire could enable Ukraine to rebuild its forces without resolving the conflict.

Ukraine, by contrast, argues that withdrawing from fortified territory without credible guarantees would expose it to renewed attack.

Neither side can be expected to disregard the military implications of the proposed arrangements.

For European governments, the principal question is consequently not simply whether Ukrainian and Russian representatives can be brought back to the negotiating table.

It is whether any agreement can prevent the territorial settlement from becoming the starting position for another war.

Stubb and Støre’s conversation with Putin demonstrated that diplomatic communication remains possible. It did not establish that Moscow is prepared to abandon its existing territorial objectives.

The distinction matters.

Putin’s demand for Donbas offers Russia two potential advantages: a justification for continuing the war if Kyiv refuses, and a substantial military gain if Kyiv accepts.

That does not prove the Kremlin has already decided to resume hostilities after a negotiated withdrawal. It does, however, explain why the terms, sequencing and enforceability of any agreement are as consequential as the territory itself.

The essential question facing negotiators is therefore not only whether Russia can obtain Donbas through diplomacy rather than force.

It is whether the price of that concession would be a lasting peace — or a weaker Ukrainian defensive position if peace fails.

Finnish President Alexander Stubb and Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre have spoken directly with Vladimir Putin before briefing Volodymyr Zelenskyy. The initiative, undertaken in consultation with Ukraine, comes ahead of planned negotiations in Abu Dhabi but has drawn criticism from other Nordic leaders.

Finnish President Alexander Stubb and Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre held a telephone conversation with Russian President Vladimir Putin on Tuesday, 27 October, marking an unusual direct diplomatic engagement between Moscow and two European NATO members since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

The conversation, initiated by the two Nordic leaders from Helsinki, was followed by a separate call with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. According to a joint statement released by the Norwegian government, the initiative had been prepared in consultation with Kyiv.

The objective was to communicate directly with Putin about efforts to end the war and the forthcoming negotiations involving Ukraine, Russia and the United States.

Stubb described the exchange as frank and substantive, arguing that Finland and Norway had particular reasons to participate in discussions concerning European security.

“We are neighbouring countries to Russia,” he said, adding that the war’s outcome would directly affect European security.

Both leaders reaffirmed their governments’ continuing support for Ukraine while calling for renewed negotiations. Støre emphasised the humanitarian and economic consequences of the conflict and the need for de-escalation.

Importantly, their statement specified that they were acting as national leaders rather than representatives of Europe collectively.

Zelenskyy briefed after discussions with Moscow

Following the conversation with Putin, Stubb and Støre spoke with Zelenskyy, who confirmed the exchange in a statement issued by his office.

The Ukrainian president thanked them for their detailed briefing and diplomatic engagement.

According to Zelenskyy, the two leaders had communicated Ukraine’s demand for concrete steps to reduce attacks against its energy facilities and other infrastructure.

The discussion also covered preparations for trilateral negotiations involving Ukrainian, American and Russian delegations, provisionally planned for November.

Kyiv’s confirmation that it had been consulted before the Putin conversation is significant. Ukraine has consistently maintained that decisions concerning its sovereignty, territory and security cannot be negotiated without its participation.

Oslo talks establish new diplomatic channel

Tuesday’s telephone diplomacy followed a meeting in Oslo on 20 October involving Zelenskyy, Stubb, Støre and representatives of US President Donald Trump.

American special envoy Steve Witkoff participated in person, while Jared Kushner joined remotely. European and NATO representatives also attended related discussions.

According to the Ukrainian presidency’s account, the consultations addressed possible steps towards ending the war and establishing security arrangements after a settlement.

Witkoff subsequently travelled to St Petersburg on 21 October for discussions with Putin.

The diplomatic contacts have produced plans for another round of talks in Abu Dhabi, expected after 4 November, although the precise date and representation remain subject to confirmation.

The European Commission has also sought involvement. During its 21 October press briefing, the Commission confirmed its participation in the Oslo consultations, which addressed territorial questions, security guarantees and post-war economic arrangements.

As EU Today previously reported, discussions about appointing a European representative to negotiations have exposed disagreements over who should speak for European governments and what authority such a representative would possess.

Moscow maintains its negotiating position

The Kremlin’s account of Tuesday’s conversation offered little indication of a change in Russia’s principal demands.

According to reports citing the Kremlin’s statement, Putin insisted that a lasting settlement would require what Moscow described as full recognition of Russia’s legitimate interests.

He also accused NATO and European Union countries of pursuing confrontational policies that prolonged the conflict.

These statements indicate that the reopening of direct communication has not, by itself, resolved the differences between the negotiating parties.

Russia continues to seek arrangements concerning Ukrainian territory and the European security order, while Kyiv maintains that its sovereignty and territorial integrity must be respected.

Denmark questions independent Nordic diplomacy

The initiative has also revealed differences among European governments over direct engagement with Moscow.

Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen criticised the Finnish-Norwegian approach, saying it had not been coordinated with Denmark and warning against individual European countries pursuing separate diplomatic initiatives.

Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson also expressed reservations about contacts that might undermine a common European position.

Their objections highlight a distinction between consultation with Ukraine and agreement among European governments on the organisation of negotiations.

For Finland and Norway, both of which share borders with Russia, the outcome of the conflict carries direct implications for security in the Baltic Sea region and the High North.

The immediate question is whether their intervention can facilitate substantive negotiations without weakening coordination between Kyiv and its European partners.

With the next US-mediated talks expected in November, Tuesday’s contacts establish another channel of communication with Moscow. Whether that channel produces movement on territorial disputes, security guarantees or an eventual ceasefire remains unresolved.

More than 420,000 leaked emails have reopened a controversy over illegal donations to Germany’s Alternative for Germany party, while newly examined correspondence reveals previously undisclosed disagreements within its leadership. The revelations could also influence the continuing debate over the party’s constitutional status.

Germany’s Alternative for Germany (AfD) is facing renewed scrutiny after hackers published a substantial archive of internal correspondence, exposing details of party finances, political strategy and disputes among senior officials.

The material, released on 19 October 2026, comprises approximately 421,000 emails and nearly 50,000 accompanying documents, amounting to some 281 gigabytes of data. The files cover more than a decade of party activity, including correspondence involving co-leader Alice Weidel, former chairman Alexander Gauland and other senior figures.

The AfD confirmed that its hosting provider had suffered a cyberattack in September. According to the party, the attackers obtained information from a limited number of email accounts, many of which had not been actively used for several years.

The identity of those responsible remains unknown.

The documents are being examined by several investigative teams, including ZDF, Der Spiegel and Austria’s Der Standard, with technical assistance from the Organised Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP).

The Swiss donations controversy returns

The most consequential findings so far concern Weidel’s knowledge of illegal campaign donations received during Germany’s 2017 federal election.

At the time, approximately €132,000 was transferred through Swiss companies into accounts belonging to the AfD’s Bodensee district organisation. The payments were designated for Weidel’s election campaign, particularly its social media activities.

When the transactions became public in 2018, Weidel maintained that she had not known about the money until September 2017 and described the donations as unsolicited.

However, correspondence examined by German investigators and journalists raises questions about that account.

In an email dated 10 July 2017, attributed to Weidel, she told her district treasurer that campaign donations had been promised and requested that the party’s bank account be checked twice weekly.

She also asked to receive confirmation of incoming payments so that campaign expenditure could be planned.

Four days later, the first payment arrived from Switzerland.

Further correspondence indicates that Weidel arranged a separate campaign account and obtained authority to direct expenditure from donations earmarked for her election activities.

The latest investigation, published on 26 October, provides additional details about the account’s management and how the party handled the ensuing controversy.

The leaked correspondence also reportedly includes invoices relating to the purchase of approximately 25,000 Facebook followers for Weidel’s campaign. The extent to which those accounts were automated, and their influence on voters, has not been established.

The AfD was previously ordered to pay approximately €396,000 for accepting the unlawful donations. Criminal proceedings involving Weidel and other district officials were discontinued in September 2021 because prosecutors found insufficient evidence of criminal wrongdoing.

Weidel’s spokesman has rejected suggestions that she misrepresented events. He maintains that she had discussed possible contributions with several potential supporters but had neither anticipated specific amounts nor expected the payments from the Swiss companies concerned.

The new material does not establish that Weidel knew the identity of the ultimate donor or participated in concealing the source of the funds.

Emails reveal divisions over the party’s radical wing

Another development concerns Weidel’s earlier relationship with Björn Höcke, the influential leader of the AfD’s Thuringia organisation.

According to correspondence examined by WELT, Weidel expressed serious reservations between 2015 and 2017 about the influence of nationalist and extremist elements within the party.

She warned colleagues that associations with the anti-Islam Pegida movement and the far-right National Democratic Party risked alienating mainstream conservative voters, particularly in western Germany.

Her private concerns contrast with her subsequent accommodation of Höcke’s influence within the AfD.

The correspondence provides evidence of the internal disagreements that accompanied the party’s transformation from an initially Eurosceptic political movement into one centred increasingly on immigration, national identity and opposition to Germany’s established parties.

The revelations are particularly relevant because Weidel now promotes proposals for substantial changes to Germany’s relationship with the European Union.

As EU Today previously reported, she has advocated withdrawing Germany from the euro and the Schengen passport-free travel area.

Could the material influence an AfD ban?

The leak arrives amid continuing legal and political arguments over whether the AfD threatens Germany’s constitutional democratic order.

In May 2025, the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution classified the party as a confirmed right-wing extremist organisation. However, a Cologne court issued an injunction in February 2026, preventing that classification from taking effect pending a final judicial decision.

The court acknowledged evidence of anti-constitutional tendencies within the AfD but found that the material presented was insufficient at that stage to establish that they characterised the party as a whole.

The leaked emails could potentially become relevant to future assessments.

Germany’s Interior Ministry has confirmed that domestic intelligence authorities can, in principle, consider available information when evaluating possible threats to the constitutional order.

Nevertheless, whether unlawfully obtained correspondence could be admitted as evidence, and what weight it would carry, would require separate legal examination.

A party ban can be imposed only by the Federal Constitutional Court. The present disclosures do not themselves establish the legal conditions necessary for such a decision.

Questions over authenticity and data protection

The scale of the archive introduces further complications.

The material reportedly contains bank statements, membership records, personal correspondence and other confidential information involving thousands of individuals.

Journalists have verified portions of the correspondence by comparing messages with independently retained originals. Handelsblatt’s examination, for example, identified previously exchanged emails whose contents matched records held by its own reporters.

However, verification of individual communications does not establish the authenticity of every document in the archive. Fabricated messages have also circulated online.

In an official statement on 21 October, the AfD described the breach as criminal data theft and said it would not authenticate individual documents for journalists.

The party has also reported the incident to the authorities.

For Germany’s political institutions, the affair now presents several distinct questions: whether historical campaign finance arrangements were accurately disclosed, what the correspondence reveals about the party’s internal decision-making, and whether any of the documents provide evidence relevant to ongoing constitutional scrutiny.

Those questions remain open as investigators and journalists continue examining the archive.

 

Britain and Poland are giving European security something it urgently needs: a practical plan to turn allied solidarity into stronger military capabilities. Their new Warsaw Defence Plan brings together missile development, ammunition production, maritime cooperation and protection against drones and cyberattacks, strengthening a partnership with consequences well beyond either country’s borders.

Announced as British Defence Secretary Wes Streeting met his Polish counterpart, Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz, in Warsaw, the agreement establishes the first phase of defence cooperation under the countries’ new Security and Defence Partnership Treaty. According to the Ministry of Defence announcement, it covers operations and industry across land, sea, air and cyberspace.

Its significance lies in that breadth. Modern deterrence depends on much more than the number of soldiers available for deployment. It requires protected infrastructure, reliable supplies of ammunition, effective air defences and forces capable of operating together under pressure. London and Warsaw are addressing those requirements as connected parts of the same challenge.

Air defence is a central priority. The two countries will collaborate on developing and manufacturing the next generation of air defence missiles, building on an industrial relationship that includes Poland’s procurement of the Narew system from MBDA UK. Closer procurement coordination offers an opportunity to align military requirements and strengthen production.

That approach has clear strategic value. Missiles become more useful when allies can sustain their supply, maintain their systems and plan their deployment together. By connecting industrial cooperation with operational needs, Britain and Poland can help develop the dependable defensive capacity that Europe requires against an increasingly demanding range of aerial threats.

The plan also embraces joint development of drones and technologies designed to defeat them. The ministry explicitly links this work to protecting civilians and critical national infrastructure amid Russian drone incursions. It is a welcome recognition that security must extend beyond military installations to the services and networks on which everyday life depends.

Cybersecurity cooperation follows the same logic. Strengthening the resilience of civilian and defence sites can reduce opportunities for disruption and make national responses more effective. For both countries, sharing expertise offers a practical way to improve preparedness against hostile activity that can unfold without a conventional military attack.

At sea, the agreement builds on an existing technical connection: Britain’s Type 31 frigates and Poland’s Miecznik ships share a common design. Exchanging experience as those capabilities develop should help both navies learn from each other. Planned exercises and regional coordination will also increase defensive maritime activity in the Baltic, supporting the protection of vital communications routes.

The industrial commitments are equally encouraging. BAE Systems and Poland’s PGZ will expand capacity and capability in large-calibre ammunition production. The announcement supplies no production figures or delivery timetable, but its direction is important. Credible defence requires the ability to replenish supplies and sustain operations, giving manufacturing capacity a direct role in military readiness.

Cooperation on defence education, training and workforce mobility could strengthen that foundation further. Advanced weapons programmes depend on skilled people as well as investment. Building shared expertise can support delivery while creating opportunities for engineers, technicians and the wider industrial supply chain in both countries.

Joint exercises will test the partnership in practice. Continued participation in Steadfast Defender, Polish Dragon and Joint Warrior is intended to prepare forces for challenges including electronic warfare, counter-drone operations and missile defence. Such training gives commanders opportunities to identify weaknesses, improve coordination and build confidence before a crisis demands immediate action.

Ukraine remains integral to this effort. The countries are preparing a major Coalition of the Willing exercise in Poland in November, involving thousands of personnel. The stated purpose is to prepare the Multinational Force Ukraine to support military training and post-war rebuilding. Preparation cannot determine the course of diplomacy, but it can make future commitments more credible.

For Europe, the promise is straightforward: two committed allies are connecting operational readiness with industrial strength. Delivering the plan will require sustained effort, but Warsaw and London have established a constructive agenda whose success would benefit the wider alliance.

A dispute over maritime jurisdiction in the Eastern Mediterranean has entered a new phase after the European Union joined Greece, Cyprus, Egypt, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates in formally rejecting an agreement between Turkey and Libya.

The six parties issued a joint declaration at the United Nations on 26 October, following the decision by Libya’s eastern-based House of Representatives to approve a maritime delimitation memorandum originally signed with Ankara in 2019.

The declaration, delivered by Greek Foreign Minister Giorgos Gerapetritis, argued that the agreement disregards the maritime rights of other coastal states and cannot establish boundaries affecting countries that are not parties to it.

Turkey has rejected the criticism, maintaining that its agreement with Libya complies with international law and protects the legitimate interests of both countries.

The competing positions concern more than the interpretation of a maritime boundary. They affect offshore energy exploration, relations between Turkey and its neighbours, and the political balance within Libya itself.

Why Libya’s decision changes the dispute

The original memorandum was signed in November 2019 between Turkey and Libya’s then internationally recognised Government of National Accord, based in Tripoli.

It established a claimed maritime boundary extending across part of the Eastern Mediterranean, where Greece maintains that the maritime entitlements of its islands, including Crete, must be taken into account.

The agreement was opposed by Greece, Cyprus and Egypt, while Libya’s rival eastern authorities initially rejected it.

That division appeared to weaken the political foundations of the arrangement, even though Ankara continued to defend its validity.

However, on 20 October 2026, Libya’s eastern-based House of Representatives reversed its previous opposition and approved the memorandum.

The decision reflects changes in relations between Turkey and eastern Libya, where military commander Khalifa Haftar has exercised considerable influence.

Turkey has expanded contacts with authorities in Benghazi despite having previously been associated primarily with the rival administration in Tripoli.

Approval by the eastern parliament consequently gives the agreement broader political acceptance within Libya than it enjoyed in 2019, although it does not resolve the country’s institutional divisions or the objections raised by neighbouring states.

A dispute over geography and maritime rights

The central disagreement concerns the legal principles used to determine maritime boundaries.

Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, coastal states possess rights within exclusive economic zones, while the delimitation of overlapping claims is intended to produce an equitable solution.

Greece argues that Turkey and Libya cannot establish the maritime boundary claimed in their memorandum without disregarding the legal entitlements of Greek islands situated between their coastlines.

The Greek Foreign Ministry’s response maintains that geography and the law of the sea cannot be changed through parliamentary approval of a bilateral agreement.

Turkey takes a different position on the weight that islands should carry when continental shelves and maritime jurisdictions are delimited, and is not itself a party to UNCLOS.

The dispute therefore involves competing interpretations of international maritime law as well as disagreements over the boundaries shown on maps.

The European Union has aligned itself with Greece and Cyprus.

In a statement issued on 21 October, EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas described the memorandum as incompatible with the law of the sea and incapable of producing legal consequences for third states.

The latest declaration extends that position into a broader diplomatic coalition involving governments from the Gulf and North Africa.

Ankara rejects the criticism

President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan responded on 26 October by arguing that objections from the EU and other parties had no legitimate basis.

According to his remarks on the agreement, Turkey was not seeking an advantage at the expense of other Mediterranean countries.

Ankara’s position is that its maritime arrangements with Libya reflect the interests of two sovereign states and should not be invalidated by objections from outside parties.

This creates a diplomatic complication for the EU.

Turkey remains a NATO member and an important partner on migration, regional security and Black Sea affairs, while Greece and Cyprus are EU member states whose maritime claims Brussels supports.

The Union must therefore manage a disagreement involving a strategically important partner without retreating from its established legal position.

Energy resources and Libya’s political future

The Eastern Mediterranean contains established and potential offshore gas resources, giving maritime boundaries commercial significance.

Delimitation determines which governments may authorise exploration and exploitation in particular areas, while overlapping claims can discourage investment or provoke disputes over survey vessels and drilling operations.

Greece has already concluded maritime delimitation agreements with Italy and Egypt, including a partial agreement with Cairo in 2020 that overlaps with areas claimed under the Turkish-Libyan arrangement.

The competing agreements illustrate why the issue cannot be settled exclusively through bilateral negotiations that exclude other interested coastal states.

Libya’s internal political structure introduces another uncertainty. The country remains divided between competing institutions, and the European declaration explicitly connects maritime stability with the reunification of Libyan state authorities.

As EU Today previously examined in its coverage of Eastern Mediterranean tensions, disputes over maritime jurisdiction intersect with regional military positioning and the broader relationship between Turkey and European governments.

For the moment, the confrontation remains diplomatic.

The principal question is whether the parties can prevent overlapping legal claims from developing into renewed confrontations over exploration rights while maintaining channels for negotiations with Libya and Turkey.

Europe’s electricity market recorded substantial regional differences on Tuesday, 27 October, with average wholesale prices ranging from approximately €6 per megawatt-hour in northern Sweden to more than €255 in Romania.

The figures reveal a persistent difficulty for European energy policy: although the continent has an increasingly interconnected electricity market, businesses and consumers remain exposed to very different underlying wholesale costs depending on location.

According to European day-ahead electricity market data, Sweden’s SE2 bidding zone recorded an average of €6.23 per megawatt-hour, while Finland stood at approximately €6.65. Romania reached €255.20, roughly 41 times northern Sweden’s price. Bulgaria registered approximately €254, Hungary €241 and Greece €225. Germany recorded approximately €155, Belgium €160 and France €162.

These are wholesale prices for delivery on 27 October, not final bills for households or businesses. Their differences nevertheless raise questions about how effectively Europe’s electricity networks distribute power from areas of lower-cost generation to those facing greater costs.

Why a common market produces different prices

European electricity trading is organised through interconnected national and regional markets. Cross-border capacity allows relatively inexpensive power to reach regions where demand is greater or local generation is more expensive.

When transmission capacity is adequate, neighbouring prices can converge. Physical networks, however, have limits. Congested interconnectors can prevent additional imports even when large price differences exist.

Other influences include availability of power stations, renewable output, fuel prices, consumption and system stability. Regions with substantial hydropower, nuclear generation or strong renewable production may experience comparatively low prices. Markets relying on gas-fired generation can be more expensive when gas plants are needed to satisfy the final increment of demand.

The result is a market responding to common European conditions but still shaped by local generation and transmission constraints.

Southeastern Europe’s structural constraints

The European Union Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators, ACER, has repeatedly examined the causes of regional price divergence. In its 2026 assessment of cross-zonal electricity trade, the agency considered unusually high prices and limited access to lower-cost power in southeastern Europe.

Constraints include available cross-border capacity and shortages of flexible generation able to respond to changing renewable output, especially in the evening. Countries including Greece, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Croatia and Slovenia have encountered substantial regional differences.

Those findings do not prove the cause of each price movement on 27 October. They do, however, explain why disparities can persist despite common market rules. ACER has advocated improved coordination among transmission operators, more effective use of existing networks and additional flexibility through storage and demand management.

Industrial consequences of expensive electricity

Energy-intensive industries, including steel, chemicals and fertiliser production, are particularly sensitive to electricity costs. Where contracts are exposed to wholesale markets, sustained regional price differences can influence output and investment decisions.

The relationship between wholesale prices and bills is not immediate. Firms may hedge prices, use long-term contracts or produce their own power. Network charges, taxes and government support also affect the amount paid. Still, persistent market differences can shape industrial competitiveness.

As EU Today reported, EU energy ministers are due to examine proposed changes to electricity network charges and market administration on 29 October. Network tariffs are distinct from wholesale prices, but both affect total electricity costs.

Renewables and the need for flexible networks

According to ACER’s energy-market monitoring, renewable sources represented around half of EU electricity generation in 2025. Solar energy can reduce prices during the day, but output falls sharply towards evening, sometimes requiring more expensive power stations to increase generation.

This increases the value of storage, flexible production, responsive demand and international connections that can balance surpluses and shortages between regions. Yet major transmission lines can take years to complete owing to planning, permitting, investment and construction requirements.

The priority is therefore not simply to install more renewable capacity. Europe’s grids and supporting technologies must be capable of moving and using that output efficiently.

What the price divide reveals

A single day’s wholesale prices should not be mistaken for long-term average electricity costs or a permanent competitive advantage. Nevertheless, the persistence of regional disparities documented by regulators shows the problem extends beyond isolated daily volatility.

For EU institutions, the question is whether further market integration can make energy more affordable while preserving incentives to invest in generation and transmission. National governments must balance security of supply, infrastructure financing and industrial competitiveness.

Electricity trading across Europe is increasingly integrated. The physical systems supplying it remain considerably less uniform. Until those constraints are addressed, the price of power will continue to reflect geography as well as the underlying cost of energy.

At least one person has been killed and 15 injured in successive Russian attacks on the Ukrainian capital. Strikes damaged a university campus, residential buildings and the Southern Bridge, disrupting metro services, as President Volodymyr Zelenskyy accused Ukraine’s allies of delaying critical air defence supplies.

Russian forces launched successive attacks on Kyiv between Monday evening, 26th October, and Tuesday morning, striking a university campus, residential neighbourhoods and a major bridge across the Dnipro River, causing casualties and disrupting transport across the Ukrainian capital.

At least one person was killed and 15 injured, according to updated reports on Tuesday. The attacks damaged university buildings and student accommodation in eastern Kyiv, while a subsequent strike hit the Pivdennyi, or Southern, Bridge, interrupting road and underground railway services between the two banks of the city.

The first wave began shortly before 10pm on Monday, when Russian ballistic missiles struck the Desnianskyi district, near Lisova metro station and Kyoto Park.

Buildings belonging to the State University of Trade and Economics were damaged, including student dormitories. Residential properties, medical facilities and vehicles were also affected.

Kyiv Mayor Vitali Klitschko initially reported ten injured, most of them students. Nine required hospital treatment, including three in serious condition.

In the neighbouring Dniprovskyi district, emergency workers recovered a body from a severely damaged building. Two ambulance workers responding to an emergency call were also injured.

Southern Bridge struck in renewed attack

A second wave of Russian attacks followed in the early hours of Tuesday.

The Southern Bridge was struck again, damaging infrastructure used by Kyiv’s underground railway system and forcing authorities to restrict traffic across the Dnipro.

Metro operations were disrupted on two lines. On the green line, trains operated only between Syrets and Vydubychi on the western bank and between Osokorky and Chervonyi Khutir on the eastern bank. Services across the bridge were suspended.

On the red line, Chernihivska and Lisova stations were temporarily closed, with trains operating between Akademmistechko and Darnytsia.

The bridge is one of Kyiv’s principal transport connections between its eastern and western districts, carrying both road traffic and part of the metro network.

The latest strike followed earlier damage to the same crossing on 22 October, when Russian ballistic attacks also disrupted traffic and underground services.

Repeated damage to transport crossings has complicated movement across the capital, particularly for residents travelling between the densely populated eastern districts and workplaces in central and western Kyiv.

Zelenskyy: Delays in air defence help Russian attacks

President Volodymyr Zelenskyy responded to Monday’s strikes by accusing Russia of targeting crowded civilian areas and warning that delays in Western air defence deliveries were increasing Ukraine’s vulnerability.

In a statement published on Telegram, he said Russian ballistic missiles had struck university grounds, Kyoto Park, areas near a metro station and residential buildings.

The president said there were no military installations near the affected sites and warned that further attacks remained possible.

He linked the casualties directly to Ukraine’s continuing difficulties obtaining sufficient air defence equipment.

“Artificial delays in providing air defence to Ukraine help terror,” Zelenskyy said.

He urged Western governments to ensure that political agreements on military assistance were implemented without administrative delays.

Zelenskyy also argued that Ukraine required weapons capable of destroying Russian ballistic missile launchers before missiles could be fired, rather than relying entirely on interception.

Such capabilities, he said, would offer a more effective means of protecting civilian lives.

Washington faces questions over interceptor deliveries

His criticism came hours after he publicly disclosed that Ukraine had been waiting almost a month for US Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth to approve deliveries of missiles for Patriot and NASAMS air defence systems.

“In particular, we have been waiting for nearly a month for Mr Hegseth to sign off on missiles for Patriots and NASAMS,” Zelenskyy said on 26th October.

He instructed Ukrainian officials to raise the matter again with Washington.

Ukraine is seeking additional PAC-2 and PAC-3 Patriot missiles from the United States, European countries and other partners.

Some of these weapons are purchased through NATO’s Prioritised Ukraine Requirements List, or PURL, which allows allied governments to finance American military equipment destined for Ukraine.

However, US-made weapons may remain subject to American export and transfer authorisations even when European governments have agreed to finance their procurement.

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio acknowledged that a shipment of air-defence missiles may have been delayed, but said the delay was not politically motivated. Ukraine has said it is waiting for US approval for missiles for its Patriot and NASAMS systems, as its forces face shortages of the ammunition needed to intercept incoming attacks.

The precise effect of the outstanding approvals on Kyiv’s ability to defend itself during the latest strikes has not been established. The delay adds to the pressure on a country already trying to protect its cities and critical infrastructure with limited air-defence stocks.

Kyiv’s continuing ballistic missile vulnerability

Ballistic missiles present particular challenges for Ukrainian air defences because of their high speeds and the limited time available to detect, track and intercept incoming weapons.

Patriot systems equipped with appropriate interceptors are among Ukraine’s principal defences against such attacks. Their effectiveness depends not only on the availability of launchers and radar systems but also on adequate stocks of interceptor missiles.

Russia’s repeated attacks on the Southern Bridge also demonstrate the wider consequences of damage to urban infrastructure. Even when a transport crossing remains structurally intact, damage to railway equipment or nearby installations can interrupt services for thousands of passengers.

The latest bombardment followed another substantial Russian attack on Kyiv on 21st–22nd October, which killed one person and injured more than 20.

For Ukraine, the attacks have reinforced two immediate requirements: protecting essential infrastructure against further strikes and securing a reliable supply of interceptor missiles.

Whether Washington can accelerate the outstanding approvals, and whether European partners can provide additional ammunition from their own stocks, will be central to Ukraine’s air defence preparations as winter approaches.

Main Image: By Mitte27 – Own work, CC BY-SA 4.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=113352288

Marine Le Pen could scarcely have chosen a more favourable backdrop for her presidential campaign. A weakened president approaches the exit, demonstrations expose deep public frustration, and scenes of disorder reinforce her central argument: France’s governing establishment has lost control. The cards are all falling in her favour. Whether she can play them successfully remains the question.

Launching her campaign in Orléans, Le Pen promised national renewal and tougher policing. Reuters reported a poll placing her at 32–33.5 per cent, against 17 per cent for Jean-Luc Mélenchon. Those numbers are a snapshot, but they suggest something politically consequential: the candidate once treated as an outsider now occupies the strongest starting position.

Emmanuel Macron, meanwhile, increasingly resembles a lame-duck president. Constitutionally unable to seek another consecutive term, he faces a succession contest in which his endorsement may carry limited weight. His admission of failures in anticipating the unrest compounds the damage. A presidency built around authority and personal command is approaching its conclusion with both visibly diminished.

For Le Pen, the advantage is obvious. Every confrontation between police and rioters supplies another opportunity to ask whether the government can perform its most basic duty: protecting the public. Citizens do not need to endorse her entire programme to find that question persuasive. They need only conclude that those already governing have exhausted their answers.

Yet the origins of the demonstrations matter. The Associated Press describes a movement rooted in education funding, rising living costs and inequality. Peaceful protesters cannot reasonably be bundled together with looters. Nor does the reporting establish that these disturbances are an expression of Islamism or Muslim demographic change. Misdiagnosing the crisis would weaken any serious argument for restoring order.

The broader integration debate nevertheless deserves frank treatment. A republic cannot function confidently if its citizens believe that common laws, civic obligations or freedom of expression are negotiable. Governments should confront Islamist intimidation, religious coercion and deliberate separatism wherever evidence establishes them. They should also expect newcomers to learn the language, respect constitutional principles and participate in national life.

Those expectations are legitimate. Treating an entire Muslim population as inherently unintegrated is not. Religious identity alone establishes neither hostility to France nor unwillingness to belong. The useful political distinction is between citizens who uphold democratic rules and individuals or organisations that seek to undermine them. That standard should apply consistently, whatever the religion or ideology involved.

Across Europe, political leaders would be wise to recognise the electoral danger of appearing evasive about integration. Voters seeking enforceable rules should receive practical answers: effective language teaching, access to employment, credible policing and action against extremist networks. When mainstream parties substitute moral lectures for measurable results, they leave an opening for opponents promising clarity and control.

Le Pen’s opportunity is to connect these concerns with a wider sense of abandonment. Disorder, strained services and anxiety about belonging can become parts of one political story: the state demands obedience and taxation but delivers too little security or reassurance. Her opponents will struggle if their response consists principally of explaining why voters should fear her.

But favourable circumstances do not eliminate her weaknesses. Her conviction over European Parliament funds, which she is appealing, sits awkwardly beside a campaign demanding accountability and respect for law. Her promises of spending restraint, lower business taxes and resistance to further retirement-age increases also invite scrutiny. Winning confidence requires explaining how competing commitments can be reconciled.

The challenge for her rivals is therefore substantive. They must demonstrate that public order and legitimate protest can coexist, that integration involves shared duties, and that economic grievances deserve workable remedies. Simply rebuilding an electoral barricade against Le Pen may prove insufficient if voters associate its defenders with the failures that brought France here.

For now, momentum belongs to her. Macron looks depleted; the streets convey insecurity; the establishment struggles to offer a convincing successor or a persuasive account of renewal. None of this guarantees a Le Pen presidency. It does mean that her opponents can no longer rely on her reputation to defeat her. They must recover the public’s confidence in their own capacity to govern. Otherwise, France’s crisis may become her decisive electoral advantage.

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