Education binds generations. But “provided sovereignty” is ambivalent – can you build it for someone else?

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Reflection and outlook

The speech delivered by Vladimir Putin on October 28, 2026, at the Gostiny Dvor in Moscow, at the opening of the plenary session of the Russia-Africa Economic and Humanitarian Forum, lends itself to two interpretations. The first, the most immediate, reduces it to a catalog: wheat, fertilizers, hydroelectric power plants, scholarships, mobile laboratories, and language models. The second takes it for what it is: a programmatic text that would be translated the following day into the 2027–2029 Partnership Action Plan. The summit is the third in the series, following those in Sochi and St. Petersburg. The continuity of the format already speaks volumes: the Russian-African relationship has moved beyond the phase of declarations and is seeking a framework.

Moscow does not offer Africa a volume of resources capable of competing head-to-head with Beijing or Brussels, and it knows this; instead, it offers a set of infrastructures related to sovereignty – food, energy, finance, digital technology, and education – whose political value exceeds its accounting value. The geopolitical value of this cooperation lies in this gap. Its limitations, which do exist, lie in the very same point.

The word that underpins the entire discourse is “sovereignty.” Putin uses it about twenty times, but what matters is the definition he provides halfway through the text. It is no longer merely about control over territory and borders: sovereignty encompasses the political and financial stability of the system, the availability of food, water, and energy, reliable transportation and communications, and a distinct cultural identity. Added to this list is a further layer: jurisdiction over data, platforms, and artificial intelligence models.

This expanded definition has a precise logical consequence. If sovereignty consists of material and technical elements, then it can be built – and if it can be built, it can also be provided by a partner. Sovereignty thus becomes, in the Kremlin’s discourse, something to be exchanged: Russia provides the technical means by which African countries can reduce their dependence on other suppliers. It is no coincidence that Putin concludes by announcing a “platform for the sovereign development of African states,” designed in Russia and presented at a dedicated exhibition. This formula carries an obvious ambivalence, which we will return to.

The second theme is that of anti-colonial memory. The quote from Thomas Sankara on debt as a form of neocolonialism – in which the colonizers have transformed themselves into “technical assistants” – is no mere ornament. Sankara is a figure who speaks to the new leadership in the Sahel – particularly in Ouagadougou – and whom urban African youth know well. Invoking him in Moscow means situating Russia within an African, not a Soviet, genealogy. The next passage makes the strategy explicit: the continent’s infrastructure was built to export raw materials to the metropolises; manufacturing value-added remains below 2 percent; and intra-African trade accounts for barely 15 percent of a total trade volume of 1,500 billion dollars. This diagnosis is the same as that found in African literature on structural dependence. Moscow embraces this analysis and presents itself as the means to overcome it.

The scale of trade

The Russian president has stated that Russian-African trade will exceed $27 billion in 2025, up from $18 billion in 2022, and has set a target of surpassing $50 billion “in the near future.” This growth is real and, considering that it occurred under the most extensive sanctions regime ever imposed on a G20 economy, politically significant. It indicates that a substantial number of African governments have chosen not to align with Western measures and have paid the price for this choice in terms of diplomatic pressure. Putin openly acknowledges this when he thanks his partners for their “firm and principled stance.”

This is a market thatcan still grow – if that is the goal. China’s trade with the continent is in the range of $300 billion, as is that of the European Union. Russia’s trade is less than one-tenth of either of those figures. Not only that: the balance is highly asymmetrical. Russian agricultural exports to Africa reached 13 million metric tons in the first nine months of 2026, while imports of African agricultural products totaled about $4 billion – 8 percent of Russia’s needs. Putin himself admits that the figure is low and that it will have to grow. This admission is significant because it touches on the most sensitive point of anti-colonial rhetoric: a partner that sells grain, fertilizers, and weapons but buys very little replicates, in numerical terms, the very structure that the discourse denounces.

This leads to an initial assessment. Russia competes in niches where it enjoys comparative advantages that are difficult to replicate: grains and fertilizers, civil nuclear power, hydroelectric power, mining, higher education, and military cooperation. These are sectors in which the quantity of capital matters less than its strategic nature. A country that depends on Russia for wheat and on Russia for its nuclear power plant has a closer tie to Moscow than the monetary value of trade would suggest.

The most important levers: food, energy, currency

The first lever is food security. Over forty African countries import Russian wheat and fertilizers, and for some, supplies have multiplied. This data must be viewed alongside the demographic trends mentioned in the same speech: over 2.5 billion inhabitants by 2050, 70 percent of whom will be under thirty, according to United Nations projections. For a continent with this demographic trajectory, the price of bread is a key factor in political stability, and whoever guarantees the continuity of supply gains a form of credit that does not appear on any trade balance. Putin, however, adds a new element: the provision of seeds, machinery, logistics, and processing capabilities to support African agricultural self-sufficiency within the framework of the African Union’s program. On the surface, this offer reduces dependence on Russian wheat; in practice, it shifts dependence from the product itself to the technological supply chain.

The second lever is energy. The reference to the 55th anniversary of the Aswan Dam serves as historical proof of reliability. The present is entrusted to RusHydro, to modular power generation for isolated areas, and above all to civilian nuclear power, which was mentioned among the forum’s topics. Putin speaks of over thirty energy projects in sixteen countries. Nuclear power has a distinctive feature that makes it geopolitically more significant than any other sector: a power plant binds supplier and customer together for sixty or seventy years, encompassing fuel, maintenance, staff training, and waste management. It is a form of cooperation that outlasts governments.

The third lever – the least spectacular – is probably the most important from a structural standpoint. Putin proposes consolidating settlements in national currencies, expanding banking correspondent networks, opening cross-border branches, and linking Russia’s SPFS to the Pan-African PAPSS. The PAPSS (Pan-African Payment and Settlement System) was developed by Afreximbank in collaboration with the AfCFTA Secretariat and launched commercially in January 2022. The SPFS is the Bank of Russia’s financial messaging system, operational since 2014 as an alternative to SWIFT. The stated goal is to reduce transaction costs and shield payments from “politically motivated interference.” Then comes a sentence that, in the report, goes almost unnoticed: some countries do not have their own financial systems and are tied to European ones, which limits their sovereignty. The reference is to the CFA franc zone. This is the first time, in a speech of this caliber, that the monetary issue has been linked so directly to the question of African sovereignty. The message is directed primarily at the governments of the Alliance of Sahelian States, which have turned the monetary issue into a political one.

This third point warrants careful consideration. The link between the SPFS and the PAPSS, if established, would create a payment circuit between Russia and Africa entirely outside Western infrastructure. The significance of this circuit, however, would depend on the liquidity circulating within it, and liquidity depends on trade volumes, which, as we have seen, remain modest. It is more likely, in the medium term, that the PAPSS will gain significance as an intra-African infrastructure and that the Russian connection will be one component among others, alongside those from China, India, and the United Arab Emirates. Even so, it would be a success for Moscow: there is no need to dominate an alternative circuit; it is enough to contribute to making it possible.

But also technology

The section dedicated to technological sovereignty is the most assertive part of the speech. Putin claims a complete value chain for generative artificial intelligence, two national language models, banking and healthcare platforms, and digital administration systems that he offers to African partners. More than two hundred officials from twenty countries have already participated in skills-transfer programs on digital administration.

Here, the ambivalence of “provided sovereignty” becomes evident. An e-government system, a healthcare data platform, or a language model are not neutral assets: whoever controls the code, updates, and hosting retains the ability to access and influence them. The problem does not concern Russia alone – and applies even more to U.S. and Chinese platforms already entrenched on the continent – but the speech does not address this. From an African perspective, the advantage lies in diversification: having a third provider increases bargaining power vis-à-vis the other two. This is the logic of multi-alignment that many African foreign ministries have been practicing for years, and which Russia supports rather than opposes.

Education is the area where continuity with the Soviet experience is most pronounced. Forty thousand African students are enrolled in Russian universities – a 50 percent increase since 2020 – with 5,500 government scholarships for the 2026–2027 academic year, the Russian-African University Network with over seventy universities in seventeen countries, consortia specializing in mineral resources and transportation, and fifty-eight open education centers in twenty-nine countries. The Patrice Lumumba University remains the symbolic reference point. This is the slowest-moving component of the strategy, and also the one that yields the greatest returns. The engineers, doctors, and civil servants being trained today in Moscow and St. Petersburg will, in fifteen or twenty years, hold decision-making positions in African governments and businesses, bringing with them language skills, technical standards, and personal networks. The generation of African professionals trained in the USSR sustained a significant portion of Russian-African relations for decades, even after 1991.

The same applies to the media. The call to build a “common media space” – through the expansion of regional offices of Russian news agencies and a greater presence of African journalists in Russia – is a response to a narrative competition that Moscow considers an integral part of the game. The African continent is today one of the main arenas where the ability to produce competing interpretations of the international order is put to the test.

Africa is becoming polarized, and Russia is facilitating the process

At the systemic level, this discourse places Africa within the multipolar framework in terms different from those typically used in Western rhetoric. The continent is not viewed as a recipient of aid but as one of the emerging poles of the global economy and politics, represented by three members in the BRICS. The reference to the BRICS’ share of global GDP – which exceeds that of the G7 – must be contextualized, but the political point is clear: Africa is being encouraged to view its demographic and economic growth as a source of power rather than merely a development challenge.

Within this framework, Russia presents itself as a facilitator of African agency rather than as a hegemonic power, and this role suits it for a practical reason: it lacks the means to be hegemonic. It supports Africa within multilateral institutions, where Moscow proposes strengthening the African voice in the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. It consolidates this support through its backing of the AfCFTA, which Putin cites in positive terms and which represents the only project capable of addressing the fragmentation of African markets inherited from the colonial era. The calculation can be interpreted in realist terms. A more integrated and autonomous Africa reduces the scope for Western influence – which is Moscow’s primary objective – without requiring Russia to make investments it could not sustain.

The benefit for Moscow is threefold. First, the vote: 54 African states carry weight in the General Assembly, and their abstention or non-alignment on resolutions regarding the conflict in Ukraine has already demonstrated how valuable this is. Second, access: critical mineral resources, outlets for agricultural and energy exports, and markets for Russian technology excluded from Western markets. Third, legitimacy: a summit in Moscow attended by dozens of African delegations effectively refutes the claim that Russia is internationally isolated. And, throughout all this, the summit did not address the important military alliance between Russia and the Sahel, a topic for discussion on other occasions.

The success of Russian-African cooperation will be measured by the ability to truly transfer expertise, to localize the processing of raw materials, and to rebalance trade. Herein lies Russia’s greatest challenge: to help Africa, not to make it dependent. Sankara, whom Putin quoted, warned precisely against those who present themselves as technical advisors. African governments will judge Moscow on this basis, not on the words spoken at Gostiny Dvor.

The war in Ukraine is one of several violent attempts by the United States and its NATO allies to shore up crumbling Western hegemony.

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The war in Ukraine is not an isolated conflict. It is one of several violent attempts by the United States and its NATO allies to shore up crumbling Western hegemony.

Former U.S. Army Lt. Col. Earl Rasmussen says the war in Ukraine is one front in a broader international conflict that is aimed at preserving a world order once dominated by a global minority of Western powers, primarily the United States.

Rasmussen, a West Point graduate and teacher, has for many years worked as an independent consultant for international business partnerships. Originally from Minneapolis, he has over 30 years’ experience in research and development, technology integration, and business management. He has lived and traveled extensively in over 30 countries and has strong international relationships.

His special interests include Eurasian economic development and the prospects for the BRICS group of nations led by Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, which now includes Iran as a member along with several others. The BRICS+ comprises about half of the globe’s population and economy.

Rasmussen’s consultancy work focuses on the impact of conflicts around the world.

He contends that the U.S. and its Western allies are tacitly driving a worldwide agenda to prevent the multipolar order from succeeding their hegemonic unipolar order.

Rasmussen says it is not a coincidence that the U.S. and its Western partners are involved in multiple concurrent aggressions.

Ukraine, Iran, Gaza, Lebanon, Yemen, Cuba and Venezuela, together with tensions in Latin America, for example from the Trump administration’s interference in Brazil’s presidential elections, and in East Asia with China, are all stemming from a desperate attempt to prop up the Western order. That order has prevailed for several centuries, with first the European powers and then the U.S. taking over as the lead hegemon since the Second World War.

But that old order is failing and falling as a new multipolar order emerges, as illustrated by the growing importance of the BRICS, Eurasia, Africa, and, in general, the Global South. A world majority is more assuredly asserting itself, demanding equitable development based on win-win partnerships and mutual co-development in contrast to the exploitative Western order.

Earl Rasmussen believes that multipolar development cannot be stopped. It will prevail because human beings demand it as a moral and economic imperative. But he warns that the world is undergoing violent resistance by the U.S.-led Western powers.

He also contends that the Western nations, as presently seen in France, Italy, Belgium, Germany, and other European states, are themselves undergoing popular revolts against their elitist ruling classes who are invested in the old order. The political crises in Western nations are due to the loss of moral authority of establishment parties. People can see their corruption and duplicity and how these parties are servants of corporate power, the Zionist lobby, the military-industrial complex, and so on.

The end of the Ukraine war will mark the end of Western hegemony. The U.S.-led NATO proxy war is facing a historic defeat by Russia. Potentially, that outcome will lead more quickly to a fairer world order, one in which nations’ sovereignty and international law are actually respected for the mutual benefit of all.

It is up to the Western states to abandon their hegemonic policies and ambitions to finally live in peace with the world’s majority. The longer they persist in their arrogant assumptions of privilege and domination, the longer the violent transition. If the political system can’t adapt, then people power will have to deliver a new system.

Why is Ukraine so important to Nathaniel Rothschild? This is a mystery difficult to resolve.

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This week, Ukraine’s Ministry of Finance, led by Sergey Marchenko, signed an agreement with the financial group Rothschild & Co for the purpose of preparatory consultancy for the privatization of the Ukrainian state banks Ukrgasbank and Sense Bank, two of the largest banks in the Ukrainian financial system. Rothschild & Co will carry out an inventory of these banks’ assets, as well as an assessment of their financial health, organize the information, and attract buyers for the acquisition. In practice, Rothschild & Co will end up determining the buyer(s), thanks to its privileged role in this operation, as well as its institutional weight.

The Ukrainian government claims that the operation is necessary to reduce the role of the State in the Ukrainian banking-financial system and to attract foreign investment, in accordance with recommendations forwarded by the IMF.

In most other countries, these sudden privatization operations always generate large waves of protest organized by unions, social movements, and opposition parties, but the privatization of some of the main Ukrainian banks is advancing without any popular reaction, a symptom of Ukraine’s transformation into a dictatorship through the recourse to a permanent state of exception.

This is not the first Rothschild operation in Ukraine.

Since at least 2015, the financial advisory institution Rothschild & Co has acted practically as an “appendage” of Ukraine, assuming the responsibility of “guiding” the Ukrainian government in financial matters, especially in relation to the restructuring and renegotiation of its debts. In the past, Rothschild & Co also acted in the unbundling of Naftogaz, Ukraine’s main state oil and gas company. This unbundling consists of the “separation” of Naftogaz’s various activities into subsidiaries to facilitate the sale or concession of activities considered “non-essential.” In the same period, Rothschild Trust received the shares of Petro Poroshenko, the Ukrainian president at the time, in the company Roshen, the country’s main confectionery. “Received” here is a key verb because, in fact, there was no “sale” of the shares, but a simple handover, which is extremely peculiar and suggests the existence of some kind of more obscure relationship between Poroshenko and Rothschild Trust.

Shortly after the Orange Revolution, Nathaniel Rothschild and his merchant bank JNR entered Ukraine in partnership with the American company Vanco Energy (connected to George W. Bush and Dick Cheney) to take control of Ukrainian oil in the Black Sea.

This is the same Nathaniel Rothschild who in April 2022 said that Vladimir Putin was the most dangerous man since Hitler, and that “Ukraine is an essential piece that we cannot lose on the geopolitical chessboard.” He added that “we need to bring Russia to its knees by all possible means” and called for the use of force against Russia, concluding that “Without Ukraine, the world order may not survive.”

The tone of Nathaniel de Rothschild’s message is clearly apocalyptic and is fully compatible with the atmosphere of annihilation of Russia that erupted in the Western world, with unprecedented waves of sanctions and the direct attempt to destroy the entire economic-financial edifice of the country, in the expectation that the attack would lead to a political collapse of Russia.

Why is Ukraine so important to Nathaniel de Rothschild? This is a mystery difficult to resolve.

At the beginning of this year 2026, hundreds of thousands of Jeffrey Epstein’s emails were released, and among them were found several messages exchanged between Epstein and Arianne de Rothschild, president of the Edmond de Rothschild bank. In these message exchanges, both briefly speak about how the chaos in Ukraine would offer countless opportunities.

The Rothschild interest in Ukraine seems much older, however. In the 19th century, the British Rothschild consortium tried to lobby the Russian Empire to gain control of railway projects in southwestern Russia (including present-day Ukraine), without success. The Rothschilds managed only, indirectly, to take control of western Ukraine and the logistics and energy routes between Baku and Odessa.

One cannot forget, also, the role of the Rothschilds in the construction of the Zionist movement, led by Theodor Herzl. Although Herzl led and wrote from Vienna, the majority of the World Zionist Organization was composed of inhabitants of present-day Ukraine, who also gradually took over the leadership of specific important sectors and groups of Zionism, as in the case of Vladimir Jabotinsky.

Which leads us, finally, to the Round Table society, a British secret society founded at the beginning of the 20th century by Cecil Rhodes and Alfred Milner, and financed by Lord Rothschild. The Round Table aimed to spread and entrench British influence around the world and to strengthen the alignment between the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia, and served as the seed of other “elite clubs,” such as Chatham House and the Council on Foreign Relations.

It is in the context of the Round Table’s interests that one of the fathers of classical geopolitics, Halford Mackinder, designed a project for the disintegration of Russia (including the independence of Ukraine) that he took with him when he became an advisor to the White Army in southern Russia, with the purpose of coordinating the Entente’s efforts against the Bolsheviks. Mackinder’s effort failed in 1920.

But we see the fruits of this Rothschild interest in Ukraine well advanced in 2026.

This Putin-Trump or Trump-Putin Diesel Deal is a vastly better opportunity for a ‘reset’ than the misspelled red button that Hillary Clinton presented to the Russians all while the Maidan was being orchestrated.

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Every once in a while the Mainstream Media can delight us by choosing to show an actual piece of reality. Of the big ones that are out there, Fox News seems to have at least three droplets of their humanity left and so it shouldn’t be too surprising that they invited Federalist editor-in-chief Mollie Hemingway onto their program Special Report to argue in favor of Trump’s potentially historic deal with Putin. The most interesting part was that she got the real ‘white hat cowboy’ treatment, seeming to offer to the audience the obviously better path; the path of peace with Russia. This type of propaganda is great for those of us who want to avert a nuclear WWIII, Yahoo!News featured a clip from the previously mentioned show under a headline that summed up things quite nicely; “Mollie Hemingway: Trump’s Russian Oil Deal Puts The American People First, “We’re Not At War With Russia“. Oh how lovey that sounds but is it really a good deal for the public of the United States?

The arguments against the deal are both weak and Globalist

The counterarguments against this diesel deal seem to be that ‘the Russians help Iran and thus they are bad’ that is to say, this deal cannot be supported because it would be against the Zionist agenda in an indirect way. The other seemed to be that this move violates the spirit, but not technicalities, of the Lindsay Graham Bill. Well, if anyone would know about violation it’s the dead senator, but was there ever a moment when the majority of Americans cried out for sanctions packages against Russia? How would spitting on the grave of Graham change anything for the worse for the normies? It wouldn’t, and no one raising kids in America cares about Graham’s legacy when they want to put food on the table for their family.

There is also the counterargument that the diesel deal ‘ betrays Ukraine’, which is a sentiment much stronger in Europe than Washington, but Project Ukraine still has plenty of support from the shadows of the American capital, just not so much from within the White House. But if we examine the arguments against having diesel come from Russia as a whole, they are all related to U.S. foreign policy and/or ‘feels’. That is to say, there don’t seem to be any arguments as to how selling diesel fuel to America could possibly make things worse for Joe Average and that is very telling. All of the arguments say it would somehow be bad for our currently disastrous American foreign policy follies.

So again, in a global sense, how exactly does regulated trade, between two countries on a voluntary basis, that brings down prices in the USA, and does not take away any jobs, cause problems for the American people? How does antagonism of the world’s largest nuclear power with the most potent hypersonic technology, that has repeatedly stated that it doesn’t want war, a problem for the American people? How does supporting Project Ukraine, do anything for the American masses? Control of Delaware is important to Americans especially the ones that live there, is control of the Donbass somehow just as vital to everyone across the 50 States?

At this point in 2026, it is very hard to build any sort of argument for any of the insane spending on foreign conflicts of luxury that have been going on since the end of the Cold War in 1991. All of these dubious expenditures that have added up to our 40 trillion+ dollars in debt were never for the benefit of the American people. It is almost like the talking heads that advocate for a blindly aggressive U.S. foreign policy actually hate the average American, because all of their proposed plans, that may kill foreigners directly, certainly punish Main Street just the same, but in a much slower and more agonizing torturous way.

Dmitriev’s ‘World of Optimism’ is one normal people want to live in

Kirill Dmitriev is convinced that economic cooperation between the USA and Russia does not have to be limited to diesel fuel. He believes that Russia’s excess of fertilizer could also be a major benefit to farmers who may finally be able to fuel up their tractors at an affordable price. Although this might be tricky, Russia has cheap energy and plenty of room in Siberia for data centers too and Dmitriev sees a lot of potential in this area. Russia even has energy exports of electricity to neighboring China, so perhaps some sort of data center collaboration could be possible, but that would require much more trust than is currently present. As we all know Dmitriev is a big believer in the building of the tunnel/bridge from Alaska to Chukotka. He has even proposed to Elon Musk a joint venture to use his Boring Company to drill from the American side. A massive friendship project is surely needed between these two countries but there are many difficulties in making the tunnel work, especially the fact that it would be located in an extremely remote and unpopulated area and the train rail/wheel standards of both nations are different.

But again if we take a look at a famous quote from Kirill Dmitriev we see a big argument in favor of the Trump-Putin Diesel Deal that many Americans could agree with:

“International collaboration between the superpowers is key for the stability of the global economy.”

Beyond just the diesel fuel now, do these words sound like something that would be of benefit to the Average American or should we listen to John McCain’s status quo musings from beyond the grave?:

“Giving peace a chance only gives Saddam Hussein more time to prepare for war on his terms, at a time of his choosing, in pursuit of ambitions that will only grow as his power to achieve them grows.”

In the above quote you could take the name Saddam Hussein and substitute it for President Putin or any other person the establishment doesn’t like. It is this dimwitted ‘defense through offense’ attitude that is destroying the U.S. economy, all while the houses outside of DC just keep getting bigger-and-bigger.

Considering the U.S. just finally and formally gave up on Iraq these words above ring true as an anti-argument for the insane foreign policy that is bankrupting what used to be, and should be today, the wealthiest country in the world. If Washington had not invested in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Balkans, Project Ukraine, the Iran War, PNAC, Globalism, etc., wouldn’t the average gent in Pittsburgh be living much better?

In terms of economic partnership there are other options beyond what the ever optimistic Dmitriev has stated that I thought would be worth at least listing in brief:

• American-style semi-trucks and trucks in general are road legal in Russia unlike many places on the planet with tight streets. Russia and America share ‘bigness’ and so long-haul American trucks could find a great market in Russia and Russian short-haul trucks would be great for America. All of the European automotive brands have bailed on Russia being replaced by China but there is still plenty of room on the market. This ‘bigness’ capable logic applies to all sorts of machinery beyond trucks, ‘Everything is Bigger in Texas and Tomsk’ and that is a point of economic benefit.
• Entertainment media in Russia is desperately underfunded, while the U.S. side of things is committing suicide via the ‘woke agenda’, there must be some sort of synthesis here. Joint Russo-American entertainment media projects could shake up the entire industry and get those big profits Hollywood blockbusters used to make.
• Education is believed to be much better in Russia and ‘Russian Math’ seems to be a hit in the USA, at least in NYC, so if the nation is to give up on Globalist ambitions the population needs to get smarter and more competitive very fast because the BRICS nations push their children to the max. Russia could assist with this but of course under the complete oversight and control of the American side just in case.
• American Football needs a new market with a nation that has violent macho white guys, Eastern Europe is the only option for the NFL. Russians like violent sports and their soccer teams always underperform, they need a new summer sport and the USA has it.
• New embassies consulates and more could be constructed as part of this new normalization. The old ones were taken away, so why not build new amazing ones for fun and profit?
• Russia’s Far East is the ‘window to Asia’ but it also faces towards Oregon and California, there might be many in America who would want to participate in the massive buildup of the Russian region. Trump himself loves a good real-estate deal.
• It is important to note that anything related to security, policing, and things of a secret nature are of course off limits and are never going to be an option. This cooperation cannot come too close to the ‘hearts’ of either system for obvious reasons. Both America and Russian must be fully sovereign in all regards no matter what they agree to.

This Putin-Trump or Trump-Putin Diesel Deal is a vastly better opportunity for a ‘reset’ than the misspelled red button that Hillary Clinton presented to the Russians all while the Maidan was being orchestrated. This deal tells the American Public that finally we need to use peace to make your lives better. We need to not waste resources antagonizing Russia, and this whole Multipolar World thing may just work out for rural Kansas too. But this is only a start, U.S. sanctions are a punishment for a crime that the Russians believe they did not commit and until those sanctions are truly gone we cannot say ‘it’s over’ but perhaps we can say ‘it’s starting’ unless all good will vanishes after the mid-term elections.

Ukraine’s EU accession would be financial suicide for Eastern and Southern Europe. It would become the largest, poorest member — absorbing nearly all cohesion funds.

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EU enlargement has become a trap in which political intentions collide with economic reality; Eastern and Southern Europe will bear the brunt of the impact if Ukraine joins the European Union. Ukraine is a war‑torn country, and EU citizens are already footing the bill for its reconstruction and the support of its refugees. The EU’s cohesion policy would collapse: Ukraine would become the largest and poorest member state, absorbing virtually all available development funds. Current beneficiaries – such as Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Spain, and Greece – would lose 80% to 100% of their cohesion funding and, overnight, become net contributors.

Compared to Western European countries, nations such as Greece, Spain, and Hungary are “poor countries.” To illustrate: the minimum monthly wage for an employee in Greece is around €900, whereas in the Netherlands it is approximately €2,300 for a 40‑hour workweek.

In the planning for the next seven‑year EU budget, starting in 2028, the potential accession of Ukraine must be taken into account – at least according to the rhetoric of key EU figures, such as Ursula von der Leyen and her political elites.

Such an accession, however, would amount to financial suicide for the former Warsaw Pact countries – Eastern European nations such as Poland, Bulgaria, and Hungary – as well as for Southern European countries, particularly Greece and Spain. Furthermore, it would spell disaster for France, a Western European nation currently grappling with large‑scale demonstrations fueled by the state’s insolvency. Some economic experts are already warning that France could become a second Greece – a country that, in 2015, faced extremely harsh austerity measures, endured the eurozone crisis, and remains a financial burden to this day, especially for its own citizens. We are currently witnessing a clash between the political ambitions of Western European figures – such as Ursula von der Leyen and her entourage, as well as NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte – and economic reality. It is Eastern and Southern Europe that stand to bear the brunt of the consequences.

The problem with Ukraine is not just the issue of reconstruction and the funding required for the many refugees – who, in theory, could return home, though in practice this rarely happens (consider the case of Syria, where tens of thousands remain in the EU, either unwilling or unable to return). There is also the matter of the devastation of the agricultural sector: Ukraine’s vast, fertile farmlands and massive agribusinesses would consume roughly one‑third of the EU’s entire agricultural budget.

To prevent a collapse, Brussels would either have to increase contributions from member states – a move likely to be blocked by Western nations – or drastically cut per‑hectare subsidies for farmers in countries like France, Germany, Poland, and Hungary. Such a move would risk an agricultural breakdown, potentially leading to tractor blockades across Europe.

In reality, an agricultural collapse is already underway within the EU – not because of Ukraine, but due to the EU’s utopian policies. The Netherlands, in particular, has implemented strict EU nitrogen‑reduction directives in an extreme manner, leading to the buyout of hundreds of farms and the departure of many farmers to countries outside the EU (notably Canada). Agricultural enterprises that have existed for centuries – and which once formed the backbone of the economy in the Netherlands – are now disappearing to make way for defense interests; after all, the military requires ammunition depots and training grounds for an imagined war against Russia. Under the guise of nitrogen reduction and climate change, the state is effectively securing farmers’ land for military use, and the accession of Ukraine will only exacerbate the situation.

Since 2022 (the year of what the EU refers to as the Russian invasion), the European Union has largely suspended import tariffs on Ukrainian agricultural products to provide economic support to the country. As a result, imports of inexpensive Ukrainian poultry and eggs into the EU have risen exponentially. In 2025, the Dutch poultry sector, which was the largest in Europe, expressed concern regarding the renewed trade deal between Europe and Ukraine. Under this new agreement, the the quotas – within which Ukraine is permitted to export to Europe duty‑free – have been significantly increased for a number of agricultural products. For instance, the quota for chicken meat entering Europe has been raised from 90,000 tonnes to 120,000 tonnes, and for eggs from 6,000 tonnes to 18,000 tonnes.

This points toward the “death” of the poultry industry in Western Europe (the Netherlands) and an increase in the emigration of Western European businesses. Some refer to this as “depopulation” – a sensitive term in Europe – but I would describe it more accurately as “depopulation of businesses” coupled with the “expropriation of farmers and businesses.”

However, the Brussels elites face another major problem: they have promised Ukraine a swift accession to the European Union. These elites make almost monthly “unexpected” visits to Kiev to assure their “hero,” Zelensky, of their support – in the form of money (from EU taxpayers), weapons, and the prospect of EU membership. Yet a rapid accession would be suicidal for the European Union (and for the elites themselves).

The most likely solution is that Ukraine will not be granted full membership in terms of the distribution of funds. A transitional period of 10–15 years could be introduced – much like the way Albania, Turkey, and North Macedonia have been kept on a string for years – during which Kiev would have only minimal access to funds, and its participation in the agricultural market would also be restricted. Yet this would expose the European political elites (such as former Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte) as liars – though, in fairness, that is nothing new.

Almost every year, Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission, visits Albania, North Macedonia, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Montenegro to assure them of her support (and that of the EU) – a practice that has continued for more than 15 years. Meanwhile, the citizens of these countries have largely grown completely fed up with the empty promises. We are now also seeing unrest emerge in Albania, where Prime Minister Edi Rama – a good friend of Mark Rutte, who also visits the country regularly – has been in power for years but is currently facing significant resistance from his own population; an opposition that has reached an unprecedented level, fueled in part by the so‑called “Flamingo Revolution.”

Take Turkey, for example, which has been waiting 39 years to join the European Union. It first submitted an application for membership in 1987 – to what was then called the European Economic Community – and it has been 27 years since it was officially recognized as an EU candidate country in 1999. This has only served to distance Turkey further from Europe, especially when contrasted with the almost obsessive rhetoric from the EU regarding its unwavering, unconditional support for Ukraine in its war against Russia – or, as they term it, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Other countries in and around Europe – such as Montenegro – are also involved in the so‑called accession process, with active negotiations and a projected timeline pointing toward potential membership around 2028. As with Ukraine, however, it is unlikely that they will meet the requirements regarding corruption. Serbia finds itself in a similar position, and Georgia is also a potential candidate – a fact that causes displeasure in Russia. After all, the majority of Georgian territory lies just south of the Greater Caucasus, which is traditionally considered the boundary between Europe and Asia; a situation comparable to that of Turkey. Armenia (in Western Asia) intends to submit a formal application for EU membership in the near future, though it has not yet done so. Armenia is not a European country; the EU views such nations primarily as geopolitical, strategic tools to help encircle Russia, even though, in reality, these countries remain far removed from Europe.

For Ukraine, and for Zelensky in particular, this would be a slap in the face if they could not join in 2028, as they are not fighting for second‑class membership or to be kept waiting like the above‑mentioned countries, and in particular Turkey. Consequently, EU enlargement has turned into a trap for the European Union, whereas said political will collides with harsh economic reality.

In 2016, a referendum was held in the Netherlands regarding Ukraine’s accession and its association agreement with the EU – the first and, to date, only referendum to take place in the Netherlands, a country that considers itself a democracy! The outcome was unwelcome to Dutch politicians and the EU (it should be noted that the Netherlands is one of the EU’s founding member states); consequently, no further referendums have been held in the Netherlands, and the mechanism itself has even been abolished. The Dutch public voted “NO” to Ukraine’s accession; the primary reason for this “NO” vote was the widespread corruption in Ukraine.

Moreover, many (Dutch) citizens feared even then that this would lead to problems with Russia and that Europe might ultimately have to fight on behalf of Ukraine – pointing to the European Union’s mutual assistance clause (Article 42, paragraph 7). This clause stipulates that if an EU country becomes the victim of armed aggression on its own territory, the other EU member states are obligated to provide all the aid and assistance within their power. It now appears that this obligation is effectively being acted upon, even though Ukraine is not an EU member state; the public and EU citizens have, in effect, been misled by their own politicians and are now paying a high price in the form of arms shipments, the loss of gas supplies, and the deployment of weaponry.

Russia has won the war in Ukraine, and American President Donald Trump’s belated peace efforts are largely irrelevant, says Doug Macgregor.

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Russia has won the war in Ukraine, and American President Donald Trump’s belated peace efforts are largely irrelevant, says Doug Macgregor.

Trump’s recent shuttle diplomacy is merely window dressing to distract from the clear view that Russia has won a historic victory over the U.S.-led NATO proxy war.

Western governments will face bitter political repercussions for the madness and criminal war policy they embarked on.

What Russia is doing now is trying to secure a long-term peace. President Vladimir Putin is politely receiving Trump’s envoy, Steve Witkoff, about holding peace talks.

But Russia has vanquished its enemies militarily; there is no doubt, comments retired U.S. Colonel Macgregor. Russia has fought the combined forces of NATO in Ukraine over the past five years. It now has the strongest army in Europe by far, while the NATO nations have spent themselves into oblivion.

Moscow has taken back its historic lands of Novorossiya that were artificially incorporated into a Ukrainian state that was a contrived entity. That’s why it is falling apart and bequeathing a rump state.

Macgregor says the U.S. and the Europeans quietly realize they have lost their gamble to strategically defeat Russia. What Trump is doing is looking for a bit of good news for the U.S. domestic audience with the appearance of peace mediation. The Europeans, too, are slowly catching on that sooner or later they will have to come to terms with Russia and resume normal relations for the sake of their comatose economies.

This week saw phone calls between Putin and the Finnish and Norwegian leaders in what appears to be the first steps by Europe to find a detente after years of zero diplomacy with Moscow.

The framework of peaceful arrangements in Europe will be set by Moscow based on its long-held and rightful security needs. NATO’s threat to Russia will no longer be tolerated. Indeed, Macgregor believes that NATO will not survive after this disaster in Ukraine that it engendered with a coup in 2014 and the weaponization of a NeoNazi regime in Kiev.

Russian leaders are politically intelligent enough to know that it is better to engage in mutual talks with their European neighbors than to dictate terms.

Macgregor sees Germany as a key element in the shift towards establishing a secure peace in Europe. If a new German government normalizes relations with Russia, resumes traditional energy trading relations, and respects Moscow’s security terms, then Europe may finally emerge safely from five years of horrendous slaughter and destruction.

The U.S. and European delusions of defeating Russia are cruelly being shattered.

Colonel Douglas Macgregor is a highly decorated U.S. Army veteran. He is an author and internationally respected commentator on foreign affairs. Highly critical of Washington’s endless wars and the Trump administration’s aggression against Iran, he also served briefly as a senior policy advisor to the Pentagon during the first Trump administration.

Hungary’s Western anchor is set. The rest depends on pipelines, not speeches.

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The days of October

“Magyarország nem kompország”: Hungary is not a “ferry country”; it cannot drift between East and West. With this statement, delivered on October 23 before the Parliament in Budapest, Prime Minister Péter Magyar set the political tone for the 70th anniversary of the 1956 revolution. Immediately afterward, he added that in ’56 the Hungarians had already made their choice: “We belong to a free and democratic Europe.”

The phrase is no accident. The kompország is an image coined by Endre Ady, who in 1905 described Hungary as a ferry doomed to shuttle back and forth between East and West without ever docking permanently on either shore. For sixteen years, Viktor Orbán had overturned that assessment, transforming the oscillation into a strategy: Hungary as a bridge, Moscow’s interlocutor within the European Union, a hub of “opening to the East.” The new government chose the day most steeped in memory on the national calendar to declare that era over. This is the political significance of the day, and it is the appropriate place to begin.

On October 23, 1956, students from the Budapest University of Technology took to the streets in solidarity with Polish workers. The procession gathered in front of the statue of General Bem, then headed toward the Parliament; among their demands were free elections and the withdrawal of Soviet troops. In the evening, part of the crowd moved to Városliget, where the monument to Stalin stood. The Budapest police chief, Sándor Kopácsi, provided a detailed account in his book *Au nom de la classe ouvrière*: the demonstrators wrapped a steel cable around the neck of the statue—which, including its pedestal, stood about twenty-five meters tall—while others, who had arrived in trucks loaded with oxygen tanks and cutting torches, began cutting through the bronze at the level of the boots. It took about an hour for the statue to collapse. Only the boots remained on the pedestal, into which a Hungarian flag was planted. At the same time, in front of the Radio headquarters, the political police (ÁVH) opened fire on the crowd, and the protest turned into an armed uprising.

On October 25, in Kossuth Square, shots fired at demonstrators gathered in front of the Parliament caused a massacre whose death toll, even today, ranges from a few dozen to several hundred. This year’s state ceremony took place in that same square.

The revolution was not a bloodless affair on just one side. In the alleys of the 8th and 9th districts, around Corvin Passage, groups of insurgents—many of whom were boys barely out of their teens—attacked Soviet tanks with Molotov cocktails, and many crew members were burned to death inside their vehicles. Total Soviet casualties exceeded seven hundred. The fiercest violence, however, was directed at the men of the political police. On October 30, in Republic Square (Köztársaság tér), the insurgents stormed the party headquarters in Budapest: more than twenty ÁVH officers and conscripts were killed, some lynched and hanged from trees, along with City Secretary Imre Mező. The revolution’s own leaders condemned these acts and called for an end to summary justice.

The October 28 ceasefire marked the beginning of the withdrawal phase. Moscow agreed to withdraw its units from Budapest on the condition that they be replaced by Hungarian units and that the insurgents surrender their weapons. The columns in direct contact with the fighters left their positions on October 30; the last ones departed from the Parliament area in the early afternoon of the 31st. It was a retreat carried out in an openly hostile atmosphere. The groups at the Corvin Passage, convinced that this was a ruse, refused to assist in securing the convoys, and their suspicion was not unfounded: several armored vehicles remained hidden in Népliget and other parts of the city. However, the available sources—both Hungarian and Soviet—do not document any systematic attacks against the departing troops during those two days. The most harrowing accounts—those of Soviet soldiers killed while fleeing from burning vehicles—pertain to the clashes that occurred after November 4. Meanwhile, on October 31, the Presidium of the CPSU had already overturned the decision.

On November 1, Imre Nagy’s government proclaimed the country’s neutrality and its withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact. At dawn on November 4, Operation “Turbine” brought seventeen Soviet divisions back to Budapest. The final toll included approximately 2,500 Hungarian deaths, about 200,000 exiles, tens of thousands of convictions, and more than two hundred executions; Nagy, Pál Maléter, and Miklós Gimes were hanged after a secret trial in June 1958.

Three squares, three memories

Magyar said that for years Hungarians had been led to believe that the national holiday belonged to a single political party. The day showed that the memory of ’56 remains divided, even if the roles have been reversed. The state held its celebrations in Kossuth Square, with the morning flag-raising ceremony and a solemn session of Parliament. Fidesz, KDNP, and Mi Hazánk did not participate because they do not recognize the legitimacy of the new President of the Republic, András Baka.

Fidesz organized its own “March of the National Flag” from the Technical University to Bem Square, following the route taken by the students in 1956. Speakers included former President János Áder, historian Mária Schmidt, and parliamentary group leader János Bóka. For the first time in many years, Orbán did not deliver the October 23 speech: he was in Paris and limited himself to sharing Bóka’s video on social media. The slogan chosen for the demonstration—“No war, no gender, no migration—God, homeland, family”—makes it quite clear which interpretation of 1956 the opposition intends to uphold: that of a revolt for the nation, faith, and family against ideology—an interpretation to be revived today against Brussels.

Mi Hazánk has taken this interpretation to its logical conclusion. Its leader, László Toroczkai, has argued that in 1956 the Hungarians did not rebel against Russia but against an internationalist empire—and that today that empire is called the European Union—which reveals that, at least for a segment of the Hungarian right, 1956 has become an anti-Western symbol.

Magyar’s speech in Kossuth Square addressed this contentious issue. He recalled Erika Szeles, Péter Mansfeld, István Angyal, Nagy, and Maléter; he said that military superiority was able to crush the revolution and execute “the martyred prime minister,” but could not extinguish the desire for freedom. Then he turned to the present. Those who seek support against their own people “in Moscow or elsewhere,” he said, should remember that power sustained by foreign backing lasts only a short while. Anyone who, after 1956, parades an aggressor through the streets or subordinates the nation to foreign empires “has understood nothing of the message of ’56,” and Magyar added: “whether in Budapest or on a Parisian terrace” . The target was Orbán.

The section on foreign policy was brief and clear: Hungary wants to be a reliable ally and an equal partner, not a country that follows an isolated course. The speech never explicitly mentioned Russia, nor did it speak of neutrality. This choice is significant. In 1956, neutrality was Nagy’s ultimate demand; seventy years later, the Hungarian government interprets that same legacy as an anchor to the West, not as equidistance.

Brussels in Budapest

The presence of Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and European Council President António Costa gave the day an explicitly European framework. Von der Leyen, on her first visit to Hungary since 2024, spoke in Parliament of a return “to a reborn country.” She said that in 1956 even the Soviets were afraid, because a victory by the Hungarian people would have spread the desire for democracy. She then directly linked the anniversary to the April 12 election: in April, Hungary would once again send a message of hope, demonstrating that democratic regression is reversible. She had already made the same comparison between Orbán’s defeat and the 1956 revolution in the aftermath of the elections, sparking protests among the Hungarian right.

The rest of the guest list was more modest than the government had led people to believe. Delegations were sent by some forty countries, almost all at the level of ministers or parliamentary speakers; Moldovan President Maia Sandu and Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze were in attendance. Emmanuel Macron, whose attendance Magyar had announced in an interview, did not attend: the French embassy clarified that the visit had never been confirmed, following days of tension over certain comments by the Hungarian prime minister regarding the unrest in France. Also absent were Giorgia Meloni, who was visiting Kuwait, and Donald Tusk, who was in India. Volodymyr Zelenskyy was not present; Ukraine was represented by the Speaker of Parliament. Vladimir Putin was the only head of state from Europe to not receive an invitation.

On October 23, he symbolically confirmed a shift that had already begun in practice. The Magyar government has classified Russia as a security threat, given the green light to open four negotiation chapters for Ukraine’s accession to the European Union, and set the 2027 defense budget at 2% of GDP. The role of bridge between Europe and Russia—which Orbán had made the hallmark of Hungarian foreign policy—is no longer government doctrine.

It remains to be seen to what extent this can be achieved in practice. Last April, Magyar pointed out that Hungary is “close to Russia” and that paying more for raw materials harms European competitiveness; he said he was ready for pragmatic cooperation with Moscow and wanted to renegotiate the terms of Paks II with the Kremlin. Oil still comes via the Druzhba pipeline, and the country’s only nuclear power plant burns Russian fuel. Energy Minister István Kapitány maintains that, starting in October 2027, gas could come entirely from non-Russian sources, and a decision on Paks II is expected by the end of the year.

The 70th anniversary thus leaves one question unanswered. Ady feared that Hungary would remain a ferry forever. Orbán had tried to turn the ferry into a bridge. Magyar now promises a permanent landing on the western shore. Whether that landing will be stable will be determined more by geography and infrastructure than by speeches.

The two squares on October 23—Kossuth and Bem—did not celebrate the same revolution.

Strategic Culture Foundation spoke with Aiden Minnis, a British-Irish volunteer fighting for Russia on the frontline in Kharkov Oblast.

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Western politicians and media claim that Russia is bogged down in a Ukrainian quagmire. We are told that Russian forces are taking heavy losses, held in a stalemate by gritty Ukrainian soldiers. Nearly five years after invading, it is claimed, Russia’s military is still confined to Ukraine’s far eastern territory with little progress.

But this upbeat Western narrative is flawed and wearing thin. The NATO-backed Ukrainian regime is straining from collapse. The grinding losses on the battlefield, as disproportionate body exchanges attest, the corruption within the Kiev regime, the dredging of conscripts to include women, and the incessant pounding by Russian air strikes are exposing a state teetering on defeat.

Even U.S. President Donald Trump seems to have sobered up from drinking the Kool-Aid about Ukraine winning. He’s peeved and telling Vladimir Zelensky it’s time for him to step aside and cut a peace deal.

There is a growing foreboding sense that European NATO leaders are dreading the inevitable implosion of their “Ukraine project”. As German MEP Michael von der Schulesburg pointed out in an interview with Glenn Diesen, European politicians are increasingly uneasy that their lies about Ukraine will soon be blown wide open. There will be hell to pay for bankrupt economies and impoverished societies, all based on lies.

Still, it is a fair question: why aren’t Russian forces making more rapid advance along the 1,000 kilometer front line? If the Kiev regime is so shaky, why isn’t Russia finishing it off quickly?

Aiden Minnis, a British-Irish volunteer serving in the Russian army, said he believes that victory is coming and is inevitable. But he explains that the advance is deliberately slow. The “meatgrinder” people refer to about the battlefield is not just about inflicting losses of military personnel. He says the conflict in Ukraine is being fought strategically as an attritional war to defeat the Western NATO alliance.

“We have defeated the Ukrainian army three times over from the losses it has suffered,” says Minnis. “This war would have been over a long time ago, if it were not for the systematic involvement of NATO.”

The amount of weaponry and personnel that NATO has funneled into Ukraine is on a scale that few in the West can imagine, he noted.

“NATO effectively runs and directs the war for Ukraine. That includes generals and special forces from NATO countries inside command structures and military units in Ukraine, and not always sheep dipped into the foreign legion either. Some are outright working without cover.

“They use NATO radars and intelligence to conduct combat operations and terrorist attacks inside Russia. None of the fighting, or rather 90 per cent of it in Ukraine, would be possible without massive Western assistance,” says Minnis.

For example, the EU is donating €90 billion to Ukraine just for 2026 and 2027 alone, never mind the €200 bn it gave from 2022 to 2025. About one-third of this money is used to manufacture and supply drones. This vast expenditure has transformed Ukrainian territory into a giant high-tech killing field. Traversing such territory is an unprecedented challenge.

Aiden Minnis left Britain in 2023 as a volunteer to fight for Russia. He has served in Donetsk and Lugansk as a sapper clearing explosives, as well as in the evacuation of civilians and wounded. Currently, he is deployed as a rifleman in a regiment on the front line in Kharkov Oblast near Kupiansk.

The British media have called him a criminal and a traitor. He says he doesn’t care because he has no intention of returning to the United Kingdom.

“I am labelled a traitor, but I only ever swore allegiance to one country… Russia, and I never broke it. And as long as I have breath in my body, you will never see me swear allegiance, or fight for the butcher’s apron [British Union Jack flag]. My soul is Irish and now Russian.”

Minnis says that what the Western media report about the war in Ukraine is “total lies”.

He says that Russian forces are making slow but relentless advances along most of the frontline. The pace is incremental because the Russian military is trying to minimize casualties among its troops and the civilian population.

“If you look at the exchanges of dead soldiers that are agreed upon from time to time, the Ukrainian side’s casualties are 10 times those of Russia.

“Also, despite the scale of this war – the biggest in Europe since World War Two – the number of civilian deaths is relatively low, and that’s because Russia is trying to minimize these casualties,” he says.

Minnis says that another factor that makes advances slow-going is that the NATO-backed regime uses tactics of boobytrapping buildings with civilians inside them. He says that when Russian forces take a village or town, the houses are often rigged with explosives, with families inside. This makes for painstaking work by sappers to defuse boobytraps.

And, of course, the massive deployment of drones is a big problem for infantry. The European Union and Britain have flooded Ukraine with drones that create “death zones.”

“The use of drone walls is in place of dwindling Ukrainian conscripts. These death zones make our ground progress difficult.”

However, Minnis said NATO’s deployment in Ukraine is a double-edged sword. The 27-nation military bloc has certainly made a Russian victory more difficult to achieve. It has prolonged the proxy war with millions of Ukrainian casualties.

But this war of attrition is grinding down the NATO arsenal with colossal impact. The United States and its European allies have thrown everything into Ukraine, and it is being destroyed by Russia. It’s a giant demolition site. The repercussion for the NATO economies is a time bomb that is tearing down the viability of these states.

Ukraine is a quagmire for NATO, not Russia. The battlefield does not have to move westwards; the Western powers are being sucked under.

In World War Two, the Soviet Red Army pushed all the way to Berlin. In today’s war, the new Berlin is in Ukraine, where Russia’s enemies are being ground down, hollowed out, and buried.

Aiden Minnis adds: “Russian leader Vladimir Putin is fighting this war very humanely; dare I say such a thing is possible in a war. But it’s a two-fold strategy: it’s to limit civilian casualties, but also a war of attrition, because what’s happening in real time is the demilitarisation of Ukraine, which won’t be able to wage a war again once this war is won by Russia, and also the demilitarisation and deindustrialization of NATO countries.”

Koreans do not want to do Uncle Sam’s dirty work any longer, and they do not want their country to be dragooned into a proxy war against their Asian neighbor, China.

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South Korea is rebelling against U.S. dominance. It is witnessing a formidable opposition movement against the United States’ historic control over the Asian country’s military forces.

There is also growing pressure on the South Korean government to refuse demands by U.S. President Donald Trump for Korean troops to deploy in the Persian Gulf.

A major driver of this surging opposition movement is the widely held concern that Washington is maneuvering South Korea to fight a war with China.

Political analyst KJ Noh explains that the Korean people perceive the United States as positioning their country as a proxy to fight an eventual war with China, in a similar way to how Ukraine is being used as a front line to provoke Russia.

“The U.S. empire is making South Korea into the next Ukraine,” says KJ Noh. “It is weaponizing South Korea.”

This is analogous to how Ukraine was groomed and weaponized since 2014 to serve as a proxy for the U.S. and NATO to confront Russia.

He points out that China has always been the main target for American imperial planners seeking to extend U.S. hegemony. Pentagon Generals have openly spoken about going to war with China since 2025. Several strategic documents cite the imperative of confronting China for the U.S. to pursue its ambitions of global dominance.

Recently, the American commander in South Korea, General Xavier Brunson, referred to the country as “a dagger pointed at China” and “an unsinkable U.S. aircraft carrier.” Such brazen comments have sparked even broader opposition.

KJ Noh contends that U.S. strategists assumed defeating Russia and Iran would be relatively easy, paving the way for the main target: China. However, the protracted war in Ukraine and Trump’s debacle in the Persian Gulf have delayed the war plan against China.

Nevertheless, Korean people understand that when the U.S. empire gets around to attacking China, their country will be deployed as Uncle Sam’s proxy.

Historically, for the past 76 years, Washington has exerted full control over the South Korean military. This was enabled by the U.S. using fascist collaborators from the Second World War to control South Korea – a legacy that persists among the deep state in South Korea.

KJ Noh surveys a history of genocidal violence perpetrated by the U.S. empire in South Korea to wipe out political opposition movements. The scale of mass murder and mass graves is shocking and hardly known in the West.

Despite the brutal oppression over many decades, there is still a defiant consciousness among Koreans who refuse to be vassals of the U.S.

Koreans do not want to do Uncle Sam’s dirty work any longer, and they do not want their country to be dragooned into a proxy war against their Asian neighbor, China, with which much of the Korean economy has beneficial relations.

This is why Koreans are demanding that the United States finally hand over Operational Control of the country’s military. President Lee Jae-myung reflects the popular will by calling on Washington to comply. It is also why the Korean people and government are refusing Trump’s peevish calls for deployment in the Persian Gulf. Given the history of loyal Korean service in U.S. wars, this latest defiance is a watershed in relations.

A country with a population of 1.3 million announces that it can strangle the commercial lifeline of the world’s leading nuclear power in a matter of hours.

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A string of provocations, but it’s all just cheap jewelry

Certain statements should be read twice – the second time aloud – to be sure you didn’t dream them. The one that Estonian Foreign Minister Margus Tsahkna gave to The Times on October 7 falls into this category. Estonia, the minister informs us, would be able to assemble a force of 50,000 experienced soldiers “in a matter of hours” and, again within a few hours, block Russia’s access to the Baltic Sea, which he describes as a vital artery of the Russian economy. For Moscow, that sea is a matter of survival, he added, especially since the Black Sea, he claims, is already closed off. Then, with a sense of timing that no playwright would have dared to imagine, Tsahkna called it “absurd” to describe NATO as an offensive organization.

The minister’s outburst did not come out of the blue. It comes at the end of an autumn that Tallinn has methodically shaped. In mid-September, the government announced it was ready to seal the border if a general mobilization were declared in Russia; on October 1, it banned the transit of Russian and Belarusian wheat; around the same time, the Financial Times reported on elite units being deployed to the border and the purchase of weapons capable of striking deep into Russian territory. The defense budget for 2026 stands at 2.4 billion euros, or 5.4% of gross domestic product. We are looking at a country of 1.3 million people that has chosen to live in a state of constant readiness and to let the world know, every week, just how prepared it is to fight.

The minister was careful to specify that the blockade would be triggered only after a Russian attack capable of invoking Article 5. The clause is about as reassuring as a “friendly dog” sign hanging on the gate of a kennel. Publicly announcing a plan to choke off a nuclear power’s main energy export route remains a deliberate political act, regardless of any qualifying conditions attached to it. Under customary international law, a naval blockade is an act of war; and in the age of severed cables, stateless drones, and oil tankers in the so-called “shadow fleet,” the threshold for what constitutes an “attack” has become elastic. Who decides when it has been crossed? The very same government that denounces a new provocation every morning?

The math of fifty thousand

Let’s focus on the numbers, which are the most entertaining part. According to public data from the Estonian armed forces, the wartime strength is just over 43,000. Of these, only 4,200 are on permanent standby; the rest are reservists and volunteers from the Defense League – brave people who train in the woods on weekends. So, there are no 50,000 “experienced” soldiers in a matter of hours. Unless you count those from other countries.

And that is exactly how the figure should be interpreted. Tsahkna’s 50,000 do not speak Estonian. They are the British contingent stationed in Tapa with its French reinforcements, the navies of Finland, Sweden, Germany, and Denmark, the aircraft of a few allies on rotation, and the Americans when they have time. A dozen or so flags, each with its own chain of command, its own parliament, its own public opinion, and its own election calendar. The Estonian minister disposes of that army the way a condominium manager disposes of the residents’ savings: in words, with great nonchalance. Could some assistant please explain to him how to do his job?

Let’s try to imagine the first missile. In London, the cabinet meets and seeks a legal opinion. Paris launches a strategic review, which requires a document and a conference. Berlin awaits the Bundestag’s vote and the blessing of its less-than-convinced coalition partner. Rome seeks clarification at the Atlantic Council; Budapest puts its reservations on record; Washington is busy elsewhere. Article 5, after all, doesn’t force anyone to fire a shot: it obligates each ally to take the action it deems necessary, and “necessary” can mean anything from an aircraft carrier to a note of protest. The oldest debate in any coalition would immediately begin: who steps in first, who withdraws last, who covers whose flank, and who pays for the fuel. Meanwhile, the Estonians would be there counting down the minutes.

European history is all too familiar with this scenario. In September 1939, France and Great Britain had guaranteed Poland’s security with the same solemnity with which Tallinn is guaranteed today. They declared war, and then spent eight months behind the Maginot Line simply watching: the French called it the drôle de guerre, the “phoney war.” Warsaw, meanwhile, had long since stopped laughing.

Let’s now set aside arithmetic for geography, which isn’t swayed by interviews – someone should tell the Minister that! About eighty kilometers of sea lie between Tallinn and Helsinki: it is along this narrow passage that the minister would like to close off the Gulf of Finland. From the Estonian capital to the Russian border at Narva, there are just over two hundred kilometers. Russia’s GDP, in nominal terms, is more than fifty times that of Estonia. The Baltic Fleet is based in Kronstadt, at the far end of the Gulf, and in Baltiysk, in the Kaliningrad exclave; which means, incidentally, that a substantial portion of that fleet is already outside the “plug” that Tallinn dreams of inserting.

Strategists carefully distinguish between three things that Estonian politicians happily confuse: guarding a passage, making its use risky for the adversary, and maintaining stable control over it. The first is possible; the second is costly; the third, against Russia, has never succeeded for anyone. Those who lay mines may fall victim to them; those who deploy coastal anti-ship batteries become, in turn, fixed targets, surveyed down to the meter.

And this is where physics comes in. Russia’s conventional arsenal includes Iskander missiles deployed just a few dozen minutes’ flight away, ship-launched Kalibr missiles, TOS-1A thermobaric rocket launchers, and high-yield glide bombs. There’s no need to bring up nuclear warheads, which remain the favorite bogeyman of Western talk shows. The coastal batteries, depots, command centers, and docks from which our dear friends in Tallinn intend to block the Gulf would go from a solid to a gaseous state in the time between launch and impact. And with them, the solidity of Estonia’s political stance would evaporate, long before an agreement on the statement is reached in Brussels. We’re not writing this to be smug. We’re writing this because, in that scenario, ordinary Estonians would be the first to pay the price, used as pawns by a ruling class that’s playing with fire in its own living room.

Creative accounting for oil

There remains the issue of the “lifeline.” Tsahkna attributes about 60% of Russian oil exports by sea to the Baltic route. Estimates from the Polish think tank OSW – which cannot be suspected of sympathizing with Moscow – put the figure at about one-third of crude oil and nearly half of refined products; and Reuters data from February show that oil continued to ship out from Russian ports on the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov, despite the sea being “already closed.” Inflating figures is an age-old rhetorical technique: it serves to make the threat seem more deadly than it is and one’s own position stronger than it actually is.

Moreover, a blockade would not affect only Moscow. Neutral shipowners, insurance companies, freight rates, refineries, and energy prices would all suffer the consequences, and Europe – which in recent years has already paid dearly for its economic war against Russia – would once again bear the cost. There’s even a grotesque detail: in 2025, Estonia sold goods worth approximately 252 million euros to Russia. They’re threatening to cut off their neighbor’s lifeline, but in the meantime, business as usual continues.

Why, then, all the fuss? The answer lies in the role the Estonian ruling class has carved out for itself within the Alliance: that of the permanent vanguard, the most zealous member of the eastern flank, the top student who raises their hand before the teacher finishes the question. It’s a source of privilege. It guarantees attention, funds, allied troops on its territory, and invitations to summits. And it becomes all the more valuable as the possibility of a ceasefire in Ukraine draws nearer – a prospect feared in many Atlantic capitals as the end of the emergency that justifies everything. So the fever must be kept high: a statement every week, a ban every month, a threat of a blockade every fall.

In 1955, Leonard Wibberley published a satirical novel, *The Mouse That Roared*, in which the tiny Grand Duchy of Fenwick declared war on the United States with the sole purpose of losing it and collecting reconstruction aid. The difference with Tallinn lies in the ending. The Grand Duchy counted on losing to a generous power, an ocean away. Estonia is threatening a neighboring power – one that has forgotten nothing since 1991 – and is entrusting its fate to a coalition that has never fought a real war together against an opponent of equal strength.

From apotheosis to casus belli?

Let’s recap. A country with a population of 1.3 million announces that it can strangle the commercial lifeline of the world’s leading nuclear power in a matter of hours. To do so, it relies on soldiers it doesn’t have – lent by allies it hasn’t consulted – based on oil figures that Western sources themselves downplay. It ties all of this to a war that its rhetoric makes a little more likely every day, and in the same breath accuses those who see NATO as something offensive of absurdity. If there is such a thing as the apotheosis of the absurd, it can be found at the Foreign Ministry in Tallinn.

Moscow, to tell the truth, doesn’t even need to respond. Geography does it, the balance of power does it, and the history of European coalitions – which have always found it easier to make promises than to keep them – does it. Deterrence that turns into permanent provocation ceases to dissuade and begins to seek its own casus belli. The Baltic Sea deserves mature diplomacy among the coastal states that will have to share it anyway. For now, it must settle for – a minister who roars – and an audience of allies who, at the first real blow, will look around wondering who should answer the phone.

Iran and Russia, both sanctioned to oblivion, are indeed in synch like never before, coordinating everything on a shared front.

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Washington, on the Ukraine front, may be switching to total Saving Face mode. After all, the scale of the strategic defeat for the Empire plus the discombobulated West in country 404 is staggering. Add to it the strategic defeat in Iran plus Yemen relentlessly hammering the House of Saud. Grandmaster Lavrov coined it: “The West will never again be the main player, dictating terms.”

The temptation may be great to identify a more straightforward path towards a multi-nodal, polycentric world order – in the wake of all those wild, unprecedented Trump concessions to Moscow. But then the real dark clouds keep coming down.

The death cult in West Asia and the Epstein Syndicate as a whole have managed to overpower the whole mass of neo-con Russophobes spread across the MICIMATT (military/industrial/congressional/intelligence/media/academia/think tank complex, in the memorable definition by Ray McGovern) and reconstitute Iran as the undisputable, one and only national security emergency.

The 7-point way or the highway

Field Marshal Asim Munir’s hasty, last minute-arranged trip from Islamabad to Tehran earlier this week in the end could not possibly mediate anything.

Munir met everyone who matters. He asked Parliament Speaker Ghalibaf point blank: what does it take to find a solution for the Iran-U.S. impasse? Ghalibaf was blunt – and repeated it at last 8 times during their meeting: Washington must implement Iran’s 7-point conditions, essentially a summary of the serially dead cat memorandum of understanding (MoU), which Trump signed and then destroyed.

The 7 points were first proposed to Tweedledum and Twedledee – Witkoff and Kushner – via the Qataris in a previous round of Iran-U.S. indirect negotiations.

President Pezeshkian and secretary of the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Mohsen Rezaee, in their meetings, stressed the exact same thing. That’s the message Munir should relay to the Sociopath-in-Chief.

Official Iranian sources will not confirm it; only the heavily-spun American version. But Munir may have carried a final U.S. ultimatum to Rezaee, Pezeshkian and Ghalibaf: ditch your nuclear program, or face massive strikes, mostly targeting Pickaxe Mountain.

Adding on the 7 points, Mohsen Rezaee actually informed Munir – and thus the White House – again, that not a single speck of nuclear dust will leave Iran. Back to the only possibility of a return to negotiations: Washington must accept the 7 points.

Foreign Minister Araghchi keeps coming back to the essentials: “The U.S. has failed to achieve any of its war objectives.” So the connectivity chain is inescapable: no military victory (and no regime change); unbearable economic costs; untainable political situation; thus only off-ramp is the 7 points.

And on top of it Tehran runs the clock.

In parallel, across the Yemeni Storm, Sana’a also runs the clock.

With Aramco, the lifeblood of U.S., Israel and Salafi-jihadi goons of the ISIS mould, and a privileged source of funding for the Forever Wars, now in Ansarallah’s direct line of fire, the Yemeni drive is to work “to dry up the sources of terrorism.”

Riyadh though is doubling down, threatening to bomb every gathering of Yemeni tribes. If that happens, more than a million more Yemenis will join the Yemeni Armed Forces and march to the Yemeni-Saudi border.

After all the tribes, well-trained and ultra-weaponized, are just waiting for a directive from Ansarallah’s leader, Abdul-Malik Badr al-Din al-Houthi, to pour into southern “Saudi” Arabia and recover the three provinces, Najran, Jizan and Asir, that are ancestral Yemeni lands stolen by the Brits in 1934.

A price you can’t afford to pay

All hell may break loose: now; soon; or until the end of November at the latest. Were it to happen sooner, before the Israeli elections, it’s a done deal the driver is the death cult. The Sociopath-in-Chief privileges a post-mid-terms attack.

The death cult is preparing a massive attack on Iranian power plants, oil infrastructure, military targets and nuclear installations. Tehran has repeatedly warned that any attack, joint or separate, from the U.S. and Israel, will be treated as Totalen Krieg, all-out war, and the response will break any limits or restraint.

Iran’s internal intel is fully concentrated on a large-scale bombing scenario happening before next Tuesday, Election Day in the death cult.

Whatever happens, Tehran’s response will make sure the price to pay is beyond prohibitive. On Israel, Iran will counterpunch on both of Israel’s refineries; the ports at Haifa and Ashdod; all airbases; and Dimona added only if Iran’s own nuclear sites are hit.

When it comes to a U.S. attack, any Gulf petro-monarchy that hosts any launch instantly becomes a legitimate target, including power grids; desalination plants; refineries; ports; data centers; HQs and installations of American companies.

The Strait of Hormuz would be completely closed. The price of a barrel of oil will skyrocket. The global economy will hit Big Depression. From an imperial point of view, that will be as gloomy as Washington letting Iran manage the Strait of Hormuz and charge fees for transit: actually the humiliating end of unilateral thalassocracy – complete with the U.S. Fifth Fleet needing to ask permission to enter or leave its own dilapidated base in Bahrain.

Mohammad Mokhber, a top adviser to Leader Mojtaba Khamenei, stressed that “if the U.S.-Israel strike our petrochemical infrastructure or power plants, Iran will strike nine countries.”

Moreover, the Fars news agency, very close to the IRGC, learned about an array of new directives: if the attacks involve the assassination of Iranian officials and the killing of civilians, the Iranian response will include political targets associated with the U.S. and all nations participating in the war, in addition to their infrastructure.

Lavrov and Araghchi revive RIC

Amidst so much horror, let’s try to stress at least one auspicious trend. During Lavrov’s recent visit to Tehran, Iranian FM Araghchi cut to the chase:

“Never in our History have Russia & Iran worked as closely as now.”

The key operative concept is “Never in our History”. Lavrov and Araghchi talked about “everything from Europe to West Asia”. But specially these four: Lebanon, Palestine, Ukraine & Yemen. Not to mention everything about expanded economic and “nuclear cooperation”.

Economic cooperation means specially the INSTC – the International North South Transportation Corridor linking 3 BRICS/SCO partners: Russia, Iran and India.

See my INSTC documentary shot in Iran last year.

The Empire of Chaos relies on sanctions, threats and bombing. Eurasia integration relies on building infrastructure, increasing trade, and sovereign cooperation. So Lavrov and Araghchi once again had to revive RIC: the original Russia/India/China connection first conceptualized as the Primakov Triangle but now with Iran in place of India.

Lavrov proposed that the new RIC establish a “common security structure” in the Persian Gulf via a trilateral summit. That amounts to RIC defining a unified framework for the Strait of Hormuz.

The Empire’s response will be increased discombobulation. Because once again this is about “indivisibility of security” – as in Russia proposing it to the U.S. and NATO in December 2021. Then that was met with a non-response response.

On Lebanon, Palestine, Ukraine and Yemen, Lavrov and Araghchi were on top of the top frontlines. Where we have the Empire of Chaos and its allies/vassals on one side, and Russia and Iran’s allies on the other side.

It’s all interconnected, of course. An imperial arc of military pressure stretches from Ukraine to Yemen. The counterpunch revolves around how to coordinate the resistance (italics mine) to such pressure.

On economic cooperation, both Iran and Russia are under a tsunami of sanctions. Their banks are expelled from SWIFT, and oil exports are severely restricted. So trade between them must bypass the U.S. dollar; the whole Western financial system; and the thalassocracy enforced by the U.S. Navy.

Know how in bypassing sanctions is something Iran-Russia may share with the whole Global South, via settlements in local currencies; barter trade; overland corridors; the INSTC; and trade across the Caspian Sea.

And that brings us once again to the Strait of Hormuz – which Iran controls. The Gulf petro-monarchies are completely freaking out. Russia maintains solid channels with both Iran and the Gulf. Lavrov is in total synch with all of them. He brought the Gulf’s concerns to Tehran, and in turn, conveyed Tehran’s conditions back to the Gulf.

Lavrov stressed that the serially dead cat Islamabad MoU is the only way to go. Exactly what Xi told Trump at the Oval Office. Exactly what the Iranian leadership told Asim Munir in Tehran.

He also stressed that the Persian Gulf petro-monarchies must get their act together and start a serious security dialogue with Iran and Arab nations, including neighbors such as Iraq and Jordan, and involve the Arab League, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), and the permanent members of the UN Security Council.

Once again: indivisibility of security.

Iran and Russia, both sanctioned to oblivion, are indeed in synch like never before, coordinating everything on a shared front – while the desperate Epstein Syndicate remains stuck in its self-concocted Forever War nightmare.

Build a physical border—widen rivers from the Baltic to the Black Sea. Sell resources to those who keep their word. Not one ruble for Europe’s rebuild, Tim Kirby writes.

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This is the type of question that in 2022 would have sounded insane both within Russia and even more so in the West. How could ‘Nigeria with snow’ possibly save the Europe that it supposedly ‘attacked’ spontaneously? But now we are at a certain nexus of events that allows one to ask such a question. Trump has started to pull back, or has been forced to pull back, support for Project Ukraine which looks to be winding down. Every locomotive, gas station, sea port, Amazon-like warehouse, and data center has been blown to bits in retaliation for Zelensky’s 40 days of terror during the summer of 2026. The President of the United States has called for a three-way meeting with Xi and Putin which some think could be a call to finally and ultimately divide up the world into zones of influence among great powers. The riots in France have potentially put a final nail in the coffin of the globalist vision for the future, not because the riots are ugly or wrong, but because ultimately the Frankfurt School concept of destroying all forms of identity to maybe achieve something utopian has only taken hold in the West. That is to say, cultural masochism is only destroying the West and has provided strong evidence to Russia, China and others that national sovereignty and cohesion is the way to go. The project to create a world with no form of collective identity has backfired.

To be clear, the defining issue around this nexus is by far is the ‘death of Europe’. Obviously the continent remains physically on the map, but geopolitically it has become a black hole. Trump has wanted to get the U.S. out of NATO since his first presidential campaign, or at least make it profitable. The forces in the States that are ‘America First’ want nothing to do with the continent anymore. Trump may be failing to get the job done, but officially the Monroe Doctrine is back in place, one that leaves European problems for Europe to deal with. This potential global carve up conference, or Yalta 2.0 between Xi, Putin and Trump probably has to do with the Cold War’s Arrakis no longer has any spice left to it. Europe has become a toxic asset after generations of vassalage to Washington/London and rule by Epstein Elites. On the geopolitical game board there is an ever growing dark pit filled by the abyssal legacy of the Monopolar Moment located where Western Europe used to be.

What’s in it for Russia to save Europe?

But as things change and the ‘paper tiger’ of Europe shows its lack of stripes, what is Russia to do about this? Surprisingly, from within Russia and especially from Pro-Russian Westerners (who love to argue with me about this online) there are plenty of calls for mama bear to ‘save Europe’. I must say that I find any such demands to be a true reflection of Western arrogance and over-inflated self-importance. Moscow is the 3^rd Rome, it does not need to save your Holy Land to achieve a state of grace.

Pro-Russian Westerners should be well aware of the fact that all of the problems Russia has suffered over the last 300 years, some of them very dire with millions of men lost, all came from the West: Napoleon’s invasion, subversion during the late 1800s mostly by the British, Lenin’s arrival in St. Petersburg from Europe, Marxism as a whole, WWI, WWII, 90s Liberalism, and now Project Ukraine. Truman gets the blame by Russian historians for starting the Cold War, FDR was much nicer bloke for Russia but his health didn’t hold out, so perhaps the American side did cause one major set of problems for the Russians, but the rest all comes from Europe and especially that accursed island, and at this point for Russian society the Cold War is in the past, but WWII is in the present thanks to the Maidan.

Perhaps Putin’s greatest yet quietest triumph is the restoration of Christianity in Russia, and with the Christian spirit comes an obligation to forgive others. However, when one ‘turns the other cheek’ and has the other slapped over-and-over again this duty to our Lord in heaven has been fulfilled and the Motherland is under no moral obligation to do anything for the West. Many, both within and without Russia, put serious blame on the USSR’s ‘geopolitical altruism’ as a cause for its loss in the Cold War. Moscow may have bought all the boots in Czechoslovakia, but it gave away unfathomable resources to all sorts of fickle socialist cousin-nations and got nothing in return by 1991, when they all jumped on the Western bandwagon. Countless billions of Soviet Rubles in oil, coal and anything else the USSR had for export, were just given a way or sold for symbolic prices in Eastern Europe, Cuba, North Korea and beyond. We have become used to the ‘West’ being the source of insane self-destructive policies in our world, but it was not always the king in that department.

I bring up Soviet geopolitical altruism, plus the ‘betrayal’ by the ‘socialist camp’ as the Russians call them, is a very strong argument against Russia doing anything to save Europe. They have tried to be nice to Europe and failed. No matter how many bloggers may be ‘begmanding’ Zelensky-style that Moscow ‘must’ save the West from itself that someone must ‘do something about the protests in France’ or at least protect Christianity in the former Roman Empire, this does not provide a counter argument to the opinion of Marshall Zhukov “We have liberated Europe from Fascism and they will never forgive us.” If Russia saves the EU from its Postmodernist death cult behavior it will never be forgiven for it either, especially from Starbucks socialist intellectuals.

Doing nothing is a fantastic option

If Russia were to ‘do something’ about Europe as it collapses these efforts will only be instantly forgotten and the Western elites (not the people, they have a far better historical memory than their leaders, but sadly they decide virtually nothing) will one day rise up to punish Moscow for all of its efforts. When Alice Weidel speaks about Germany restoring relations with Russia the locals in land of black gold roar with naïve applause. However, as a Westerner I hear something different in her words as they are auto-translated before my eyes. Ms. Weidel does not express some sort of guilt or remorse or a deep desire to live in brotherhood, but something more like an attitude of “we are losing badly, so let’s allow the snow negroes to go back to sending us liquid cotton”. There is no mutual respect or friendship in her voice, just the pragmatism of not fighting the subhuman barbarians to the east because it is ineffective at present for the German economy. Let’s look at it this way, should Russia, even for payment, send resources to rebuild those who have desired its demise for centuries, or sell those resources to countries that only want peace and mostly keep their word? Russia should sell absolutely nothing to the West for the next few generations, no matter how much posh Muscovites like Gucci and Porsche. The rebirth of Europe is the deaths of future millions of Russians.

The last 300 years of history since Peter I became infatuated with the West have never yielded anything for his nation but misery, revolution, exported resources that were needed at home, and piles of humiliation with a cherry on top. Russia is under no obligation to do anything in Europe and the all signs point to the need to take absolutely no action over there whatsoever and let the Postmodernist nightmare run its course.

The irony of Russian history is that somehow it can always make deals with the Muslims, even the Turks who have had a lot of geopolitical tension with them, can still keep their word on deals and common ground can be found across the potentially dangerous Black Sea region. Protestants are as loyal to the Russians as they were to the Native Americans that they wiped off the continent. The biolab network in Ukraine was a 21^st century ‘diseased blanket’ but for the primitive aboriginal Slavs. So it is hard to say whether an Islamic France would actually be more hostile to Moscow, perhaps they would want peace and shish kebabs with a rival they could actually respect?

A true border wall would be a better option

There is an old geopolitical folk belief that the border of Russia starts somewhere in the Baltic Sea and ends somewhere in the Black Sea and that its shape throughout history is constantly changing between these two endpoints. There seems to be some truth to this, and when Project Ukraine is finally settled the Russians need to not just establish some border, but change the actual physical landscape of Europe to suit their security needs.

I would propose that the Union State between Russia and Belarus, at the end of the conflict draw up a plan to unite rivers and canals that somehow connect to the Baltic Sea and go down towards the Black Sea. Supposedly the oceans are rising and thus there should be plenty of water to fill this passageway. Furthermore, all of these natural and unnatural bodies of water must be widened to something like at least a kilometer. The steppes between Russia and Germany have been nothing but a nightmare zone of conflict since WWI and that is due to its geography, since the West will probably never change its attitude towards Russia, it is vastly easier for Moscow to alter the landscape than the minds of the Epstein Elite. Will the Baltic states object to this? Yes, but who knows what their fate will be after the Special Military Operation ends and America abandons them.

Having a final definitive, although expensive to produce, line on every map in the world with only a tiny number of bridges, that is too wide to cross easily, would finally define a concrete dividing point between the ‘barbaric’ East and ‘civilized’ West. That is to say, Russia must achieve some sort of physical separation, or possibly segregation from a mentally diseased Europe for centuries to come. Putting up a massive border wall would also be a boon, but that would be quite costly to the Russian taxpayer. The important thing is that there must be a potent form of division that is felt by both sides. The term Zaporozhia, means something like “along the threshold” and the threshold to Russia is eternally open, someone needs to close the damn door already and flick the lock.

In Summation Russia does not need to save Europe, it needs to fully and completely divide itself from it:

• • Geopolitical altruism is a methodology of failure, the more Russia spends on itself the more powerful and wealthy it becomes. Today’s Russia flourishes under the challenges that crushed the all too generous USSR from within.
  • The Western elites (not the people) will always hate Russia and they should not be allowed to rebuild via Russian resources, even if they are willing to pay for them. There are other better customers. Let them rot in the Postmodern grave they’ve dug for themselves.
  • There needs to be a permanent physical border between Russia and Europe, the easiest way would be by uniting and widening preexisting rivers and canals.
  • Supposedly Christian Europe has wished death upon Russia for generations, maybe a Caliphate won’t be so bad for Moscow? How many Russians died to Islamic extremism as opposed to the Third Reich?
  • Russia cannot and must not spend one ruble to rebuild Europe let alone a single soldier’s life.
  • Russia is under no obligation to save your country of origin, it never was, and never will be.

Instead of prioritizing stakeholder profit, the Witkoff-Europe combo should address Eurasian security architecture and NATO-Russia-China frontiers to gain traction in Moscow.

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Back in December 2025, U.S. commentator Sundance, writing in the Conservative Treehouse, wrote about Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner’s new ‘Money Diplomacy’ solution for Ukraine that “require[d] [the establishment of] a system whereby the western opportunity for financial benefit continues”. From this perspective, the U.S. negotiators would “propose a long-term plan for continued financial benefit”.

From their current language it appears that Witkoff and Kusher are still confident they can construct a financial reward system for western banks, investors, politicians and Ukraine officials that will retain the benefits of war without the ancillary ingredient of bloodshed.

As Sundance noted —

“If the U.S. delegation can pull this off, then Russia can gain the territory they want, corrupt Ukraine officials can keep skimming investment money, the EU can retain the power it wants to extract financial payments, American politicians can use the “long-term recovery projects” for money laundering, and quasi-public/private investment banks can benefit from the exploitation of Ukraine resources”.

From this evident New York real estate worldview, all other issues — territorial boundaries, security and NATO’s encroachment into Central Asia’s security architecture — are but ‘downstream details’ “to the stuff that really matters, the money”.

Monetary diplomacy, however, has not brought a solution for Ukraine (nor for that matter, for Gaza either). Nonetheless, Witkoff has a new plan that David Ignatius has outlined in his column at the Washington Post.

Ignatius highlights that despite the recent Ukraine “flap” over its targetting of Russian refineries, “the U.S. and Europe are moving toward a joint peace proposal that would deliver financial and security benefits to both Ukraine and Russia as a baseline for a territorial settlement that falls short of both sides’ war aims”. In other words, ‘a sweetener’ dangled to persuade the sides to stop bombing each other’s refineries and to open the path for this ‘new’ initiative.

If Zelensky agrees to halt refinery attacks, “we’re back in, and we go to Moscow”, an American official told Ignatius.

In gist, the 4-point plan envisages a generous reconstruction framework to meet “Zelensky’s myriad cash needs”; security guarantees for Ukraine equivalent to NATO’s Article 5; the economic integration of Russia, Ukraine and Europe through an energy deal — “This might consist of a pipeline carrying Russian oil and gas to Europe with Ukraine and Russia splitting the profits. Such a pipeline could sharply reduce European energy costs”, a U.S. official said. In addition to providing Russia with “long-term access to the European energy market”, a peace deal would specify how and when existing economic sanctions on Russia would be removed.

The final point – wait for it — would be a ceasefire along the existing front line, or the ‘line of control’.

It seems extraordinary: The U.S. and Europeans negotiate amongst themselves, seemingly oblivious to the explicit statements issued by the Russian side.

Oil and gas would be supplied by Russia to the needy Europeans who voluntarily forsook their earlier cheap Russian supply, who are trapped by their own decisions and who denigrate Russia at every opportunity. And with the profits to be “split” with Ukraine? No way will Russia accept such a one-sided proposal.

FM Lavrov said at the UNGA no ceasefire under any format. That means that any negotiations would have to take place under fire, and Putin has suggested that even then, he would ‘think twice’ about starting any negotiations (whether under fire or not).

Putin’s spokesman Dmitry Peskov confirmed just last week that “piecemeal solutions and agreements” would prevent a comprehensive settlement from being reached; a “freeze” of the conflict would not help either —

“[Ukraine] is a highly complex matter, and the settlement must be comprehensive … We need a solution for future generations — one that is guaranteed and safeguarded against setbacks”.

It seems that the Europeans have not grasped that a Korean-style cessation of hostilities (as argued by General Kellogg) along a front where two militaries face each other is a recipe for precisely no solution. It has been 73 years since the Korean War was frozen by armistice. Nothing has changed.

The repeated return to this mantra of a ceasefire along line of contact, rather than solution first; ceasefire last, shouts out to the Russians that the West wants to keep Ukraine in the locker-room for the time when a platform from which to exert pressure (again) on Russia in the future is to be jacked-up.

The fatal flaw to this initiative is its cultural deafness. For Witkoff and Kushner it may be “all about the stuff that really matters – money” — but that is not the case for Russia.

If the Witkoff-Europe combo recalled Russian history, they would understand why, for Russia, security, security, security comes top.

Walter Munchau cautioned just this week that “the Ukraine war risks escalating” —

“We should be under no illusion about a war with Russia. We are absolutely not in a position to win. Whose bond markets are going to be blown up first? Who is going to run out of interceptor missiles first? … On every [count] — military, energy, finance — Europe is at a disadvantage. That’s not all. There is a relatively plausible scenario in which Ukraine and Iran merge into a single West Eurasian war — and become the ultimate proxy conflict between the U.S. and China”.

If, instead of putting continued ‘stakeholder’ grift first, with its mechanism to ensure “that the western opportunity for financial benefit continues”, the Witkoff-Europe combo chose rather to address the fundamentals to the conflict — the deeper question of a Eurasian security architecture; the definition of where exactly the frontier that separates NATO security interests from those of Sino-Russian interests physically lies — they might find a more receptive audience on their next trip to Moscow.

Alas, circumscribing NATO’s extent is not possible – as things stand.

Without becoming official, BRICS’ role in resolving conflicts remains reduced.

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Recently, I delivered a presentation at the Russian Academy of Sciences on the role of BRICS in addressing the conflict in the Middle East. The discussion raised a fundamental question about the group’s international relevance: to what extent can an increasingly influential association of emerging powers contribute to resolving a major geopolitical crisis when its members hold divergent positions and maintain competing regional interests?

The answer requires a realistic assessment of BRICS’ institutional character and the political considerations shaping its members’ foreign policies.

The expansion of BRICS has increased its economic weight and diplomatic reach. Nevertheless, the group remains primarily a platform for intergovernmental coordination rather than a formal international organization equipped with binding decision-making mechanisms and a unified foreign policy. Its members maintain regular consultations, pursue economic cooperation, and issue joint declarations, but these activities do not automatically translate into coordinated action during armed conflicts.

The Middle East illustrates this limitation particularly clearly. Iran and the United Arab Emirates belong to BRICS while occupying opposing positions in the current military confrontation. Tehran considers American military infrastructure in the region a central element of the threat it faces, while the UAE seeks to protect its territory and critical infrastructure from Iranian missiles and drones. The presence of American forces on Emirati soil places Abu Dhabi in a particularly sensitive position, regardless of whether Iran considers the country itself its principal adversary.

Other members face similarly complex calculations. Egypt maintains important relations with Israel, while India combines longstanding ties with Iran with a strategic partnership with Israel. Meanwhile, China’s rivalry with India remains an important feature of Asian geopolitics, despite diplomatic efforts to stabilize bilateral relations. These differences prevent BRICS from adopting a common strategic position on every major international crisis.

The frequently invoked objective of establishing a multipolar world order does little to eliminate these contradictions. Multipolarity itself carries different meanings across the group’s membership. Brazilian foreign policy discourse often associates it with multilateral institutions and international governance, including the United Nations. Russia, China, and Iran, however, place greater emphasis on redistributing global power and reducing the capacity of Western states to impose their strategic preferences on other countries.

Consequently, BRICS lacks a fully shared geopolitical doctrine. Its cohesion rests primarily on the combined economic and political weight of its members and their recognition that the international system cannot be transformed without their participation. This common interest provides a foundation for cooperation, although it remains insufficient to establish a unified approach to every regional conflict.

These structural limitations define what BRICS can realistically accomplish in the Middle East. The group cannot be expected to endorse Iran’s military position collectively, nor is it likely to become a unified negotiating intermediary. The interests of its Arab members, particularly the UAE, make such an arrangement politically implausible. Likewise, most BRICS countries do not support eliminating the State of Israel.

However, significant opportunities for coordinated diplomatic action remain. Members can oppose attacks against civilians, condemn violations of international humanitarian law, and demand accountability for the destruction affecting Palestine, Lebanon, and Iran. Such positions can establish common ground without requiring every member to adopt identical strategic objectives.

Joint declarations at BRICS summits have already provided a framework for expressing humanitarian concerns. The challenge is to translate diplomatic language into practical measures, including coordinated initiatives for humanitarian assistance, sustained international pressure against violations of international law, and diplomatic efforts to prevent further escalation.

Whether BRICS can pursue these objectives effectively depends on decisions about its institutional future. If its members want the group to exercise greater influence over international crises, they will need to develop clearer procedures, establish more concrete long-term priorities, and identify areas where collective action is possible despite strategic disagreements.

The Middle East conflict therefore presents BRICS with a significant test. Its capacity to influence the international order will depend not only on the combined power of its members, but also on their willingness to convert shared interests into sustained political action.

The realities obscured by the “One Nation” narrative intersect with broader imperialist power struggles, extending from the energy resources of the Caspian Basin to the trade routes of Eurasia.

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Although Ankara and Baku maintain a strong partnership spanning Karabakh, energy corridors, the defence industry and the Organization of Turkic States, the 2009 rapprochement with Armenia, the natural gas dispute of 2010 and the political tensions that have resurfaced today show that the two countries have long been engaged in a relationship marked by rivalry as well as cooperation.

Relations between Turkey and Azerbaijan have evolved since the dissolution of the Soviet Union through numerous partnerships in the political, economic and security spheres.

Turkey was the first country to recognise Azerbaijan’s independence. Its support for Baku during the Karabakh conflicts, joint oil and natural gas projects, and increasingly close military cooperation in recent years have all been presented through the political slogan “One Nation, Two States.” Yet several episodes have demonstrated that the two states do not necessarily interpret this supposed unity in the same way.

The tensions that have recently emerged over dress regulations and debates about secularism in Azerbaijan are particularly revealing in this respect. The responses from senior Azerbaijani officials to criticism originating in Turkey have exposed significant differences in how the two countries perceive their relationship.

While the Turkish side has promoted a vision of a “Greater Turkic World” under Ankara’s leadership through the “One Nation, Two States” narrative, the Azerbaijani side has responded with a different emphasis: “One nation, but two states.”

From 1991 to the present: How the foundations of the relationship were laid

Turkey recognised Azerbaijan’s independence on 9 November 1991, becoming the first country to do so. Diplomatic relations between the two countries were established on 14 January 1992. Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, a new era of interstate relations between Ankara and Baku began.

For Turkey, Azerbaijan was more than a country linked to it through a shared Turkic identity. The relationship also provided a strategic gateway to the Caspian Basin, Central Asia and the South Caucasus—an objective that aligned with the broader strategic interests of the United States as well. For Azerbaijan, meanwhile, Turkey was an important partner capable of providing political support on the international stage, facilitating access to Western markets and cooperating on security matters.

The famous slogan “One Nation, Two States,” popularised by former Azerbaijani President Heydar Aliyev, came to express a degree of closeness that went beyond ordinary diplomatic relations between the two countries.

One of the most important issues on the agenda in the early 1990s was the Karabakh conflict. In 1993, Turkey closed its land border with Armenia after Armenian forces took control of the Kelbajar district. This decision marked a defining moment in Ankara’s diplomatic position on the Karabakh conflict.

Turkish-Armenian relations thus became an integral part of Ankara’s relationship with Baku. Turkey’s policy towards Armenia began to be shaped not only by the dynamics of bilateral relations but also by its strategic partnership with Azerbaijan.

The first major tension: The rapprochement with Armenia

The problems that have periodically emerged in Turkey–Azerbaijan relations are not new. A closer look at the 2008–2010 period reveals how disagreements in both diplomacy and economics brought underlying tensions between the two countries into the open for the first time.

In 2008, Turkey and Armenia launched a renewed initiative to normalise relations. On 6 September 2008, then-Turkish President Abdullah Gül travelled to Yerevan at the invitation of Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan to watch a football match between the national teams of the two countries. The visit became one of the symbolic moments in the normalisation process between two countries pursuing different paths towards transatlantic integration. The initiative would subsequently become known as “football diplomacy.”

Following negotiations, Turkey and Armenia signed protocols in Zurich in October 2009 aimed at establishing diplomatic relations and developing bilateral ties.

The Azerbaijani leadership, however, viewed the process with considerable reservations. Baku regarded any normalisation between Ankara and Yerevan conducted independently of the Karabakh issue as contrary to its core foreign policy interests. Such moves raised concerns in Azerbaijan that Turkey’s political support could weaken.

The protocols signed by Turkey and Armenia never entered into force. The process failed to advance through the parliamentary ratification stages and eventually came to a standstill. Lobbying efforts by pro-Baku circles, drawing heavily on Azerbaijani financial resources, are also understood to have influenced the process.

This first major test therefore became an illustration of Azerbaijan’s ability to exert influence over Turkish policy.

Partnership and bargaining

During the same period, the two countries experienced a serious dispute over natural gas prices and energy transportation.

Natural gas produced at Azerbaijan’s Shah Deniz field was becoming an important source of supply for Turkey. However, when negotiations to renew earlier agreements began in 2008, disagreements emerged over gas prices, the recalculation of past purchases, Turkey’s ability to resell the gas to third countries, and transit fees.

At this point, Ankara’s ambition to establish itself as a central energy corridor to Europe intersected with Baku’s efforts to secure more direct commercial arrangements for its natural gas exports.

The dispute between the two supposed partners lasted approximately two years. Azerbaijan sought to strengthen its bargaining position against Ankara by drawing on its relations with alternative partners, including Russia and Iran.

Agreements signed in June 2010 ultimately resolved the disagreements over natural gas prices, sales and transit conditions.

This dispute was a clear indication that relations between the two countries were shaped by far more complicated dynamics than the rhetoric of “brotherhood” suggested.

Turkey offered a critical transit route for Azerbaijan’s access to European markets, while Azerbaijan used its energy resources to gain leverage over Ankara’s strategic objectives.

“Blood brothers” or energy partners?

Energy cooperation can be seen as one of the most important long-term foundations of Turkey–Azerbaijan relations. Energy projects have not only tied the two countries’ economic interests together; they have also influenced Turkey’s position in the European energy market and Azerbaijan’s ability to bring Caspian resources to international markets.

From the Caspian to the Mediterranean: The Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline

One of the clearest manifestations of this partnership is the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline. Beginning full-capacity operations in 2006, the pipeline transports Azerbaijani oil through Georgia to the Turkish Mediterranean terminal at Ceyhan. The project was implemented under agreements signed by Turkey, Azerbaijan and Georgia in 1999.

The significance of BTC extends beyond oil transportation. Most importantly, it enables Caspian energy resources to reach global markets through routes that bypass Russia. Azerbaijan has thus expanded its export options, while Turkey has become a major energy transit hub. At the broader geopolitical level, the project also represented an important step in the Atlantic alliance’s strategy to reduce Russia’s influence over regional energy routes.

Baku–Tbilisi–Erzurum and TANAP

Natural gas cooperation between the two countries developed along similar lines. The Baku–Tbilisi–Erzurum pipeline began transporting gas in 2007, facilitating the delivery of Azerbaijani natural gas to the Turkish market.

The Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP) subsequently became one of the most important projects in the bilateral partnership. The first gas flowed through TANAP in June 2018. The pipeline delivers Azerbaijani natural gas to Turkey and contributes to its transportation to European markets through the Southern Gas Corridor.

A turning point for Azerbaijani capital: SOCAR

Energy relations are not limited to pipelines. Investments by the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR) in Turkey have become one of the largest components of the two countries’ economic relationship.

SOCAR Turkey operates in sectors including refining, petrochemicals, logistics and port management. In a statement concerning 2024, the company said its total investments in Turkey had exceeded $18 billion and described itself as the country’s largest foreign direct investor. The STAR Refinery in Aliağa, İzmir, is another major Azerbaijani investment in Turkey.

The economic relationship, therefore, is not simply a matter of Turkey gaining access to Azerbaijan or Azerbaijan reaching European markets through Turkey. Azerbaijani capital has also established a significant presence in Turkey’s industrial and energy infrastructure.

Why is bilateral trade falling short of its target?

Despite close political ties and major investment projects, bilateral trade remains below the target set by the two countries’ leaders.

According to figures published by the Azerbaijani Embassy in Turkey, bilateral trade reached $5.72 billion in 2025. Of this total, $3.38 billion consisted of Azerbaijani exports to Turkey, while $2.34 billion represented Turkish exports to Azerbaijan.

The two governments aim to increase bilateral trade to $15 billion. Achieving this target would require the current volume to grow by approximately 2.6 times.

Although energy, defence industry cooperation and major infrastructure projects keep bilateral relations at a strategic level, a comparable leap in trade has yet to materialise.

Transport corridors, Eurasia and rivalry within the OTS

Following the development of energy corridors, transport projects became another major dimension of relations between the two countries.

The Baku–Tbilisi–Kars (BTK) railway, inaugurated on 30 October 2017, connected Azerbaijan to Turkey’s railway network through Georgia. The project forms an important part of a route through which goods from China and Central Asia can travel across the Caspian Sea and the South Caucasus towards Turkey and Europe.

These interests have gained further importance in recent years within the framework of the international transport route known as the Middle Corridor.

The 2020 Karabakh War

One of the most important turning points in Turkey–Azerbaijan relations was the Second Karabakh War in 2020.

During the 44-day war, Turkey emerged as one of Azerbaijan’s most important political and military supporters. Military training, defence industry cooperation and security ties between the two countries had deepened considerably. For Turkey, the conflict also provided an environment in which its defence industry—regarded in recent years as one of the country’s most important export sectors—was put to the test on the battlefield.

Azerbaijan’s use of Turkish-made unmanned aerial vehicles, including the Bayraktar TB2, and the depth of military cooperation between the two countries were among the key issues highlighted in assessments of the war.

The Shusha Declaration: Relations elevated to an alliance

It was in 2021 that relations between the two countries were formally elevated to the level of an alliance. On 15 June 2021, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev signed the Shusha Declaration on allied relations in Shusha.

The declaration provided a more comprehensive political framework for the strategic partnership, incorporating military and security cooperation.

It stipulates that the parties will hold consultations if either country faces a threat or attack by a third state against its independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity or security. The document also provides for expanded defence cooperation, modernisation of the armed forces, joint military exercises and coordination between security institutions.

In other words, the agreement further facilitated access for Turkish defence companies to the Azerbaijani market and for Azerbaijani capital to the Turkish economy.

The Karabakh victory and shifting balances of power

Azerbaijan’s re-establishment of control over Karabakh in September 2023 did more than alter the course of the Armenia–Azerbaijan conflict. It also ushered in a new phase in the political psychology of relations between Ankara and Baku.

Turkey continued to support Azerbaijan’s position on territorial integrity. But the picture in Baku began to change. Having strengthened its military and diplomatic position, Azerbaijan increasingly pursued regional policies independently of Ankara, including in areas where its preferences might diverge from those of Turkey.

Both sides continued to tell their own story of “brotherhood,” but their relative leverage varies depending on the issue. Turkey has greater overall military and economic capacity, yet Azerbaijan possesses instruments of influence—particularly in the energy sector—that can affect Ankara’s decisions.

Nakhchivan and the Zangezur issue

Transport connections and the status of Nakhchivan are becoming increasingly important to the future of Turkey–Azerbaijan relations.

The absence of a direct land connection between mainland Azerbaijan and the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic is one of the region’s fundamental transport challenges. Turkey’s border with Nakhchivan and its connections to the exclave therefore occupy a special place in Ankara–Baku relations.

The Iğdır–Nakhchivan natural gas pipeline, inaugurated on 5 March 2025, contributes to diversifying Nakhchivan’s energy supply. With an announced initial capacity of 730 million cubic metres per year, the pipeline delivers natural gas to Nakhchivan through Turkey.

The main dispute, however, concerns road and railway routes that would connect mainland Azerbaijan directly to Nakhchivan.

The joint declaration signed by Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan in Washington on 8 August 2025 included efforts to establish unimpeded connectivity between Azerbaijan and Nakhchivan through Armenian territory. Subsequently, the United States and Armenia developed an implementation framework for a project known as the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP).

This route is not merely about Azerbaijan gaining access to Nakhchivan. For Turkey, it also promises easier access to the Caspian Basin, Central Asia and other countries in the Turkic world.

This is precisely where Turkish, Azerbaijani and Armenian companies are preparing for new battles over contracts and tenders associated with the Trump corridor.

As of October 2026, however, a peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan has yet to be formally signed. Despite significant progress in the process, the final text remains to be brought into force.

Although Ankara’s and Baku’s interests appear to overlap substantially on this issue, competition over contracts, commercial opportunities and the distribution of the spoils could generate new sources of tension.

The Organization of Turkic States: Partnership or rivalry?

Another source of tension in Turkey–Azerbaijan relations is the Organization of Turkic States (OTS).

The organisation aims to strengthen transport connectivity, expand trade, promote economic cooperation and improve coordination on security issues. For Turkey, however, it also represents a means of expanding access to Central Asia and projecting an image of leadership over the “Turkic world” to its domestic audience. For Azerbaijan, the critical objective is to preserve its dominant position along the Trans-Caspian route.

The adoption of the Karabakh Declaration at the OTS informal summit held in Shusha on 6 July 2024 was also followed by an increase in Azerbaijani media narratives promoting Baku’s leadership of the “Turkic world.”

In other words, political leadership within the Turkic world, the form of economic integration and the distribution of influence among member states are all arenas of ongoing competition concealed beneath the rhetoric of a “single nation.”

The OTS summit that Turkey is expected to host in Ankara on 29–30 October 2026 is significant in this context. Ankara and Baku can be expected to emphasise the language of “brotherhood” at the summit, but it remains unclear whether they will offer concrete solutions to the issues dividing them.

The Israel question: Do Ankara and Baku have different priorities?

Relations with Israel are sometimes described as a major point of disagreement between Turkey and Azerbaijan. Contrary to this assumption, however, cooperation with Israel is one of the areas in which the two countries’ interests overlap most significantly.

Turkey continues to express opposition to Israel in its public rhetoric while also making statements about having halted trade with the country. Yet the continuation of trade through other channels is no secret. On the Azerbaijani side, critics of Baku among supporters of the ruling AKP in Turkey are accused of hypocrisy over the issue.

In a statement dated 10 November 2024, Turkey’s Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources argued that BOTAŞ International had no authority over the buying and selling of oil transported through BTC and maintained that no cargoes destined for Israel were being loaded. According to the ministry, the oil companies using the pipeline were complying with Turkey’s decision to halt trade with Israel.

In contrast, a Reuters report published in January 2026, citing data from the ship-tracking company Kpler, stated that Israel’s imports of Azerbaijani crude oil from Ceyhan averaged 94,000 barrels per day in 2025, a 31 per cent increase compared with the previous year.

Why did the headscarf debate become a diplomatic issue?

The immediate trigger for the latest tensions between Turkey and Azerbaijan was a set of dress regulations governing state schools in Azerbaijan.

On 21 September 2026, Azerbaijan’s Cabinet of Ministers amended the dress code rules for state schools. Although the regulation did not explicitly mention headscarves, reports and footage showing students wearing headscarves being denied entry to schools provoked a backlash in Turkey.

Oktay Saral, a chief adviser to President Erdoğan, and several AKP lawmakers spoke out against the obstruction of headscarved students’ right to education. The debate quickly expanded beyond school regulations in Azerbaijan to encompass the two countries’ differing understandings of secularism and the limits of one state’s right to comment on another’s domestic affairs.

On 13 October, the ruling New Azerbaijan Party (YAP), led by Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, issued a statement directly targeting the AKP. YAP described the statements coming from Turkey as irresponsible and argued that the principle of “One Nation, Two States” could not legitimise interference in the domestic affairs of one country by the other.

The controversy thus brought tensions between Turkey and Azerbaijan into the open, with the headscarf issue serving as the immediate point of contention.

While Azerbaijan has delivered particularly strong messages on the matter, Ankara has maintained institutional silence, despite statements from individual figures.

Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan’s remarks during his visit to Baku on 15 October emphasised that the two countries had weathered numerous tests in the past, that the relationship between their leaders remained strong, and that the “Two States, One Nation” principle continued to manifest itself across all areas of cooperation.

What does the overall picture reveal?

Relations between the two countries have long been shaped by a combination of rivalry and cooperation. Yet the relationship is generally treated as an almost untouchable domain, with both sides behaving as though no tensions exist.

The slogan “One Nation, Two States” does less to explain the actual nature of Turkey–Azerbaijan relations than to conceal the conflicts of interest embedded within them. It functions as a nationalist political narrative that obscures the competing interests of the two states.

The decisive factors in bilateral relations, however, are energy resources, transport corridors, the defence industry, capital investments and the struggle for influence within the Organization of Turkic States.

Despite the many sources of tension, the economic ties and agreements established between the two countries’ business interests have helped sustain the rhetoric of “brotherhood.” This is because nationalist discourse can place these relationships behind a shared identity narrative, rendering the interests of big capital operating in the name of “Turkic unity” and serving US strategic interests largely immune from scrutiny.

Moreover, this partnership is not confined to the independent choices of the two countries. The realities obscured by the “One Nation” narrative intersect with broader imperialist power struggles, extending from the energy resources of the Caspian Basin to the trade routes of Eurasia.

The U.S. negotiates with Moscow and Europe is left commenting. Zakharova’s “none of her business” says it all.

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A Senate session

On October 14, 2026, in her address to the Senate ahead of the European Council, Giorgia Meloni did something that, until just a few years ago, would have seemed unthinkable for a right-wing Italian government: she publicly distanced herself from the President of the United States to defend a position even more uncompromising than his own. The issue at hand was the diesel fuel agreement announced by Donald Trump following a phone call with Vladimir Putin, accompanied by a temporary license from the U.S. Treasury that reopens the global market to Russian fuel. For the prime minister, this is a “very risky” decision: it legitimizes Moscow while bombs are falling on Ukrainian cities, provides it with new revenue, and weakens the leverage of sanctions. During the same session, Meloni argued that Putin is seeking a new enemy, and that that enemy could be Europe; and that a Ukraine that stopped defending itself would not achieve peace, but occupation.

So much for the news report. The rest was left to the chamber and the newspapers. The applause from the majority was joined by that of a portion of the opposition: Azione, Italia Viva, and the reformist wing of the Democratic Party. La Stampa framed support for Kiev as a matter of values and borders – those borders that “are being defended there.”

There is also a detail that speaks louder than many analyses. When questioned by ANSA, Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova dismissed the prime minister’s remarks with a curt response: “It’s none of her business.” At the same time, Volodymyr Zelenskyy was in London, welcomed by Prime Minister Andy Burnham, and denouncing the restriction of military satellite services provided to the Ukrainian army. Elon Musk, for his part, clarified that the StarShield network belongs to the U.S. government and that any restrictions depend on the U.S. military and, ultimately, on the president. Washington deals with Moscow; Moscow responds to Washington. Rome applauds itself. Pathetic, isn’t it?

Not an exclusively Italian case

It would be a mistake to view the October 14 session as merely an episode of domestic politics. Italy’s stance is the national manifestation of a framework that today unites nearly all European capitals, and which has three rules. The first: the conflict in Ukraine is presented as an existential clash between political civilizations, in which any compromise amounts to surrender. The second: the Russian threat is projected beyond Ukraine, onto EU territory, so as to make rearmament an indisputable necessity. The third, the most insidious: internal dissent is attributed to the enemy’s influence.

Germany offers the clearest example. Defense Minister Boris Pistorius, who as early as 2023 had called for the country to become kriegstüchtig – capable of waging war – and who has since pointed to a timeframe of just a few years within which Russia could attack a member of the Alliance, has argued in recent days that the widespread fear of war in German society is being deliberately fueled by Putin and the AfD. This line of reasoning deserves attention. In a country that lost millions of lives in the two world wars, the fear of a new conflict would not need external agents to explain itself. Attributing it to Moscow and the main opposition party means transforming a legitimate political sentiment into a national security issue.

The same pattern is repeated elsewhere, albeit with different nuances. Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski claims credit for the results of Ukrainian attacks on Russian refineries and infrastructure; his German counterpart, Johann Wadephul, argues that now is not the time to ease sanctions, but to tighten them. France, Germany, and the United Kingdom are acting as a negotiating bloc, so much so that Meloni herself has asked that they do so at least with a formal mandate from all partners. These words are backed by numbers: the ReArm Europe plan presented by the Commission in March 2025; the commitment made at the NATO summit in The Hague to raise defense and security spending to 5% of GDP by 2035; and the 90-billion loan to Kiev approved by the European Council in December 2025. This rhetoric is not the eccentricity of some minister; it is literally the official language of the Union – and unfortunately, we have grown accustomed to it.

A foolish and counterproductive stance

Calling this approach foolish is not polemical hyperbole, if by “foolishness” we mean the stubborn persistence in repeating behavior that produces effects opposite to those declared. This is evident on three levels.

The first is strategic. Deterrence theory has taught us for decades that a threat is only as valuable as the credibility of the one making it, and that credibility depends on the ability to back up one’s words with action. Today’s Europe is raising the tone without having the tools to back it up. The Starlink affair has demonstrated this with almost textbook clarity: the Ukrainian military, which Europeans fund and encourage, depends for communications and drone guidance on infrastructure owned by an American company and controlled by the Pentagon. All it takes is a decision in Washington for part of the operations to grind to a halt. Promising victory in a war where one does not control the satellites is a form of strategic hypocrisy, and adversaries see it for what it is.

The second aspect is economic, of course. As early as 2024, Mario Draghi’s report on European competitiveness identified the energy price differential with the United States as one of the factors behind the continent’s industrial lag. Since then, the rejection of Russian hydrocarbons has become dogma; the war in Iran has driven fuel prices even higher; and the commitment to spend 5% of GDP on defense promises to absorb resources that public budgets simply do not have – unless at the expense of healthcare, pensions, and civilian investments. The paradox is clear: just as Washington, for entirely domestic reasons tied to the midterm elections, is seeking cheap diesel even from Moscow, European governments are touting the fact that they pay more for energy than their competitors as a moral principle.

The third level is diplomatic, and perhaps the most decisive one. A foreign policy that rules out negotiation on principle dooms itself to being left out of the talks when negotiations finally begin. And that is exactly what is happening: the United States and Russia are hammering out energy agreements, the pace of the war, and the terms of a possible truce, while Europe merely comments. Zakharova’s response to the Italian prime minister is not merely a diplomatic snub.

It is the exact measure of the weight Moscow currently attributes to European capitals. One can debate whether it is right; it is harder to argue that it is wrong as a description.

The price of credibility

The deepest damage, however, is not measured on the front lines or even in the markets. It is measured in the relationship between institutions and citizens. When the gap between what is proclaimed and what actually happens becomes visible to the naked eye, public discourse loses its value. For four years, European citizens have been told repeatedly that Russia’s defeat is near, that sanctions are bringing it to its knees, and that every new aid package will be the decisive one. Now they see their main ally negotiating with Moscow, Ukraine dependent on decisions made in Washington, and their own governments increasing military spending while public services deteriorate. No foreign disinformation campaign is needed to breed mistrust. A simple comparison between rhetoric and results is enough.

This distrust stems from a crisis of representation with deeper roots. About a decade ago, in his book *Ruling the Void*, Peter Mair described – well in advance – the withdrawal of political parties from society toward the state, and the gradual separation between responsible government – that is, one faithful to external constraints – and representative government – that is, one responsive to the demands of voters. Together with Richard Katz, he coined the term “cartel party” to describe political formations that compete in the electoral arena but share the management of resources and fundamental policy decisions. The cross-party applause on October 14 is an almost perfect illustration of that model. On an issue of life-and-death importance – the cost of energy and the fate of industry – voters who dissent find no political alternative in Parliament that represents them.

The effects are plain for all to see. In France, governments fall one after another without a stable majority emerging. In Germany, the ruling coalition governs with the strongest postwar opposition breathing down its neck. In Italy, abstention has become the largest “party.” Procedures remain intact, elections are held regularly, but significant decisions are made elsewhere, and the vote ends up merely confirming choices that have already been made.

Governing through distrust

At this point, a less obvious question arises. If distrust damages institutions, why do Europe’s ruling classes continue down a path that fuels it? The simplest answer would be incompetence. But there is a more robust hypothesis that better explains the facts: distrust, within certain limits, is a resource for governance.

Here’s how the mechanism works. A disillusioned electorate becomes fragmented, abstains from voting, and scatters among new and unstable parties. Fragmentation leads to ungovernability; ungovernability, in turn, makes “responsible” grand coalitions, technocratic governments, and cross-party agreements – which keep forces deemed unreliable out of power – indispensable. The more unstable the system is, the more necessary the center becomes, as it promises stability. The crisis of representation, rather than weakening those in power, consolidates their position, because it makes them the only bulwark against the chaos that the crisis itself has produced.

War perfects this mechanism in two ways. First, it allows dissent to be treated as a security issue. When the fear of conflict is attributed to Putin and the opposition, those who call for negotiations cease to be political adversaries and become vehicles of enemy influence. Carl Schmitt identified the state of exception as the place where sovereignty is revealed; Giorgio Agamben has shown how the exception tends to become an ordinary technique of governance.

A permanent state of emergency – whether health-related, financial, or military – removes decision-making from democratic debate and entrusts it to those who present themselves as guarantors of collective survival. Second, war justifies shifting decision-making to forums beyond electoral control: the European Commission, the European Council, NATO, and small-group formats such as the E3.

We must be precise on one point, so as not to slip into caricature. This interpretation does not presuppose a plan agreed upon in some secret room. There is no need for that. It is enough that interests converge: the defense industries seeing orders increase, the European bureaucracies acquiring new powers, the ruling parties finding a raison d’être in the emergency, and the major media conglomerates peddling moral mobilization. Each acts in its own self-interest, and the sum of these self-interests produces a self-perpetuating system. We are, to all intents and purposes, in a Gramscian “organic crisis” – the phase in which the old dies and the new cannot be born, and in which morbid phenomena proliferate. The management of mistrust is one such phenomenon: a way to survive the crisis without resolving it.

Winning at any cost

The final question remains – and it is the most serious one. What are these elites willing to sacrifice to emerge victorious from the current phase? Looking back at recent years, the answer is that part of the sacrifice has already been made. Politics was sacrificed when fundamental decisions were shifted outside of parliaments and the distinction between majority and opposition became merely ornamental. The economy was sacrificed when the continent’s industrial competitiveness was subordinated to geopolitical objectives set elsewhere, accepting unsustainable energy prices and the very real risk of deindustrialization. Those who have already given up these two pillars have little to lose when it comes to the third – the human cost.

For now, that cost is being borne primarily by the Ukrainians. Even members of the Verkhovna Rada who zealously supported the line of all-out war – such as Mar’jana Bezuhla – or who have distanced themselves from it – such as Anna Skorochod – describe a country with destroyed infrastructure, forced mobilization marked by abuses, and a population on the brink of collapse, and admit that the conflict has become a business opportunity for some; but the cost is also beginning to fall on European societies: in public budgets, in wages eroded by energy inflation, and in the idea – now voiced without embarrassment by sitting ministers – that we must get used to the prospect of fighting.

Here, the rhetoric of war reveals its deepest function, for it does not serve to win the war against Russia, which no European government has the means to win on its own. It serves to win the domestic battle, to maintain control over political systems that can no longer generate consensus and that need an external enemy to justify their continued existence. In this sense, the human cost is not a side effect of the calculation. It is a variable, adjusted according to the convenience of the moment, in the perpetual dance of death that is political utilitarianism.

There is an alternative, and it does not amount to surrender: it consists of bringing diplomacy back to the center of European foreign policy, recognizing that a now multipolar international order cannot be governed by moral crusades, and restoring to parliaments and voters the power to decide on war and peace. The indicators for gauging whether anything is changing are concrete: the mandate that the next European Council will – or will not – entrust to the negotiators; the fate of the sanctions regime following the U.S. exemption on diesel fuel; and the stability of national budgets in the face of the 5% target.

As long as the response remains the one applauded on October 14, Europe will continue to pay an ever-increasing price for a war it does not control, while those who govern it will find in its very instability the reason to remain where they are.

Considerations on the boundaries between secularism, sovereignty, and social stability\

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The controversy surrounding the wearing of the hijab in Azerbaijani schools took on new dimensions in October, following the implementation of dress code rules that resulted in female students and teachers being denied entry to public institutions. The episode sparked demonstrations, arrests, and criticism from international organizations, while also drawing reactions from Turkey. The debate extends far beyond the school environment, involving questions of sovereignty, religious identity, and regional stability.

Azerbaijan has historical reasons for maintaining a secular state model. The Soviet experience, the formation of its institutions after independence, and the need to govern a religiously diverse society amid a tense regional environment have contributed to the consolidation of a system in which the state maintains strict control over the functioning of public institutions. Azerbaijani authorities have the prerogative to determine their educational policies, establish standards for schools, and decide how constitutional principles are to be implemented.

However, the way these policies are implemented can produce consequences that extend beyond their original objectives. In the case of the hijab, the enforcement of school regulations has provoked resistance among families and religious communities, while arrests related to the protests have amplified the controversy. The government’s central challenge will be to manage this reaction without allowing a dispute over school uniforms to develop into a broader conflict between state authorities and religious communities.

The situation also has important international implications. Ankara, Baku’s main strategic partner, has expressed concern over restrictions on the Islamic headscarf. The political, cultural, and linguistic proximity between the two countries makes the issue particularly sensitive. Although this disagreement does not necessarily amount to a bilateral crisis, it demonstrates how domestic decisions can create friction even between governments that maintain close relations. Ankara must take its own social and political considerations into account, while Baku seeks to preserve its autonomy in managing domestic affairs.

The Iranian dimension also deserves attention. Azerbaijan maintains a complex relationship with Iran, shaped by historical and religious ties as well as strategic disagreements. Like Iran, Azerbaijan has a predominantly Shiite population, while the Islamic Republic has a substantial Azerbaijani minority. Both Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei and President Masoud Pezeshkian have Azerbaijani ethnic backgrounds. In this environment, secularization policies may be interpreted by external actors as part of a broader struggle for religious and political influence within Azerbaijan. This interpretation, however, does not establish that the school regulations were adopted exclusively to counter Iranian influence.

There is also a domestic risk worth considering. Religious restrictions implemented too rigidly can produce effects contrary to those intended. When segments of the population perceive certain measures as impositions on their religious practices, radical groups may exploit the resulting discontent, portray the state as an adversary of religion, and expand their capacity for mobilization. Understanding this issue requires consideration of other experiences, such as Syria under the Assad government, where secularism coexisted with the proliferation of extremism. This outcome is not inevitable, and opposition to the regulations should not automatically be equated with extremism. Nevertheless, international experience suggests that this possibility needs close examination.

For Azerbaijan, the issue therefore involves more than the definition of a school uniform. The country has the right to organize its institutions according to its own priorities, without foreign governments dictating its choices. At the same time, maintaining stability requires preventing administrative decisions from fueling lasting polarization or creating new opportunities for actors seeking to intensify religious tensions.

The evolution of this case will have implications for Baku’s relations with Ankara and Tehran, as well as for the country’s domestic political dynamics. The outcome will depend not only on the regulations themselves but also on their practical implementation and the authorities’ response to concerns raised by students, families, and educators. In the South Caucasus, where identity, sovereignty, and security remain closely intertwined, even a seemingly localized dispute can have serious regional repercussions.

The war in Ukraine has always been about fomenting a proxy war to defeat Russia.

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The contradictions are absurd but instructive of the criminal proxy war that the U.S. and European powers have perpetrated against Russia under the guise of “defending Ukraine”.

Western sanctions on Russia – the most heavily sanctioned nation on Earth – were meant to supposedly punish Moscow for its alleged unprovoked aggression against Ukraine.

The United States recently signed into law a “sanctions bill from hell” in honor of the late war hawk Senator Lindsey Graham, aimed at crushing the Russian economy, principally by shutting down its energy exports.

Likewise, the European Union has implemented more than 20 rounds of sanctions imposed on Russia over the past four years, again purportedly to block Russian exports of oil and gas. The EU has vowed to terminate all Russian energy imports by the end of this year.

The official rationale out of Washington and European capitals is to exact retribution on Russia for its alleged invasion and violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty. Western embargoes on Russia’s economy were immediately announced after Moscow launched its Special Military Operation in February 2022. (The real background to the SMO – unreported by Western media – was the NATO-backed coup in Kiev in 2014, and the arming of NeoNazis to conduct a proxy war against Russia.)

The U.S. and European Union, as well as Britain of course, presented the attempted economic blockade of Russia as a demonstration of the West enforcing international law and supporting Ukraine. The latter is portrayed in Western media as a fair maiden of democracy assailed by a drooling Russian tyrant.

In a nutshell, the sanctions are sold to the Western public as a plausible way of neutralizing “Russia’s war machine.” If Moscow’s oil and gas exports could be cut off, then, the dubious logic goes, Russia would not be able to continue its war effort in Ukraine.

However, laughably, the supposedly noble Western rationale is in tatters this week after the U.S. Treasury lifted sanctions off Russian diesel exports for the next six months in order to boost global oil supplies and curb soaring energy prices.

Another shattering blow to the facade of Western “principles” was the disclosure by Russia’s energy minister, Alexander Novak, that the European Union has continued to buy Russian energy exports at nearly pre-war levels. (Cue Western media silence on that!)

Since 2022, the EU has bought a total of $320 billion worth of Russian hydrocarbons. To put the expenditure in perspective, that far exceeds what the European governments have donated to Ukraine, some $226 bn, according to EU data.

How’s that for a contradiction? The European governments are throwing hundreds of billions of taxpayers’ money at Ukraine supposedly to defend itself against Russia, yet these same governments are giving Russia much, much more by buying its energy resources. In other words, to use their own rhetoric, Brussels and other European capitals are “fuelling the Russian war machine.”

As for the United States, it is equally duplicitous. The Americans blew up the Nord Stream pipeline in 2022 so that Europe would not be at the mercy of Russian oil dependency. Washington also imposed sanctions on Russian energy while increasing its more expensive gas exports to Europe. Yet last Friday, October 9, President Donald Trump announced, to the dismay and alarm of the Europeans and Ukraine, that he had made a deal with Vladimir Putin to release 3.5 million tonnes of Russian diesel onto the world market to ease pressure on crippling pump prices.

Whatever happened to American laws against “trading with the enemy”?

Of course, Trump is desperate for relief over record-high fuel prices as a result of his criminal aggression against Iran and Iran’s closure of the Persian Gulf oil route in retaliation. With the mid-term Congressional elections only three weeks away, Trump is seeking to assuage angry American consumers and spare his Republican Party from an electoral drubbing that will tarnish his presidency.

Out of sheer expedience, Trump wants Russian diesel exports to save his political neck. Some observers may question whether Moscow should oblige Trump considering that Washington is arming the NeoNazi Kiev regime with missiles and intelligence. Perhaps the Kremlin is calculating that Trump could finally pull off a peace deal in Ukraine.

Another smart move by Moscow, perhaps, is that the diesel deal with Trump has managed to unleash a storm of recriminations from Europe and Ukraine, which is severely undermining the transatlantic axis. Is this political judo by Putin?

The European NATO partners and the Kiev puppet president Vladimir Zelensky reacted with unprecedented insults and defiance of Trump. They accused the American leader of treachery and of siding with Russia. Within Washington, Trump has also been lambasted for “betrayal”.

Trump and his aides hit back furiously, dismissing the Europeans as “hypocrites” over their own record purchases of Russian energy exports. Trump even called for Zelensky to be replaced by someone who he can work with.

For his part, Zelensky doubled down with truculence, badmouthing Trump for being “weak” and accusing him of putting Ukrainian lives at risk. He refused to stop Ukrainian air strikes on Russia’s oil refineries, as requested by the White House. And the little money-grabbing, narco-Führer also attempted blackmail by suggesting to Trump that he would halt air attacks on Russian energy infrastructure “if” the Pentagon supplied more Patriot missiles.

Trump’s anger has exploded over Zelensky and his European patrons. He sees their obstruction of his diesel deal with Russia as not only hypocritical but a political attack on his presidency ahead of the crucial November polls.

The debacle is a rich farce. American and European posturing is seen for what it is, without any principle or genuine motives. It is a plague on all their houses.

Both the U.S. and its European partners are buying Russian energy like never before to sustain their struggling economies. The sanctions they imposed on Russia never had anything to do with “upholding international law” or “defending Ukraine”.

Using their own disingenuous logic, the NATO nations are fuelling the Russian war machine with their continuing business-as-usual purchase of Russia’s oil and gas.

That contradiction, in turn, exposes the fraud of the war in Ukraine. It was never about defending democratic Ukraine – a corrupt NeoNazi dictatorship – or European security from Russian “threat”.

The whole murderous episode has always been about fomenting a proxy war to defeat Russia. That covert policy is a gargantuan crime of aggression that has cost millions of lives and bankrupted Western societies. What’s more, it is an utterly failed policy which Western governments are covering up to avoid accountability. The destruction and deception go hand in hand.

What is all the more damning is that this travesty could have been easily exposed years ago if the Western news media had actually reported on facts instead of being the propaganda service they so evidently are to enable criminal aggression by their imperialist masters.

Lacking the material conditions to challenge Chinese industrial supremacy, the European Union insists on turning its economic difficulties into a justification for a new escalation of hostilities.

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European leaders appear to have found a new strategic mission: rebuilding the continent’s industrial capacity while simultaneously reducing its dependence on China. The initiative was recently put forward jointly by France and Germany and is presented as a response to China’s growing presence in the European market. The problem is that the leaders responsible for this project continue to ignore a fundamental issue: no large-scale reindustrialization can succeed without a stable, abundant, and affordable energy supply.

Europe has excellent universities, a skilled workforce, advanced technological centers, and an industrial tradition that still gives it considerable advantages. However, these assets cannot function in isolation. Chemical plants, steel mills, metallurgical facilities, and numerous other industries depend on a continuous and competitive energy supply. Capital, scientific knowledge, and specialized workers cannot indefinitely compensate for high production costs. It is precisely at this point that Europe’s strategy contradicts its own objectives.

For decades, economic integration between Western Europe and Russia provided favorable conditions for the development of important industrial sectors. Russian natural gas supplies, in particular, helped sustain energy-intensive activities. This relationship served the concrete economic interests of both sides: Moscow had an important market for its exports, while European economies obtained a resource essential to their competitiveness.

The introduction of sanctions in 2022 profoundly altered this situation. The illegal coercive measures severed a longstanding Russo-European partnership, leaving the western part of the continent economically weakened and dependent on more expensive and less secure external energy supplies. Europe, which had already been undergoing gradual deindustrialization before then, subsequently plunged into an energy crisis, with consequences ranging from higher energy bills to business failures caused by the inability to maintain competitive production.

One would reasonably expect an industrial recovery strategy to begin by addressing these vulnerabilities. Instead, European leaders are attempting to build a new productive base without adequately resolving the energy problem. Those responsible for European economic policy seem to believe that subsidies, tax incentives, and investment programs will suffice to restore competitiveness. Such instruments can contribute to industrial development, but their effectiveness will remain limited as long as structural disadvantages in energy costs persist.

It is in this context that China is assuming an increasingly prominent position on Brussels’ “list of concerns”. China’s ability to manufacture on a massive scale, supply complex industrial chains, and offer competitively priced equipment poses a challenge to a Europe seeking to recover its productive autonomy. Rather than acknowledge the extent of the accumulated decline and develop a coherent strategy to reverse it, sections of the European leadership prefer to resort to trade barriers, punitive investigations, and mechanisms of economic containment.

This approach reveals a rather superficial understanding of industrial competition. Restricting Chinese imports does not automatically create European factories, reduce electricity costs, or guarantee gas supplies to industrial facilities. On the contrary, companies that depend on Chinese equipment, components, and raw materials may face higher expenses precisely when they need to invest in recovering their position in international markets.

The Russian question makes this situation even more delicate. Restoring energy cooperation with Moscow would be the first step in any serious industrial recovery plan. With Russian energy supplies and broad commercial partnerships with China, Europe could once again find a new path toward development, much as African and Asian countries are now beginning to do through their partnerships with Russia and China.

Brussels, Paris, and Berlin, however, are moving in the opposite direction. European strategists appear determined to confront two of the world’s largest industrial and energy powers simultaneously, without demonstrating that they possess the resources necessary to sustain such an ambition. First, they undermined a fundamental energy relationship with Russia. Now, they risk turning China into a permanent trade adversary.

Ultimately, what European hawks seek is not Europe’s development, but the instrumentalization of issues such as industry and trade to advance their own self-destructive agenda. Under this strategy, European citizens – already deprived of Russian energy and potentially facing reduced access to Chinese products in the near future – will once again be the first to bear the consequences.

Macron’s France: 15% approval, war prep with Russia, now dissolving Soral’s E&R for “extremism.” Elections loom. Romania-style manipulation?

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Macron is, today, quite possibly, the most unpopular president on the planet, with only 15% approval, according to an Ipsos BVA-Cesi poll. Under his command, France faces economic stagnation (0.6% growth in 2025) and indebtedness (120% of GDP). Under Macron, France has also seen the accelerated deindustrialization of the country, with industries accounting for only 9% of GDP, the lowest level in the European Union, and not surprisingly, purchasing power has plummeted, with half of French people saying their income only covers the essentials and only 70% of citizens of working age currently holding a job.

As if that were not enough, in approximately 10 years of Macron’s government, approximately 4 million immigrants entered the country (many of whom do not work but receive social benefits); an amount that makes economic absorption as well as the ethnocultural assimilation of newcomers impossible. Naturally, linked to the immigration失控 are crime rates, the formation of slums in urban centers, and increased social tensions. Many ethnic French people feel demographically replaced in their homeland, and not by chance, everything indicates that Marine Le Pen will (finally) win the French presidential elections in 2027.

We do not know what the results of a Le Pen presidency would be and it is reasonable to be skeptical about it, but clearly France’s current course is extremely dangerous, including in its foreign policy.

Gradually, over the last 2 years, numerous signs have begun to appear that Macron would be preparing the country for a war with Russia. The French government created a voluntary military service and approved the expansion of the permanent armed forces to 275,000 men, as well as a budget increase for defense. General Fabien Mandon, of the General Staff, stated in 2025 that France should prepare for a high-intensity conflict with Russia within three to four years, and now in September 2026 Macron declared that France “could” become a target of explosive drones. Constantly, too, one hears speeches about the need to transform the French economy into a “war economy.”

Therefore, it may be surprising to many (but not to us) that amid all this that has been happening in the country, the Macron government still finds time for the implementation of a censorship and repression apparatus of totalitarian levels.

Its new victim is the association Egalité et Réconciliation (Equality and Reconciliation), created by sociologist and writer Alain Soral. The association identifies as “left-wing nationalist” and has as its main slogan “left of work, right of values,” appealing to an overcoming of the false dichotomy between left and right and, even more importantly, for a national reconciliation among all social sectors; in recent years, it has been involved in the Yellow Vests protests, in some activities linked to the National Rally party (despite, simultaneously, maintaining a posture of “constructive criticism” against certain Zionist and liberal tendencies present in the party) and in pro-Palestinian activism.

It happens that, on October 9, the Interior Minister of Macron’s government, Laurent Nuñez, announced the opening of a dissolution procedure against the association Egalité et Réconciliation, under the accusation of “political extremism.” Its legal team was given a deadline of 1 week to defend itself, and the decision on the matter should occur, still, in October.

Alain Soral himself is a figure of high nonconformist spirit, which is why he has already been the victim of countless judicial persecutions – dozens in fact – mostly for “opinion offenses,” that is, for critical comments against specific people or “protected minorities.” In convictions, Soral has already accumulated millions of euros to be paid in indemnities to various globalist NGOs, an obviously unpayable sum, as well as having already been imprisoned several times, also for the same reasons. The judicial persecution was so intense that Soral had to exile himself from his homeland, first in Switzerland and then in Russia.

Now, beyond the official justifications, for what reason would the French State ban a relatively small organization with few financial resources?

It is possible to analyze the “angle” of Alain Soral’s presence in Russia in more than one sense. First, because by being in Russia Soral finally became immune to the constant judicial persecution and threats of imprisonment he suffered in France, while at the same time continuing to take an active part in the French political and cultural debate, even from a distance. In this, he was able to exercise and expand his influence, “under the protection of the Russians,” which certainly feeds the typical current paranoias of the French elite about a Russian “informational war.”

There is, however, also an internal aspect. Recently, Alain Soral has again been much discussed by the French media for two reasons. One is the “Bardella case,” which concerns the discovery of supposed “politically incorrect” writings by Jordan Bardella, president of the National Rally party, and the information that in his youth Bardella’s main intellectual influence was Alain Soral. The second is an opinion poll indicating that 15% of French men under 35 years of age identify with Soral’s ideas.

This, on the eve of the presidential elections, represents a significant risk for Macron and for the French establishment. Although, apparently, there is no chance of victory for any candidate against Le Pen, we cannot doubt the possibility of manipulation of the electoral process, as happened in Romania.

This silencing is even more concerning due to the fact that Soral and E&R are practically the only socially and culturally relevant figures in France today who defend national reconciliation and who avoid inciting internal tension, promoted by the most Islamophobic elements of the RN and by the very leadership of Mélenchon’s LFI with its “army” of antifa and immigrants.