L’isteria crescente delle classi dominanti – e dei mass media da essi finanziati – ormai buttano tutto nel calderone del “nemico interno”: agenti russi, cittadini pagati dai russi, ingerenze islamiche e, ovviamente, i partiti della sinistra e i comunisti.

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E’ stato sufficiente che l’edizione di giovedi del giornale Politico.eu scrivesse qualche riga per mettere in moto una valanga, rivelando che l’Unione Europea ritiene di trovarsi di fronte all’escalation delle operazioni ibride russe e che si sta preparando all’eventualità che, prima o poi, queste azioni provochino delle vittime in Paesi Ue o Nato. Insomma quasi un auspicio che da qualche parte ci scappi il morto da poter strumentalizzare ai fini della propaganda di guerra, sia sul fronte esterno che sul fronte interno.

Si tratta di uno scenario che in Italia abbiamo purtroppo visto e subìto spesso: dalla strage di Piazza Fontana in poi. Su questo, nostro malgrado, potremmo tenere delle lectio magistralis a tutti gli altri paesi europei che non hanno sperimentato tragedie e orrori analoghi

Il giornale Politico.eu riferisce di una riunione di diplomatici della Ue a porte chiuse, senza telefonini e senza assistenti ha valutato il rischio di attacchi gravi, “capaci di provocare vittime su larga scala”. Due fonti diplomatiche hanno confermato a Politico che una riunione degli ambasciatori presso l’Ue, svoltasi mercoledì scorso, ha riguardato proprio questo tipo di scenario.

Per una fonte diplomatica citata dal sito, “data la portata e la vastità dell’azione russa, è inevitabile che prima o poi vi siano delle vittime. È pura fortuna che non ce ne siano ancora state”.

“È abbastanza ovvio che, quando la Russia utilizza strumenti sempre più letali per mettere alla prova la nostra preparazione e la nostra volontà di adottare contromisure, a un certo punto ci saranno delle vittime”, ha dichiarato a Politico la finlandese Teija Tiilikainen, direttore del Centro europeo di eccellenza per il contrasto alle minacce ibride. “Prima o poi, intenzionalmente o meno, questo è ciò che accade”.

Se diversi cittadini di Paesi membri dell’UE o della NATO venissero uccisi in quello che sembra essere un attacco, la pressione ad agire sarebbe enorme per entrambe le istituzioni. “Temiamo fortemente che a un certo punto venga tolta la vita a un nostro alleato”, ha affermato un diplomatico della NATO, il che renderebbe la pressione ad agire “molto alta”, riporta ancora Politico.eu.

Ma l’isteria ormai è talmente dilagante che alcuni Paesi membri della Ue, ritengono che debba essere la Nato e non l’Unione Europea la sede opportuna per trattare di questi argomenti e delle possibili soluzioni, soprattutto perché le riunioni della Ue sarebbero troppo “porose” per la fuga di notizie o di informazioni sensibili.

A rendere il tutto ancora più strumentalizzabile ai fini della mera propaganda di guerra esterna ed interna in Europa, vi è anche il tentativo di leggere le proteste giovanili e popolari in Francia come eterodirette o articolazioni di progetti di destabilizzazione. E in questo gioco sporco tutto fa brodo, dalla guerra ibrida della Russia alle ambizioni dell’islam politico.

“Quello che sta accadendo in Francia non è altro che immigrazione di massa fuori controllo“, ha scritto Donald Trump il 6 ottobre sul suo social Truth riferendosi agli scontri e alle manifestazioni che stanno attraversando la Francia. Per il presidente americano “non si tratta delle scuole”, ma dell’”Islam che vuole prendere il controllo di un Paese un tempo grande“.

A fargli eco è subito arrivato l’eurodeputato lepenista Fabrice Leggeri, esponente del gruppo della destra dei Patrioti al Parlamento di Strasburgo, secondo il quale “sulle proteste in Francia Trump non ha del tutto torto”. Perché, ha affermato durante un punto stampa al Parlamento Europeo, “le rivolte in corso, le rivolte dei cosiddetti studenti o presunti studenti, sono di fatto strumentalizzate dall’estrema sinistra e, come sappiamo, l’estrema sinistra è infiltrata da elementi islamisti”.

L’isteria crescente delle classi dominanti – e dei mass media da essi finanziati – ormai buttano tutto nel calderone del “nemico interno”: agenti russi, cittadini pagati dai russi, ingerenze islamiche e, ovviamente, i partiti della sinistra e i comunisti.

Se al posto degli ebrei mettiamo gli islamici, sono esattamente gli stessi nemici messi all’indice in Europa dai nazifascisti negli anni Trenta.

Articolo originale:  contropiano.org

Lula vence com ajuda do STF e promete transferência de renda. Flávio contesta, Senado bolsonarista pode fazer impeachment. Convulsão social à vista.

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Em 2002, Lula ganhou pela primeira vez a eleição com o slogan “A esperança venceu o medo”. Seus adversários alegavam que Lula seria uma espécie de Che Guevara no poder e faria os investimentos correrem – nada mais distante da realidade, pois o presidente é amado pelos banqueiros. De todo modo, não há contraste maior do que aquele entre a primeira e a última vitória de Lula. Nesta, as magras e pouco convincentes propostas de Lula logo deram lugar a uma campanha do medo. Flávio ia acabar com o Bolsa Família, cortar as aposentadorias e até tirar de Nossa Senhora Aparecida o título de Padroeira do Brasil – coisa que só o Papa tem poder para fazer.

Essa é a versão popularesca da campanha do medo, e é a mais racional. A versão de classe média alegava que os gays iam ser impedidos de existir; as mulheres, de abortar; e a democracia acabaria. Democracia, no caso em tela, é um conceito esotérico de difícil apreensão. Se a maioria do povo brasileiro é contra o aborto – que, em tese, já é proibido no Brasil –, então a coisa democrática é justamente impedir as mulheres de usarem o aborto como método contraceptivo. A vermos o surto histérico de parte da classe média brasileira, fica-se com a impressão de que uma Era de Aquário do Mal poderia começar caso Flávio vencesse as eleições.

As coisas iam muito bem para Flávio até as 13h22 do dia 25 de outubro. Flávio venceu o primeiro turno com uma vantagem de 2.224.965 votos sobre Lula, e tinha esperanças de herdar boa parte dos votos dos quatro candidatos terceira via, que é majoritariamente antipetista. Os três candidatos antipetistas somados tiveram 5.607.483 votos. O escritor de autoajuda Augusto Cury teve 3.448.569 votos, e os institutos de pesquisa indicavam que os votos dele seriam divididos entre Flávio e Lula no segundo turno. Assim, seria razoável esperar que Flávio ganhasse uns 7 milhões de votos no segundo turno. Lula, por outro lado, contava com a redução da abstenção para reverter o quadro. Expectativa pouco ou nada realista.

Até o início da campanha, Lula nada tinha para oferecer ao povo além de um dia extra de descanso para trabalhadores de carteira assinada, a revogação de um imposto que ele mesmo criou e o fim das apostas que ele mesmo regulamentou. Durante a campanha, ele deu o primeiro aumento em três anos ao Bolsa Família, o programa neoliberal de transferência de renda que o transformou num símbolo da esquerda brasileira, e, perguntado sobre o porquê da demora, disse que não sabia que não houve aumento, e quando descobriu, aumentou. O aumento sequer estava previsto no orçamento. Além disso, prometeu um depósito de 5 mil reais para pequenos empreendedores e uma mesada de 400 reais para estudantes universitários – sendo que o país já está com dívida pública alta e juros de 13,75% ao ano.

O estilo lulista de fazer política foi explicitado mais uma vez no último debate presidencial: tudo o que ele promete é transferência de renda, e toda a sua retórica se baseia em divisão social. Lula chegou ao ponto de dizer que só um presidente nascido no Nordeste poderia cuidar da região, pois as pessoas do Sul e do Sudeste desdenham o Nordeste. Toda crítica a um governo que passou quase 20 anos no poder é interpretada como ódio aos pobres. Lula se coloca como um pobre apenas porque nasceu nessa condição, mas é o único pobre do mundo a ganhar de um banqueiro um uísque Macallan de meio milhão de reais (80 mil euros). Perguntado por Flávio se ele gostaria de pedir desculpas aos brasileiros endividados, Lula afirmou que quem tem que pedir desculpas é a elite.

Diante dessa estagnação incontornável e deliberada, o fato político mais relevante da campanha de Flávio talvez tenha sido a adesão de Roberto Mangabeira Unger e de Aldo Rebelo, dois ex-ministros de Lula. Aldo Rebelo, em virtude da questão ambiental, já havia se aproximado muito do bolsonarismo, então sua adesão em 2026 não é uma surpresa. Mangabeira Unger, porém, é um professor de Harvard que sempre foi próximo do PDT, m partido de esquerda que recentemente se tornou satélite do lulismo, mas que até pouco tempo atrás era desenvolvimentista. Para que as figuras políticas de esquerda campeãs do desenvolvimentismo se aliem todas ao bolsonarismo, falta apenas Ciro Gomes, e foi o assessor dele, Gustavo Castañon, que organizou o encontro entre Flávio, Aldo e Mangabeira, tendo este último pegado um avião nos Estados Unidos para este fim.

Às 13h22 do dia 25, porém, o otimismo da campanha de Flávio começou a fazer água porque o PT pediu ao Tribunal Eleitoral que a votação em algumas cidades da Bahia fosse prorrogada até as 19 horas. As eleições no Brasil vão das 8 às 17h do horário de Brasília, e uma rápida apuração das urnas eletrônicas se segue. A razão do pedido era o suposto complô de prefeitos apoiadores de Flávio para tirar os ônibus da rua e impedir os eleitores de votar. No entanto, os ônibus atrasaram em Salvador porque sindicalistas petistas fizeram um “adesivaço”: quando os ônibus ainda estavam na garagem, colaram adesivos do PT, e se os ônibus circulassem assim, isso configuraria crime eleitoral. Como a circulação de ônibus é assunto da prefeitura, foi a prefeitura que reteve os ônibus para tirar os adesivos, mas até as 10h30 o trânsito já havia sido normalizado (fora que as seções eleitorais ficam a uma curta distância do endereço do eleitor na hora do cadastro do título, e pode ser mudada depois caso o eleitor queira).

Salvador é uma área que dá muitos votos ao PT. Assim, a campanha de Flávio também pediu que as chuvas em cidades de direita fossem pretextos para retardar a eleição naqueles locais. Depois o PT foi direto ao Supremo Tribunal Federal pedir que as eleições fossem prorrogadas em todo o país. O sistema inauditável do STF sorteou o ministro Zanin, ex-adovado pessoal de Lula, que concedeu a prorrogação às 17h05, depois de muitas urnas já terem sido fechadas e desligadas – sendo vedada a sua abertura.

Por fim, veio a apuração, que aconteceu numa ordem diversa da habitual (os votos do Nordeste costumam entrar por último, por exemplo, então numa eleição brasileira normal a direita começa bem e vai derretendo no final da apuração). Para espanto generalizado, Lula melhorou de desempenho em todas as regiões do país. Flávio ganhou apenas 3.721.538 novos votos (o razoável era esperar uns 7 milhões da terceira via), e Lula conseguiu ganhar inacreditáveis 10.376.694 novos votos.

Flávio anunciou que vai pedir a anulação do segundo turno, mas é pouco provável que consiga algo, já que o grande problema do Brasil no presente momento é justamente a confiabilidade do Judiciário – que trata questionamentos às urnas como atentado à democracia.

Justamente pelo fato de que o STF é percebido por grande parte da população brasileira como o maior problema do país, Flávio se empenhou em eleger senadores para poder votar impeachment de ministros do Supremo. E conseguiu: ano que vem, o Senado terá 45 senadores bolsonaristas, o que é mais da metade. Dada a insatisfação da população com o Supremo, não é implausível que eles consigam totalizar 54 votos (dois terços do senado) para tirar no mínimo um ministro.

Lula já governa com o apoio do Supremo para ignorar as casas legislativas e censurar a população. Quando a crise econômica vindoura se somar à política (imagine o leitor que a partir do ano que vem as empresas vão pagar o imposto tão logo recebam seus pagamentos da clientela), o Brasil deve passar por uma convulsão social e enfrentar uma onda repressiva. Não será fácil o fim da Nova República. No presente momento, uma criança já pagou com a sua saúde: numa favela carioca dominada pelo tráfico, as vítimas da sociedade comemoraram a vitória de Lula com fogos e tiros, dos quais um atingiu uma menina.

Muitos antissionistas exigem que o Brasil vote em Lula por causa das crianças da Palestina. Pelo jeito, só as crianças palestinas importam; as brasileiras, jamais.

Una guerra total en ciernes será parida por el curso inexorable de la Historia.

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“No permitiría que las decisiones de las grandes potencias fueran juzgadas por países pequeños”

Iosif Stalin. Actas de Yalta 1945

“El pasado no puede cambiarse; el futuro está en nuestras manos, pero las leyes que rigen el destino de las civilizaciones son tan implacables como el movimiento de los astros”

  Arnold J. Toynbee. Estudio de la Historia.  1933

Adivinar antes de demostrar. ¿Necesito recordaros que así se han hecho todos los descubrimientos importantes?

— Henri Poincaré El valor de la ciencia 1902

La mayoría de los escritores de otras y esta prestigiosa publicación, Strategic Culture Fundation, entregan sus apreciaciones y cavilaciones con base en una mayor o menor capacidad de acceso a fuentes primarias, complementadas con lo que se denomina ‘fuentes abiertas’.

En mi caso particular mis análisis se fundamentan en el registro histórico, las fuentes abiertas y la información de portales fiables o instituciones oficiales de los gobiernos y estamentos, según el tema abordado en cada tema. A ello sumo una profunda desconfianza acerca de que aquello que puedo observar sea tal cual como se presenta, incluso el decir de los personajes centrales de la vida pública internacional.

Este preámbulo para reivindicar la tarea de todos los analistas, sobre todo aquellos sin fuentes primarias y cercanas al poder, porque ofrecemos eso: un uso objetivo de la imaginación, una intuición afinada a pulso de seguir el día a día del acontecer y afirmarlo, compararlo, ponderarlo con el registro histórico. Van así, algunas especulaciones, sobre lo que será y no será la reunión a tres bandas de las grandes potencias actuales.

Reunión Xi – Putin – Trump ¿Pre-Yalta 2.0?

Los días 18 y 19 de noviembre, tendrá lugar el foro número 33 de Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperacion, APEC, en China. El lema elegido es “Construyendo una comunidad Asia-Pacífico para prosperar juntos”. Al margen de la misma, se especula sobre una reunión a tres bandas de los líderes de las grandes potencias globales y se presume un diálogo donde China, indiferente a la violencia en el mundo, es tenida en cuenta como un alto jerarca que dará la venia a los acuerdos entre las partes del conflicto o al menos, no interferirá, mientras logra algunos intereses.

En Yalta, Península de Crimea, actual Federación de Rusia, los mandatarios, Franklin D. Roosevelt, presidente de Estados Unidos, Winston Churchill, primer ministro del Reino Unido y Iósif Stalin, líder de la Unión Soviética, en febrero de 1945, tuvieron la histórica reunión concretada cuando la derrota de la Alemania Nazi era inminente. Se define como la reunión donde se repartieron las áreas de injerencia de los vencedores de la guerra.

Al parecer, aunque no conozco pronunciamiento definitivo de ningún gobierno, la reunión es tan inminente como la derrota de la OTAN y su proxy ucraniano, y es también inminente la crisis de fertilizantes, ergo de alimentos y de combustibles por el problema en los estrechos de Ormuz y Bab El Mandeb, por la guerra Israel – EE.UU. contra Irán.

Si esto parece un Yalta es porque Ucrania, exhibida como ‘defensora de su soberanía’ bajo el lema europeo de ‘ataque ruso no provocado’, así como la OTAN, de una forma irónica, no son convidadas. Son por el contrario tratadas como al nazismo derrotado.

A esto se suma la ambivalencia hipócrita de Estados Unidos, líder de la OTAN y agresor asesino de civiles rusos y que siendo co-beligerante en el conflicto se exhibe como mediador.

Europa, al margen del nuevo ciclo histórico de grandes potencias, se encuentra inmerso en protestas por la crisis de su Estado de bienestar en varios de sus países y no ignora cómo lo deja su ausencia en la reunión en Shenzhen, según el viejo dicho: ‘si no estás en la mesa de comensal, estás en el menú’. Por cierto. El 27 de octubre, ya comenzaron a llamar los pusilánimes líderes europeos de Finlandia y Noruega, al presidente Putin.

Estados Unidos negocia cierto aislamiento de Irán, por parte de Rusia y China. Esto con el fin de obrar de la mano del sionismo de manera más agresiva e impune. También, hablará de un acuerdo nuclear que comprometa a China, pese a no tener ésta ni una tercera parte del armamento que poseen Rusia o EE.UU.

La compra del diésel a Rusia, no es sólo una cantidad simbólica. Determinará en parte cómo se acumulará tal exportación rusa a través de la ruta del ártico, de la cual acaba de activar su mayor puerto exportador de combustible, Vostok Oil, en la región de Krasnoyarsk, con una capacidad inicial de 30 millones de toneladas al año de petróleo proyectadas en aumento gradual.

En promedio, entre 2023-2024, por el golfo Pérsico circularon alrededor de 860.000–870.000 barriles por día (bpd) de exportaciones marítimas de diésel de la región. Y llegaron a 1,8 millones bpd en junio de 2024, esto impulsado por nuevas refinerías en Kuwait y Omán.

Mientras, Rusia en 2025 exportó alrededor de 780.000–820.000 bpd (aprox. 3,3 millones de toneladas al mes). Siendo el segundo mayor exportador mundial de diésel después de EE.UU. Puede alcanzar 3–3,5 millones de toneladas al mes (equivalente a unos 700.000–850.000 bpd).

Lo anterior tenderá a estabilizar en parte la demanda de diésel y además vincular la ruta ártica como una forma vanguardista de circulación de todas las demás mercancías. De hecho, China, país no ártico, se ha sumado en lo que llama “Ruta de la Seda del Hielo” Donde además hay cooperación científica.

Aun siendo socios de Irán con similares intereses geopolíticos esto de alguna manera debilita la carta iraní para afectar a Trump en las elecciones y tensionar la economía global para presionar a USA y claro, proyecta una ruta poderosa que puede debilitar otros pasos marítimos de su socio BRICS+ -Egipto en el canal de Suez- y en el contexto del cambio de temperatura que afecta también al canal de Panamá con prolongadas sequías mientras se despeja el tránsito glacial del ártico a causa de la misma variación de temperatura.

A lo anterior se conecta, por un lado, el control que finalmente ha ejercido EE.UU. sobre Dinamarca para ceder Groenlandia, punto de salida ártica al Atlántico. Por otro, una dulce venganza china que fue apartada de su participación creciente en Panamá por la ‘doctrina Donroe’.

También EE.UU. negocia inversiones en los óblast nuevos que ha incorporado Rusia, donde hay grandes riquezas naturales, incluido litio e industrias metalúrgicas, además de querer administrar el gaseoducto Nord Stream, luego de haberlo hecho volar por los aires en 2022.

A cambio, Rusia espera que esta vez sí se cumplan los acuerdos a diferencia del encuentro en Anchorage, Alaska, en 2025. Estos acuerdos deben presionar a Ucrania a reconocer las regiones rusas, hacer elecciones, renunciar a su deseo de incorporación en la OTAN y a la vez, crear una arquitectura de seguridad mutuamente beneficiosa para Rusia y Europa; además el reintegro de los activos rusos incautados ilegalmente por Euroclear. A esto se suma la reanudación de las conversaciones trilaterales entre Rusia, Ucrania y Estados Unidos en Abu Dabi en noviembre.

Por su parte China desea respeto a las mismas leyes del mercado inventado ‘libre’ por occidente y articulado por la OMC; lo que implica no ser bloqueado en su rama expansiva automotriz ni de alta tecnología, -IAG- ni interrumpida en su corredor de la Ruta de la Seda que cruza por Irán. Se suma, y creo a esto se debe en parte el resultado electoral en Brasil, respetar las inversiones en el país suramericano, que es el brazo fuerte de Latinoamérica en BRICS+. Esto también implica respetar las inversiones chinas y rusas en la nueva y americanizada Venezuela.

Abro un paréntesis, respecto a las recientes elecciones en Brasil, en mi concepto el Big-Tech estadounidense es lo suficientemente fuerte para acomodar elecciones donde quiera y, por cierto, en la misma fecha del 25 de octubre, Vucic en Serbia, perdió las elecciones y denunció la previsibilidad del resultado ante el acorralamiento planteado por Europa – OTAN.

¿Hubo acaso una guerra electrónica China – EE.UU. determinando el resultado electoral? ¿Cómo entender la derrota sionista en Brasil? ¿En verdad creen que hubo tal derrota? La Bancada Evangélica que hace lobby en el parlamento, Frente Parlamentario Evangélico, o la Igreja Universal do Reino de Deus en São Paulo, réplica del Templo de Salomón, son parte de lo activo que es el sionismo desde hace años. Por si hace falta decirlo, Lula es un administrador del capitalismo brasileño, a ningún millonario le va mal con él y el sionismo sigue en expansión.

Los ‘progres’ del planeta estaban contentos por el triunfo de Lula, pues desconocen los matices duros y subrepticios de la política, sobre todo, de la política de grandes potencias. Yo también la ignoro, pero sé que siempre negocian sus intereses y no los de terceros. Recuerde el lector la cita de Stalin con la que inicio el artículo.

Esto se aprecia en la mirada a otro lado de China, India y Rusia, ante el genocidio israelí en Gaza, Líbano y Cisjordania. Esto se vio en las negociaciones ruso-estadounidenses de la crisis de los misiles en 1962 donde omitieron a Cuba. Esto no los hace países malos, son simplemente las expresiones inerciales del poder; cosa que tenía clara el cubano Enrique José Barona al describir a inicios del siglo XX a la naciente potencia norteamericana.

En mi concepto Brasil ganó con Lula, sí. Pero también puede explicarse como un principio de flexibilidad del neo imperialismo estadounidense que ha aprendido de El arte de la guerra, de Sun Wu (孫武), en aquel segmento donde señala que, al enemigo acorralado siempre se le deja una salida, para evitar volverlo violento, indómito y peligroso, al sólo poder huir hacia delante.

Si la región pierde la esperanza por estar copada de sionistas y neoliberales, puede volverse más proactiva. La tesis funciona también como complemento a las negociaciones entre potencias. No vi muy acongojado a Trump.

Cálculo de la guerra y cumplimiento de los objetivos rusos

Los objetivos de la Operación Militar Especial, si bien no han cambiado en su fondo sí lo han hecho en su forma, y ésta, es la forma de las regiones necesarias a incorporar en Rusia para acabar con la esperanza de nuevas guerras en 20, 50 o 100 años con la Ucrania occidental; que siendo la más anti rusa, es la que menos muertos ha puesto, menos destrucción ha sufrido y la que más respalda la continuación de la guerra. ¿Por qué bailan tranquilas las élites no busificadas -reclutadas por la fuerza- en bares nocturnos en Kiev y Leópolis?

Es la zona más oriental rusa étnica, idiomática y con doctrina ortodoxa la que más destrucción y muerte ha sufrido. Entonces ¿Qué negociará o negoció Rusia?

Dijo el propio presidente Putin que el acuerdo de Anchorage lo había aceptado bajo la condición de que Ucrania cedería gran parte del Donbás (Donetsk) a Rusia y a cambio, Rusia devolvería territorios que ocupa en Sumy y Járkov, que servían como “zonas de amortiguación”. Moscú mantendría su ofensiva hasta que esa fórmula fuera aceptada.

Pero esto fue hace un año. La situación siempre ha cambiado según como marche todo en el terreno. Rusia no quería incorporar regiones en la Operación Militar básica, pero ante el fracaso de las negociaciones en Estambul, saboteadas por Inglaterra, se efectuó un referéndum y se asumieron como rusas las cuatro regiones, más Crimea. Sólo resta un 9% del Donbás, ¿Por qué no tomarlo militarmente?

En mi concepto esto no es suficiente. Rusia debe tomar toda la región de la costa del Mar Negro, que implica adhesión total a Rusia de la región histórica de Novorossiya integrada por Odesa, Mykolaiv, Kherson, Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhzhia, Donetsk, Luhansk y Crimea. Si esto no se cumple, quedará el mar negro abierto para una futura escalada con Europa, siendo necesario tocar frontera con Moldavia y la franja de Transnistria para evitar también desestabilización, así como apoyar a los ciudadanos rusos, que son el 30% de la población allí, particularmente hostilizada o segregada. Además, toda Novorossiya es étnicamente rusa.

Entonces, luego de casi cinco años de guerra, Rusia simplemente mientras gana abrumadoramente en el campo de batalla, hará un trato que le pondrá en unos años en una amenaza quizá peor, cuando Europa y la OTAN o el cuerpo militar que sea, tal vez la propia Alemania, se hayan recuperado. ¿Perdonará Rusia una vez más a sus enemigos históricos que la odian hasta el tuétano de sus imperialistas huesos?

Los europeos y los nazis ucranianos no firmarán una derrota por convicción, guardarán más resentimiento, sus bases más radicales están casi intactas en Europa y Ucrania occidental, Rusia al menos debería acrecentar los bombardeos en esa zona y entender que es la Ucrania católica prooccidental la que debe ser desmantelada, piedra por piedra, para evitar su resurrección. Un imperio es arrogante por inercia, sólo la derrota humillante en su piel e ideas fundacionales le harán ver la verdad.

El presidente Putin tiene como reto ser tan o más grande que Pedro y Catalina. Debe corregir el error de Lenin, Stalin y Khruschev, así como el error de la firma de acuerdo entre Bielorrusia, Ucrania y Rusia -Tratado de Belavezha de diciembre de 1991- que cimentó en Ucrania el camino hacia la apología al nazismo, a Stephan Bandera y a la reescritura de una historia deformada y excepcionalista.

Otro aspecto que el canciller Sergei Lavrov ha señalado desde el acercamiento con la administración estadounidense trata sobre el castigo a victimarios nazis que deben ser juzgados en un Nuremberg 2.0 y para lo cual debería habilitarse una orca. Este tema de los juicios y reparaciones no se vislumbra o es de lo que menos se habla; lo que implicaría una impunidad de los crímenes sobre la población rusa e incluso la ucraniana desde 2014, cuando con el golpe de Estado, se inició la des rusificación de los oblast que intentaron ser autónomos mediante los acuerdos de Minsk y que ahora son parte del cuerpo político administrativo de la Federación de Rusia y gozan de representantes en la Duma, según las últimas elecciones de septiembre.

Entonces, desmilitarización, desnazificación, castigo a crímenes de guerra, allanamiento de toda posibilidad de osadía occidental contra Rusia, ¿Quedarían totalmente resueltas en una mesa de diálogo? ¿Congelar los logros en el terreno sin copar todos los territorios que ya son parte de Rusia, no es una debilidad? Por otra parte, ¿Entiende el Kremlin que China es un enemigo latente y solapado que tampoco desea la paz de Rusia, sino su atemperamiento mediante una guerra eterna? ¿Dimensiona la pobreza intelectual y diplomática de los emisarios estadounidenses, Kushner y Witkoff, vulgares mercaderes inmobiliarios?

La Historia es superior a los hombres, incluso a los más poderosos

Cuando en el título señalo un pre – Yalta 2.0, quiero enfatizar que, si bien se reúnen tres potencias globales, la única que desea la paz es Rusia y puede ser, como señalé, una paz que sacrifique objetivos urgentes para el futuro.

Sin embargo, la pérfida y detestable Europa, llena de crisis por estos días, no soportará ser un convidado de piedra al concurso del nuevo orden mundial post unipolar. Podría obrar de mala fe. Las élites internas de Estados Unidos que odian a Rusia volverán a impedir un acuerdo; la CIA – Mossad son su arma. Israel no desea una Rusia fuerte, aunque la mayoría de sus sionistas tienen sangre eslava, desde hace ochenta años se alinearon con el mundo anglosajón.

Como señalé, China tampoco es un socio fiable y no olvida la osadía del viejo zarismo ruso que le quitó los actuales oblast de Primorie y Amur. Tampoco los varios conflictos sostenidos, incluso durante la era soviética.

Sólo si alguno de los tres hombres y sus élites se rinde en el pre-Yalta 2.0, habría paz relativa o una nueva forma de guerra solapada. Si entiendo el carácter existencial de esta guerra para al menos dos de las partes, no será una mesa de diálogo la que lleve el fin de la guerra en Ucrania y la que se ha producido en Irán; profundamente interconectada con la primera.

Una guerra total en ciernes será parida por el curso inexorable de la Historia. Nunca un humano ha podido detener aquello que con tanto ahínco se fue formando durante siglos. Pueden los hombres aplazar los fenómenos, pero no detenerlos. Rusia deberá despejar por la fuerza las dudas que tienen sus enemigos sobre su determinación a existir.

Vladímir Putin, presidente de Rusia, siempre ha sido un buen lector de la Historia. La ve como un río que fluye inexorablemente y le pone piedras con cuidado para moldear cadencias en su cause o atemperarlo, retardarlo, pero nunca para detenerlo o desviarlo. Eso implica que la guerra total será, pero en los términos que va moldeando Rusia, Putin, su Staff.

Finland and Norway are hinting at the need for a new approach to the continent`s relationship with Russia

By Matthew Blackburn

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The Trump administration’s latest initiative to end the war is creating heartburn in Europe.

“We have to pressure the aggressor to stop the war, not the victim to surrender,” said European Union High Representative Kaja Kallas. “Squeezing Ukraine is not the right approach, and that’s why Europe is standing by Ukraine.” Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, meanwhile, insists Russia has no genuine desire for peace, pointing in particular to Russian strikes on Ukrainian civilians.

This moral language frames the conflict as a zero-sum, good-versus-evil struggle. In this light, Europeans have no choice but to unite behind Ukraine to stop Russian President Vladimir Putin.

But not all European leaders are talking this way. The press conference in Oslo on Oct. 20 featuring Zelenskyy, Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre and Finnish President Alexander Stubb was full of constructive language about ending the conflict. Stubb said the Oslo summit was the result of “substantive progress” made “under the radar.” Støre emphasised that “Europe has to be at the table” to secure a “lasting peace.” Europe, it seems, is not united on a negotiated end to the conflict.

Then on Tuesday, the two met with Putin unofficially, in an effort at de-escalation, according to reports. “We are neighboring countries to Russia,” Stubb said in a statement afterwards. “The outcome of this war will have a direct impact on our and the broader European security. Ending the war requires direct discussions.”

The Oslo summit was no bolt from the blue; Finnish and Norwegian representatives have been preparing the ground for several months. At last week’s Warsaw Security Forum, Norwegian Foreign Minister Espen Barth Eide avoided the usual binary of Ukraine’s victory or capitulation. He stressed that since the Europeans are now paying for the war, they should also lead the diplomacy to end it. Eide noted that a peace agreement could secure a democratic, independent Ukraine integrated into the EU with 80% of its original territory. Advancing this point among more hawkish European colleagues, Eide struck a tone of hope rather than fear. In an interview last Saturday, Eide noted that Europe must contribute concrete proposals for a post-war security architecture: “in the long run, we need to return to a normal relationship with Russia after the war (….) some kind of order must be restored.”

During his recent visit to the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Stubb presented a complementary argument. Restating his case for a “value-based realism,” he argued that European states should be faithful to their values but would not resolve the conflict by rigidly clinging to the moral high ground. Stubb urged the audience to keep “cooler heads”; fostering a “war mentality” would make it near impossible to conceive of peace.

Eide and Stubb are moving in a different direction from those who claim “victory” over Russia – however defined – is a prerequisite for future European security. They reject the mantra of ex-NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg that “weapons are the way to peace” and emphasize the military reality that neither side has the resources to win decisively.

This is a noble recognition of reality. Offensive actions from both sides have repeatedly failed to produce a breakthrough. Costs keep rising for both warring parties, while gains have become increasingly meagre. Europe, Ukraine, and Russia are stuck in a war that cannot be won on the terms set by either side.

Continuing the current course brings problems for all sides. Putin faces an overheating economy and increasing social fatigue and anxiety. Even if Russia destroys more and more Ukrainian infrastructure from the air, land offensives are likely to incur heavy losses. Ukraine’s situation is even tougher. Its chronic manpower shortages have led to intensified forced mobilization and increased social strains. Blockaded at sea and bombarded from the air, Ukraine is also short of money and weapons, constantly appealing to Western allies to plug the gaps.

The European coalition behind Ukraine faces serious problems of its own. Many European states are facing a sovereign debt crisis as war costs mount. The EU has been unable to persuade Belgium to make use of Russia’s frozen assets to fund the war. All the while, the dirty reality is that, since the war began, Europe has spent more on Russian energy imports than on weapons for Ukraine.

Tuesday’s meeting in Oslo provides a way out of this mess. As Stubb said at Tuesday’s press conference: “Peace requires patience. But unfortunately, war does not wait. People are dying each and every day. Our job is to do what we can to end it.” Norway and Finland are communicating the urgency of ending a senseless war. Referring to the recent spat between Trump and Zelensky, Støre advised against dwelling on past disagreements: “What matters now is what lies ahead of us.”

On the same day, Kaja Kallas looked back in anger. She accused the Trump administration of trying to “push Ukraine into surrender” on “Putin’s terms.” Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen, for her part, presented Ukraine as Europe’s only protection: “If we allow Ukraine to fall, we will open the way for Russia to advance into other parts of Europe.”

One can understand fears that, if Ukraine is rendered neutral with limits on its armed forces, Russia would hold the whip hand over Europe. Nobody wants to let Moscow dictate the terms of the European security architecture through violence. But at this point, Europe’s rejection of a “dirty deal” could mean impotently watching Ukraine’s destruction over the next six months. How would this outcome improve European security or prestige?

Norway and Finland have offered the most constructive European response to U.S. diplomacy since Trump returned to the White House. They offer Europe a new language of patient diplomacy to replace maximalist rhetoric. This is in line with both countries’ previous experience mediating and building bridges with Russia. It also recognizes a basic fact: all protracted wars not settled decisively on the battlefield — which is to say, the vast majority of wars — end in negotiated settlements between the aggressor and the defender. America’s signature is absolutely necessary to secure such an outcome.

Mainstream analysis seems unable to accept these realities. It is stuck in moral posturing or fearmongering. There is still little serious discussion of what compromises might be struck. The 28-point plan that U.S.-Russian diplomacy developed in 2025 should not be equated with Ukraine’s capitulation, nor is it a recipe for turning Ukraine into Belarus. Ukraine would enter the EU, receive reconstruction assistance, and retain armed forces on a level comparable to Finland’s. It is time to return to the core points on which a deal must be struck.

Russia has responded positively to the proposals sent from Oslo. Ukraine, Russia, and the U.S. have agreed to a three-way summit in November, according to Zelensky. The key question now is whether other European governments will take the Oslo initiative seriously and agree on who can represent Europe in these talks. Dmitri Peskov, Putin’s press secretary, has cautiously welcomed the idea that Alexander Stubb could represent Europe in the negotiations.

Finland and Norway’s more moderate language is a crucial first step toward a shared European understanding that continuing the war in its current form is self-defeating. As Eide observed at the U.N. last month, “diplomacy can work – if we allow it to.”

But first, Europe must decide: will it support or sabotage the U.S. effort to build a diplomatic off-ramp?

Original article: responsiblestatecraft.org

This Putin-Trump or Trump-Putin Diesel Deal is a vastly better opportunity for a ‘reset’ than the misspelled red button that Hillary Clinton presented to the Russians all while the Maidan was being orchestrated.

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Every once in a while the Mainstream Media can delight us by choosing to show an actual piece of reality. Of the big ones that are out there, Fox News seems to have at least three droplets of their humanity left and so it shouldn’t be too surprising that they invited Federalist editor-in-chief Mollie Hemingway onto their program Special Report to argue in favor of Trump’s potentially historic deal with Putin. The most interesting part was that she got the real ‘white hat cowboy’ treatment, seeming to offer to the audience the obviously better path; the path of peace with Russia. This type of propaganda is great for those of us who want to avert a nuclear WWIII, Yahoo!News featured a clip from the previously mentioned show under a headline that summed up things quite nicely; “Mollie Hemingway: Trump’s Russian Oil Deal Puts The American People First, “We’re Not At War With Russia“. Oh how lovey that sounds but is it really a good deal for the public of the United States?

The arguments against the deal are both weak and Globalist

The counterarguments against this diesel deal seem to be that ‘the Russians help Iran and thus they are bad’ that is to say, this deal cannot be supported because it would be against the Zionist agenda in an indirect way. The other seemed to be that this move violates the spirit, but not technicalities, of the Lindsay Graham Bill. Well, if anyone would know about violation it’s the dead senator, but was there ever a moment when the majority of Americans cried out for sanctions packages against Russia? How would spitting on the grave of Graham change anything for the worse for the normies? It wouldn’t, and no one raising kids in America cares about Graham’s legacy when they want to put food on the table for their family.

There is also the counterargument that the diesel deal ‘ betrays Ukraine’, which is a sentiment much stronger in Europe than Washington, but Project Ukraine still has plenty of support from the shadows of the American capital, just not so much from within the White House. But if we examine the arguments against having diesel come from Russia as a whole, they are all related to U.S. foreign policy and/or ‘feels’. That is to say, there don’t seem to be any arguments as to how selling diesel fuel to America could possibly make things worse for Joe Average and that is very telling. All of the arguments say it would somehow be bad for our currently disastrous American foreign policy follies.

So again, in a global sense, how exactly does regulated trade, between two countries on a voluntary basis, that brings down prices in the USA, and does not take away any jobs, cause problems for the American people? How does antagonism of the world’s largest nuclear power with the most potent hypersonic technology, that has repeatedly stated that it doesn’t want war, a problem for the American people? How does supporting Project Ukraine, do anything for the American masses? Control of Delaware is important to Americans especially the ones that live there, is control of the Donbass somehow just as vital to everyone across the 50 States?

At this point in 2026, it is very hard to build any sort of argument for any of the insane spending on foreign conflicts of luxury that have been going on since the end of the Cold War in 1991. All of these dubious expenditures that have added up to our 40 trillion+ dollars in debt were never for the benefit of the American people. It is almost like the talking heads that advocate for a blindly aggressive U.S. foreign policy actually hate the average American, because all of their proposed plans, that may kill foreigners directly, certainly punish Main Street just the same, but in a much slower and more agonizing torturous way.

Dmitriev’s ‘World of Optimism’ is one normal people want to live in

Kirill Dmitriev is convinced that economic cooperation between the USA and Russia does not have to be limited to diesel fuel. He believes that Russia’s excess of fertilizer could also be a major benefit to farmers who may finally be able to fuel up their tractors at an affordable price. Although this might be tricky, Russia has cheap energy and plenty of room in Siberia for data centers too and Dmitriev sees a lot of potential in this area. Russia even has energy exports of electricity to neighboring China, so perhaps some sort of data center collaboration could be possible, but that would require much more trust than is currently present. As we all know Dmitriev is a big believer in the building of the tunnel/bridge from Alaska to Chukotka. He has even proposed to Elon Musk a joint venture to use his Boring Company to drill from the American side. A massive friendship project is surely needed between these two countries but there are many difficulties in making the tunnel work, especially the fact that it would be located in an extremely remote and unpopulated area and the train rail/wheel standards of both nations are different.

But again if we take a look at a famous quote from Kirill Dmitriev we see a big argument in favor of the Trump-Putin Diesel Deal that many Americans could agree with:

“International collaboration between the superpowers is key for the stability of the global economy.”

Beyond just the diesel fuel now, do these words sound like something that would be of benefit to the Average American or should we listen to John McCain’s status quo musings from beyond the grave?:

“Giving peace a chance only gives Saddam Hussein more time to prepare for war on his terms, at a time of his choosing, in pursuit of ambitions that will only grow as his power to achieve them grows.”

In the above quote you could take the name Saddam Hussein and substitute it for President Putin or any other person the establishment doesn’t like. It is this dimwitted ‘defense through offense’ attitude that is destroying the U.S. economy, all while the houses outside of DC just keep getting bigger-and-bigger.

Considering the U.S. just finally and formally gave up on Iraq these words above ring true as an anti-argument for the insane foreign policy that is bankrupting what used to be, and should be today, the wealthiest country in the world. If Washington had not invested in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Balkans, Project Ukraine, the Iran War, PNAC, Globalism, etc., wouldn’t the average gent in Pittsburgh be living much better?

In terms of economic partnership there are other options beyond what the ever optimistic Dmitriev has stated that I thought would be worth at least listing in brief:

• American-style semi-trucks and trucks in general are road legal in Russia unlike many places on the planet with tight streets. Russia and America share ‘bigness’ and so long-haul American trucks could find a great market in Russia and Russian short-haul trucks would be great for America. All of the European automotive brands have bailed on Russia being replaced by China but there is still plenty of room on the market. This ‘bigness’ capable logic applies to all sorts of machinery beyond trucks, ‘Everything is Bigger in Texas and Tomsk’ and that is a point of economic benefit.
• Entertainment media in Russia is desperately underfunded, while the U.S. side of things is committing suicide via the ‘woke agenda’, there must be some sort of synthesis here. Joint Russo-American entertainment media projects could shake up the entire industry and get those big profits Hollywood blockbusters used to make.
• Education is believed to be much better in Russia and ‘Russian Math’ seems to be a hit in the USA, at least in NYC, so if the nation is to give up on Globalist ambitions the population needs to get smarter and more competitive very fast because the BRICS nations push their children to the max. Russia could assist with this but of course under the complete oversight and control of the American side just in case.
• American Football needs a new market with a nation that has violent macho white guys, Eastern Europe is the only option for the NFL. Russians like violent sports and their soccer teams always underperform, they need a new summer sport and the USA has it.
• New embassies consulates and more could be constructed as part of this new normalization. The old ones were taken away, so why not build new amazing ones for fun and profit?
• Russia’s Far East is the ‘window to Asia’ but it also faces towards Oregon and California, there might be many in America who would want to participate in the massive buildup of the Russian region. Trump himself loves a good real-estate deal.
• It is important to note that anything related to security, policing, and things of a secret nature are of course off limits and are never going to be an option. This cooperation cannot come too close to the ‘hearts’ of either system for obvious reasons. Both America and Russian must be fully sovereign in all regards no matter what they agree to.

This Putin-Trump or Trump-Putin Diesel Deal is a vastly better opportunity for a ‘reset’ than the misspelled red button that Hillary Clinton presented to the Russians all while the Maidan was being orchestrated. This deal tells the American Public that finally we need to use peace to make your lives better. We need to not waste resources antagonizing Russia, and this whole Multipolar World thing may just work out for rural Kansas too. But this is only a start, U.S. sanctions are a punishment for a crime that the Russians believe they did not commit and until those sanctions are truly gone we cannot say ‘it’s over’ but perhaps we can say ‘it’s starting’ unless all good will vanishes after the mid-term elections.

Ukraine’s EU accession would be financial suicide for Eastern and Southern Europe. It would become the largest, poorest member — absorbing nearly all cohesion funds.

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EU enlargement has become a trap in which political intentions collide with economic reality; Eastern and Southern Europe will bear the brunt of the impact if Ukraine joins the European Union. Ukraine is a war‑torn country, and EU citizens are already footing the bill for its reconstruction and the support of its refugees. The EU’s cohesion policy would collapse: Ukraine would become the largest and poorest member state, absorbing virtually all available development funds. Current beneficiaries – such as Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Spain, and Greece – would lose 80% to 100% of their cohesion funding and, overnight, become net contributors.

Compared to Western European countries, nations such as Greece, Spain, and Hungary are “poor countries.” To illustrate: the minimum monthly wage for an employee in Greece is around €900, whereas in the Netherlands it is approximately €2,300 for a 40‑hour workweek.

In the planning for the next seven‑year EU budget, starting in 2028, the potential accession of Ukraine must be taken into account – at least according to the rhetoric of key EU figures, such as Ursula von der Leyen and her political elites.

Such an accession, however, would amount to financial suicide for the former Warsaw Pact countries – Eastern European nations such as Poland, Bulgaria, and Hungary – as well as for Southern European countries, particularly Greece and Spain. Furthermore, it would spell disaster for France, a Western European nation currently grappling with large‑scale demonstrations fueled by the state’s insolvency. Some economic experts are already warning that France could become a second Greece – a country that, in 2015, faced extremely harsh austerity measures, endured the eurozone crisis, and remains a financial burden to this day, especially for its own citizens. We are currently witnessing a clash between the political ambitions of Western European figures – such as Ursula von der Leyen and her entourage, as well as NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte – and economic reality. It is Eastern and Southern Europe that stand to bear the brunt of the consequences.

The problem with Ukraine is not just the issue of reconstruction and the funding required for the many refugees – who, in theory, could return home, though in practice this rarely happens (consider the case of Syria, where tens of thousands remain in the EU, either unwilling or unable to return). There is also the matter of the devastation of the agricultural sector: Ukraine’s vast, fertile farmlands and massive agribusinesses would consume roughly one‑third of the EU’s entire agricultural budget.

To prevent a collapse, Brussels would either have to increase contributions from member states – a move likely to be blocked by Western nations – or drastically cut per‑hectare subsidies for farmers in countries like France, Germany, Poland, and Hungary. Such a move would risk an agricultural breakdown, potentially leading to tractor blockades across Europe.

In reality, an agricultural collapse is already underway within the EU – not because of Ukraine, but due to the EU’s utopian policies. The Netherlands, in particular, has implemented strict EU nitrogen‑reduction directives in an extreme manner, leading to the buyout of hundreds of farms and the departure of many farmers to countries outside the EU (notably Canada). Agricultural enterprises that have existed for centuries – and which once formed the backbone of the economy in the Netherlands – are now disappearing to make way for defense interests; after all, the military requires ammunition depots and training grounds for an imagined war against Russia. Under the guise of nitrogen reduction and climate change, the state is effectively securing farmers’ land for military use, and the accession of Ukraine will only exacerbate the situation.

Since 2022 (the year of what the EU refers to as the Russian invasion), the European Union has largely suspended import tariffs on Ukrainian agricultural products to provide economic support to the country. As a result, imports of inexpensive Ukrainian poultry and eggs into the EU have risen exponentially. In 2025, the Dutch poultry sector, which was the largest in Europe, expressed concern regarding the renewed trade deal between Europe and Ukraine. Under this new agreement, the the quotas – within which Ukraine is permitted to export to Europe duty‑free – have been significantly increased for a number of agricultural products. For instance, the quota for chicken meat entering Europe has been raised from 90,000 tonnes to 120,000 tonnes, and for eggs from 6,000 tonnes to 18,000 tonnes.

This points toward the “death” of the poultry industry in Western Europe (the Netherlands) and an increase in the emigration of Western European businesses. Some refer to this as “depopulation” – a sensitive term in Europe – but I would describe it more accurately as “depopulation of businesses” coupled with the “expropriation of farmers and businesses.”

However, the Brussels elites face another major problem: they have promised Ukraine a swift accession to the European Union. These elites make almost monthly “unexpected” visits to Kiev to assure their “hero,” Zelensky, of their support – in the form of money (from EU taxpayers), weapons, and the prospect of EU membership. Yet a rapid accession would be suicidal for the European Union (and for the elites themselves).

The most likely solution is that Ukraine will not be granted full membership in terms of the distribution of funds. A transitional period of 10–15 years could be introduced – much like the way Albania, Turkey, and North Macedonia have been kept on a string for years – during which Kiev would have only minimal access to funds, and its participation in the agricultural market would also be restricted. Yet this would expose the European political elites (such as former Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte) as liars – though, in fairness, that is nothing new.

Almost every year, Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission, visits Albania, North Macedonia, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Montenegro to assure them of her support (and that of the EU) – a practice that has continued for more than 15 years. Meanwhile, the citizens of these countries have largely grown completely fed up with the empty promises. We are now also seeing unrest emerge in Albania, where Prime Minister Edi Rama – a good friend of Mark Rutte, who also visits the country regularly – has been in power for years but is currently facing significant resistance from his own population; an opposition that has reached an unprecedented level, fueled in part by the so‑called “Flamingo Revolution.”

Take Turkey, for example, which has been waiting 39 years to join the European Union. It first submitted an application for membership in 1987 – to what was then called the European Economic Community – and it has been 27 years since it was officially recognized as an EU candidate country in 1999. This has only served to distance Turkey further from Europe, especially when contrasted with the almost obsessive rhetoric from the EU regarding its unwavering, unconditional support for Ukraine in its war against Russia – or, as they term it, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Other countries in and around Europe – such as Montenegro – are also involved in the so‑called accession process, with active negotiations and a projected timeline pointing toward potential membership around 2028. As with Ukraine, however, it is unlikely that they will meet the requirements regarding corruption. Serbia finds itself in a similar position, and Georgia is also a potential candidate – a fact that causes displeasure in Russia. After all, the majority of Georgian territory lies just south of the Greater Caucasus, which is traditionally considered the boundary between Europe and Asia; a situation comparable to that of Turkey. Armenia (in Western Asia) intends to submit a formal application for EU membership in the near future, though it has not yet done so. Armenia is not a European country; the EU views such nations primarily as geopolitical, strategic tools to help encircle Russia, even though, in reality, these countries remain far removed from Europe.

For Ukraine, and for Zelensky in particular, this would be a slap in the face if they could not join in 2028, as they are not fighting for second‑class membership or to be kept waiting like the above‑mentioned countries, and in particular Turkey. Consequently, EU enlargement has turned into a trap for the European Union, whereas said political will collides with harsh economic reality.

In 2016, a referendum was held in the Netherlands regarding Ukraine’s accession and its association agreement with the EU – the first and, to date, only referendum to take place in the Netherlands, a country that considers itself a democracy! The outcome was unwelcome to Dutch politicians and the EU (it should be noted that the Netherlands is one of the EU’s founding member states); consequently, no further referendums have been held in the Netherlands, and the mechanism itself has even been abolished. The Dutch public voted “NO” to Ukraine’s accession; the primary reason for this “NO” vote was the widespread corruption in Ukraine.

Moreover, many (Dutch) citizens feared even then that this would lead to problems with Russia and that Europe might ultimately have to fight on behalf of Ukraine – pointing to the European Union’s mutual assistance clause (Article 42, paragraph 7). This clause stipulates that if an EU country becomes the victim of armed aggression on its own territory, the other EU member states are obligated to provide all the aid and assistance within their power. It now appears that this obligation is effectively being acted upon, even though Ukraine is not an EU member state; the public and EU citizens have, in effect, been misled by their own politicians and are now paying a high price in the form of arms shipments, the loss of gas supplies, and the deployment of weaponry.

Anyone who wants to view the protests in Italy as a national anomaly, the result of some “maranza” or a few agitators, should look beyond the Alps.

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An increasingly tense situation

On October 24, in the center of Milan, several stores on the shopping streets covered their windows with wooden panels, and some large international chains closed their stores, urging customers to shop at outlying locations. A picture is worth a thousand words. Merchandise is barricaded away, the citizen-consumer is sent to the suburbs, and the “showcase city” discovers it is afraid of the real city. In Turin, at the head of the march, a banner read: “We won’t pay for the war.” The march was stopped by several police charges.

Seven days earlier, on October 17, the Milan demonstration against the high cost of living had ended in clashes all the way to Piazza Duomo, with fifty people detained, half of whom were minors; tensions also flared in Turin and Bologna. The mobilization calendar already has two dates marked: the general strike by the grassroots unions on October 30 and the CGIL strike on November 20, which will be joined by the European student strike.

The government’s official narrative is well known: public order, infiltrators, and violent elements to be isolated. This article offers an alternative interpretation – that of scientific socialism. It asks who is paying for the crisis, who is profiting from it, and what role the state and its foreign policy play in distributing the burden. The answer, I’ll say in advance, does not flatter Palazzo Chigi.

Let’s start with the numbers, which have the merit of not aligning with any political party – at least for now. In September, Italian inflation rose to 4.2% year-over-year, up from 3.3% in August, driven by energy prices, which rose by 22.3%. Frequently purchased items – those bought every week – rose by 5.3%; unprocessed food by 5.5%. This is the highest figure in three years.

So much for the statistics. The political dimension comes into play when we break down the average. In the third quarter, the harmonized index rose by 4.4% for households with low spending levels and by 2.9% for those with the highest spending levels. A difference of one and a half percentage points, which Istat attributes to the different composition of consumption: those with low incomes spend almost everything on utility bills, gas, and groceries – exactly the items that are becoming more expensive. In short, inflation isn’t a rain that wets everyone equally. It’s an umbrella for some and a bucket for others. Marx would have called it by its name: a redistribution of value shifting from wages to profit and rent without needing to alter the contract, because all it takes is adjusting the price.

The National Consumers’ Union has translated the 4.2% into hard cash: an additional 1,108 euros per year for the average family, 1,516 for a couple with two children. On the same day, Istat recorded a plunge in consumer confidence, from 94.5 to 91.2. The October protests are the political expression of that 91.2.

The wage picture brings things full circle. According to the Istat Annual Report, Italian contractual wages have lost 8.6% of their purchasing power since 2019. In the second quarter of 2026, after ten quarters of modest recovery, wages once again began to rise at a slower rate than prices. The OECD forecasts a further 0.9% loss for Italy in 2026 and calculates that, compared to 2021, Italian workers have effectively worked 20 days a year for free. The government flaunts record employment figures like a trophy. It’s right to flaunt them: they’re the trophy of a capitalism that has learned to make people work more while paying them less. More people employed, lower wages. It’s not a paradox – it’s the formula.

The “Leopard” fiscal maneuver

Faced with this scenario, what has the Meloni government done? It has done what it does best: it has shifted cents from one pocket to another of the same citizen, calling it relief.

Take diesel, the fuel for trucks, tractors, fishing boats, and sixteen million cars. With the budget law for 2026, the government had accelerated the alignment of excise taxes between gasoline and diesel, raising the tax on diesel by 4.05 cents starting January 1. Then came the energy crisis of 2026, and, starting in March, a series of stopgap decrees offering temporary discounts. By the end of September, the discount on diesel had been cut in half, from about 12 to 6 cents, and the average price reached nearly 2.36 euros per liter – the highest level since records began. On October 5, the discount expired, replaced by “variable excise taxes”: the government promises to return tomorrow, in the form of a reduced excise tax, the additional VAT revenue it collects today due to the price increase. On October 21, self-service diesel still cost 2.259 euros per liter. The CGIA estimates a total increase of 13.6 billion in fuel spending by households and businesses in 2026 compared to 2025. Meanwhile, Germany – which no one accuses of lax accounting – has cut the tax on gasoline and diesel by 14 cents per liter from October 1 through the end of the year. In Rome, the tax authorities have a long memory when it comes to collecting revenue and a short one when it comes to refunding it.

Then there’s the 2027 budget law, the last of this legislative term, the one that’s supposed to see the government through to the next election. The total budget announced is 23.4 billion. But upon closer inspection, the pie shrinks: according to calculations reported by la Repubblica, about 9.5 billion remains for the government’s “identity-based” measures, while 14.3 billion is absorbed by energy and defense spending financed through the flexibility requested from Brussels. Parliament voted for a deviation of 29 billion “for energy and defense” – two words that, in the government’s lexicon, are now uttered in the same breath.

The mechanism allocates up to 0.3% of GDP per year for defense and the same amount for energy security in 2027 and 2028. According to the Budget Policy Document, approximately 2.4 billion is allocated to healthcare.

The government claims the contribution requested from banks and insurance companies – just over five billion in 2027 and about 10.7 billion over the three-year period. “Fine,” one might say. But the proportions tell the story better than the press releases: the financial sector is making a temporary and decreasing contribution (0.21% of GDP in 2027, 0.10% in 2029) after having reaped inflated margins for years – driven precisely by high interest rates and inflation – while workers bear the burden structurally. Starting in 2027, with the phasing out of “Quota 103” and the “Women’s Option,” the automatic adjustment based on life expectancy takes effect: old-age retirement at 67 years and one month, with early retirement available at 42 years and 11 months of contributions for men. The government that had promised to abolish the Fornero reform has become its most diligent enforcer. For the bank, a one-time payment; for the worker, one more month of life on the factory floor, on a permanent contract.

The European Commission, for its part, warns that incentives for consumption would further fuel the cost-of-living crisis. This is the core of the doctrine: if energy prices rise, demand is to blame; if demand falls, it’s because wages are too rigid. In both cases, the bill falls on those who live on wages. Where, however, is the fiscal leeway? In the clause that grants it for tanks. Butter must wait; the cannon has the fast lane.

Kalecki at Palazzo Chigi: Italian-style military Keynesianism

Here we arrive at the crux of the matter that the mainstream press carefully avoids. So-called European rearmament is not merely a strategic choice. It is also an economic policy, and as such must be judged.

Italy has decided to tap into the European SAFE program, requesting 14.9 billion in defense loans, repayable over 45 years. Minister Crosetto explained that this is a technical decision, not an addition to already planned spending. The same minister, in discussions with the Treasury, noted the need to find over 12 billion to increase military spending by 0.5% of GDP by 2028, in accordance with NATO commitments. Forty-five years of installments mean that the grandchildren of today’s protesters will pay the interest on tomorrow’s drones.

Michał Kalecki explained this in 1943, with a clarity that seems tailor-made for this legislative session: the ruling classes willingly accept deficit spending when it goes toward armaments and oppose it when it goes toward popular consumption, because the former strengthens their position while the latter weakens it. Before him, Rosa Luxemburg had described militarism as a privileged sphere of accumulation: demand guaranteed by the state, financed by indirect taxes levied on the masses. Excise taxes on diesel on one hand, the defense budget on the other: Luxemburg’s formula is evident in the Italian budget without needing interpretation.

The German case helps illustrate where this path leads. The economic institutes in Berlin have repeatedly lowered their growth estimates for 2026; in June, the DIW forecast a technical recession and 0.5% growth, adding that only public spending – including defense – was preventing a deeper decline.

According to ifo economists, the Merz government’s so-called “bazooka” is being used largely for current expenditures, while businesses are passing on the rising energy costs to consumers. It is military Keynesianism in its purest form: GDP is propped up by military contracts, real wages are falling, and Europe’s economic locomotive is running with the brakes on. Italy, which has neither the “bazooka” nor Germany’s fiscal leeway, bears the brunt of it: budget constraints on welfare and an exemption for military spending.

All of Europe takes to the streets, because the crisis has no passport

Anyone who wants to view the protests in Italy as a national anomaly, the result of some “maranza” or a few agitators, should look beyond the Alps. On the weekend of October 17 and 18, hundreds of thousands of people protested in various European countries, including France, Belgium, Italy, Portugal, and Albania.

France, as is often the case, served as a testing ground. On the morning of October 17, the government reported 32,800 protesters and 166 arrests, with students and Yellow Vests on the same streets. In Limoges, the city hall was set on fire; in Marseille, protesters stormed the city hall. Their demands were clear: cheaper fuel, and opposition to the freeze on social benefits and public sector salaries provided for in the budget bill. Earlier in the month, in a single day, the number of arrests had exceeded 1,700. On October 24, the “Yellow Vests” called for their “second act.”

The parallel with Italy is instructive for two reasons. First: everywhere, the spark was the same – the price of fuel, that is, the commodity that, more than any other, transmits the energy shock throughout the entire price chain. Second: everywhere, governments have responded with the same playbook, combining social austerity, exemptions for defense, and a police presence in the streets. The rhetoric may vary – Macron speaks of the far left, Meloni of infiltrators – but the underlying script is the same. This comes as no surprise. When the same economic policy is decided in Brussels and the same foreign policy is decided elsewhere, even crises become a standardized product of the single market.

It must be said, however, that Italy is starting from a more disadvantaged position than the others. With real wages stagnant for thirty years and GDP growth projected at 0.8% in 2027 (0.6% without the budget), and with debt set to peak at 138.5%, the country has no safety net. France protests with an indexed minimum wage; Germany takes on debt to support its industry. Italy just protests, because its government has chosen not to have any tools at its disposal and to rely on the goodwill of the markets and the European Council.

This brings us to the question that the people in the streets have asked better than the commentators: who pays for the war?

It’s important to start from a firm foundation. The energy shock of 2026 stems primarily from the war in the Middle East and the crisis in the Strait of Hormuz; Istat itself, in its Annual Report, linked the risk of inflation once again outpacing wages to the prolonged blockade of the Strait. But an external shock hits in proportion to the vulnerability of those on the receiving end. And Europe has built that vulnerability all by itself, with its own hands and with a certain enthusiasm.

Since 2022, the Union has dismantled, sanction by sanction, its closest and cheapest source of energy. Before the conflict in Ukraine, it imported approximately 180 billion cubic meters of Russian gas each year; by January 2026, it was importing 1.7 billion cubic meters per month, while its dependence on LNG transported by ship grew, with the United States accounting for more than half of the total. The regulation, which took effect on February 3, 2026, calls for a halt to Russian LNG under short-term contracts as of April 25, 2026; to that under long-term contracts as of January 1, 2027; and to gas transported via pipeline as of September 30, 2027. According to the IEEFA, the share of U.S. gas could rise from 27% in 2025 to about 40% by 2030. Dependence on a single supplier via pipeline has been replaced by dependence on suppliers via sea – which are more expensive, farther away, and, as the Strait of Hormuz demonstrates, vulnerable to any crisis along the routes. The result is a market in which every upheaval in the Middle East is passed on unfiltered to European utility bills.

The saga also has a second act. In the first nine months of 2026, Europe spent approximately 7.88 billion euros on Russian LNG from the Arctic. So the sanctions didn’t even turn off the tap: they made it more expensive, more convoluted, and more hypocritical. Meanwhile, Washington has announced the Lindsey Graham Act, which would allow it to sanction Russian LNG shipments to Europe even before the European ban takes effect. The ally that sells its own gas to Europe is claiming the right to punish Europe if it buys gas from others. Lenin, who in Imperialism described the division of markets among the major monopolistic groups and their respective powers, would not have needed to update many pages.

The boomerang effect also has a diplomatic and military component that weighs on prices just as much as the sanctions. NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte argued in Berlin that Russia might be capable of attacking Europe within 5 years. On October 12, in Warsaw, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, General Grynkewich, promised that NATO forces would destroy anything involved in a potential attack, while Moscow, the previous month, had warned that it would use nuclear weapons if the Alliance attempted to isolate Kaliningrad. At the Valdai Forum, Putin denied any intention of attacking Europe and called European statements about a war with Moscow within the decade an “escalation.” Everyone will interpret Moscow’s words as they see fit. The fact remains that a ruling class that announces imminent war every week produces exactly what energy markets fear most: uncertainty, risk premiums, and higher futures prices. Fear is a commodity, and we pay for it at the pump.

Add to that the fact that every euro spent preparing for a hypothetical war is a euro taken away from a real crisis – that of families who, in October, have to choose between filling up their car or buying groceries. The rhetoric of the “Russian threat” thus serves a dual purpose. Externally, it justifies rearmament and sanctions. Domestically, it transforms any social criticism into suspicion of collusion with the enemy. Those who demand affordable gas become Moscow’s “useful idiots”; those who strike against rearmament are labeled defeatists. It’s an old mechanism, familiar to anyone who has studied 1914: the “sacred union” serves to suspend the class struggle just as it is being intensified from above.

Who pays for rearmament? A rhetorical – and hypocritical – question

Let’s return, then, to the banner in Turin. “We won’t pay for the war” is a slogan, and like all slogans, it simplifies. But it simplifies in the right direction. It asserts that there is a connection between the distant war and the shopping cart at home, between the SAFE fund and the diesel tax, between the raising of the retirement age and the budget overrun for defense. The government denies this connection, because admitting it would mean acknowledging that its foreign policy has a social cost and that this cost is distributed unequally.

Marxism has never viewed crises as mere hiccups along the way. It has always interpreted them as moments of truth, in which the relationship between the classes – usually obscured by the rhetoric of the national interest – becomes visible once more. The fall of 2026 is one such moment. Low-income families facing 4.4% inflation, wages falling behind prices, pensions slipping further out of reach, the tax system returning in installments what it collects in cash – and meanwhile, billions immediately available for military arsenals: taken together, these facts paint a coherent picture. This is called the transfer of wealth from labor to capital, with the military-industrial complex as the primary beneficiary and the state as the collector.

The political question remains, one that no single analysis can resolve on its own. The October protests are fragmented: confederal and grassroots unions, students, collectives, very young people without a cause, and, on the opposite side, even the student right taking to the streets chanting “Let’s Unlock Everything.” Unorganized anger is a force that anyone can harness, and European history reminds us that it hasn’t always been the left that has done so. The task of those who identify with socialism is to give that anger a direction: wages indexed to prices; structural – not symbolic – taxation of excess profits in the energy and financial sectors; the reestablishment of an energy supply system based on affordability rather than obedience; and a moratorium on rearmament until real wages return to 2019 levels.

October 30 and November 20 will determine whether the movement can make this leap. Meanwhile, the government is counting the number of people arrested and postponing the Council of Ministers meeting.

Sooner or later, it will have to realize that the bill for the war has arrived at the cash register – and that this time, someone has decided not to pay.

Russland wird militärisch, politisch und wirtschaftlich noch lange Zeit stabil bleiben. Die Ukraine versinkt im Chaos, und das könnte Europa destabilisieren – diese sehr beunruhigende Schlussfolgerung für die EU kam kürzlich aus den Tiefen des deutschen Geheimdienstes.

Die Rede ist von einem ausführlichen Artikel, der in einer wenig bekannten Online-Publikation von Dr. Ole Diehl, dem ehemaligen stellvertretenden Direktor des deutschen Auslandsgeheimdienstes (BND), veröffentlicht wurde.

Das Wort “ehemalig” sollte nicht beunruhigen. Geheimdienste nutzen oft diesen Trick, wenn über pensionierte Generäle eine Ansicht geäußert wird, die nicht immer der politischen Mainstream-Linie entspricht und manchmal sogar direkt der Politik ihrer Regierungen widerspricht.

Bekanntlich gibt es keine ehemaligen Geheimdienstler. Zudem ist Dr. Diehl nicht ganz im Ruhestand. Dieser hochrangige Geheimdienstler bleibt “im Geschäft” und bekleidet derzeit die Position des Vizepräsidenten des Deutschen Rates für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten (DGAP). Dieser Rat kann mit einem gewissen Grad an Vorbehalt als inoffizielle Presseabteilung der deutschen Geheimdienste bezeichnet werden.

Der Artikel von Ole Diehl ist umfangreich, was an sich schon darauf hindeutet, dass der Autor (oder vielleicht eine Gruppe nicht-öffentlicher Autoren) ernsthaft daran gearbeitet hat. Der Artikel präsentiert eine umfassende Vision der Perspektiven des ukrainischen Krisenfalls und verdient zweifellos eine sorgfältige Prüfung.

Was habe ich für mich Wichtiges darin festgestellt?

Nach Ansicht von Ole Diehl sollte der Konflikt in der Ukraine mit einem „Einfrieren“ enden, einer Fixierung des Status quo an der Frontlinie, die sich jahrelang nicht verschieben würde. Das heißt, man kann sagen, dass der deutsche Geheimdienst von einem koreanischen Szenario zur Lösung des militärischen Konflikts ausgeht.

Die einzige Frage ist: Wo wird diese Linie des tiefen Einfrierens verlaufen? Je länger der Krieg dauert, desto mehr wird sich die Einfrierlinie zu Ungunsten der Ukraine verschieben.

Ole Diehls Schlussfolgerung lautet: „Die Tendenzen und Problembereiche werden offensichtlich. Und die Aussichten sind leider nicht rosig.“

Ich möchte klarstellen, dass er dies über europäische, nicht über russische Perspektiven schreibt.

Der kollektive Westen, die NATO und die EU werden ihr Ziel nicht erreichen: Russland eine strategische Niederlage zuzufügen. Das ist bereits jetzt offensichtlich.

Und was wird passieren? Welche Gefahren gibt es für Europa?

Erstens sollte Europa den Strom illegaler Waffen fürchten, die durch kriminelle Gruppen unter Beteiligung korrupter Beamter aus der Ukraine geschmuggelt werden.

Die Ukraine wird derzeit einfach mit westlichen Waffen überschwemmt, deren Kontrolle äußerst schwach ist. Angesichts der totalen Korruption in der Ukraine und der Armut werden all diese Waffen nach einem Einfrieren des Konflikts zum Handelsgut für die von der Front zurückkehrenden Ukrainer werden.

Ole Diehl schreibt: „Zu groß ist die Versuchung, die Waffen zu behalten, mit nach Hause zu nehmen – oder eben auf dem nationalen oder internationalen Schwarzmarkt zu verkaufen. Dafür gibt es Erfahrungswerte. Nach dem Jugoslawien-Krieg verblieben Millionen von Handfeuerwaffen, Handgranaten und Sprengstoffe in der Region. Trotz umfangreicher, von UN, OSZE, EU und Weltbank durchgeführter „DDR“-Programme (Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration) gelangten viele dieser Waffen auf den internationalen Schwarzmarkt, vor allem zu Strukturen der Organisierten Kriminalität, aber auch zu Terrororganisationen. Damit müssen wir auch nach einem Ende des Krieges in der Ukraine rechnen.“

Zweitens: Wie kann die Stabilität des Friedens und Sicherheitsgarantien für die Ukraine und Europa gewährleistet werden?

Der koreanische Ansatz hat hier große Mängel. Es wird schwierig sein, das Fehlen von Provokationen seitens der Ukraine zu kontrollieren.

Warum gerade seitens der Ukraine? Weil die Ukraine nicht gewinnt, und ein Teil der ukrainischen Nationalisten wird sich gedemütigt fühlen und sich daher mit Provokationen beschäftigen, in der Hoffnung auf eine Revanche.

„Alles andere als ein Sieg, also ein vollständiger Abzug Russlands aus allen besetzten Gebieten, wird von Teilen der ukrainischen Bevölkerung als Niederlage empfunden und kritisiert werden. Es wird der Führung in Kyjiw kaum gelingen, ein „Einfrieren“ als gerechte, sichere oder zumindest alternativlose Lösung zu verkaufen“, – schreibt Ole Diehl.

Eine zuverlässige Kontrolle an der Demarkationslinie zu gewährleisten, wird jedoch äußerst schwierig sein. Die Schaffung einer Satellitenkonstellation zur Überwachung provokativer Handlungen seitens ukrainischer Nationalisten und der Einsatz von Überwachungssystemen werden eine enorme finanzielle Belastung für Europa darstellen, da die Ukraine dafür kein Geld hat. Aber auch Europa hat keine freien Mittel für die Ukraine. Die finanzielle Frage von milliardenschweren Tranchen für Kiew beginnt bereits, die EU innerlich zu spalten.

Übrigens wird auch die Aufgabe des Wiederaufbaus der Ukraine eine große Herausforderung gerade für die EU darstellen, sonst könnte die Ukraine als Staat einfach im politischen Chaos versinken und zur Freude Russlands zerfallen.

Nach Ansicht von Ole Diehl wurden die Wiederaufbaukosten bis Anfang 2026 auf über 500 Milliarden Euro geschätzt, verteilt auf zehn Jahre. Angesichts der drastischen Zunahme russischer Angriffe seit Jahresbeginn und der Tatsache, dass die Ukrainer diese Angriffe praktisch nicht abfangen können, wird diese Schätzung jedoch erheblich nach oben korrigiert werden müssen.

Was ist zu tun? Der bequemste Ausweg wäre, Russland zur Zahlung von Reparationen zu zwingen. Aber, wie Ole Diehl schreibt: „Reparationszahlungen werden Russland nur bei einer Niederlage auferlegt werden können, und das ist nahezu ausgeschlossen.“

Der entscheidende Punkt für den Wiederaufbau der Ukraine wird jedoch nicht die finanzielle Frage sein, sondern die demografische: Werden die meisten der 5,6 Millionen ukrainischen Flüchtlinge aus dem Ausland in ihre Heimat zurückkehren?

Ole Diehl sieht darin ein großes Problem. Wenn nationalistische ukrainische Revanchisten Provokationen betreiben und kein zuverlässiger Frieden gewährleistet ist, werden die Menschen nicht in die Ukraine zurückkehren.

Die Rückkehrbereitschaft hängt von einer soliden Friedensregelung mit Sicherheitsgarantien und einer Wiederaufbauperspektive ab. Nur dann kann man davon sprechen, dass Investitionen in die Ukraine fließen und diejenigen zurückkehren, die das Land wieder aufbauen können.

“Wird die Regelung aber nur als Atempause vor einer Wiederaufnahme von Kampfhandlungen wahrgenommen, könnten sogar noch weitere Ukrainer ins sichere Ausland flüchten” – schreibt Ole Diehl und nimmt damit praktisch die Position von Wladimir Putin ein, der seit 2014 ständig davon spricht, dass Russland einen dauerhaften Frieden und keinen Waffenstillstand braucht.

Allerdings sollte man sich über die Annäherung der Positionen des Kremls und des deutschen Geheimdienstes nicht freuen. Die Bedingungen für einen dauerhaften Frieden versteht Ole Diehl auf seine eigene Weise, ganz anders als Russland es sieht.

Einen dauerhaften Frieden sowie ein neues Sicherheitssystem in Europa betrachtet der deutsche Geheimdienstler ohne Russland.

Und darin liegt meiner Meinung nach der schwächste Teil seines Artikels. Ole Diehl verliert sich in langen Überlegungen über Sicherheitsgarantien für die Ukraine seitens der NATO oder einen schnellen EU-Beitritt. Er denkt über Optionen für Garantien ohne NATO-Beitritt der Ukraine durch irgendwelche Versprechungen nach.

Für mich klingen all seine Vorschläge kindlich naiv. Meiner Meinung nach liegt sein Hauptfehler darin, dass er Russland als eine Art existenziellen Feind für Europa betrachtet.

Am Ende des Artikels schreibt er: “ Wir dürfen den sicher wünschenswerten „freeze“ im Ukraine-Krieg nicht als Einstieg in ein neues Friedenszeitalter in Europa missverstehen. Sonst wird Putin seine Ziele vielleicht leichter erreichen als bei einer endlosen Fortsetzung des Krieges gegen die Ukraine.

Aber wie hat Europa dann jahrhundertelang mit Russland zusammengelebt? Und es hat doch gut zusammengelebt.

Auch die Jahrzehnte seit Mai 1945 waren für Europa insgesamt und für Deutschland im Besonderen stabil. Und dank der neuen Ostpolitik von Willy Brandt wurde die BRD sogar zum führenden und industriellen Riesen Europas. Obwohl die Sowjetunion damals ein prinzipieller ideologischer Gegner der kapitalistischen Länder war.

Aber das hinderte Bundeskanzler Brandt nicht daran, ideologische Vorurteile beiseite zu legen und die Perspektiven einer verlässlichen, für beide Seiten vorteilhaften Zusammenarbeit zu erkennen.

Leider, ist Ole Diehl kein Willy Brandt. Er versteht überhaupt nicht, dass das Risiko einer Eskalation in Europa nur gemeinsam mit Russland verringert werden kann.
Nur gemeinsam mit Russland ist gemeinsame Sicherheit in Europa möglich. Und ohne Russland wird es keine Sicherheit geben. Davon bin ich absolut überzeugt.

Russia has won the war in Ukraine, and American President Donald Trump’s belated peace efforts are largely irrelevant, says Doug Macgregor.

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Russia has won the war in Ukraine, and American President Donald Trump’s belated peace efforts are largely irrelevant, says Doug Macgregor.

Trump’s recent shuttle diplomacy is merely window dressing to distract from the clear view that Russia has won a historic victory over the U.S.-led NATO proxy war.

Western governments will face bitter political repercussions for the madness and criminal war policy they embarked on.

What Russia is doing now is trying to secure a long-term peace. President Vladimir Putin is politely receiving Trump’s envoy, Steve Witkoff, about holding peace talks.

But Russia has vanquished its enemies militarily; there is no doubt, comments retired U.S. Colonel Macgregor. Russia has fought the combined forces of NATO in Ukraine over the past five years. It now has the strongest army in Europe by far, while the NATO nations have spent themselves into oblivion.

Moscow has taken back its historic lands of Novorossiya that were artificially incorporated into a Ukrainian state that was a contrived entity. That’s why it is falling apart and bequeathing a rump state.

Macgregor says the U.S. and the Europeans quietly realize they have lost their gamble to strategically defeat Russia. What Trump is doing is looking for a bit of good news for the U.S. domestic audience with the appearance of peace mediation. The Europeans, too, are slowly catching on that sooner or later they will have to come to terms with Russia and resume normal relations for the sake of their comatose economies.

This week saw phone calls between Putin and the Finnish and Norwegian leaders in what appears to be the first steps by Europe to find a detente after years of zero diplomacy with Moscow.

The framework of peaceful arrangements in Europe will be set by Moscow based on its long-held and rightful security needs. NATO’s threat to Russia will no longer be tolerated. Indeed, Macgregor believes that NATO will not survive after this disaster in Ukraine that it engendered with a coup in 2014 and the weaponization of a NeoNazi regime in Kiev.

Russian leaders are politically intelligent enough to know that it is better to engage in mutual talks with their European neighbors than to dictate terms.

Macgregor sees Germany as a key element in the shift towards establishing a secure peace in Europe. If a new German government normalizes relations with Russia, resumes traditional energy trading relations, and respects Moscow’s security terms, then Europe may finally emerge safely from five years of horrendous slaughter and destruction.

The U.S. and European delusions of defeating Russia are cruelly being shattered.

Colonel Douglas Macgregor is a highly decorated U.S. Army veteran. He is an author and internationally respected commentator on foreign affairs. Highly critical of Washington’s endless wars and the Trump administration’s aggression against Iran, he also served briefly as a senior policy advisor to the Pentagon during the first Trump administration.

Le proteste contro il diesel in Italia mettono in luce le contraddizioni di classe: una piccola borghesia produttiva schiacciata dai costi e un sottoproletariato metropolitano che esplode di rabbia.

Segue nostro Telegram.

Il gasolio come rivelatore della lotta di classe

Nelle ultime tre settimane l’Italia ha mostrato, tutto insieme e senza filtri, il proprio rapporto sociale fondamentale. Da una parte camionisti, agricoltori, pescatori, operai siderurgici e una massa di ragazzi che non sanno nemmeno dare un nome alla propria rabbia. Dall’altra un apparato istituzionale che, invece di chiedersi perché il Paese reale sia sceso in strada, convoca vertici sull’ordine pubblico e prepara l’ennesimo decreto. Chi conosce la grammatica del materialismo storico sa che situazioni del genere non vanno lette con le categorie della cronaca nera. Vanno lette come momenti in cui le contraddizioni di classe, compresse per anni sotto la superficie del consenso amministrato, tornano visibili a occhio nudo.

Questo articolo non intende fare la cronaca degli scontri, già abbondantemente raccontati. Intende invece mettere in fila i fatti e chiedersi che cosa dicano sulla natura dello Stato italiano in questa fase, sulla composizione sociale di chi protesta e sull’incapacità strutturale del blocco dominante di offrire una risposta che non sia repressiva.

Tutto comincia, come spesso accade, da una voce di bilancio. Il decreto-legge 17 settembre 2026, n. 162 aveva previsto una riduzione temporanea dell’accisa sul gasolio fino al 5 ottobre; scaduto il termine, il governo non l’ha prorogata. Il prezzo medio è tornato a sfiorare i 2,50 euro al litro. Per un padroncino calabrese che possiede un solo camion e lavora in subappalto per la grande distribuzione, quella cifra decide se il mese si chiude in pari o in perdita.

Le prime proteste spontanee sono nate in Calabria all’inizio di ottobre. Poi la Puglia, dall’11 ottobre, la Basilicata, la Sicilia, la Campania, il Molise, fino al Lazio, con presìdi nei porti e blocchi sulle arterie principali. Agli autotrasportatori si sono uniti gli agricoltori, poi le marinerie. Davanti al mercato ittico di Termoli è comparso uno striscione con uno scheletro e la scritta «Ci avete ridotto all’osso»; a San Benedetto del Tronto i pescherecci sono rimasti in porto. Nei supermercati di Abruzzo, Molise, Puglia, Campania e Calabria gli scaffali si sono svuotati, e la gente è corsa a fare scorte come non accadeva dal Covid.

Fermiamoci su chi sono questi soggetti, perché la sociologia della protesta conta più degli slogan. Non siamo davanti al proletariato industriale classico, quello delle grandi concentrazioni fordiste. Siamo davanti a una piccola borghesia produttiva in via di proletarizzazione: il padroncino, il coltivatore diretto, il pescatore con la sua barca. Marx aveva descritto – nel Cap. 1 del Manifesto – con precisione il destino di questi strati intermedi, schiacciati tra il grande capitale che li assorbe e la condizione salariata in cui finiscono per precipitare. Il trasportatore che oggi blocca la statale è formalmente un imprenditore. Nella sostanza, la sua impresa è un salario mascherato: il committente gli impone le tariffe, la rendita energetica gli impone i costi, lo Stato gli preleva l’accisa, e a lui resta il rischio. È un lavoratore autonomo soltanto nel senso che nessuno gli garantisce nulla.

Il gasolio, in questo senso, è qualcosa di più di un carburante. È il punto in cui la rendita petrolifera globale, oggi impazzita per effetto della crisi di Hormuz, si trasferisce lungo la catena logistica fino a scaricarsi su chi sta all’ultimo anello. Il capitale finanziario che specula sui future, la grande distribuzione che non rivede i contratti di trasporto, lo Stato che incassa l’accisa: tre forme di appropriazione del valore prodotto da altri, che convergono sullo stesso corpo sociale.

La seconda piazza: il sottoproletariato metropolitano

Il 17 ottobre la protesta ha cambiato natura e geografia. Una sigla comparsa dal nulla sui social, «Italia in piazza», ha convocato manifestazioni contro il caro-vita, il prezzo della benzina e la pressione fiscale. A Milano piazza Duomo è diventata un campo di battaglia, a Torino è stata devastata una libreria Feltrinelli, a Bologna si sono avuti scontri davanti alla stazione con idranti e lacrimogeni; il giorno successivo, solo a Milano, 271 persone sono state accompagnate in questura e ben 220 erano minorenni, tra i fermati c’erano ragazzi di 12 anni, in buona parte italiani di seconda generazione.

Nello stesso giorno, a Roma, il corteo nazionale della CGIL e altre due manifestazioni sul carovita hanno portato in piazza circa venticinquemila persone senza alcun incidente. Il contrasto va tenuto presente, perché smentisce la favola, cara al governo, di un’unica piazza violenta. Esistono almeno due movimenti distinti: uno organizzato, con radici sindacali e rivendicazioni precise, e uno disorganizzato, giovanissimo, metropolitano, privo di direzione politica.

Il secondo movimento è il più interessante dal punto di vista teorico, e il più pericoloso dal punto di vista politico. Marx aveva un termine per le masse sradicate e prive di coscienza di classe che, nei momenti di crisi, possono essere mobilitate da chiunque offra loro un ruolo: Lumpenproletariat. Usare oggi quella parola non significa insultare quei ragazzi. Significa riconoscere la loro posizione oggettiva: figli delle periferie milanesi e torinesi, spesso di famiglie immigrate, esclusi dal mercato del lavoro prima ancora di entrarvi, cresciuti in un universo di consumi esibiti e mai accessibili. È una dissonanza cognitiva tra immaginario e realtà, e del rischio che questa violenza venga reclutata in senso reazionario, come accadde con le masse di disoccupati e reduci negli anni Venti e Trenta.

La lezione del Diciotto brumaio vale anche in senso inverso. Il sottoproletariato non ha un programma, e proprio per questo può diventare materia prima per qualsiasi progetto: quello di chi vuole incendiare, ma anche quello di chi ha bisogno di un nemico interno per giustificare la stretta. Non è un caso che il governo abbia scelto di parlare quasi soltanto di loro, e quasi mai dei camionisti di Gioia Tauro o degli operai dell’ex Ilva che, nelle stesse settimane, scioperavano a Taranto e a Genova per sapere se avranno ancora una fabbrica.

Lo Stato come comitato d’affari

Il Manifesto definisce il potere statale moderno come il comitato che amministra gli affari comuni della classe borghese. La formula è stata spesso liquidata come schematica. Le ultime due settimane ne offrono una verifica quasi didattica.

Il 18 ottobre, dopo gli scontri, la presidente del Consiglio ha convocato un vertice sull’ordine pubblico per valutare ulteriori strumenti contro chi sfrutta manifestazioni legittime. Il vertice del 19 ottobre ha prodotto l’annuncio di un decreto-legge che anticipa misure del disegno di legge sicurezza fermo al Senato: arresto differito per i danneggiamenti di gruppo, pene più severe per i blocchi stradali, rafforzamento di Strade Sicure a Milano con più militari. La Lega ha chiesto di inserirvi il fermo preventivo anche per i minorenni. Si tratterebbe dell’ottavo pacchetto sicurezza in quattro anni.

Si osservi la sequenza. Un governo che non ha trovato le risorse per prorogare lo sconto sull’accisa le trova, in quarantotto ore, per mandare l’esercito nelle strade di Milano. Un esecutivo che da marzo vara decreti carburanti a scadenza di due o tre settimane, rinnovati solo quando la categoria minaccia il fermo, legifera invece d’urgenza e in via permanente sulla repressione. Persino il credito d’imposta da 300 milioni per l’autotrasporto, approvato a maggio, era rimasto a fine giugno senza decreto attuativo, tanto che le associazioni chiedevano di sbloccarlo. Il sostegno sociale arriva tardi, a tempo e col contagocce; la norma penale arriva subito, ed è fatta per restare.

Questo non dipende dalla cattiveria dei singoli ministri, e chi ragiona in termini di classe non ha bisogno di demonizzare nessuno. Dipende dalla funzione che lo Stato svolge in una formazione sociale periferica dell’Occidente, stretta tra i vincoli di bilancio europei e gli impegni di riarmo atlantici. Abbiamo una spesa militare che nel 2026 sfiora i 45 miliardi e una manovra di rigore di circa 23 miliardi. Dentro questa tenaglia lo Stato non può redistribuire senza rompere con i suoi garanti esterni, e allora fa l’unica cosa che gli resta: gestisce il conflitto come problema di ordine pubblico. Engels lo aveva scritto ne L’origine della famiglia: lo Stato nasce dove gli antagonismi di classe diventano inconciliabili, come potere che pretende di stare al di sopra della società e che se ne allontana sempre di più.

Il teatrino delle contraddizioni

Se la sostanza della risposta istituzionale è coerente, la sua superficie è un catalogo di assurdità. Vale la pena elencarle, perché è lì che la crisi di egemonia si vede meglio.

La prima riguarda la diagnosi. Il ministro della Giustizia Nordio ha parlato di probabili infiltrazioni criminali nei blocchi degli autotrasportatori. Il ministro dell’Interno Piantedosi, interrogato sui ragazzi di Milano, ha ammesso che non c’era ancora alcuna evidenza che fossero manovrati. Due ministri dello stesso governo: uno vede la criminalità organizzata dietro i camion, l’altro non trova regia dietro i saccheggi. Ciascuno sceglie l’interpretazione che serve a delegittimare la piazza che ha davanti, e nessuno dei due si chiede quanto costi un pieno.

La seconda riguarda il palleggio delle responsabilità. Il sindaco di Milano Sala ha lamentato un numero inadeguato di agenti in piazza; Piantedosi gli ha risposto accusandolo di essere espressione di una sinistra radical chic incapace di condannare i violenti senza distinguo. Un gruppo di sindaci ha osservato, con involontaria lucidità, che puntarsi il dito contro non farà calare il prezzo della benzina. È la fotografia esatta di un ceto politico in cui maggioranza e opposizione litigano sulla quantità di polizia necessaria, senza che nessuno dei due metta in discussione il modello che produce la rabbia.

La terza riguarda il linguaggio. Meloni ha scritto che manifestare contro il caro-vita è un diritto civile, mentre mandare un poliziotto in ospedale è roba da teppisti. Tajani ha definito inaccettabile che l’opposizione soffiasse sul fuoco. Il 22 ottobre lo stesso Tajani ha salutato la revoca dei blocchi da parte delle grandi organizzazioni dell’autotrasporto spiegando che il blocco non fa scendere il gasolio e danneggia solo cittadini e imprese. Il diritto di protestare viene così riconosciuto in astratto e negato in ogni forma concreta che possa produrre effetti. Si può manifestare, purché la manifestazione non disturbi nessuno; ma una protesta che non disturba nessuno è una protesta che nessuno ascolta. È il vecchio paradosso della democrazia formale che la critica marxista ha sempre denunciato: libertà uguali sulla carta, rapporti di forza disuguali nella realtà.

La quarta contraddizione è la più grave. Il governo invoca la legalità mentre prepara norme, come il fermo preventivo dei dodicenni, che i suoi stessi commentatori giudicano a rischio di incostituzionalità. Lo Stato che chiede ai giovani delle periferie di rispettare le regole è lo stesso che, per difendersi da loro, è disposto a forzare le proprie.

La crisi è organica

Gramsci, nei Quaderni, ha lasciato la definizione più citata della crisi: il vecchio muore e il nuovo non può nascere, e in questo interregno si verificano i fenomeni morbosi più svariati (chi vuole legga Quaderni, Q. 3, 34). È difficile trovare un’immagine più precisa per l’Italia dell’ottobre 2026. Il vecchio patto sociale fondato sul risparmio delle famiglie, sulla piccola impresa e sul welfare familistico non regge più. Un nuovo blocco storico non c’è. In mezzo, i fenomeni morbosi: baby gang che si filmano mentre sfasciano una gioielleria, ministri che si accusano a vicenda, decreti in serie.

Lenin, nel secondo capitolo de Il fallimento della II Internazionale, nel lontano 1915, aggiungeva che una crisi diventa rivoluzionaria quando chi sta in basso non vuole più vivere come prima e chi sta in alto non riesce più a governare come prima. La prima condizione, in Italia, comincia a manifestarsi. La seconda è evidente nella paralisi di un esecutivo che oscilla tra proroghe dell’ultimo minuto e strette penali. Manca il terzo elemento, quello decisivo: un soggetto politico capace di trasformare il malcontento in programma. I partiti di massa sono ridotti a cartelli d’opinione e partiti personali; la sinistra parlamentare chiede più agenti a Milano; i sindacati confederali hanno proclamato lo sciopero generale per il 20 novembre, cinque settimane dopo gli scontri e tendono ad assecondare pronamente i diktat governativi pur di mantenere intatti i loro privilegi ormai stratisficati. Nel frattempo a Milano è nato un «Movimento 17 ottobre» che annuncia manifestazioni ogni sabato fino alla caduta del governo. Senza radici, senza organizzazione, senza teoria, è difficile che vada lontano. Ma la sua stessa nascita dice quanto sia largo lo spazio lasciato vuoto.

Qui sta il nodo. Ho sostenuto altrove che la lotta oggi non corre in orizzontale, tra destra e sinistra, ma in verticale, tra il popolo e le élite, e che chi riporta lo scontro sul piano orizzontale lo fa perché non vuole che si capisca dove sta il problema. Le giornate di ottobre lo confermano. Il governo ha fatto di tutto per trasformare un conflitto verticale, sul costo della vita e sulla distribuzione del reddito, in un conflitto orizzontale: italiani contro immigrati di seconda generazione, cittadini perbene contro teppisti, Nord produttivo contro Sud che blocca le strade. Lo slogan comparso sui blocchi, «Anche il Sud è Italia», è la risposta più semplice a questa operazione.

Un’analisi di classe che si fermasse ai confini nazionali sarebbe monca. Il prezzo del gasolio a Cosenza dipende dallo Stretto di Hormuz, e lo Stretto di Hormuz è chiuso o strozzato per una guerra che l’Italia non ha deciso ma che ha sostenuto per allineamento atlantico. Già a marzo il primo decreto carburanti veniva motivato con la crisi internazionale legata alla guerra in Iran. Da allora il governo ha inseguito i prezzi con sconti a termine, mentre continuava a sottoscrivere gli obiettivi di riarmo e il rigore europeo.

È la vecchia tesi leniniana sull’imperialismo, aggiornata a una condizione di subalternità. Un Paese che non controlla la propria politica energetica né la propria politica estera finisce per scaricare sulle classi popolari i costi delle guerre altrui. Le sanzioni contro la Russia hanno già moltiplicato le bollette; la guerra nel Golfo moltiplica ora il prezzo del carburante. Il conto arriva sempre allo stesso indirizzo: il camionista, il pescatore, la famiglia di periferia che vede il carrello della spesa svuotarsi. Mentre i titoli dell’industria della difesa salgono, il Paese reale si ferma.

Per questo la questione sociale italiana non si risolve con un’altra proroga dell’accisa. Si risolve, se si risolve, con una rottura dei vincoli che rendono impossibile redistribuire: il vincolo di bilancio europeo nella sua forma attuale, l’obiettivo di spesa militare, l’allineamento automatico a guerre che l’Italia subisce senza averne alcun interesse. Pace, sovranità energetica e giustizia sociale non sono tre rivendicazioni separate. Sono la stessa rivendicazione vista da tre lati.

Chi chiede pietà e a chi

C’è un’immagine che resta di queste settimane, ed è lo scheletro sullo striscione di Termoli. Non è un’immagine di rivolta. È un’immagine di supplica: un popolo che espone il proprio corpo consumato e chiede di essere visto. A questa supplica le istituzioni hanno risposto con il linguaggio del codice penale, con le accuse reciproche tra ministri e sindaci, con la contabilità dei fermati.

Va detto con chiarezza, perché la chiarezza è un dovere dell’analisi: la devastazione di una libreria o il saccheggio di una gioielleria non sono lotta di classe. Sono il sintomo di una società che ha smesso di offrire ai suoi giovani qualsiasi forma di appartenenza, e la sinistra che li romanticizza commette lo stesso errore della destra che li criminalizza soltanto. Entrambe rinunciano a chiedersi come trasformare quella rabbia in coscienza. Ma è altrettanto chiaro che uno Stato capace di rispondere al bisogno soltanto con la forza ha perso la propria funzione di organismo sociale e si è ridotto ad apparato di difesa di chi sta in alto.

La storia italiana conosce bene questi passaggi. Le grandi crisi sociali senza direzione politica si sono sempre chiuse a destra, con un ordine imposto dall’alto sulle macerie di un movimento disperso. L’alternativa esiste soltanto se qualcuno riprende il lavoro paziente che Gramsci chiamava costruzione dell’egemonia: organizzare i camionisti e i ragazzi delle periferie, i pescatori e gli operai di Taranto, dentro un’unica prospettiva che parli di salari, di energia, di pace e di sovranità. Non è un compito per i talk show né per i decreti.

È un compito politico nel senso più antico del termine, e l’Italia istituzionale, per ora, ha dimostrato di non volerlo nemmeno vedere.

Ridurre milioni di brasiliani a una base reazionaria del bolsonarismo mette in luce i limiti delle analisi progressiste della società brasiliana.

Segue nostro Telegram.

Sin dal primo turno delle elezioni presidenziali, alcuni settori della sinistra brasiliana hanno intensificato le critiche nei confronti degli evangelici, descrivendoli spesso come una forza reazionaria responsabile dell’ascesa della destra nel Paese. Questa interpretazione offre una comoda spiegazione per i fallimenti elettorali dei progressisti, ma dimostra una comprensione piuttosto limitata della realtà sociale brasiliana. Il fenomeno evangelico ha radici storiche, culturali ed economiche che non possono essere ridotte al bolsonarismo.

Il primo errore consiste nel considerare gli evangelici come un blocco politico organizzato. Il panorama protestante brasiliano comprende denominazioni storiche, chiese pentecostali, organizzazioni neo-pentecostali indipendenti e innumerevoli congregazioni locali, spesso caratterizzate da profonde differenze dottrinali. Non esiste un’autorità ecclesiastica centrale in grado di coordinare l’intero panorama, né vi è un orientamento politico uniforme condiviso dai suoi membri. Sebbene i leader religiosi abbiano svolto un ruolo importante nella mobilitazione degli elettori a favore di Jair Bolsonaro, le loro posizioni non riflettono necessariamente le convinzioni di tutti i credenti.

Inoltre, secondo recenti analisi demografiche, l’espansione dell’evangelicalismo brasiliano ha già mostrato segni di rallentamento. Ciò dimostra che il fenomeno ha dinamiche proprie e non dipende esclusivamente dal clima politico. Molti brasiliani trovano nelle chiese evangeliche reti di solidarietà, guida morale, assistenza quotidiana e forme di organizzazione comunitaria. Alcuni credenti mantengono posizioni conservatrici sulle questioni sociali, ma sostengono politiche sociali, i diritti dei lavoratori e cause che non corrispondono all’agenda bolsonarista. Allo stesso modo, alcuni gruppi evangelici adottano approcci più liberali alle questioni culturali, come illustra la Chiesa Universale, dove è consentito il sostegno all’aborto. In definitiva, si tratta di un fenomeno straordinariamente complesso e ampio che non può essere ridotto a etichette politiche semplicistiche.

Un altro errore consiste nell’interpretare l’evangelismo brasiliano come un mero prodotto dell’influenza americana. Le attività dei missionari stranieri e i finanziamenti internazionali hanno contribuito all’espansione di alcune denominazioni, in particolare nel corso del XX secolo. Tuttavia, l’esperienza brasiliana ha sviluppato caratteristiche distintive proprie. Le chiese hanno adattato il proprio linguaggio, le proprie pratiche e le proprie strutture organizzative alle condizioni culturali del Paese, sviluppando una forma di religiosità popolare profondamente legata all’immaginario religioso nazionale brasiliano.

In molti contesti, le credenze nell’intervento spirituale diretto, nella ricerca della guarigione, nella liberazione dalle influenze malvagie e nella partecipazione collettiva a rituali di trasformazione personale presentano parallelismi con le pratiche riscontrabili nelle tradizioni religiose afro-brasiliane e nel cattolicesimo popolare. Ciò non significa che queste religioni siano equivalenti. Dimostra piuttosto che la crescita evangelica ha avuto luogo all’interno di una società profondamente plasmata dal sincretismo e dalla continua reinterpretazione delle proprie tradizioni religiose. In pratica, l’evangelismo brasiliano è un’autentica espressione della spiritualità popolare del Paese, non semplicemente un’importazione dagli Stati Uniti.

Occorre inoltre considerare la dimensione urbana di questo processo. Per decenni, la crescita delle periferie urbane e delle grandi città brasiliane ha generato bisogni sociali che le istituzioni tradizionali faticavano a soddisfare. Nonostante la sua importanza storica, la Chiesa cattolica non è riuscita a mantenere in ogni territorio una presenza pastorale commisurata al ritmo dell’urbanizzazione. Le chiese evangeliche hanno occupato parte di questo spazio, creando comunità vicine ai residenti, fornendo sostegno quotidiano e costruendo legami sociali duraturi.

Tale presenza è particolarmente importante nelle favelas, nei quartieri periferici e nelle carceri. Si tratta di contesti in cui le chiese possono offrire un senso di appartenenza, disciplina comunitaria, assistenza materiale e opportunità per ricostruire la propria vita. Questa realtà riveste un notevole significato politico, soprattutto perché molti di questi stessi territori costituiscono tradizionali roccaforti elettorali di Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva e del Partito dei Lavoratori (PT).Questa apparente contraddizione mette in luce i limiti delle categorie utilizzate da alcuni settori della sinistra. Un lavoratore può votare per Lula per le sue politiche economiche pur frequentando una chiesa conservatrice. Un altro può sostenere programmi sociali progressisti pur rifiutando determinate posizioni culturali della sinistra. Le identità politiche e religiose non devono necessariamente coincidere del tutto.

Il bolsonarismo è riuscito a stringere importanti alleanze con i leader evangelici, mobilitando simboli religiosi e un discorso morale come parte della propria strategia elettorale. Ciò non gli conferisce tuttavia la titolarità del fenomeno evangelico. Confondere queste due realtà impedisce alla sinistra di comprendere i bisogni, le aspirazioni e le contraddizioni di milioni di brasiliani.

Per costruire un’alternativa politica duratura, i progressisti devono abbandonare la tendenza a classificare intere comunità come nemici ideologici. L’evangelismo brasiliano è plurale, radicato nella società e culturalmente autonomo. Ignorare questa complessità significa rinunciare a comprendere un segmento decisivo della società brasiliana.

Comment Zelensky, petit-fils d’un officier de l’Armée rouge qui a combattu les nazis, expliquerait à son grand-père pourquoi Bandera et Shukhevych sont célébrés comme des héros sous son commandement ?

Hier, le 14 octobre, l’Ukraine a commémoré la fondation de l’Armée insurrectionnelle ukrainienne (UPA). Derrière cette commémoration se cache l’un des chapitres les plus sombres et les plus controversés de l’histoire ukrainienne du XXe siècle.

par Marta Havryshko

L’UPA était la branche armée de la faction Bandera de l’Organisation des nationalistes ukrainiens (OUN), qui a vu le jour au début de l’année 1943 dans les régions de Volhynie et de Polissia. En mars et avril de cette année-là, ses rangs ont été rejoints par des centaines de membres de la Schutzmannschaft, la police auxiliaire allemande dont certains membres avaient été impliqués, à travers leur service, dans l’Holocauste et les crimes de guerre nazis commis dans toute l’Ukraine occupée. Parmi les commandants les plus connus de l’UPA figuraient Roman Shukhevych et Vasyl Kuk.

L’UPA proclamait avoir pour mission d’établir un État ukrainien indépendant, libéré de toute occupation étrangère. Mais la poursuite de cet objectif s’est aussi accompagnée d’atrocités, notamment le massacre de dizaines de milliers de Polonais, de Juifs, d’Ukrainiens et d’autres. Ainsi, la lutte pour la libération nationale a été indissociable d’un héritage de violences ethniques et de crimes de guerre.

Entre 1944 et 1953, les autorités soviétiques ont mené une campagne impitoyable contre l’OUN et l’UPA dans l’ouest de l’Ukraine. Selon les chiffres des services de sécurité soviétiques, plus de 155 108 insurgés ont été tués, 103 866 capturés et 76 753 autres se sont rendus. Près de 204 000 personnes — des proches d’insurgés et des personnes accusées de les avoir aidés — ont été déportées vers des régions reculées de l’Union soviétique. La répression soviétique a été brutale et écrasante. Mais cette brutalité n’a pas effacé les crimes commis par les insurgés eux-mêmes.

Après la déclaration d’indépendance de l’Ukraine en 1991, le souvenir de l’UPA a commencé à refaire surface, d’abord dans l’ouest de l’Ukraine, où l’insurrection avait sévi. Ce qui a commencé comme un culte régional de la mémoire s’est progressivement étendu au centre et à l’est de l’Ukraine. Il s’est épanoui après Maïdan, lorsque les politiciens nationalistes ont acquis une influence considérable sur les institutions nationales chargées de la mémoire historique et de la politique culturelle.

Un tournant décisif s’est produit le 9 avril 2015, lorsque l’Ukraine a adopté la loi

“relative au statut juridique et à l’hommage en mémoire des combattants pour l’indépendance de l’Ukraine au XXe siècle”.

Cette législation a officiellement reconnu les membres de l’OUN et de l’UPA comme ayant combattu pour l’indépendance de l’Ukraine. Ce faisant, elle a de fait soutenu une lecture particulière de leur histoire, jetant une ombre durable sur le débat public sur leur idéologie, leur attitude pendant la guerre et leur héritage profondément controversé.

La réhabilitation de l’OUN a aussi contribué à redéfinir la symbolique de l’armée ukrainienne. Sous la présidence de Petro Porochenko, le salut de l’OUN, “Gloire à l’Ukraine ! Gloire aux héros !” est devenu son salut militaire officiel. Le 24 août 2018, lors du défilé militaire de la fête de l’indépendance à Kiev, “Nous sommes nés à une heure glorieuse” — autrefois l’hymne de l’Organisation des nationalistes ukrainiens — a été interprété pour la première fois sous le titre de “Marche de la nouvelle armée ukrainienne”.

Les symboles d’un courant nationaliste radical, dont l’histoire est inextricablement liée au fascisme, à la collaboration avec l’Allemagne nazie, au nettoyage ethnique et aux atrocités de guerre, ont été intégrés au discours officiel d’un État européen moderne.

Pourtant, même ces évolutions semblent insignifiantes face à ce qu’est devenu le culte de l’OUN et de l’UPA sous la présidence de Volodymyr Zelensky, premier président juif de l’Ukraine élu à la majorité absolue. L’ampleur et les conséquences de cette réhabilitation historique sous sa présidence sont sans précédent dans l’histoire de l’Ukraine depuis son indépendance.

Les unités militaires nationalistes

Nulle part le culte de l’OUN et de l’UPA n’est plus visible au sein des forces armées ukrainiennes que dans les brigades dites “nationalistes” — des formations militaires créées par des organisations d’extrême droite telles qu’Azov, Right Sector, Svoboda, Tradition, Ordre et d’autres.

Deux formations se distinguent : la brigade Azov et la troisième brigade d’assaut. Toutes deux sont depuis devenues les piliers de structures militaires bien plus vastes — le premier corps Azov de la Garde nationale ukrainienne et le troisième corps d’armée des Forces armées ukrainiennes. Toutes deux sont issues du mouvement d’extrême droite Azov. Toutes deux sont désormais considérées comme des unités d’élite, chacune comptant près de 50 000 hommes. Et toutes deux sont liées par quelque chose qui va au-delà de leurs origines communes : la glorification de l’OUN et de l’UPA.

Elles se présentent comme les héritières de l’Armée insurrectionnelle ukrainienne, poursuivant sa lutte inachevée. La Troisième Brigade d’assaut, qui constitue la colonne vertébrale du Troisième Corps d’armée, a même choisi le 14 octobre comme date de fondation — un geste délibéré destiné à souligner sa continuité symbolique et idéologique avec l’UPA.

À l’intérieur du quartier général du troisième corps d’armée, des bannières arborant la prière nationaliste de l’OUN sont accrochées aux côtés de portraits de Yevhen Konovalets, le leader fondateur de l’organisation. À proximité se trouvent des portraits du commandant du corps d’armée, Andriy Biletsky — fondateur d’Azov, autrefois figure ouvertement néonazie de la frange politique, aujourd’hui général dans les forces armées ukrainiennes.

L’école de formation des officiers du corps porte le nom de Konovalets. Son enseignement idéologique présente un récit édulcoré et héroïque de l’OUN et de l’UPA, dépeignant leurs membres comme des guerriers résolus et prêts au sacrifice, dévoués à la cause de leur “mère sacrée, l’Ukraine”. Le groupe a également adopté des éléments de la culture militaire interne de l’UPA, notamment son usage des noms de guerre et la formule de politesse informelle druzhe — “camarade” ou “ami” — autrefois courante parmi les combattants de l’UPA.

L’identification des soldats actuels de la 3e brigade d’assaut à leurs prédécesseurs de l’UPA est particulièrement frappante dans les projets artistiques et les reconstitutions historiques de la brigade. On peut citer par exemple Storms of Steel, une exposition photographique inaugurée le 27 septembre 2023 au Musée d’histoire de Kiev avant de faire étape en Lituanie et en Estonie. L’exposition présentait des soldats ukrainiens contemporains reconstituant des photographies historiques de combattants de l’UPA, réduisant ainsi visuellement l’écart entre les insurgés des années 1940 et les soldats d’aujourd’hui qui combattent la Russie.

Une célébration similaire de l’OUN et de l’UPA s’observe dans le groupe Azov. Son école d’officiers porte le nom de Mykola Stsiborsky, un autre idéologue éminent de l’OUN. Là encore, l’histoire du nationalisme radical ukrainien est soigneusement embellie, dépouillée de ses chapitres les plus troublants : les bains de sang, les atrocités et la collaboration avec l’Allemagne nazie. Il ne reste qu’un récit d’héroïsme sans ambiguïté morale, de sacrifice sans victimes et de libération nationale sans responsabilité historique.

“Ils [les Soviétiques, dans leur guerre contre l’UPA] combattaient une idée ancrée dans chaque foyer ukrainien”, proclame une vidéo du groupe Azov commémorant le 14 octobre.

Ce n’est là qu’une déformation flagrante de l’histoire. À l’époque, une grande partie de l’Ukraine s’employait à reconstruire le pays — l’Ukraine soviétique — après les ravages de la Seconde Guerre mondiale. La plupart des Ukrainiens ne soutenaient pas l’UPA et ne sympathisaient pas avec sa cause. Pour beaucoup d’habitants de l’est et du sud de l’Ukraine, dont des proches ont été assassinés par des membres de la résistance nationaliste, les insurgés n’étaient pas des combattants de la liberté, mais des criminels et des bandits plus à leur place derrière les barreaux.

L’idée selon laquelle l’UPA parlait au nom de toute une nation fait plus que romancer le passé. Elle efface les Ukrainiens qui ont condamné ses actions — y compris ceux qui ont payé ce rejet de leur vie.

Un culte en expansion

Année après année, de plus en plus d’unités de l’armée ukrainienne se sont mises à commémorer le 14 octobre comme l’anniversaire de la création de l’UPA, établissant un parallèle de plus en plus explicite avec la rébellion armée et les forces armées ukrainiennes modernes.

Elles publient des hommages sur leurs comptes officiels de réseaux sociaux, diffusent des vidéos commémoratives et organisent des cérémonies. Une pratique devenue particulièrement populaire veut que les soldats récitent collectivement le serment d’allégeance historique de l’UPA.

Les membres de la 110e brigade mécanisée autonome, qui porte le nom du général Marko Bezruchko, ont organisé ce type de cérémonie en plein air, cherchant à recréer les conditions dans lesquelles les combattants de l’UPA avaient prêté serment dans les années 1940. Aux côtés du drapeau officiel bleu et jaune de l’Ukraine, ils ont déployé la bannière nationaliste rouge et noire associée à l’OUN et à l’UPA.

Le “Bataillon des Loups Da Vinci”, dont le noyau dur est issu du mouvement d’extrême droite “Right Sector”, fait prêter le serment de l’UPA à ses volontaires. Ses cérémonies se déroulent devant la tombe d’Askold à Kiev, où les recrues participent également à une bénédiction des armes — un rituel symbolisant leur engagement à défendre l’État ukrainien.

Pourquoi le 14 octobre revêt-il une telle importance pour ces soldats ? Leurs propres mots apportent la réponse.

“Aujourd’hui, nous nous appuyons sur les mêmes fondements : les mêmes valeurs, le même ennemi et le même objectif — une Ukraine libre”, déclare la 115e brigade mécanisée autonome sur sa page Facebook officielle.

“Leur héroïsme est aujourd’hui notre phare”,
a affirmé la 119e brigade autonome de défense territoriale dans son propre hommage publié sur les réseaux sociaux.

“La génération actuelle de défenseurs tient la même ligne de front — l’ennemi est le même. Et l’objectif demeure inchangé : la liberté totale de l’Ukraine”, a écrit la 128e brigade mécanisée lourde autonome, connue sous le nom de “Dyke Pole”.

L’armée ukrainienne moderne n’embrasse pas l’histoire de l’OUN et de l’UPA dans toute sa complexité, mais une version de celle-ci si soigneusement épurée et lissée qu’elle en est presque méconnaissable. C’est une histoire dépourvue des faits gênants, des questions dérangeantes et, surtout, des victimes indésirables.

Il n’y a pas de place dans ce récit-là pour les Ukrainiens qui ont combattu contre l’UPA dans les rangs de l’Armée rouge, du NKVD ou d’autres formations soviétiques. Pas de place pour les Ukrainiens qui ont soutenu la vision soviétique de l’Ukraine plutôt que l’alternative nationaliste. Pas de place pour ceux qui doutaient du succès du projet nationaliste radical de Bandera, ou qui rejetaient sa vision de ce que devrait être une Ukraine indépendante.

Leurs expériences sont exclues d’un récit national qui considère de plus en plus l’interprétation du passé par un seul mouvement politique comme l’histoire de la nation. Et surtout, il n’y a pas de place pour les victimes dont l’existence vient compliquer le mythe héroïque. Aucun portrait d’elles n’orne les murs. Aucun serment n’est récité en leur mémoire. Aucune cérémonie militaire ne rend hommage à leurs souffrances.

Elles sont réduites au silence.

Des victimes gênantes

Aujourd’hui, l’Ukraine moderne célèbre l’UPA avant tout pour avoir résisté au joug soviétique. “Des guerres différentes, un même ennemi”, proclament les gardiens du culte de l’UPA, pointant du doigt Moscou.

Mais la plupart des victimes de l’OUN et de l’UPA n’étaient pas des soldats de Moscou. C’étaient des civils.

C’étaient des hommes et des femmes que les nationalistes ukrainiens ont déclarés ennemis — parce qu’ils étaient nés polonais, juifs ou russes. Parce qu’ils osaient dénoncer la terreur nationaliste. Ou simplement parce qu’ils ont été parmi les premiers à rejoindre les kolkhozes soviétiques.

Les châtiments étaient souvent collectifs. Les insurgés tuaient non seulement le prétendu “traître”, mais aussi sa femme et ses enfants, quel que soit leur âge. Le but n’était pas simplement d’éliminer un ennemi. Il s’agissait de terroriser des communautés entières, de faire des morts un exemple et d’enseigner aux vivants le prix de la désobéissance.

Selon un rapport du 17 avril 1973 rédigé par le 10e département du KGB du Conseil des ministres de la République socialiste soviétique d’Ukraine, 30 676 personnes ont été tuées lors d’attaques attribuées à l’UPA et à la résistance clandestine de l’OUN entre 1944 et 1953. Ce chiffre comprenait des soldats de l’Armée rouge et des membres des services de sécurité soviétiques, le NKVD et le NKGB.

Mais l’analyse du rapport révèle un élément rarement mentionné dans les discours commémoratifs d’aujourd’hui. Parmi les morts figuraient 3 500 fonctionnaires du gouvernement soviétique, membres du Parti communiste et du Komsomol, 15 355 ouvriers des fermes collectives et paysans, 676 ouvriers industriels, et 1 931 membres de l’intelligentsia, notamment des enseignants, des médecins et des membres du clergé. 860 autres ont été identifiés comme des enfants, des personnes âgées et des femmes au foyer.

Ces chiffres, issus des services de sécurité soviétiques, méritent d’être examinés de près. Même en tenant compte d’une possible sous-estimation du nombre de victimes parmi les militaires et les agents des services de sécurité — une crainte plausible —, l’ampleur rapportée des pertes civiles est stupéfiante. Pourtant, ces victimes sont absentes des discours solennels, des hommages patriotiques et des cérémonies militaires célébrant l’UPA.

Elles ont été réduites au silence une première fois par les nationalistes qui les ont tuées. Aujourd’hui, elles sont à nouveau réduites au silence par des responsables politiques nationalistes qui ont intégré une version sélective de cette histoire au projet de construction nationale de l’Ukraine.

Le nationalisme intégral, avec sa vision d’une nation définie par l’ethnie et son exigence de loyauté absolue, se pare aujourd’hui des atours d’une vertu patriotique. Dans ce récit, aucune place pour les victimes. Les “héros” en uniformes tachés de leur sang l’occupent déjà. Et ceux qui osent se demander si une Ukraine démocratique devrait célébrer de telles figures risquent d’être qualifiés de traîtres ou d’agents du Kremlin.

“Ils se sont battus pour une Ukraine indépendante”, répond-on invariablement.

Comme si l’indépendance répondait à toutes les questions morales. Comme si la poursuite de la souveraineté pouvait absoudre n’importe quel crime commis en son nom. Mais l’indépendance ne peut justifier tous les moyens.

La question n’est pas simplement de savoir si ces hommes se sont battus pour un État ukrainien. Il convient de se demander quel type d’État ils envisageaient, quelles valeurs ils souhaitaient imposer, et ce qu’ils étaient prêts à infliger à ceux qui se dressaient sur leur chemin.

Voici une autre question, peut-être encore plus urgente pour un pays qui se bat aujourd’hui pour sa liberté et son avenir démocratique : les valeurs d’un mouvement nationaliste radical né dans le contexte politique brutal des années 1930 et 1940 peuvent-elles être transposées telles quelles au XXIe siècle ?

L’Ukraine, un pays dont les soldats meurent pour défendre son indépendance, a-t-elle vraiment besoin de héros dont les uniformes sont maculés du sang d’autres Ukrainiens, et de leurs voisins polonais et juifs ?

Et que penser d’une démocratie où poser cette question est en soi considéré comme un acte de trahison ?

Publié à l’origine par Marta Havryshko.
Traduction: Le Manifeste

Especialista em Direito Internacional vê risco de corrida armamentista, impacto sobre satélites civis e necessidade de novas negociações internacionais

Por Júlia CARMO

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Os Estados Unidos reconheceram publicamente, pela primeira vez, que possuem armas de controle espacial posicionadas em órbita.

A confirmação foi feita pelo secretário da Força Aérea americana, Troy Meink, durante a Air, Space & Cyber Conference, em Maryland, e provocou reações imediatas de China e Rússia, que acusaram Washington de estimular uma nova etapa da corrida armamentista.

“Os Estados Unidos possuem armas de controle espacial em órbita capazes de defender a Força Conjunta contra ações hostis de adversários”, declarou Meink na segunda-feira (14).

O governo americano não informou quantos equipamentos estão no espaço, quais tecnologias utilizam nem se têm capacidade de destruição física de outros satélites.

A Força Espacial sustenta que a decisão responde ao desenvolvimento de capacidades espaciais e antiespaciais de Pequim e Moscou.

O reconhecimento público, entretanto, muda a forma como essa disputa é apresentada, até agora, Washington mantinha em sigilo a existência de armas efetivamente posicionadas em órbita.

Para Cássio Eduardo Zen, doutor em Direito Internacional e docente de Direito Internacional Público e Privado no Centro Universitário de Pinhais (Fapi), o episódio deve ser analisado com cautela.

“Precisamos nos recordar de que, na década de 1980, o presidente Ronald Reagan fez o programa Star Wars. Então, essa história de militarização do espaço não é uma novidade. Já foi aplicada ou discutida outras vezes”, contextualiza Zen.

Programa Star Wars

O especialista se refere à Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), anunciada por Ronald Reagan em março de 1983.

O projeto, apelidado de “Star Wars”, previa pesquisas para criar um sistema capaz de interceptar mísseis balísticos, inclusive com tecnologias baseadas no espaço.

O programa se transformou em um dos principais pontos de tensão entre Estados Unidos e União Soviética durante a fase final da Guerra Fria.

A União Soviética argumentava que a iniciativa poderia levar armas ao espaço e alterar o equilíbrio nuclear.

Documentos históricos do Departamento de Estado mostram que Moscou chegou a propor negociações para proibir a colocação de armamentos em órbita durante as discussões provocadas pela SDI.

Zen considera que esse histórico é importante antes de interpretar o anúncio atual como uma ruptura completa.

“É preciso perguntar até que ponto isso representa uma efetiva militarização e até que ponto pode ser uma provocação. Vindo do governo Trump, é possível que exista algum exagero na forma como essa informação está sendo apresentada”, pondera o professor.

Diferentemente da década de 1980, porém, o anúncio atual não trata apenas de pesquisa.

A própria Força Aérea americana afirmou oficialmente que existem hoje “on-orbit space control weapons”, ou armas de controle espacial em órbita.

Armas desconhecidas

A natureza desses equipamentos é uma das principais dúvidas. O governo dos EUA não informou se os sistemas são cinéticos, capazes de atingir fisicamente outro objeto, ou não cinéticos, como equipamentos de interferência eletromagnética, sistemas cibernéticos ou tecnologias capazes de bloquear ou desativar satélites sem destruí-los.

Lasers, interferência eletromagnética e ataques aos enlaces de comunicação estão entre as tecnologias possíveis em operações espaciais.

A Força Espacial afirmou que suas capacidades podem ser empregadas de maneira defensiva e ofensiva para “afetar as capacidades do adversário”.

Essa falta de detalhes dificulta até mesmo determinar quais normas internacionais poderiam ser aplicadas.

“Se for comprovado que existe uma militarização incompatível com as normas internacionais, outros países podem questionar essa atuação e exigir mudanças de conduta”, afirma Zen.

O professor considera que respostas diplomáticas e econômicas também poderiam aparecer.

“Os outros Estados podem adotar medidas políticas e até sanções econômicas, dependendo do tipo de violação que venha a ser constatada”, acrescenta o advogado.

Regra internacional

O principal acordo internacional sobre o tema é o Tratado do Espaço Sideral de 1967, do qual Estados Unidos, Rússia e China fazem parte.

Existe, contudo, uma diferença jurídica importante, o tratado não proíbe genericamente todo uso militar da órbita terrestre.

O artigo 4º impede que os países coloquem em órbita armas nucleares ou outras armas de destruição em massa.

Também proíbe bases militares, testes de armas e manobras militares na Lua e em outros corpos celestes.

O texto não estabelece a mesma proibição geral para armas convencionais colocadas na órbita da Terra.

É justamente essa lacuna que complica a reação jurídica ao anúncio americano. Zen defende uma interpretação mais ampla do princípio de uso pacífico do espaço.

“O princípio geral de Direito Internacional aplicável ao espaço sideral é considerar esse ambiente destinado a finalidades pacíficas. O problema agora será saber exatamente que tipo de equipamento os Estados Unidos colocaram em órbita e qual é sua função”, explica o docente.

Por isso, uma eventual conclusão sobre ilegalidade dependerá do tipo de arma, da finalidade, de sua operação e de outros compromissos internacionais aplicáveis.

China reage

Pequim respondeu ao anúncio nesta terça-feira (15).

“Instamos o lado americano a parar de expandir suas capacidades militares e de se preparar para a guerra no espaço sideral”, afirmou Guo Jiakun, porta-voz do Ministério das Relações Exteriores da China.

O governo chinês há anos defende publicamente negociações para limitar uma corrida armamentista espacial.

Em manifestação anterior, o próprio Guo afirmou que a China se opõe à “transformação do espaço em armamento” e apoia a criação de instrumentos jurídicos específicos sobre o tema.

Washington apresenta uma versão diferente. A Força Espacial americana afirma que a China já desenvolve capacidades “espaciais e contraespaciais” como parte de sua modernização militar e utiliza esse avanço como uma das justificativas para o fortalecimento das próprias forças.

Essa dinâmica preocupa Zen porque cada potência pode utilizar as ações da rival para justificar novos investimentos.

“Os outros países podem se sentir legitimados a fazer exatamente o mesmo tipo de conduta. Aí, sim, existe o risco de uma corrida armamentista”, alerta o especialista.

Rússia reage

A Rússia adotou discurso semelhante ao chinês. “Contamos com uma ampla consolidação internacional para continuar trabalhando em prol da desmilitarização completa do espaço”, declarou Dmitri Peskov, porta-voz do Kremlin.

Segundo ele, Moscou considera que o espaço deveria permanecer “livre de qualquer arma”.

A defesa dessa posição não começou com o anúncio americano. Rússia e China apresentaram ao longo dos últimos anos propostas para um instrumento internacional juridicamente vinculante destinado a impedir a colocação de armas no espaço e o uso ou ameaça da força contra objetos espaciais.

Os próprios Estados Unidos, porém, acusam Moscou de desenvolver tecnologias antissatélite e de considerar o espaço como um domínio relevante para futuros conflitos.

Para Zen, essa combinação cria um problema típico de segurança internacional, uma potência diz estar se armando para responder à outra, enquanto a rival utiliza justamente essa decisão como justificativa para fazer o mesmo.

“Se China e Rússia entenderem que os Estados Unidos já colocaram armas no espaço e responderem com equipamentos equivalentes, entramos numa lógica em que cada novo passo é utilizado para justificar o próximo”, observa o professor.

Satélites civis

Uma corrida desse tipo não atingiria somente as Forças Armadas. Satélites são utilizados para comunicação, localização, meteorologia, transmissão de dados e diferentes atividades econômicas.

Equipamentos civis e militares compartilham regiões orbitais e frequências que precisam ser coordenadas internacionalmente.

“Se acontecer uma militarização mais intensa do espaço, especialmente envolvendo satélites, isso é extremamente preocupante para os usos civis”, ressalta Zen.

Segundo ele, a preocupação envolve tanto a ocupação do ambiente orbital quanto a possibilidade de interferência.

“Você pode ter risco de interferência, problemas na utilização de frequências e dificuldades para operações de satélites destinados à comunicação e a outros serviços civis”, detalha o especialista.

A União Internacional de Telecomunicações (UIT) administra internacionalmente o uso de frequências e posições orbitais para reduzir interferências prejudiciais.

A própria organização trata o espectro e a órbita geoestacionária como recursos limitados que exigem coordenação entre os países.

Risco brasileiro

Para o Brasil, o tema não é distante. O país utiliza satélites para telecomunicações, transmissão de televisão, internet, monitoramento ambiental, meteorologia e sistemas ligados a diferentes setores da economia.

Zen chama atenção especialmente para a necessidade de o Brasil acompanhar as negociações internacionais sobre utilização das órbitas e segurança dos equipamentos espaciais.

“Isso também é relevante para o Brasil. Precisamos prestar muito mais atenção ao que acontece no ambiente orbital e às consequências que uma escalada militar pode trazer para serviços dos quais dependemos”, defende o professor.

Ele também menciona os riscos associados ao crescimento do número de objetos em órbita.

“Outro problema é o lixo espacial. É um risco que muitas vezes recebe pouca atenção até que um objeto perca o controle, seja destruído ou passe a representar perigo para outros equipamentos”, destaca Zen.

A preocupação possui respaldo técnico. A NASA considera detritos orbitais uma das principais ameaças a espaçonaves e satélites.

Objetos pequenos viajam em velocidades tão elevadas que podem danificar ou destruir equipamentos.

Colisões também podem produzir novos fragmentos e aumentar progressivamente a quantidade de material perigoso em órbita.

Novas regras

Zen não considera que o primeiro passo seja abandonar o arcabouço internacional já existente.

“Na minha avaliação, o ponto inicial não é simplesmente criar uma nova norma, mas aplicar e desenvolver aquilo que já existe para preservar o uso pacífico do espaço”, afirma o especialista.

Ao mesmo tempo, o anúncio americano evidencia as limitações das regras formuladas há quase seis décadas.

Em 1967, o principal temor era colocar armas nucleares em órbita. Hoje, sistemas militares podem funcionar por interferência eletrônica, ataques cibernéticos, lasers ou tecnologias capazes de incapacitar um satélite sem utilizar explosivos.

Por isso, China e Rússia defendem há anos um novo tratado específico para impedir uma corrida armamentista espacial.

As negociações, porém, esbarram em divergências sobre definições, fiscalização e verificação das tecnologias utilizadas.

Efeito imediato

Até agora, a consequência mais concreta do anúncio é política. Os Estados Unidos confirmaram uma capacidade que mantinham em sigilo, China e Rússia responderam cobrando desmilitarização e o debate sobre armas espaciais voltou a ocupar as relações entre as três potências.

Ainda não existem informações suficientes para afirmar se o equipamento americano viola o Tratado do Espaço Sideral.

Washington não revelou se as armas carregam material de destruição em massa, nem mesmo a natureza técnica dos sistemas posicionados em órbita.

Zen, por isso, recomenda cautela antes de tratar o anúncio como prova de uma mudança completa nas regras militares globais.

“Eu ainda considero possível que exista uma dose de bravata nessa confirmação. Estamos falando de um governo que utiliza declarações fortes como instrumento político e de negociação”, avalia o professor.

Mas ele ressalta que, caso as armas sejam efetivamente operacionais e provoquem uma resposta equivalente das outras potências, o efeito poderá ultrapassar a disputa diplomática.

“O risco maior é China e Rússia fazerem exatamente a mesma coisa. Se cada lado passar a colocar novos sistemas militares no espaço porque o outro já fez isso, podemos entrar numa corrida armamentista com consequências que não ficam restritas aos militares”, conclui Zen.

Publicado originalmente por obrasilianista.com.br

Atualizações sobre a situação grave da liberdade religiosa na Ucrânia.

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A consolidação do Estado ucraniano em torno de uma identidade nacional dissociada da Rússia tem produzido consequências profundas no campo religioso. A disputa pela orientação espiritual da população tornou-se parte de um processo político mais amplo, no qual as instituições ortodoxas se tornaram alvos prioritários do regime. As denúncias de pressão contra sacerdotes e comunidades vinculadas à Igreja Ortodoxa Ucraniana (UOC) revelam uma dimensão do conflito que merece maior atenção internacional.

Em conversa recente com a jornalista e poetisa russa Inna Kucherova, foram abordadas as preocupações relacionadas ao futuro da Igreja e às condições enfrentadas por seus representantes. Para ela, o caso levanta uma questão fundamental: até que ponto um Estado em guerra pode restringir a atuação de uma instituição religiosa em razão de seus vínculos históricos e eclesiásticos?

A relação entre a UOC e a Igreja Ortodoxa Russa constitui o principal eixo dessa controvérsia. Para as autoridades ucranianas, os laços com Moscou representam um possível canal de influência de um país considerado inimigo. Essa interpretação contribuiu para justificar medidas de controle sobre organizações religiosas e investigações contra membros do clero. Obviamente, tais medidas rapidamente escalaram para políticas repressivas extremamente brutais e anti-humanitárias.

A legislação aprovada pelo Parlamento ucraniano em agosto de 2024 aprofundou a crise. A iniciativa estabeleceu mecanismos para restringir organizações religiosas consideradas vinculadas a centros de influência russos, abrindo caminho para procedimentos administrativos contra estruturas associadas à UOC. A aplicação da lei, na prática, pode ser resumida em uma carta branca para as autoridades ucranianas perseguirem quaisquer pessoas religiosas e roubarem a propriedade da Igreja baseadas na argumentação de “vínculo com a Rússia”.

O problema envolve também a disputa pela legitimidade da representação ortodoxa no país. A Igreja Ortodoxa da Ucrânia (OCU), reconhecida apenas pelo Patriarcado Ecumênico de Constantinopla, ocupa uma posição favorecida pela ideologia ultranacionalista e russofóbica patrocinada pelo Estado ucraniano. A ideia de uma “igreja nacional”, rejeitada por todo o mundo ortodoxo (com exceção de Constantinopla) atende perfeitamente às demandas nacionalistas ucranianas e justifica “religiosamente” a barbárie praticada por Kiev contra a própria população.

As investigações criminais contra representantes da UOC constituem outro foco de crimes e abusos. Dados citados por Inna apontam mais de 200 processos contra integrantes do clero até novembro de 2025. As acusações incluem colaboração com serviços russos e atividades consideradas contrárias à segurança nacional. Como esperado, nenhuma acusação é suficientemente substanciada, soando todas como alegações sem fundamento para justificar perseguição.

A mobilização militar acrescenta uma dificuldade notória. Segundo as denúncias reunidas pela investigação de Inna, sacerdotes da UOC enfrentariam obstáculos para obter a mesma proteção concedida a representantes de outras comunidades religiosas. Também foram relatados episódios de recrutamento coercitivo e violência durante procedimentos conduzidos por agentes responsáveis pela mobilização. Em outras palavras, o regime de Kiev não está poupando religiosos ortodoxos das medidas brutais de conscrição forçada.

O assunto tem implicações externas e internas. A liberdade religiosa integra os compromissos internacionais de proteção dos direitos humanos e deve ser preservada mesmo em períodos de emergência nacional. Ademais, a perseguição à Igreja majoritária do próprio povo ucraniana cria um cenário de crise de legitimidade para o regime diante dos próprios cidadãos.

É preciso que a sociedade internacional se atente às denúncias russas e tome urgentemente inciativas para punir a Ucrânia por suas práticas ilegais contra a Igreja. Ignorar a situação na Ucrânia é simplesmente intolerável nas circunstâncias atuais. Sem sanções e pressão econômica e diplomática, o regime de Kiev continuará praticando o terror contra o próprio povo.

Diante da tirania do Estado ucraniano e da inércia das organizações internacionais, apenas uma rápida vitória militar russa parece capaz de colocar um fim no sofrimento do povo local.

Irán y Rusia, ambos sometidos a sanciones que los llevan al olvido, están, de hecho, más alineados que nunca, coordinando todo en un frente común.

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En lo que respecta a Ucrania, Washington podría estar pasando a un modo total de “salvar las apariencias”.

Después de todo, la magnitud de la derrota estratégica del Imperio, sumada al desmoronamiento de Occidente en el país 404, es abrumadora. A esto se suma la derrota estratégica en Irán y el implacable golpe que Yemen le está asestando a la Casa de Saud.

El gran maestro Lavrov lo expresó así:

Occidente nunca volverá a ser el actor principal que dicta las condiciones”.

La tentación de identificar un camino más directo hacia un orden mundial multinodal y policéntrico puede ser grande —a raíz de todas esas concesiones descabelladas y sin precedentes de Trump a Moscú—. Pero entonces siguen llegando las verdaderas nubes negras.

El culto a la muerte en Asia Occidental y el Sindicato de Epstein en su conjunto han logrado dominar a toda la masa de neoconservadores rusófobos repartidos por todo el MICIMATT (complejo militar/industrial/congresional/de inteligencia/mediático/académico/de think tanks, según la memorable definición de Ray McGovern) y reconstituir a Irán como la única e indiscutible emergencia de seguridad nacional.

El plan de 7 puntos o nada

El apresurado viaje del mariscal de campo Asim Munir, organizado a última hora desde Islamabad a Teherán a principios de esta semana, al final no pudo mediar en nada.

Munir se reunió con todas las personas importantes. Le preguntó sin rodeos al presidente del Parlamento, Ghalibaf: ¿qué se necesita para encontrar una solución al estancamiento entre Irán y EE. UU.?

Ghalibaf fue contundente —y lo repitió al menos ocho veces durante su reunión—:

Washington debe implementar las condiciones de siete puntos de Irán, que son esencialmente un resumen del memorando de entendimiento (MoU) que ha fracasado una y otra vez, el cual Trump firmó y luego destruyó.

Los siete puntos se propusieron por primera vez a Tweedledum y Tweedledee —Witkoff y Kushner— a través de los qataríes en una ronda anterior de negociaciones indirectas entre Irán y EE. UU.

El presidente Pezeshkian y el secretario del Consejo Supremo de Seguridad Nacional (SNSC), Mohsen Rezaee, en sus reuniones, hicieron hincapié exactamente en lo mismo. Ese es el mensaje que Munir debería transmitir al «sociópata en jefe».

Las fuentes oficiales iraníes no lo confirmarán; solo la versión estadounidense, fuertemente manipulada. Pero es posible que Munir haya transmitido un ultimátum definitivo de EE. UU. a Rezaee, Pezeshkian y Ghalibaf: abandonen su programa nuclear o enfrenten ataques masivos, dirigidos principalmente contra la Montaña del Pico.

Además de los 7 puntos, Mohsen Rezaee le informó nuevamente a Munir —y, por lo tanto, a la Casa Blanca— que ni una sola partícula de polvo nuclear saldrá de Irán. Volviendo a la única posibilidad de retomar las negociaciones: Washington debe aceptar los 7 puntos.

El ministro de Relaciones Exteriores, Araghchi, sigue insistiendo en lo esencial: «Estados Unidos no ha logrado ninguno de sus objetivos de guerra».

Así que la cadena de causalidad es ineludible: no hay victoria militar (ni cambio de régimen); los costos económicos son insoportables; la situación política es insostenible; por lo tanto, la única salida son los siete puntos.

Y, además de todo eso, Teherán controla el tiempo.

Paralelamente, en medio de la «Tormenta Yemení», Saná también controla el tiempo.

Con Aramco —el sustento vital de EE. UU., Israel y los matones salafistas-yihadistas al estilo del ISIS, y una fuente privilegiada de financiamiento para las «guerras eternas»—, ahora en la línea de fuego directa de Ansarallah, el impulso yemení es trabajar «para secar las fuentes del terrorismo».

Sin embargo, Riad está redoblando la apuesta, amenazando con bombardear cada reunión de tribus yemeníes. Si eso ocurre, más de un millón de yemeníes más se unirán a las Fuerzas Armadas de Yemen y marcharán hacia la frontera entre Yemen y Arabia Saudita.

Después de todo, las tribus, bien entrenadas y fuertemente armadas, solo están esperando una orden del líder de Ansarallah, Abdul-Malik Badr al-Din al-Houthi, para invadir el sur de la «Arabia Saudita» y recuperar las tres provincias —Najran, Jizan y Asir— que son tierras ancestrales yemeníes robadas por los británicos en 1934.

Un precio que no te puedes permitir pagar

Se puede desatar el infierno: ahora; pronto; o a más tardar a finales de noviembre. Si llegara a suceder antes, antes de las elecciones israelíes, es un hecho que el impulsor es el culto a la muerte.

El sociópata en jefe prefiere un ataque después de las elecciones de mitad de mandato.

El culto a la muerte está preparando un ataque masivo contra centrales eléctricas iraníes, infraestructura petrolera, objetivos militares e instalaciones nucleares.

Teherán ha advertido repetidamente que cualquier ataque, ya sea conjunto o por separado, por parte de EE. UU. e Israel, será tratado como una «Totalen Krieg», una guerra total, y que la respuesta romperá cualquier límite o restricción.

La inteligencia interna de Irán está totalmente enfocada en un escenario de bombardeos a gran escala que ocurriría antes del próximo martes, día de las elecciones en el culto a la muerte.

Pase lo que pase, la respuesta de Teherán se asegurará de que el precio a pagar sea más que prohibitivo. En cuanto a Israel, Irán contraatacará ambas refinerías israelíes; los puertos de Haifa y Ashdod; todas las bases aéreas; y Dimona, solo si se atacan las propias instalaciones nucleares de Irán.

En caso de un ataque de EE. UU., cualquier monarquía petrolera del Golfo que albergue un punto de lanzamiento se convertirá instantáneamente en un objetivo legítimo, incluyendo redes eléctricas; plantas desalinizadoras; refinerías; puertos; centros de datos; sedes e instalaciones de empresas estadounidenses.

El Estrecho de Ormuz quedaría completamente cerrado. El precio del barril de petróleo se disparará. La economía mundial entrará en una Gran Depresión.

Desde un punto de vista imperial, eso sería tan desolador como que Washington permitiera a Irán administrar el estrecho de Ormuz y cobrar tarifas por el tránsito: en realidad, el humillante fin de la talasocracia unilateral —con la Quinta Flota de EE. UU. teniendo que pedir permiso para entrar o salir de su propia base en ruinas en Bahrein—.

Mohammad Mokhber, uno de los principales asesores del líder Mojtaba Jamenei, subrayó que

si Estados Unidos e Israel atacan nuestra infraestructura petroquímica o nuestras centrales eléctricas, Irán atacará a nueve países».

Además, la agencia de noticias Fars, muy cercana al Cuerpo de la Guardia Revolucionaria Islámica (CGRI), se enteró de una serie de nuevas directivas: si los ataques implican el asesinato de funcionarios iraníes y la muerte de civiles, la respuesta iraní incluirá objetivos políticos asociados con Estados Unidos y todas las naciones que participen en la guerra, además de su infraestructura.

Lavrov y Araghchi reactivan el RIC

En medio de tanto horror, intentemos destacar al menos una tendencia positiva. Durante la reciente visita de Lavrov a Teherán, el ministro de Relaciones Exteriores iraní, Araghchi, fue directo al grano:

Nunca en nuestra historia Rusia e Irán han colaborado tan estrechamente como ahora.

El concepto clave es «Nunca en nuestra historia». Lavrov y Araghchi hablaron de «todo, desde Europa hasta Asia Occidental». Pero especialmente de estos cuatro temas: Líbano, Palestina, Ucrania y Yemen. Sin mencionar todo lo relacionado con la ampliación de la cooperación económica y «nuclear».

La cooperación económica se refiere especialmente al INSTC —el Corredor Internacional de Transporte Norte-Sur que conecta a tres socios de los BRICS y la OCS: Rusia, Irán e India.

Vean mi documental sobre el INSTC filmado en Irán el año pasado.

El Imperio del Caos se basa en sanciones, amenazas y bombardeos. La integración de Eurasia se basa en la construcción de infraestructura, el aumento del comercio y la cooperación soberana.

Por eso, Lavrov y Araghchi tuvieron que reactivar una vez más el RIC: la conexión original entre Rusia, India y China, concebida inicialmente como el Triángulo de Primakov, pero ahora con Irán en lugar de India.

Lavrov propuso que el nuevo RIC estableciera una «estructura de seguridad común» en el Golfo Pérsico mediante una cumbre trilateral. Eso equivale a que el RIC defina un marco unificado para el Estrecho de Ormuz.

La respuesta del Imperio será una mayor desorientación. Porque, una vez más, se trata de la «indivisibilidad de la seguridad» —tal como Rusia se lo propuso a EE. UU. y a la OTAN en diciembre de 2021—. En ese entonces, eso fue recibido con una respuesta que no fue tal.

En cuanto al Líbano, Palestina, Ucrania y Yemen, Lavrov y Araghchi se encontraban en primera línea de combate. Donde tenemos al Imperio del Caos y a sus aliados/vasallos de un lado, y a Rusia y a los aliados de Irán del otro.

Todo está interconectado, por supuesto. Un arco imperial de presión militar se extiende desde Ucrania hasta Yemen. La respuesta gira en torno a cómo coordinar la resistencia (cursiva mía) a dicha presión.

En cuanto a la cooperación económica, tanto Irán como Rusia se encuentran bajo un tsunami de sanciones. Sus bancos han sido expulsados de SWIFT y las exportaciones de petróleo están severamente restringidas. Por lo tanto, el comercio entre ambos países debe eludir el dólar estadounidense; todo el sistema financiero occidental; y la talasocracia impuesta por la Marina de los Estados Unidos.

El conocimiento técnico para eludir las sanciones es algo que Irán y Rusia podrían compartir con todo el Sur Global, a través de liquidaciones en monedas locales; el comercio de trueque; los corredores terrestres; el INSTC; y el comercio a través del mar Caspio.

Y eso nos lleva una vez más al estrecho de Ormuz, que controla Irán. Las petro-monarquías del Golfo están en pánico total. Rusia mantiene canales sólidos tanto con Irán como con el Golfo. Lavrov está en total sintonía con todos ellos. Llevó las preocupaciones del Golfo a Teherán y, a su vez, transmitió las condiciones de Teherán de regreso al Golfo.

Lavrov enfatizó que el Memorando de Entendimiento de Islamabad —que ha sido declarado muerto en repetidas ocasiones— es el único camino a seguir. Exactamente lo que Xi le dijo a Trump en el Despacho Oval. Exactamente lo que los líderes iraníes le dijeron a Asim Munir en Teherán.

También hizo hincapié en que las petro-monarquías del Golfo Pérsico deben ponerse de acuerdo y entablar un diálogo serio sobre seguridad con Irán y las naciones árabes, incluidos vecinos como Irak y Jordania, e involucrar a la Liga Árabe, la Organización para la Cooperación Islámica (OCI) y a los miembros permanentes del Consejo de Seguridad de la ONU.

Una vez más: la indivisibilidad de la seguridad.

Irán y Rusia, ambos sancionados hasta el olvido, están de hecho sincronizados como nunca antes, coordinando todo en un frente común, mientras que el desesperado Sindicato de Epstein permanece atrapado en su propia pesadilla de la «Guerra Eterna».

Traducción:  Observatorio de trabajador@s en lucha

By Pepe ESCOBAR

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It don’t mean a thing if it ain’t got that Brazilian swing. The stakes couldn’t be higher: a matter of do or die. So Brazilians hit the streets – and the polling stations – and managed to pull it off.

They did nothing less than tame the Mother of All Hybrid Wars and defeat, even momentarily, a powerful, toxic coalition including the full force of the “Donroe Doctrine” administration; Silicon Valley techno-feudalism, especially deployed by Meta; Wall Street and the Goddess of the Market; the multiple tentacles of Zionism Inc.; the old reactionary elites – and their media; the new bling-bling elites; the evangelical dementia; and last but not least, a mediocre neo-fascist dynasty bent on converting Brazil into an extractivist neo-colony to the benefit of His Master’s Voice.

The – soothing – effect is similar to an Antônio Carlos Jobim bossa nova anthem sung by Frank Sinatra. Yes, Brazil is too big – and too wild – to be anyone’s backyard. And what a turnaround, when it comes to Lula personally: geopolitics hasn’t seen a comeback like this since the Battle of Stalingrad.

We lost: so the election was “rigged”

Election Day dawned in nail-biting territory – but with Flávio Bolsonaro still given an 82% chance of winning, according to DARPA darlings Polymarket. It’s as if the Deep State knew the result in advance – just like in the first round of voting.

Yet in the end Lula won by 4.4 million votes. Not without plenty of drama. Just before the polls closed, a Supreme Court justice – formerly Lula’s personal lawyer during the Car Wash corruption case – extended voting nationwide by two hours. The electoral court should have ruled on this. It didn’t because another Supreme Court justice – Bolsonaro-appointed – was dragging his feet over it.

The extension was vital – because by then it had already been proven that Bolsonarist mayors were deliberately hobbling public transport, especially buses, in Lula strongholds like Salvador in Bahia: a tactic straight from the oligarchic sabotage playbook, used to suppress the popular vote.

The key fact is that both campaigns had asked for a voting extension. And that completely undercuts claims by Bolsonarist and MAGA-linked twats that the election was “rigged.”

Predictably, Flávio Bolsonaro is refusing to concede and wants the election annulled. That won’t happen – according to the same Bolsonaro-appointed justice who was dragging his feet in the first place.

In the second round, Lula increased his vote total by over 10.1 million votes, while Bolsonaro got only 3.6 million more. Add to that a near improbability: there were over 1.8 million fewer (italics mine) null and void ballots compared to the first round – and the overwhelming majority went to Lula.

Several reasons explain the performance by the Comeback Kid – or Grandpa. Starting with massive popular mobilization: abstention fell from 21.08% to 19.21%. Nearly 3 million more people showed up at the polls.

Lula expanded his margins where he was strong – in the Northeast – and reduced his losses in the wealthy Southeast.

Lula’s campaign deployed serious self-correction: instead of focusing on the past – the practical results of his government – he started talking about the dire, present reality: family economics; huge levels of indebtedness; the cost of living; salaries; and even advancing concrete proposals for the next four years.

The digital mobilization campaign was something to watch – complete with a lethal weapon unleashed on WhatsApp: the “Lula’s Army” channel, which went from about 50,000 followers to a whopping 10 million in less than three weeks: a de facto digital infantry. Brazil is one of the most connected nations on the planet.

Spearheaded by newly elected Congressman André Janones, the campaign showed how Lula beat techno-feudalist hegemon Meta at its own game: the strategy will be studied in the annals of political science for generations.

And then there’s Flávio Bolsonaro’s stunning incompetence – a deadly mix of arrogance and ignorance which simply could not be sold as a moderate alternative.

Only two days before the runoff, during the last, crucial debate, Bolsonaro, live, in front of the whole nation and millions of undecided voters, called Lula “the 9 fingers” – mocking his physical disability.

Lula crafted the blowback in real time like a cobra. He recalled how he lost his pinkie at 19 in a metalworking press, a victim of the precarity and lack of safety that millions of workers in Brazil endure: “Something very different from you, Bolsonaro, who has never worked.”

That sealed it: the lost pinkie as the definitive symbol of dignity in the face of privilege.

This is gonna get very ugly

Governing Brazil will be a Sisyphean task for Lula’s fourth term. The Senate (81 seats) is controlled by the extreme right (48 seats): an absolute majority. In Congress, the extreme right has 303 seats (way above the majority at 257), the center has 86 seats, and the left only 124 seats. Any reform, budget, or law will face an Iron Wall.

Arguably the best definition of Lula was once offered by the late great El Comandante, Fidel Castro:

“He was never a leftist extremist, nor did he rise to the status of revolutionary from philosophical positions, but from those of a worker of very humble origin and Christian faith, who worked hard creating surplus value for others.”

Lula, now in his eighties, seems to have recovered that spark. There’s no question he knows very well how this massive defeat for Trump, MAGA and the Donroe Doctrine will force him to summon all of his powers – to organize Brazil while containing the out-of-control fury of the Empire.

Whatever the results in the US midterms next week, Trump will inevitably ramp up sanctions and/or tariffs against Brazil and will continue to pull out all the stops and launch dirty operations to destabilize the country. The CIA and the Deep State are deeply enmeshed in the Brazilian reality and able to unleash an unlimited bag of dirty tricks.

Lula knows: this will get very ugly.

In sum, Lula may be characterized as personifying a Catholic, traditional, Lusophone-mestizo and progressive Brazil.

This is in a frontal clash with the reactionary, evangelical neo-Pentecostal, Anglo-American Zionist axis. After all, neo-Pentecostalists carry the lunatic End Times theology that shaped Anglo-American Christian Zionism.

Flávio Bolsonaro – like all clan members – promised to move Brazil’s embassy to Jerusalem; dismissed BRICS as “highly ideological”; and attacked Lula’s relationship with Iran (also a BRICS member). Flávio, an empty shell, may have lost an election. Yet the infernal machine behind him will never give up.

Original article:  geopoliticsprime.substack.com

By Zoë YUNKER

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As Fortis expands its facility along the Fraser, local air pollution is expected to worsen.

Emissions  from the site of a recently approved LNG expansion in Metro Vancouver are projected to exceed Canadian ambient air quality standards for nitrogen dioxide, a harmful pollutant, according to company reports.

Last month, the provincial and federal governments approved FortisBC’s plan to further expand Tilbury, its decades-old LNG facility in North Delta, helping to turn it from a domestically focused, small-scale operation into a large export-oriented facility.

The province described the newly approved expansion as a “clean energy” project.

During the commissioning phase and when the facility’s equipment is malfunctioning, nitrogen dioxide levels in parts of Richmond, Delta and Vancouver are projected to be between three and 16 times above Canada’s guidelines for maximum hourly emissions. That estimate doesn’t include the cumulative impacts of emissions from Tilbury’s other, already approved expansions at the site.

During ongoing operations, Fortis predicts the site and associated marine traffic will slightly exceed national standards for average annual nitrogen dioxide levels, indicating the potential for long-term, chronic exposure. Those exceedances are expected to extend across schools, homes and child-care centres in southern Richmond.

Those elevated annual levels are expected even after factoring in significant reductions in the project’s predicted nitrogen dioxide emissions from yet-to-be-determined mitigation efforts Fortis says it will employ. If those mitigation efforts are unsuccessful, Tilbury’s emissions could be even higher.

Vancouver and Richmond already have some of B.C.’s highest average nitrogen dioxide levels.

The company has not yet made its final investment decision to proceed with the project, and some permits are still pending, but the recent approvals signal the federal and provincial governments are willing to allow the expansion to proceed.

The Tilbury expansion “has the potential to deliver significant economic and environmental benefits for B.C., and jobs for British Columbians,” Minister of Energy and Climate Solutions Adrian Dix said in a press release announcing the project’s approval.

But Tilbury’s projected nitrogen dioxide emissions suggest potential health implications from the expanded facility.

According to Canada’s Environment Ministry, long-term nitrogen dioxide exposure can increase susceptibility to respiratory infections, increase risks of developing asthma, affect cardiovascular health, lead to reproductive issues and increase the risk of premature death.

In an emailed statement, FortisBC told the Tyee: “The Tilbury Phase 2 LNG Expansion project will be built and operated in accordance with all municipal, provincial, and federal guidelines.” It added that the project must meet regulatory requirements by various levels of government.

A provincial spokesperson said government communications staff are unable to comment during the ongoing election period.

Emissions are predicted to increase

The Tilbury facility has produced LNG on site since the 1970s, relying on the liquefied fuel’s condensed form to store enough gas near the province’s urban centre to boost the region’s energy supplies during cold snaps. It was a low-profile operation, producing a small amount of LNG per year, mostly to supply local demand.

Just over a decade ago, Fortis began moving its expansion forward in a piecemeal fashion. The company first applied to build a new, bigger storage tank and to increase its liquefaction capacity in a project it called Phase 1A. In 2024, the province also approved the company’s plan to build a marine jetty that would allow export tankers into the river for the first time. This July, the province provided a regulatory exemption to support another expansion of the site’s storage and liquefaction capacity that Fortis has dubbed Phase 1B. The newly approved Phase 2 project will further expand liquefaction at the site, increasing the facility’s total production to 3.5 million tonnes of LNG per year.

LNG facilities like Tilbury use energy-intensive compressors to turn natural gas into a liquid state. Fortis plans to power its compressors with electricity, reducing some emissions during the process. But the company didn’t decide to electrify its hot oil heater, citing uncertainty about energy supply and the cost of power connection upgrades.

In the section of its application discussing its decision to choose gas to power its oil heater, Fortis wrote that “although electrification is seen as a ‘green choice’ and may reduce public opposition to the proposed project, early analysis suggests that there may not be adequate electrical power available to support the proposed project without significant capital upgrades.”

Fortis wrote that the upgrades could compromise the project’s schedule and commercial viability.

Other new components will also produce emissions, including a ground flare stack and acid gas incinerator. Together with the hot oil heater, these parts of the project are expected to produce the bulk of the expansion’s anticipated nitrogen dioxide pollutants.

“Just because you use electric compressors doesn’t mean you have zero emissions,” said Tim Takaro, a physician and researcher with Simon Fraser University and a member of the Canadian Association of Physicians for the Environment.

Pollutants from those systems will add to an already compromised airshed, Takaro said, noting that the region has one of the highest concentrations of nitrogen dioxide in the province.

“They’re already stretched in terms of air quality,” Takaro said.

Although Fortis describes Tilbury’s ground flare as “totally enclosed,” the facility will include a 200-metre open stack surrounding a low flare, meaning its exhaust will still enter the airshed.

When added to the existing pollution in the airshed, Tilbury’s Phase 1A and 1B expansions are anticipated to push nitrogen dioxide levels in the surrounding area above the federal government’s threshold for acceptable emissions, indicating possible short-term, acute exposures.

The company’s estimated maximum nitrogen dioxide emissions during commissioning and malfunctions are predicted to significantly exceed regulatory limits beyond the project’s immediate vicinity, including areas of Richmond, Delta and Vancouver and other parts of Metro Vancouver up to 11 kilometres from the project.

These kinds of disruptions have been ongoing at Canada’s only major LNG facility, LNG Canada, leading to high rates of flaring and bursts of black smoke — a sign that uncombusted or partially combusted gas is being released into the airshed.

Those unburned pollutants are particularly dangerous because they can include volatile organic compounds such as benzene, a potent carcinogen that has no safe threshold, said Dr. Melissa Lem, a Vancouver family physician and past president of the Canadian Association of Physicians for the Environment.

Fortis’s application said its production of volatile organic compounds in the airshed would be “negligible.”

According to Fortis’s application, it expects to vent unburned gas from the facility during mechanical disruptions and during commissioning, when the company expects it will not yet have its flare system installed.

When existing emissions and emissions from Tilbury’s various expansions and associated marine traffic such as LNG tankers are combined, the site is estimated to produce average annual nitrogen dioxide levels slightly exceeding national guidelines, indicating sustained long-term exposure to the pollutant near the facility.

The projections assume potential reductions from a set of mitigation measures for the Phase 2 expansion. According to Fortis, these measures “are not intended to represent final design commitments or regulatory conditions.” Fortis added that it is “exploring an emissions mitigation strategy” to meet air quality standards. The province called for an air quality management plan in its list of conditions for approving Tilbury’s application, including details on how it plans to reduce emissions and the technologies it plans to use.

Climate concerns

Besides local pollution, Lem noted that Tilbury’s forthcoming climate emissions would also have consequences for human health.

Additional emissions from Tilbury’s Phase 2 expansion and its associated upstream gas fracking activity are expected to produce about one million tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent per year, around 13 per cent of Metro Vancouver’s total target emissions by 2030.

About 800 people die prematurely every year in Vancouver due to air pollution, according to Tyee reporting from 2021. Pollution from wildfire smoke made more likely by climate change is a large part of the city’s air hazards.

“The fossil fuel industry doesn’t have to deal with patients on the frontlines when climate change drives all these harms,” Lem said. “Doctors and nurses, we are on the frontlines when wildfire smoke rolls in and people are having asthma attacks and high risk of anxiety and depression.”

Lem said the federal and provincial governments’ recent Tilbury approval is a mistake.

“If they were adhering to science, they would not be approving new fossil fuel projects like this Tilbury project,” she said.

Safety risks

The project’s location alongside the narrow, heavily trafficked Fraser River has also raised safety concerns among locals, including from Kelly Greene, the NDP’s MLA for Richmond-Steveston, a riding located just downriver from the Tilbury site. Greene, who was also the province’s minister of emergency management and climate readiness, cited her opposition to the project in a statement announcing she would not seek re-election.

“While no industrial activity is without risk, my work in emergency management taught me that low-probability events can still have profound impacts, particularly when they occur in densely populated or environmentally sensitive areas,” she wrote in a statement posted to LinkedIn.

“I remain deeply concerned about risks posed by the Tilbury LNG shipping channel and have advocated for better safety standards for a decade.”

Like Greene, Richmond Coun. Michael Wolfe worries about the safety risks from Tilbury’s riverside locale.

“It’s just a remarkably challenging environment for boats,” he told The Tyee.

The Society of International Gas Tanker and Terminal Operators advises that vessels carrying LNG avoid “long, narrow inland waterways… due to greater navigation risk.”

Alhough Tilbury’s operations are long-standing, the expansion project means international LNG carriers will enter the Fraser for the first time. Fortis’s application estimates the tankers will be about 300 metres long — roughly the size of three football fields.

Spills and explosions related to LNG production remain rare, but when they occur, their consequences can be profound. Supercooled and compressed LNG can explode when it comes into contact with water and rapidly changes from liquid to gas.

When it leaks, LNG can remain as heavier-than-air vapour that can travel long distances before it dissipates. Under certain conditions, that vapour can ignite if it contacts an ignition source, as it did at the Freeport LNG facility in Texas in 2022.

Wolfe noted that Tilbury sits adjacent to a jet fuel terminal on the other side of the river. “If one of these sites has a major event, it’s going to compromise all the other ones in the area,” he said.

“It’s absolutely crazy to think that people will do that and not care about the future generations.”

Original article:  thetyee.ca

With economic crisis looming, Brazil faces social convulsion. The New Republic’s end won’t be easy.

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In 2002, Lula won the election for the first time with the slogan “Hope has triumphed over fear.” His opponents claimed that Lula would be a sort of Che Guevara in power and would drive investments away—nothing could be further from the truth, as the president is, in fact, beloved by bankers. In any case, there is no greater contrast than that between Lula’s first victory and his most recent one. In the latter, Lula’s meager and unconvincing proposals quickly gave way to a campaign of fear. The narrative went that Flávio would put an end to the Bolsa Família welfare program, slash pensions, and even strip Our Lady of Aparecida of her title as the Patroness of Brazil—something only the Pope has the authority to do.

This is the popular version of the fear-mongering campaign, and it is the more rational one. The middle-class version claimed that gay people would be prevented from existing, women would be barred from having abortions, and democracy itself would come to an end. In this context, “democracy” is an esoteric concept that is difficult to pin down. Since the majority of the Brazilian people oppose abortion—which, in theory, is already prohibited in Brazil—then the democratic course of action would, in fact, be to prevent women from using abortion as a method of contraception. Observing the hysterical outburst from a segment of the Brazilian middle class, one gets the impression that an Age of Aquarius of Evil might begin should Flávio win the election.

Things were going very well for Flávio until 1:22 PM on October 25th. Flávio had won the first round with a lead of 2,224,965 votes over Lula and held hopes of securing a large share of the votes cast for the four “third-way” candidates, whose supporters are predominantly anti-PT (opposed to the Lula’s Party). Combined, the three anti-PT candidates had garnered 5,607,483 votes. Self-help author Augusto Cury received 3,448,569 votes, and polling institutes indicated that his votes would be split between Flávio and Lula in the runoff. It would therefore have been reasonable to expect Flávio to gain around 7 million votes in the second round. Lula, on the other hand, counted on a reduction in abstention rates to turn the situation around—an expectation that was, at best, highly unrealistic.

Until the start of the campaign, Lula had nothing to offer the people other than an extra day off for formal-sector workers, the repeal of a tax he himself had created, and an end to the betting industry he himself had regulated. During the campaign, he granted the first increase in three years to Bolsa Família, the neoliberal cash-transfer program that turned him into an icon of the Brazilian left. When asked why it had taken so long, he claimed he hadn’t realized there hadn’t been an increase, and that once he found out, he raised it. The increase had not even been accounted for in the budget. Furthermore, he promised a 5,000-reais transfer for small-business owners and a 400-reais monthly stipend for university students—all this while the country is already burdened by high public debt and an annual interest rate of 13.75%.

Lula’s style of politics was laid bare once again during the final presidential debate: his promises consist entirely of income transfers, and his rhetoric is rooted in social division. Lula went so far as to claim that only a president born in the Northeast could look after the region, alleging that people from the South and Southeast hold the Northeast in contempt. Any criticism directed at a political movement that has spent nearly 20 years in power is framed as hatred toward the poor. Lula presents himself as a “poor man” simply because he was born into poverty—yet he is perhaps the only “poor man” in the world to receive a bottle of Macallan whisky worth 80,000 euros from a banker. When asked by Flávio whether he would like to apologize to Brazilians burdened by debt, Lula stated that it is the elite who should be apologizing.

Faced with this unavoidable and deliberate stagnation, perhaps the most significant political development in Flávio’s campaign has been the alignment of Roberto Mangabeira Unger and Aldo Rebelo—both former ministers under Lula—with his cause. Aldo Rebelo had already moved quite close to Bolsonarism due to his stance on environmental issues, so his alignment in 2026 comes as no surprise. Mangabeira Unger, however, is a Harvard professor who has long been associated with the PDT—a left-wing party that, while recently becoming a satellite of Lula, was, until not long ago, rooted in developmentalism. With these prominent left-wing figures—all champions of developmentalism—now aligning themselves with Bolsonarism, only Ciro Gomes is lacking; however, it was his aide, Gustavo Castañon, who organized the meeting between Flávio, Aldo, and Mangabeira—the latter having even flown in from the United States for this purpose.

At 1:22 PM on the 25th, however, the optimism within Flávio’s campaign began to falter when Lula’s PT requested that the Electoral Court extend voting hours in several Bahian cities until 7:00 PM. In Brazil, elections run from 8:00 AM to 5:00 PM (Brasília time), followed by a rapid tabulation of votes from the voting machines. The basis for the request was an alleged conspiracy by mayors supporting Flávio to pull buses off the streets and prevent voters from reaching the polls. In reality, the delay in Salvador occurred because PT-affiliated union members had engaged in a “sticker campaign”—placing PT campaign stickers on buses while they were still in the depot. Operating the buses in that condition would have constituted an electoral offense. Since bus operations fall under the jurisdiction of the municipal government, the city held the vehicles to remove the stickers; by 10:30 AM, however, transit services had returned to normal. (Furthermore, polling stations are located within a short distance of a voter’s registered address—a location that can be updated at the voter’s request.)

Salvador is a stronghold for the PT, yielding a high number of votes for the party. Consequently, Flávio’s campaign also sought to use rainfall in right-leaning municipalities as a pretext to extend voting hours in those areas. Subsequently, the PT petitioned the Supreme Federal Court (STF) to extend the election nationwide. Through the STF’s opaque, non-auditable selection process, the case was assigned to Justice Zanin—formerly Lula’s personal attorney—who granted the extension at 5:05 PM. By that time, many voting machines had already been closed and powered down, and under the rules, they could not be reopened. Finally, the vote count took place—in an order different from the norm (for instance, votes from the Northeast usually come in last; in a typical Brazilian election, the right starts strong but sees its lead melt away as the count progresses). To everyone’s astonishment, Lula’s performance improved in every region of the country. Flávio gained only 3,721,538 additional votes—a modest figure, considering one might have expected around 7 million from the “third way”—while Lula managed to secure an incredible 10,376,694 new votes.

Flávio has announced that he will seek the annulment of the runoff election, though he is unlikely to succeed. The central problem in Brazil today is the credibility of the Judiciary itself, which treats any questioning of the electoral process as an assault on democracy.

Precisely because a large segment of the Brazilian population views the Supreme Federal Court (STF) as the nation’s greatest problem, Flávio focused on electing senators capable of voting for the impeachment of justices. He succeeded: next year, the Senate will include 45 Bolsonarist senators—more than half the chamber. Given the public’s deep dissatisfaction with the Court, it is not implausible that they could reach the 54-vote threshold (two-thirds of the Senate) required to remove at least one justice.

Lula already governs with the backing of the Supreme Court, allowing him to bypass the legislative branches and censor the public. As the looming economic crisis compounds the political one (consider, for example, that starting next year, companies will be required to pay taxes the moment they receive payments from their clients), Brazil is likely to experience social convulsion and face a wave of repression. The end of the New Republic will not be easy. As things stand, one child has already paid with her health: in a Rio de Janeiro slum controlled by drug traffickers, those “victims of society” celebrated Lula’s victory with fireworks and gunfire—one round of which struck a young girl.

Many anti-Zionists demand that Brazil vote for Lula for the sake of the children in Palestine. It would seem that only Palestinian children matter; Brazilian children, apparently, do not.

Hungary’s Western anchor is set. The rest depends on pipelines, not speeches.

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The days of October

“Magyarország nem kompország”: Hungary is not a “ferry country”; it cannot drift between East and West. With this statement, delivered on October 23 before the Parliament in Budapest, Prime Minister Péter Magyar set the political tone for the 70th anniversary of the 1956 revolution. Immediately afterward, he added that in ’56 the Hungarians had already made their choice: “We belong to a free and democratic Europe.”

The phrase is no accident. The kompország is an image coined by Endre Ady, who in 1905 described Hungary as a ferry doomed to shuttle back and forth between East and West without ever docking permanently on either shore. For sixteen years, Viktor Orbán had overturned that assessment, transforming the oscillation into a strategy: Hungary as a bridge, Moscow’s interlocutor within the European Union, a hub of “opening to the East.” The new government chose the day most steeped in memory on the national calendar to declare that era over. This is the political significance of the day, and it is the appropriate place to begin.

On October 23, 1956, students from the Budapest University of Technology took to the streets in solidarity with Polish workers. The procession gathered in front of the statue of General Bem, then headed toward the Parliament; among their demands were free elections and the withdrawal of Soviet troops. In the evening, part of the crowd moved to Városliget, where the monument to Stalin stood. The Budapest police chief, Sándor Kopácsi, provided a detailed account in his book *Au nom de la classe ouvrière*: the demonstrators wrapped a steel cable around the neck of the statue—which, including its pedestal, stood about twenty-five meters tall—while others, who had arrived in trucks loaded with oxygen tanks and cutting torches, began cutting through the bronze at the level of the boots. It took about an hour for the statue to collapse. Only the boots remained on the pedestal, into which a Hungarian flag was planted. At the same time, in front of the Radio headquarters, the political police (ÁVH) opened fire on the crowd, and the protest turned into an armed uprising.

On October 25, in Kossuth Square, shots fired at demonstrators gathered in front of the Parliament caused a massacre whose death toll, even today, ranges from a few dozen to several hundred. This year’s state ceremony took place in that same square.

The revolution was not a bloodless affair on just one side. In the alleys of the 8th and 9th districts, around Corvin Passage, groups of insurgents—many of whom were boys barely out of their teens—attacked Soviet tanks with Molotov cocktails, and many crew members were burned to death inside their vehicles. Total Soviet casualties exceeded seven hundred. The fiercest violence, however, was directed at the men of the political police. On October 30, in Republic Square (Köztársaság tér), the insurgents stormed the party headquarters in Budapest: more than twenty ÁVH officers and conscripts were killed, some lynched and hanged from trees, along with City Secretary Imre Mező. The revolution’s own leaders condemned these acts and called for an end to summary justice.

The October 28 ceasefire marked the beginning of the withdrawal phase. Moscow agreed to withdraw its units from Budapest on the condition that they be replaced by Hungarian units and that the insurgents surrender their weapons. The columns in direct contact with the fighters left their positions on October 30; the last ones departed from the Parliament area in the early afternoon of the 31st. It was a retreat carried out in an openly hostile atmosphere. The groups at the Corvin Passage, convinced that this was a ruse, refused to assist in securing the convoys, and their suspicion was not unfounded: several armored vehicles remained hidden in Népliget and other parts of the city. However, the available sources—both Hungarian and Soviet—do not document any systematic attacks against the departing troops during those two days. The most harrowing accounts—those of Soviet soldiers killed while fleeing from burning vehicles—pertain to the clashes that occurred after November 4. Meanwhile, on October 31, the Presidium of the CPSU had already overturned the decision.

On November 1, Imre Nagy’s government proclaimed the country’s neutrality and its withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact. At dawn on November 4, Operation “Turbine” brought seventeen Soviet divisions back to Budapest. The final toll included approximately 2,500 Hungarian deaths, about 200,000 exiles, tens of thousands of convictions, and more than two hundred executions; Nagy, Pál Maléter, and Miklós Gimes were hanged after a secret trial in June 1958.

Three squares, three memories

Magyar said that for years Hungarians had been led to believe that the national holiday belonged to a single political party. The day showed that the memory of ’56 remains divided, even if the roles have been reversed. The state held its celebrations in Kossuth Square, with the morning flag-raising ceremony and a solemn session of Parliament. Fidesz, KDNP, and Mi Hazánk did not participate because they do not recognize the legitimacy of the new President of the Republic, András Baka.

Fidesz organized its own “March of the National Flag” from the Technical University to Bem Square, following the route taken by the students in 1956. Speakers included former President János Áder, historian Mária Schmidt, and parliamentary group leader János Bóka. For the first time in many years, Orbán did not deliver the October 23 speech: he was in Paris and limited himself to sharing Bóka’s video on social media. The slogan chosen for the demonstration—“No war, no gender, no migration—God, homeland, family”—makes it quite clear which interpretation of 1956 the opposition intends to uphold: that of a revolt for the nation, faith, and family against ideology—an interpretation to be revived today against Brussels.

Mi Hazánk has taken this interpretation to its logical conclusion. Its leader, László Toroczkai, has argued that in 1956 the Hungarians did not rebel against Russia but against an internationalist empire—and that today that empire is called the European Union—which reveals that, at least for a segment of the Hungarian right, 1956 has become an anti-Western symbol.

Magyar’s speech in Kossuth Square addressed this contentious issue. He recalled Erika Szeles, Péter Mansfeld, István Angyal, Nagy, and Maléter; he said that military superiority was able to crush the revolution and execute “the martyred prime minister,” but could not extinguish the desire for freedom. Then he turned to the present. Those who seek support against their own people “in Moscow or elsewhere,” he said, should remember that power sustained by foreign backing lasts only a short while. Anyone who, after 1956, parades an aggressor through the streets or subordinates the nation to foreign empires “has understood nothing of the message of ’56,” and Magyar added: “whether in Budapest or on a Parisian terrace” . The target was Orbán.

The section on foreign policy was brief and clear: Hungary wants to be a reliable ally and an equal partner, not a country that follows an isolated course. The speech never explicitly mentioned Russia, nor did it speak of neutrality. This choice is significant. In 1956, neutrality was Nagy’s ultimate demand; seventy years later, the Hungarian government interprets that same legacy as an anchor to the West, not as equidistance.

Brussels in Budapest

The presence of Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and European Council President António Costa gave the day an explicitly European framework. Von der Leyen, on her first visit to Hungary since 2024, spoke in Parliament of a return “to a reborn country.” She said that in 1956 even the Soviets were afraid, because a victory by the Hungarian people would have spread the desire for democracy. She then directly linked the anniversary to the April 12 election: in April, Hungary would once again send a message of hope, demonstrating that democratic regression is reversible. She had already made the same comparison between Orbán’s defeat and the 1956 revolution in the aftermath of the elections, sparking protests among the Hungarian right.

The rest of the guest list was more modest than the government had led people to believe. Delegations were sent by some forty countries, almost all at the level of ministers or parliamentary speakers; Moldovan President Maia Sandu and Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze were in attendance. Emmanuel Macron, whose attendance Magyar had announced in an interview, did not attend: the French embassy clarified that the visit had never been confirmed, following days of tension over certain comments by the Hungarian prime minister regarding the unrest in France. Also absent were Giorgia Meloni, who was visiting Kuwait, and Donald Tusk, who was in India. Volodymyr Zelenskyy was not present; Ukraine was represented by the Speaker of Parliament. Vladimir Putin was the only head of state from Europe to not receive an invitation.

On October 23, he symbolically confirmed a shift that had already begun in practice. The Magyar government has classified Russia as a security threat, given the green light to open four negotiation chapters for Ukraine’s accession to the European Union, and set the 2027 defense budget at 2% of GDP. The role of bridge between Europe and Russia—which Orbán had made the hallmark of Hungarian foreign policy—is no longer government doctrine.

It remains to be seen to what extent this can be achieved in practice. Last April, Magyar pointed out that Hungary is “close to Russia” and that paying more for raw materials harms European competitiveness; he said he was ready for pragmatic cooperation with Moscow and wanted to renegotiate the terms of Paks II with the Kremlin. Oil still comes via the Druzhba pipeline, and the country’s only nuclear power plant burns Russian fuel. Energy Minister István Kapitány maintains that, starting in October 2027, gas could come entirely from non-Russian sources, and a decision on Paks II is expected by the end of the year.

The 70th anniversary thus leaves one question unanswered. Ady feared that Hungary would remain a ferry forever. Orbán had tried to turn the ferry into a bridge. Magyar now promises a permanent landing on the western shore. Whether that landing will be stable will be determined more by geography and infrastructure than by speeches.

The two squares on October 23—Kossuth and Bem—did not celebrate the same revolution.

Strategic Culture Foundation spoke with Aiden Minnis, a British-Irish volunteer fighting for Russia on the frontline in Kharkov Oblast.

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Western politicians and media claim that Russia is bogged down in a Ukrainian quagmire. We are told that Russian forces are taking heavy losses, held in a stalemate by gritty Ukrainian soldiers. Nearly five years after invading, it is claimed, Russia’s military is still confined to Ukraine’s far eastern territory with little progress.

But this upbeat Western narrative is flawed and wearing thin. The NATO-backed Ukrainian regime is straining from collapse. The grinding losses on the battlefield, as disproportionate body exchanges attest, the corruption within the Kiev regime, the dredging of conscripts to include women, and the incessant pounding by Russian air strikes are exposing a state teetering on defeat.

Even U.S. President Donald Trump seems to have sobered up from drinking the Kool-Aid about Ukraine winning. He’s peeved and telling Vladimir Zelensky it’s time for him to step aside and cut a peace deal.

There is a growing foreboding sense that European NATO leaders are dreading the inevitable implosion of their “Ukraine project”. As German MEP Michael von der Schulesburg pointed out in an interview with Glenn Diesen, European politicians are increasingly uneasy that their lies about Ukraine will soon be blown wide open. There will be hell to pay for bankrupt economies and impoverished societies, all based on lies.

Still, it is a fair question: why aren’t Russian forces making more rapid advance along the 1,000 kilometer front line? If the Kiev regime is so shaky, why isn’t Russia finishing it off quickly?

Aiden Minnis, a British-Irish volunteer serving in the Russian army, said he believes that victory is coming and is inevitable. But he explains that the advance is deliberately slow. The “meatgrinder” people refer to about the battlefield is not just about inflicting losses of military personnel. He says the conflict in Ukraine is being fought strategically as an attritional war to defeat the Western NATO alliance.

“We have defeated the Ukrainian army three times over from the losses it has suffered,” says Minnis. “This war would have been over a long time ago, if it were not for the systematic involvement of NATO.”

The amount of weaponry and personnel that NATO has funneled into Ukraine is on a scale that few in the West can imagine, he noted.

“NATO effectively runs and directs the war for Ukraine. That includes generals and special forces from NATO countries inside command structures and military units in Ukraine, and not always sheep dipped into the foreign legion either. Some are outright working without cover.

“They use NATO radars and intelligence to conduct combat operations and terrorist attacks inside Russia. None of the fighting, or rather 90 per cent of it in Ukraine, would be possible without massive Western assistance,” says Minnis.

For example, the EU is donating €90 billion to Ukraine just for 2026 and 2027 alone, never mind the €200 bn it gave from 2022 to 2025. About one-third of this money is used to manufacture and supply drones. This vast expenditure has transformed Ukrainian territory into a giant high-tech killing field. Traversing such territory is an unprecedented challenge.

Aiden Minnis left Britain in 2023 as a volunteer to fight for Russia. He has served in Donetsk and Lugansk as a sapper clearing explosives, as well as in the evacuation of civilians and wounded. Currently, he is deployed as a rifleman in a regiment on the front line in Kharkov Oblast near Kupiansk.

The British media have called him a criminal and a traitor. He says he doesn’t care because he has no intention of returning to the United Kingdom.

“I am labelled a traitor, but I only ever swore allegiance to one country… Russia, and I never broke it. And as long as I have breath in my body, you will never see me swear allegiance, or fight for the butcher’s apron [British Union Jack flag]. My soul is Irish and now Russian.”

Minnis says that what the Western media report about the war in Ukraine is “total lies”.

He says that Russian forces are making slow but relentless advances along most of the frontline. The pace is incremental because the Russian military is trying to minimize casualties among its troops and the civilian population.

“If you look at the exchanges of dead soldiers that are agreed upon from time to time, the Ukrainian side’s casualties are 10 times those of Russia.

“Also, despite the scale of this war – the biggest in Europe since World War Two – the number of civilian deaths is relatively low, and that’s because Russia is trying to minimize these casualties,” he says.

Minnis says that another factor that makes advances slow-going is that the NATO-backed regime uses tactics of boobytrapping buildings with civilians inside them. He says that when Russian forces take a village or town, the houses are often rigged with explosives, with families inside. This makes for painstaking work by sappers to defuse boobytraps.

And, of course, the massive deployment of drones is a big problem for infantry. The European Union and Britain have flooded Ukraine with drones that create “death zones.”

“The use of drone walls is in place of dwindling Ukrainian conscripts. These death zones make our ground progress difficult.”

However, Minnis said NATO’s deployment in Ukraine is a double-edged sword. The 27-nation military bloc has certainly made a Russian victory more difficult to achieve. It has prolonged the proxy war with millions of Ukrainian casualties.

But this war of attrition is grinding down the NATO arsenal with colossal impact. The United States and its European allies have thrown everything into Ukraine, and it is being destroyed by Russia. It’s a giant demolition site. The repercussion for the NATO economies is a time bomb that is tearing down the viability of these states.

Ukraine is a quagmire for NATO, not Russia. The battlefield does not have to move westwards; the Western powers are being sucked under.

In World War Two, the Soviet Red Army pushed all the way to Berlin. In today’s war, the new Berlin is in Ukraine, where Russia’s enemies are being ground down, hollowed out, and buried.

Aiden Minnis adds: “Russian leader Vladimir Putin is fighting this war very humanely; dare I say such a thing is possible in a war. But it’s a two-fold strategy: it’s to limit civilian casualties, but also a war of attrition, because what’s happening in real time is the demilitarisation of Ukraine, which won’t be able to wage a war again once this war is won by Russia, and also the demilitarisation and deindustrialization of NATO countries.”