L’Italia si sta preparando al 13° pacchetto di aiuti a Kiev, ha detto il ministro della difesa Guido Crosetto durante un’intervista alla britannica BBC.
“Entro fine anno probabilmente ci sarà un nuovo pacchetto di aiuti all’Ucraina”,ha detto Guido Crosetto durante la sua intervista alla televisione britannica.
Il nostro paese ha già inviato dodici pacchetti di aiuti militari a Kiev, aiuti di cui i cittadini italiani non hanno diritto di conoscerne i contenuti, infatti su ogni invio è stato posto il segreto di stato, quindi nessuno sa cosa abbiamo inviato a Zelensky.
Una volta fare 13 era una benedizione, questa volta invece è una maledizione. Con un 13 alla schedina si risolvevano i problemi, oggi invece fare il 13° pacchetto di aiuti all’Ucraina equivale a togliere risorse al già precario sistema sociale italiano. La schedina pare l’abbiano vinta Zelensky e i suoi soci, non noi.
Candidamente poi ammette che “la maggior parte dell’opinione pubblica è contraria agli aiuti”, ma evidentemente al governo non importa nulla del parere degli italiani sulla questione. Ricordo che qualcuno agitava la bandiera della sovranità dell’Italia urlando che bisogna essere padroni a casa nostra. Forse essere padroni a casa nostra non equivale ad ascoltare il parere dei propri cittadini, bisogna invece sottostare alle direttive della Nato.
Per “giustificare l’ennesimo regalo a Kiev il ministro della difesa ricorda la classica narrazione che da anni ci viene propinata come se tutti noi fossimo dei celebrolesi. Ha detto che “Putin non si ferma all’Ucraina. E Nato e Unione Europea si preparano. Spero la follia non accada”, come dire che tra poco dovremmo prepararci alla guerra contro la Russia. Vedremo se i suoi figli saranno i primi a partire.
Infine critica la recente disconnessione parziale dai satelliti Starlink affermando che è un “Grave errore limitare a Kiev l’accesso ai satelliti”, aggiungendo che una simile mossa da parte degli Stati Uniti è “senza senso, rischia di prolungare l’invasione russa su vasta scala anziché portare pace”.
Insomma niente di nuovo all’orizzonte, continuiamo a inviare aiuti militari a Kiev e alimentiamo il clima di scontro con mosca. Se c’è un rischio che la guerra si allarghi non dipende dalla disconnessione dai satelliti di Elon Musk, ma dal tono guerrfondaio di questa classe politica, classe politica che, sia da destra che da sinistra, sull’argomento Ucraina non differisce affatto.
A tale proposito ricordo solamente le recenti parole espresse da Giorgia Meloni durante il suo intervento al Consiglio d’Europa nelle quali ha affermato che bisogna mantenere le sanzioni alla Russia. Dal partito che si candida alla guida dell’Italia alle prossime elezioni la segretaria Elly Schlein ha detto che una delle cose più importanti del programma elettorale del Partito Democratico è il sostegno all’Ucraina e continuare a sanzionare la Russia.
Quindi chiunque vinca alle prossime elezioni la politica verso l’Ucraina non cambia, soldi a palate in direzione di Kiev, Poi poco importa se per fare un ecografia ti danno l’appuntamento dopo due mesi, se va bene …
Intanto l’ íultima decisione di Donald Trump nelle relazioni con l’ucraina riguarda la sospensione di alcune sanzioni emesse, poche settimane fa, contro la Russia. Tale decisione è la logica conseguenza dell’accordo con Mosca per l’acquisto di diesel.
Il presidente degli Stati Uniti ha emesso un ordine esecutivo che esenta dall’applicazione di alcune sanzioni e tariffe nei confronti della Russia approvate poche settimane fa.
“Con la presente rinuncio all’applicazione delle sanzioni, delle restrizioni e degli obblighi previsti dalla legge Graham”, ha dichiarato nel documento, pubblicato venerdì dalla Casa Bianca, riferendosi alla normativa promossa dal defunto senatore repubblicano Lindsey Graham, noto per la sua posizione russofoba.
Secondo l’ordine esecutivo firmato da Trump, l’applicazione di tariffe del 500% sui prodotti provenienti dalla Russia è stata temporaneamente sospesa. Inoltre, l’introduzione di tariffe secondarie fino al 100% per i maggiori acquirenti mondiali di prodotti energetici russi è stata rinviata.
Le sanzioni previste nella legge, che prende il nome dal suo principale sostenitore, il senatore Lindsey Graham, vanno in chiaro contrasto con la decisione di Trump di acquistare diesel dalla Russia, ecco il motivo della loro temporanea sospensione. Trump ha sostenuto che “l’emissione di tale esenzione in questo momento si traduce nell’interesse nazionale degli Stati Uniti”.
Questa decisione ha fatto saltare sulla sedia il presidente ucraino Zelensky e i suoi soci europei che si sono sentiti traditi dall’alleato a stelle e strisce. Ma le tensioni con Kiev non si fermano qui. Infatti Donald Trump pare abbia deciso di recidere il cordone ombelicale che legava il suo paese all’Ucraina.
Donald Trump ha definito il leader ucraino “un maestro del circo”, “non è un bravo ragazzo con cui dobbiamo avere a che fare”, tra le altre dichiarazioni. Relativamente agli attacchi alle raffinerie russe ha affermato che Zelensky “Non sta facendo un buon servizio al mondo”
Sabato scorso, Trump ha nuovamente accusato Zelensky di aver attaccato le raffinerie russe, che le forze ucraine hanno continuato a portare avanti nonostante i suoi avvertimenti. “Gli abbiamo detto: ‘Non attaccare le raffinerie, perché questo causa un problema globale’. Ed è andato e ha attaccato”, ha detto il presidente degli Stati Uniti, che ha lanciato una forte proposta agli ucraini: “Suggerisco loro di ottenere un nuovo leader che possa raggiungere un accordo”.
Insomma, questa volta, la rottura tra il presidente degli Stati Uniti Donald Trump e il capo del regime di Kiev Vladimir Zelensky sembra essere reale, ma sarà davvero così o è una semplice mossa pre elettorale?
Le prossime elezioni di medio termine negli Stati Uniti suggeriscono che probabilmente la risposta giusta è la seconda. Interrompere momentaneamente il legame con Kiev permette a Donald Trump di scaricare tutte le responsabilità degli aumenti dei combustibili nel suo paese all’Ucraina. Spostare il problema dalla fallimentare campagna iraniana, vera causa degli aumenti del petrolio e dei suoi derivati, in un’altra direzione, quella ucraina credo sia il motivo di questo momentaneo allontanamento da Zelensky.
Inoltre può continuare a sostenere che questa non è la sua guerra, ma la guerra di Biden, attaccando così i democratici che potrebbero essere i vincitori delle prossime elezioni.
Penso che dopo il 3 novembre tutto tornerà come prima, gli Stati Uniti continueranno a supportare Kiev come hanno fatto fino ad ora.
Articolo originale: farodiroma.it
Key developments on Oct. 24-25:
A country with a population of 1.3 million announces that it can strangle the commercial lifeline of the world’s leading nuclear power in a matter of hours.
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A string of provocations, but it’s all just cheap jewelry
Certain statements should be read twice – the second time aloud – to be sure you didn’t dream them. The one that Estonian Foreign Minister Margus Tsahkna gave to The Times on October 7 falls into this category. Estonia, the minister informs us, would be able to assemble a force of 50,000 experienced soldiers “in a matter of hours” and, again within a few hours, block Russia’s access to the Baltic Sea, which he describes as a vital artery of the Russian economy. For Moscow, that sea is a matter of survival, he added, especially since the Black Sea, he claims, is already closed off. Then, with a sense of timing that no playwright would have dared to imagine, Tsahkna called it “absurd” to describe NATO as an offensive organization.
The minister’s outburst did not come out of the blue. It comes at the end of an autumn that Tallinn has methodically shaped. In mid-September, the government announced it was ready to seal the border if a general mobilization were declared in Russia; on October 1, it banned the transit of Russian and Belarusian wheat; around the same time, the Financial Times reported on elite units being deployed to the border and the purchase of weapons capable of striking deep into Russian territory. The defense budget for 2026 stands at 2.4 billion euros, or 5.4% of gross domestic product. We are looking at a country of 1.3 million people that has chosen to live in a state of constant readiness and to let the world know, every week, just how prepared it is to fight.
The minister was careful to specify that the blockade would be triggered only after a Russian attack capable of invoking Article 5. The clause is about as reassuring as a “friendly dog” sign hanging on the gate of a kennel. Publicly announcing a plan to choke off a nuclear power’s main energy export route remains a deliberate political act, regardless of any qualifying conditions attached to it. Under customary international law, a naval blockade is an act of war; and in the age of severed cables, stateless drones, and oil tankers in the so-called “shadow fleet,” the threshold for what constitutes an “attack” has become elastic. Who decides when it has been crossed? The very same government that denounces a new provocation every morning?
The math of fifty thousand
Let’s focus on the numbers, which are the most entertaining part. According to public data from the Estonian armed forces, the wartime strength is just over 43,000. Of these, only 4,200 are on permanent standby; the rest are reservists and volunteers from the Defense League – brave people who train in the woods on weekends. So, there are no 50,000 “experienced” soldiers in a matter of hours. Unless you count those from other countries.
And that is exactly how the figure should be interpreted. Tsahkna’s 50,000 do not speak Estonian. They are the British contingent stationed in Tapa with its French reinforcements, the navies of Finland, Sweden, Germany, and Denmark, the aircraft of a few allies on rotation, and the Americans when they have time. A dozen or so flags, each with its own chain of command, its own parliament, its own public opinion, and its own election calendar. The Estonian minister disposes of that army the way a condominium manager disposes of the residents’ savings: in words, with great nonchalance. Could some assistant please explain to him how to do his job?
Let’s try to imagine the first missile. In London, the cabinet meets and seeks a legal opinion. Paris launches a strategic review, which requires a document and a conference. Berlin awaits the Bundestag’s vote and the blessing of its less-than-convinced coalition partner. Rome seeks clarification at the Atlantic Council; Budapest puts its reservations on record; Washington is busy elsewhere. Article 5, after all, doesn’t force anyone to fire a shot: it obligates each ally to take the action it deems necessary, and “necessary” can mean anything from an aircraft carrier to a note of protest. The oldest debate in any coalition would immediately begin: who steps in first, who withdraws last, who covers whose flank, and who pays for the fuel. Meanwhile, the Estonians would be there counting down the minutes.
European history is all too familiar with this scenario. In September 1939, France and Great Britain had guaranteed Poland’s security with the same solemnity with which Tallinn is guaranteed today. They declared war, and then spent eight months behind the Maginot Line simply watching: the French called it the drôle de guerre, the “phoney war.” Warsaw, meanwhile, had long since stopped laughing.
Let’s now set aside arithmetic for geography, which isn’t swayed by interviews – someone should tell the Minister that! About eighty kilometers of sea lie between Tallinn and Helsinki: it is along this narrow passage that the minister would like to close off the Gulf of Finland. From the Estonian capital to the Russian border at Narva, there are just over two hundred kilometers. Russia’s GDP, in nominal terms, is more than fifty times that of Estonia. The Baltic Fleet is based in Kronstadt, at the far end of the Gulf, and in Baltiysk, in the Kaliningrad exclave; which means, incidentally, that a substantial portion of that fleet is already outside the “plug” that Tallinn dreams of inserting.
Strategists carefully distinguish between three things that Estonian politicians happily confuse: guarding a passage, making its use risky for the adversary, and maintaining stable control over it. The first is possible; the second is costly; the third, against Russia, has never succeeded for anyone. Those who lay mines may fall victim to them; those who deploy coastal anti-ship batteries become, in turn, fixed targets, surveyed down to the meter.
And this is where physics comes in. Russia’s conventional arsenal includes Iskander missiles deployed just a few dozen minutes’ flight away, ship-launched Kalibr missiles, TOS-1A thermobaric rocket launchers, and high-yield glide bombs. There’s no need to bring up nuclear warheads, which remain the favorite bogeyman of Western talk shows. The coastal batteries, depots, command centers, and docks from which our dear friends in Tallinn intend to block the Gulf would go from a solid to a gaseous state in the time between launch and impact. And with them, the solidity of Estonia’s political stance would evaporate, long before an agreement on the statement is reached in Brussels. We’re not writing this to be smug. We’re writing this because, in that scenario, ordinary Estonians would be the first to pay the price, used as pawns by a ruling class that’s playing with fire in its own living room.
Creative accounting for oil
There remains the issue of the “lifeline.” Tsahkna attributes about 60% of Russian oil exports by sea to the Baltic route. Estimates from the Polish think tank OSW – which cannot be suspected of sympathizing with Moscow – put the figure at about one-third of crude oil and nearly half of refined products; and Reuters data from February show that oil continued to ship out from Russian ports on the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov, despite the sea being “already closed.” Inflating figures is an age-old rhetorical technique: it serves to make the threat seem more deadly than it is and one’s own position stronger than it actually is.
Moreover, a blockade would not affect only Moscow. Neutral shipowners, insurance companies, freight rates, refineries, and energy prices would all suffer the consequences, and Europe – which in recent years has already paid dearly for its economic war against Russia – would once again bear the cost. There’s even a grotesque detail: in 2025, Estonia sold goods worth approximately 252 million euros to Russia. They’re threatening to cut off their neighbor’s lifeline, but in the meantime, business as usual continues.
Why, then, all the fuss? The answer lies in the role the Estonian ruling class has carved out for itself within the Alliance: that of the permanent vanguard, the most zealous member of the eastern flank, the top student who raises their hand before the teacher finishes the question. It’s a source of privilege. It guarantees attention, funds, allied troops on its territory, and invitations to summits. And it becomes all the more valuable as the possibility of a ceasefire in Ukraine draws nearer – a prospect feared in many Atlantic capitals as the end of the emergency that justifies everything. So the fever must be kept high: a statement every week, a ban every month, a threat of a blockade every fall.
In 1955, Leonard Wibberley published a satirical novel, *The Mouse That Roared*, in which the tiny Grand Duchy of Fenwick declared war on the United States with the sole purpose of losing it and collecting reconstruction aid. The difference with Tallinn lies in the ending. The Grand Duchy counted on losing to a generous power, an ocean away. Estonia is threatening a neighboring power – one that has forgotten nothing since 1991 – and is entrusting its fate to a coalition that has never fought a real war together against an opponent of equal strength.
From apotheosis to casus belli?
Let’s recap. A country with a population of 1.3 million announces that it can strangle the commercial lifeline of the world’s leading nuclear power in a matter of hours. To do so, it relies on soldiers it doesn’t have – lent by allies it hasn’t consulted – based on oil figures that Western sources themselves downplay. It ties all of this to a war that its rhetoric makes a little more likely every day, and in the same breath accuses those who see NATO as something offensive of absurdity. If there is such a thing as the apotheosis of the absurd, it can be found at the Foreign Ministry in Tallinn.
Moscow, to tell the truth, doesn’t even need to respond. Geography does it, the balance of power does it, and the history of European coalitions – which have always found it easier to make promises than to keep them – does it. Deterrence that turns into permanent provocation ceases to dissuade and begins to seek its own casus belli. The Baltic Sea deserves mature diplomacy among the coastal states that will have to share it anyway. For now, it must settle for – a minister who roars – and an audience of allies who, at the first real blow, will look around wondering who should answer the phone.
This weekly update from the Kyiv Independent aims to shed light on the situation facing Ukrainians living under Russian occupation and the ever-tightening control of information imposed by the Kremlin.
Key news as of Oct. 25:
Oleg Zaslavskii has worked at V. N. Karazin Kharkiv National University (KhNU) for almost forty years, studying general relativity, gravitation, and black hole physics. But two papers he coauthored with a Russian colleague who has spoken out against the war have cost him his funding. For ten months now, Zaslavskii has gone without a salary and has been unable to propose new research projects. In wartime, should sanctions policy take an individual’s stance into account — or does any interaction with someone from a Russian institution automatically count as cooperation with Russia?
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In Ukraine, state funding for researchers is tied to specific research topics. Rather than allocating money in the abstract — “to an institute” or to an individual scientist — the state funds research projects (naukovo-doslidni roboty in Ukrainian) approved by the ministry or by an academy of sciences. A scientist’s salary can be pieced together from several such projects: the same person might be appointed at 0.5 FTE on one project, 0.25 FTE on another, and another 0.25 FTE on a third. If a project goes unfunded, or a researcher isn’t included in it, they don’t get paid. For researchers funded under this model, then, access to funding competitions is directly tied to their ability to earn a living.
For astrophysicist Oleg Zaslavskii, this system has had critical consequences: after publishing with a Russian coauthor, he lost the right to compete for research funding from the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine (MES). How did this happen?
On February 6, 2024, the MES sent Ukrainian universities and research institutions a letter titled On the Need to Terminate All Forms of Scientific (Scientific and Technical) Cooperation with the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus. The document imposed restrictions on authors of joint publications with staff of Russian and Belarusian institutions: a ban on taking part in MES research funding competitions in 2024–2026 and removal from expert and advisory roles within the ministry’s system. In addition, the MES would cut off funding for any research projects whose state registration numbers appeared in such publications.
“Even though I’ve been working at the university for about forty years and have a strong research record, I don’t have official permanent-staff status. Like many of my colleagues, I’m still a ‘day laborer,’” says Oleg Zaslavskii. “One consequence of this funding model is that you’re much more dependent on the administration: if for some reason it decides to get rid of someone, it doesn’t even need to issue a separate dismissal order. All it has to do is leave them off a new project, or off the continuation of an old one. That’s exactly what’s happening to me now: I’ve been stuck without pay for eight months. I can’t propose new projects either. The vice-rector for research, A. V. Panteleimonov, citing the MES letter On the Need to Terminate All Forms of Scientific (Scientific and Technical) Cooperation with the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus, won’t let me submit new projects.”
Zaslavskii stresses that these joint papers did not list any Ukrainian state research registration numbers. That, however, did not save his funding.
“This is the principle of collective responsibility,” he explains. “Nothing matters — not who the Russian coauthor is (even if he signed letters against the war with Ukraine), not how important the topics I work on are, not the fact that I published these papers as a private individual. What’s more, other project leaders are afraid to take on a Ukrainian author who’s been caught collaborating with Russians (their project could get cut just because some ‘criminal’ like that is somehow involved). I’ve already been shut out of Ukraine’s main competition, the NRFU [the National Research Foundation of Ukraine, the country’s main state grant-making foundation, established to fund research and development on a competitive basis — T-invariant]. You’d think the ban wouldn’t extend to the nauka.gov.ua competition: there, selection will be done automatically, based on data from scientists’ profiles. But if I’m not put on a current project in the next few days, my candidacy won’t even be considered — I don’t count as a full-time staff member.”
The Kinematic Censorship of Black Holes
What exactly does Zaslavskii study — and what were the two papers that cost him his funding actually about?
In 2009, physicists Bañados, Silk, and West described a theoretical effect that came to be known, after their initials, as the BSW effect: if two elementary particles fall into a rotating black hole and collide near the event horizon, the energy of their collision can, in theory, grow without bound. On Earth, accelerating particles to extreme energies requires building giant machines like the Large Hadron Collider. A black hole could serve as a free supercollider, offering a glimpse into the mysteries of quantum gravity. But the original BSW effect describes an idealized mathematical model. It was Zaslavskii who made the concept “physical” by answering fundamental questions about how the process would actually work in reality. He proved that the effect is not a mere fluke of the equations but a universal property.
Zaslavskii succeeded in extending the theory to a wide range of black holes. In particular, he studied the effect not only for rotating black holes but also for electrically charged ones, where the particle acceleration mechanism works differently. Real black holes, moreover, may be surrounded by matter — plasma and gas, for example. Zaslavskii proved mathematically that the BSW effect persists even when the gravitational influence of this surrounding matter is taken into account.
If collision energies can approach infinity, one might expect the cosmos to be constantly rocked by micro-explosions of unimaginable power, capable of spawning new universes or tearing space apart. Zaslavskii answered the question of why this doesn’t happen. By investigating the physical limits of the process, he formulated the principle of kinematic censorship.
A black hole’s gravitational field really can accelerate particles to mind-boggling energies. But the geometry of spacetime itself “vetoes” truly infinite energy. For a collision to reach enormous energies, one of the particles has to move along a very specific, “critical” trajectory. Zaslavskii calculated that gravitational attraction and centrifugal forces near the event horizon act as a natural filter: they “blow away,” or screen out, particles headed for a dangerous collision, keeping physical quantities from becoming truly infinite.
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Until recently, physicists did little research on black hole interiors, since no information can get out of them. Zaslavskii took on the task of describing, mathematically, the extreme gravity inside the event horizon. His recent papers (including one of the very papers he wrote with his Russian colleague) tackle a notoriously difficult problem involving coordinate systems. If you fall into a black hole, an outside observer will see you slowing down at its edge forever. In reality, though, you’ll cross it in a fraction of a second. Zaslavskii and his coauthor developed and refined a mathematical framework (a modified “Lemaître time”) that makes it possible to describe the physics of matter moving from our space into a black hole’s interior smoothly — without mathematical discontinuities or “catastrophes” in the formulas.
His research shows that black holes are not just dead gravitational graves but highly complex dynamic systems that constantly interact with the surrounding universe at both the quantum and the macro level.
In the papers that got him into trouble, Zaslavskii and his coauthor explore the “fail-safes” the universe has built into black holes to prevent an explosion of infinite energy — in other words, “kinematic censorship.”
In one of the two papers, for example, the physicists work through an extreme scenario: a collision at the event horizon between a particle emerging from a white hole and a particle falling into a black hole. You’d expect the energy to be colossal. But the researchers proved mathematically that kinematic censorship kicks in. For physically realizable particles, the laws of relativity cause their velocities to drop. No “infinite energy” is born in our reality — the universe hits the brakes in time.
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In their second joint paper — the other one that caused the trouble — the researchers considered more complex black holes: ones that rotate and carry an electric charge. From the point of view of an outside observer, including one on Earth, time freezes at a black hole’s horizon. There, the ordinary equations of physics start to glitch and “spit out” spurious infinities. To get around this dead end, the researchers used what is known as Lemaître time — a time scale “tied” to the clock of the infalling observer. For the infalling observer, though, time passes perfectly normally, and they cross the boundary in a matter of seconds.
Using this frame of reference, the coauthors were able to analyze particle collisions immediately after the horizon is crossed. According to their work, the principle of kinematic censorship continues to hold even inside rotating, charged black holes. The authors’ mathematics describes in detail exactly how the properties of spacetime change during those first fractions of a second of the fall, confirming that black holes remain extreme objects — but the laws of physics don’t break down inside them.
When Publishing Stops Being a Private Matter
T-invariant asked the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine (MES) to comment on the situation. Below is a full translation of the response from Hryhorii Mozolevych, Director General of the MES Science Development Directorate, with the original capitalization preserved [Ukrainian official documents often write “russia,” as well as the abbreviations “rf” (Russian Federation) and “rb” (Republic of Belarus), in lowercase — T-invariant].
“The aggressive war that russia has been waging against Ukraine since 2014 has been accompanied by the systematic use of science as an instrument of propaganda and of attempts to legitimize the occupation. Beginning in 2014 with the occupation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, and continuing during the full-scale military invasion of Ukraine by the rf, the aggressor state has seized more than 1,500 Ukrainian educational and research institutions. The occupation administration of the rf uses these institutions to promote its geopolitical agenda, to justify the attempted illegal annexation of Ukrainian territories, and to assimilate the population.
More than 2,000 Ukrainian educational institutions, research institutions, and libraries have been destroyed or damaged, forcing thousands of scientists to flee conflict zones in order to save themselves and their families.
Hundreds of higher education institutions and research institutions located in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine, together with their intellectual and information resources, archives, libraries, collections, publications, know-how, trade names and symbols, technologies, and equipment, have been seized by the occupation administrations and, in essence, stolen by the rf.
The position of the MES remains principled and unchanged: any official scientific cooperation with representatives of the rf and the rb is unacceptable until the territorial integrity of Ukraine is fully restored and the damage inflicted is compensated.
The state policy prohibiting joint scientific activity is based on a number of legal and regulatory acts. In particular, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, by Resolution No. 355 of March 24, 2022, denounced the Agreement in the Field of Education and Science with the Russian Federation, and by Resolution No. 417 of April 9, 2022, the Treaty on Cooperation in the Field of Science and Technology with the republic of Belarus was denounced. The key document is Law of Ukraine No. 2299-IX of June 19, 2022, On the Termination of the Agreement between the Government of Ukraine and the Government of the Russian Federation on Scientific and Technical Cooperation. In addition, pursuant to clause 20 of part one of Article 4 of the Law of Ukraine On Sanctions No. 1644-VII of August 14, 2014, the types of sanctions include the termination of cultural exchanges, scientific cooperation, educational and sports contacts, and entertainment programs with foreign states and foreign legal entities. The said acts require the termination of scientific cooperation with institutions of the aggressor state, including at the level of joint scientific publications.
Furthermore, by letter No. 1/2000-24 of February 5, 2024, the MES informed all higher education institutions and research institutions of Ukraine, as well as the principal administrators of budget funds within whose sphere of management/under whose authority higher education institutions and research institutions fall, of the need to terminate all forms of scientific (scientific and technical) cooperation with the rf and the rb.
Consequently, any cooperation with representatives of the aggressor state, the rf, as well as the rb (with whose support the aggression against Ukraine is being carried out), including cooperation at the level of joint scientific publications, the implementation of research projects, etc., should have been terminated in compliance with the requirements of the legislation of Ukraine.
In response to your question regarding the possibility of publishing joint articles without indicating a Ukrainian affiliation, we hereby inform you that the determining factor for the prohibition of cooperation is the coauthor’s legal affiliation with the state institutions of the aggressor, which imposes corresponding obligations on such a person. Any person working at an institution of the rf is part of the aggressor’s scientific system, and the results of his or her research directly or indirectly serve the Russian military potential.
The MES does not regulate the private correspondence of citizens; however, it emphasizes that if contacts develop into a scientific result (joint publications), they cease to be ‘private’ and become a form of scientific interaction. The use of intellectual property to create joint products with representatives of the rf constitutes a violation of the legislation and the national interests of Ukraine. An article’s association with a Russian institution automatically renders such a publication unacceptable for any reporting purposes, as well as for the defense of dissertations or the conferral of academic titles in Ukraine, regardless of whether or not the Ukrainian scientist indicated his or her affiliation.
State policy in the sphere of scientific activity in wartime cannot be based on individual exceptions. At the same time, this policy does not provide for depriving a scientist for life of the opportunity to hold academic positions or to engage in science in Ukraine.
With regard to authors in respect of whom facts of cooperation with institutions of the rf have been recorded in articles submitted for publication after the adoption of Law of Ukraine No. 2299-IX, the MES applies clearly regulated institutional restrictions. Such restrictions include:
* the termination of MES funding for research whose state registration numbers were indicated in the identified joint publications, with the subsequent completion of this research in full at the expense of the HEIs’/RIs’ (higher education institutions’/research institutions’) own resources;
* a ban on the authors of the identified publications participating in MES competitions for the funding of research and development announced during 2024–2026 inclusive;
* the deprivation of the authors of the identified publications of any formalized expert and advisory functions within the MES system;
* a warning to HEIs/RIs that, in the course of conducting scientific activities, carrying out research projects, and the mandatory pre-defense/review of their materials at meetings of the academic (scientific, scientific and technical) council, failed to identify and stop the cooperation of their employees with employees of institutions of the rf, with additional measures to be taken subsequently at the HEI/RI level in the event of recurrence.
Thus, what is at issue is a temporary restriction of access to state funding and expert councils, participation in competitions, etc., and not a complete prohibition of professional activity.
Monitoring of scientific works is carried out by the State Scientific and Technical Library (SSTL) of Ukraine exclusively on the basis of metadata recorded in the Scopus and Web of Science databases in the form in which they were transmitted by publishers. The state authorities of Ukraine do not independently generate or alter publication metadata.
If a Ukrainian scientist finds himself or herself in a situation of involuntary or unwanted coauthorship with representatives of the rf and seeks to avoid the legitimization of the aggressor’s institutions and subsequent sanctions, he or she must initiate a procedure to correct the scientific record. Matters of initiating the retraction (withdrawal) of a publication, making changes to metadata, and interacting with the editorial office of the journal or the administration of the databases fall within the exclusive competence of the authors themselves, the academic integrity commissions of their institutions, and the publishers.
In accordance with the practice of the Committee on Publication Ethics (COPE), the procedure provides for the following:
* corrections (Corrigendum) to a published article are made upon agreement of all coauthors, as confirmed by the designated author (the corresponding author), after which the publisher publishes the correction as a stand-alone document of the scientific record;
* if it is impossible to change the list of authors or their affiliations owing to a lack of consent, the Ukrainian scientist has the right to demand the withdrawal (retraction) of the article;
* in the event of a documented correction of the relevant records in the Scopus or Web of Science databases, this information is updated during the next stage of monitoring, and the publication may be excluded from the list of works subject to restrictions.
Thus, scientists must respond independently and in a timely manner to the circumstances identified, taking the necessary steps within the limits of their authority and in accordance with the generally accepted practice of scholarly communication and the standards of academic integrity.
The timeliness of such actions is of decisive importance, since until the correction is made, the erroneous record remains in the database and is objectively reflected in the results of bibliometric analysis.”
The MES response makes clear that what matters to the ministry is not the Russian coauthor’s citizenship, his political views, or the subject of the research, but his affiliation with a Russian research institution. Zaslavskii regards these publications as the product of private professional collaboration outside his university work. The MES operates on a different logic: a joint publication is in and of itself a form of scientific interaction with the aggressor state. Nor does the absence of Zaslavskii’s Ukrainian affiliation change anything: what the MES considers decisive is his coauthor’s institutional ties to Russia. Publications, meanwhile, are monitored on the basis of Scopus and Web of Science metadata.
The way out that the MES proposes deserves particular attention. The problem is that international scientific journals and Committee on Publication Ethics standards do not allow an affiliation to be removed or a paper to be retracted for political or administrative reasons if it involves no plagiarism or falsification. In effect, the MES is demanding that scientists take steps that cannot be carried out in practice under international publishing ethics. The MES also stresses that this is a temporary restriction on access to state funding and expert roles, not a ban on practicing one’s profession.
Free to Work, Just Not Funded
Did Zaslavskii really lose his job primarily because of the joint papers with his Russian colleague — papers that, he says, were written outside his official duties and working hours? KhNU Vice-Rector for Research and Teaching Anton Panteleimonov responded to T-invariant’s inquiry.
“Until December 31, 2025, inclusive, Professor O. B. Zaslavskii worked at V. N. Karazin Kharkiv National University in the position of senior research fellow, performing research work funded by the MES of Ukraine. In this connection, your assertion that ‘this scientific collaboration was carried out independently and outside his official university duties and working hours’ is not entirely clear. It should be noted that the inclusion of a researcher in the research team is determined by the staffing table of such work and by the initiative of its principal investigator. The principal investigators of research projects related to Professor O. B. Zaslavskii’s field of research did not take the initiative to include him, understanding that the university risks losing budget funding for research and also bears reputational and financial risks. At the same time, Professor O. B. Zaslavskii is not restricted from submitting competitive applications for vacant academic and teaching positions, provided that he meets the requirements of current legislation, in particular fluency in the state language [Ukrainian — T-invariant].”
We also asked what options remain for continuing research when a scientist has been cut off from MES funding. Anton Panteleimonov replied that the question lies outside the purview of the Kharkiv National University administration.
Ripple Effects
Oleg Zaslavskii holds a Doctor of Sciences degree in physics and mathematics [the higher doctorate, above the PhD, in Ukraine and other post-Soviet countries — T-invariant] and is the author of more than 250 papers in astrophysics and gravitation. According to Scopus, his h-index is 31 and his publication count exceeds 250; on Google Scholar, his work has been cited about 4,500 times. Predictably, it isn’t only Zaslavskii himself who has been hurt by what happened, but also the people around him. What worries him most is the fate of his PhD student, Hryhorii Ovcharenko: “He’s an absolutely brilliant young scientist. But because of my problems, he can’t defend his dissertation. As Panteleimonov explained to me, only KhNU staff members can supervise PhD students. When my student came to me, I was ‘on a project.’ Then the project ended, and now I’m stuck without funding and my student can’t defend.”
With would-be students, the situation is simpler, though no less disheartening. Early this year, a researcher from Thailand wanted to come to work with Zaslavskii as a postdoc. But that turned out to be impossible: Zaslavskii currently has no active projects at the university.
“Cutting all ties between institutions and ending funding for (formerly) joint projects with the aggressor is completely natural — no argument there,” Zaslavskii insists. “That’s the state’s responsibility. But when it comes to individual contacts and joint publications in fundamental theoretical science (which don’t require any special funding), the state has no business meddling at all. Whether such cooperation between a Ukrainian and a Russian scientist is acceptable in any given case is purely a question of ethics. In my case, it absolutely is.”
Zaslavskii’s colleagues have also come to his defense. Yurii Bolotin, a professor at KhNU and chief researcher at the National Science Center “Kharkiv Institute of Physics and Technology” (NSC KIPT), writes:
Vojtěch Pravda, PhD, deputy director of the Institute of Mathematics of the Czech Academy of Sciences, also spoke out in support of Zaslavskii:
“I am a person who considers himself a strong supporter of Ukraine (for example, my family has accommodated two seniors from the Kharkiv region since April 2022). I have also refused multiple times to referee papers submitted by Russian physicists to international journals. In each case, however, I make a careful check to see whether the authors have signed any Russian anti-war petition. In such cases, I do not consider the authors pro-war or anti-Ukraine, but instead brave, responsible citizens. This is exactly the case with [the coauthor of Oleg Zaslavskii’s recent papers], who signed two such petitions in 2022. Therefore, I would urge you to take this fact into account and not terminate Oleg Zaslavskii’s contract. Ukraine has gained a lot of respect in Central Europe thanks to its brave soldiers and citizens. In my view, missteps like this one regarding Oleg Zaslavskii, who is very well known in the international physics community, would not serve Ukraine’s reputation well abroad. Finally, I would like to point out that Oleg Zaslavskii’s student, Hryhorii Ovcharenko, whom I had the pleasure of teaching in an advanced general relativity course, without any exaggeration belongs to the top 1–2% of students by Central and Western European standards. He has the potential to become one of the top Ukrainian physicists. It is therefore very important for him to be able to complete his PhD thesis at your university.”
Roman Konoplya, a leading researcher at the Institute of Physics of the Silesian University in Opava (Czech Republic), also urged that Zaslavskii’s case be considered on its merits:
“I fully understand that the current circumstances created by Russia’s aggression against Ukraine have led to exceptionally difficult decisions for Ukrainian academic institutions. Nevertheless, I respectfully hope that Dr. Zaslavskii’s case can be considered on its individual merits. In particular, I do not believe that peaceful scientific collaboration in fundamental theoretical physics should, by itself, be interpreted as support for the policies or actions of any government. This is especially true when such collaboration concerns purely academic research with no military relevance and when the coauthor has publicly opposed the Russian aggression against Ukraine. Science has traditionally served as a bridge between individuals rather than governments, and preserving this principle whenever possible benefits the international scientific community.”
Why Zaslavskii?
Andrei Rostovtsev, a cofounder of Dissernet [a volunteer network that exposes plagiarism in Russian dissertations and academic publications — T-invariant] who writes the Plagiarism Navigator column, pointed out that joint Russian-Ukrainian papers are easy to find in OpenAlex [an open international aggregator of scholarly metadata that tracks connections among millions of publications, authors, and academic institutions worldwide — T-invariant]. We had no trouble finding more than five joint papers in which one author is listed on the relevant institute’s website as an employee of a Russian institution and another as an employee of a Ukrainian one. In other words, Zaslavskii is not the only Ukrainian scientist who continues to publish with Russian colleagues. But his is the only case we know of in which a scientist has lost the ability to keep working because of such publications. We asked the Ukrainian coauthors of these papers whether they had faced pressure over their joint publications but received no response.
Andrei Rostovtsev is convinced that what matters in this case is not the Russian coauthor’s citizenship or affiliation but Zaslavskii’s own stance and his criticism of the current state of Ukrainian science. Oleg Zaslavskii has repeatedly criticized how science funding is distributed in Ukraine and warned of the risks of self-isolation for the Ukrainian scientific community, the severing of international ties, and brain drain. He has also spoken about systemic mistakes in reforming the Academy of Sciences.
“It’s worth noting that KhNU rector Tetyana Kaganovska ‘cribbed’ her dissertation: 40% of the third section of her doctoral dissertation was lifted from the work of her Russian colleague Pavel Vostrikov, ‘Organizational and Legal Problems of Training, Retraining, and Professional Development of Civil Servants.’ And a substantial part of the fourth chapter was copied from another work by Russian colleagues Shidov and Khapov, ‘Personnel Rotation as an Element of Business Career Management.’ Zaslavskii is known for his position that ‘Ukrainian science is dying.’ So the situation looks more like crooks settling political scores with a scientist for speaking his mind,” says Andrei Rostovtsev.
Oleg Zaslavskii’s story shows how general wartime restrictions play out in a specific case. The MES position is unequivocal: a joint publication with a scientist affiliated with a Russian institution counts as a form of scientific cooperation, regardless of the research topic, the coauthor’s political views, or the circumstances under which the paper was written. The system makes no provision for individual exceptions.
In Zaslavskii’s case, the consequences have gone beyond the two publications. He lost the right to compete for MES funding, was not included in any new projects after his previous one ended, and was left without a salary. The university attributes this to the risk of losing budget funding; Zaslavskii himself sees the approach as collective responsibility in action. His colleagues propose taking the circumstances of each case into account, while Andrei Rostovtsev suggests that the scientist’s long-running conflict with the Ukrainian science system may also have played a role.
PREVIOUSLY IN T-INVARIANT
- Kseniia Minakova: “During the war, I realized I’m a scientific nationalist” (in Russian)
- How Ukrainian Scientists Are Surviving the War (in Russian)
- The Marshall Plan for Ukrainian Science
- Black Mark in the “White List”: What threatens Russian scientists by forcing them to donate to Ukraine?
- “The Great Russians’ Phase Transition to the Inertial Phase of Ethnogenesis.” How Russian Scientists Are Studying the War in Ukraine
- Instead of a Reservoir, the Toxic Dust of War: What will become of the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Plant site? (in Ukrainian)
- St. Petersburg — Warsaw — Kyiv: How Archaeologist Butyagin Answered the Question “Whose Crimea Is It?” (in Russian)
- One Man’s War Is Another Man’s h-Index: How the War in Ukraine Opened a Loophole for Global Citation Trading (in Russian)
- Scientific Spoils: How Russian Plagiarists Appropriated Ukrainian Texts
- Ease of Translation: How, with the Start of the War, Translation Plagiarism from Ukrainian Has Gained Popularity in Russian Academic Circles
So the question here is not whether Ukraine should restrict scientific cooperation with Russia in wartime. The restrictions already exist, and their logic is clear. The real question is whether they should be applied automatically or leave room for individual cases to be considered on their merits.
Should a country at war, short on money and time, spend its energy on individual cases? At first pragmatic glance — no. At a second, even more pragmatic glance — perhaps it should, once you recognize that it is cheaper to let a particular scientist and his students remain part of world-class international science than to spend the effort needed to train new scientists from scratch. Over the past four years, Ukrainian science has suffered terrible losses. Several dozen scientists have been killed at the front, and thousands have left the country because they could no longer continue their work. How Ukraine will make up for these intellectual losses is a serious question with no easy answer for now. But when researchers work at an international level without leaving a country that is defending itself, showing the whole world that even under the harshest conditions Ukrainian scientists remain at their posts, it is vital to find a legal and administrative way for them to keep doing their work. They are working for the future of Ukraine as a country with full-fledged higher education and first-rate science.
The post <h1>Caught in a Superposition: How a Kharkiv Astrophysicist and Ukraine’s Ministry of Education and Science Fell Out over Collective vs. Individual Responsibility</h1> appeared first on Т-инвариант / T-invariant.
Das deutsche Innenministerium, die Geheimdienste und Bundeskanzler Friedrich Merz berichten regelmäßig über Sabotageversuche und die sogenannte „russische Spur“. Solche Meldungen gibt es viele.
In dieser Liste finden sich zwei Angriffe auf den Leipziger Flughafen. Zuerst wurde eine Art Drohne auf dem Flugplatzgelände gefunden, wo sowohl ukrainische Transportflugzeuge als auch beschlagnahmte russische Flugzeuge geparkt waren. Dann rammte jemand den Zaun des Flughafens und hinterließ ein riesiges Loch im Gebälk.
Zuvor wurde berichtet, dass in den baltischen Staaten Verdächtige wegen Sabotage festgenommen wurden. Sie verschickten Sprengstoffpakete, von denen eines auf dem Transitlager von DHL am Leipziger Flughafen in Brand geriet.
Ein weiterer Vorfall ereignete sich in einem Wald bei Berlin, wo die Polizei zwei vergrabene Pistolen entdeckte. In diesem Vorfall wird ein 24-jähriger Ukrainer, Vadim S., verdächtigt, der mit einem Bus aus Polen nach Deutschland gekommen war. Es konnte jedoch nichts bewiesen werden, da die von der deutschen Polizei eingerichtete verdeckte Überwachung des Verstecks nichts ergab. Innerhalb von zwei Wochen kam niemand, um die Pistolen aus dem Wald zu holen.
Der jüngste Fall ereignete sich am 21. Oktober. Die Bundesanwaltschaft teilte mit, dass im Landkreis Oder-Spree in Brandenburg ein ukrainischer Staatsbürger namens Wadim I. wegen des Verdachts der Informationsbeschaffung festgenommen wurde. Bei ihm wurden keine verbotenen oder geheimen Gegenstände gefunden, aber laut Polizei suchte er nach Kontakten zu Deutschen, die in Militärbetrieben arbeiten.
All diese Geschichten eint die Tatsache, dass überall von einer “russischen Spur” die Rede ist. Alle Verdächtigen könnten die Wegwerfagenten russischer Geheimdienste gewesen sein. Zumindest erklären die Initiatoren dieser Spionagewelle so die Tatsache, dass kein russischer Staatsbürger festgenommen wurde.
Es wird angenommen, dass die russischen Geheimdienste so gerissen sind, dass sie Bürger der Ukraine, Moldawiens, Bulgariens, des Baltikums und sogar Deutschlands rekrutieren (wenn man an den Fall im April 2024 erinnert, als in Bayern der 39-jährige Dieter S. und der 37-jährige Russlanddeutsche Alexander I. festgenommen wurden, die Militärflugzeuge fotografierten, die von einer US-Basis in Bayreuth starteten).
Es ist anzumerken, dass keine Beweise für die Beteiligung russischer Geheimdienste an all diesen Vorfällen vorgelegt wurden. Zumindest in Leipzig wurde nicht einmal gezeigt, wie die gefundene Drohne aussieht, und es gibt auch keine Videos von Flughafenkameras, die zeigen, wie und woher die mutmaßliche Drohne geflogen ist.
Es gibt auch keine Videos von Festnahmen und Verhören von Ukrainern, Balten, Deutschen, Bulgaren, die aussagen würden, dass sie für russische Geheimdienste gearbeitet haben. Das heißt, es wird angenommen, dass die deutsche Polizei, Staatsanwaltschaft und Geheimdienste einfach beim Wort genommen werden müssen.
Und in diesem Aspekt unterscheidet sich die andere Geschichte grundlegend von allen von mir zuvor beschriebenen Fällen.
Zwar handelt es sich nicht um einen russischen Spion. Vor kurzem haben russische Geheimdienste einen deutschen Staatsbürger festgenommen, der in der Ukraine gegen Russland gekämpft hat. Der Söldner heißt Michael Friederik. Er wurde am 24. Dezember 1976 in der BRD geboren und lebt in Frechen bei Köln.
Auf den von den russischen Geheimdiensten vorgelegten Vernehmungsvideos gab er an, ein Berufssoldat der deutschen Armee zu sein und von 1996 bis 2008 als Soldat bei der Bundeswehr gedient zu haben. Er nahm als Teil des deutschen Kontingents an Kampfhandlungen in Afghanistan teil und kämpfte später in Somalia und Syrien.
Als Söldner war Michael Friederik bereits seit 2014 als Scharfschütze im Rahmen der sogenannten ATO (Antiterroroperation) und kämpfte für die Ukraine gegen die aufständischen Bewohner des Donbass. Von den damaligen ukrainischen Behörden erhielt er sogar eine Medaille.
Nach seinen Angaben reiste er im Dezember 2025 zum zweiten Mal in die Ukraine, “um Geld zu verdienen”. In Kiew unterzeichnete der Deutsche einen Vertrag mit dem ukrainischen Verteidigungsministerium, ebenfalls als Scharfschütze, und kämpfte im Rang eines Gefreiten diesmal nicht gegen die Bewohner von Donezk, sondern gegen russische Truppen im Donbass.
Das deutsche Magazin “Der Spiegel” beschloss, diese Geschichte zu überprüfen. Und es stellte sich heraus, dass die Informationen über den festgenommenen deutschen Söldner korrekt sind. Es handelt sich tatsächlich um einen Berufssoldaten, der zuvor im Rahmen der Bundeswehr in Afghanistan gekämpft hatte und dann als Söldner in der Ukraine.
Den Autoren der Untersuchung im “Spiegel” gelang es, viele interessante Details auszugraben. Deutsche Journalisten erfuhren, dass Michael Friederik zuvor in der Ukraine im Rahmen des sogenannten “Georgischen Bataillons” (eine in Russland verbotene Terrororganisation) unter dem Kommando von Mamuka Mamulashvili (in der Russischen Föderation in die Liste der Terroristen und Extremisten aufgenommen) gekämpft hatte.
Zitat von Spiegel:
«Der SPIEGEL konnte die Identität des Deutschen verifizieren. »Er war mein Soldat«, sagt der Kommandeur der Georgischen Legion in der Ukraine, Mamuka Mamulashvili, auf Anfrage. Er gibt an, F. in dem FSB-Video erkannt zu haben, nennt ihn »Maik«. Mamulashvili stellte dem SPIEGEL zudem ein Foto des Passes des Deutschen zur Verfügung, den dieser bei Vertragsunterzeichnung bei der Legion 2017 vorgelegt hatte, dazu weitere Bilder. Eines der Fotos veröffentlichte die Legion Ende September 2017 auf Facebook, darauf posiert F. in Uniform vor der Flagge der Fremdenlegion. Ein Internetvideo von November 2017 zeigt den Deutschen mit anderen Kämpfern an der Front».
Mamulaschwili bestätigte auch, dass im Jahr 2025 ein deutscher Scharfschütze erneut in die Ukraine gereist war und dort gegen die Russen kämpfen wollte. Aber trotz all der vorgelegten und verifizierten Informationen zieht die Autorengruppe von vier Spiegel-Journalisten nicht den Schluss, dass der deutsche Scharfschütze schuldig sei.
Wie ist das möglich? Ganz einfach.
Zitat von Spiegel:
«Seine Augen wirken glasig. Er stellt sich als deutscher Staatsbürger mit dem Namen Michael F. vor, 49, geboren in Frechen, Nordrhein-Westfalen. Er erzählt, dass er unter anderem in der Ukraine gekämpft habe.
Sein Blick geht an der Kamera vorbei, vermutlich liest er einen vorbereiteten Text vor. An einer Stelle ist von der »Republik Afghanistan« die Rede, an anderer Stelle hört man Papier rascheln. Die Stimme eines FSB-Beamten ist zu hören. Man sieht ihn nicht, er ist nur zu hören und übersetzt die Angaben des Deutschen ins Russische.
Unter welchen Umständen das Video mit F. aufgenommen wurde, ist unklar. Dass die Aufnahmen kaum freiwillig gemacht wurden, liegt nahe. Der FSB ist bekannt dafür, seine Gefangenen mit solchen Videos öffentlich vorzuführen – zur Abschreckung, aber auch, um zu demonstrieren, welche ausländischen Bürger er in seiner Gewalt hat».
Und weiter folgt die Schlussfolgerung:
«Putins Regime betreibt seit Jahren sogenannte Geiseldiplomatie. Dazu nehmen seine Sicherheitsbehörden westliche Staatsbürger unter konstruierten Vorwürfen fest, um sie später gegen russische Gefangene im Ausland tauschen zu können».
Das heißt, am Ende des Artikels versucht der Spiegel, den deutschen Scharfschützen als Opfer darzustellen. Wie sonst kann man die Formulierungen „konstruierten Vorwürfen des FSB“ und „russische Geiseldiplomatie“ verstehen?
Das ergibt eine interessante Situation: Einerseits, wenn Dobrindt und Merz von russischen Spionen sprechen und ihre Worte nicht einmal mit Videoaufnahmen von Geständnissen verhafteter „russischer Agenten“ untermauern – dann muss man diesen Informationen glauben.
Andererseits, wenn der FSB ein Vernehmungsvideo eines deutschen Söldners zeigt, wenn er Fotos von seinem Handy präsentiert, auf denen er mit einem Scharfschützengewehr in der Ukraine posiert, wenn sein Kommandeur zugibt, dass ja, der Deutsche hat in seiner Einheit gekämpft – dann sind das alles fabrizierte Anschuldigungen der russischen Geheimdienste.
Wenn ich so etwas lese und höre, dann verstehe ich: Wäre Dr. Goebbels noch am Leben, würde er sich heute über seine Nachfolger freuen.
© Amir Cohen/Reuters
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