Production: By Europod, in co-production with Sphera Network.

EUobserver is proud to have an editorial partnership with Europod to co-publish the podcast series “Briefed” hosted by Léa Marchal. The podcast is available on all major platforms.

Find the full transcript below: 

Ten years after the Brexit vote, more and more Britons are asking whether they should go back. According to a YouGov poll conducted earlier this month, 52% would vote to rejoin the EU in a referendum.

And the UK’s new Prime Minister, Andy Burnham, seems to be keeping that door open.

But how realistic is that? Andy Burnham became Prime Minister this summer. And since then, he has been dropping hints here and there about a possible return to the EU. A few months ago, he was saying it was too early to even discuss it.

So what changed? Perhaps the international context, but also the realisation that the UK cannot get everything it wants while staying outside the Union.

On 20 November, EU leaders will have the opportunity to discuss the relationship with the UK during a bilateral summit. They will try to reach agreements on a number of issues that have stalled.

What are those topics? First, food. Today, agri-food products face checks and certification when they enter the EU, and that slows trade down. The solution on the table is for the UK to align its sanitary and phytosanitary standards with the EU’s. But the details still need to be agreed.

Second, people. Right now, a European who wants to work in the UK needs a visa. The two sides could agree on a scheme to make mobility easier, especially for young people.

Third, carbon. The British would like to link their carbon market to the EU’s, so that their exporters don’t have to pay extra for their emissions when they sell to Europe. In practice, that means avoiding the EU’s carbon border tax.

Last but not least, industry. And this is a big part of the discussion. As the EU moves towards giving priority to European products, the British fear being left out of this “European preference”.

Now, you might say: in all these cases, isn’t this a bit like being in the EU, without the drawbacks? That’s exactly what critics call cherry-picking.

At the heart of the problem is a simple question: where do you draw the line between being a member and being a partner? It’s the same debate the EU has with Switzerland, which wants to stay very close but not be part of the bloc.

Now, is a return to the EU a realistic scenario? The door is open, as Emmanuel Macron and others have put it.

The UK could apply, and it’s unlikely that any member state would block the process. But the European Commission has already warned: there would be no special treatment for the British.

On the positive side, the UK would start from a good position. It already applies a good part of EU legislation, and it meets the rule-of-law criteria.

But all these years after leaving the EU, the two sides are still negotiating. There are sticking points on free movement and on standards. And those disagreements would make any accession talks that much harder.

Let’s see what comes out of the summit on 20 November.

Mercedes-Benz chief executive Ola Källenius has warned that excluding British manufacturers from European industrial preference rules would damage automotive production on both sides of the Channel, increasing pressure on Brussels ahead of negotiations over its proposed Industrial Accelerator Act.

The head of Mercedes-Benz has warned that excluding British manufacturers from the European Union’s proposed industrial preference rules would damage the competitiveness of carmakers across Europe, challenging Brussels over legislation intended to protect European production from growing international competition.

Ola Källenius, chief executive of Mercedes-Benz and president of the European Automobile Manufacturers’ Association (ACEA), criticised the prospect of restricting British participation in the forthcoming “Made in Europe” framework during discussions in Brussels on Wednesday, 14 October.

His intervention comes as European governments negotiate the Industrial Accelerator Act, which would introduce European-content requirements affecting public procurement and certain forms of industrial support.

The proposed legislation is intended to strengthen manufacturing within the EU, but its treatment of production in neighbouring countries has become contentious, particularly in an automotive industry whose factories and suppliers operate across national borders.

European production extends beyond the EU

British manufacturing remains closely integrated with continental European automotive production despite the United Kingdom’s departure from the single market.

Components manufactured in Britain are incorporated into vehicles assembled in EU member states, while British factories depend on engines, batteries, electronics and other parts produced in continental Europe.

The value of this integrated manufacturing system depends on companies being able to source components across borders without unnecessary restrictions.

Källenius warned that excluding the UK from the proposed rules would weaken manufacturers operating on both sides of the Channel.

His position reflects industry concerns that a narrowly defined European-content regime could impose additional costs on companies already facing pressure from Chinese competition, slowing demand and substantial investment requirements.

As EU Today reported in September, British Prime Minister Andy Burnham has been pressing Brussels to recognise the UK as a trusted industrial partner under the emerging framework.

Germany has also supported a broader approach that would allow selected trading partners to qualify under European-content rules where reciprocal conditions are met.

France has favoured stronger preferences for production within the EU itself, reflecting differences among member states over how far European industrial policy should extend beyond the Union’s borders.

A dispute over industrial sovereignty

The Industrial Accelerator Act proposed by the European Commission is intended to strengthen Europe’s manufacturing base and support production in strategically important sectors.

Its provisions address public procurement and industrial incentives affecting products including vehicles, steel, aluminium and clean technologies.

The Commission wants European public spending to support local industrial capacity rather than reinforce dependence on imports from major international competitors.

China has become the principal focus of those concerns because of its expanding manufacturing capacity, particularly in electric vehicles and batteries.

However, measures designed to counter Chinese industrial competition could also affect established trading partners whose manufacturers form part of European supply chains.

The United Kingdom, Norway, Switzerland and Turkey occupy different legal positions in their economic relations with the EU, but all maintain important industrial connections with member states.

An approach that treats their production as equivalent to imports from countries with substantially different market conditions could require European companies to reorganise existing supplier relationships.

For manufacturers, replacing a supplier may involve more than simply ordering components from another factory. Production standards, technical certification, logistics and long-term investment arrangements can make changes expensive and difficult.

Industry demands regulatory certainty

Following an ACEA board meeting on Wednesday, European manufacturers called for faster progress on the wider automotive legislative package.

In its 14 October statement, ACEA urged EU institutions to advance negotiations so that the package could be finalised early next year.

The association argues that manufacturers require a predictable regulatory framework to plan investments in electric vehicles, production facilities and new technologies.

Källenius linked the industry’s transition towards zero-emission mobility with the need to preserve employment and strengthen economic security.

European manufacturers are simultaneously investing heavily in electrification while competing against Chinese companies with established battery supply chains and significant production capacity.

The resulting financial pressures are particularly serious for manufacturers that must develop new vehicle platforms while maintaining existing factories and dealer networks.

Additional restrictions on component sourcing could complicate those decisions at a time when companies are seeking to reduce costs.

Britain refuses to follow EU tariffs automatically

The dispute has acquired a further dimension following remarks by British Business Secretary Jonathan Reynolds.

Speaking on Wednesday, Reynolds indicated that Britain would not automatically follow the European Union in imposing tariffs on Chinese vehicles.

The UK government maintains that trade measures must be determined according to British economic interests rather than adopted simply to align with Brussels.

That position complicates London’s attempt to secure favourable treatment under European industrial rules.

EU policymakers have argued that closer alignment on trade defences could support Britain’s claim to be treated as a trusted partner.

British ministers, however, must consider whether restrictions on Chinese imports would benefit domestic manufacturers and consumers.

The disagreement will form part of the broader economic relationship being discussed ahead of the next UK–EU summit, scheduled for 20 November.

The wider implications for EU–UK relations

The automotive dispute follows earlier negotiations over British participation in European defence procurement and other industrial programmes.

In both cases, London wants access to initiatives designed to strengthen European production while remaining outside the EU’s institutional framework.

Brussels must determine how far preferential treatment can extend to non-member countries without undermining the objectives of its industrial policy.

The Commission’s proposals have already revealed disagreements between governments favouring a tightly defined European manufacturing base and those seeking to preserve wider commercial partnerships.

Källenius’s intervention strengthens the argument that industrial protection cannot be considered separately from the supply chains on which European manufacturers depend.

The final legislation will influence investment decisions, procurement arrangements and the position of British suppliers within the continental automotive industry.

The outcome will also provide an indication of how far the EU is prepared to accommodate its closest trading partners as it attempts to strengthen European manufacturing against growing competition from China.

As he charges head first into the Brexit debate, Andy Burnham resembles no one so much as Donald Trump, says Prof James Alexander: cause a stir via wild assertions, the better to give cover to what you really want to do.

The post Brexit Does Not Mean Brexit appeared first on The Daily Sceptic.

Britain is expected to push for a new post-Brexit trade deal and increased information-sharing on immigration at a UK-EU summit in Brussels next month.

This comes as Andy Burnham, the country’s prime minister, says the post-Brexit “status quo is not good enough for Britain”, in a hint that he might seek to rejoin the European Union.

And, more than a decade after the Brexit vote, he also accused Russia of having meddled in the 2016 British referendum.

The UK leader will meet European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen and European Council president António Costa in Brussels on 20 November.

And Costa has also said that European and British security and prosperity are “closely intertwined”, while a closer relationship could “promote stability in Europe and beyond”.

Made in Europe and immigration

The November summit will be an opportunity to “raise concerns” about ‘Made in Europe,’ Burnham told members of UK MPs on Monday (12 October).

The ‘Made in Europe’ proposal in the Industrial Accelerator Act would require companies to source a certain number of parts from within the EU to be eligible for public money in strategic sectors.

But UK officials are worried the law could hurt British manufacturers, with Burnham expected to seek concessions.

But the British premier also wants to go further in renegotiating his country’s ties with the EU. 

“On the table is a trade deal on food and drink products, a deal on emissions trading, progress towards linking our energy systems, a new youth experience scheme, and deeper cooperation on immigration,” he said. 

Burnham aims to address an EU import ban on UK meat, seed potatoes, and shellfish and wants to reduce costs for shipping other goods to mainland Europe. 

He also hopes for closer work between European and UK border forces on immigration.  

“On immigration, we could link up our law enforcement efforts once again [since brexit], sharing more data and criminal records of foreign nationals,” Burnham said.

He may aim to rejoin the Schengen Information System, a database for border management and law enforcement cooperation in Europe.

And he could also pursue greater freedoms for UK citizens to live in the 27 member states.

“It would be a major dereliction of duty to turn away [from the EU]” the UK leader told parliament.

10 years on from Brexit vote

The last EU-UK summit, held in London in 2025, was already branded as a reset in relations across the English channel, with a new defence and security partnership, reciprocal access to fishing waters, and expansion of student exchanges. 

And leaders are expected to build on the previous agreements by discussing defence, energy, and climate, as well as trade and migration, at their meeting next month.

But under the terms of the EU and UK’s legal divorce in 2020, the two sides remain bound by complex limitations.

And Burnham told MPs on Monday that renegotiating Britain’s relations with the EU could add over £10bn (€11.8bn) per year to the UK economy by 2040, “with the potential to add significantly more,” even if it did not rejoin.

Russian meddling?

Burnham also told a podcast on 11 October that Russia had meddled in the country’s Brexit vote 10 years ago. 

Upon assuming office in July, Burnham asked officials if there had been Russian interference in the 2016 referendum, he told The Rest is Politics, and officials gave him a “clear answer that yes, there was.”

“We haven’t informed people [the general public] sufficiently,” he added, amid similar Russian electoral interference in France, Germany, and further afield in Europe.

For his part, British foreign secretary Stephen Doughty subsequently told the LBC broadcaster: “I don’t think [Russia] succeeded in their efforts to undermine our election”.

And Burnham also rowed back in the parliament debate on Monday when pressed by opposition MPs, by saying the outcome of the Brexit vote remained legitimate.

But he added that Russia’s meddling in the UK’s 2019 general election was a matter of record and that it was “inconceivable that this was the first time”.

Appetite for EU re-entry 

Burnham also dropped hints on Monday that Britain could rejoin the European Union.

“One thing I think is true is that public opinion has moved more quickly than political opinion. I think the political class is behind the public on this issue,” he said.

“At every stage, the British public will be the boss,” he added, while promising a “pragmatic approach” to the hot-button issue, which has the potential to enflame right-wing anger in England.

“We need to draw a line on a decade of drift and division [from Europe],” he said.

But questions of a holding second referendum were “jumping ahead too far” according to Burnham.

The Westminster debate came after YouGov polling commissioned by Best for Britain, a pro-EU lobby group, indicated that pushing for closer EU ties would be politically advantageous for Burnham’s ruling Labour party.

The organisation also claimed Britain could reenter the union within five years.

Brexit was “not a sacred cow”, said Emily Thornberry, a fellow Labour MP, on Monday.

Sandro Gozi, an Italian liberal MEP and chair of the UK-EU parliamentary partnership assembly, also said in a statement: “As a former member, and with much of the regulatory framework already in place, I personally do not see any serious reason why an application from the UK would not be achievable.”

“When countries are already closely aligned to EU rules, such as was the case for Sweden and Finland, the process for accession is faster than for applicants essentially starting from scratch,” he said.

É "altamente provável" que a Guarda Revolucionária tenha dirigido a tentativa de ataque, diz Burnham, que anunciou que vai impor novas sanções. Burnham rejeita referendo de adesão à União Europeia

© JASON ALDEN / POOL/EPA

Na véspera de uma cimeira com a União Europeia, o primeiro-ministro britânico rompe com a posição do antecessor Starmer e apela aos deputados para que façam uma avaliação "calma e realista" do Brexit.

© FILIP SINGER/EPA

Andy Burnham will say that failing to pursue a closer relationship with the EU would be a "dereliction of duty" in a major Commons address today, following his comments blaming Russia for interfering in the Brexit vote.

The post Burnham to Say it’s His “Duty” to Pursue Closer EU Ties appeared first on The Daily Sceptic.

Prime Minister Andy Burnham has acknowledged that Russia interfered in Britain’s 2016 referendum on European Union membership, ending a decade in which successive governments avoided making a definitive public assessment of Moscow’s involvement.

British Prime Minister Andy Burnham has confirmed that Russia interfered in the 2016 Brexit referendum, marking a significant change in the government’s position on foreign involvement in one of the country’s most consequential political decisions. The acknowledgement comes more than ten years after Britain voted to leave the European Union and six years after a parliamentary intelligence investigation criticised the failure to examine Russian activities surrounding the vote.

Speaking on The Rest Is Politics podcast, Burnham said he had requested an assessment of Russian interference after becoming prime minister in July. He subsequently received confirmation that Moscow had attempted to influence the referendum, although he declined to disclose the intelligence underpinning that conclusion or explain the methods employed.

The statement establishes an important distinction between Russian interference and the referendum’s outcome. The former is now publicly acknowledged by the British government; the latter remains a separate question. No evidence has been presented demonstrating that Russian activities determined the result, which saw 51.9 per cent vote to leave the EU.

The investigation that never took place

The controversy dates back to the Intelligence and Security Committee’s 2020 report on Russia, which identified serious weaknesses in Britain’s response to hostile foreign influence.

The committee examined Russian activities targeting British political institutions, including attempts to exploit social divisions through state-controlled information channels and online networks. It found that the British government had failed to conduct a comprehensive assessment of potential Russian interference in the Brexit referendum.

That failure was particularly striking when compared with the United States, where intelligence agencies investigated Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election and published conclusions identifying a coordinated campaign.

In Britain, by contrast, responsibility for examining foreign interference had been divided between departments and intelligence agencies. The parliamentary committee found that no organisation had assumed responsibility for assessing the threat to the referendum comprehensively.

The distinction was politically convenient for successive governments. Without a formal investigation, ministers could maintain that there was insufficient evidence to establish interference while avoiding the question of whether the evidence had ever been properly examined.

Burnham’s acknowledgement changes that position, although it does not resolve every question raised by the original inquiry.

What Russia sought to achieve

Russian information operations have repeatedly targeted political divisions within European societies, particularly disagreements over immigration, national sovereignty, NATO and relations with Brussels.

Research into online activity surrounding the Brexit campaign identified networks of accounts associated with Russian influence operations that circulated divisive political messages. Establishing their precise reach, coordination and effect on individual voters remains considerably more difficult.

Moscow had an identifiable strategic interest in weakening European political cohesion. Britain’s departure from the EU removed one of the bloc’s largest economies, a permanent member of the UN Security Council and an important supporter of sanctions against Russia.

That geopolitical consequence does not establish that Brexit was engineered by Moscow. Britain’s referendum reflected longstanding domestic political divisions, disagreements over European integration and dissatisfaction with successive governments.

Russian interference, however, need not create political divisions to exploit them. Amplifying existing disputes, discrediting institutions and encouraging distrust between political opponents can serve strategic objectives without requiring direct control over a campaign.

Consequences for relations with Europe

The timing of Burnham’s intervention is significant. His government has begun reconsidering Britain’s relationship with the EU, while European governments are confronting increasingly aggressive Russian hybrid operations.

Burnham has also suggested that Britain should be prepared to reconsider EU membership in the future, although such a decision would require a separate political mandate and negotiations with the bloc’s 27 members.

The prime minister’s comments place Russian interference within a broader European security debate. France and Germany are among the countries confronting allegations of foreign information operations, covert political influence and attempts to undermine electoral confidence.

The European Council’s forthcoming October summit will include discussions of Russian-linked hybrid attacks, demonstrating that the problem extends beyond conventional espionage and cyber-security.

For Britain, the outstanding question concerns the intelligence assessment itself. Burnham has not indicated whether further evidence will be published, whether Parliament will receive a classified briefing or whether the government intends to examine failures by previous administrations.

A public acknowledgement without supporting details may establish the government’s position, but it cannot by itself provide a complete historical account.

Ten years after the referendum, Britain is therefore confronting two separate matters: the extent of Russia’s activities during the campaign and the reasons its own institutions took so long to acknowledge them.

The first concerns foreign interference. The second concerns the accountability of the British state.

The UK’s trade ambitions are clear: open new markets, reduce border friction, and make it genuinely easier for small businesses to compete globally. The government’s 2025 Trade Strategy frames this as a growth priority. Yet the data tells a more sobering story, write Jose Puyana and Tom Harding.

UK goods exports to the EU have fallen by £27 billion since Brexit. Exports remain roughly 18% below pre-2019 levels. And around one in seven UK businesses have stopped trading with the EU altogether.

Large-scale surveys from the Federation of Small Businesses and British Chambers of Commerce consistently cite customs processes and compliance complexity as the leading barriers for SMEs. But surveys don’t fully capture the emotional texture of what traders describe: a persistent, low-level anxiety about whether a detail has been missed, whether the code is right, whether the rules have quietly changed since last time.

The traders understand their products, their customers, and their commercial realities. What leaves them uneasy is the web of rules, requirements, and systems governing the movement of goods across a border. We call this mindset the Nervous Trader.

The fear of getting it wrong

Consider a small business importing animal-derived products: the origin of materials, their treatment, and finishing processes can all shift how a shipment must be declared. A detail that seems minor to an outsider - whether a skin has been treated, how a component has been finished - can change the commodity code entirely. Get it wrong, and products are delayed or blocked at the border. Unexpected duties land, turning a profitable shipment into a loss. Time is consumed by questions from freight forwarders and internal scrutiny that the business cannot afford.

For a clothing importer shipping technical apparel from multiple countries, the same anxiety plays out at scale. Every declaration carries the nagging worry of a missed detail or overlooked cost. And for a manufacturer exporting specialist components, the risk doesn’t just lie with a single shipment - it scales with volume. As the business grows, so does the exposure. One overlooked requirement can have knock-on effects across the whole operation.

Rules without a map

What these businesses share is not inexperience. It is the absence of certainty. Trade is inherently consequential - financial and reputational stakes are real. But the systems around it do remarkably little to reduce the sense of exposure. Nervousness is rational in an ambiguous environment. The question is why we continue to design ambiguity into the experience.

International trade is inherently complex. Nobody who works in it would claim otherwise. The rules are numerous, the requirements specific, and the consequences of error real. Traders understand this. None of the businesses we spoke to expected the process to be simple.

What they experience, however, is complexity without context - rules and requirements presented without enough orientation to be useful. Government guidance is often comprehensive and technically accurate. The information assumes a level of prior knowledge that most small business operators simply don’t have time to develop.

More critically, guidance is almost always written around policy rather than around the person trying to follow it. That gap between what guidance says and what a trader actually needs to know in a given moment is where confidence breaks down.

When traders are nervous and the guidance around them fails to build confidence, they find other ways to manage the risk. They defer. They delegate. They pay someone else to carry the uncertainty; they were never given the tools to handle themselves.

It is a rational response to an inadequate system. The more revealing data point, though, is the informal workarounds. Traders describe turning to AI tools, online forums, and third-party platforms to fill the gap that official guidance leaves. Not because those sources are more authoritative, but because they are faster, more conversational, and more willing to engage with the specific question being asked rather than the general rule that may or may not apply.

Designing for confidence, not just compliance

If our digital services don’t actively build confidence and help manage the risks associated with trade compliance, other ecosystems will fill that gap. Intermediaries become the only translators of complexity, while traders never fully learn the language.

Trade is never static. For UK businesses, the pace of change over the past decade has been relentless: Brexit reshaping EU relationships, US tariff policy shifting unpredictably, new regulatory requirements emerging as new markets are entered. The environment that small traders are navigating today bears little resemblance to the one they trained themselves on five years ago.

The consequences are visible. Businesses that built strong European revenue streams have watched them erode as post-Brexit duties and friction increased. What had been a reliable, profitable channel became uncertain, then marginal, then unviable. The challenge wasn’t that traders didn’t see change coming - most did. The challenge was that the systems around them provided no clear guidance on what to do about it.

When those questions arise constantly, in a domain that already feels high-risk and poorly signposted, the fear of making mistakes doesn’t simply persist; it compounds. And that compounding weight is what drives traders towards avoidance - towards stepping back from unfamiliar routes, delaying entry into new markets, and, at worst, withdrawing from international trade altogether.

Change is inevitable in trade. But adaptation should not require heroic effort on the part of the trader. When our systems don’t communicate change in accessible, context-relevant ways, they transform something manageable into something exhausting.

Addressing this requires more than incremental improvements to individual services. It requires a different frame. In practical terms, it means translating policy into language that traders can act on. It means providing reassurance at the moments it is most needed, not just information. It means improving relevance - helping traders quickly understand what applies to their situation rather than leaving them to extract that signal from comprehensive but impersonal guidance. And it means fragmented government services beginning to work more deliberately across boundaries, acknowledging their shared users, shared challenges, and shared outcomes.

Confidence should be treated as a primary, measurable outcome of good service design in trade. Not a soft aspiration, but a design specification. If a service leaves traders more uncertain than when they arrived, something has gone wrong - regardless of whether the information was technically accurate.

The role of digital and service design is not to eliminate the complexity of international trade. It is to prevent that complexity from being amplified by the experiences built around it. Trade will always carry risk. The question is whether we design services that help traders manage that risk clearly, or services that make them feel exposed to it at every turn.