Novaya Gazeta, the venerable Russian newspaper that sought to expose corruption and rights abuses and whose reporting staff included the slain Anna Politkovskaya and at least five others who were killed or died under suspicious circumstances, announced it was shutting down.
"They killed us," the paper's top editors said in a Telegram post on October 30, a day after authorities began evicting the remaining staff from their Moscow editorial offices.
The paper, which had mostly suspended work...
"Everyone who wishes to leave Oleshky will be given the opportunity to leave safely. At the same time, those who have decided to stay can stay and will receive all the necessary humanitarian support," Ukraine's Human Rights Ombudsman Dmytro Lubinets said.
Euroclear is facing "multiple proceedings in Russian courts," including a case launched by the Russian Central Bank that seeks to challenge the immobilization of its assets.
Il 24 ottobre, l’Ucraina ha annunciato che i suoi sistemi Starlink e Starshield erano di nuovo pienamente operativi dopo oltre una settimana di restrizioni. Nello specifico, il Ministero della Difesa ucraino ha rilevato che la connessione è tornata stabilmente a velocità superiori a 400 km/h, a fronte dei 160 km/h a cui era precipitata giorni prima. La limitazione, hanno spiegato diversi funzionari ucraini, aveva compromesso la capacità ucraina di intercettare i droni russi in fase di attacco, costringendo le forze armate di Kiev ad annullare alcune operazioni già pianificate.
Tuttavia, a brevissima distanza dal ripristino della piena operatività dei sistemi Starlink a disposizione di Kiev, Elon Musk, amministratore delegato di Space-X, ha accusato l’esercito ucraino di aver violato i termini di servizio.
In un post sul suo profilo X, il magnate di origini sudafricane ha affermato che: «l’uso di Starlink, un servizio commerciale civile, per attacchi con droni offensivi volti a uccidere persone non è mai stato consentito, né dovrebbe esserlo. Starshield è un sistema diverso ed è controllato dal governo degli Stati Uniti. Ciò che decidono di fare spetta a loro».
L’esercito ucraino «ha violato i termini di servizio di Starlink e lo ha utilizzato per attacchi con droni offensivi volti a uccidere persone. Quella falla è stata chiusa la settimana scorsa».
Starlink «rimane cruciale per la difesa dell’Ucraina, poiché è l’unico sistema che non può essere disturbato o distrutto, almeno per ora. Se Starlink venisse spento, il fronte ucraino collasserebbe immediatamente. Questa non è una minaccia, è semplicemente un dato di fatto.
Il sistema si è rivelato cruciale per «impedire alla Russia di sopraffare l’Ucraina nei primi giorni della guerra, poiché tutti gli altri mezzi di comunicazione erano stati distrutti o disturbati dalla Russia».
Space-X «ha fatto molto di più per difendere l’Ucraina di qualsiasi altra azienda privata sulla Terra. Detto questo, non provo che disprezzo assoluto per i guerrafondai che fanno la morale e spingono per un massacro senza fine, senza offrire alcuna soluzione realistica al conflitto. Che possano bruciare all’inferno. Fine della storia».
Starlink è un sistema internet satellitare gestito da Space-X, mentre Starshield è una versione che si avvale della tecnologia Starlink per scopi militari gestita dal governo degli Stati Uniti.
Questa integrazione rende quantomeno ambigua la posizione di Starlink, mettendo in seria discussione la natura privata della casa madre Space-X.
Quella del connubio pubblico-privato negli Stati Uniti è una storia vecchissima, ma che trova negli anni Cinquanta uno dei suoi momenti decisivi.
All’epoca, in piena Guerra Fredda, lo spauracchio sovietico, agitato con cieca ossessività specialmente in seguito allo shock generato dal lancio dello Sputnik (1957) e all’entrata in servizio del bombardiere strategico Tupolev-95, si rivelò determinante a costruire un robusto consenso politico attorno alla decisione dell’amministrazione Eisenhower di destinare una quota crescente di risorse al rafforzamento della marina e al potenziamento dei settori di ricerca e sviluppo.
L’onere di gestire le risorse e coordinare gli sforzi in questo senso ricadde sulla Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (Darpa), un organismo facente capo al Pentagono fondato, al pari della National Aeronautics and Space Administration (Nasa), nel 1958 in conformità all’esigenza di colmare il divario tecnico-scientifico con l’Unione Sovietica.
Mentre il governo moltiplicava le misure di stimolo alle imprese (assegnazione di commesse pubbliche agli atenei, concessione di agevolazioni fiscali, ecc.), la Darpa elaborava una rete di ricerca e condivisione a maglie strettissime, in grado di interconnettere decine di università, start-up e laboratori di ricerca e portare gli Stati Uniti all’avanguardia nel campo cruciale della scienza. Il lancio dei programmi Gemini e Apollo, lo sviluppo dei missili balistici a medio e lungo raggio, la realizzazione dei sottomarini e delle portaerei a propulsione nucleare si devono al contributo determinante apportato dalla Darpa.
Nel 1982, il Congresso approvò il programma di sostegno alle start-up Small Business Innovation Research (Sbir), affidandone la gestione alla Small Business Administration, predisponendo parallelamente la trasformazione della Darpa nel fondamentale canale di collegamento tra imprese e dipartimenti universitari, in grado di assolvere ai compiti di mediazione tecnologica e imprenditoriale necessari alla commercializzazione delle innovazioni che venivano realizzate nei settori di punta (informatica, telecomunicazioni, biotecnologia, semiconduttori, ecc.) dalle società hi-tech a cui il complesso militar-industriale aveva subappaltato parte delle mansioni legate ai comparti di ricerca e sviluppo, nell’ambito della celeberrima Strategic Defense Initiative (Sdi).
Il progetto, concepito dall’amministrazione Reagan e annunciato urbi et orbi nel marzo 1983, puntava alla creazione di un sistema di difesa aerea multistratificato basato su intercettori spaziali in grado di colpire i missili balistici nemici prima che colpissero il suolo statunitense, “superando” così il principio della mutua distruzione assicurata su cui si era imperniata la Guerra Fredda fino a quel momento.
La Sdi, recita un documento del dipartimento di Stato, «si basava su tecnologie avveniristiche, inclusi sistemi laser spaziali non ancora realizzati», il cui sviluppo assorbì enormi risorse pubbliche in larga parte ridistribuite a beneficio delle aziende private sotto il coordinamento della Darpa.
Una volta convertite all’uso civile, le nuove tecnologie ad elevata intensità di capitale messe a punto contestualmente alla Sdi assunsero rapidamente un grado di pervasività – inteso come capacità di trovare applicazione in un numero sbalorditivo di campi sconvolgendone il funzionamento e i rendimenti – tale da scompaginare il vecchio sistema di produzione fordista ad elevata intensità di manodopera riducendo drasticamente la presenza umana sia nella manifattura che nel settore di servizi.
«Non si tralasciò occasione – osserva Giuseppe Guarino – che si prestasse per la stimolazione e la promozione della Information Technology per finalità militari. Ognuna delle sue fasi essenziali, con successiva trasformazione e utilizzazione dei prodotti a fini commerciali, è stata in pratica resa possibile dal sostegno del Dipartimento della Difesa, dalla Nasa e degli altri dipartimenti militari, compresa la Cia […]. Il merito dell’intervento pubblico non è di aver assorbito l’intera produzione della Information Technology, ma di aver contribuito in maniera determinante con i propri acquisti iniziali a far scendere i prezzi a livelli che avrebbero consentito la diffusione civile e commerciale delle innovazioni, nonché con quelli successivi che hanno favorito l’utilizzazione delle nuove tecnologie nell’organizzazione pubblica, anche civile, e la diffusione delle stesse» (1).
La progressiva affermazione del nuovo modello in tutti i comparti dell’economia ha accelerato il processo di “terziarizzazione” dell’economia statunitense, e palesato il ruolo cruciale giocato dallo Stato rispetto al finanziamento dello sviluppo tecnologico realizzato da aziende private.
Negli anni ’90, sotto la direzione del direttore George Tenet, la Cia iniziò a finanziare generosamente le piccole aziende intente a sviluppare tecnologie applicabili a fini di intelligence aggirando le lungaggini che caratterizzano la mastodontica macchina burocratica statunitense. A questo scopo, la Casa Bianca e il Congresso approvarono la creazione di In-Q-Tel, oscura società di venture capital senza scopo di lucro incaricata di finanziare la messa a punto di tecnologie d’avanguardia per conto – o quasi – della Cia. Come riporta il «Wall Street Journal»: «i vertici In-Q-Tel considerano l’azienda come indipendente, nonostante i legami molto stretti con la Cia e il fatto che quasi tutte le decisioni di investimento sono gestite dall’agenzia di spionaggio […].La presenza di intricati legami è endemica nel venture capital, in cui la conoscenza intima del settore è essenziale per il successo. Le altre società, tuttavia, giocano con il proprio denaro, o quello di privati».
In-Q-Tel «utilizza denaro pubblico, soggetto a severe norme sul conflitto di interessi e, secondo fonti vicine, si tratta di almeno 120 milioni di dollari all’anno. A volte impegna questo capitale secondo modalità che, anche se non intenzionalmente, avvantaggiano gli stessi amministratori dell’azienda in virtù di altre cariche nel settore hi-tech».
Quasi sempre, le scelte di In-Q-Tel «attraggono altri finanziamenti. Ogni dollaro investito in una piccola impresa in genere è accompagnato da 15 dollari provenienti da altre fonti. Questo aumenta le probabilità di successo del piccolo business in questione e rende le sue stock option più preziose».
Nel 2000, In-Q-Tel ha investito somme piuttosto rilevanti in alcune imprese che producevano satelliti e che si occupavano di raccogliere, classificare e analizzare dati sensibili. In breve tempo, la società ha accumulato quote azionarie di maggioranza di decine compagnie hi-tech, così da dettarne gli indirizzi e allinearle alle esigenze di Washington. Opportunamente orientata dai fondi di In-Q-Tel, una compagnia specializzata nell’elaborazione di soluzioni chimiche adatte alla fabbricazione di tappeti sviluppò in breve tempo una specie di sonda in grado di rilevare la presenza di veleni ed altre sostanze chimiche letali in ambienti chiusi, poi sistematicamente impiegata nei teatri di guerra afghano e iracheno.
Parallelamente, In-Q-Tel investì in un’azienda operante nel settore delle antenne satellitari, ricavando sistemi di localizzazione portatili di cui le truppe e le forze speciali Usa si sono servite per segnalare la propria posizione ai centri di comando.
Più recentemente, i capitali di In-Q-Tel hanno finanziato aziende cruciali come Anduril e, soprattutto, Palantir, saldamente integrata nelle macchine militari statunitense, israeliana e ucraina oltre che nella pubblica amministrazione britannica e in molti altri comparti critici.
L’altissimo livello di “collaborazione pubblico-privato” raggiunto negli Stati Uniti grazie a entità come In-Q-Tel è emblematizzato dal cosiddetto “scandalo Datagate”, scoperchiato nel 2013 grazie alle rivelazioni dello “spifferatore” Edward Snowden. In qualità di tecnico impiegato per una società appaltatrice della National Security Agency, Snowden ha documentato con dovizia di particolari l’esistenza di una rete di sorveglianza capillare e massiccia sui miliardi di comunicazioni sia interne che esterne agli Stati Uniti gestita dalla Nsa stessa attraverso Prism. Vale a dire un sistema in grado di assicurare all’intelligence nazionale la possibilità di accedere in maniera diretta ai server di cui si servivano le aziende operanti nel settore dell’alta tecnologia per ottenere qualsiasi tipo di informazione (messaggi, fotografie, e-mail, ecc.).
Entrato in vigore nel 2007 e beneficiando nel corso degli anni della collaborazione di colossi del calibro di Microsoft, Yahoo, Google, Facebook, PalTalk, Skype, AoL, YouTube e Apple, Prism ha posto la Nsc e anche il Gchq britannico nelle condizioni di acquisire i metadati in transito attraverso i cavi in fibra ottica collegati ai server centrali di Yahoo e Google.
Space-X non ha beneficiato dei fondi di In-Q-Tel, ma del subappalto sistematico ad opera di agenzie statali come la Nasa o dello stesso Pentagono, che come contropartita gode di libero e completo accesso alla tecnologia Starlink. Al punto da garantirlo a Paesi alleati come l’Ucraina.
La decisione di ridurre prima e ripristinare poi il servizio Starlink a Kiev non fa quindi capo a Elon Musk, ma sui vertici del potere pubblico statunitense a cui Space-X – così come le altre grandi aziende hi-tech statunitensi – rispondono più o meno indirettamente.
NOTE
1) Guarino, Giuseppe, I soldi della guerra. Gli Stati Uniti: spesa militare, innovazione, economia globale, Mondadori, Milano 2003, pp. 67-80.
Connu pour son rôle de Jaime Lannister dans "Game of Thrones", l'acteur danois Nikolaj Coster-Waldau a vécu une nuit sous tension à Kiev. En déplacement en Ukraine comme ambassadeur de bonne volonté de l'ONU, le...
Beyond strikes on Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, Russia launched ballistic missiles, four guided aerial missiles, and 113 Shahed-type drones, including 83 jet-powered drones, against Ukraine overnight on Oct. 30, according to Ukraine's Air Force.
"In developing drones and counter-drone systems, Europe has one significant advantage: our partnership with Ukraine," said European Commissioner Valdis Dombrovskis.
The war in Ukraine is not an isolated conflict. It is one of several violent attempts by the United States and its NATO allies to shore up crumbling Western hegemony.
Former U.S. Army Lt. Col. Earl Rasmussen says the war in Ukraine is one front in a broader international conflict that is aimed at preserving a world order once dominated by a global minority of Western powers, primarily the United States.
Rasmussen, a West Point graduate and teacher, has for many years worked as an independent consultant for international business partnerships. Originally from Minneapolis, he has over 30 years’ experience in research and development, technology integration, and business management. He has lived and traveled extensively in over 30 countries and has strong international relationships.
His special interests include Eurasian economic development and the prospects for the BRICS group of nations led by Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, which now includes Iran as a member along with several others. The BRICS+ comprises about half of the globe’s population and economy.
Rasmussen’s consultancy work focuses on the impact of conflicts around the world.
He contends that the U.S. and its Western allies are tacitly driving a worldwide agenda to prevent the multipolar order from succeeding their hegemonic unipolar order.
Rasmussen says it is not a coincidence that the U.S. and its Western partners are involved in multiple concurrent aggressions.
Ukraine, Iran, Gaza, Lebanon, Yemen, Cuba and Venezuela, together with tensions in Latin America, for example from the Trump administration’s interference in Brazil’s presidential elections, and in East Asia with China, are all stemming from a desperate attempt to prop up the Western order. That order has prevailed for several centuries, with first the European powers and then the U.S. taking over as the lead hegemon since the Second World War.
But that old order is failing and falling as a new multipolar order emerges, as illustrated by the growing importance of the BRICS, Eurasia, Africa, and, in general, the Global South. A world majority is more assuredly asserting itself, demanding equitable development based on win-win partnerships and mutual co-development in contrast to the exploitative Western order.
Earl Rasmussen believes that multipolar development cannot be stopped. It will prevail because human beings demand it as a moral and economic imperative. But he warns that the world is undergoing violent resistance by the U.S.-led Western powers.
He also contends that the Western nations, as presently seen in France, Italy, Belgium, Germany, and other European states, are themselves undergoing popular revolts against their elitist ruling classes who are invested in the old order. The political crises in Western nations are due to the loss of moral authority of establishment parties. People can see their corruption and duplicity and how these parties are servants of corporate power, the Zionist lobby, the military-industrial complex, and so on.
The end of the Ukraine war will mark the end of Western hegemony. The U.S.-led NATO proxy war is facing a historic defeat by Russia. Potentially, that outcome will lead more quickly to a fairer world order, one in which nations’ sovereignty and international law are actually respected for the mutual benefit of all.
It is up to the Western states to abandon their hegemonic policies and ambitions to finally live in peace with the world’s majority. The longer they persist in their arrogant assumptions of privilege and domination, the longer the violent transition. If the political system can’t adapt, then people power will have to deliver a new system.
Russia’s foreign minister arrives at the G20 meeting in Atlanta without Moscow having made significant concessions over Ukraine. His presence offers a reminder that diplomatic access can be valuable even when negotiations produce little progress.
Sergei Lavrov’s arrival in the United States for the G20 foreign ministers’ meeting is unlikely to transform the prospects for peace in Ukraine. For Moscow, however, the visit offers opportunities extending well beyond the formal agenda.
Russia’s veteran foreign minister will participate in discussions alongside representatives of the world’s major economies, including governments that have imposed extensive sanctions on Moscow and others that have maintained profitable commercial relationships with it.
The meeting, chaired by US Secretary of State Marco Rubio on 30–31 October, takes place as Washington pursues another diplomatic initiative concerning Ukraine.
Lavrov’s presence has attracted criticism from American lawmakers, including Republican Congressman Don Bacon, who has questioned why a senior representative of a government conducting military operations against Ukrainian cities should be welcomed in the United States.
Yet the more consequential issue is not whether Lavrov should attend. It is what Moscow hopes to achieve through renewed access to Western diplomatic forums, and what the United States expects to obtain in return.
Russia’s Diplomatic Opportunities
The Kremlin has spent much of the war arguing that Western attempts to isolate Russia have failed.
There is some substance to that argument, although it requires qualification.
Russia has suffered extensive restrictions on access to Western finance, technology and markets. Its economic relationships with Europe have been severely reduced, and its dependence on alternative trading partners has increased.
Nevertheless, Moscow has preserved important commercial and diplomatic connections with China, India and other countries unwilling to participate fully in Western sanctions.
For these governments, relations with Russia are often determined by energy requirements, commercial opportunities and their own strategic calculations rather than European security priorities.
The G20 provides Moscow with an opportunity to exploit those differences.
Lavrov can challenge Western sanctions, defend Russia’s diplomatic positions and hold bilateral discussions without demonstrating any willingness to compromise over occupied Ukrainian territory.
That does not make the meeting a Russian victory. Attendance at a multilateral gathering is not equivalent to the removal of sanctions or recognition of territorial claims.
But it offers Moscow something useful: opportunities for engagement without the conditions that would normally accompany substantive negotiations.
The limitations of such diplomacy were illustrated recently when German Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul met Lavrov in New York.
Germany restated its support for Ukraine. Moscow reiterated its established arguments.
The encounter demonstrated that diplomatic access and diplomatic progress are not necessarily the same thing.
Washington’s Negotiating Problem
The Trump administration approaches Russia from a different perspective.
Washington appears increasingly interested in identifying economic and political incentives that could make a negotiated settlement possible.
The calculation is understandable. Sanctions alone have not ended the war, and continued fighting imposes enormous costs on Ukraine while consuming Western military resources.
However, negotiations depend on more than establishing contact.
A settlement requires agreement over territory, security arrangements, enforcement mechanisms and the consequences of renewed hostilities.
Russia’s willingness to participate in discussions does not establish its willingness to accept terms compatible with Ukrainian sovereignty.
Nor does the prospect of economic cooperation necessarily create sufficient leverage to change Moscow’s calculations.
The administration must also consider how concessions offered to Russia would affect Ukraine’s ability to negotiate.
If Moscow expects economic benefits merely for remaining at the negotiating table, it has an incentive to prolong discussions while preserving its military position.
Conversely, a credible offer tied to verifiable Russian actions could provide a basis for substantive bargaining.
The difference lies in the conditions attached to any concessions and the mechanisms available to enforce them.
Europe’s Place at the Table
For European governments, the Atlanta meeting exposes a familiar weakness.
The EU is a major provider of financial assistance to Ukraine, maintains extensive sanctions against Russia and would face the consequences of any settlement that failed to establish lasting security arrangements.
Yet European influence over direct American-Russian negotiations remains limited.
Her participation gives Brussels an opportunity to communicate its position. It does not guarantee a role in determining the terms of any eventual agreement.
Ukraine itself is not participating in the gathering, although the G20 meeting is not formally a peace negotiation.
The danger for Europe is not simply exclusion from particular meetings. It is the possibility that decisions affecting European security will emerge from negotiations in which European governments possess limited influence over the agenda.
The EU retains important instruments of leverage, particularly sanctions, financial assistance and access to its markets.
But those instruments are less effective when member states disagree over their use or when Washington pursues a separate diplomatic strategy.
The Wider G20 Agenda
The meeting also takes place amid serious tensions over Iran, maritime security and international trade.
Washington wants greater cooperation over freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz, Red Sea, Black Sea and South China Sea.
These priorities intersect with European interests, particularly energy security and the protection of commercial shipping.
Yet the participating governments approach these disputes from markedly different positions.
China has little interest in endorsing an American interpretation of maritime security that could constrain its own regional ambitions.
Russia is unlikely to support arrangements that weaken its position in the Black Sea.
Meanwhile, disagreements over American tariffs complicate Washington’s efforts to secure cooperation from traditional economic partners.
The G20 remains useful precisely because governments with conflicting interests can communicate through it.
But communication should not be mistaken for agreement.
For Moscow, Lavrov’s visit offers another opportunity to demonstrate that Russia remains engaged in international diplomacy despite its war against Ukraine.
For Washington, the challenge is to show that renewed engagement can produce something more substantial than another meeting.
Europe’s concern is more immediate: any settlement negotiated with Moscow will have to be sustainable on European territory, with European resources and against the possibility of renewed Russian aggression.
Diplomatic access may be relatively easy to restore. Establishing credible security arrangements will be considerably harder.
Brussels is preparing another round of restrictions against Moscow while Washington explores the possibility of economic concessions. The disagreement exposes a weakness in Europe’s sanctions strategy: its effectiveness still depends heavily on decisions taken outside the European Union.
The European Union has imposed sanctions on almost 1,600 additional individuals and companies connected with Russia’s military-industrial complex. It is preparing a 22nd sanctions package, expanding restrictions on the networks that supply Moscow’s armed forces.
Washington, meanwhile, is considering whether economic incentives could help persuade the Kremlin to negotiate an end to the war in Ukraine.
The two approaches are not necessarily incompatible. Sanctions can be used both to constrain an adversary and as bargaining instruments in negotiations.
But they become considerably less effective when the governments imposing them disagree about the conditions under which they should be lifted.
For Europe, the problem extends beyond transatlantic diplomacy. After more than four years of war, Brussels has developed an extensive sanctions regime but still faces difficulties preventing restricted technologies from reaching Russia, limiting its energy revenues and enforcing measures against companies operating through third countries.
A change in American policy could expose those weaknesses more sharply.
The measures targeted 826 companies and 743 executives associated with Russia’s defence industry.
Unlike earlier restrictions concentrated on prominent political figures and major financial institutions, the latest designations reach into the industrial supply chains supporting Russian weapons production.
According to the Council, the companies concerned employ more than 250,000 people and generate annual turnover of at least €20 billion.
Their activities include the production and supply of electronics, semiconductors, communications equipment, navigation systems, explosives and components used in missiles, drones and military aircraft.
More than half the listings concern supply chains associated with ballistic missile production.
The approach reflects an increasingly detailed understanding of how Russia sustains its military operations.
Modern weapons depend on complex manufacturing networks. A missile producer may be able to replace a sanctioned supplier, but obtaining specialised components through alternative channels can increase costs, delay production and complicate quality control.
Targeting those networks can therefore be more consequential than imposing restrictions on another senior official whose assets in Europe have already been frozen.
Nevertheless, the number of sanctioned entities is an imperfect measure of effectiveness.
A designation has limited practical value if the targeted company has no assets within European jurisdiction, does not require Western financing and can obtain equivalent components elsewhere.
The more useful questions concern production delays, procurement costs, component availability and the extent to which Russian manufacturers can replace restricted technology.
Sanctions Evasion Has Become an Industry
European restrictions have encouraged the development of increasingly elaborate procurement networks involving intermediaries, logistics companies and financial service providers.
The cases illustrate the geographical complexity of enforcement.
Among those targeted were trading and logistics businesses associated with Türkiye, financial intermediaries operating in Russia and companies linked to oil transactions involving the United Arab Emirates, India and the Seychelles.
These networks exploit differences between national legal systems, commercial practices and the willingness of third-country authorities to cooperate with European restrictions.
Brussels can prohibit European companies from supplying particular goods. Preventing those products from being resold through several intermediaries is substantially more difficult.
Enforcement requires customs intelligence, banking supervision, corporate ownership information and cooperation with governments that may have little interest in restricting profitable trade with Russia.
The EU’s 21st sanctions package, adopted in July, extended restrictions to additional shadow-fleet vessels, financial institutions and cryptocurrency service providers.
Such measures increase the cost of evasion. They do not automatically eliminate the commercial incentives sustaining it.
Washington Holds Cards Brussels Cannot Replace
The Trump administration’s exploration of possible economic arrangements with Moscow introduces another complication.
American sanctions possess particular influence because of the dollar’s international role, the importance of US financial institutions and Washington’s capacity to restrict access to American markets.
European sanctions operate independently, but their effectiveness can be reinforced substantially by corresponding American measures.
If Washington relaxes restrictions on selected Russian institutions or commercial activities while Brussels maintains its prohibitions, companies could encounter two increasingly different regulatory environments.
European businesses would remain subject to EU law. American companies might gain access to transactions unavailable to their European competitors.
More importantly, Moscow could recover access to certain financial or commercial channels without obtaining equivalent relief from Brussels.
The scale of the consequences would depend on which restrictions Washington changed. Limited exemptions would not have the same effect as broader measures involving Russian banks, energy companies or international payments.
No comprehensive American sanctions rollback has been agreed.
Nevertheless, the prospect creates uncertainty for European policymakers.
Their position is strategically coherent. Sanctions represent one of Europe’s principal instruments of leverage in negotiations.
But preserving that leverage requires more than refusing to lift existing restrictions.
It requires ensuring that those restrictions remain effective even if American priorities change.
Europe’s Unfinished Economic Strategy
The European Union has considerable economic weight. Its single market, regulatory powers and financial institutions provide instruments that Russia cannot simply disregard.
Yet Europe has often been more effective at adopting sanctions than at enforcing them consistently.
Implementation remains dispersed among national authorities with different resources, investigative capacities and political priorities.
Companies operating across multiple jurisdictions encounter uneven enforcement, while intermediaries outside the EU can exploit gaps in information-sharing.
Brussels has attempted to address these weaknesses through expanded reporting obligations, restrictions on third-country entities and closer coordination among national authorities.
The forthcoming 22nd package will provide another indication of whether the EU intends to deepen that approach.
Its precise contents have not yet been announced.
A credible European strategy would also require greater attention to the relationship between sanctions and defence production.
Restricting Russian access to components is valuable. Expanding Europe’s own capacity to manufacture ammunition, missiles and air-defence systems is equally important.
Economic pressure cannot substitute indefinitely for military capability, particularly when the country being sanctioned remains engaged in a prolonged war.
Europe also needs to consider the conditions under which sanctions might eventually be modified.
A negotiated settlement could require carefully defined economic incentives. But those incentives would need to be linked to verifiable Russian obligations and mechanisms for restoring restrictions if agreements were violated.
Otherwise, sanctions relief could become an irreversible concession in exchange for commitments that prove difficult to enforce.
The immediate challenge for Brussels is therefore not simply to produce another package.
It is to establish whether Europe can sustain an independent economic strategy towards Russia if Washington decides that its diplomatic objectives require a different approach.
The EU has accumulated considerable sanctions authority since 2022. The next test is whether it can turn that authority into durable strategic leverage without relying on American policy remaining unchanged.
The Pentagon’s reported attempts to restrain Baltic criticism of Moscow reveal a more consequential disagreement within NATO: whether Europe’s assessment of the Russian threat is becoming inconvenient for Washington’s diplomatic ambitions.
The Trump administration wants European allies to assume greater responsibility for their defence. It also appears to want some of those allies to be rather less outspoken about the country against which much of that defence is being organised.
American defence officials have privately urged Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania to moderate their public warnings about Russia, according to accounts of recent Pentagon discussions.
The requests reportedly came from senior officials, including Elbridge Colby, the Pentagon’s Under Secretary of Defence for Policy, who is involved in reviewing America’s military commitments in Europe.
The conversations were described as cordial. There is no evidence that Washington demanded changes to Baltic defence policies. Nevertheless, their timing is revealing.
The United States is pursuing renewed negotiations with Moscow, examining potential economic incentives and pressing Ukraine to restrict attacks on Russian energy infrastructure. Simultaneously, American defence planners are considering reducing their military presence in Europe.
The Baltic governments are therefore being asked to assume greater responsibility for their security while exercising greater restraint in describing the threat they believe makes that responsibility necessary.
The Pentagon’s Strategic Calculation
Colby’s involvement gives the episode significance beyond an argument over diplomatic etiquette.
He has long advocated concentrating American military resources on the Indo-Pacific, where China represents the principal long-term challenge to US strategic predominance.
His argument is not inherently unreasonable. American military resources are finite, European NATO members possess substantial economic capacity, and Washington cannot indefinitely remain the principal provider of conventional security across several continents.
Indeed, Europe’s excessive dependence on American military capabilities has been recognised in European capitals for years.
The difficulty lies in reconciling this strategic redistribution with Washington’s approach towards Russia.
If the United States intends to reduce its European military commitments, European governments will require more accurate threat assessments, greater investment in intelligence and defence, and clearer public explanations of the expenditure involved.
Discouraging those governments from discussing Russian threats could make that transition politically harder.
One justification reportedly offered by American officials is that confrontational language risks provoking Moscow or reinforcing the Kremlin’s attempts to spread fear.
There is a legitimate argument for avoiding theatrical warnings unsupported by intelligence. Governments can undermine their credibility by repeatedly presenting hypothetical threats as imminent.
But Baltic intelligence assessments have often been more measured than the public debate suggests.
Estonian and Latvian security officials have distinguished between Russia’s current military limitations, caused partly by its war in Ukraine, and the longer-term danger of Moscow rebuilding its forces.
Such assessments are not evidence of an intention to provoke Russia. They are part of the ordinary work of national security institutions.
The Problem with Reassuring Moscow
The reported exchanges also expose an uncomfortable contradiction in Washington’s negotiating strategy.
The administration is considering incentives intended to encourage Moscow towards a settlement while asking European allies to avoid language that might complicate those negotiations.
Yet Russia’s conduct towards NATO members has not been confined to diplomatic disagreements.
European governments have reported suspected sabotage, cyber operations, intelligence activity and interference involving critical infrastructure.
German authorities recently announced arrests connected with a suspected arson plot in the Nuremberg area. Berlin has also accused Moscow of involvement in a drone incident at Leipzig/Halle Airport, an allegation Russia denies.
These activities form part of the wider security environment that European governments must address, irrespective of Washington’s diplomatic timetable.
The question is whether restraint by NATO members would encourage reciprocal restraint from Moscow.
There is little publicly available evidence that Russia has made such a commitment.
Nor has Moscow demonstrated that its objectives concerning Ukraine have fundamentally changed.
A diplomatic strategy based on reducing tensions can be sensible. A strategy that asks one side to moderate its conduct without establishing corresponding obligations for the other risks creating an imbalance.
For the Baltic states, that imbalance is especially difficult to accept.
Their geographical position, historical experience and exposure to Russian intelligence operations give them reasons to approach Moscow differently from governments separated from Russia by several countries.
That does not make every Baltic political statement wise. It does mean that their security concerns cannot reasonably be dismissed as a communications problem.
Europe’s Security Cannot Depend on Diplomatic Convenience
The larger issue is not whether an Estonian prime minister should describe Vladimir Putin as a cornered rat.
It is whether European governments can continue to define their security requirements independently when those assessments complicate American foreign policy.
NATO’s collective defence arrangements depend on credible military capabilities, political cohesion and the willingness of member states to act.
They also depend on governments being able to explain why those capabilities are necessary.
Europe’s defence spending increases will require difficult budgetary choices, industrial investment and sustained public support. Governments cannot make those decisions convincingly while treating the underlying security threat as something best discussed discreetly.
Washington is entitled to pursue negotiations with Moscow. European governments are equally entitled to assess the consequences for their own security.
The United States may ultimately conclude that a reduced military presence in Europe serves its wider strategic interests. European allies will then have to adjust, whether or not they welcome that decision.
What they cannot afford is to confuse American diplomatic preferences with an objective assessment of Russian capabilities and intentions.
The Pentagon’s reported advice may have been intended to reduce unnecessary friction. But if Washington expects Europe to carry more of the burden of deterrence, it will also have to accept that Europeans will increasingly make their own judgements about the threats they face.
Voters who backed the US president in the last election are saying they can’t vote for him today: ‘This is an abomination’
Outside the Ukrainian educational and cultural center in a quiet Pennsylvania suburb of Jenkintown, on the outskirts of Philadelphia, a banner expressed unqualified gratitude: “Thank you USA for supporting Ukraine.”
Inside, however, the sentiment was altogether different. Irene Skulsky, a retired teacher in her late 70s, voiced indignation at Donald Trump’s sudden turn against her ancestral homeland, which she believed had come close to killing her son, Darko, and a desire to punish his fellow Republicans at next week’s midterm elections.
Malgré les "efforts" de paix récents et la trêve temporaire des combats dans la ville ukrainienne d'Olechky, Vladimir Poutine poursuit les menaces contre l'Europe. Lors d'un rare appel avec les dirigeants norvégiens...
The Sky Sentinel turret can autonomously acquire and lock onto air targets, even jet-powered drones.
Viacheslav Madiievskyi/ Ukrinform/Future Publishing via Getty Images
Once experimental tech, AI turrets are now becoming an "integral part of air defense" in Ukraine's war.
These are guns that can detect and lock onto targets by calculating speed and trajectory.
Ukraine has deployed over a dozen of these and is looking to surge their production and use.
Ukraine is using machine gun turrets controlled by artificial intelligence in battle, and they're working well enough that Kyiv wants to roll them out at a faster pace.
While Ukraine began revealing prototypes of these systems last year, Brave1, the country's defense innovation platform, said on Thursday that they've now become "an integral part of air defense" for its forces.
"In the last month alone, automated turrets have destroyed dozens of enemy drones over Kyiv," Brave1 said, adding that it started work on these weapons in 2024 as experimental technology.
Not much is publicly known about the core capabilities of these turrets, such as their range or how their software works, but they've primarily been described as an air defense tool against Russian drones.
The idea is that artificial intelligence helps the turret detect, acquire, and track a target, making it more accurate than human operators at engaging high-speed air targets such as jet-powered Gerans.
More than a dozen such systems are now deployed in the Kyiv area, with another eight planned for the region, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said in early October.
In a sign that Ukraine plans to lean further into the technology, Zelenskyy later praised the systems further, saying on October 19 that AI-powered turrets have "proven highly effective against shaheds."
"We are increasing orders, and it is important to accelerate every process as much as possible — organizational, financial, and production-related," Zelenskyy said.
One such system, the Sky Sentinel, is a .50-cal M2 Browning turret developed and operated by private air defense firm Carmine Sky. It can spin 360 degrees and lock onto a target while firing by calculating speed and trajectory.
Each one costs about $150,000, a Ukrainian commander told Business Insider's Jake Epstein last summer, and can distinguish between birds and drones. The turret still requires a human operator to authorize when to fire, the commander said.
Ukraine said an AI-enabled turret shot down Russia's fastest attack drone.
Courtesy of United24
Brave1 released a montage on Thursday indicating that Ukraine is also fielding other types of automated turrets, showcasing clips of several designs.
It said turrets had shot down at least 60 targets under its Private Air Defense Project, a pilot that allows private Ukrainian firms to buy air defense equipment and train civilian staff to use them against drones threatening factories, warehouses, and other important sites.
Notably, Brave1 said these turrets took down Russian Geran-5s and Banderols — jet-powered drones and cruise missiles that can reach speeds of 375 to 400 mph.
A similar claim was made by Yuriy Ihnat, the Ukrainian air force's spokesperson, in early October, when he said that AI-powered turrets had shot down Russian jet-powered drones for the first time. Ihnat did not say which system was used.
Kyiv has eagerly integrated AI into much of its war effort, using machine learning models for other functions, such as predicting enemy drone strikes and autonomously conducting supply runs with robotic buggies.
The turrets do have limited range, making them more useful as a final defense against drones or against low-flying targets.
They'll likely be one of several tools Ukraine is developing to counter Russian jet-powered threats.
Over the last few months, the Kremlin has been ramping up production and deployment of cheap cruise missiles or drones equipped with turbojet engines. These weapons, flying at nearly half the speed of sound and launched by the thousands every month, have become a major challenge for Ukrainian air defenses.
A US-brokered mission, which would allow humanitarian aid to enter the Russian-occupied southern Ukrainian city of Oleshky and residents to leave safely, is in its final phase, Kyiv announced.
The reported attack is being called a ‘resumption of strikes’ on various monitoring channels, being the first after an unofficial pause on Ukraine’s campaign against oil refineries that began in mid-October.
Pentagon officials have in recent weeks asked several NATO countries to tone down their rhetoric regarding the threat posed by Russia, arguing that some statements by European leaders and officials have undermined continental security, four people familiar with the matter said.
Among the nations that have received messages urging them to keep public statements in check are Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, said the people, who spoke on condition of anonymity. It was not clear if the messages, which were delivered in bilateral meetings, were conveyed to other European governments.
The US requests come as the Trump administration restarts an effort to press for a negotiated end to the full-scale war in Ukraine, now well into its fifth year. The latest push has blended incentives for Russia – including sanctions relief – with pressure on Ukraine to halt its attacks on Russian energy infrastructure.
Asked for comment, a Pentagon official said: “Private conversations among allies are just that, so we will not comment on these allegations.”
Among the comments that have drawn US officials’ attention are suggestions by European leaders that Russia is cornered and resorting to increasingly desperate measures as its invasion of Ukraine slows to a crawl, one of the people said.
Pentagon policy chief Elbridge Colby, a key figure in an ongoing review of US troop levels in Europe, was one of the US officials delivering the message, the people said. Reuters could not determine what other officials were involved.
None of the people, who include three European officials and a US official, suggested the advice was communicated in a confrontational manner.
US urges allies not to provoke Moscow
The US messages reflect a debate within NATO regarding how to publicly address the threat of an increasingly assertive Russia.
Some Western officials have argued that emphasizing the threat posed by Moscow could play into the hands of the Kremlin, which they say seeks to sow fear and undermine support for Ukraine.
Others argue European governments must be transparent to show their electorates that sacrifice and resources are needed to keep Moscow at bay. That is especially true as Russia appears to accelerate a covert campaign of sabotage throughout the continent.
Russia has denied that it is pursuing such a campaign.
Baltic states face pressure over public warnings
One of the people familiar told Reuters that Colby told a Baltic official recently that there should be no “poking” directed at the Russians.
The person said Colby pointed to Europeans publicly suggesting that Russia was “cornered like a rat” as an example of unhelpful rhetoric.
It was not clear what specific statement Colby was referring to. However, Estonian Prime Minister Kristen Michal referred to Putin as a “rat in a corner” in late September, suggesting the Russian leader was resorting to sabotage efforts in Europe as Russia had become increasingly bogged down in Ukraine.
“We are helping you. The Americans are there,” said a separate European official, describing the Pentagon’s recent private messaging. “Just don’t be loud. Don’t make noise.”
In a separate recent meeting, the Pentagon urged an Estonian delegation to be “measured” in its communications, according to a person briefed on the encounter, though the person did not say Pentagon officials complained about any specific statement.
The defense ministries of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia did not respond to requests for comment, while NATO declined to comment.
Russian sabotage fears divide NATO allies
One of the European officials said that the Pentagon’s advice, while cordial, was baffling, given that intelligence services in the Baltic states have in recent months consistently played down the probability of Russia testing NATO’s mutual defense provisions.
Other NATO intelligence services, by contrast, have publicly warned that Russia could dramatically ramp up its sabotage campaign in the near future.
The Pentagon messages to NATO officials come at a fraught time for European security.
Moscow has recently intensified its campaign of deniable attacks on NATO countries, Western intelligence officials have said.
On Wednesday, German prosecutors said two Belarusians were arrested for allegedly planning to set fire to a building or critical infrastructure facility in the Nuremberg area. In September, the German government blamed Russia for an attempted drone attack at Leipzig/Halle Airport, allegations Moscow has denied.
At the same time, US officials have been discussing potential business deals with Russia as part of the Trump administration’s push for peace in Ukraine. Those efforts have drawn mixed reactions from European officials, many of whom are pushing for the Kremlin’s continued economic isolation.
US reviews military presence in Europe
Pentagon planners, meanwhile, are reviewing Washington’s force posture in Europe, a process that could see a sharp drawdown in America’s troop presence on the continent.
US officials have said European NATO members need to assume more responsibility for their own defense, particularly as the US focuses on threats in the Middle East, Latin America and East Asia.
The plant has repeatedly faced threats to nuclear safety, including drone attacks, disruptions to external power supplies, and incidents affecting plant workers.
Login
, X
, and VK
.
