The United States has privately warned Middle Eastern allies to prepare for renewed military operations against Iran following the 3 November congressional elections, according to diplomatic sources. Although President Donald Trump has not authorised further strikes, the warnings have heightened concerns about regional escalation, energy infrastructure and the consequences for European economies already facing rising fuel costs.

American officials have advised several governments in the Middle East to prepare for possible new military strikes against Iran after next week’s US midterm elections, raising the prospect of another escalation in a conflict that has already disrupted international energy markets.

According to an Associated Press investigation published on 29 October, two diplomats familiar with the warnings said US officials had urged regional allies to consider the possibility of Iranian retaliation against energy facilities and other critical infrastructure.

The diplomats emphasised that President Donald Trump had not made a final decision to resume military operations.

Nevertheless, Washington’s warnings suggest that preparations are being discussed for a potential campaign extending over several days.

Regional governments are concerned that retaliatory action by Iran or organisations aligned with Tehran could prolong the fighting beyond the duration initially envisaged by the United States.

The White House and American officials declined to comment on the reported communications.

Military Preparations and Political Timing

The warnings come as Trump approaches the final days of campaigning ahead of the 3 November elections.

The president has repeatedly suggested that further military action against Iran could follow the vote, although he has also claimed that the conflict may be approaching its conclusion.

During a campaign appearance in Texas, Trump said the war could end within weeks, while reiterating his insistence that Iran must not acquire nuclear weapons.

The timing of possible military action remains uncertain.

The Pentagon has increased its regional military presence, including the deployment of the aircraft carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt and additional amphibious forces.

Approximately 9,000 military personnel were associated with the deployment announced in September.

However, the movement of forces does not establish that an attack has been authorised or that particular targets have been selected.

American military preparations can also serve as deterrence, signalling and contingency planning.

The distinction is important because the political consequences of renewed strikes would depend on their scale, objectives and Iranian response.

Tehran Maintains That Diplomacy Remains Possible

Iran has indicated that it remains willing to pursue negotiations.

Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said on 28 October that Tehran was continuing to consider diplomatic proposals and wanted elements of its earlier ceasefire initiative to form the basis for renewed discussions.

That proposal had previously been rejected by Washington.

The continuing disagreement concerns both the conditions for ending military operations and wider questions about Iran’s nuclear programme.

The United Arab Emirates has urged the parties to seek political solutions and avoid returning to large-scale fighting.

Regional governments face a particularly difficult position because they may be exposed to retaliation even when they are not directly involved in American military operations.

Energy facilities, airports, ports and other infrastructure could become targets during an escalation.

Such attacks would also affect civilian populations and commercial activity beyond the immediate combatants.

The Conflict Has Already Spread

The war involving Iran, the United States and Israel began in late February and has subsequently affected other parts of the Middle East.

Iran-aligned Houthi forces have carried out attacks on Saudi oil infrastructure and airports, prompting retaliatory operations by a Saudi-led coalition against targets in Yemen.

These developments have complicated attempts to contain the conflict geographically.

The United States has not conducted a strike against Iran since early September, according to the reporting available on 29 October.

However, the absence of recent American attacks has not removed the risk of renewed operations.

Regional governments are therefore considering a range of possible developments, including limited strikes, a longer military campaign or retaliatory attacks preceding any American operation.

None of these scenarios should be treated as inevitable.

Europe Faces Another Energy Risk

For the European Union, a renewed confrontation would have implications extending well beyond diplomatic relations with Washington.

The Middle East remains a major source of global oil and liquefied natural gas supplies.

The Strait of Hormuz is particularly important to international energy shipping, connecting producers in the Persian Gulf with markets in Europe and Asia.

An increase in attacks on shipping, production facilities or export terminals could place further pressure on global energy prices.

The consequences would not necessarily be confined to countries purchasing oil or gas directly from the region.

European consumers compete in internationally connected markets, meaning supply disruptions can influence prices even where import arrangements have been diversified.

The EU has substantially reduced its dependence on Russian pipeline gas since 2022, but growing reliance on liquefied natural gas creates exposure to fluctuations in international supply and demand.

A further Middle Eastern escalation could therefore complicate Europe’s efforts to rebuild gas reserves and contain industrial energy costs before winter.

Higher fuel prices would also affect transport, food production and household expenditure.

The Strategic Dilemma for European Governments

European governments must balance several interests.

They support efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation, maintain relations with the United States and preserve stability in the Middle East.

At the same time, they have a direct economic interest in avoiding prolonged disruption to maritime trade and energy production.

A new American military campaign could revive debates concerning the legality, necessity and proportionality of military action, particularly if diplomatic alternatives remain available.

European governments may also face decisions about the protection of their nationals, regional diplomatic missions and commercial shipping.

The immediate significance of Washington’s warnings lies in the possibility of renewed hostilities, not in confirmation that such hostilities have been ordered.

With the American elections approaching, governments across the Middle East and Europe are preparing for developments that remain contingent on decisions in Washington and Tehran.

Whether the warnings lead to military action or renewed diplomacy will determine the next phase of a conflict whose economic effects are already being felt far beyond the region.

Photo: Mass Communication Specialist Seaman Kaylianna Genier / US Navy / Wikimedia Commons (Public Domain).

Moscow has indicated that European governments will not participate in the next round of negotiations over the war in Ukraine, despite their central role in financing Kyiv, supplying military assistance and shaping the continent’s security arrangements. The Kremlin’s position raises questions about whether any agreement negotiated principally by Washington, Moscow and Kyiv could be implemented without substantial European involvement.

Russia has ruled out European participation in the next round of trilateral talks with Ukraine and the United States, while suggesting that the negotiations could be delayed by developments on the battlefield and the continuing conflict in the Middle East.

Yuri Ushakov, foreign policy adviser to Russian President Vladimir Putin, said on 29 October that Moscow had not agreed to a specific date for further consultations and that European representatives were not being considered for inclusion.

Ushakov maintained that preparations concerned representatives of Russia, Ukraine and the United States.

His remarks followed statements by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky indicating that the next round could take place in Abu Dhabi between 6 and 10 November.

The Kremlin has not confirmed those dates.

The disagreement comes as European governments seek a more substantial role in diplomatic efforts concerning a conflict whose eventual settlement would have direct consequences for their security, defence expenditure and relations with Russia.

Moscow Sets Its Conditions

Ushakov’s position was particularly explicit when discussing European participation.

Speaking to Russian media on 28 October, he suggested that European representatives were free to travel to the proposed venue but would not be invited to join the negotiations.

His remarks were subsequently reinforced by a statement that European involvement was not under consideration.

The Kremlin adviser also linked the timing of the next meeting to developments in the Middle East, where the US-Israeli conflict with Iran has complicated Washington’s diplomatic and military priorities.

Ushakov said that conditions on the Ukrainian battlefield would also influence when negotiations could resume.

These explanations give Moscow considerable latitude over the timetable while leaving uncertainty about the practical arrangements for the next meeting.

They do not, however, establish that Washington and Kyiv have accepted Russia’s preferred arrangements for every subsequent stage of negotiations.

Technical consultations between three parties and broader discussions over a European security settlement are not necessarily the same diplomatic process.

Europe Wants a Place at the Table

The Russian position contrasts with statements from the leaders of Britain, France and Germany, who have maintained that European governments must participate in discussions concerning Ukraine’s future security.

Their argument rests partly on the responsibilities that European countries would be expected to assume after any agreement.

European states have provided substantial financial, military and humanitarian assistance to Ukraine since Russia launched its full-scale invasion in February 2022.

They have also introduced successive sanctions against Russia, expanded defence expenditure and debated arrangements for security guarantees intended to discourage renewed hostilities.

Any settlement that required changes to European sanctions, military deployments or financial assistance would therefore depend on decisions taken by European governments and institutions.

Neither Moscow nor Washington could independently commit the European Union to lifting sanctions or authorise European states to deploy forces.

This distinction limits the practical significance of excluding European officials from a negotiating session.

An agreement could be discussed without European participation, but implementing provisions that require European action would demand further negotiations.

The Donbas Question Remains Unresolved

The principal obstacle continues to concern territory and the conditions under which military operations would end.

Russia has maintained its demand that Ukraine relinquish territory in the eastern Donbas region, including areas remaining under Ukrainian control.

Kyiv has rejected the surrender of territory as a precondition for ending the war.

The proposed negotiations are consequently expected to concentrate on technical issues where limited agreements may be more achievable.

These include possible arrangements concerning energy infrastructure, maritime security, the exchange of prisoners and the return of Ukrainian children taken to Russia or Russian-controlled territory.

Such measures could produce humanitarian or economic benefits without resolving the central territorial dispute.

However, their implementation would require monitoring arrangements and sufficient confidence that the parties would honour their commitments.

The temporary humanitarian ceasefire around Oleshky, in the Kherson region, offers a narrowly defined example of cooperation between Russian and Ukrainian representatives.

It does not demonstrate that a broader political agreement is within reach.

The American Role

Washington remains the principal external mediator in the current negotiating format.

That position reflects American diplomatic influence and its capacity to engage directly with both Moscow and Kyiv.

However, the United States is simultaneously managing military commitments in the Middle East and domestic political pressures ahead of the 3 November congressional elections.

These competing priorities may affect the pace of diplomatic engagement.

For Russia, a negotiating framework centred on Washington offers the possibility of addressing wider bilateral issues alongside the conflict in Ukraine.

For Ukraine, American participation remains important because US decisions concerning military assistance and security commitments could influence the durability of any settlement.

Europe’s position is more complicated. Its governments possess substantial economic leverage, but their influence over the negotiating agenda depends on coordination with Washington and Kyiv.

Negotiating Without Europe Has Practical Limits

The immediate dispute concerns who participates in the next round of talks.

The longer-term question is which parties would be responsible for implementing a settlement.

A ceasefire might initially involve arrangements agreed by military and diplomatic representatives of Russia and Ukraine, supported by the United States.

A more comprehensive agreement could involve sanctions, reconstruction finance, security guarantees, troop deployments and Ukraine’s future relationship with European institutions.

Those issues cannot be settled on behalf of European governments without their consent.

Moscow’s attempt to restrict participation may therefore succeed at the level of an initial negotiating format while proving more difficult to sustain during discussions about implementation.

For the moment, neither the date nor the outcome of the proposed Abu Dhabi meeting is certain.

What has become clearer is the divergence between Russia’s preferred negotiating structure and Europe’s determination to influence the security arrangements that would follow the war.

A dispute between Germany and Italy over natural gas storage has exposed tensions within the European Union’s energy market, as wholesale prices approach levels last recorded during the 2022 energy crisis and governments confront the prospect of another expensive winter.

Italy has accused Germany of contributing to the latest surge in European natural gas prices by delaying the replenishment of its underground storage facilities, reopening a debate about national energy policies and their consequences for the EU’s single market.

The dispute emerged on 29 October after the European benchmark gas price briefly exceeded €100 per megawatt hour the previous day, its highest level since December 2022.

Germany’s gas storage facilities were just 61.7 per cent full, compared with almost 91 per cent in Italy and an EU average of approximately 75 per cent.

The difference has become politically sensitive because European countries purchase gas in an interconnected market, meaning decisions taken by one major consumer can influence prices paid elsewhere.

Speaking at the Montel Italian Energy Day conference in Milan, Alessandro Noce, director general for energy markets and infrastructure at Italy’s Energy Ministry, criticised Germany’s approach to preparing for winter.

According to Reuters, Noce argued that Italy had spent €300 million securing additional gas reserves, only to face higher market prices as Germany attempted to replenish its comparatively depleted stocks.

He also questioned whether Germany had delayed purchases because of preparations to privatise energy companies involved in the storage process.

Germany’s Economy Ministry did not immediately respond to the criticism.

Germany’s Storage Decisions Under Scrutiny

The German government’s approach has attracted particular attention because of its role in the operations of Uniper and Securing Energy for Europe (SEFE).

Both companies became important components of Germany’s energy-security arrangements following the disruption of Russian gas supplies in 2022.

Plans concerning their future ownership have coincided with renewed questions about how Berlin balances commercial considerations against the need to maintain strategic reserves.

At the Milan conference, an energy analyst suggested that preparations for privatisation had contributed to delays in storage purchases.

That assessment has not been established as the definitive explanation for Germany’s comparatively low reserves.

Nevertheless, the resulting political dispute demonstrates the difficulties of managing energy security through a system in which national governments retain considerable discretion while their purchasing decisions affect a common market.

Europe’s Gas Market Faces Renewed Pressure

Europe’s latest price increase has several causes extending beyond German storage policies.

Disruptions to liquefied natural gas shipments associated with the conflict involving Iran have constrained supplies from the Middle East.

At the same time, European countries entered the summer storage-refilling period with unusually low reserves following the previous winter.

The EU Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) reported that underground gas storage was only 28 per cent full at the end of winter 2025–26.

By 21 October, that figure had risen to 75 per cent, still below historical levels.

In its latest gas-market monitoring report, ACER estimated that disruption linked to the Middle East conflict had added between €18 billion and €33 billion to Europe’s gas-import bill.

The agency also found that American liquefied natural gas accounted for roughly 30 per cent of EU gas supplies, reflecting Europe’s growing reliance on transatlantic energy imports.

Although this diversification has reduced dependence on Russian pipeline gas, it has also increased Europe’s exposure to international competition for LNG cargoes.

European buyers must compete with customers in Asia, particularly when colder weather or geopolitical disruptions increase demand.

EU Storage Rules Face a Test

The disagreement has implications for the European Union’s gas-storage framework.

Following the 2022 energy crisis, the EU introduced mandatory storage requirements intended to reduce the risk of supply shortages during winter.

The arrangements were subsequently extended until the end of 2027.

Under the revised rules, member states retain a 90 per cent storage-filling target but have greater flexibility over when and how it is achieved.

Countries may reach the target between 1 October and 1 December, rather than being bound to the previous 1 November deadline.

Further flexibility is available in difficult market conditions.

These provisions were designed partly to prevent governments from creating artificial demand peaks by purchasing gas simultaneously to meet rigid deadlines.

However, the present dispute suggests that delayed purchases can create another problem if several major consumers need additional supplies as winter approaches.

Germany’s current storage level does not, by itself, establish a breach of EU requirements. The applicable deadlines and permitted exemptions must also be considered.

Italy Seeks Greater Scope for Intervention

The Italian government has meanwhile been seeking permission from the European Commission to use public funds to reduce energy costs for households and businesses.

Rome’s concerns reflect the economic consequences of sustained high gas prices, particularly for industries dependent on energy-intensive manufacturing.

Italy faces a general election expected in 2027, adding a domestic political dimension to the debate over energy subsidies.

Noce warned that prices could rise to between €150 and €180 per megawatt hour if January brings particularly cold weather.

Such an outcome remains a scenario rather than a forecast.

Energy markets will also be influenced by developments in the Middle East, LNG deliveries, industrial demand and winter temperatures.

A European Problem Without a Single National Solution

Europe has expanded its LNG import infrastructure and diversified energy sources substantially since 2022.

However, the latest price increases demonstrate that greater import capacity does not necessarily insulate consumers from global supply disruptions.

The German–Italian dispute also exposes the limits of national energy planning within an integrated European market.

Germany’s storage policies affect its neighbours, just as decisions taken elsewhere influence the price German consumers pay.

The central question for Brussels is whether existing coordination arrangements provide sufficient incentives for governments to safeguard their own winter supplies without transferring additional costs to other member states.

With the heating season approaching, that issue is becoming an immediate economic concern rather than a theoretical dispute about European energy solidarity.

Trade unions representing workers at 113 ports across five continents are preparing coordinated industrial action on 30 October, protesting against the movement of military equipment through commercial shipping terminals. The mobilisation raises questions about international trade, defence logistics and the growing involvement of organised labour in geopolitical disputes.

Dockworkers’ unions in 22 countries and regions are preparing coordinated strikes and demonstrations on Friday, 30 October, in an international campaign opposing the use of civilian ports to transport weapons and other military supplies to conflict zones.

The mobilisation involves more than 25 trade unions representing workers at 113 ports, according to organisers, with planned actions extending across Europe, North Africa, Asia and the Americas.

Major shipping centres expected to participate include Hamburg, Genoa, Le Havre, Valencia, Algeciras and Piraeus, alongside Morocco’s Tangier Med and India’s Nhava Sheva.

The scale of actual disruption remains uncertain.

Some unions have announced 24-hour stoppages, while others intend to organise shorter walkouts, demonstrations or symbolic protests.

Organisers have suggested that the action could affect more than 40 per cent of Mediterranean cargo traffic and freight worth over $2 billion.

However, these figures represent estimates of potential disruption rather than confirmed losses or cargo volumes that will necessarily be immobilised.

A Campaign Extending Beyond Europe

The initiative originated among dockworkers’ organisations in Italy, France, Greece, Spain’s Basque Country, Turkey and Morocco.

It subsequently attracted support from unions in northern Europe and several countries outside the Mediterranean region.

Among the participating organisations are Germany’s ver.di, France’s CGT Ports et Docks, Ireland’s SIPTU and Denmark’s 3F.

Indian maritime unions have also declared their support, citing the effects of armed conflict on commercial shipping and the safety of seafarers.

The campaign follows an international declaration agreed in Istanbul in May 2026, when dockworkers’ representatives called for ports to remain outside military supply operations.

The organisers argue that commercial transport infrastructure is increasingly being used to facilitate the movement of weapons and equipment to active conflict zones.

Their demands extend beyond any single war, although opposition to arms deliveries connected with the conflict involving Israel and the Palestinians has featured prominently in earlier industrial action.

Italy at the Centre of the Mobilisation

Italy is expected to become one of the principal centres of Friday’s protests.

The Unione Sindacale di Base (USB) has called a nationwide general strike, with demonstrations planned in more than 40 cities.

Port workers are expected to participate in Genoa, Livorno, Trieste, Ravenna, Gioia Tauro and several other maritime centres.

Genoa has previously been associated with protests against the handling of military cargo, including shipments linked to Israel and American military facilities.

However, the port’s representatives have indicated that they expect only limited operational disruption from Friday’s action.

The distinction between planned participation and actual interruption of shipping is important.

Large ports operate through complex arrangements involving terminal operators, subcontractors, transport companies and different categories of employees.

Consequently, industrial action affecting one part of a port does not necessarily bring all commercial activity to a halt.

Greek Ferries Face Disruption

Greece is among the countries where the effects on passenger transport could be more immediate.

Dockworkers, engineers and seafarers’ unions have announced participation in the protests, with Greek ferry services expected to remain suspended for 24 hours.

At Piraeus, the country’s largest port, dockworkers have announced a three-hour stoppage.

Other Greek maritime unions intend to participate in longer strikes.

Disruption to ferry operations could affect travel between the Greek mainland and its islands, demonstrating how a campaign directed primarily against military cargo can also affect civilian transport.

The effects will depend on the precise participation of employees and the arrangements made by port and ferry operators.

Defence Logistics and Commercial Shipping

The planned mobilisation draws attention to the relationship between military supply chains and civilian maritime infrastructure.

Commercial ports are essential to international trade, but they may also handle military vehicles, ammunition, equipment and other cargo connected with defence operations.

NATO members and other states depend on commercial transport networks for certain aspects of military logistics.

Military equipment may be transported aboard commercial vessels or through terminals that also process ordinary goods.

The use of such facilities is not inherently unlawful, and arms shipments may be authorised under national and international export-control arrangements.

Nevertheless, dockworkers’ organisations argue that employees should have a greater role in determining whether ports are used to facilitate military operations.

This creates potential tensions between industrial rights, contractual obligations, national security priorities and government decisions concerning defence exports.

The implications are particularly significant in Europe, where governments are expanding defence production and seeking to strengthen military supply chains.

Any sustained disruption to port logistics could complicate the movement of equipment and components, although the consequences of Friday’s planned action cannot yet be established.

Europe’s Growing Defence Trade

The protest comes as European countries increase military spending and procurement in response to deteriorating security conditions.

According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Europe became the world’s largest arms-importing region over the 2021–2025 period.

The expansion of defence trade has increased the importance of transport infrastructure capable of handling military equipment.

It has also exposed disagreements over the political responsibilities of companies and workers involved in these supply chains.

For governments, the movement of defence equipment may form part of legitimate security commitments and international assistance programmes.

For participating unions, opposition to particular military shipments is presented as an extension of workers’ rights and their broader political objectives.

These competing positions are unlikely to be resolved through a single day of industrial action.

An Immediate Test for International Shipping

Friday’s mobilisation will provide an indication of how effectively unions can coordinate industrial action across different countries, legal systems and transport networks.

Its practical significance will depend on how many workers participate, which terminals suspend operations and whether shipping companies can maintain schedules through alternative arrangements.

The organisers have demonstrated their ability to coordinate protests across a geographically extensive network.

Whether that coordination translates into substantial disruption to international maritime trade remains to be seen.

For European governments and shipping operators, the immediate task will be to manage any interruption to commercial and passenger services.

The wider question is whether opposition to the use of civilian transport infrastructure for military logistics will become a recurring feature of industrial relations across Europe’s major ports.

Christine Lagarde’s unexpected decision to leave the European Central Bank nine months ahead of schedule has triggered a politically sensitive succession process at a time when renewed inflation, rising borrowing costs and economic uncertainty are testing the eurozone’s monetary institutions.

Christine Lagarde will step down as president of the European Central Bank (ECB) on 7th February 2027, bringing her tenure to an early conclusion and opening negotiations among European Union governments over one of the continent’s most influential economic appointments.

The announcement, made by the ECB on 29th October, came on the same day that its Governing Council decided to leave interest rates unchanged, despite renewed inflationary pressure linked to rising energy prices.

Lagarde, who has led the institution since November 2019, was originally expected to remain in office until October 2027. Her departure will therefore bring forward a succession contest that had already attracted considerable attention in European financial and political circles.

Speaking after the announcement, Lagarde explained that she wanted greater freedom to address matters beyond monetary policy, arguing that the restrictions associated with central bank leadership prevented her from contributing publicly to wider debates.

Her explanation leaves open questions about the political consequences of her departure, particularly as EU governments prepare for difficult negotiations over the institution’s future leadership.

A Succession Shaped by European Politics

Under Article 283 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the ECB president is appointed by the European Council, acting by qualified majority following consultations with the European Parliament and the ECB’s Governing Council.

Although the process is formally governed by treaty provisions, appointments to the ECB’s Executive Board have historically involved negotiations among the eurozone’s largest economies.

Two former national central bank governors have emerged as prominent potential successors: Klaas Knot of the Netherlands and Pablo Hernández de Cos of Spain.

Both have substantial experience in monetary policy, although their possible candidacies remain subject to the political calculations of EU governments.

The timing is especially significant for France, which faces a presidential election in April 2027 against a background of domestic political instability and mounting concerns about public finances.

An appointment concluded before that election would be negotiated by the existing European leadership, potentially affecting the balance of influence over one of the eurozone’s principal institutions.

However, Lagarde has not publicly identified the French election as the reason for her departure.

The succession process will also coincide with other changes to the ECB’s Executive Board, increasing the importance of negotiations over the geographical and institutional balance of its leadership.

Inflation Returns to the Foreground

The leadership announcement coincided with a difficult monetary policy decision. On 29th October, the ECB maintained its deposit facility rate at 2.5 per cent, leaving the main refinancing and marginal lending rates at 2.65 and 2.90 per cent respectively.

Eurozone inflation reached 3.8 per cent in September, substantially above the ECB’s medium-term target of 2 per cent. Rising energy prices have complicated the institution’s position. Higher gas and oil costs threaten to increase consumer prices while simultaneously weakening industrial output and household purchasing power.

The ECB acknowledged that the energy shock could produce further inflationary pressures and reduce growth.

At the same time, tighter financial conditions across the eurozone have increased the risks associated with additional monetary tightening.

This leaves policymakers confronting a familiar but difficult problem: raising interest rates may restrain inflation, but it can also deepen economic weakness and increase borrowing costs for governments, businesses and households.

The next president will inherit these competing pressures rather than a settled monetary environment.

France Adds Another Complication

Financial developments in France have added urgency to the debate.

French government bond yields have risen sharply, with ten-year borrowing costs reaching levels not seen since 2002.

This reflects market concerns about the country’s fiscal position and political uncertainty, while raising wider questions about financial stability within the eurozone.

For the ECB, the challenge is particularly delicate.

Its mandate requires monetary policy to be directed towards price stability across the currency union. However, the economic consequences of higher interest rates differ considerably between member states.

Countries with elevated public debt face greater pressure from rising financing costs, while economies exposed to higher energy prices may experience weaker investment and industrial production.

The ECB possesses instruments intended to address disorderly financial-market conditions, but these do not eliminate the underlying fiscal and political differences between eurozone members.

The appointment of Lagarde’s successor will therefore take place against a backdrop of renewed debate about the relationship between monetary independence and national economic interests.

An Institution Facing a Different Europe

Lagarde’s presidency began before the pandemic, Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and the subsequent European energy crisis.

During her tenure, the ECB navigated emergency monetary interventions, unusually high inflation and substantial changes in interest rates.

Her successor will confront a different combination of challenges: renewed geopolitical disruption, economic competition with the United States and China, and growing demands for European investment in defence and industrial development.

These priorities are primarily the responsibility of governments, but they influence the economic conditions in which the central bank operates.

The immediate question is who will replace Lagarde. The more consequential question is how the next ECB president will manage monetary policy in a eurozone whose economic and political divisions are becoming increasingly difficult to separate.

For EU leaders, the succession is an opportunity to determine the institution’s leadership. For the ECB, it will be another test of its ability to maintain monetary independence while managing the consequences of Europe’s changing political economy.

The ECB faces an ugly choice as eurozone inflation hits 3.8pc

Why Norway and Finland Were Right to Call Putin

By Glenn Diesen | October 29, 2026

The leaders of Norway and Finland are criticised for breaking with the European consensus on boycotting diplomacy by calling President Putin. Their decision to undermine this solidarity is seen as dividing and weakening Europe. I argue the opposite. It was a brave and necessary move, as the European consensus is based on a rhetorical trap that isolates Europe, makes it increasingly irrelevant, and risks taking it to war with Russia – the world’s largest nuclear power. I will make a further argument: we should develop a healthy scepticism towards the notion that speaking with one voice is always a strength.

How to Speak with One Voice: The Rhetorical Trap

Ask yourself: how can 27+ countries with different political, economic, and security interests agree on a common foreign policy and speak with one voice? A common voice can be achieved by defining collective interests or by setting a rhetorical trap. A rhetorical trap is set when politicians use shared values and earlier commitments to pressure others into supporting policies they would otherwise oppose. Disagreement is portrayed as a betrayal of these values, making it politically costly to dissent, even when the policy goes against national interests.

The easiest way to force a consensus is to frame every issue as a struggle between good and evil. Once political disagreements become moral questions, those who challenge the consensus can be shamed rather than answered. If every issue is reduced to a choice between freedom and imperialism, it becomes much easier to speak with one voice. The obsession with speaking with one voice makes Europeans vulnerable to Manichean thinking and warmongering policies.

Europeans unite around absurd slogans such as “Putin is Hitler” and “Russia wants to restore the Soviet Union”. These slogans do not help us understand Russia or develop sensible policies to mitigate the security competition. Their purpose is to establish moral clarity and enforce political conformity. Challenging these slogans with well-documented arguments is considered immoral and a threat to European unity. This rhetorical trap is extremely dangerous because, in a struggle between good and evil, we reach the conclusion that diplomacy is appeasement and weapons are the path to peace.

The End of Debate

Consider the debate about European security after the Cold War. We once recognised the principle of indivisible security, which means that one state should not strengthen its security at the expense of others. Discussions about security entailed balancing deterrence with reassurance. These principles have largely disappeared from European political discourse. It is now only about deterrence. It is heresy to contest the notion that NATO is a “force for good”, and all concerns about NATO expansionism are framed as opposition to democracy and freedom. How can we resolve a security competition if we are not even allowed to discuss its causes?

Instead, European leaders increasingly measure the success of their policies by their moral intentions rather than their consequences. Sanctions are presented as a demonstration of resolve, the willingness to fight a war as an expression of solidarity, and refusing diplomacy as standing firm against aggression. But what happens when these policies fail to produce the intended results? The answer is usually more sanctions, more war, and less diplomacy. The policies themselves cannot be questioned without appearing to undermine the moral foundations of European unity.

Weaponising Solidarity

The demand for solidarity is also weaponised to override reason. WikiLeaks exposed how Norwegian officials had initially expressed serious concerns that US strategic missile defence would disrupt the nuclear balance with Russia and destabilise the world. The US ambassador reported to Washington that the Norwegians could be persuaded to change their position, not through arguments, but by emphasising the need for NATO solidarity. If the Norwegians were presented with a choice between “repeating Russian narratives” and defending NATO solidarity, they would fall in line.

Later, the American ambassador sent another cable to Washington confirming that their work with NGOs, think tanks, journalists, and politicians had delivered the message, and that the Norwegians were abandoning their security concerns. This was not the result of arguments, but of pressure to show solidarity in a world where everything is framed in black-and-white terms. Since then, the nuclear arms control architecture has largely collapsed, and the world faces a dangerous future – but the political class takes comfort in the fact that it was all done in solidarity.

This is a dangerous way to organise European security. If solidarity means that countries must abandon their own security assessments to support a common position, then solidarity itself becomes a source of insecurity. The purpose of cooperation should be to reconcile different interests and develop better policies, not to pressure governments into repeating the same empty arguments.

Speaking with One Voice or Correcting Course?

A strong Europe should be able to tolerate disagreements among its members. Indeed, such disagreements are necessary if Europe is to correct mistaken policies. When dissent is treated as disloyalty, political mistakes become almost impossible to reverse. Leaders become prisoners of their own rhetoric.

Norway and Finland should therefore not be criticised for challenging the European consensus on diplomatic isolation. They should be encouraged. Europe needs countries willing to question policies that have become resistant to criticism, especially when those policies concern war and peace.

The current European consensus is sustained by a rhetorical trap that isolates Europe, makes the continent increasingly irrelevant, and risks dragging us into war. I therefore argue for a little less solidarity and a little more common sense.

In un certo senso Mosca sta facendo qualcosa che la società europea non può fare da sola: mettere alle strette la sua classe dirigente, farla venire allo scoperto e ridicolizzarla costringendola a mettersi a confronto coi propri limiti, ad uscire dalla propria torre d’avorio ed infine a ridefinire un’identità – quella europea – in dubbio da quasi 80 anni.

Segue nostro Telegram.

Le notizie delle ultime settimane lasciando intravedere spiragli di qualcosa: un qualcosa che è ancora troppo presto per definire, ma in cui molti sperano. Una risoluzione del conflitto che infiamma il fianco orientale d’Europa potrebbe vedere una svolta (si mormora) eppure più tale ipotesi si avvicina, più si percepisce un’ansia generalizzata, come un nervosismo inesprimibile che pervade la classe politica al comando delle istituzioni europee, a tutti i livelli, ma soprattutto a quelli più alti. Lo spaventoso paradosso lo si può articolare in modo assai semplice: c’è paura della pace.

La classe dirigente europea, anzichè remare in direzione di una soluzione definitiva, a lungo termine, del conflitto in Ucraina, al contrario esterna tutta una serie di dubbi e ostilità ad ogni compromesso da far quasi credere nell’esistenza di un avversione a tale pace: in breve, le istituzioni europee nel momento più critico dell’ultimo lustro, esprimono qualcosa di indicibile che di certo non si addice allo spirito dei padri costituenti della comunità europea, votati a edificare una cultura sovranazionale basata sul compromesso, sulla reiezione del nazionalismo e sulla diplomazia. La verità è che siamo di fronte ad un nodo di grandissime proporzioni: il conflitto in Ucraina, sebbene limitato dal punto di vista prettamente geografico, ha effetti geopolitici di grande portata che ridefiniscono gli equilibri di potere ereditati dalla caduta del muro di Berlino. In un contesto come questo, sorgerà una delle domande più difficili: quale destino per l’Europa ? Un continente uscito azzerato dal secondo conflitto mondiale, risorto e fiorito economicamente fino al massimo splendore nelle generazioni post-belliche, pur rimanendo perennemente “monco” ovvero privo di una propria politica di difesa (così come di una propria politica estera indipendente da quella di Washington). I suoi leader si trovano ad affrontare ora qualcosa di mai visto prima nell’esperienza dell’Europa politica, ovvero l’assumersi di una responsabilità storica: in questo caso quella di un insuccesso, nel prevenire e gestire una grande guerra convenzionale ai margini del proprio continente, aver preso decisioni avventate ed ora ritrovarsi messi da parte constatando una propria sconfitta sul campo contro il rivale identificato con Mosca. Per poter comprendere tutto questo occorre tuttavia fare qualche passo indietro e riflettere su cosa sia la leadership europea, cosa rappresenta e come si è formata. Innanzitutto occorre rendersi conto che la classe dirigente europea è forse l’elite più saldamente insediata e meno “sfidata” sulla faccia del pianeta facendo i conti: siedono sul trono di un continente pacificato, vale a dire senza velleità di potenza o nemici naturali da cui doversi difendere, estremamente prospero (a differenza degli USA per 70 anni non ha affrontato vere spese militari), le cui elite sociali di riferimento – anziane e benestanti – non danno problemi particolari. Una torre di avorio unica sul pianeta, che per la prima volta nella sua esistenza ha subito una scossa: la crisi geopolitica che abbiamo visto in questi anni – ancora in corso – primo grande conflitto europeo del XXI secolo (in realtà il primo dal 1945 ad oggi su questo continente) costituisce anche la prima vera sfida alla classe politica europea: quest’ultima in 70 non ha mai dovuto vedersela con un vero nemico, con nulla che potesse mettere alla prova la propria prerogativa al “trono” il loro diritto “sacro” al comando.

Si può dunque dire questo a buona ragione: le circostanze odierne sono un inedito banco di prova per tutti costoro, un momento della verità per tutto l’estabilishment politico emerso in Europa dai tempi dell’ultimo conflitto mondiale in poi (il carosello di forze liberal-democratiche, cristiano-democratiche/democristiane, social-democratiche, ecologiste tipiche del panorama partitico occidentale post-bellico): il cosiddetto “arco costituzionale” europeo consolidatosi nel corso di generazioni con il placet d’oltreoceano ossia con la condizionale delle fedeltà indiscussa alle direttiva politiche di Washington.

Ora, tale classe si è messa in un pasticcio più grande di sè stessa senza rendersene conto: ha sfidato una potenza militare (malgrado tutto, la Russia questo ancora è) con la sicurezza assoluta di un successo nonchè di un grande fratello a stelle e strisce, pronto ora e sempre all’intervento in supporto degli alleati. Questi ultimi, mai si sono resi conto della propria funzione di satelliti rispetto al potente alleato ed ora si ritrovano soli a dover gestire un evento per loro ingestibile: un grande conflitto convenzionale che non possono vincere, il cui insuccesso può essere la miccia di una situazione sociale a casa propria già ai limiti per altre ragioni. Per riassumere in altre parole, la classe dirigente europea che oggi osserviamo, si ritrova per la prima volta sul banco degli imputati (assieme al governo di Kiev): i governanti europei nella propria animosità nei confronti di Mosca, si sono esposti oltre il limite massimo fino a trovarsi ora in un vicolo cieco, considerando che la prova di forza che hanno voluto non può essere vinta, ma al tempo medesimo non si può tornare indietro. L’Europa politica – quella di Bruxelles – si è gravemente compromessa, fomentando nelle proprie opinioni pubbliche paure infondate ed isterismi al fine di creare artificialmente un consenso attorno a prese di posizione antirusse e far accettare un coinvolgimento nel conflitto ucraino costato ai contribuenti centinaia di miliardi di euro, a danno delle proprie economie e pace sociale. Il nodo più inconfessabile è proprio questo: si è voluto inventare un “grande nemico” (in realtà inesistente) cui addossare responsabilità di ogni colpa, di ogni male sociale che affligge l’occidente europeo, per non dover affrontare le proprie di responsabilità; in fondo nulla di strano, un meccanismo esistente da secoli ovvero cercare di convogliare le energie sociali verso l’esterno (dandogli un bersaglio, un nemico) per evitare che queste ultime identifichino il problema del male sociale verso l’interno vale a dire nei propri stessi governanti. La riprova di questo si è manifestata in maniera eclatante tanto in Francia quanto in Italia nelle ultime settimane, sotto forma di una protesta di piazza come non se ne vedevano da decenni, che ha costretto la capitale francese allo stato di emergenza per la prima volta da una generazione a questa parte. In Francia come in Germania si è alle porte del successo di forze non convenzionali, alternative nel contesto politico europeo, come Fronte nazionale (ora RN) oppure Alternative fur Deutschland (AFD) che sono sempre meno contenibili: la classe dirigente di Bruxelles – di matrice liberaldemocratica – di questo ha timore e non vi è modo di arginare la “marea sovranista” se non con una “vittoria contro le autocrazie” che però non può esserci nel mondo reale. La responsabilità storica dell’UE è di aver ceduto ad un idealismo che ignora ogni regola di realpolitik, facendosi tutt’una col mito di una superiorità etica inesistente e non applicabile nella realtà oggettiva: atteggiamento che ha finito col danneggiare e addirittura mettere in pericolo la propria base sociale.

In definitiva sì, la conclusione del conflitto ucraino mette in tensione perchè costringe ad una resa dei conti inedita nella politica interna delle pricipali economie europee: una classe dirigente che verrà soppesata e valutata di fronte all’opinione pubblica, scontando il tutto con una potenziale catastrofe elettorale neigli anni a venire che rischia di sostituirla. Proprio a tale proposito, di recente il sociologo ed editorialista italiano Alessandro Orsini ha lanciato una provocazione direttissima, affermando che la Russia di V. Putin in un certo senso sta contribuendo ad una futura “rivoluzione” europea, dal momento che la socnfitta del regime di V. Zelensky può comportare anche il declino rapido di tutta la corrotta classe al potere a Bruxelles che ha legato le sue sorti all’esito alle sorti dell’Ucraina. Quindi, in un certo senso Mosca sta facendo qualcosa che la società europea non può fare da sola: mettere alle strette la sua classe dirigente, farla venire allo scoperto e ridicolizzarla costringendola a mettersi a confronto coi propri limiti, ad uscire dalla propria torre d’avorio ed infine a ridefinire un’identità – quella europea – in dubbio da quasi 80 anni.

Prime minister wrote to ministers saying he did not want them to ‘advocate for specific options or opine on the likely outcome of the process’

Selling nicotine-free vapes to children under the age of 18 has become illegal from today, the government has said.

Children were already banned from buying vapes containing nicotine. But, under the Tobacco and Vapes Act, shops across the UK will now be banned from selling nicotine-free vapes, and nicotine pouches, to children.

Vaping can be a way to help established adult smokers who are already addicted to nicotine from tobacco to swap to a less dangerous product. Vaping is considered safer than smoking, but that is a low bar. Vapes should therefore never be used by children or non-smokers.

Some children have already come to harm from bad reactions to vapes. The long-term health harms of vaping in today’s children will only become clear over time. They are however unlikely to be good; inhaling multiple, often heated, chemicals into the lungs may well do irreversible harm.

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© Photograph: Darren Staples/AFP/Getty Images

© Photograph: Darren Staples/AFP/Getty Images

© Photograph: Darren Staples/AFP/Getty Images

With no single European representative negotiating directly with Moscow, some leaders are establishing their own channels – with messy results

The Nordic countries rarely fall out in public over foreign policy, least of all over Russia.

But a 90-minute phone call this week to Vladimir Putin by the leaders of Finland and Norway drew an unusual rebuke from their Danish and Swedish neighbours.

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© Photograph: SPUTNIK/Reuters

© Photograph: SPUTNIK/Reuters

© Photograph: SPUTNIK/Reuters

With no single European representative negotiating directly with Moscow, some leaders are establishing their own channels – with messy results

The Nordic countries rarely fall out in public over foreign policy, least of all over Russia.

But a 90-minute phone call this week to Vladimir Putin by the leaders of Finland and Norway drew an unusual rebuke from their Danish and Swedish neighbours.

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© Photograph: SPUTNIK/Reuters

© Photograph: SPUTNIK/Reuters

© Photograph: SPUTNIK/Reuters

Possible candidate to run World Economic Forum departs ECB nine months early, saying she wants to speak her mind about world affairs

Christine Lagarde, the eurozone’s top central banker, has said she is stepping down nine months early to speak her mind about world affairs and confront the “misrepresentation of the truth”.

Ending months of speculation about her future at the European Central Bank, Lagarde said she would quit her role as president in March rather than October next year because the rules of neutrality that governed her job prevented her from influencing debate about financial and economics affairs.

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© Photograph: Athit Perawongmetha/Reuters

© Photograph: Athit Perawongmetha/Reuters

© Photograph: Athit Perawongmetha/Reuters

Possible candidate to run World Economic Forum departs ECB nine months early, saying she wants to speak her mind about world affairs

Christine Lagarde, the eurozone’s top central banker, has said she is stepping down nine months early to speak her mind about world affairs and confront the “misrepresentation of the truth”.

Ending months of speculation about her future at the European Central Bank, Lagarde said she would quit her role as president in March rather than October next year because the rules of neutrality that governed her job prevented her from influencing debate about financial and economics affairs.

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© Photograph: Athit Perawongmetha/Reuters

© Photograph: Athit Perawongmetha/Reuters

© Photograph: Athit Perawongmetha/Reuters

The real reasons are that the Brussels club is broke and wants to dump U.S. technology on the battlefield in preference to Britain’s.

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The UK prime minister might go further than merely bringing the EU closer to the UK. But the real reasons are that the Brussels club is broke and wants to dump U.S. technology on the battlefield in preference to Britain’s.

There are increasing signs that Britain’s new PM, Andy Burnham, might consider shifting over to full EU membership, away from his more moderate position of merely a closer working relationship, according to a recent report from a pro-Labour thinktank.

Such a move might be a stroke of genius, as it would give Labour exclusive ground to stand on, creating a clear divide between it and the rest of the political landscape in the UK whose apparatchiks are against re-joining the Brussels club. According to the recent report, as much as 64 percent of the British public would vote to rejoin the EU if there were such a referendum.

Such a large majority could be a real advantage for Burnham and the Labour party, perhaps sealing their fate for at least another term in government.

Yet it is the war in Ukraine and the fabricated so-called threat of war with Russia which is driving this new hardcore idea being floated to Burnham. A combination of wanting to marginalise, if not isolate, the far right and link it to Russia, plus providing a feel-good factor among the general public who have been worn down by successive governments’ failure to fix a broken economy, floating the idea of a referendum around the same time (or even at the same moment) as a general election could easily push Labour way ahead of the pack and leave the right broken and fighting among themselves.

Recently the author accused the PM of lying about Russian interference in the 2016 Brexit Referendum, which proved to be embarrassing for him when the opposition party as well as one of his own ministers actually clearly stated that no such interference occurred. It was a crude attempt to stir up Russian hatred to act as a double-barrelled catalyst to both stoke up war hysteria ahead of conscription and higher defence spending, as well as hammering home the point which aligns with France and Germany’s incumbent leaders that the far right in Europe is financed by Russia.

Yet Burnham’s idea that being in the EU means being part of a bigger defence pact against Russia is also flawed. Given that the EU still has no army of its own, despite decades of hardcore federalists’ wet dream always presenting the subject on the talk-shop circuit in EU institutions, the move to join the EU is purely political and a way of supporting a failed project as the EU itself faces a massive funding crisis (a shortfall of 750 billion euros for its next seven-year budget period). Can we assume that Macron, Merz and Ursula von der Leyen have all been lobbying Burnham and see political capital in the UK rejoining? Likely.

Laura Chappell, associate director at the IPPR thinktank, said: “It’s time to stop talking about Brexit and focus entirely on the future. A lot has changed over the past decade. The prime minister has said his mission is to give people back control, but Britain can’t do that alone anymore,” she is quoted by the British pro-Brexit tabloid the Daily Express – a newspaper favoured by older people and which can be argued played a key role in pumping out flawed information about the benefits of leaving the EU.

Chappell, in a nutshell, seems to be saying that the UK is too tiny and pathetic to hope to achieve anything on its own. “Whether it’s protecting households from swings in the cost of living, restarting industry, or keeping us secure, we lack the weight to act alone. In today’s world, we can’t take back control while being an outsider in Europe.”

And then, almost as an afterthought, the dark truth emerges in the article about why the EU really needs Britain to rejoin.

“The IPPR calls on the government to work with the EU to, among other things, create a European Defence Alliance, with the UK offering capabilities that would allow Europe to rely less heavily on the U.S., including satellite communications,” she gushes.

In plain English, with Britain in the EU, the EU can go ahead with some sort of EU-NATO alliance, with increased budget contributions (not to mention the UK’s) as well as using British technology to replace Starlink and Starshield battlefield intranet systems for Ukraine’s army. In even plainer English, the Czech PM made it even more crystal clear when asked if the UK would be welcome back to the EU. Czechia’s Prime Minister Andrej Babiš: “Yes, of course, we need more money.”

Il Consiglio europeo del 15-16 ottobre ha reso evidente la nuova realtà finanziaria della guerra: mentre Washington riduce progressivamente il proprio impegno, Kiev presenta all’Europa un fabbisogno aggiuntivo di circa 70 miliardi di euro per il solo 2027.

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Il Consiglio europeo del 15 e 16 ottobre ha avuto il merito, forse involontario, di rendere esplicita una questione che da mesi aleggiava sul futuro del conflitto ucraino: chi continuerà a pagare la guerra se gli Stati Uniti ridurranno ulteriormente il proprio coinvolgimento? La risposta che emerge da Bruxelles è sempre più chiaramente «l’Europa». Ma tra l’affermazione politica secondo cui l’Unione Europea sarebbe pronta a prendere il posto di Washington e la capacità effettiva di farlo esiste una distanza considerevole, che riguarda non soltanto il denaro, ma anche la struttura stessa della potenza europea.

Intervenendo al vertice, Volodymyr Zelens’kyj ha quantificato in 155 miliardi di euro il costo complessivo della guerra per l’Ucraina nel 2027, chiedendo ai partner europei di trovare almeno altri 70 miliardi «per la difesa, per le armi e per la nostra resilienza». Ursula von der Leyen ha successivamente confermato l’esistenza di un divario finanziario dell’ordine di 70 miliardi, precisando che il fabbisogno per il 2026 è invece coperto.

Si tratta di una richiesta che arriva quando l’Unione Europea sta ancora implementando il gigantesco prestito da 90 miliardi di euro destinato all’Ucraina per il biennio 2026-2027, deciso dal Consiglio europeo nel dicembre 2025 e successivamente tradotto nel relativo quadro legislativo. Di questa cifra, 30 miliardi sono destinati al sostegno macroeconomico e al bilancio dello Stato ucraino, mentre ben 60 miliardi sono riservati alle esigenze militari e allo sviluppo e approvvigionamento delle capacità dell’industria della difesa. Il finanziamento avviene attraverso emissioni di debito dell’Unione sui mercati, garantite dal bilancio europeo, mentre il rimborso da parte ucraina dovrebbe avvenire solo una volta ottenute eventuali riparazioni dalla Russia (ovvero mai).

Il problema è che una somma che alla fine del 2025 appariva enorme si è rivelata insufficiente meno di un anno dopo. Le conclusioni ufficiali del Consiglio europeo del 16 ottobre si limitano a constatare che sono state individuate le risorse necessarie per coprire le esigenze di bilancio e difesa dell’Ucraina nel 2026 e rinviano a una nuova valutazione della Commissione Europea e del Fondo Monetario Internazionale per gli anni successivi. Ma il linguaggio diplomatico non nasconde la sostanza: per continuare la guerra, Bruxelles deve trovare un’altra ingente quantità di denaro, e deve farlo rapidamente.

Già alla vigilia del vertice, il commissario europeo per l’Economia e la Produttività Valdis Dombrovskis aveva spiegato che l’Unione dispone di circa 45 miliardi di euro già previsti per il 2027, ma che la somma non sarebbe sufficiente. Bruxelles punta a coprire approssimativamente due terzi del fabbisogno ucraino, lasciando il restante terzo ad altri partner quali Regno Unito, Norvegia, Canada, Giappone e Svizzera. La stessa Commissione sta valutando di anticipare parte dei fondi già programmati per guadagnare tempo in attesa che altri governi mettano sul tavolo nuove risorse.

Nonostante il possibile contributo di partner esterni all’UE, il cambiamento rispetto ai primi anni del conflitto è comunque notevole. Secondo i dati dello Ukraine Support Tracker dell’Istituto di Kiel, l’Europa ha ormai superato gli Stati Uniti nel volume complessivo degli aiuti militari assegnati all’Ucraina e nel 2025 ha aumentato sensibilmente il proprio contributo nel tentativo di compensare la drastica riduzione delle nuove allocazioni statunitensi. Nel primo semestre del 2026, inoltre, le istituzioni europee hanno ulteriormente incrementato gli stanziamenti attraverso il nuovo prestito da 90 miliardi.

Le istituzioni dell’UE stimano ormai in oltre 220 miliardi di euro il sostegno complessivamente mobilitato dall’Unione e dai suoi Stati membri dall’inizio della guerra, comprendendo aiuti finanziari, economici, militari, umanitari e sostegno ai rifugiati. Una cifra che dimostra come l’Europa sia già diventata il principale finanziatore dell’Ucraina in termini aggregati.

Allo stesso tempo, analizzando i dati emerge una palese contraddizione. Lo stesso Istituto di Kiel rileva che circa il 30% degli acquisti effettuati dai Paesi europei per sostenere militarmente l’Ucraina nella prima metà del 2026 proveniva dall’industria statunitense. Nel meccanismo NATO PURL, destinato a soddisfare le esigenze prioritarie ucraine, oltre il 90% degli armamenti provenienti da scorte esistenti era di origine nordamericana. Lo Ukraine Support Tracker ha sintetizzato il problema sottolineando come l’Europa continui a dipendere dall’accesso ai sistemi d’arma statunitensi, mettendo a nudo le vulnerabilità sia economiche che militati di Bruxelles.

Il problema riguarda soprattutto quelle capacità che non possono essere semplicemente sostituite aumentando uno stanziamento di bilancio: intercettori Patriot, intelligence satellitare, allarme precoce contro i missili balistici, comunicazioni militari satellitari, manutenzione e munizionamento per piattaforme di origine statunitense. Anche gli F-16 forniti da Paesi europei continuano a dipendere in misura significativa da componenti, armamenti e assistenza tecnica nordamericani.

Allo stesso tempo, il progressivo disimpegno dell’amministrazione Trump pone l’UE davanti al problema strategico che per anni è stato rimandato. Gli Stati Uniti, infatti, possono diminuire i trasferimenti finanziari e militari diretti verso Kiev sapendo di possedere comunque alcune delle capacità tecnologiche decisive dalle quali gli alleati continuano a dipendere; l’UE, invece, può aumentare la quantità di denaro impegnata senza acquisire automaticamente la capacità di sostituire Washington nelle funzioni più sofisticate della guerra.

Gli sviluppi delle ultime settimane rendono tale vulnerabilità ancora più evidente. I rapporti tra Donald Trump e Volodymyr Zelens’kyj si sono ulteriormente deteriorati, mentre Washington ha drasticamente ridotto le forniture dirette di armi e ha dato segnali di voler utilizzare alcuni strumenti di sostegno – dall’intelligence ai sistemi satellitari e alle forniture militari – come leve nelle trattative con Kiev e Mosca. Gli Stati Uniti non sono scomparsi dal conflitto, ma il loro ruolo sta cambiando: sempre meno finanziatore incondizionato dell’Ucraina e sempre più potenza esterna che conserva gli strumenti indispensabili per condizionarne le scelte.

A Bruxelles, nel frattempo, rimane soprattutto un salato conto da pagare.

Anche sotto il profilo puramente finanziario, tuttavia, il passaggio di consegne è tutt’altro che semplice. Il prestito europeo da 90 miliardi è stato possibile attraverso un nuovo ricorso al debito comune garantito dal bilancio dell’UE. Il primo ministro estone Kristen Michal ha già indicato apertamente che un nuovo prestito europeo appare la soluzione più probabile per coprire il fabbisogno aggiuntivo del 2027. Ma già il precedente pacchetto era stato approvato tramite cooperazione rafforzata, con la partecipazione di 24 Stati membri e l’esclusione dagli obblighi finanziari di Repubblica Ceca, Ungheria e Slovacchia.

In altre parole, persino il consenso sul finanziamento dell’Ucraina è meno uniforme di quanto suggerisca il linguaggio delle dichiarazioni finali.

A questa divisione politica se ne aggiunge una economica. L’Europa si trova contemporaneamente ad affrontare bassa crescita, elevato indebitamento pubblico, costi energetici ancora pesanti per famiglie e industria, aumento delle spese per la difesa e pressioni derivanti dall’invecchiamento della popolazione. Il Fondo Monetario Internazionale prevede una crescita dell’Eurozona di appena l’1,2% nel 2027 e segnala che il debito pubblico medio potrebbe passare dall’88,7% del PIL nel 2025 al 91,2% nel 2027. Alla luce di questi dati, lo stesso FMI chiede a gran parte dei governi europei nuovi sforzi di consolidamento fiscale.

Nasce così una contraddizione politica difficilmente sostenibile all’infinito. Agli Stati membri viene chiesto contemporaneamente di rispettare le regole fiscali, aumentare drasticamente la propria spesa militare, finanziare la transizione energetica e industriale, proteggere sistemi sociali sottoposti a crescente pressione e trovare decine di miliardi aggiuntivi ogni anno per sostenere lo Stato ucraino.

La risposta delle istituzioni europee è che il costo del mancato sostegno a Kiev sarebbe superiore a quello dell’assistenza: una vittoria russa renderebbe l’Europa meno sicura e imporrebbe spese militari ancora maggiori nel lungo periodo. È l’argomento fondamentale utilizzato per giustificare il trasferimento progressivo dell’onere finanziario dagli Stati Uniti al continente europeo. Ma proprio perché tale impegno viene ormai presentato come strutturale e potenzialmente pluriennale, il problema del consenso pubblico diventa inevitabile.

Le tensioni politiche sono già visibili: in Francia, Marine Le Pen ha messo in discussione la possibilità di continuare ad aumentare indefinitamente il contributo francese ai programmi europei per l’Ucraina; in Ungheria e Slovacchia, la resistenza a nuovi impegni è ormai consolidata. E il 2027 sarà un anno elettorale particolarmente delicato in diversi Paesi europei, circostanza che spiega perché alcuni governi vogliano chiudere un nuovo accordo finanziario prima che il tema finisca al centro delle campagne elettorali.

Alla luce delle considerazioni emerse, la domanda, dunque, non è più soltanto chi pagherà per l’Ucraina nel 2027. È fino a quando l’Europa e gli europei saranno disposta a pagare, quanto di quel costo verrà trasferito sui bilanci e sui contribuenti degli Stati membri e quale sarà il prezzo politico di una strategia nella quale Washington conserva buona parte del potere decisionale mentre Bruxelles assume una porzione sempre maggiore degli oneri economici.

Prime minister wrote to ministers saying he did not want them to ‘advocate for specific options or opine on the likely outcome of the process’

Selling nicotine-free vapes to children under the age of 18 has become illegal from today, the government has said.

Children were already banned from buying vapes containing nicotine. But, under the Tobacco and Vapes Act, shops across the UK will now be banned from selling nicotine-free vapes, and nicotine pouches, to children.

Vaping can be a way to help established adult smokers who are already addicted to nicotine from tobacco to swap to a less dangerous product. Vaping is considered safer than smoking, but that is a low bar. Vapes should therefore never be used by children or non-smokers.

Some children have already come to harm from bad reactions to vapes. The long-term health harms of vaping in today’s children will only become clear over time. They are however unlikely to be good; inhaling multiple, often heated, chemicals into the lungs may well do irreversible harm.

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© Photograph: Darren Staples/AFP/Getty Images

© Photograph: Darren Staples/AFP/Getty Images

© Photograph: Darren Staples/AFP/Getty Images

Some EU leaders courted the authoritarian Vučić regime – they must offer this reborn democracy a future within the union

As polling stations closed across Serbia on Sunday evening, riot police were deploying around the presidency in Belgrade. Many of us feared the worst: massive electoral fraud, a refusal to recognise defeat or outright violence. After nearly 15 years of Aleksandar Vučić’s increasingly authoritarian rule, a peaceful transfer of power seemed implausible.

I had good reason to feel afraid. I am co-founder of an annual conference on the security and foreign policy challenges shaping the western Balkans, and sit on the international advisory committee of a civil society thinktank, the Belgrade Centre for Security Policy. Such work would be uncontroversial in most countries seeking European Union membership. Under Vučić’s regime, it was anything but.

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© Photograph: Marko Dimic/ZUMA Press Wire/Shutterstock

© Photograph: Marko Dimic/ZUMA Press Wire/Shutterstock

© Photograph: Marko Dimic/ZUMA Press Wire/Shutterstock

Watered-down version of statement to be issued at end of Montreal summit instead offers ‘ever closer association’

The EU has backed away from its offer to Canada to start talks on becoming an “associate member” after disagreements between member states just as an EU-Canada summit was set to begin in Montreal.

A draft of a joint statement to be issued after the end of the summit, which runs Thursday and Friday, showed a watered-down version offering “an ever closer association of Canada to the EU, short of full membership itself”.

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© Photograph: Ahmet Sel/Anadolu/Getty Images

© Photograph: Ahmet Sel/Anadolu/Getty Images

© Photograph: Ahmet Sel/Anadolu/Getty Images

Watered-down version of statement to be issued at end of Montreal summit instead offers ‘ever closer association’

The EU has backed away from its offer to Canada to start talks on becoming an “associate member” after disagreements between member states just as an EU-Canada summit was set to begin in Montreal.

A draft of a joint statement to be issued after the end of the summit, which runs Thursday and Friday, showed a watered-down version offering “an ever closer association of Canada to the EU, short of full membership itself”.

Continue reading...

© Photograph: Ahmet Sel/Anadolu/Getty Images

© Photograph: Ahmet Sel/Anadolu/Getty Images

© Photograph: Ahmet Sel/Anadolu/Getty Images

L’isteria crescente delle classi dominanti – e dei mass media da essi finanziati – ormai buttano tutto nel calderone del “nemico interno”: agenti russi, cittadini pagati dai russi, ingerenze islamiche e, ovviamente, i partiti della sinistra e i comunisti.

Segue nostro Telegram.

E’ stato sufficiente che l’edizione di giovedi del giornale Politico.eu scrivesse qualche riga per mettere in moto una valanga, rivelando che l’Unione Europea ritiene di trovarsi di fronte all’escalation delle operazioni ibride russe e che si sta preparando all’eventualità che, prima o poi, queste azioni provochino delle vittime in Paesi Ue o Nato. Insomma quasi un auspicio che da qualche parte ci scappi il morto da poter strumentalizzare ai fini della propaganda di guerra, sia sul fronte esterno che sul fronte interno.

Si tratta di uno scenario che in Italia abbiamo purtroppo visto e subìto spesso: dalla strage di Piazza Fontana in poi. Su questo, nostro malgrado, potremmo tenere delle lectio magistralis a tutti gli altri paesi europei che non hanno sperimentato tragedie e orrori analoghi

Il giornale Politico.eu riferisce di una riunione di diplomatici della Ue a porte chiuse, senza telefonini e senza assistenti ha valutato il rischio di attacchi gravi, “capaci di provocare vittime su larga scala”. Due fonti diplomatiche hanno confermato a Politico che una riunione degli ambasciatori presso l’Ue, svoltasi mercoledì scorso, ha riguardato proprio questo tipo di scenario.

Per una fonte diplomatica citata dal sito, “data la portata e la vastità dell’azione russa, è inevitabile che prima o poi vi siano delle vittime. È pura fortuna che non ce ne siano ancora state”.

“È abbastanza ovvio che, quando la Russia utilizza strumenti sempre più letali per mettere alla prova la nostra preparazione e la nostra volontà di adottare contromisure, a un certo punto ci saranno delle vittime”, ha dichiarato a Politico la finlandese Teija Tiilikainen, direttore del Centro europeo di eccellenza per il contrasto alle minacce ibride. “Prima o poi, intenzionalmente o meno, questo è ciò che accade”.

Se diversi cittadini di Paesi membri dell’UE o della NATO venissero uccisi in quello che sembra essere un attacco, la pressione ad agire sarebbe enorme per entrambe le istituzioni. “Temiamo fortemente che a un certo punto venga tolta la vita a un nostro alleato”, ha affermato un diplomatico della NATO, il che renderebbe la pressione ad agire “molto alta”, riporta ancora Politico.eu.

Ma l’isteria ormai è talmente dilagante che alcuni Paesi membri della Ue, ritengono che debba essere la Nato e non l’Unione Europea la sede opportuna per trattare di questi argomenti e delle possibili soluzioni, soprattutto perché le riunioni della Ue sarebbero troppo “porose” per la fuga di notizie o di informazioni sensibili.

A rendere il tutto ancora più strumentalizzabile ai fini della mera propaganda di guerra esterna ed interna in Europa, vi è anche il tentativo di leggere le proteste giovanili e popolari in Francia come eterodirette o articolazioni di progetti di destabilizzazione. E in questo gioco sporco tutto fa brodo, dalla guerra ibrida della Russia alle ambizioni dell’islam politico.

“Quello che sta accadendo in Francia non è altro che immigrazione di massa fuori controllo“, ha scritto Donald Trump il 6 ottobre sul suo social Truth riferendosi agli scontri e alle manifestazioni che stanno attraversando la Francia. Per il presidente americano “non si tratta delle scuole”, ma dell’”Islam che vuole prendere il controllo di un Paese un tempo grande“.

A fargli eco è subito arrivato l’eurodeputato lepenista Fabrice Leggeri, esponente del gruppo della destra dei Patrioti al Parlamento di Strasburgo, secondo il quale “sulle proteste in Francia Trump non ha del tutto torto”. Perché, ha affermato durante un punto stampa al Parlamento Europeo, “le rivolte in corso, le rivolte dei cosiddetti studenti o presunti studenti, sono di fatto strumentalizzate dall’estrema sinistra e, come sappiamo, l’estrema sinistra è infiltrata da elementi islamisti”.

L’isteria crescente delle classi dominanti – e dei mass media da essi finanziati – ormai buttano tutto nel calderone del “nemico interno”: agenti russi, cittadini pagati dai russi, ingerenze islamiche e, ovviamente, i partiti della sinistra e i comunisti.

Se al posto degli ebrei mettiamo gli islamici, sono esattamente gli stessi nemici messi all’indice in Europa dai nazifascisti negli anni Trenta.

Articolo originale:  contropiano.org

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