America's interminable war with Iran has killed thousands, disrupted commerce that flows through the Strait of Hormuz, and raised prices on the home front.

But there may be one silver lining. In an attempt to lower gas prices that spiked because of the war, the Trump administration has repeatedly issued waivers of the Jones Act, a century-old law that requires all goods moved between American ports to be carried on American-built, American-crewed ships.

With the law (temporarily) not being enforced, commerce has exploded.

Just look at how much propane has been shipped from the mainland United States to Puerto Rico, says Colin Grabow, a trade policy analyst at the Cato Institute and perhaps the nation's foremost advocate for abolishing the Jones Act.

Since March, when the first waiver was issued, Puerto Rico has imported more than 800,000 barrels of propane from the mainland. That's more than twice the amount of American propane shipped to Puerto Rico in the last 22 years combined.

America is one of the world's leading producers and exporters of propane, but the lack of Jones Act–compliant ships capable of carrying gas means that it has been nearly impossible to ship propane from the mainland to outlying parts of the country. In the past, Puerto Rico has imported gas from Nigeria, Chile, and elsewhere because those deliveries don't have to comply with the Jones Act.

For years, libertarians have argued that the Jones Act unfairly impoverishes American consumers and businesses that want to buy and sell things within the same country in order to artificially inflate the price of moving those things across water. Waiving the law seems to have proven that point: There are plenty of ships capable of moving gas and oil around the country as long as the government gets out of the way.

"The instant the Jones Act no longer applied to energy shipments, mainland propane displaced foreign imports, suggesting it had been the cheapest option all along," says Grabow.

Puerto Rico is hardly the only winner.

The Jones Act waivers are offering a glimpse into a world where the law doesn't exist. From March through mid-August, there had been 210 voyages completed that otherwise would have been deemed unlawful without the waivers, according to an analysis of Maritime Administration data by the Institute for Energy Research.

It's a world where American oil and natural gas can be more easily shipped from the Gulf Coast to New England, which had previously been importing energy from Russia and Europe. Another big winner is California, which had been importing gasoline from as far away as the Bahamas because it was nearly impossible to legally ship gas from Texas or Alaska to the West Coast.

President Donald Trump reupped the Jones Act waiver in mid-May. Another extension, issued in August, will last for 90 days but applies only to ships carrying energy products such as gas and oil. Before that waiver expires in November, lawmakers ought to kill the Jones Act permanently.

There is some irony in the fact that one of Trump's most successful policy maneuvers has paused a protectionist law that limited commerce, when so much else of his economic policy has been focused on erecting barriers to trade. It's also amusing that it was a war in the Middle East—something Trump pledged to avoid—that triggered this change.

Still, the proof is in the shipping. The free traders were right all along.

The post Trump's War With Iran Pushed Him To Waive a Century-Old Shipping Law. Commerce Boomed. appeared first on Reason Magazine.

By Marco CARNELOS

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Record debt, a paralysed trade-dispute architecture and the normalisation of sovereign-asset seizure as a policy tool means fragility is baked into the global economic system

Since 2022,  a steady drumbeat of forecasts has warned that cascading military and political upheavals – war in Ukraine, conflict in the Middle East, an accelerating tariff war, the weaponisation of sanctions and the disruption of energy supplies – would eventually overwhelm the world economy’s capacity to absorb shocks.

The most destructive of those scenarios have not materialised, or at least not yet.

As the IMF’s managing director Kristalina Georgieva stated last year, while previewing the fund’s World Economic Outlook, the global economy “has generally withstood significant strains from various shocks”.

Although that resilience is real, on closer inspection, it is a more fragile and more contested achievement than it first appears.

The adaptive mechanisms behind this resilience are visible and measurable. Trade has rerouted rather than collapsed. Energy corridors have diversified. And reserve managers have spent the past three years quietly re-engineering the architecture of the international monetary system.

According to the World Gold Council’s 2026 Central Bank Gold Reserves survey – which drew responses from 76 institutions, its highest participation in nine years – 89 percent of central banks expect global gold holdings to keep rising over the next year, with a record share planning to add to their own reserves.

The result: gold has overtaken US Treasuries as the largest single component of global central bank reserves for the first time since the mid-1990s.

Mother of all ticking bombs

Analysts tracking the shift link it directly to a single event: reserve managers were unsettled by the seizure of the Central Bank of Russia’s reserves at the start of the Ukraine war by Washington and have since been actively reducing the dollar share of their portfolios.

This is a clear example that the economic system is not breaking under political pressure, it is adapting to it – flexibly, and crucially, without severing the interconnections that make global trade and finance function at all.

In other words, central banks accumulating gold are not exiting the system; they are just hedging within it.

But adaptability has a cost, and that cost is compounding.

Global debt – government, household, corporate and financial combined – surpassed $365 trillion in the first half of 2026, according to the Institute of International Finance’s Global Debt Monitor, the sixth consecutive quarterly record.

Emerging-market debt alone rose by $6.5 trillion in the same period, breaking past $110 trillion. Georgieva has been blunt about the trajectory: speaking at the IMF and World Bank annual meetings, she warned that global public debt is projected to reach 110 percent of the world’s GDP by 2029.

There is an evident reluctance to address what is not a crisis in any single country’s balance sheet, but a structural drift that every major economy appears aware of and none is prepared to correct unilaterally.

Debt of this scale narrows the fiscal space available to absorb the next shock, military or otherwise, which is precisely what makes today’s resilience difficult to extrapolate into tomorrow’s.

In this context, there is also the mother of all ticking bombs, a nuclear one: the $40 trillion US federal debt which US Secretary of Treasury Scott Bessent is desperately trying to reign in.

The third strand, the onslaught of punitive political measures targeting market principles, is best illustrated by the fate of Russia’s frozen central bank reserves. Roughly $300bn in Russian sovereign assets have been immobilised globally since 2022, with some €210bn ($235bn) held within the European Union.

Erosion of neutrality

Rather than remaining in legal limbo, these reserves have become the financial engine of a specific policy outcome: the EU’s proposed €140bn ($157bn) “reparations loan” to Ukraine, structured so that Ukraine would repay it only once Russia itself pays war damages – effectively converting a sanctions freeze into a grant.

Russia’s central bank has responded by suing the Brussels-based depository Euroclear, which holds the bulk of the assets, calling the manoeuvre illegal.

Whatever one’s view of the underlying conflict, the precedent is the point economists increasingly raise: the first large-scale use of frozen sovereign reserves as collateral for a geopolitical objective changes the calculus for every reserve-holding state watching from outside the western bloc.

It is one more data pointing to the reinforcing of the gold-accumulation trend described above – and a vivid example of how political tools aimed at a single adversary can erode the perceived neutrality of the system itself.

A parallel erosion is under way in trade governance. The WTO’s Appellate Body (the one supposed to settle trade dispute among countries) has been non-functional since December 2019, after the United States blocked the appointment of new judges and talks on reviving or replacing it remain stuck.

More than 30 appeals currently sit unresolved, and the workaround mechanism created to fill the gap – the Multi-Party Interim Appeal Arbitration Arrangement – has resolved only a single case. The institution designed to prevent trade disputes from becoming purely a function of relative power has been quietly sidelined for seven years.

It is then worth wondering – in such a situation – if the Global West and Global Rest see the same picture here.

The evidence suggests convergence on diagnosis but real divergence on meaning. Both recognise that debt is unsustainable and that institutions are strained. But where western policymakers tend to treat sanctions, frozen assets and trade paralysis as defensive responses to external aggression.

Voices from the Global Rest increasingly read the same tools as confirmation that the system was never as neutral as advertised.

India’s External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar captured this gap memorably in 2022, telling European interlocutors that Europe needed to “grow out of the mindset” that its problems are everyone’s problems while the reverse does not hold.

Selective status

This is something many Global Rest governments had been thinking but not saying aloud: that the postwar order’s claim to universality was always, in practice, more selective than it appeared.

The more honest and outspoken western leader to recognise such an unfair situation, to use an understatement, was Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney earlier this year in Davos.

None of this means the system is about to fracture. The world economy has proven more elastic than feared, absorbing shocks that a decade ago might have triggered genuine crisis. But elasticity and durability are not the same thing.

The real test of this sort of “economy of resistance” is not whether it survives the next military-political storm – it plainly has, repeatedly.

It is whether record debt, a paralysed trade-dispute architecture, and the normalisation of sovereign-asset seizures as a policy tool are quietly converting what is in effect a short-term adaptability into long-term fragility, especially at a moment when the Global Rest and Global West can no longer agree on what the system is actually for.

Original article:  www.middleeasteye.net

The EU is preparing to curb Chinese imports of chemicals and industrial machinery, following a successful deal with Beijing that capped hybrid car exports to the bloc.

The European Commission “showed openness” to proposing safeguards, referring to an emergency brake on imports that can cover entire sectors, an EU diplomat told EUobserver on Thursday (15 October).

And there was “broad support” for the idea among member states for the commission to proceed, the diplomat said.

Last week, trade commissioner Maroš Šefčovič agreed with Beijing to cap imports of Chinese hybrid cars at 350,000 next year, which was less than half the amount expected this year.

He called the deal a “blueprint” for other sectors, a view which was publicly echoed by EU Commission president Ursula von der Leyen, also on Thursday. 

Under World Trade Organization (WTO) and EU rules, anti-dumping and anti-subsidy cases require Brussels to prove that Chinese firms sell at unfairly low prices or receive subsidies.

Safeguards do not need evidence under WTO rules, which allows them to be used as an emergency measure.

And the commission only has to show that a surge in imports is seriously harming European producers. 

“We like the idea, chemicals, machinery where there’s still a lot of Chinese overproduction needs to be managed,” said another EU diplomat.

The instrument had its limits: Safeguards have to apply to all countries, not just China, and can last no more than eight years.

The EU rarely uses WTO safeguards, but did so on steel, also aimed at China, which expired in June, after reaching the eight-year limit, and which have since been replaced by a separate EU steel regime.

And the Centre for European Reform, a prominent think-tank in Brussels, previously suggested exempting the EU’s 76 free-trade partners from safeguards so that the measures fell mainly on China.

It was a legal moot point in the WTO if that was OK, but the EU has done something similar before. 

Norway, Iceland, Liechtenstein, and 10 other countries were left out of the steel safeguard, but using this tool to address Chinese imports was still seen as a temporary solution.

Before the end of the year, the EU commission aims to present diversification tools to reduce reliance on Chinese goods, as well as a mechanism to compensate companies hit by Chinese countermeasures.

And the package would include an instrument to shut Chinese companies out of the EU market if need be, in a measure first proposed in a Franco-German paper last week.

When the oil supertanker Esteem Explorer sails from the United States to Japan in late November, loaded with about 2 million barrels of crude, the journey will cost $81 million. The same journey would have cost $9.1 million last year, on average.

Europe’s trade deficit with China reached a record $34.8bn [€31bn] in September, as EU leaders meet in Brussels on Thursday (15 October) to discuss Europe’s competitiveness agenda and what they call “macroeconomic imbalances” — a euphemism to avoid mentioning China by name.

EU heads of state and government are expected to give a mandate to the EU Commission to propose a set of trade defence measures and tools to reduce the EU’s reliance on Chinese industry, based on a new Franco-German blueprint, as a united front spreads across the bloc. 

There was a move towards a “surprising unitary position” on Beijing among member states, said an EU diplomat, ahead of a two-day summit in Brussels which began on Thursday (15 October).

A joint letter and policy paper submitted by French president Emmanuel Macron and German chancellor Friedrich Merz to commission president Ursula von der Leyen last week was viewed by many EU diplomats as marking a decisive shift towards a more consolidated EU stance on trade relations with China. 

“For a long time, there were significant differences between these two countries on how to deal with China, how to address the economic situation,” parliament president Roberta Metsola told reporters on Thursday. 

The diplomat added that the commission’s trade diversification package, designed to reduce the bloc’s reliance on Chinese industrial inputs and curb Chinese exports, will be presented by the end of the year and will be based on the Franco-German paper. 

But the commission, for its part, has downplayed the prospect of rapid progress to EU-Chinese trade statistics. “It’s an issue which is not going to be solved in a couple of months,” said one official. 

‘Be ready for escalation’ but do nothing

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Belgium’s foreign minister has called on the EU to deepen its economic, trade, and defence ties with Turkey, amid concerns from Ankara that it risks being shut out of the bloc’s new rules on industrial supply chains and multi-billion euro defence procurement scheme. 

Speaking at a Turkey-EU business forum in Brussels on Tuesday (13 October), Belgian foreign minister Maxime Pévot said that European manufacturers were increasingly looking for reliable partners closer to home as they seek to reduce their reliance on Chinese inputs. 

“We should make values of its proximity, particularly in sectors where Europe needs to reduce strategic dependencies,” he added. 

“Our economic relationship should no longer be limited to buying and selling goods. We should also be developing, producing, and investing together,” he said. 

For his part, following talks with Ankara’s trade minister, Ömer Bolat, EU trade commissioner Maroš Šefčovič told reporters that the two sides had agreed on reforms to Turkey’s import control system to make the system easier for EU exporters to use and a mutual recognition pact on trusted traders. 

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BRICS Pay non è una valuta né una rete di regolamento: è interoperabilità. E a Nuova Delhi i leader si sono limitati a “prenderne atto”.

Segue nostro Telegram.

Cosa è e cosa non è

Alla vigilia del diciottesimo vertice BRICS, ospitato al Bharat Mandapam di Nuova Delhi il 12 e 13 settembre 2026, una parte della stampa specializzata dava per imminente il debutto di BRICS Pay. Le guide al vertice indicavano proprio la capitale indiana come sede del pieno dispiegamento del sistema, con la Reserve Bank of India incaricata del coordinamento tecnico. Il testo approvato dai leader racconta un’altra storia. La Dichiarazione di Nuova Delhi, 140 paragrafi adottati per consenso, si limita a «prendere atto» del lavoro svolto dalla BRICS Payment Task Force sull’interoperabilità dei canali di pagamento e di messaggistica e sulle discussioni relative al regolamento in valute locali, precisando che ciò avviene nel rispetto delle priorità nazionali e nella consapevolezza che non esiste una soluzione valida per tutti. La proposta indiana di collegare le valute digitali delle banche centrali, su cui Nuova Delhi aveva investito una parte consistente del capitale politico della propria presidenza, nel documento non compare.

La distanza tra attese e risultato non va letta come un incidente diplomatico. Riflette due condizioni strutturali che la pubblicistica sulla de-dollarizzazione tende a sottovalutare. La prima è che i Paesi BRICS, presi uno per uno, hanno ancora buone ragioni per regolare in dollari una parte rilevante dei propri scambi. La seconda è che un sistema di pagamento comune non è un problema di ingegneria finanziaria. È un atto di governo condiviso, che richiede regole vincolanti, un’istanza di arbitrato e la disponibilità a fidarsi delle banche centrali altrui. A Nuova Delhi nessuna di queste condizioni era sul tavolo.

Il nome induce in errore. BRICS Pay non è una moneta e non è, almeno nella configurazione discussa finora, un circuito di regolamento. È un livello di interoperabilità pensato per mettere in comunicazione sistemi nazionali già esistenti: il russo SPFS, nato dopo le sanzioni del 2014; il cinese CIPS, operativo dal 2015; l’indiano UPI e il brasiliano Pix, costruiti per i pagamenti domestici istantanei e solo in seguito proiettati all’estero. Il progetto ha preso forma durante la presidenza russa del 2024, nel quadro della BRICS Cross-Border Payments Initiative accolta a Kazan, un’iniziativa che la stessa dichiarazione di quel vertice qualificava come volontaria e non vincolante.

Per capire dove si colloca il progetto conviene distinguere tre piani che il dibattito pubblico confonde di continuo. Il primo è la messaggistica, cioè la trasmissione standardizzata degli ordini di pagamento tra istituzioni finanziarie: è il terreno di SWIFT, ed è qui che BRICS Pay si propone come alternativa. Il secondo è il regolamento, il trasferimento effettivo di valore tra conti presso banche centrali o banche corrispondenti, con tutto ciò che comporta in termini di liquidità, rischio di controparte e gestione dei saldi. Il terzo è l’unità di conto, la moneta in cui i contratti sono denominati. Un’alternativa a SWIFT agisce soltanto sul primo piano. Se un esportatore indiano fattura in dollari e la banca russa regola in dollari presso un corrispondente, aver trasmesso il messaggio su un canale non occidentale cambia ben poco.

L’interoperabilità ha però un vantaggio politico evidente, ed è la ragione per cui è diventata la formula di compromesso del gruppo: consente a ciascun Paese di conservare la propria moneta e il proprio sistema finanziario. Una moneta comune imporrebbe rinunce di tutt’altra portata, dalle regole di emissione e di cambio alla gestione dei Paesi strutturalmente in avanzo o in disavanzo. Non a caso Sudhakar Dalela, segretario per le relazioni economiche del ministero degli Esteri indiano, ha ribadito durante il vertice che una valuta BRICS non è in discussione, aggiungendo la prudente clausola «per ora».

La storia del dossier è la storia di un lessico che avanza di millimetri. Nel 2010, a Brasília, i quattro Paesi fondatori si impegnavano a studiare la fattibilità di una cooperazione monetaria e di accordi di regolamento in valuta locale. A Ufa, nel 2015, si riconosceva il potenziale delle valute nazionali; a Xiamen, due anni dopo, si parlava di swap valutari e di investimenti diretti in moneta locale. Dal 2019 l’attenzione si è spostata sulle infrastrutture di pagamento, con l’avvio dei lavori della Payment Task Force. Johannesburg, nel 2023, ha evocato per la prima volta l’interconnessione dei sistemi di pagamento transfrontalieri; Kazan ha lanciato l’iniziativa volontaria; Rio, nel 2025, ha accolto un rapporto tecnico sul sistema di pagamenti transfrontalieri BRICS che a oltre un anno di distanza non è stato reso pubblico. Sedici anni dopo Brasília, Nuova Delhi «prende atto». La successione dei verbi (studiare, riconoscere, accogliere, prendere atto) è già un indicatore: in un organismo che decide per consenso, il grado di impegno reale si legge nella grammatica dei comunicati.

L’ambizione indiana e il prezzo del consenso

L’India aveva fatto dei pagamenti transfrontalieri uno dei pilastri della propria presidenza. A gennaio la Reserve Bank of India aveva proposto di collegare le valute digitali di banca centrale dei Paesi membri per facilitare commercio e turismo; ad agosto il governatore Sanjay Malhotra confermava che erano in corso discussioni sul collegamento dei sistemi di pagamento veloce e delle CBDC; alla vigilia del vertice il ministro del Commercio Piyush Goyal rilanciava l’invito a regolare gli scambi in moneta locale. Già il 10 settembre, tuttavia, Reuters riferiva di ostacoli politici e tecnici in grado di limitare i progressi, e ne indicava due in particolare: l’interruzione dei rapporti finanziari tra Emirati Arabi Uniti e Iran e la riluttanza della stessa India ad approfondire la connettività finanziaria con la Cina senza una fiducia reciproca più solida.

Il secondo ostacolo merita attenzione, perché rovescia un’immagine corrente. Il freno più robusto a un’integrazione dei pagamenti BRICS non viene da Washington, ma dal Paese che presiedeva il vertice. Nuova Delhi vuole infrastrutture che rendano più semplice il commercio in rupie e più economiche le rimesse della sua diaspora. Non vuole che queste infrastrutture passino per nodi cinesi, né che il loro effetto netto sia un’espansione dello yuan in Asia meridionale. L’incontro tra Narendra Modi e Xi Jinping a margine del vertice ha segnato un disgelo prudente, ma il disavanzo commerciale indiano verso la Cina, raddoppiato nell’arco di un decennio, resta una frattura che nessun comunicato può ricomporre.

C’è poi l’effetto dell’allargamento. Con undici membri e dieci Paesi partner, il gruppo comprende oggi Stati che nella guerra del 2026 si sono trovati su fronti opposti. A maggio la riunione dei ministri degli Esteri, sempre a Nuova Delhi, si era chiusa senza un comunicato congiunto, costringendo la presidenza indiana a una dichiarazione a titolo proprio. L’unanimità di settembre è stata ottenuta abbassando la soglia degli impegni. La dichiarazione critica dazi e sanzioni unilaterali senza nominare gli Stati Uniti e, sul dossier finanziario, rinvia a un lavoro tecnico di cui non fissa né scadenze né obiettivi. Ajay Srivastava, fondatore del Global Trade Research Initiative, ha osservato che il testo non prevede alcuna azione concreta e che, in assenza di un piano coordinato, il commercio in valute locali potrà crescere solo gradualmente, senza raggiungere volumi significativi.

Va segnalato, per scrupolo di metodo, che alcune testate hanno presentato il vertice come il momento del «lancio» di BRICS Pay. Il testo della dichiarazione, così come riportato dalle fonti che lo hanno esaminato nel dettaglio, non autorizza questa lettura. La confusione tra annuncio e realizzazione è uno dei tratti ricorrenti della comunicazione sul tema, e contribuisce a gonfiare aspettative che poi ricadono sulla credibilità del gruppo.

Le buone ragioni del dollaro

Le statistiche disponibili spiegano meglio di qualsiasi dichiarazione perché la de-dollarizzazione resti, per ora, più un tema di dibattito che una tendenza misurabile. Secondo l’ultima indagine triennale della Banca dei regolamenti internazionali, nell’aprile 2025 il dollaro compariva in circa l’89% delle transazioni valutarie mondiali, una quota in lieve aumento rispetto al 2022, mentre lo yuan si fermava all’8,5%. Sul versante delle riserve, i dati del Fondo monetario internazionale indicano per il primo trimestre del 2026 una quota del dollaro pari al 57,13%, contro l’1,99% della valuta cinese. La tendenza di lungo periodo è di erosione: intorno al 1999 il dollaro superava il 70% delle riserve allocate. Ma la diversificazione si disperde su una costellazione di valute minori, la cui quota residua è più che raddoppiata dal 2021, e non si concentra sulle monete dei Paesi BRICS.

La ragione non è la sudditanza, è il calcolo. Il dollaro offre ciò che nessuna alternativa offre ancora: mercati profondi e liquidi, strumenti di copertura a basso costo, un enorme stock di debito denominato nella stessa valuta e la possibilità di convertire in qualsiasi momento il ricavato di una transazione in un attivo considerato sicuro. Barry Eichengreen ha descritto questi vantaggi in termini di effetti di rete: una moneta è utile in proporzione al numero di soggetti che già la usano, e ciò rende costosa qualunque transizione tentata da un solo attore o da un piccolo gruppo. Per un importatore brasiliano o un esportatore indonesiano pagare in dollari significa pagare nella moneta che la controparte accetta senza trattare.

Scendendo al livello dei singoli membri, il quadro si fa ancora più netto. L’India ha dichiarato a più riprese di non avere interesse a indebolire il dollaro: nel dicembre 2024 il ministro degli Esteri Subrahmanyam Jaishankar ricordava che gli Stati Uniti sono il primo partner commerciale del Paese, e nell’estate 2025 il portavoce del ministero ribadiva che la de-dollarizzazione non rientra nell’agenda finanziaria indiana. Emirati Arabi Uniti e Arabia Saudita mantengono le proprie valute ancorate al dollaro e fondano la propria sicurezza su un rapporto con Washington che nessun circuito di pagamento alternativo potrebbe compensare. Riyadh, del resto, continua a stare nel gruppo in una posizione ambigua: la presidenza indiana la elencava tra gli undici membri, ma a Nuova Delhi la delegazione saudita si è presentata con lo status di Paese invitato. Egitto ed Etiopia, che negli ultimi anni hanno negoziato programmi con il Fondo monetario e portano un debito estero in valuta forte, non possono permettersi di complicare il rapporto con i propri creditori. Il Brasile di Lula ha rilanciato più volte l’idea di una moneta commerciale comune, ma il suo sistema di punta, Pix, rimane un successo domestico.

Restano la Russia e l’Iran, per i quali l’uscita dal dollaro non è una scelta ma una necessità imposta dalle sanzioni, e la Cina, che ha un interesse reale all’internazionalizzazione dello yuan ma lo persegue attraverso infrastrutture proprie, a cominciare da CIPS, e senza rinunciare ai controlli sui capitali che limitano l’attrattiva della sua moneta come riserva. Anche per chi ha le motivazioni più forti, tuttavia, il regolamento in valute locali ha mostrato limiti precisi. L’esperienza russo-indiana è istruttiva. Il forte aumento delle importazioni indiane di petrolio russo dopo il 2022 ha lasciato Mosca con ingenti saldi in rupie difficili da impiegare, un problema che lo stesso Sergej Lavrov ammise pubblicamente nel maggio 2023. Quando gli scambi sono squilibrati, la moneta del Paese in disavanzo si accumula presso il Paese in avanzo, e il dollaro torna a essere la via d’uscita più semplice.

A questi incentivi si somma il costo esplicito di una rottura. Donald Trump ha minacciato dazi del 100% contro i Paesi BRICS che sostenessero una moneta alternativa al dollaro e, dopo il vertice di Rio del 2025, un dazio aggiuntivo del 10% per chi si allineasse alle politiche del gruppo da lui definite antiamericane. Alla vigilia di Nuova Delhi l’economista di Natixis Alicia García-Herrero prevedeva che i leader avrebbero discusso di pagamenti transfrontalieri senza tentare di sostituire il dollaro. È andata esattamente così.

Una scelta politica

Si arriva così al punto centrale. Un sistema di pagamento non è un’infrastruttura neutrale. Susan Strange collocava la struttura finanziaria, cioè il controllo sul credito e sui canali attraverso cui circola, tra le quattro fonti del potere strutturale nell’economia politica internazionale. Gli Stati che controllano i nodi centrali delle reti economiche globali, di cui SWIFT è l’esempio canonico, possano trasformarli in strumenti di coercizione, sfruttandone sia la funzione di osservatorio sia la capacità di esclusione. È proprio questa esperienza, culminata nell’esclusione delle principali banche russe da SWIFT nel 2022, ad aver dato slancio politico al progetto BRICS.

La stessa lezione, però, vale all’interno del gruppo. Chi costruisce una rete alternativa deve stabilire dove si trovano i nodi, chi ne gestisce i dati, quale diritto regola le controversie, chi fornisce liquidità nei momenti di tensione e come si compensano i saldi tra economie in avanzo e in disavanzo. Ognuna di queste decisioni redistribuisce potere. Per l’India un sistema imperniato su CIPS significherebbe sostituire una dipendenza da Washington con una dipendenza da Pechino, cioè da un rivale con cui condivide una frontiera contesa. Per gli Emirati collegarsi a un circuito in cui transita l’Iran vorrebbe dire esporsi al rischio di sanzioni secondarie, proprio mentre i due Paesi escono da una guerra vissuta su fronti opposti. Il problema non è la tecnologia: le componenti nazionali esistono e funzionano. Manca un accordo su chi governa l’insieme.

La storia monetaria del Novecento offre due riferimenti utili. Il primo è la proposta keynesiana di una International Clearing Union, presentata dal Tesoro britannico nel 1943, che affrontava esattamente il nodo degli squilibri persistenti imponendo oneri simmetrici ai Paesi in avanzo e a quelli in disavanzo. Un BRICS Pay che volesse andare oltre la messaggistica avrebbe bisogno di un meccanismo analogo di compensazione multilaterale, e dunque di regole capaci di vincolare anche la Cina, principale creditore commerciale del gruppo. Il secondo riferimento è la tesi di Charles Kindleberger sulla stabilità del sistema internazionale come bene pubblico, che richiede un attore disposto a sostenerne i costi. Nell’ordine del dollaro quel ruolo è svolto, con tutti gli abusi che ne derivano, dagli Stati Uniti. Nel partenariato BRICS l’unico candidato plausibile è la Cina, e gli altri membri non intendono riconoscerle quella funzione. Qui sta il dilemma costitutivo di un ordine monetario multipolare: moltiplica i poli, ma lascia vacante il posto di chi garantisce il sistema.

A ciò si aggiunge la fragilità istituzionale. Il gruppo opera senza un segretariato permanente, con presidenze annuali a rotazione che affidano la continuità dei dossier tecnici alla volontà del Paese di turno. L’allargamento ha accresciuto l’eterogeneità degli interessi senza dotare il partenariato di strumenti decisionali più robusti. Un sistema di pagamento unificato richiederebbe un trattato, o almeno un accordo vincolante di governance, mentre l’iniziativa sui pagamenti transfrontalieri è, per esplicita scelta dei firmatari, volontaria e non vincolante. Finché questa asimmetria tra ambizione e forma giuridica non sarà sciolta, BRICS Pay resterà ciò che è oggi: un marchio politico sovrapposto a un insieme di corridoi bilaterali. La stabilità del partenariato non è dunque una condizione accessoria del progetto. Ne è il presupposto.

Verso la presidenza cinese del 2027

Con il passaggio della presidenza alla Cina per il 2027, l’orizzonte di valutazione più utile è quello dei prossimi diciotto-ventiquattro mesi. Le valutazioni che seguono poggiano su evidenze di qualità moderata, costituite in larga parte dai testi ufficiali e dalla stampa economica internazionale.

Lo scenario che considero altamente probabile è quello di un mosaico bilaterale. Crescono i corridoi già avviati, come quelli tra India ed Emirati e tra India e Russia, mentre l’architettura comune resta allo stadio di studio. Il commercio in valute locali aumenta in termini assoluti, ma la quota del dollaro negli scambi intra-BRICS si riduce solo in misura marginale.

Uno scenario alternativo, cui attribuisco una probabilità moderata, prevede che la presidenza cinese usi il 2027 per promuovere un nucleo a geometria variabile, costruito attorno a CIPS e SPFS, con l’adesione di Russia, Iran e di alcuni Paesi partner. Il marchio BRICS Pay verrebbe formalmente attivato, ma per una parte soltanto del gruppo e con ogni probabilità senza l’India. Sarebbe un risultato politicamente spendibile per Pechino e Mosca, ma renderebbe esplicita la frattura che oggi il linguaggio delle dichiarazioni riesce ancora a coprire.

L’entrata in funzione, entro il 2028, di un sistema unificato e operativo per tutti i membri resta invece altamente improbabile.

Gli indicatori da seguire sono pochi e concreti: la pubblicazione del rapporto tecnico accolto a Rio; l’eventuale firma di un accordo vincolante sulla governance dei pagamenti; la creazione di un meccanismo multilaterale di compensazione o di linee di swap dedicate, magari affidate alla Nuova Banca di Sviluppo; la posizione indiana su un collegamento con CIPS; la formalizzazione, o il definitivo abbandono, della membership saudita. Un comunicato che parli di «lancio» senza alcuno di questi elementi andrà letto per ciò che è, un annuncio.

Il multipolarismo ha finora prodotto soprattutto una pluralità di opzioni nazionali, utili a ciascun Paese per ridurre l’esposizione alle sanzioni e per negoziare da posizioni migliori con Washington. Trasformare queste opzioni in un sistema richiede un partenariato che riconosca un interesse comune più forte delle rivalità interne. Quel partenariato è ancora in evoluzione, e BRICS Pay ne seguirà i tempi, non il contrario.

The European Union has reached an agreement with China to restrict imports of Chinese hybrid vehicles to 350,000 annually, introducing a significant new barrier to the expansion of Chinese manufacturers in Europe’s automotive market.

The arrangement, confirmed on 12 October, follows months of negotiations between Brussels and Beijing and reflects growing concern about the competitive position of European carmakers.

The import ceiling could reduce Chinese hybrid vehicle sales in the EU by more than half compared with previously anticipated volumes, although the actual effect will depend on demand, product classifications and implementation.

The agreement comes as manufacturers gather for the Paris Motor Show, where the future of European vehicle production, Chinese competition and industrial policy have become central subjects.

China’s Commerce Ministry has presented the outcome as a negotiated arrangement intended to preserve trading relations, while the European side has emphasised the need to prevent rapidly increasing imports from undermining domestic production.

Chinese manufacturers confront a new European barrier

Chinese carmakers have expanded aggressively in overseas markets as domestic demand has weakened. Chinese passenger vehicle exports rose sharply in September, with manufacturers increasingly targeting Europe, Latin America and Asian markets.

Hybrid vehicles have become particularly important because they offer consumers lower fuel consumption without requiring the same degree of dependence on charging infrastructure as fully electric cars.

This has allowed Chinese brands to compete in market segments where European manufacturers retain substantial established production capacity.

The new quota limits the number of eligible Chinese hybrid vehicles permitted to enter the European market each year. According to details of the import restrictions, shipments exceeding the permitted volume would face restrictions at EU customs.

The mechanism differs from a conventional tariff because imports beyond the ceiling cannot simply enter the market by paying a higher duty. Manufacturers and importers will need to consider both delivery costs and the availability of import allocations.

European manufacturers seek protection

The measures arrive amid growing pressure on the European automotive industry, which faces high production costs, expensive energy, competition from Chinese manufacturers and the capital requirements of shifting towards electrified transport.

Companies operating in Germany, France, Italy and other established manufacturing centres must fund the development of new vehicles while maintaining existing factories and employment.

Chinese manufacturers benefit from extensive domestic production networks, considerable scale and access to battery manufacturing capacity.

European policymakers have questioned whether competition takes place under equivalent economic conditions, particularly where Chinese producers receive support from state-directed industrial policies.

Beijing rejects allegations that its export performance results principally from unfair state assistance, arguing that Chinese companies have achieved competitiveness through investment, innovation and efficiency.

The quota represents a departure from the assumption that European consumers will necessarily have unrestricted access to the lowest-priced imported vehicles.

Its economic effects will depend partly on whether European manufacturers can use the additional protection to improve productivity and develop more competitive models.

Will Chinese manufacturers move production into Europe?

Restrictions on imports do not necessarily reduce the presence of Chinese-owned companies in the European automotive industry.

Several manufacturers are already developing production capacity outside China, including within the European Union. BYD’s investment in Hungary is one example of how Chinese companies can pursue access to European consumers through local manufacturing rather than relying entirely on imported finished vehicles.

The new arrangements could strengthen the commercial incentive to expand such operations.

For European governments, Chinese investment presents a difficult calculation. New factories may create employment, increase industrial activity and preserve automotive supply chains, while also expanding the influence of Chinese manufacturers within Europe’s domestic market.

The economic consequences depend on how much research, component manufacturing, battery production and other high-value activity takes place locally.

A Chinese-owned assembly plant using predominantly imported components would provide different benefits from a fully developed European production network.

The British dimension

The debate is also drawing attention to the position of the United Kingdom, whose automotive industry remains closely integrated with European supply chains despite Brexit.

Executives from Stellantis and Renault have supported including Britain within proposed European industrial protection measures, reflecting the importance of UK manufacturing operations to their broader businesses.

Such an arrangement would raise questions about regulatory alignment, trade preferences and the conditions under which non-EU production could qualify for European industrial support.

British manufacturers also face the challenge of Chinese competition, and decisions taken in Brussels could influence investment strategies across the wider European automotive sector.

Protection versus competitiveness

The restrictions may offer European manufacturers additional time to adapt, but they do not eliminate the structural challenges confronting the industry.

Energy prices, labour costs, the availability of batteries and the affordability of new vehicles remain important factors in the competitiveness of European production.

Nor will the quota necessarily prevent Chinese firms from gaining market share through investment, partnerships or vehicles manufactured outside China.

The EU’s approach combines restrictions on imports with the possibility of continued Chinese industrial participation inside Europe.

The outcome will depend on whether European manufacturers use the reduced competitive pressure to strengthen their technological and manufacturing position, or whether the restrictions primarily accelerate the relocation of Chinese-owned production into the EU.

EU and Chinese officials agreed a series of trade concessions covering electric cars, rare earths and tariffs that dragged them away from a damaging trade war on Friday (9 October), following two days of crisis talks.

Following two days of talks in Beijing, EU trade commissioner Maroš Šefčovič said that he and China’s commerce secretary Wang Wentao had made a “crucial first step” towards rebalancing EU-China trade relations.

Europe can point to progress on hybrid vehicles, stronger assurances over the supply of critical raw materials, and continued engagement on market access issues in China.

Hours before Šefčovič arrived, Beijing rejected an EU demand for so-called “voluntary export restrictions” on its electric vehicles (EVs). However, in a joint statement on Friday, the two sides said that they had reached an “understanding on trade in hybrid vehicles in a WTO compliant manner”, but without providing further details.

They added that further negotiations on reducing tariffs and minimum pricing deals would allow Chinese EVs to enter the EU at a lower duty rate.

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Persuading China that its €1bn daily trade surplus with the EU is not sustainable was always going to be a hard sell for EU trade commissioner Maroš Šefčovič.  

And the early signs are that Šefčovič’s two days of talks with Chinese commerce secretary Wang Wentao, which conclude on Friday (9 October), are not going to deliver the breakthrough demanded by EU leaders when they gather for a summit in Brussels next week. 

“The message around the table was clear: the need to improve access to the Chinese market, while boosting our economic security,” Šefčovič posted on X ahead of the first day of talks. 

But rhetoric aside, three months after the EU Commission set up a series of ‘work streams’ with Chinese officials, with a mandate to address the multi-layered EU-Sino trade dispute, it is hard to see much tangible progress. 

Hours before Šefčovič arrived, Beijing rejected an EU demand for so-called “voluntary export restrictions” on its electric vehicles (EVs). 

In August, data published by Schmidt Automotive Research found that 14 percent of EV sales across Europe this year were Chinese-made, up from 9.4 percent last year. 

That is despite the EU imposing additional tariffs of between 17 and 36 percent on Chinese EVs in October 2024. 

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Mexico's auto exports posted their biggest slump so far this year, data from statistics office INEGI showed on Wednesday, a decline analysts attributed to tariff policies from the US, the biggest market for the Latin American country's top industrial sector.

Production: By Europod, in co-production with Sphera Network.

EUobserver is proud to have an editorial partnership with Europod to co-publish the podcast series “Briefed” hosted by Léa Marchal. The podcast is available on all major platforms.

Find the full transcript below: 

Chinese carmakers are taking an increasing share of the European car market, particularly when it comes to electric vehicles. Why are European carmakers now opening their factories to their Chinese competitors?

Until recently, the main concern in Europe was Chinese-made electric vehicles being imported into the EU. That’s why, two years ago, the EU imposed hefty tariffs on Chinese electric cars.

But Chinese manufacturers have found another way into the European market: they are setting up production here. Some are building factories of their own. Others are entering partnerships with European carmakers and using their existing production sites.

That’s the case with Stellantis and Chinese manufacturer Leapmotor. And now Dongfeng is also negotiating to produce cars at the French plant of Rennes La Janais. Because by moving production to Europe, Chinese manufacturers may be losing one of their main advantages, which is cheap labour.

But low labour costs are only one part of their competitive edge.

Chinese manufacturers also continue to benefit from state support. And setting up production in Europe doesn’t necessarily mean building brand-new factories.

In many cases, Chinese companies are looking to partner with European manufacturers and use factories that are already there — factories that are no longer operating at full capacity. That means they can save significantly on investment costs. And they can also rely on their European partners’ existing sales and distribution networks.

So how big is this Chinese presence in Europe becoming? For 2028, there are already 12 projects involving Chinese carmakers setting up production in Europe. Several are in Spain, with others in France, Belgium, Slovakia, Hungary, Sweden and Austria.

Now, why would European manufacturers allow their Chinese competitors to produce cars in their own factories? Part of the answer is that European carmakers are struggling to keep up in electric vehicles sells. And that is contributing to factory closures and job losses.

European manufacturers have to meet EU targets on average CO2 emissions each year. And producing more electric vehicles is necessary to meet those requirements.

So partnerships with Chinese manufacturers can serve two purposes: they can help European companies fulfilling their green cars objectives, while also keeping existing factories and jobs running.

Though there is a longer-term risk for European manufacturers. The more Chinese companies establish themselves in Europe, the more competitive pressure they could put on European brands — potentially even leading to takeovers. That has happened before: Volvo Cars, for example, was acquired by Chinese group Geely in 2010. 

In Germany, carmakers are for now refusing to open the doors of their production sites to the Chinese. But they do have partnerships with Chinese companies to produce vehicles in China, where they can benefit from lower production costs. That explains why they were very much opposed to imposing tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles.

But the situation is now changing. Volkswagen closed its Dresden factory last year, and other German plants are also facing closure risks. Germany’s car industry is therefore increasingly joining calls for stronger protection against Chinese competition.

And that brings us back to the Franco-German paper that is circulating in Brussels, which calls for measures to restrict Chinese access to the European market.

Because this debate goes well beyond cars. The EU is increasingly concerned about Chinese competition and dependence in a range of strategic industries. This will be discussed next week, when EU leaders meet in Brussels.

The European Commission could also present a new so-called “diversification” tool, either at the summit or around it. One possibility would be to require companies not to rely exclusively on China for certain critical materials. Something which could trigger what we call a trade war. I’ll be following that very closely!

The war between the United States and Iran is no longer just a confrontation between Washington and Tehran. A second contest is taking shape alongside and behind it. China is not fighting the United States directly, but its economic, technological and diplomatic links to Iran are complicating Washington’s strategy and ability to win the conflict. […]

The post The China factor behind the Iran war appeared first on Asia Times.

A copper ingot cast somewhere in inland Sardinia during the Bronze Age might, centuries later, turn up in a Scottish tomb or a village in southern Sweden. That is the striking picture drawn by Serena Sabatini, an archaeologist at the University of Gothenburg, in a new paper that pulls together decades of isotopic analyses to […]

Tharangambadi is a fishing village on India’s Coromandel Coast, in the state of Tamil Nadu. Its name means “place of the singing waves,” a nod to the Indian Ocean lapping at its shore. It isn’t much of a tourist stop, and fishing is still its main trade, but anyone who walks its streets runs into […]

Trade Commissioner Maroš Šefčovič and MEP Dirk Gotink (EPP, Netherlands) Photographer: Mathieu Cugnot © European Union

The European Parliament has approved a major overhaul of the EU’s customs system, tightening requirements on e-commerce platforms, introducing a new handling fee for goods ordered from outside the bloc and creating a central EU customs authority.

“This is the biggest reform of European customs since 1968, supporting trade and the enforcement of EU rules,” said MEP Dirk Gotink, (EPP, Netherlands) who steered the legislation through Parliament. Gotink said European customs authorities had been overwhelmed by a “tsunami of Chinese parcels” and that the reform would give customs officers stronger tools to enforce EU standards.

Under the new rules, e-commerce platforms and sellers shipping goods directly from non-EU countries to European consumers will be treated as importers. That will make them responsible for providing customs data, handling applicable charges and ensuring products comply with EU law.

The reform also introduces an EU-wide handling fee on goods ordered directly from non-EU countries, with member states required to begin collecting it no later than 1 November, 2026. The European Commission will determine the amount and review it every two years.

Companies that repeatedly breach EU customs rules could face fines ranging from at least 1% to as much as 6% of the value of goods they imported into the EU during the previous 12 months.

The overhaul will also establish an EU Customs Data Hub, designed to replace at least 111 existing customs IT systems. A new EU Customs Authority, based in Lille, France, will manage the hub and coordinate customs cooperation and risk management across the EU.

The Council has already given the reform its final formal approval, making Parliament’s vote the final step in the legislative procedure.

European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen during her speech in 2025 Photographer: Dati Bendo © European Union, 2025

Ursula von der Leyen is expected to make the case for a more independent and resilient Europe in her State of the European Union address on Wednesday (16 September). But analysts and political groups in the European Parliament are demanding something more concrete: evidence that the Commission can turn its expanding ambitions into results Europeans can see.

The State of the European Union address, commonly known in Brussels as the “SOTEU”, is the Commission president’s annual speech to Parliament setting out priorities for the year ahead. Modeled in part on the US president’s State of the Union address to Congress, the EU version began in 2010 under then Commission president José Manuel Barroso. Von der Leyen will deliver this year’s address at 9:00 tomorrow morning (16 September).

The speech comes as Europe is confronted with an ongoing war in Ukraine, a fragmenting global trading system and the challenge of strengthening defence while reviving competitiveness and financing the green transition. At home, von der Leyen must reconcile political groups that broadly agree on the need for a stronger Europe but differ over what that means.

For Manfred Weber, chairman of von der Leyen’s centre-right European People’s Party group, the focus should be on voters’ economic and security concerns.

“Europe’s priorities must reflect people’s concerns: jobs, the cost of living and economic security,” Weber said. He called for a stronger economy and well-paid jobs, tighter control of Europe’s borders, leadership on AI, continued support for Ukraine and “a strong European defence pillar”.

On the centre-left, Iratxe García Pérez, president of the Socialists and Democrats group, argues that the Commission has relied too heavily on deregulation.

“Europe needs more than announcements,” García Pérez said. “It needs concrete policies backed by the necessary resources.” The S&D wants greater emphasis on affordable food, housing and energy, quality jobs and climate action, alongside European sovereignty in defence and digital technologies.

Renew Europe is also making delivery the benchmark, calling on von der Leyen to present “a credible plan turning European ambition into visible results” and framing the choice as one between united European action and fragmentation.

Analysts at the European Policy Centre see the same challenge extending to Europe’s position in the world.

“Von der Leyen will tell us that the EU is forging new partnerships around the globe,” said Almut Möller, the EPC’s director for European and Global Affairs. Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney’s attendance will reinforce the geopolitical dimension of the speech.

But strategic autonomy goes beyond defence and trade. Georg Riekeles, the EPC’s head of political economy, identifies financial dependence as an overlooked vulnerability. With the international financial system becoming less stable, Europe cannot assume Washington and the US Federal Reserve will play the stabilising role they did in previous crises. Von der Leyen “must therefore address financial sovereignty as a core element of European security”, he argues.

Technology poses another test. Elizabeth Kuiper, the EPC’s head of health and societal resilience, says von der Leyen should “reject the trade-off between competitiveness, technological progress, and the EU’s social model”, particularly as AI affects employment, income security and social cohesion.

Climate policy presents a similar collision between ambition and resources. Stefan Šipka, the EPC’s head of sustainable prosperity, argues that Europe needs “a robust delivery mindset, no more strategies” as it tries to combine defence, decarbonisation and economic security.

The common thread is delivery. Von der Leyen has no shortage of strategic objectives. The harder task on Wednesday will be explaining how they fit together, how Europe will finance them and what takes priority when they conflict.

For EPC policy analyst Eric Maurice, von der Leyen “must provide strategic focus and political clarity”.

“As the midterm in her second term approaches,” Maurice said, “it is time for von der Leyen to present a vision and deliver.”

On 11 September, the European Commission has put forward its proposals to the Council for the signature and conclusion of Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between the European Union and India, seeking authorization for its signature and conclusion. If authorized by the Council, this will be the largest trade agreement ever concluded by both the EU and India.

Once adopted and entered into force, the agreement will improve market access, reduce tariffs, tackle unnecessary barriers to trade, as well as provide predictable rules for trade and investment between the EU and India. The EU and India already trade over €180 billion worth of goods and services per year, supporting close to 800,000 EU jobs. This deal will eliminate or reduce tariffs on 96% of EU goods exports to India. Overall, the tariff reductions will save around €4 billion per year in duties on European products. It will make it easier for European companies to access the Indian market and compete on a more level playing field, while it will ensure consumers can benefit from increased choices and more competitive prices.

The proposal put forward today represents a key step towards ensuring that consumers and businesses can start reaping the benefits of this deal as soon as possible. This is in line with the fast-track procedure laid out by Commissioner for Trade and Economic Security, Maroš Šefčovič earlier this year. The procedure aims at speeding up the implementation of FTA's, which is crucial at a time of geopolitical uncertainty and growing pressure on the global trading system.

The EU-India FTA reflects the EU's commitment to strengthen economic ties with key partners in the Indo-Pacific region. With its proposals, the Commission is seeking Council's approval to sign the agreements which will then require European Parliament's consent, before conclusion and entry into force. The Indian authorities are in parallel going through their own internal ratification procedures.

For more information

Proposal for a Council Decision on the signing of the Free Trade Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of India

Proposal for a Council Decision on the conclusion of the Free Trade Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of India

Questions and answers on the EU-India Free Trade Agreement

From illicit production to smuggling, the illicit tobacco trade continues to pose a serious problem for the EU, as it negatively impacts its finances, public health and security, according to a new report by the European Court of Auditors (ECA). Although the European Commission and EU countries have made efforts to combat this global criminal phenomenon, their action is not robust enough. Illicit production across the EU is increasing, smuggling methods are getting more sophisticated, and new tobacco products are on the rise. Against this backdrop, the auditors criticise poor cross-country cooperation, which suffers from persistent gaps and lacks a concerted EU-wide approach.

The illicit tobacco trade has changed significantly in recent years. Organised crime groups have strategically relocated production from Ukraine to the EU in order to shorten supply chains and access consumers more directly. Although smuggling remains a problem, illicit manufacturing sites have been detected in almost all EU countries, and illicit production has grown across the EU. For instance, in a large-scale illicit cigarette production factory in Belgium, each machine was capable of producing around a million cigarettes per hour. In the largest illicit cigarette factory dismantled in Spain, three million packets of counterfeit cigarettes were seized, i.e. 56 times the height of Mount Everest if the cigarettes were stacked horizontally.

“The EU cannot afford to let its fight against the scourge of illicit tobacco go up in smoke,” said Petri Sarvamaa, the ECA Member leading the audit. “If we are serious about safeguarding citizens’ health, wallets and security, the Commission and member states must up their game to fight criminal activity head-on.”

The illicit tobacco trade deprives EU and member state budgets of €13 billion a year, according to the Commission’s estimate. However, this figure should be treated with caution, as it is based on external studies. The fact remains that the Commission lacks a reliable and independent EU-wide estimate of the illicit tobacco market, its structure and its economic impact, e.g. in terms of lost tax revenues. Such data, however, are crucial for determining the magnitude of the problem and designing an effective response. As it stands, the Commission’s reporting is largely based on seizures, and so does not provide a full picture of the situation.

Over the past decade, the EU and its member states have taken measures to combat the illicit tobacco trade. However, EU law is not harmonised, and member states’ efforts are uneven. For example, key production inputs such as raw tobacco and production machinery, and new types of products such as heated tobacco products and liquids for e-cigarettes, are not treated in the same way across the EU. At the same time, the EU regulatory framework gives member states a free hand in choosing counter-measures, thus leading to enforcement gaps that organised crime groups can exploit. In particular, as national control systems and enforcement approaches differ, such as in the definition of offences and the severity of penalties, this can encourage criminal activities to relocate to laxer jurisdictions. Furthermore, EU countries are inconsistent in the way they exchange information.

In the EU, responsibility for combating the illicit tobacco trade is shared between several stakeholders. However, no single entity has a clear coordinating role, meaning that initiatives are fragmented. The auditors thus call on the Commission to assume a more active role in combating the illicit trade in tobacco products.

Background information

Although overall tobacco consumption has continued to fall, the quantity of illicit tobacco products in the EU has risen in recent years. In 2023, the Commission estimated that the quantity of illicit tobacco products was 8.8 % of total cigarette consumption. Excluding cigarettes, the illicit tobacco market amounts to nearly 21 000 tonnes in the EU. According to estimates, these new products make up 13 % of the market value of tobacco products sold in the EU, and attract younger consumers.

Illicit tobacco products are very attractive for organised crime groups due to their high profitability and comparatively low risk (penalties have traditionally been light and detection rates low). Such illegal activity not only provides a significant source of income for criminals but, by offering cheaper tobacco products, also undermines efforts to reduce tobacco consumption. Ultimately, it leads to losses in terms of customs duties, value-added tax and national excise duties.

The audit assesses the effectiveness of the action taken by the Commission and the member states. The auditors carried out field visits in Belgium, Spain, Poland and Romania, and include examples of illicit manufacturing sites in their report. ECA special report 23/2026 “Combating the illicit trade in tobacco in the EU: Fragmented efforts and persistent gaps” is available in 24 EU languages on the ECA website.

Pakistan and Kyrgyzstan also signed an agreement on scientific and technical cooperation.

The post Pakistan, Kyrgyzstan sign 16 MoUs, agreements to boost bilateral ties appeared first on BOL News.