Last March on Instagram, Students for Life President Kristan Hawkins posted a photo showing her and two other members of the Virginia-based group standing outside Space Center Houston. According to the captions, Hawkins and her fellow activists, one of whom was holding a mobile phone, were "ordering abortion pills undercover."

A lawsuit filed last week in Harris County, which includes Houston, describes that Instagram post as "nothing more than a publicity stunt." The lawsuit, which aims to deploy a Texas abortion law championed by Students for Life against the organization, is also a publicity stunt. But while it may be effective by that measure, it faces legal challenges that will be hard to overcome.

The lawsuit, which a Texas woman who opposes her state's abortion ban filed under the pseudonym Maria Puerto with help from the reproductive rights group Amplify Legal, is supposed to highlight the vagueness and broad scope of House Bill 7, a 2025 law that authorizes private civil action to enforce state restrictions on "abortion-inducing" drugs. But Puerto's attempted act of legal jiu-jitsu seems too clever by half, relying on a dubious reading of the statute to seek "monetary compensation" it does not authorize and thereby punish anti-abortion activists for constitutionally protected advocacy.

H.B. 7, also known as the Woman and Child Protection Act, says "a person may not manufacture or distribute an abortion-inducing drug in this state" or "mail, transport, deliver, prescribe, or provide an abortion-inducing drug in any manner to or from any person or location in this state." Those prohibitions, it says, "may be enforced only through a qui tam action" against a "person" who "violates" or "intends to violate" them.

Any "person" other than a state or local official can qualify as a "relator" authorized to bring such an action. The relator can seek injunctive relief and "an amount of not less than $100,000 for each violation," plus "costs and reasonable attorney's fees." A successful relator generally receives $10,000 of that "amount," with the rest going to a "charitable organization" of his choice.

As a "person" who is not a government official, Puerto meets H.B. 7's minimal test for standing. And although H.B. 7 precludes lawsuits against pregnant women who obtain "an abortion-inducing drug," Puerto says Hawkins and the other activists "are not pregnant and were not pregnant" at the time of the Instagram post. So far, so good. But although the lawsuit asserts that Hawkins et al. "openly and flagrantly violated" the law's prohibitions, it does not explain how.

A photo accompanying a recent Mother Jones profile of Hawkins shows her and her social media coordinator, Lydia Taylor Davis, outside Space Center Houston during their "abortion-pill 'sting' stunt." Another Mother Jones photo shows Hawkins holding a mobile phone displaying what Puerto's lawsuit describes as "an order confirmation."

Judging from the Mother Jones account, it is not clear whether that description is accurate. "The scheme rapidly went off the rails," Amy Littlefield writes. "The plan was to purchase pills from a couple of services, with Hawkins posing as a male abuser while Davis pretended to be a 16-year-old—all to try to portray mail-order suppliers as reckless and dangerous. For reasons even she couldn't explain, Hawkins chose the fake name 'Wanda' as her male-abuser alter ego. But when Davis input her information, she hit a snag."

Davis was trying to order pills from the Massachusetts Medication Abortion Access Project. But according to Littlefield, that organization "had blocked Davis in its system after Students for Life teased the sting operation on social media." Hawkins "attempted to save the stunt by placing her own order, but 'Wanda' accidentally gave her age as 15," which was below the supplier's minimum age, Littlefield says. "Now a security guard was wandering over to tell them they couldn't film. Having set out to show that telemedicine services don't screen their clients, they inadvertently proved the opposite."

Puerto "will need proof that the Students for Life leaders actually obtained or intended to obtain the pills," abortion law scholar Mary Ziegler notes in Slate. "The activists may argue that the post was not in earnest, and that no one involved ever seriously intended to bring pills into Texas."

Even assuming that Hawkins et al. successfully ordered abortion pills, that conduct by itself does not fit the language of H.B. 7, which applies to people who "distribute" such drugs or who "mail, transport, deliver, prescribe, or provide" them "to or from any person or location in this state." That language encompasses out-of-state suppliers, which raises obvious concerns about extraterritorial application of Texas law. But on its face, the prohibition does not cover someone who simply orders abortion pills.

Puerto's lawyer, Amplify Legal attorney Molly Duane, argues that Hawkins et al. could be covered by the statute's reference to transportation. "What the statute says is that transporting abortion drugs from one location to another within the state is a violation of H.B. 7," Duane told The Texas Tribune. "By the plain language of the statute, this would seem to be a violation. This is the problem with writing such a confusing and vague law."

Under that theory, however, Hawkins, Davis, and the two other activists named in the lawsuit violated H.B. 7 only if they 1) successfully ordered abortion pills, 2) took delivery of them, and 3) subsequently moved them to another location within Texas. The lawsuit alleges only that they "ordered abortion pills, apparently multiple times." According to The Texas Tribune, Duane and Puerto "are hoping that the lawsuit will eventually surface more about what the defendants did with the abortion pills once they ordered them."

The lawsuit faces another obstacle. H.B. 7 does not apply to "speech or conduct protected by the First Amendment." Hawkins et al.'s efforts to show how easily state abortion bans can be circumvented certainly seem to fall into that category. "Students for Life may stress that the case targets their political speech about abortion," which is "protected under the First Amendment," Ziegler notes.

Those are not the only puzzling aspects of the lawsuit. Puerto, a 26-year-old single mother of two young children, emphasizes that she "had no choice but to continue" those pregnancies because she did not "have access to transportation or the economic resources to pay for travel out of state." The lawsuit devotes 11 paragraphs to describing the burdens imposed by her state's denial of "true reproductive rights," which she argues justifies some sort of compensation.

All of this seems legally irrelevant under H.B. 7, which does not require a relator to allege damages of any sort, let alone damages stemming from the abortion ban it aims to reinforce. "With nowhere else to turn for assistance," the lawsuit says, "Ms. Puerto is seeking financial compensation" from Hawkins et al. "in the amount of $459,782—the average cost of raising two children from birth to age 18 in the state of Texas."

Although H.B. 7 sets a minimum award of $100,000, the lawsuit notes, "there is no cap on the monetary compensation owed a relator." But the law does not describe H.B. 7 awards as "monetary compensation" for injuries allegedly suffered by the relator.

The statute's only reference to "compensatory damages" deals with lawsuits filed against H.B. 7 relators under "clawback provisions" of other states that have tried to thwart such litigation. In response to a "clawback" action, the law says, an H.B. 7 relator can seek "compensatory damages, including money damages in an amount equal to the judgment damages and costs, expenses, and reasonable attorney's fees spent in defending the action." By contrast, the bounty for proving a violation of the restrictions on abortion pills is simply "an amount."

The lawsuit itself, emphasizing the lax standards for filing a claim under H.B. 7, notes that Puerto "did not suffer an injury traceable to [the defendants'] ordering of abortion pills that can be remedied by a court." But it suggests that an award to Puerto would be appropriate given the defendants' anti-abortion activism.

The lawsuit notes that Students for Life "proudly advertised" its support for H.B. 7. Puerto complains that Hawkins et al. "ignore the immense harms and multiple deaths already attributed to Texas's cruel abortion bans" and "demean the six million Texans of reproductive age who have had their ability to decide whether and when to begin or expand a family stripped away by these bans." Whatever you make of that charge, the defendants' activism is constitutionally protected and therefore cannot support a cause of action in civil court.

"Texas is a strange place filled with vigilante statutes" that "seek to turn Texans against each other," Duane told The Texas Tribune. "But if anyone should be benefiting from these legal regimes, it's people like our client." While "putting those two things together…might be unusual," she said, "this is the situation that Texas has put its citizens in."

Depending on your perspective, you may or may not sympathize with Duane's reasoning. But it seems unlikely to pass muster as a matter of law.

The post A Texas Lawsuit Dubiously Accuses Students for Life of Violating the State's Abortion Pill Restrictions appeared first on Reason Magazine.

European Union ministers have adopted a new recommendation calling for stronger measures to prevent homelessness and housing exclusion, as governments face increasing pressure over housing shortages and the cost of accommodation.

The recommendation was approved at a meeting of employment and social affairs ministers in Luxembourg on Monday, 19 October, and forms part of the European Commission’s wider efforts to address Europe’s housing crisis.

It proposes measures ranging from early intervention for households facing eviction to increased investment in affordable housing, improved access to social services and more coordinated support for people without permanent accommodation.

However, the recommendation is not legally binding. Member States will retain responsibility for deciding which measures to introduce, how they should be financed and the extent to which existing national housing policies should be changed.

More than one million people affected

According to the Council’s announcement, more than one million people are estimated to experience homelessness across the European Union.

The problem extends beyond people sleeping on streets or using emergency shelters.

The term housing exclusion also encompasses households living in inadequate accommodation, people facing imminent eviction and those unable to secure stable housing because of financial or personal circumstances.

The Council identifies poverty, unemployment, domestic violence, disability, poor health and insufficient affordable housing among the factors contributing to the problem.

Housing costs have also risen considerably faster than incomes in several European countries.

Between 2013 and 2024, nominal house prices increased by more than 60 per cent across the EU. In some Member States, average increases exceeded 220 per cent during the same period.

These developments have placed additional pressure on households with lower incomes, particularly in cities where rental accommodation is increasingly expensive and social housing is limited.

The shortage affects not only unemployed people but also individuals in paid employment whose earnings are insufficient to cover market rents.

Prevention before eviction

A central element of the new recommendation is the introduction or strengthening of national strategies intended to prevent homelessness before people lose their accommodation.

The Council encourages Member States to establish early-warning mechanisms capable of identifying households experiencing serious financial or housing difficulties.

Proposed interventions include debt counselling, emergency rental assistance, mediation between landlords and tenants, and appropriate safeguards against forced eviction.

The emphasis on prevention reflects the potentially substantial social and financial consequences of losing stable accommodation.

Once a person becomes homeless, obtaining employment, maintaining healthcare arrangements and securing permanent accommodation can become considerably more difficult.

The Council also calls for particular attention to children, young people leaving care and people facing domestic abuse.

Member States are encouraged to ensure that children have access to adequate housing and that young people leaving institutional or foster care are not placed at risk of homelessness because appropriate support arrangements are unavailable.

Greater emphasis on permanent housing

The recommendation promotes a housing-led approach, under which securing suitable and stable accommodation becomes a central element of the response to homelessness.

This differs from policies relying primarily on emergency shelters or temporary accommodation, although such facilities remain necessary for people facing immediate housing difficulties.

Housing-led programmes can include permanent accommodation accompanied by individual support services, depending on the person’s circumstances.

The Council also proposes simplifying access to social and healthcare services through integrated arrangements that allow people to obtain assistance without repeatedly approaching different public authorities.

One suggested model involves providing access to relevant services through a single contact point, with support from social workers, healthcare professionals and other organisations.

However, access to permanent housing ultimately depends on the availability of suitable properties.

The recommendation therefore calls for increased public and private investment in affordable and social housing, renovation of existing accommodation and support for non-profit housing models.

Questions over implementation and funding

The non-binding character of the recommendation remains one of its principal limitations.

European institutions can coordinate policies, provide guidance and support investment, but national governments and local authorities retain substantial responsibility for housing provision and social welfare arrangements.

The recommendation does not automatically establish a new EU housing entitlement or provide dedicated funding to every Member State.

Its effectiveness will depend on whether governments introduce measures capable of increasing housing supply and reducing the number of people entering homelessness.

The European Federation of National Organisations Working with the Homeless, known as FEANTSA, previously welcomed the Commission’s proposal while identifying shortcomings.

In its assessment of the original proposal, the organisation argued that EU policy should place greater emphasis on permanently ending homelessness rather than primarily managing housing exclusion.

It also questioned the adequacy of funding arrangements and the proposed five-year interval for national progress reporting.

Five-year assessment planned

Under the adopted recommendation, Member States are encouraged to provide the European Commission with information on the effectiveness of their national strategies every five years.

The Commission is expected to evaluate national progress and report to the Council five years after the recommendation’s adoption.

The policy follows the European Affordable Housing Plan, presented in December 2025, and the EU’s Anti-Poverty Strategy, introduced in May 2026.

Together, these initiatives seek to expand the Union’s role in coordinating housing policy without transferring national housing responsibilities to Brussels.

The first indication of whether the recommendation will produce measurable results will come from national decisions on social housing investment, eviction prevention and access to permanent accommodation. Without changes to those practical arrangements, the Council’s commitments will remain principally a framework for voluntary cooperation.

Spain’s government has declared that the first phase of its emergency response to the Ceuta migration crisis has been completed, following the arrival of an estimated 80,000 migrants from Morocco at the end of July.

Interior Minister Fernando Grande-Marlaska said on Friday, 16 October, that approximately 12,000 people had returned voluntarily to Morocco since August, while the authorities had expanded facilities to process asylum applications and return decisions.

Nevertheless, substantial administrative and humanitarian challenges remain in the Spanish enclave, particularly concerning people awaiting decisions on their legal status and unaccompanied minors. The situation has become an important test of the European Union’s revised migration and asylum legislation.

Unprecedented crossings at the African border

The crisis began on 30 July, when tens of thousands of people entered Ceuta from Morocco by land and sea following the circulation of misleading information on social media about access to Spanish territory.

According to an October briefing by the European Parliament’s Research Service, approximately 80,000 people crossed into the enclave during the incident, overwhelming local reception facilities and creating an emergency at one of the EU’s few land borders with Africa.

A subsequent European Parliament resolution referred to at least 141 deaths associated with the crossings, although the initial figure reported by Spanish authorities was lower. The exact number of people who crossed and the final death toll have remained subjects of uncertainty.

Most entrants returned to Morocco within days. However, thousands remained, leaving Spain responsible for assessing individual claims, arranging lawful returns and providing appropriate accommodation.

Ceuta’s geographical position complicates these procedures. Although the enclave is Spanish and forms part of the EU, travellers departing for mainland Spain remain subject to specific controls at its ports and airports.

Spain expands its processing capacity

During a visit to Ceuta on 16 October, Grande-Marlaska defended the government’s management of the emergency and announced that additional police resources would substantially increase administrative capacity.

The expanded temporary reception and processing facilities at El Tarajal are intended to handle at least 100 files daily, including applications for international protection and return procedures.

According to figures presented by the Interior Minister, approximately 1,200 applications for international protection had been formally submitted, with around 700 decisions already issued.

He also rejected allegations that the authorities had conducted concealed or involuntary returns, insisting that departures to Morocco had followed voluntary decisions or the appropriate legal procedures.

The minister said more than 500 expulsions had been executed through judicial or administrative decisions in recent months. These are distinct from the approximately 12,000 voluntary returns recorded since August.

The treatment of unaccompanied minors remains contentious. The European Parliament’s research briefing estimated that around 1,100 such minors were in Ceuta, including some who arrived before the July emergency.

Responsibility for their care has generated disagreement between the Spanish central government and Ceuta’s autonomous administration, particularly over guardianship, identification and the distribution of minors to other regions.

New EU asylum system faces a practical test

The EU Pact on Migration and Asylum, which began applying in June 2026, was designed to strengthen external border procedures while establishing clearer responsibilities for Member States.

Its provisions include identity and security screening, accelerated procedures for certain asylum applications and a solidarity mechanism allowing countries to support those facing disproportionate migration pressures.

Under the screening rules, the authorities generally have up to seven days to complete the initial checks required for people apprehended after irregular entry.

However, the Ceuta emergency demonstrates the difficulty of applying individual administrative procedures when arrivals occur in exceptionally large numbers within a short period.

The geographical concentration of arrivals means that adequate staffing, interpretation, legal assistance and reception facilities become essential to ensuring the system operates within its prescribed deadlines.

Spain requested assistance from Frontex, Europol and the European Union Agency for Asylum in August. The Commission subsequently announced €114.7 million in emergency assistance in September.

Political dispute over migration policy

The crisis has widened divisions between European governments over border enforcement and the regularisation of migrants already living within the EU.

Italy and several other Member States have questioned whether Spain’s separate regularisation programme could encourage further irregular migration. Madrid rejects the suggestion that the programme caused the Ceuta crossings.

The Spanish scheme covers only people who met the residence requirements by the end of 2025. Those who arrived during the July 2026 crisis are not eligible.

European Parliament members also adopted a resolution in September calling for stronger protection of the EU’s external borders and greater cooperation with Morocco. The resolution characterised the crisis as involving the possible instrumentalisation of migration, although Spain has said it has no evidence establishing Moroccan government involvement.

The continuing administrative backlog, the position of minors and the effectiveness of EU assistance will determine how quickly Ceuta can return to ordinary border operations.

Beyond Spain, the episode raises a practical question for Brussels: whether Europe’s new asylum framework can maintain border controls and individual legal safeguards simultaneously during an exceptionally large and sudden influx.

Belgium’s three regions have reached an agreement with the European Commission to strengthen measures against water pollution, improve wastewater treatment and increase protection against floods and droughts.

The joint statement, signed in Leuven on Monday, 19th October, sets out commitments for Flanders, Wallonia and the Brussels-Capital Region, including action on industrial pollution, pesticides and persistent chemicals such as per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances, commonly known as PFAS.

The agreement was signed by European Commissioner for Environment, Water Resilience and a Competitive Circular Economy Jessika Roswall, Flemish Environment Minister Jo Brouns, Walloon Environment Minister Yves Coppieters and Brussels State Secretary Ans Persoons.

According to the European Commission’s announcement, the agreement follows a detailed examination of Belgium’s implementation of European water legislation and identifies measures requiring greater attention from regional authorities.

European Commission seeks faster implementation

Belgium is the second EU Member State to complete a structured dialogue under a Commission initiative launched in November 2025.

The process is intended to improve implementation of existing environmental requirements rather than establish an entirely new legislative framework.

European water legislation already obliges Member States to assess the condition of their rivers and groundwater, control pollution and prepare management plans intended to improve water quality.

However, achieving the objectives of the EU’s Water Framework Directive remains difficult in several countries, particularly where pollution, agricultural activity and urban development place competing demands on water resources.

Belgium presents additional administrative complications because responsibility for environmental policy and water management is divided principally between three regional governments.

Watercourses also cross regional and international boundaries, requiring cooperation with neighbouring countries.

The Commission’s review examined Belgium’s third generation of river basin management plans and its second generation of flood risk management plans.

Technical discussions identified areas where implementation could be accelerated, particularly regarding pollution controls, water efficiency and coordination between public authorities.

Flanders to address industrial pollution

Under the agreement, Flanders will prioritise investment in water resilience and stronger action against industrial pollution.

The region intends to use its IMPULSE programme to support improvements in water management and pollution reduction.

Industrial discharges are among the issues specifically identified for closer scrutiny.

The joint statement calls for more systematic reviews of permits governing water abstraction and industrial wastewater discharges, particularly where existing activities place pressure on rivers and groundwater.

The agreement also highlights the need to tackle persistent chemical pollution.

PFAS have become a significant environmental concern because many of these substances degrade extremely slowly and can accumulate in water, soil and living organisms.

Certain PFAS compounds have been associated with adverse health effects, although the risks depend on the individual chemical, exposure level and duration.

The Commission’s commitments include stronger action on PFAS and pesticides, alongside improvements in monitoring and pollution prevention.

Agricultural pollution is another area requiring attention.

Fertilisers and pesticides can enter rivers and groundwater through runoff or infiltration, creating difficulties for water treatment and contributing to the deterioration of aquatic ecosystems.

The three regions have agreed to strengthen cooperation with farmers, retailers and researchers to support more sustainable agricultural practices, including expanding markets for organic products.

€300 million for river restoration in Wallonia

Wallonia has committed to continuing investment in river restoration and improved water resilience, with particular attention to the Vesdre basin.

The region intends to use a €300 million loan secured from the European Investment Bank in 2025 to support restoration work.

The Vesdre basin experienced severe flooding in July 2021, when widespread destruction across eastern Belgium exposed weaknesses in flood protection and the management of vulnerable river valleys.

Restoration measures can include improving river channels, reconnecting floodplains and using natural systems to retain water during periods of heavy rainfall.

The regional authorities also intend to support industrial companies investing in water-efficient production technologies and environmental innovation.

These measures are intended to reduce pressure on water resources while helping businesses adapt to changing environmental requirements.

Wallonia has additionally committed to supporting cleaner agricultural practices, consistent with the wider national objective of reducing pollution from fertilisers and pesticides.

Brussels focuses on wastewater treatment

The Brussels-Capital Region will concentrate on improving water governance and wastewater treatment.

Urban wastewater infrastructure is particularly important in densely populated areas, where drainage networks and treatment facilities must accommodate domestic sewage, commercial activity and rainfall.

Heavy precipitation can place additional pressure on combined sewer systems, potentially increasing the risk of untreated or insufficiently treated wastewater entering natural watercourses.

Improving treatment capacity and water management requires investment in infrastructure, monitoring and coordination between the authorities responsible for sanitation and environmental protection.

The Brussels commitments therefore form part of the wider European effort to modernise urban wastewater systems and improve the ecological condition of rivers passing through major cities.

Cross-border water management

The agreement also identifies the need for closer cooperation in the Scheldt and Meuse river basins.

Both river systems cross national boundaries, making their management dependent on coordination between Belgium and neighbouring countries.

Regional governments have committed to supporting the restoration of floodplains and the removal of barriers affecting shared watercourses where appropriate.

The measures are intended to improve the condition of aquatic ecosystems while strengthening natural protection against floods and droughts.

The Commission will support Belgium through initiatives under the European Water Resilience Strategy, including research, digital technologies, technical expertise and assistance in mobilising public and private investment.

However, the joint statement signed in Leuven does not itself establish a new binding regulatory regime or guarantee that all the investments identified will be financed.

Its importance will depend on whether the three regional governments translate their commitments into funded projects, revised permits and measurable improvements in water quality.

For the European Commission, Belgium’s agreement is also part of a wider programme of structured discussions with Member States on compliance with EU water legislation. Further national dialogues are expected as Brussels seeks to improve implementation across the Union.

Registrations of fully electric cars across 17 European markets increased by 70.3 per cent in September, according to industry figures published on Monday, 19 October, as France and Germany seek to ease the European Union’s emissions requirements for new vehicles.

The data show that 300,202 battery-electric cars were registered during the month, accounting for 32.6 per cent of new passenger-car registrations in the markets surveyed.

The figures emerge three days after Paris and Berlin announced a joint position on the future of Europe’s automotive industry, proposing greater flexibility in the EU’s 2035 emissions regime while introducing measures intended to favour vehicles manufactured in Europe.

Electric vehicles gain market share

The latest figures, compiled by E-Mobility Europe, New Automotive and Fier Automotive, indicate that electric vehicle demand accelerated sharply during September.

According to the industry data published on 19 October, approximately 1.98 million battery-electric cars have been registered across the 17 markets during the first nine months of 2026, an increase of 38.1 per cent compared with the equivalent period last year.

Higher oil prices, government incentives and the introduction of more affordable electric models have all contributed to demand.

The figures represent a substantial change in the composition of European new-car sales, although they cover selected markets rather than constituting a complete statistical account of the EU’s 27 Member States.

France recorded 65,243 battery-electric registrations in September, representing 41.7 per cent of its new-car market. Germany registered 88,724 electric vehicles, giving the technology a market share of 34.6 per cent.

Both countries have substantial automotive manufacturing industries and are directly involved in negotiations over Europe’s future emissions legislation.

Significant differences between European markets

Despite the overall increase, electric vehicle adoption remains uneven across the continent.

Norway retained its position as Europe’s most electrified new-car market, with battery-electric vehicles accounting for 98.8 per cent of registrations in September.

Denmark followed with 88.8 per cent, while Finland recorded 62.7 per cent and Sweden 49 per cent.

Electric models also accounted for approximately half of new-car registrations in Belgium, the Netherlands, Ireland and Portugal.

At the other end of the market, battery-electric vehicles represented only 11.2 per cent of registrations in the Czech Republic, 7.6 per cent in Italy and 6.2 per cent in Poland.

These differences illustrate the difficulty of establishing a uniform European transition timetable.

Household incomes, purchase incentives, vehicle prices and charging infrastructure differ substantially between countries. The availability of affordable electric cars is particularly important in markets where buyers are more sensitive to the initial purchase price.

The varying national figures also complicate the EU’s industrial calculations, since manufacturers must operate across markets progressing at different rates.

France and Germany reach automotive compromise

On 16 October, French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Friedrich Merz agreed on a joint approach to changes in European automotive regulations.

Under the proposed compromise, car manufacturers would be required to reduce carbon dioxide emissions from new vehicles by 90 per cent by 2035 compared with the 2021 reference level.

The agreement would also remove a proposed requirement to compensate for the remaining emissions through measures such as the use of low-carbon steel.

The change would create additional opportunities for manufacturers to continue selling vehicles powered by combustion engines beyond 2035, subject to the final legislative framework.

In their joint declaration on the automotive industry’s future, the French and German governments argued that emissions reduction must be combined with industrial competitiveness, investment and European manufacturing capacity.

The agreement also envisages preferential treatment for vehicles produced in Europe under certain public procurement and subsidy arrangements.

Britain could potentially benefit from provisions allowing selected European partners to qualify under the proposed industrial framework.

The Franco-German understanding is not, however, a final EU legislative decision. Changes to the regulatory regime require agreement through the relevant European legislative procedures.

Automotive competitiveness enters the debate

The principal argument advanced by supporters of greater regulatory flexibility is that European manufacturers need additional time to adapt production, protect employment and compete with international rivals.

German manufacturers retain extensive investment in combustion-engine and hybrid technology, while French producers have placed considerable emphasis on electric vehicles and maintaining European supply chains.

The negotiations therefore concern more than emissions limits. They also involve battery production, access to raw materials, manufacturing costs and the ability of European companies to compete with producers in China and other markets.

Supporters of the existing transition timetable argue that weakening long-term requirements could discourage investment in electric manufacturing capacity just as consumer demand is increasing.

Manufacturers seeking greater flexibility maintain that regulatory targets must account for uneven market conditions and the cost of developing new technologies.

September’s sales figures provide evidence that electric vehicle adoption is accelerating, but they do not establish whether the same rate of growth will continue without existing incentives.

The debate now centres on whether regulatory relaxation will preserve Europe’s automotive industry during the transition or slow investment in the technology that is already capturing an increasing share of the market.

The European Parliament is preparing to vote on amendments to the as Brussels seeks to reduce its dependence on foreign suppliers of minerals essential for defence equipment, electric vehicles, advanced electronics and industrial production.

The proposals, scheduled for debate in Strasbourg on Monday, 19 October, and a vote on Tuesday, would strengthen coordination over strategic supplies and revise the responsibilities of European companies that depend on vulnerable international supply chains.

At the centre of the discussions is a proposal to establish a European Critical Raw Materials Centre, which would coordinate purchasing arrangements, assess supply risks and support the development of strategic reserves.

The initiative comes amid increasing concern over China’s dominant position in the processing and supply of several materials regarded as indispensable to European industry.

Parliament considers stronger European coordination

According to the European Parliament’s October plenary briefing, the proposed Critical Raw Materials Centre would operate as an EU body responsible for several functions currently distributed between European institutions and national authorities.

These would include identifying vulnerabilities in supply chains, conducting risk assessments, coordinating contingency stocks and supporting joint purchasing arrangements.

The objective is to give European governments and manufacturers greater capacity to respond to interruptions in supplies of minerals and processed materials that cannot easily be replaced.

The legislative report has been prepared by the Parliament’s Committee on Industry, Research and Energy, with Dutch Social Democrat MEP Mohammed Chahim serving as rapporteur.

The committee examined amendments to the existing legislation during 2026, with its revised report submitted for plenary consideration on 9th October.

Tuesday’s vote is intended to establish Parliament’s position for negotiations with the Council. It would not, by itself, constitute final adoption of the amended regulation.

China’s position creates supply risks

The European Union depends heavily on imported critical raw materials, particularly those required for batteries, permanent magnets, semiconductors and specialist industrial equipment.

China occupies a particularly important position in the refining and processing of rare earth elements, graphite and several other materials used in high-technology manufacturing.

The concentration of production creates vulnerabilities because disruption at a single stage of processing can affect manufacturers operating across multiple European countries.

According to the Council of the European Union’s assessment of strategic mineral supplies, China is the principal supplier to the EU for numerous materials, including gallium, germanium, magnesium and rare earth elements.

These substances are used in applications extending well beyond electric vehicles.

Permanent magnets are required for certain electric motors, wind turbines and defence systems, while other critical materials are used in radar, satellites, aircraft components and advanced electronic equipment.

Restrictions affecting their availability can therefore have consequences for European industrial output, defence procurement and the development of new technology.

The question for EU policymakers is not simply whether minerals can be obtained, but whether Europe has sufficient alternative sources and processing capacity to withstand restrictions imposed by a dominant supplier.

Existing targets remain difficult to achieve

The Critical Raw Materials Act entered into force in May 2024 and established benchmarks intended to strengthen European production and diversify imports by 2030.

Under the existing framework, the EU aims to develop extraction capacity equivalent to at least 10 per cent of its annual consumption of strategic raw materials, where geological reserves allow.

The corresponding benchmarks are 40 per cent for processing and 25 per cent for recycling.

The legislation also seeks to prevent any single non-EU country from supplying more than 65 per cent of the Union’s annual consumption of a particular strategic raw material at any relevant processing stage.

These are policy benchmarks rather than binding production quotas imposed on individual companies.

Their achievement depends on the development of mines, processing facilities and recycling operations, as well as the ability to attract investment.

New extraction projects frequently require lengthy environmental assessments, infrastructure development and extensive capital investment. Processing operations face additional challenges involving energy costs, technical expertise and commercial competitiveness.

Consequently, reducing import dependence involves more than identifying mineral deposits within European territory.

Greater obligations for manufacturers

The proposed amendments also address the responsibilities of major European companies using strategic raw materials.

Under provisions examined by the parliamentary committee, the European Commission would take a greater role in identifying large manufacturers whose operations depend on strategically important supplies.

These companies could face requirements to assess vulnerabilities in their supply chains, including the geographical location of extraction and processing operations and the ownership of relevant facilities.

The arrangements would be particularly significant for businesses producing batteries, aircraft, drones, satellites, advanced chips and other products considered strategically important.

Where significant risks are identified, companies could be expected to consider measures including diversification, improved material efficiency or maintaining stocks.

The proposals also seek to strengthen recycling and the recovery of valuable materials from existing products, reducing the quantity of newly extracted resources required by European industry.

Recycling alone cannot remove the need for imports, particularly where demand for new technologies is increasing, but it can provide an additional source of supply.

Supply security becomes an industrial priority

The legislation forms part of a wider effort to link European industrial policy with economic security.

Brussels has been seeking additional raw materials partnerships with third countries, while manufacturers remain concerned about the commercial cost of building alternative supply chains.

Recent EU discussions concerning cooperation with Vietnam illustrate the emphasis being placed on securing alternative access to minerals such as tungsten and rare earth elements.

However, diversifying supplies does not necessarily mean transferring extraction and processing to Europe. Partnerships with reliable external producers may remain essential, particularly for materials unavailable in sufficient quantities within the Union.

The proposed European centre would therefore have to balance internal production, international purchasing, strategic stocks and commercial demand.

The immediate legislative issue is whether the revised framework gives European institutions sufficient powers to coordinate these activities without placing disproportionate administrative obligations on businesses.

Tuesday’s parliamentary vote will determine the negotiating position MEPs take into discussions with EU governments over how those responsibilities should be distributed.

We saw last time what reckless reliance on close polling led to. The omertà on rejoining has now been broken, but it would be folly to move too soon

When I hear that word again, a shudder runs down my spine. I want to groan, hold my head in my hands and wail. The horror! No, never again, not another referendum. But the idea is back in play as Andy Burnham looks for ways to reverse a decade of economic stagnation.

As the prime minister dared to unlock the door to a Brussels reunion, you could hear Ode to Joy burst out from all remainers. But the prospect of a re-run of the most self-destructive vote in our history is dismaying.

Polly Toynbee is a Guardian columnist

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© Photograph: Justin Tallis/AFP/Getty Images

© Photograph: Justin Tallis/AFP/Getty Images

© Photograph: Justin Tallis/AFP/Getty Images

Is this really about cost of living? Over the weekend, the civil unrest that had been at a simmer boiled over in cities all over France. Over 1,000 police officers were injured, with seven seriously injured. More than 2,400 people were arrested.

"Rioters…attacked city halls from Lille in northern France to Marseille in the south, where they broke into the local government headquarters and tipped over a bust of Marianne, a symbol of the French Republic," reports The New York Times. "A fire destroyed a tourist office in Lyon, and 1,500 shops were damaged or looted nationwide, according to Alexandre Bompard, head of the French federation of commerce and distribution, who estimated that the cost of repairs could run into hundreds of millions of dollars."

"They came prepared," claimed the French journalist Paul Amar on CNews. "They had the addresses of town halls. They had addresses of Jewish shop owners. In a street in Marseille, all businesses owned by Jews were set on fire. Businesses run by Muslims weren't." The Jewish Community Protection Service has disputed such claims.

Reason's Matt Welch has a good write-up of how the violence and destruction have altered Lyon, Paris, Marseille, and Limoges, where the city hall was burned and collapsed.

Ces images doivent faire le tour du monde. Nos voisins doivent savoir.

Lyon l'une des plus grandes villes de France le 17 octobre est l'une des villes les plus touchées.

A Lyon, aucun commerce n'a été épargné, oui aucun commerce n'a aucun épargné vous avez bien lu. Toutes les… pic.twitter.com/15dG6QB5lK

— Guillaume Herblot (@Guigz75116) October 18, 2026

What was nominally about cost of living and budget issues appears to have expanded far beyond those. ("Free Palestine" and "ACAB" graffiti have been seen everywhere.) President Emmanuel Macron has blamed far-left protesters, saying they have taken advantage of the situation. Far-right leader Marine Le Pen has blamed the "Macronist administration that is out of steam, exhausted, and disoriented."

It's not clear to me how the possibility of that retirement age needs to be raised will in any way be changed by, say, donning black balaclavas and breaking into the Louis Vuitton store:

French rioters loot Louis Vuitton store located just 2 KM away from the Élysée. pic.twitter.com/cnb5aWczcN

— Drew Pavlou (@DrewPavlou) October 17, 2026

Here's how it all started: Since September 18, lycée (or secondary-school) students have held demonstrations, starting in the Paris suburb, Créteil. The students said the Education Ministry had neglected them—not enough resources, not enough teachers, and overcrowded classes. (The original demands were met and that strike ended, but not before sparking a wider movement.) This was all happening concurrently as the government was deciding its budget, and public-sector strikes were beginning. High social-program spending, an aging population, and high debt-to-GDP, plus an ever-increasing cost-of-living is resulting in a math problem that politicians have no real way out of except by raising the retirement age. Over the last few years, the French have had several hissy fits over the possibility of that happening.

Lawmakers from left-wing party La France Insoumise were at the first blockade on September 21, which has sparked questions about whether the party helped fuel the protests ahead of April's presidential election. I take all this—the disparate movements, the sheer volume of violence, the political-party involvement, the elections coming up—to mean that what started as an education-quality/cost-of-living protest has been used to lodge all kinds of grievances, and is attracting allies with an unquenchable thirst for violence and destruction.

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Scenes from New York: "Darrel Rodriguez, 26, was shot on Saturday in the 7th Avenue Station on 53rd Street, a few blocks from Times Square, the police said. An unidentified man approached Mr. Rodriguez on the northbound E train platform, drew a gun and shot him once in the chest, they said," reports The New York Times. The man who shot Rodriguez was wearing a full balaclava-style face covering, and has not been found by the cops.

Philadelphia enacted a ban on such masks back in 2023. Just anecdotally, I've seen a lot of them in New York, but not by people trying to stay warm in the cold—these types of masks are used by people hopping turnstiles, stealing from bodegas, and more. Some bodega owners have started posting signs on their doors saying masks aren't allowed, since it's become such a problem.

"As of Oct. 11, there have been 1,697 crimes in the transit system since the start of the year, 27 more than the same period in 2025," reports The New York Times, citing Police Department figures.

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QUICK HITS

• Inside the property-tax rebellion.
• In Texas, Ken Paxton appears to have lost the support of suburban women, according to The Washington Post.
• "Jewish life in the Emirates has grown quieter and less visible," notes The New York Times. "Religious symbols have disappeared, and gatherings have moved into private. Many have become more guarded about their online presence and their willingness to speak to the media. Some are reconsidering how openly to identify themselves as Israeli or Jewish, while others weigh whether they can still build a life in a nation they once considered a haven."
• Can you really see everything?

YOU CAN SEE EVERYTHING is doing a public service if it gets the general population to question why, precisely, folks lend so much credence to documentaries as vehicles of truth. https://t.co/n7CHwkmDmr pic.twitter.com/IHUvEbKECl

— Sonny Bunch (@SonnyBunch) October 18, 2026

• "I recently attended a meeting of the Democratic Socialists of America, where I officially enrolled as a member. Though I was new to the party, I put forth a number of proposals, many of which were met with considerable enthusiasm and, I'm happy to report, have now been incorporated into their manifesto," writes Larry David in a satirical essay for Airmail. "We contend that the only way anyone can be rehabilitated is through the simple act of love. When the D.S.A. takes over, it will be our policy to close the jails and release all prisoners. Once released, the former prisoners will continue to walk around in their orange jumpsuits, the easier to spot them. People will be encouraged to give them a pat on the back, offer some words of encouragement, and maybe even get them to open up about their crimes. Imagine how upsetting it must be to know you've taken a life! To err is human, to forgive, divine. With empathy and compassion, it's easy to see a day when these former convicts will be contributing to society in a very meaningful way." It's not that funny of an essay, but I think it's great for more people to be talking about how asinine DSA ideas are.

The post France Burns appeared first on Reason Magazine.

Successive Australian governments have reacted with alarm at China’s influence-building activities in Southeast Asia and the Pacific. They have passed foreign interference laws, tightened foreign investment regulations, and regulated university collaborations with institutions overseas. They have executed a Pacific Step-Up and a plan for greater trade and investment with Southeast Asia. And they have tightened […]

The post What Australia could learn from SE Asia about managing China appeared first on Asia Times.

Ukrainian president accuses Washington of ‘denial of reality’ in continuing row with Trump over apparent support for Moscow

Ukraine did not receive a warning from the US about an impending Russian missile attack on Sunday evening, Volodymyr Zelenskyy has said, reviving concerns that Washington is withholding intelligence to bully Kyiv into capitulating to Moscow.

Yuri Ihnat, a spokesperson for the Ukrainian air force, said on television on Monday morning that Ukraine had not received a warning before a Russian missile barrage hit power plants in Kyiv at about 11pm. Earlier, a Ukrainian government official had told the Guardian the US had not warned the capital about the impending missile strike.

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© Photograph: Valentyn Ogirenko/Reuters

© Photograph: Valentyn Ogirenko/Reuters

© Photograph: Valentyn Ogirenko/Reuters

Premium paid over French counterparts has risen to almost £30 a megawatt hour, analysis by lobby group finds

British steelmakers have been pushed further behind European rivals on electricity costs after the US-Israeli war on Iran caused a surge in global gas prices.

The premium paid by the British industry over its French counterpart has risen to almost £30 a megawatt hour (MWh), its highest level in three years, according to analysis by the lobby group UK Steel.

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© Photograph: Ian Forsyth/Getty Images

© Photograph: Ian Forsyth/Getty Images

© Photograph: Ian Forsyth/Getty Images

UK home secretary’s meeting comes after PM said he wanted to rejoin European law enforcement databases

The UK home secretary, Shabana Mahmood, will meet the EU’s home affairs commissioner on Monday for further talks just days after Andy Burnham said he wanted to rejoin European law enforcement databases from which the UK has been locked out of since Brexit.

According to the European Commission, they will discuss “migration, border management, law enforcement cooperation and counter-terrorism”, with the latest Frontex data published on Monday showing a 43% decline in small boats crossing the Channel.

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© Photograph: Marcin Nowak/Anadolu/Getty Images

© Photograph: Marcin Nowak/Anadolu/Getty Images

© Photograph: Marcin Nowak/Anadolu/Getty Images

Cabinet ministers are turning on Ed Miliband, accusing him of blocking AI investment to protect Net Zero – while families pay the price in lost jobs and holidays.

The post Ministers Turn on Ed Miliband Over Net Zero Block on AI Investment appeared first on The Daily Sceptic.

For more than three decades, Michael Gove has been a leading figure in British Conservatism. As a journalist, government minister and now editor of the Tory bible the Spectator, he has helped shape the right even as it has moved further rightwards. In the latest episode of Radical Thinking, Gove joins Aditya Chakrabortty to discuss the future of the right, his record on Brexit and austerity, and the Spectator’s position on Islam

Watch the full episode with Michael Gove here.

Aditya’s suggested reading:

To read the fruits of Michael Gove’s dalliance with the Marxism Today gang, look up his essay in a 1998 collection called The Moderniser’s Dilemma: Radical Politics in the Age of Blair

For a slalom ride through Michael Gove’s years in power, read The Demented Dalek by the historian Richard J Evans in the London Review of Books

To learn more on what’s become of the British right, there’s a Guardian column by Aditya

Phil Burton-Cartledge analyses in depth why the most successful political party is now failing in his book The Party’s Over: The Rise and Fall of the Conservatives from Thatcher to Sunak

Phil also writes a very good blog on British politics, which keeps a close eye on how each party is trying to marshall a coalition of voters. Here he is on Kemi Badenoch

Geoffrey Wheatcroft does an entertaining short narrative in Bloody Panico!:

or, Whatever Happened to The Tory Party

For more on the economics of the Cameron years, this paper is acute on how the Tories failed to move the UK away from being a country of renters towards a country of makers. Two of its authors will join us for a podcast later in the series.

And if you want to read how Brexit may have cost the UK 8% of GDP, there’s this paper based on data from the Bank of England

Finally, on the Spectator, read Nesrine Malik’s recent Guardian column

Why has Britain’s oldest political magazine become such a rabid cheerleader for Islamophobia?

Continue reading...

© Photograph: James Tindale/The Guardian

© Photograph: James Tindale/The Guardian

© Photograph: James Tindale/The Guardian

Italy has extended checks on travellers from Spain for another week, but talks between Giorgia Meloni and Pedro Sánchez have opened the way for an end to reciprocal restrictions imposed after the migration crisis in Ceuta.

Italy and Spain have agreed to work towards ending their reciprocal Schengen border controls following discussions between Prime Ministers Giorgia Meloni and Pedro Sánchez at the European Council summit in Brussels. Rome nevertheless extended its restrictions for another seven days on Friday, 16 October, as the two governments consider how to bring their respective measures to an end.

The decision marks a possible turning point in a dispute that has disrupted travel between two of the European Union’s largest countries since the summer. According to the notifications recorded by the European Commission, the restrictions concern air and sea connections between Italy and Spain, which do not share a land border.

The two governments have instructed their interior ministers to consider alternative arrangements over the coming week. Although neither side has formally withdrawn its measures, the agreement to coordinate their removal suggests that both capitals are seeking a way out of an increasingly uncomfortable confrontation over migration and internal European security.

How the Ceuta crisis reached Schengen

The dispute began after an extraordinary influx of migrants from Morocco into Spain’s North African enclave of Ceuta in late July. More than 72,000 people crossed the border, prompting serious questions about the management of the EU’s external borders and the possibility of onward movements into other member states.

Italy responded by introducing checks on passengers arriving from Spain, arguing that the situation created risks for public order and internal security. Rome also raised concerns about the possible movement of individuals presenting security threats, although the extent of any such movement remained disputed.

Madrid rejected the justification and introduced reciprocal measures. What began as an emergency response to events on an external border consequently developed into a disagreement about whether one Schengen member could impose restrictions on another on the basis of anticipated migration movements.

EU Today examined the original Spanish retaliation in August, when the dispute first threatened to turn temporary border controls into an instrument of political pressure.

The wider consequences of the Ceuta incident have raised questions about the vulnerabilities exposed at the EU’s external border and the effectiveness of common European migration and crisis-response policy.

The limits of temporary border controls

Schengen is built on the principle that people can travel between participating countries without routine internal border checks. Member states nevertheless retain the right to reintroduce temporary controls in response to serious threats to public policy or internal security, subject to the requirements of EU law.

The difficulty lies in determining when those exceptional powers are justified. Italy has maintained that the Ceuta crisis warranted precautionary action. Spain has argued that controls imposed specifically on travellers from its territory were unjustified and discriminatory.

These opposing positions matter beyond the two countries. If concerns over irregular arrivals in one member state become sufficient grounds for another to introduce sustained checks, the distinction between Europe’s external borders and its internal travel area becomes increasingly difficult to maintain.

The operational results have also entered the political argument. Italian figures cited during the dispute indicate that nearly half a million passengers were checked during the first month, with 31 refused entry. Those numbers demonstrate that the measures were substantial, but do not by themselves establish whether the original security concerns were proportionate to the restrictions imposed.

Madrid, meanwhile, has maintained that migrants involved in the Ceuta influx had not moved onwards to mainland Spain in the manner suggested by Italian concerns.

Meloni and Sánchez seek a practical compromise

The latest discussions offer both governments a route towards de-escalation without formally conceding their underlying positions. Meloni can present the additional week of controls as a continuation of Italy’s security precautions, while Sánchez can point to an agreement to prepare their coordinated removal.

The two prime ministers remain politically divided on migration. Meloni has consistently argued for stronger border enforcement and deterrence, while Sánchez has defended an approach incorporating legalisation and labour-market integration for migrants already living in Spain.

Those disagreements were also visible during the Brussels summit, where European leaders returned to the question of migration management and the consequences of national decisions for the wider Union.

For Brussels, the immediate concern is whether the two governments can replace competing national restrictions with arrangements that address security concerns without unnecessarily interrupting movement between Schengen countries.

A coordinated end to the controls would not resolve the underlying problems exposed by Ceuta. It would, however, remove one of the more unusual internal consequences of that crisis and demonstrate that political negotiations can still prevent emergency border measures from becoming semi-permanent.

The decisive period is now the coming week. Whether the controls expire as planned will depend on the discussions between the Italian and Spanish interior ministries and their ability to agree practical alternatives.

For more than three decades, Michael Gove has been a leading figure in British Conservatism. As a journalist, government minister and now editor of the Tory bible, the Spectator, he has helped shape the right even as it has moved further rightwards. In the latest episode of Radical Thinking, Gove joins Aditya Chakrabortty to discuss the future of the right, his record on Brexit and austerity, and the Spectator’s position on Islam

Watch the full episode with Michael Gove here.

Aditya’s suggested reading:

To read the fruits of Michael Gove’s dalliance with the Marxism Today gang, look up his essay in a 1998 collection called The Moderniser’s Dilemma: Radical Politics in the Age of Blair

For slalom ride through Michael Gove’s years in power, read The Demented Dalek by the historian Richard J Evans in the London Review of Books

To learn more on what’s become of the British right, there’s a column by me for the Guardian

Just why the most successful political party is now failing is analysed in-depth by Phil Burton-Cartledge in his book The Party’s Over: The Rise and Fall of the Conservatives from Thatcher to Sunak

Phil also writes a very good blog on British politics, which keeps a close eye on how each party is trying to marshall a coalition of voters. Here he is on Kemi Badenoch

Geoffrey Wheatcroft does an entertaining short narrative in Bloody Panico!:

or, Whatever Happened to The Tory Party

For more on the economics of the Cameron years, this paper is acute on how the Tories failed to move the UK away from being a country of renters towards a country of makers. Two of its authors will join us for a podcast later in the series.

And if you want to read how Brexit may have cost the UK 8% of GDP, there’s this paper based on data from the Bank of England

Finally, on the Spectator read Nesrine Malik’s recent column in The Guardian

Why has Britain’s oldest political magazine become such a rabid cheerleader for Islamophobia?

Continue reading...

© Photograph: James Tindale/The Guardian

© Photograph: James Tindale/The Guardian

© Photograph: James Tindale/The Guardian

Janeese Lewis George, a D.C. councilmember and the city's presumptive next mayor, has come out against pending legislation that would allow autonomous ride-share vehicles onto city streets, citing the technology's potential to eliminate the jobs of ride-share human drivers. 

"DC is facing a jobs crisis. Rushing the legalization of autonomous vehicles is irresponsible given the anticipated AI-related job displacement and disruptions that put countless workers at risk," she said on X yesterday.  

DC is facing a jobs crisis.

Rushing the legalization of autonomous vehicles is irresponsible given the anticipated AI-related job displacement and disruptions that put countless workers at risk.

— Janeese Lewis George (@Janeese4DC) October 15, 2026

In a follow-up post, she said that the D.C. Council should delay consideration of a pending bill that would allow Waymo, which is currently testing its technology with human safety operators on District streets, to offer autonomous rides to the public.  

Ever since Lewis George won a commanding victory in D.C.'s Democratic mayoral primary earlier this year, pundits and wonks have been trying to read the tea leaves on how the Democratic Socialist will govern. 

D.C.'s economy is currently in a rough spot. Unemployment is high. The housing market is down. Population growth is slowing.  

Lewis George's comments about Waymo suggest the mayor has a deeply mistaken view about the effects and benefits of technological innovation. Contrary to her contention, Waymo legalization is unlikely to exacerbate a "jobs crisis" for at least three reasons. 

The first reason she's wrong is that very few D.C. residents work full-time as ride-share drivers. On her Capital Commonsense Substack, Ashley Schapitl reports that, by Lewis George's own estimate, there are only 200 District residents who work full-time as ride-share drivers.

For comparison's sake, the District has a labor force of roughly 400,000 people. So even if Waymo displaced all human drivers in the District, it would be a statistical nonevent. 

Few headlines, for instance, reported that D.C.'s labor force shrank by 1,000 people between May and June. Neither did many outlets report that the labor force grew by roughly 600 people between July and August. 

Yet here the mayor is talking about a "jobs crisis" over what would be an even smaller change in the number of employed workers in the city. 

The second reason not to fear an exacerbated "jobs crisis" as a result of Waymo legalization is that autonomous vehicles (A.V.s) will not completely replace human rideshare drivers in the foreseeable future. 

In the cities where Waymo has been active for years, A.V.s are still responsible for a minority of rideshare rides. 

That's the case in Phoenix, where Waymo has been offering autonomous commercial service since 2020. In an article from April, Business Insider cites one study that put Waymo's market share at 16 percent of ride-share rides. 

In other words, 84 percent of ride-share rides are still being performed by humans a full six years after A.V.s came onto the scene. 

That isn't to say the impacts of A.V.s are necessarily positive for human drivers' earnings.

Another study by Gridwise from August 2025 found that A.V.s appeared to be marginally reducing drivers' hourly pay and number of trips per hour. That's evidence of the market for rides becoming more competitive, but it's not, as of yet, evidence of a job apocalypse. 

Network design matters too. In places like Los Angeles and San Francisco, Waymo is a standalone competitor to traditional ride-share companies like Uber and Lyft. In Austin and Phoenix, Waymo partners with Uber to offer rides on hybrid human-and-A.V. networks. 

A report by EnoTrans, funded by a grant from Lyft, found that the later cities' hybrid networks actually increased human drivers' trips per hour. Their pay-per-hour fell, albeit less steeply than in cities without hybrid networks. 

All of that is to say that while Waymo, as a competitor to human-operated ride-share services, shouldn't be expected to have a positive impact on drivers' earnings. It shouldn't be expected to have a catastrophic impact on them either. 

The third and final reason that Lewis George is wrong to think that Waymo will worsen a coming "jobs crisis" is that Waymo's employment impacts are not limited to its effect on competing human drivers. 

If Waymo earns any market share at all, it'll be because it's offering some travelers a better transportation option than the ones that currently exist. Increased ease of travel within the city would be expected to raise employment levels, not lower them. 

If Waymo makes it easier or cheaper for people to get from home to the office or from the office to their kids' school, they might be more willing to live in D.C. over Arlington or Silver Spring. If it's more convenient to get to the movies or dinner, residents will be more willing to patronize local businesses. 

None of that even touches on the economic and human benefits of Waymo's likely positive impact on road safety. 

The direct effects of Waymo on drivers' employment must be weighed against all the other economic activity that autonomous vehicles will facilitate. 

In the long run, the economic effects of autonomous vehicles may well be revolutionary. In the foreseeable future, they'll make the market for for-hire rides slightly more competitive. 

A reasonable assumption then is that Waymo will have a modest, but positive, impact on overall economic activity and employment in the District, even if it has a modest, but negative, impact on the small number of full-time ride-share drivers who live here. 

If the new mayor can't even tolerate that level of economic disruption, that does not portend good things for D.C.'s economy under a Lewis George administration. 

The post Presumptive D.C. Mayor Janeese Lewis George Demands Halt to Waymo Legalization To Protect Drivers' Jobs appeared first on Reason Magazine.

NFU analysis of official data shows falls in exports to UK’s largest trading partner since 2019 include 70% for sugar and 74% for egg products

Exports of British food and drink to the EU have collapsed by more than a third since Brexit with eggs, chicken and potato producers badly hit, new figures show.

Analysis by the National Farmers’ Union (NFU) of HMRC data shows a sharp fall in exports in the year to July compared with the same period in 2019, with sugar dropping the most, down 70%.

Continue reading...

© Photograph: David Levene/The Guardian

© Photograph: David Levene/The Guardian

© Photograph: David Levene/The Guardian

Nearly 93 million EU residents were at risk of poverty or social exclusion in 2025, with the latest regional figures revealing sharp differences both between and within member states. The findings raise questions about how effectively European investment is addressing longstanding economic inequality.

More than one in five people living in the European Union remained at risk of poverty or social exclusion in 2025, according to Eurostat figures that reveal substantial differences in living conditions across the bloc’s regions.

Approximately 92.7 million people, representing 20.9 per cent of the EU population, fell into the category during the year. Although the total declined slightly from 93.3 million in 2024, regional data show that economic vulnerability remains heavily concentrated in particular areas.

In 26 of the 243 EU regions for which figures were available, at least 31 per cent of residents were at risk of poverty or social exclusion. At the opposite end of the distribution, 24 regions recorded rates below 13 per cent.

The regional figures published by Eurostat show that the highest rate was recorded in French Guiana, at 54.8 per cent, while Slovakia’s capital region, Bratislavský kraj, recorded the lowest at 2.9 per cent.

National averages conceal substantial differences

The contrast is not confined to richer and poorer member states. In several countries, internal regional disparities are more pronounced than comparisons of national economic performance might suggest.

Within Slovakia, the proportion of people at risk of poverty or social exclusion in Východné Slovensko was 9.1 times the rate recorded in the Bratislava region.

In Italy, the equivalent rate in Calabria was 8.1 times that of Valle d’Aosta, illustrating the persistent economic divide between parts of the country’s north and south.

These differences are recorded in Eurostat’s regional living-conditions statistics, which provide a more detailed picture than EU-wide or national averages.

The comparison requires care. Eurostat’s measure of poverty or social exclusion combines three indicators: relative income poverty, severe material and social deprivation, and very low household work intensity.

Consequently, the figures do not mean that every person included lacks sufficient income to meet basic needs. They identify people experiencing at least one of the defined forms of economic disadvantage.

Differences in income, employment, household composition and living costs can also influence the results, making direct comparisons between metropolitan areas, rural districts and overseas territories more complicated than a single percentage might imply.

Nevertheless, the scale of regional variation illustrates why national economic growth does not automatically produce equivalent improvements in living standards throughout a country.

Poverty reduction remains an EU commitment

The European Union has set a target of reducing the number of people at risk of poverty or social exclusion by at least 15 million by 2030, including at least five million children.

The limited annual reduction recorded in 2025 indicates that progress remains modest relative to the scale of that objective.

The problem has become increasingly important for European policymakers as housing costs, energy prices and employment insecurity affect household finances in different ways across member states.

In May, the Commission presented an anti-poverty and housing policy package, bringing together measures concerning social inclusion, housing exclusion and child poverty.

The regional figures indicate that such initiatives will need to account for considerable differences in local economic conditions.

Policies designed for prosperous urban economies may have limited relevance in regions characterised by low employment, weak infrastructure or dependence on a small number of industries. Conversely, economic activity and relatively high average incomes do not necessarily prevent serious poverty problems within major cities.

Cohesion funding becomes a central question

The findings have direct relevance to negotiations over the EU’s next long-term budget, covering 2028 to 2034.

The European Commission’s proposal envisages roughly €450 billion for economic, social and territorial cohesion under national and regional partnership plans, including at least €218 billion for less developed regions.

The proposed structure would combine several funding programmes within broader national plans, with the Commission arguing that the changes could improve coordination and make spending more responsive to local requirements.

However, regional authorities have expressed concern that greater national control over financial allocations could weaken their influence over investment decisions.

As EU Today reported earlier this week, representatives of European regions have warned that the proposed budget arrangements could concentrate decision-making in national capitals.

The latest poverty statistics provide a concrete context for that disagreement. Investment priorities may differ considerably between a region experiencing industrial decline, an agricultural area with limited employment opportunities and a metropolitan district facing severe housing affordability problems.

A central question for EU institutions is therefore how funding allocations will reflect measurable regional needs rather than being driven primarily by national political negotiations.

The Commission maintains that its proposed partnership arrangements will protect allocations for less developed regions and continue supporting social inclusion.

Negotiations over the financial framework will determine how those commitments are translated into enforceable rules, while Eurostat’s figures provide a statistical basis against which future claims of progress can be assessed.

With 92.7 million people still at risk, the debate is not simply about the overall size of the EU budget. It is also about whether spending reaches the communities where economic disadvantage remains most concentrated.

Brussels has criticised the Palestinian Authority’s decision to postpone presidential and legislative elections, warning that democratic legitimacy is essential to Palestinian state-building and institutional reform. The delay raises questions about the political conditions attached to substantial European financial assistance.

The European Union has expressed serious concern over the Palestinian Authority’s decision to postpone legislative and presidential elections until September 2027, placing renewed pressure on President Mahmoud Abbas over democratic accountability and the future of Palestinian political institutions.

In a statement issued on 14th October, the EU said it regretted the postponement of legislative elections previously scheduled for 28th November 2026 and a presidential contest expected in early 2027.

The decision extends an electoral impasse that has lasted for nearly two decades. Palestinians last voted in legislative elections in 2006, while Abbas was elected president in January 2005.

The EU’s formal statement called for both contests to be organised as soon as conditions allow, stressing that credible elections are necessary for representative institutions and political accountability.

 

The intervention is particularly significant because the EU remains one of the Palestinian Authority’s most important financial supporters and has made institutional reform a central element of its approach to Palestinian state-building.

Abbas cites obstacles to holding elections

The postponement was announced through the Palestine Liberation Organisation’s executive structures following consultations over the conditions necessary to conduct voting in Gaza, the West Bank and East Jerusalem.

 

Palestinian officials have cited restrictions imposed by Israel, continuing insecurity and difficulties involving election materials, observers and access to voting locations.

Israel has disputed the suggestion that it was responsible for preventing the elections from proceeding.

The practical difficulties are substantial. The Palestinian Authority exercises limited administrative control in parts of the West Bank, while Hamas has maintained de facto control over Gaza since 2007, despite subsequent changes in the territory’s security and governance arrangements.

Holding elections across geographically separated territories under different political and security conditions would require agreements extending well beyond the Palestinian Authority’s existing administrative powers.

Those obstacles do not, however, resolve the separate question of democratic legitimacy.

Abbas’s original presidential term expired in 2009, and subsequent extensions of his authority have not been confirmed through a new presidential election. The absence of regular legislative elections has similarly weakened the representative basis of Palestinian governance.

The latest postponement means that Palestinians must wait at least another year for an opportunity to choose their national political leadership.

Brussels links financial assistance to reform

For the European Union, the delay raises questions about the relationship between political reform and financial support.

In April 2025, the European Commission announced a proposed multiannual programme worth up to €1.6 billion for Palestinian recovery and institutional development between 2025 and 2027.

The programme includes approximately €620 million in direct financial support to the Palestinian Authority, alongside assistance for reconstruction, public services and economic recovery.

European officials have repeatedly stressed that part of this support is linked to implementation of agreed reforms, including improvements in public financial management, transparency and administrative accountability.

Those priorities were central to the Brussels donor discussions previously examined by EU Today, where international partners considered how a reformed Palestinian Authority might assume a greater role in Gaza’s future governance.

The election postponement adds a political dimension to those financial arrangements.

The EU’s statement did not announce any suspension of funding, nor did it specify that electoral delays would automatically trigger financial penalties.

Instead, Brussels emphasised that continued assistance to the Palestinian Authority must accompany progress towards institutional reform and the development of credible representative structures.

That distinction matters because European financial assistance also supports public services and civilian needs, which could be affected by reductions in funding unrelated to the conduct of elections.

Elections and the two-state policy

The EU has consistently presented a functioning Palestinian administration as a necessary component of its support for a negotiated two-state settlement.

Its position depends on the existence of institutions capable of representing Palestinians, administering public services, exercising legitimate authority and negotiating internationally.

A prolonged absence of elections complicates that objective, particularly when Palestinian political factions remain divided over leadership and the future organisation of government.

The dispute also affects European discussions concerning Gaza’s reconstruction and its relationship with the West Bank.

Brussels has supported the eventual reunification of Palestinian governance under a reformed administration, but such arrangements face difficulties if the authority expected to assume responsibility lacks a renewed electoral mandate.

In its latest statement, the EU reiterated its willingness to support an eventual election process, including the deployment of an EU Election Observation Mission.

Such missions can provide independent assessments of electoral procedures, but their deployment depends on the necessary political arrangements, security conditions and access.

The European Union’s position now presents Abbas with a specific political demand: to establish conditions under which Palestinian voters can elect both a president and a legislature, rather than allowing temporary postponements to become a permanent substitute for elections.

For Brussels, the immediate question is how to pursue that demand while maintaining assistance to Palestinian institutions and civilians and supporting a diplomatic settlement.

The next test will be whether the Palestinian Authority produces a credible electoral timetable and the administrative arrangements needed to hold the postponed votes in September 2027.