The European Commission has opened talks with oil producers, refiners and NATO over the future of Europe’s fuel industry, exposing growing tensions between decarbonisation, industrial competitiveness and the demands of military preparedness.

The European Union is reconsidering the strategic importance of its oil-refining industry as disruptions to international energy supplies and growing defence requirements force Brussels to examine whether Europe can afford further reductions in domestic fuel production.

On 28 October, the European Commission convened its first high-level dialogue with the European refining industry, bringing together energy companies, technology providers and representatives of NATO.

The meeting was chaired jointly by Energy Commissioner Dan Jørgensen and Defence and Space Commissioner Andrius Kubilius.

Its significance extends beyond the immediate increase in fuel prices associated with the conflict in the Middle East.

Brussels is confronting a longer-term problem: Europe intends to reduce its dependence on fossil fuels, but its transport networks, industrial infrastructure and military forces remain substantially dependent on petroleum products.

The question is no longer simply how quickly the European economy can decarbonise. It is also how much refining capacity must be retained to guarantee essential fuel supplies during a geopolitical crisis.

A strategic industry under pressure

Europe’s refining industry occupies an important position in the continent’s energy system.

According to figures published by the European Commission, EU refineries supply approximately 70 per cent of the jet fuel and 85 per cent of the diesel consumed in Europe.

These products are essential not only for civilian transport and logistics but also for military aviation, armoured vehicles and the movement of equipment.

Maintaining adequate production capacity therefore has implications for both economic activity and defence readiness.

Yet European refineries have faced difficult commercial conditions for years.

High energy costs, international competition and declining expectations for long-term fossil-fuel demand have complicated investment decisions.

Refineries require substantial capital expenditure to remain competitive, meet environmental requirements and adapt production processes.

Companies considering whether to modernise facilities must consequently assess the profitability of assets that may be expected to operate in a progressively decarbonising economy.

The resulting uncertainty creates a problem for governments seeking to retain strategically important industrial capabilities.

The Middle East conflict changes the calculation

The immediate catalyst for the Commission’s initiative is the disruption to energy markets caused by the continuing conflict in the Middle East.

Interruptions to supply chains and uncertainty over maritime transport have increased concerns about the availability and cost of refined petroleum products.

Importing crude oil and importing finished fuels are not equivalent from a strategic perspective.

A country with domestic refining capacity can process available crude into the particular products required by its economy.

An economy heavily dependent on imported refined products is additionally exposed to processing capacity, transport availability and commercial decisions outside its jurisdiction.

The distinction becomes particularly relevant when governments must guarantee supplies of diesel and aviation fuel during an emergency.

European policymakers are therefore examining ways to improve output from existing facilities and strengthen the resilience of fuel supply chains.

However, the Commission has not announced a binding production target or a programme to reopen closed refineries.

The 28 October meeting represents the beginning of a policy discussion rather than the adoption of a new industrial strategy.

NATO introduces a different perspective

The participation of NATO gives the initiative a wider security dimension.

Military preparedness requires dependable access to energy products, including during periods when normal commercial supply chains are disrupted.

Aircraft, naval vessels, military logistics and ground operations cannot be reorganised around alternative energy sources at the same pace as some civilian activities.

Furthermore, the ability to sustain prolonged operations depends on reliable industrial production, storage, distribution and transport.

A refinery’s strategic importance may therefore exceed its immediate commercial profitability.

That raises difficult policy questions.

Governments may consider whether critical production facilities require targeted support, whether strategic stockpiles are sufficient and how supply arrangements should function during emergencies.

Any intervention would have to address competition rules, public financing and the risk of subsidising facilities that become commercially unviable.

Decarbonisation remains part of the policy

Brussels has not abandoned its climate objectives.

The Commission has explicitly linked its refining discussions to the development of sustainable biofuels and synthetic fuels, commonly known as e-fuels.

These technologies offer potential alternatives for sectors where direct electrification remains technically difficult, including aviation.

However, their commercial development requires investment, suitable feedstocks, reliable energy supplies and sufficient demand.

Traditional refineries may be able to participate in this transition, although the technical requirements and economic viability vary between facilities.

Jørgensen said the Commission intended to work with industry on a roadmap that would reconcile domestic fuel production with Europe’s longer-term climate ambitions.

The challenge will be translating those objectives into investment decisions.

Europe’s industrial strategy faces a practical test

The initiative illustrates a wider adjustment in European economic policy.

In recent years, the EU has increasingly described industrial capacity as an element of economic security, rather than treating production solely as a commercial activity.

Semiconductors, pharmaceuticals, critical minerals and defence equipment have all attracted attention because of vulnerabilities in international supply chains.

Oil refining is now entering the same discussion.

The Commission must determine how to preserve sufficient capacity for essential civilian and military requirements while continuing to encourage cleaner technologies.

Those objectives are not necessarily incompatible, but they operate over different timescales and involve different commercial incentives.

For European refiners, the central question is whether governments can provide enough regulatory and investment certainty to support modernisation.

For Brussels, it is whether the energy transition can proceed without creating new strategic dependencies.

The outcome of the dialogue will indicate how the EU intends to balance its climate commitments with the industrial demands of a less predictable security environment.

A new investigation into the activities of Google, Meta and other technology companies has intensified scrutiny of EU plans to revise data-protection legislation, placing Ireland and Germany at the centre of a dispute over corporate influence and European digital sovereignty.

European technology policy has become the focus of a dispute over corporate lobbying after researchers documented extensive contacts between major technology companies and political decision-makers during negotiations to revise EU data-protection rules.

An investigation published on 28 October by Corporate Europe Observatory and the German transparency organisation LobbyControl alleges that leading technology companies mounted a coordinated campaign to influence European governments and legislators.

The findings come one week after EU member states agreed a negotiating position on the Digital Omnibus, a legislative package intended to simplify aspects of European data-protection, privacy and cybersecurity regulation.

The campaigners argue that the proposed changes risk weakening existing safeguards in order to accommodate the commercial requirements of artificial intelligence developers.

Ireland, which holds the rotating presidency of the Council of the European Union, has rejected suggestions that its handling of the legislation was improperly influenced by technology companies.

The dispute exposes a fundamental disagreement over the balance between commercial innovation and the protection of personal information.

The scale of the lobbying campaign

According to LobbyControl’s investigation, non-European technology companies recorded 103 meetings with representatives of Germany’s federal government between May 2025 and September 2026.

Google accounted for 28 meetings, Microsoft 18, Amazon 16 and OpenAI 11.

Germany’s Digital Minister, Karsten Wildberger, participated in 18 meetings with representatives of major technology companies, the researchers reported.

In Ireland, the organisations identified extensive engagement involving Meta, Google and politicians ahead of the country’s assumption of the EU Council presidency in July.

Their findings indicate that Meta engaged with 41 Irish parliamentarians over the Digital Omnibus, while Google recorded 30 meetings.

The researchers also identified 655 lobbying meetings concerning the legislation involving members of the European Parliament.

According to their analysis, approximately 83 per cent represented business interests, compared with 11 per cent involving civil society organisations or trade unions.

These figures demonstrate the intensity of corporate engagement, although the existence of lobbying meetings does not, by itself, establish that particular legislative provisions were adopted because of that activity.

Why the Digital Omnibus matters

The legislative package forms part of a broader European Commission initiative to reduce administrative burdens and improve competitiveness.

Its provisions address several areas of digital regulation, including the General Data Protection Regulation, commonly known as GDPR.

The proposals seek to simplify compliance obligations, clarify the treatment of personal information and revise rules governing certain forms of data processing.

One particularly contentious issue concerns the use of personal data in developing and operating artificial intelligence systems.

AI developers require large quantities of information to train and improve their models. However, the collection and processing of personal information remain subject to European legal safeguards.

Technology companies have argued that regulatory complexity can discourage investment and make it more difficult for European businesses to compete internationally.

Privacy campaigners maintain that simplifying regulatory procedures must not become a mechanism for reducing substantive protections.

The disagreement concerns not merely administrative paperwork but the legal circumstances under which companies may process information relating to identifiable individuals.

Ireland rejects allegations of improper influence

Ireland occupies a particularly sensitive position in the debate.

The country hosts major European operations of several American technology companies, including Google and Meta, and has substantial economic interests in the digital sector.

At the same time, its presidency of the EU Council requires it to coordinate negotiations between member states.

According to RTÉ’s reporting on the investigation, the Irish government strongly rejected the allegation that it had weakened data safeguards in response to corporate pressure.

A presidency spokesperson emphasised that Ireland’s responsibility was to facilitate agreement between member states and that the negotiating mandate approved on 21 October enjoyed broad support.

The Council has presented the proposed changes as a means of reducing compliance costs while preserving established privacy protections.

In its official statement, the Council said its mandate retains the existing definition of personal data and introduces additional provisions governing pseudonymisation.

It also includes safeguards relating to sensitive information used for biometric verification and AI systems.

These details are significant because they demonstrate that the negotiating text contains protections alongside proposed simplifications.

Germany’s role in the negotiations

Germany has also emerged as an important participant in the controversy.

The investigation points to close contact between the German government and international technology companies during discussions about the future of European digital regulation.

Berlin has supported reducing administrative restrictions that it considers obstacles to innovation and the development of competitive AI technologies.

For Germany, the issue is connected to wider concerns about industrial competitiveness, investment and Europe’s dependence on foreign technology suppliers.

Yet an unresolved question remains.

Measures designed to assist European innovators may also benefit established American companies whose extensive computing infrastructure and data resources give them advantages over smaller competitors.

Consequently, easing restrictions does not necessarily guarantee a stronger European technology industry.

The European Parliament holds the next decision

The Council’s negotiating position does not make the Digital Omnibus law.

The European Parliament must establish its own position before negotiations between the institutions can determine the final legislation.

Parliamentarians will therefore have an opportunity to examine the treatment of personal data, the safeguards attached to AI development and the relationship between regulatory simplification and individual rights.

The lobbying investigation is likely to become part of that debate.

Its central political significance lies in the competing interpretations of European technological sovereignty.

For governments seeking investment, regulatory flexibility may provide an instrument for improving Europe’s international competitiveness.

For privacy organisations, the same flexibility could increase the influence of companies already dominant in global digital markets.

The outcome will help determine whether Europe’s future digital framework preserves the existing balance between commercial data use and individual protections, or establishes a different relationship between the two.

Bo French said the presence of Indian American students at a football game was a “problem.” His campaign for Railroad Commission tests whether these biased views are now mainstream.

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Brussels (Brussels Morning Newspaper) October 28, 2026 – Fifteen prominent media outlets, journalists’ associations, and press freedom organizations have jointly appealed to European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, demanding immediate improvements in journalists’ access to public documents.… Read more

With a crucial EU–UK summit approaching, London is seeking assurances that British manufacturers will not be disadvantaged by Europe’s new industrial policies. The dispute exposes a wider problem: how closely Britain must align with Brussels to preserve access to European supply chains.

Britain and the European Union are attempting to resolve an increasingly consequential dispute over European industrial policy, as proposed rules favouring domestically manufactured goods threaten to complicate the economic relationship that London has spent much of the past year trying to rebuild.

Business Secretary Jonathan Reynolds said on 27 October that the two sides were making progress towards addressing concerns surrounding the proposed Made in Europe requirements.

Speaking to Sky News, Reynolds said the governments were “finding a way through” the disagreement, although the precise terms of any compromise remain uncertain.

The negotiations come ahead of the EU–UK summit scheduled for 20 November, when Prime Minister Andy Burnham is due to meet European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and European Council President António Costa.

For British manufacturers, the immediate issue is whether political promises of closer cooperation can prevent new economic barriers from emerging.

When industrial policy becomes trade policy

The dispute centres on the European Commission’s Industrial Accelerator Act, proposed in March.

The legislation would introduce European-origin and low-carbon requirements into public procurement and certain government support schemes covering strategic industries.

Among the sectors affected are steel, cement, aluminium, automotive manufacturing and technologies associated with the energy transition.

Brussels argues that such measures are necessary to strengthen European manufacturing and reduce dependence on overseas suppliers, particularly in industries exposed to competition from China.

The economic difficulty is that European industrial production does not stop at the EU’s external borders.

British manufacturers supply components, materials and specialist engineering services to European factories, while many UK production facilities rely on parts and technologies imported from the continent.

Automotive manufacturing illustrates the problem.

Vehicles assembled in Britain frequently contain components produced in several EU countries. Equally, European automotive manufacturers incorporate British-made parts into their own production.

If eligibility for subsidies or public contracts depends increasingly on where products and components originate, companies could face incentives to reorganise supply chains.

The question is therefore not merely whether British products can enter the European market, but whether they will qualify for the same industrial support arrangements as competing European products.

France and Germany disagree

The dispute has exposed differences among EU governments.

As EU Today reported earlier this month, France has argued for a restrictive interpretation of European origin requirements, while Germany has favoured a broader approach allowing certain trusted trading partners to participate.

Berlin’s position reflects the interests of industries whose production networks extend beyond the EU, including manufacturers operating in Britain.

According to reporting on the negotiations, France and Germany have discussed a potential compromise under which Britain might receive preferential treatment if it aligns with European tariffs on Chinese goods.

Such an arrangement would have implications extending beyond manufacturing.

It would involve coordination over trade policy towards China, an area in which Britain currently retains independent decision-making authority.

No agreement has been finalised, and any legislative compromise would require approval through the EU’s institutional procedures.

Burnham’s broader European calculation

For Burnham’s government, the industrial disagreement coincides with a wider attempt to redefine relations with Brussels.

The forthcoming summit is expected to concentrate on practical agreements covering agricultural and food trade, emissions trading and temporary mobility arrangements for young people.

A sanitary and phytosanitary agreement could reduce inspections and documentation requirements for certain food products moving between Britain and the EU.

Closer coordination between emissions trading systems could also reduce complications created by different carbon-pricing regimes.

However, these initiatives do not resolve the wider question of Britain’s relationship with the European single market.

Burnham has indicated that he intends to open a broader discussion about future options, while maintaining Labour’s existing commitments against rejoining the single market, customs union or restoring general free movement during the current parliamentary term.

Reynolds has acknowledged that repeated changes in EU policy create uncertainty for British companies operating across the Channel.

The price of industrial cooperation

The underlying difficulty is structural.

Britain seeks the benefits of close industrial integration while maintaining the independence acquired through Brexit. The EU, meanwhile, is increasingly using common industrial rules, subsidies and procurement preferences to pursue economic-security objectives.

These priorities are not necessarily incompatible, but reconciling them may require new arrangements governing regulatory alignment, product origin and relations with third countries.

As EU Today previously examined, London’s request to be treated as a trusted industrial partner has already become part of the broader political negotiations.

The November summit may establish a framework for resolving some immediate concerns.

It will not, however, eliminate the fundamental problem facing British manufacturers: future decisions taken in Brussels can materially affect their competitiveness, even though Britain no longer participates directly in making those decisions.

Production: By Europod, in co-production with Sphera Network.

EUobserver is proud to have an editorial partnership with Europod to co-publish the podcast series “Briefed” hosted by Léa Marchal. The podcast is available on all major platforms.

Find the full transcript below: 

The European Commission has unveiled its plan to help Europe adapt to climate change. But as extreme heat and climate disasters become the norm, the plan offers very few binding commitments.

So what does it actually change? Let’s start with what’s on the table. The commission is proposing a law that would require all 27 member states to work from the same reference scenario for rising temperatures. And, based on that, to adopt national adaptation plans.

The idea is to stop countries from redoing their own analyses and justifying what their actions are based on. From now on, the shared assumption would be: 1.5 degrees of warming by 2030, 2 degrees by 2050, and 3 degrees by 2100.

There is already something notable here: this scenario is more pessimistic than the Paris Agreement, which aims to keep global warming well below 2 degrees.

The European commissioner for climate, Wopke Hoekstra, gave an explanation ot that: 

“It would be unwise not to prepare for the scenarios science puts on the agenda: so scientists are saying 1,5 might do more or less for now, but by 2050 you’re looking at 2 degrees. And by 2100, you’re looking at 3. so I would argue we need to do 2 things: one is staying close to 1,5 and make sure if there is an overshoot, we bring things down, and at the same time, let’s not contemplate and wait but let’s prepare also for a hollow future, that is also the logic of the proposal.”

Now, this assumption is also at the source of another criticism: the EU isn’t doing enough to cut greenhouse gas emissions in the first place.

At yesterday’s press conference, a journalist asked the commissioner how he could defend the Paris Agreement while the EU was lowering climate ambitions at the same time. Because in recent years, the EU has watered down several key measures of the Green Deal.

Think of the rollback on the end of combustion-engine cars, the suspension of the regulation on methane emissions, or the one on imported deforestation.
In parallel, the commission is no longer proposing new legislation to cut emissions.

Now, moving to the proposition in itself, will they really help countries to prepare for climate events to come, starting by with the next summer?

Not immediately. The package will make it easier to share useful data with national authorities, notably thanks to Copernicus, the EU’s Earth observation programme.

The commission will also publish a catalogue of adaptation solutions, available to everyone.

So overall, the package is mostly about exchanging information and ideas, and about commitments to implement national adaptation plans. It also streamlines some existing work, which is always useful.

But what the commission does not do is force member states to take concrete action, or let’s say, to show tangible results.

The Climate Law already requires countries to have adaptation plans. But those plans don’t come with quantified targets. Whether it’s about adapting soils, making buildings more resilient to heat, or protecting vulnerable people.

This is something the Greens in the European Parliament regret. German MEP Kai Tegethoff warns that the risk is to end up with plenty of information about the risks, and then do nothing about them. He is calling for binding targets.

And then, there’s one last thing: money. The commission hasn’t announced any new funding for adaptation.

So: technical tools and encouragement, but no obligations and no cash.
Commissioner Hoekstra even highlighted the amounts already allocated in the current budget, and in the proposal for the next one.

But as we know, negotiations on the next long-term EU budget are heading towards cuts. So it is unlikely that there would be an increase in the budget for climate measures.

This transcript was updated on 29 October to correct MEP Kai Tegethoff’s nationality to German.

European agriculture ministers have reached a negotiating position on the future Common Agricultural Policy, advancing plans to restructure farm support after 2027. The agreement leaves unresolved the central dispute over funding and the balance of power between Brussels and national governments.

European Union agriculture ministers have agreed a negotiating position on the future Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), advancing a restructuring of the bloc’s agricultural support system while postponing decisions about the financial arrangements that will determine how the reforms operate.

The agreement reached on 26 October establishes the Council’s position on the framework governing agricultural payments and support measures from 2028 onwards.

However, ministers have deliberately excluded funding allocations and several related financial provisions, which remain subject to negotiations over the EU’s next seven-year budget.

The distinction is important.

Governments have agreed how they want the future system to operate, but not how much money will ultimately be available to finance it.

A fundamental restructuring of farm support

The proposed reform would integrate agricultural funding into a broader system of national and regional partnership plans covering several major areas of European spending.

Under the existing CAP, agricultural support is organised around two principal funds: one primarily financing direct payments and market measures, and another supporting rural development.

The Commission wants to replace this arrangement with a more integrated structure, while retaining agricultural policy instruments within the new framework.

Each member state would prepare a comprehensive national and regional plan incorporating agriculture, cohesion, fisheries and several other funding programmes.

Brussels argues that the new system could simplify administration, reduce overlapping procedures and give governments more flexibility to address domestic requirements.

However, greater national discretion also raises questions about whether the policy will remain sufficiently uniform across the European single market.

Agricultural conditions differ considerably between member states, from large cereal producers in Eastern Europe to smaller farms operating in mountainous or Mediterranean regions.

Allowing governments to tailor support to domestic conditions may improve flexibility, but it also creates the possibility of greater variation in how European funds are distributed.

Who should receive agricultural payments?

One of the principal changes concerns the distribution of income support.

The Council supports a proposed system known as Degressive Area-Based Income Support, or DABIS, intended to direct assistance more effectively towards farmers actively engaged in agricultural production.

Member states would be required to establish a definition of an active farmer, although governments would retain discretion over the precise national criteria.

The distinction matters because agricultural subsidies have historically generated disputes over payments based primarily on land ownership or agricultural area rather than the scale of productive activity.

The Council has also proposed an optional redistributive mechanism intended to help governments adjust the distribution of payments.

More contentious decisions, including possible payment ceilings and reductions for larger recipients, have been postponed until the broader budget negotiations.

The problem of Europe’s ageing farmers

The reform also addresses generational renewal.

Governments would be required to provide additional income support for young farmers and assistance to help them establish agricultural businesses.

Each member state would have to develop a generational renewal strategy and provide a package of support measures covering areas such as training, advice and access to agricultural activity.

These provisions reflect the difficulties facing younger people seeking to enter farming.

High land prices, expensive equipment and restricted access to finance can create substantial barriers, particularly where established farms are passed between generations.

The Council also supports expanded risk-management arrangements, including insurance and assistance following severe weather, animal diseases and other agricultural emergencies.

Environmental requirements would remain part of the framework, combining common conditions with incentives for practices intended to protect biodiversity and natural resources.

The €300 billion question

The most consequential disagreement concerns financing.

The European Commission has proposed protecting approximately €300 billion for agricultural income support and crisis measures under the 2028–2034 budget.

Additional agricultural and rural-development funding could be available through the broader national and regional plans.

The final ringfenced amount, however, has not been agreed.

As EU Today reported earlier this month, 17 member states have called for agricultural and cohesion spending to be protected during negotiations over the Commission’s proposed €2 trillion long-term financial framework.

The disagreement reflects competing budgetary priorities.

Agriculture remains one of the EU’s largest expenditure areas, but governments are simultaneously facing demands for greater defence spending, industrial investment, infrastructure and migration-related programmes.

Protecting agricultural funding would therefore limit the financial resources available for other priorities unless governments agree to increase the overall budget.

The latest agreement also follows the Council’s 19 October negotiating position on agricultural market rules, which addressed sectoral support and market organisation but similarly avoided resolving the wider funding dispute.

Negotiations enter a decisive stage

Irish Agriculture Minister Martin Heydon, whose government holds the rotating Council presidency, described the latest agreement as a milestone intended to provide farmers with greater stability and flexibility.

The Council’s position now provides a basis for negotiations with the European Parliament.

However, the final shape of agricultural policy will depend heavily on the separate negotiations over the 2028–2034 financial framework.

Until governments agree how much money will be available, questions about payment limits, distribution between countries and the balance between agricultural and other EU priorities will remain open.

The October agreement establishes the proposed framework for European farming after 2027. The budget negotiations will determine the scale of support that framework can actually provide.

The European Commission wants to expand Frontex into a more powerful border and returns agency, with operations extending beyond EU territory. The proposal raises questions about national sovereignty, operational accountability and the future management of European migration.

The European Commission has proposed a substantial expansion of Frontex, the European Union’s border and coastguard agency, in a move that would increase its personnel to 30,000, extend its operational responsibilities beyond EU territory and give Brussels a greater role in coordinating the removal of people without permission to remain in Europe.

The legislative proposals presented on 27 October represent a further stage in the EU’s efforts to establish a common system of migration enforcement, following the introduction of new asylum rules and the adoption of legislation allowing migrant return centres outside the Union.

At issue is not simply the size of Frontex but the extent to which responsibility for border enforcement, surveillance and deportation should be exercised at European rather than national level.

From supporting agency to operational force

Under the Commission’s plan, Frontex would progressively expand its standing corps to 30,000 officers by 2041, including a new reserve of 17,000 personnel available for deployment.

The agency would also gain wider powers to purchase, lease and jointly own equipment, including surveillance systems and technologies using artificial intelligence.

These arrangements are intended to reduce dependence on individual governments for essential equipment and personnel during emergencies.

The proposal follows the extraordinary migration crisis in Spain’s North African enclave of Ceuta, where more than 72,000 people crossed from Morocco during July.

As EU Today previously reported, Spain subsequently requested additional assistance from Frontex, Europol and the European Union Agency for Asylum as its authorities struggled with the consequences of the mass crossing.

The Commission argues that such incidents demonstrate the limitations of a system in which European assistance depends heavily on national requests, available personnel and sometimes lengthy coordination procedures.

A proposed Quick Reaction Force could deploy within 24 hours following an emergency request from a member state.

Deportations beyond European borders

The most consequential change concerns the agency’s proposed role in returns.

Frontex would receive responsibility for a new Return Coordination Centre, bringing together operational information and supporting the entire removal process, from identifying individuals and arranging voluntary departures to organising deportations and reintegration assistance.

More significantly, it could help conduct returns between two non-EU countries under agreements with the countries concerned.

This would allow European personnel to participate in removal operations that neither begin nor end on European territory.

The development follows the EU’s approval of new legislation permitting return hubs outside the bloc.

The Commission presents the two initiatives as complementary: national governments would retain responsibility for individual immigration decisions, while Frontex would increasingly provide the operational capacity needed to implement them.

The effectiveness of such arrangements would depend on cooperation with third countries, reliable identification procedures and compliance with international legal obligations.

Digital surveillance and accountability

The proposal would establish an Online Monitoring and Response Centre to examine publicly accessible social-media activity for indications of emerging border-security threats.

EU governments would also be required to communicate significant border developments through the EUROSUR information network within 24 hours.

The Commission considers these tools necessary to identify organised migrant movements and potential security incidents before they develop into emergencies.

However, the proposed expansion has also prompted questions about oversight.

According to details of the proposal reported on 27 October, the reform would narrow the responsibilities of Frontex’s internal fundamental-rights watchdog, with certain complaints referred to national authorities.

Dutch Green MEP Tineke Strik has warned that operations in third countries without sufficient oversight could undermine accountability and create uncertainty about the legal responsibilities of European personnel.

These concerns are particularly relevant when activities involve several jurisdictions and different national legal systems.

A European force with national responsibilities

The Commission has proposed allocating €11.8 billion to Frontex under the EU’s 2028–2034 financial framework, almost twice the allocation envisaged under the current seven-year budget.

That funding remains subject to negotiations.

The legislation must also receive approval from the European Parliament and the Council, where governments will determine how far they are prepared to extend the agency’s mandate.

For national capitals, the central question is whether a larger common force will strengthen their ability to manage migration or progressively transfer operational discretion to an EU institution.

For Brussels, the proposal reflects a different calculation: a common external border requires more than common legislation if national authorities remain responsible for providing most of the capacity.

The negotiations will determine whether Frontex remains principally a supporting agency or becomes the operational centre of a more integrated European border-management system.

"Sports and culture must not become vehicles for whitewashing Russian aggression," the EU's top diplomat Kaja Kallas said on Oct. 13. But since then, Russia has advanced its sports agenda in at least two instances.

Hungary’s Western anchor is set. The rest depends on pipelines, not speeches.

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The days of October

“Magyarország nem kompország”: Hungary is not a “ferry country”; it cannot drift between East and West. With this statement, delivered on October 23 before the Parliament in Budapest, Prime Minister Péter Magyar set the political tone for the 70th anniversary of the 1956 revolution. Immediately afterward, he added that in ’56 the Hungarians had already made their choice: “We belong to a free and democratic Europe.”

The phrase is no accident. The kompország is an image coined by Endre Ady, who in 1905 described Hungary as a ferry doomed to shuttle back and forth between East and West without ever docking permanently on either shore. For sixteen years, Viktor Orbán had overturned that assessment, transforming the oscillation into a strategy: Hungary as a bridge, Moscow’s interlocutor within the European Union, a hub of “opening to the East.” The new government chose the day most steeped in memory on the national calendar to declare that era over. This is the political significance of the day, and it is the appropriate place to begin.

On October 23, 1956, students from the Budapest University of Technology took to the streets in solidarity with Polish workers. The procession gathered in front of the statue of General Bem, then headed toward the Parliament; among their demands were free elections and the withdrawal of Soviet troops. In the evening, part of the crowd moved to Városliget, where the monument to Stalin stood. The Budapest police chief, Sándor Kopácsi, provided a detailed account in his book *Au nom de la classe ouvrière*: the demonstrators wrapped a steel cable around the neck of the statue—which, including its pedestal, stood about twenty-five meters tall—while others, who had arrived in trucks loaded with oxygen tanks and cutting torches, began cutting through the bronze at the level of the boots. It took about an hour for the statue to collapse. Only the boots remained on the pedestal, into which a Hungarian flag was planted. At the same time, in front of the Radio headquarters, the political police (ÁVH) opened fire on the crowd, and the protest turned into an armed uprising.

On October 25, in Kossuth Square, shots fired at demonstrators gathered in front of the Parliament caused a massacre whose death toll, even today, ranges from a few dozen to several hundred. This year’s state ceremony took place in that same square.

The revolution was not a bloodless affair on just one side. In the alleys of the 8th and 9th districts, around Corvin Passage, groups of insurgents—many of whom were boys barely out of their teens—attacked Soviet tanks with Molotov cocktails, and many crew members were burned to death inside their vehicles. Total Soviet casualties exceeded seven hundred. The fiercest violence, however, was directed at the men of the political police. On October 30, in Republic Square (Köztársaság tér), the insurgents stormed the party headquarters in Budapest: more than twenty ÁVH officers and conscripts were killed, some lynched and hanged from trees, along with City Secretary Imre Mező. The revolution’s own leaders condemned these acts and called for an end to summary justice.

The October 28 ceasefire marked the beginning of the withdrawal phase. Moscow agreed to withdraw its units from Budapest on the condition that they be replaced by Hungarian units and that the insurgents surrender their weapons. The columns in direct contact with the fighters left their positions on October 30; the last ones departed from the Parliament area in the early afternoon of the 31st. It was a retreat carried out in an openly hostile atmosphere. The groups at the Corvin Passage, convinced that this was a ruse, refused to assist in securing the convoys, and their suspicion was not unfounded: several armored vehicles remained hidden in Népliget and other parts of the city. However, the available sources—both Hungarian and Soviet—do not document any systematic attacks against the departing troops during those two days. The most harrowing accounts—those of Soviet soldiers killed while fleeing from burning vehicles—pertain to the clashes that occurred after November 4. Meanwhile, on October 31, the Presidium of the CPSU had already overturned the decision.

On November 1, Imre Nagy’s government proclaimed the country’s neutrality and its withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact. At dawn on November 4, Operation “Turbine” brought seventeen Soviet divisions back to Budapest. The final toll included approximately 2,500 Hungarian deaths, about 200,000 exiles, tens of thousands of convictions, and more than two hundred executions; Nagy, Pál Maléter, and Miklós Gimes were hanged after a secret trial in June 1958.

Three squares, three memories

Magyar said that for years Hungarians had been led to believe that the national holiday belonged to a single political party. The day showed that the memory of ’56 remains divided, even if the roles have been reversed. The state held its celebrations in Kossuth Square, with the morning flag-raising ceremony and a solemn session of Parliament. Fidesz, KDNP, and Mi Hazánk did not participate because they do not recognize the legitimacy of the new President of the Republic, András Baka.

Fidesz organized its own “March of the National Flag” from the Technical University to Bem Square, following the route taken by the students in 1956. Speakers included former President János Áder, historian Mária Schmidt, and parliamentary group leader János Bóka. For the first time in many years, Orbán did not deliver the October 23 speech: he was in Paris and limited himself to sharing Bóka’s video on social media. The slogan chosen for the demonstration—“No war, no gender, no migration—God, homeland, family”—makes it quite clear which interpretation of 1956 the opposition intends to uphold: that of a revolt for the nation, faith, and family against ideology—an interpretation to be revived today against Brussels.

Mi Hazánk has taken this interpretation to its logical conclusion. Its leader, László Toroczkai, has argued that in 1956 the Hungarians did not rebel against Russia but against an internationalist empire—and that today that empire is called the European Union—which reveals that, at least for a segment of the Hungarian right, 1956 has become an anti-Western symbol.

Magyar’s speech in Kossuth Square addressed this contentious issue. He recalled Erika Szeles, Péter Mansfeld, István Angyal, Nagy, and Maléter; he said that military superiority was able to crush the revolution and execute “the martyred prime minister,” but could not extinguish the desire for freedom. Then he turned to the present. Those who seek support against their own people “in Moscow or elsewhere,” he said, should remember that power sustained by foreign backing lasts only a short while. Anyone who, after 1956, parades an aggressor through the streets or subordinates the nation to foreign empires “has understood nothing of the message of ’56,” and Magyar added: “whether in Budapest or on a Parisian terrace” . The target was Orbán.

The section on foreign policy was brief and clear: Hungary wants to be a reliable ally and an equal partner, not a country that follows an isolated course. The speech never explicitly mentioned Russia, nor did it speak of neutrality. This choice is significant. In 1956, neutrality was Nagy’s ultimate demand; seventy years later, the Hungarian government interprets that same legacy as an anchor to the West, not as equidistance.

Brussels in Budapest

The presence of Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and European Council President António Costa gave the day an explicitly European framework. Von der Leyen, on her first visit to Hungary since 2024, spoke in Parliament of a return “to a reborn country.” She said that in 1956 even the Soviets were afraid, because a victory by the Hungarian people would have spread the desire for democracy. She then directly linked the anniversary to the April 12 election: in April, Hungary would once again send a message of hope, demonstrating that democratic regression is reversible. She had already made the same comparison between Orbán’s defeat and the 1956 revolution in the aftermath of the elections, sparking protests among the Hungarian right.

The rest of the guest list was more modest than the government had led people to believe. Delegations were sent by some forty countries, almost all at the level of ministers or parliamentary speakers; Moldovan President Maia Sandu and Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze were in attendance. Emmanuel Macron, whose attendance Magyar had announced in an interview, did not attend: the French embassy clarified that the visit had never been confirmed, following days of tension over certain comments by the Hungarian prime minister regarding the unrest in France. Also absent were Giorgia Meloni, who was visiting Kuwait, and Donald Tusk, who was in India. Volodymyr Zelenskyy was not present; Ukraine was represented by the Speaker of Parliament. Vladimir Putin was the only head of state from Europe to not receive an invitation.

On October 23, he symbolically confirmed a shift that had already begun in practice. The Magyar government has classified Russia as a security threat, given the green light to open four negotiation chapters for Ukraine’s accession to the European Union, and set the 2027 defense budget at 2% of GDP. The role of bridge between Europe and Russia—which Orbán had made the hallmark of Hungarian foreign policy—is no longer government doctrine.

It remains to be seen to what extent this can be achieved in practice. Last April, Magyar pointed out that Hungary is “close to Russia” and that paying more for raw materials harms European competitiveness; he said he was ready for pragmatic cooperation with Moscow and wanted to renegotiate the terms of Paks II with the Kremlin. Oil still comes via the Druzhba pipeline, and the country’s only nuclear power plant burns Russian fuel. Energy Minister István Kapitány maintains that, starting in October 2027, gas could come entirely from non-Russian sources, and a decision on Paks II is expected by the end of the year.

The 70th anniversary thus leaves one question unanswered. Ady feared that Hungary would remain a ferry forever. Orbán had tried to turn the ferry into a bridge. Magyar now promises a permanent landing on the western shore. Whether that landing will be stable will be determined more by geography and infrastructure than by speeches.

The two squares on October 23—Kossuth and Bem—did not celebrate the same revolution.

The NBA announced Monday it is partnering with prediction markets Kalshi and Polymarket, as multiple states have sued those companies in an attempt to establish their regulatory authority over them. The league said in a release it entered into a memorandum of understanding with the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) to designate Kalshi and Polymarket…

In Congress and in several states, officials have been questioning online gambling companies about their use of artificial intelligence.

© Tony Luong for The New York Times

Brussels (Brussels Morning Newspaper) October 26, 2026 – The European Commission has initiated a four-week call for evidence and a targeted stakeholder consultation to gather feedback and information aimed at shaping the evolution of the European Union’s hydrogen … Read more

European Union fisheries ministers are meeting in Luxembourg on 26th October to negotiate catch limits for the Baltic Sea in 2027, confronting a sharply divided scientific picture in which some commercially important fish populations are recovering while others remain at critically low levels.

The European Commission has proposed increasing total fishing opportunities by approximately 35 per cent compared with 2026, largely because of improved assessments for several herring stocks and sprat. At the same time, it wants substantial reductions in permitted accidental catches of cod, whose depleted populations have shown little evidence of sustained recovery.

The negotiations, scheduled for 26th and potentially 27th October, will determine how fishing opportunities are allocated between EU member states bordering the Baltic Sea.

According to the Council’s published agenda, ministers are seeking a political agreement on total allowable catches and national quotas for ten commercially significant fish stocks.

The outcome will determine how much fish can be landed legally during 2027, while also influencing the future prospects of coastal communities, processing companies and fishing fleets.

Some stocks recover while cod remains depleted

The Commission’s proposal for 2027 fishing opportunities reflects significant differences in the condition of individual stocks.

Brussels recommends increasing the catch limit for central Baltic herring by 49 per cent and for sprat by 44 per cent. Proposed increases for Bothnian herring and Gulf of Riga herring are more modest, at three and 11 per cent respectively.

The improved outlook for sprat follows stronger reproduction in recent years, while scientific assessments suggest some herring populations are beginning to recover.

However, these improvements do not mean the Baltic ecosystem as a whole has returned to a healthy condition.

Central Baltic and Bothnian herring remain below important sustainability reference levels, even though the latest scientific assessments permit increased catches under specified conditions.

For cod, the position is considerably worse.

The International Council for the Exploration of the Sea, known as ICES, has advised that there should be no catches of eastern Baltic cod in 2027 or 2028 under its precautionary approach.

Its scientific advice for eastern Baltic cod reflects the continuing failure of the stock to recover sufficiently to support fishing.

Western Baltic cod faces similarly severe restrictions.

The Commission consequently proposes reducing the permitted incidental catch of western Baltic cod by 88 per cent and eastern Baltic cod by 51 per cent.

These allowances are designed to account for fish caught unintentionally during other fishing operations. They do not amount to the reopening of a targeted commercial cod fishery.

Fishing communities face uneven consequences

The proposed increases in herring and sprat quotas would benefit some fishing operators and processing industries, but the economic effects will vary significantly between countries and fleets.

Larger vessels specialising in pelagic species such as herring and sprat are likely to benefit more directly from increased catch opportunities.

Smaller operators whose activities depend on depleted stocks or mixed fisheries may face continued restrictions.

The Commission also proposes reducing the permitted incidental catch of western Baltic herring by 45 per cent and removing an exemption previously available to certain small-scale coastal fisheries.

That proposal creates a particularly difficult issue for smaller fishing businesses, whose operations may have limited capacity to switch fishing grounds or target different species.

The economic effects will depend not only on the size of the quotas but also on how national governments distribute them among individual operators.

The limits of quota management

The Baltic Sea’s problems cannot be explained by fishing pressure alone.

Nutrient pollution, changes in oxygen availability, habitat degradation and shifting environmental conditions have contributed to the deterioration of several stocks.

Restrictions on fishing can reduce direct pressure on fish populations, but they cannot independently resolve pollution or other environmental problems affecting reproduction and survival.

This complicates the relationship between scientific advice and political decisions.

Ministers are required to take account of conservation objectives under the Common Fisheries Policy. They must also consider the economic consequences for fishing communities and the viability of fleets operating within the agreed limits.

EU Today previously examined the political compromises surrounding European fishing quotas, including the tension between short-term commercial demands and the recovery of depleted fish populations.

The Baltic negotiations present a particularly concentrated version of that conflict because the condition of individual stocks varies so substantially.

Ministers must decide how much recovery is sufficient

The Commission’s proposed increases are based on the latest assessments rather than a general relaxation of conservation policy.

Indeed, its draft regulation envisages maintaining restrictions on vulnerable stocks while allowing greater exploitation where the scientific evidence supports it.

The proposed overall catch volume is approximately 543,000 tonnes, compared with substantially lower fishing opportunities in 2026.

That figure represents a proposed ceiling, not a confirmed agreement or a forecast of actual landings.

Once ministers reach a political agreement, the Council is expected to adopt the final regulation formally in November, with the principal catch limits applying from 1 January 2027.

The central question is whether governments will preserve the distinction between stocks showing measurable recovery and those for which scientific advisers continue to recommend no fishing.

Their decision will determine both the short-term economics of Baltic fisheries and the pace at which the region’s most vulnerable commercial fish populations may recover.

Main Image: By Wilhelm Thomas Fiege – Own work, CC BY-SA 4.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=122363104

European Union energy ministers will meet in Luxembourg on Thursday, 29th October, to discuss proposed changes to electricity network charges that could alter how households and businesses pay for the operation and expansion of Europe’s power grids.

The European Commission wants to revise the rules governing network tariffs, encourage more efficient electricity consumption and accelerate the introduction of smart meters and digital grid technologies. The measures form part of a wider effort to reduce electricity costs, which remain a significant concern for European households and industrial competitiveness.

According to the Council’s published agenda, ministers will examine legislation presented on 17th July alongside the European Commission’s Electrification Action Plan.

The proposals come as Europe faces continued energy-market volatility, with the war in Ukraine and instability in the Middle East affecting supply expectations and prices. Ministers will also assess energy security ahead of the 2026–27 winter.

Why electricity network charges matter

Electricity bills contain several distinct components. Consumers pay for the electricity itself, the operation and maintenance of transmission and distribution networks, and applicable taxes and levies.

Network charges finance the infrastructure needed to deliver electricity from generating facilities to homes and businesses. They also contribute towards grid maintenance, balancing and new investment.

Unlike wholesale electricity prices, which fluctuate according to supply and demand, these charges are generally determined through regulated national tariff systems.

The Commission argues that existing arrangements do not always encourage efficient use of infrastructure or reflect the costs created by electricity consumption at different times and locations.

Its proposed regulation would amend Regulation 2019/943 to strengthen incentives for network operators to control costs and use existing capacity more effectively.

The legislation would also encourage tariffs that reflect when electricity is consumed and the demands placed on local networks.

For example, consumers who can move electricity-intensive activities away from periods of peak demand could face lower charges under certain tariff arrangements.

However, the financial benefits would depend on national implementation, available technology and individual consumption patterns.

Industry presses for lower energy costs

The Commission’s proposal recognises that electricity prices have become a major issue for European industrial competitiveness.

Energy-intensive manufacturers, including steel, chemicals and other industrial producers, face particular difficulties when electricity costs are substantially higher than those of international competitors.

The proposed legislation would allow specific categories of users, including energy-intensive businesses and data centres, to benefit from differentiated network charges where justified by their consumption patterns.

Such arrangements would be subject to safeguards intended to prevent disproportionate costs being transferred to households and smaller businesses.

The proposal also addresses energy taxation. Brussels wants the minimum taxation level for electricity to remain below that of natural gas, reducing a financial disincentive to replacing fossil-fuel equipment with electric alternatives.

As EU Today previously reported, the Commission has been examining changes to electricity taxation as part of its response to Europe’s exposure to imported energy and volatile international markets.

However, reducing charges for one category of consumer does not automatically reduce the overall cost of maintaining a national grid. Regulators must still determine how those costs are recovered.

A growing problem of grid congestion

Europe’s electricity networks require considerable investment to accommodate renewable generation, electric vehicles, heat pumps and expanding industrial demand.

The Commission estimates that approximately €600 billion in electricity-grid investment will be needed by 2030, rising to around €1.2 trillion by 2040.

These figures, outlined in its accompanying assessment, illustrate the difficulty of pursuing lower consumer charges while simultaneously financing substantial infrastructure expansion.

Grid congestion is already delaying connections for renewable-energy projects, industrial facilities and other electricity users.

As EU Today examined in its coverage of Europe’s grid bottlenecks, limited transmission capacity can prevent relatively inexpensive electricity from reaching regions where demand is greatest.

The latest proposal therefore places greater emphasis on making better use of existing infrastructure before committing to conventional network expansion.

It would encourage regulators and operators to consider digital technologies, flexible connection arrangements and improved network planning.

Smart meters and the distribution of costs

The Commission is also seeking faster deployment of smart meters, which can provide consumers and network operators with more detailed information about electricity consumption.

In principle, such systems allow households and businesses to adjust demand in response to changing prices and network conditions.

Industrial consumers may have greater flexibility to shift production schedules or invest in electricity storage. Households, however, may have fewer opportunities to change when they use energy, particularly where consumption is linked to heating or essential daily activities.

This raises questions about how tariff reforms would affect different consumers.

A system that rewards flexible consumption could reduce costs for households with smart appliances, batteries or electric vehicles, while offering fewer benefits to people unable to alter their electricity usage.

National regulators would therefore have to balance economic efficiency against the risk of unevenly distributing network costs.

Ministers face difficult choices

The 29th October meeting will not itself introduce new electricity charges or establish binding national tariff rates.

The Commission’s proposal remains subject to negotiations through the EU legislative process, involving the Council and European Parliament.

Governments will need to consider how much discretion national regulators should retain, whether tariff structures can be made more consistent across the single market and how vulnerable consumers should be protected.

The meeting will also examine longer-term energy security and possible targets for the period after 2030.

For Brussels, the difficulty is that electricity must become sufficiently competitive to encourage industrial investment and electrification, while the infrastructure required to support increased consumption must still be financed.

Whether the proposed reforms eventually reduce electricity bills will depend on their final legislative form, national implementation and the extent to which more efficient grid management produces measurable savings.

In states like Florida, officers who hand out fishing citations and inspect produce have been deputized by Immigration and Customs Enforcement, expanding the reach of President Trump’s deportation campaign.

© Alfonso Duran for The New York Times

The FCC should utilize its $9 billion 5G Fund to subsidize direct-to-device satellite service in areas where traditional cell tower construction is impractical.

The reality 40 years later is that Congress made the drug penalties permanent law, while drug treatment was left to be determined during annual budget fights.

The European Commission is preparing a new trade-defence instrument that would allow the European Union to restrict access to its single market more rapidly when large volumes of low-priced imports threaten domestic manufacturers.

Commission President Ursula von der Leyen outlined the initiative during a speech to the European Parliament in Strasbourg on Wednesday, 21 October, following discussions among EU leaders over growing global trade imbalances.

The proposal would form part of a wider package addressing economic dependence on foreign suppliers and attempts by third countries to exert commercial pressure on individual EU member states. Although the Commission has not yet published detailed legislation, the announcement signals Brussels’ intention to expand its capacity to intervene in international trade disputes.

European industries seek protection

European manufacturers have faced increasing competition from imported products in sectors including chemicals, machinery, vehicles, steel and industrial components.

Much of the concern centres on China, where extensive manufacturing capacity and government support have enabled companies to expand their presence in international markets.

European producers argue that differences in subsidies, production costs and market access place them at a competitive disadvantage.

According to the European Commission, the EU’s goods trade deficit with China exceeded €1 billion per day in 2025.

Von der Leyen has described the imbalance as unsustainable and argued that European trade policy must respond more effectively to market distortions.

During her 21st October address to Parliament, she confirmed that the Commission was working on additional safeguards intended to address sudden increases in imports affecting European businesses.

The proposed measures follow a Franco-German initiative calling for stronger instruments to counter systemic economic imbalances.

France and Germany have urged Brussels to act more quickly where existing trade investigations and enforcement procedures prove insufficient.

China trade negotiations produce limited progress

The announcement follows recent negotiations between Brussels and Beijing aimed at reducing tensions over industrial competition.

Earlier this month, the two sides reached an arrangement restricting Chinese hybrid vehicle exports to the European market.

As EU Today reported on 13rd October, the agreement established an annual ceiling of 350,000 vehicles, potentially reducing Chinese manufacturers’ expected market access.

However, European officials acknowledge that restrictions covering a single automotive category cannot resolve the wider trade imbalance.

Other industries remain concerned about Chinese production capacity, including chemicals, machinery and manufactured components.

Beijing has warned against further unilateral European restrictions, arguing that protectionist measures could damage commercial relations.

The Chinese authorities have also demonstrated a willingness to pursue trade investigations involving European products.

As previous EU Today coverage established, China opened an anti-dumping investigation into an EU chemical product in early October, adding to existing commercial disputes.

Further European restrictions could therefore prompt additional Chinese countermeasures affecting exporters from member states.

New instrument would strengthen EU response

The proposed market-access mechanism is intended to give Brussels greater scope to act when existing safeguards cannot address economic threats quickly enough.

However, its legal structure, enforcement thresholds and relationship with existing anti-dumping and anti-subsidy legislation have not yet been specified.

The EU already possesses several trade-defence instruments, including duties against unfairly priced or subsidised products and safeguards designed to protect industries from damaging import surges.

Those mechanisms generally require formal investigations and evidence demonstrating the conditions for intervention.

The new proposal could introduce a faster response, but questions remain over how any restrictions would comply with international trade obligations and the EU’s commitments under World Trade Organisation rules.

Member states would also have to consider the consequences for European businesses that depend on imported materials, components and finished goods.

Reducing dependence on foreign suppliers

The Commission’s strategy extends beyond restrictions on imports. Von der Leyen confirmed that a separate initiative, known as DiversifyEU, would be presented in December.

The programme is intended to help European companies reduce excessive dependence on individual suppliers and countries, particularly where critical raw materials and strategic technologies are involved.

The Commission also plans a solidarity mechanism designed to assist member states and industries facing external economic coercion or retaliation. Such arrangements could become relevant when a foreign government targets exports from a particular member state in response to an EU policy decision.

The initiative follows growing concern that Europe’s access to strategically important industrial supplies can be disrupted through export controls or political disputes.

Difficult negotiations ahead

The Commission will still have to translate the proposed measures into legislation and secure sufficient political support among member states and the European Parliament.

National governments have different commercial relationships with China and varying levels of dependence on imported industrial goods. Countries with substantial export markets in China may be particularly concerned about retaliation, while manufacturers facing foreign competition are likely to press for faster intervention.

The Commission must also determine whether new trade powers should be exercised centrally in Brussels or require additional approval from national governments. For European industry, the immediate question is whether the new mechanism can provide effective protection without increasing production costs through restrictions on essential imports.

The Commission’s forthcoming legislative proposals will establish how far the EU intends to move towards a more interventionist trade policy.

Extreme heat across Europe during the summer of 2026 caused an estimated 50,391 deaths, according to new research examining mortality in 854 cities. Nearly two-thirds of the deaths were attributed to additional warming caused by human activity, principally greenhouse gas emissions from burning fossil fuels.

The findings, reported on 23 October, indicate that 32,619 people died as a consequence of temperatures intensified by human-induced climate change. The estimated total represents a 71 per cent increase compared with 2022, previously the deadliest summer in the researchers’ historical dataset, when 29,480 heat-related deaths were calculated.

The research builds on a long-term assessment of heat-related mortality, published in Nature Health on 14 October, which examined the impact of rising temperatures across European cities between 2000 and 2025. The latest estimates for 2026 extend that analysis to an exceptionally severe summer marked by successive heatwaves across much of the continent.

Italy, France, Spain and Germany among worst affected

The highest estimated death tolls were recorded in Italy, France, Spain and Germany, where prolonged periods of extreme heat placed considerable pressure on vulnerable populations and public-health services.

Approximately one-third of the deaths occurred between 17 June and 1 July, when temperatures in some affected areas exceeded seasonal averages by 5.3°C.

The scale of the June heatwave had already become apparent in preliminary national mortality statistics. As EU Today reported in July, France, Belgium and the Netherlands recorded at least 3,700 excess deaths during the early stages of the summer’s extreme temperatures.

Subsequent official assessments suggested that the mortality impact was considerably greater. According to France’s national public-health agency, at least 5,764 excess deaths were recorded during the heatwave between 17 June and 2 July, followed by another 1,243 during the period from 3 to 22 July.

These national figures measure excess deaths from all causes during heatwave periods and are not directly equivalent to the temperature-attributable mortality estimates in the European study.

The researchers also cautioned that their European estimates probably understate the total mortality burden. The 854 cities included in the analysis represent approximately 40 per cent of Europe’s population, while deaths associated with an earlier heatwave in May were excluded.

Climate change responsible for almost two-thirds of deaths

Researchers used established climate-attribution methods to estimate how many deaths would have occurred under natural summer conditions and how many resulted from additional warming associated with greenhouse gas emissions.

Their calculations compared observed temperatures with computer simulations representing a climate without human-induced global warming. The difference between the two scenarios provided an estimate of mortality attributable to climate change.

Clair Barnes, a climate scientist at Imperial College London and lead author of the research, said Western and Northern European infrastructure was not designed to withstand the temperatures now being experienced.

In some European cities, temperatures during the summer reached as much as 12°C above seasonal norms.

The researchers estimated that the proportion of heat-related deaths attributable to human-induced climate change has increased from approximately 45 per cent in the early 2000s to around 65 per cent today.

The findings are consistent with the European Commission’s assessment of rising heat risks, which identifies Europe as the world’s fastest-warming continent, with temperatures increasing at approximately twice the global average rate.

Elderly Europeans account for majority of fatalities

People aged 85 and above accounted for more than half of the estimated deaths, although the research also identified more than 800 deaths among adults aged between 20 and 44.

Extreme temperatures increase the risk of cardiovascular and respiratory complications, dehydration and heatstroke. According to the World Health Organisation’s assessment of heat-related health risks, older people and those with existing medical conditions face particularly serious consequences from prolonged exposure.

The findings also reflect the impact of high overnight temperatures, which prevent buildings from cooling and reduce opportunities for physical recovery after extreme daytime heat.

EU Today previously examined how rising night-time temperatures are exposing weaknesses in European housing and public-health preparedness, particularly in densely populated urban areas.

The latest research identified Rome as having the highest cumulative heat-related death toll among European capitals between 2000 and 2025.

Belgium records separate evidence of climate-related mortality

A study published by Vrije Universiteit Brussel on 20 October provides additional evidence of the mortality impact of this summer’s temperatures.

Researchers estimated that Belgium’s June heatwave caused 1,181 heat-related deaths, of which 665, or 56 per cent, were attributable to human-induced climate change.

The study found that climate change increased temperatures during the heatwave by approximately 3.9°C and more than doubled the estimated number of heat-related deaths. Its findings have not yet undergone peer review.

Belgium’s public-health authorities separately recorded 2,018 excess deaths during and immediately after the heatwave, the highest figure associated with any Belgian heatwave since monitoring began in 2003.

European governments face growing pressure to adapt

The latest findings add to concerns about the capacity of European healthcare systems, residential buildings and urban infrastructure to withstand increasingly severe summer temperatures.

The European Commission has warned that public-health systems across many EU and European Economic Area countries remain insufficiently prepared for extreme heat.

Researchers have identified improved early-warning systems, accessible cooling facilities, better building design and targeted assistance for elderly residents as measures capable of reducing mortality.

The new estimates also demonstrate the limitations of existing mortality records. Heat frequently contributes to deaths without being identified as the immediate medical cause, requiring researchers to use statistical models to calculate its wider impact.

The estimated 50,391 deaths therefore represent modelled heat-attributable mortality rather than individually certified fatalities. Nevertheless, the results indicate that extreme temperatures are becoming an increasingly substantial public-health risk across Europe, extending beyond Mediterranean countries into regions historically less exposed to prolonged summer heat.