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Russia replaces Ukrainians with Russian settlers in occupied Kherson Oblast; only 10–20% of pre-war population remains, Ukraine says

A street in Oleshky, Kherson Oblast, in 2007. Under Russian occupation since 2022, the settlement has since descended into a severe humanitarian crisis amid Russian restrictions and attacks. Photo via Wikimedia Commons

Ukraine’s military intelligence estimates that only 10–20% of the prewar population may remain in the Russian-occupied left bank of Kherson Oblast, accusing Moscow of forcing Ukrainians from their homes while relocating Russian citizens to the area.

Russia’s efforts to displace Ukrainians and bring Russian citizens into occupied Kherson Oblast are part of Moscow’s broader campaign to consolidate control over occupied territory, impose Russian institutions, and erode Ukrainian national identity. Similar practices have been documented in other occupied Ukrainian territories, including the resettlement of Russians into homes in Mariupol and efforts to replace Ukrainian education with Russian curricula.

The Main Intelligence Directorate of Ukraine’s Defense Ministry (HUR) said Russia was creating intolerable living conditions for Ukrainian residents and unlawfully seizing private property to displace them. The agency said Moscow was simultaneously using financial incentives to recruit Russian teachers, doctors, and other professionals to work in occupied areas.

Russia brings in Russian workers as Ukrainians are pushed out

Before Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022, around 500,000 people lived on the left bank of Kherson Oblast, according to HUR. The agency estimates that only 10–20% of that population may remain.

Moscow is using state-backed recruitment programs, including “Zemsky Teacher,” “Zemsky Doctor,” “Zemsky Feldsher,” “Zemsky Cultural Worker,” and “Zemsky Coach,” to attract Russian citizens to occupied Ukrainian territory, HUR said.

Under these programs, Russian teachers and doctors who agree to work in occupied areas are offered one-time payments of 2 million rubles, while junior medical staff can receive 1 million rubles. The incentives also include higher salaries and other benefits, with contracts lasting at least five years.

HUR said hundreds of Russian teachers and doctors had already been brought to occupied Ukrainian territories from regions across Russia, including Krasnodar, Khabarovsk, Stavropol, and Perm Krais, as well as Rostov, Kursk, and Leningrad oblasts.

According to Ukrainian intelligence, Russian medical personnel are needed primarily to serve occupying forces, while Russian teachers are being brought in to undermine Ukrainian children’s national identity.

Ukraine accuses Russia of war crimes and genocidal practices

HUR said Russia’s efforts to displace Ukrainian residents and bring in Russian citizens bore signs of war crimes and genocidal practices against the Ukrainian population.

The agency’s allegations concern both the coercive removal of Ukrainians from occupied territory and the replacement of local residents with people brought from Russia. Ukrainian authorities say these policies are part of Moscow’s broader effort to consolidate control over occupied Ukrainian land and impose Russian identity and institutions.

Kherson Oblast faces displacement, attacks, and a humanitarian crisis

Russian forces occupied much of Kherson Oblast in the early months of the full-scale invasion in 2022. Ukrainian forces liberated the oblast’s right-bank areas, including the regional capital, in November that year, but Russia continues to occupy the left bank of the Dnipro River.

Russian forces regularly attack Ukrainian-controlled areas of Kherson Oblast with artillery and drones, killing and injuring civilians. Ukrainians have described repeated drone attacks on civilians as a “human safari.” In May 2025, a UN commission of inquiry concluded that Russian forces’ repeated drone attacks on civilians along the Dnipro’s right bank amounted to crimes against humanity of murder.

The occupied town of Oleshky, on the left bank, has also faced severe shortages of food, medicine, and medical care amid restrictions on movement and continued fighting.

Oleshky, Kherson Oblast, has been under Russian occupation since 2022, following Russia’s capture of the city during the initial phase of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
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Thousands are starving in occupied Oleshky. People have no food, no way out, and Russian forces bomb incoming aid

Russia’s occupation has also exposed residents of Kherson Oblast to major humanitarian disasters. The destruction of the Kakhovka Dam in June 2023 flooded settlements along the Dnipro, including Russian-occupied communities on the left bank, damaging homes and forcing residents to flee. Russian forces’ restrictions on access and evacuation further endangered civilians in the affected areas.

While Russia occupies the left bank of Kherson Oblast, its forces continue to target civilians on the Ukrainian-controlled right bank. Across the oblast, residents face the consequences of Russia’s invasion, from forced displacement and property seizures under occupation to deadly drone and artillery attacks.

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Oleshky ceasefire expands beyond occupied town as truce holds without reported violations

Aerial view of Russian-occupied Oleshky, in Ukraine's Kherson Oblast. Photo via ArmyInform

The ceasefire around Russian-occupied Oleshky in Kherson Oblast has expanded beyond the town to provide safe passage for humanitarian convoys, US First Lady Melania Trump said on 27 October. The expansion is intended to facilitate aid deliveries to civilians trapped under Russian occupation.

Ukraine and Russia are observing a localized ceasefire to enable a humanitarian mission to reach Oleshky, where residents have faced months of shortages of food, medicine, and medical care under Russian occupation. 

Trump said the ceasefire took effect at 04:00 Moscow time on 27 October, two days ahead of the original schedule, to protect civilians and facilitate the delivery of critical humanitarian aid. Russia’s chief of General Staff, Valery Gerasimov, had confirmed the arrangement, she said.

Ukraine’s human rights ombudsman Dmytro Lubinets said no ceasefire violations had been recorded by 19:49 Kyiv time on 27 October, and Russian forces had made no attempts to advance. He added that he remained in constant contact with his Russian counterpart, Yana Lantratova.

THE CEASEFIRE HAS COMMENCED
The ceasefire between Ukraine and Russia took effect at 4:00am Moscow time on October 27, 2026. 
 
Timing was accelerated two days ahead of schedule to protect the safety of civilians and to facilitate the delivery of critical humanitarian aid. The…

— First Lady Melania Trump (@FLOTUS) October 27, 2026

Road to Oleshky must be cleared before aid can arrive

Lubinets said the ceasefire began at 03:00 Kyiv time and would remain in effect until 22:59 Kyiv time on 1 November. He reported no violations since it began and said Russian forces had made no attempts to advance.

The next steps are to clear mines from the road to Oleshky and deliver humanitarian supplies. Representatives of Ukraine, Russia, and the United States will be present once the route is cleared and the aid arrives, Lubinets said in an interview with Ukrainian broadcaster 1+1.

He added that everyone who wants to leave for Ukrainian-controlled territory would be able to do so and that assistance would be provided to everyone who needs it.

The Financial Times earlier reported, citing sources familiar with the negotiations, that residents who agree to leave Russian-occupied Oleshky during the ceasefire would first be transported to occupied Crimea or Russia before being allowed to return to Ukrainian-controlled territory.

Humanitarian mission follows months of efforts

Oleshky has been under Russian occupation since 2022. The town has been cut off for months, with shortages of food, medicine, and medical care worsening. 

The White House announced on 23 October that Melania Trump had secured a localized ceasefire originally scheduled to begin on 29 October. Russia subsequently announced a ceasefire on the Kherson axis from 27 October, with preparations to secure a route for a humanitarian convoy.

Oleshky, Kherson Oblast, has been under Russian occupation since 2022, following Russia’s capture of the city during the initial phase of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
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Ceasefire planned for occupied Oleshky as residents face starvation and blocked escape routes, White House announces

Lubinets said efforts to address the humanitarian crisis in Oleshky began in late February 2026, but progress accelerated in September following Melania Trump’s involvement.

The expanded ceasefire area is intended to facilitate the humanitarian operation, but the route must still be cleared and supplies delivered before the mission can reach residents. The new boundaries of the ceasefire area have not been specified publicly.

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Ukraine says it has finished its part of FREYJA, Europe’s joint anti-ballistic project. Partners’ work is still underway

ukraine advertise its new ballistic missiles until factories can mass-produce ex-security officer says · post test launch fp-7 missile prototype fire point news ukrainian reports

Ukraine has finished its share of FREYJA, a joint European project to build a system against ballistic missiles, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy told journalists on 17 October, Ukrinform reported. He added that Kyiv wants to test the first system as soon as possible.

Ukraine still relies on US-made Patriot interceptors to stop Russian ballistic missiles. Zelenskyy told ABC News on 23 October that Ukraine had received only 24 of them from the US in three months, while it needs 350 a month on average. FREYJA can not close that gap soon, because the system is still in development.

Ukraine’s missile and launcher, partners’ radars and sensors

Zelenskyy said the partners’ share of the work, with 10 countries taking part, is still underway. He also said he had discussed the project with French President Emmanuel Macron, and he named Norway as a key partner.

Fire Point concept graphic showing the FP-7.x interceptor missile beside a table of proposed specifications.
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Ukraine’s missile, Europe’s sensors—FREYJA enters active development on an early-2027 clock

Zelenskyy did not say what the partners still have to deliver. In August, he said Ukraine is capable of making the missile and launcher, while partners would supply critical components such as radars and sensors.

One part not made in Ukraine

In May, Fire Point co-founder and chief designer Denys Shtilerman said all components of the FP-7.x interceptor are made in Ukraine except one. “As for that one part we don’t manufacture in Ukraine, we’ve contracted a certain quantity of it. We already have it,” he said, but did not name the part.

In June, however, Shtilerman told the Financial Times that mass production depended on an infrared seeker Fire Point hoped to get from Germany’s Diehl Defence. Neither statement says whether the seeker is that one part.

Fire Point co-founder Iryna Terekh said in September that FREYJA was going through testing and technical integration in combat conditions in Ukraine. The company plans its first intercept of a ballistic target by mid-2027.

The official timeline has since moved closer. On 21 October, Zelenskyy wrote that officials had identified where to speed up so FREYJA reaches testing by the end of this year. A test is still a step short of an intercept.

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Export hurdles and visa waits for Ukrainian companies force Pentagon to slow its drone contest

One morning in June, the head of export at Ukrainian drone company Stellarion found himself unexpectedly in need of a U-Haul outside the Detroit Metro Airport in Michigan.

Stellarion was set to test its drones in front of American soldiers at a competition organized by the Pentagon at Camp Grayling,

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Military Situation In Ukraine And Ukrainian Attacks On Russian Territory On October 27, 2026 (Maps Update)

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  • Russian strikes hit targets in the Sumy, Kharkiv, Zaporizhzhia, Dnipropetrovsk, Kherson, Kyiv, Vinnytsia, Zhytomyr, Ivano-Frankivsk, Odesa, Rivne, Khmelnytskyi, Cherkasy, Chernihiv regions, and the DPR;
  • According to the Ukrainian Air Force, Russian forces attacked Ukraine with Iskander-M/S-400 ballistic missiles and 280 strike UAVs;
  • Russian forces struck an industrial enterprise, the Oakline LLC UAV assembly workshop, another UAV workshop, and the Yuzhny road-rail bridge in Kyiv;
  • Russian forces struck the unloading and customs terminal of Regional Logistics Centre LLC in Kharkiv;
  • Russian forces struck a dry cargo vessel delivering cargo to the port of Chornomorsk in the Odesa region;
  • Russian forces struck an energy facility in Chernivtsi;
  • Ukrainian losses amounted to approximately 1,115 personnel over the past 24 hours.

Click to see the full-size image

  • Russian forces advanced toward Khatneye.

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  • Russian forces advanced in the tract area near Miropolye and Velyka Rybytsia.

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  • During the past night, Russian air defenses destroyed 222 Ukrainian drones in the rear regions;
  • Russian air defenses intercepted UAVs in the Novgorod, Tver, Belgorod, Bryansk, Kursk, Kaluga, Oryol, Tula, Voronezh, Smolensk, and Rostov regions, in Krasnodar Krai, in the Republic of Crimea, and over the Black Sea;
  • Russian air defenses intercepted UAVs in the Novgorod, Tver, Belgorod, Bryansk, Kursk, Kaluga, Oryol, Tula, Voronezh, Smolensk, Rostov regions, Krasnodar region, the Republic of Crimea, and over the Black Sea;
  • One person was killed and six were injured in Bryansk. Several apartment buildings were damaged;
  • Ukrainian drones targeted a passenger bus traveling from Simferopol to Moscow, One person was killed.

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No Volunteers Left: Ukraine Turns Factories Into Recruiting Offices

Ukraine’s leadership is wrestling with a problem that no speech or summit can solve: finding enough soldiers. The issue surfaces in the news at irregular intervals, but it never goes away, and the latest government proposal suggests that the search for a solution is becoming more desperate.

The pool of volunteers dried up several years ago. Since then, forced mobilization has been the main tool for keeping the army at a tolerable strength. Even so, losses often outpace the incoming replacements. Two factors explain much of the gap: the dense saturation of the battlefield with drones, and a command structure that critics describe as wasteful with its own manpower.

Getting to the front is itself an ordeal. Conditions in territorial recruitment centers are reportedly sometimes worse than in prisons. The same is said of training centers, where recruits are delivered in prison transport vans to prevent escape.

Many men have responded by taking jobs at defense plants and other critical facilities, hoping that employment will shield them from the draft. That shield is now being reshaped.

Prime Minister Serhiy Koretsky on October 26 outlined the government’s new approach at the Kyiv International Economic Forum. Under the proposed model, companies would be allowed to reserve their employees from mobilization. In return, they would have to guarantee a predictable flow of manpower into the army. By December 1, the Cabinet intends to present a new contract on mobilization and reservation. At the same time, the government plans to toughen penalties for draft evasion.

The consequences deserve a closer look. Company managers would effectively decide which employees go to the front, and for those selected, that choice may amount to a death sentence. Such a system could hand President Volodymyr Zelenskyy a new lever of control over large industrialists, whose commercial interest lies in surrendering as few workers as possible.

Big business, meanwhile, would gain nearly unlimited authority over its staff. Workers will tolerate almost any conditions to keep their exemption. Wage cuts and higher productivity demands are the obvious costs, and they will fall on ordinary citizens, who have the least power to refuse.

The result is a mobilization model built on fear at every level. The state fears the front will run out of men. Employers fear losing either their workforce or the government’s favor. Workers, in turn, fear the draft office more than their bosses. A system that runs on fear can fill the  ranks for a while, but it cannot restore the trust that a long war quietly consumes.

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Russia Continues Strikes on Ukraine’s Attack-Drone Production and Military Supply Hubs

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On the night of October 27, the Russian Armed Forces carried out a massive combined strike across Ukrainian territory. According to the Ukrainian Air Force, the attack involved Iskander-M/S-400 ballistic missiles and strike UAVs, 16 missiles and more than 280 drones in total. The Russian Ministry of Defense says it struck defense-industrial enterprises involved in the production of cruise missiles and UAVs, transportation infrastructure, logistics centers handling dual-use cargo, and maritime vessels used to support the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

Strikes by Region

Kyiv and Kyiv Region

• Southern Road-and-Rail Bridge. A key piece of transportation infrastructure in the capital used for the transit of cargo by road and rail. Ukrainian sources confirmed damage to the crossing, which led to a partial suspension of service on the Green Line of the metro and major transport disruption at Darnytsia Station.
• UAV assembly workshop of LLC Oakline. A production site that assembled and stored Fire Point’s FP-1 and FP-2 long- and medium-range unmanned aerial vehicles.
• Industrial facility producing and storing long- and medium-range UAVs. Another Kyiv site struck during the overnight attack; its specific name has not been disclosed.
• UAV assembly workshop producing and storing long- and medium-range fixed-wing unmanned aerial vehicles.

Kharkiv Region
• Unloading and customs terminal of the Regional Logistics Center company. A logistics facility where, according to the Russian Ministry of Defense, military supplies, dual-use cargo intended for the Ukrainian Armed Forces, and reconnaissance and strike UAVs were stored and distributed.

• Electronics manufacturer LLC NTP Ukrspetssvyaz, in the settlement of Nadtochii. A production site that made automation systems and communications equipment for the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

• Gas production infrastructure. Naftogaz reported a morning strike on gas production infrastructure in Kharkiv Region. The available information does not identify specific fields or facilities.

• Budmen home-improvement store in Kharkiv. A facility reportedly struck, according to local Telegram channels.

Odesa Region
• Bulk carrier bound for the port of Chornomorsk. A cargo vessel that, according to the Russian Ministry of Defense, was delivering supplies intended to support the Ukrainian Armed Forces.
• Bulk carrier bound for the port of Odesa. Another cargo vessel en route to Odesa with military cargo; it was struck in the daytime wave of attacks.

Chernivtsi Region
• Energy infrastructure facility. Local sources said the target was a substation; Chernivtsioblenergo warned of possible large-scale emergency outages. In Chernivtsi, trolleybus service was suspended, power was lost in several districts, and water was supplied at reduced pressure.

Chernihiv Region
• Depot holding UAV assets and winter uniforms of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. According to monitoring channels, a UAV strike sparked a large fire that destroyed unmanned systems and winter uniforms belonging to Ukrainian troops.

Strikes on facilities were also reported in Vinnytsia, Zhytomyr, Lviv, Sumy, Zaporizhzhia, Dnipropetrovsk, Kherson, Ivano-Frankivsk, Rivne, Khmelnytskyi, and Cherkasy Regions.

The nature of the October 27 strikes points to a continued systematic campaign against Ukraine’s strike-UAV production chain and the logistics hubs supplying its armed forces. Within this framework, the overnight wave combined strikes on Kyiv’s assembly facilities with damage to the Southern Bridge, affecting both drone production and its delivery channels. The strikes on the logistics terminal in Kharkiv Region and on cargo vessels off Chornomorsk and Odesa serve the same purpose: cutting off routes for dual-use cargo and components. The damage to the energy facility in Chernivtsi Region was limited in scale and did not involve major power-generation capacity, unlike earlier attacks on thermal and hydroelectric power plants.

Ukraine’s response is shifting toward scaling output rather than quality: Defense Minister Oleksii Khmara discussed with Western partners the transfer of 10% of their Patriot and IRIS-T missile stockpiles, as well as the possibility of doubling Ukrainian drone production by 2027 with sufficient funding. This aligns with Fire Point’s acknowledgment that the Flamingo missile mattered more as a political signal than as a “superweapon.” According to company head Iryna Terekh, the project was primarily intended to demonstrate Ukraine’s ability to conduct long-range strikes against Russian territory. The company also acknowledged the economic trade-off: delivering a 200-kilogram warhead over 300 kilometers by ballistic missile costs about $600,000, whereas a drone can deliver a comparable payload over 380 kilometers for $40,000-$50,000.

It is precisely this economic logic that explains why strikes on FP-1 and FP-2 assembly capacity and logistics hubs are becoming increasingly significant: drones remain Ukraine’s most numerous and affordable means of long-range strike, and this segment is also the most vulnerable part of its program. In the medium term, Russian strikes are likely to continue prioritizing enterprises that produce components for UAVs and cruise missiles, as well as transportation routes linking Ukraine’s central and western regions to the front line.


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Why Putin Demands Donbas: The Territorial Ultimatum That Could Shape Ukraine’s Next War

Vladimir Putin’s insistence that Ukraine surrender its remaining positions in Donetsk is not simply a dispute over territory. It is a demand that could dismantle Ukraine’s principal defensive barrier in the east, hand Moscow a military advantage it has struggled to achieve through years of fighting, and establish a precedent for further territorial concessions. The latest diplomatic contacts with European leaders have brought this question back to the centre of negotiations.

There are two ways for Russia to capture the remaining Ukrainian-held cities of Donbas. One is to fight its way through heavily fortified defensive positions, accepting substantial casualties, equipment losses and an uncertain timetable. The other is to secure their evacuation through diplomatic negotiations.

The second would achieve an important Russian military objective without requiring Moscow to bear the full cost of a prolonged offensive.

This distinction helps explain why Vladimir Putin continues to insist that Ukrainian forces withdraw from the remaining government-controlled territory of Donetsk region before a comprehensive settlement can be negotiated.

It also raises a more consequential question: would surrendering Donbas bring the war closer to an end, or would it improve Russia’s position in any subsequent confrontation?

A diplomatic opening without a strategic concession

The issue returned to prominence on 27 October when Finnish President Alexander Stubb and Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre held a rare telephone conversation with Putin.

According to the Finnish president’s official statement, the call followed discussions in Oslo on 20 October involving Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and US presidential envoy Steve Witkoff.

The Nordic leaders sought to advance preparations for renewed American-mediated negotiations, expected in Abu Dhabi in November. They emphasised that they were acting on behalf of their respective countries rather than representing Europe collectively.

Stubb described the exchange as “frank and substantive”, arguing that direct communication with Moscow was necessary to address the security consequences of the war.

However, the Kremlin’s account offered little indication of movement on the fundamental disagreements.

Moscow insisted that any durable peace must fully accommodate Russian interests. A source close to the Kremlin told Reuters that Putin had reiterated his refusal to compromise on the objective of controlling the entire Donbas.

Following the conversation, Zelenskyy confirmed that the Nordic leaders had briefed him and stressed to Putin the need for concrete measures to reduce attacks on Ukrainian energy infrastructure.

The diplomatic process has therefore resumed without resolving the territorial dispute at its centre.

The military significance of the remaining Donbas

The territory Russia is demanding includes some of Ukraine’s most important surviving defensive positions.

Since fighting began in eastern Ukraine in 2014, Ukrainian forces have constructed and reinforced an extensive defensive system centred on Sloviansk, Kramatorsk, Druzhkivka and Kostiantynivka.

Known as the fortress belt, this network combines urban areas, industrial facilities, transport infrastructure, prepared defensive positions and terrain that complicates offensive operations.

The military importance of this system extends far beyond the administrative boundaries of Donetsk.

According to the Institute for the Study of War, surrendering these positions would allow Russian forces to occupy heavily defended territory without undertaking the prolonged operations otherwise required to capture it.

In its 26 October battlefield assessment, the institute continued to identify the capture of this defensive belt as Russia’s principal military objective in Donetsk. Ukrainian forces retained positions in parts of Kostiantynivka, while Russian operations towards other major cities remained contested.

The implications of a negotiated Ukrainian withdrawal would be substantial.

Russia could occupy the fortified urban corridor, reorganise its forces, establish new logistics routes and potentially redirect formations towards other sectors.

Ukraine, meanwhile, would have to construct or reinforce defensive positions further west, potentially under pressure and in less favourable terrain.

The resulting military imbalance would not necessarily lead to another Russian offensive. But it would change the conditions under which any renewed hostilities might take place.

That is why territory cannot be assessed solely by its surface area. A relatively small section of the front can possess strategic value disproportionate to its size.

Why Moscow prefers a negotiated withdrawal

Russia’s insistence on Donetsk also reflects the limits of what its military has achieved.

Despite years of fighting, Moscow has not secured complete control of the region. Successive offensives have produced territorial gains, but at considerable cost and without the rapid breakthrough originally anticipated.

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio recently acknowledged the central importance of the remaining Ukrainian-held territory.

In an interview published by the US State Department, Rubio characterised the dispute as centred on territory Russia wants but has been unable to capture militarily, while recognising Ukraine’s sovereignty and long-term security concerns.

His remarks demonstrate how Donbas has become the principal territorial obstacle in Washington’s diplomatic calculations.

For Moscow, however, concentrating negotiations on this specific demand offers an additional advantage.

If Ukraine refuses to withdraw, the Kremlin can argue that Kyiv is preventing progress towards peace. If Ukraine agrees, Russia obtains strategically valuable territory without the military costs associated with conquering it.

The demand therefore serves a dual purpose: it establishes a public explanation for the absence of an agreement while offering Russia an immediate military benefit should negotiations succeed on its terms.

The problem with treating Donbas as the final concession

The central weakness in any settlement built around a Ukrainian withdrawal is the assumption that control of Donbas represents the limit of Russia’s territorial ambitions.

Moscow’s previously declared objectives suggest a more complicated picture.

In June 2024, Putin demanded Ukrainian withdrawal from four regions claimed by Russia: Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson. Moscow does not fully control these regions, despite claiming to have annexed them in September 2022.

Russia has also demanded restrictions on Ukraine’s military capabilities and future security relationships.

As EU Today previously reported, renewed diplomatic engagement has not produced a clear abandonment of the Kremlin’s wider objectives.

Consequently, transferring the remaining territory of Donetsk would not necessarily satisfy Moscow’s other demands.

There is a significant difference between conceding territory as part of an enforceable settlement and withdrawing from defensive positions as a precondition for negotiating one.

In the first case, territorial arrangements form part of a wider agreement establishing obligations, verification procedures and security guarantees.

In the second, one party makes a potentially irreversible military concession before knowing whether an agreement will ultimately be reached.

This asymmetry is particularly important where the proposed concession directly affects the withdrawing country’s ability to defend itself.

The strategy of incremental gains

One interpretation of Moscow’s approach is that it reflects a strategy of incremental territorial expansion rather than an attempt to achieve all its objectives through a single decisive offensive.

After Russia failed to capture Kyiv in 2022, its military campaign increasingly concentrated on taking territory through successive, often prolonged operations.

The diplomatic equivalent would involve securing one concession, consolidating the resulting advantage and subsequently presenting additional demands.

Under such a scenario, Russia could obtain control of the remaining Donetsk territory, establish new positions closer to Dnipropetrovsk region and later argue that further territorial or security arrangements were necessary to protect its newly acquired frontier.

Moscow has already used the language of protective buffer zones to justify military operations elsewhere in Ukraine.

There is no evidence establishing that such a sequence would inevitably follow a Donbas settlement. Nevertheless, the possibility must be considered when assessing the military consequences of a withdrawal.

The concern is not merely that Russia might violate a future agreement. It is that the agreement itself could alter the strategic balance in ways that make renewed military pressure more effective.

There is also an internal Ukrainian dimension.

An agreement requiring the evacuation of cities defended for years would create substantial political controversy. Disagreements over territorial concessions, security guarantees and the credibility of Western commitments could complicate domestic political stability.

For Moscow, such divisions might provide another means of influencing Ukraine without immediate military escalation.

Donbas and the wider question of Ukrainian sovereignty

Donbas has considerable political significance for Putin beyond its military value.

The conflict in eastern Ukraine began in 2014, following Russia’s annexation of Crimea. Donetsk and Luhansk became central to the Kremlin’s justification for intervention, and their incorporation into Russia was later proclaimed as part of the 2022 annexations.

Control of the entire region would allow Putin to present a tangible achievement after years of warfare.

Yet the Kremlin’s objectives have never been confined exclusively to Donbas.

Putin has repeatedly questioned Ukraine’s historical and political independence, while Russian negotiating demands have extended to the country’s military posture, international alliances and internal political arrangements.

These positions suggest that territorial control forms part of a broader attempt to determine Ukraine’s strategic orientation.

A settlement that ends fighting in Donetsk without resolving these wider disagreements might therefore suspend the conflict rather than settle its underlying causes.

What the next negotiations must establish

The planned talks in Abu Dhabi will test whether Moscow is prepared to distinguish between its territorial demands and the conditions necessary for a sustainable ceasefire.

An immediate halt to hostilities along existing lines would preserve the military status quo while allowing negotiations to proceed.

Russia has resisted this approach, arguing that a temporary ceasefire could enable Ukraine to rebuild its forces without resolving the conflict.

Ukraine, by contrast, argues that withdrawing from fortified territory without credible guarantees would expose it to renewed attack.

Neither side can be expected to disregard the military implications of the proposed arrangements.

For European governments, the principal question is consequently not simply whether Ukrainian and Russian representatives can be brought back to the negotiating table.

It is whether any agreement can prevent the territorial settlement from becoming the starting position for another war.

Stubb and Støre’s conversation with Putin demonstrated that diplomatic communication remains possible. It did not establish that Moscow is prepared to abandon its existing territorial objectives.

The distinction matters.

Putin’s demand for Donbas offers Russia two potential advantages: a justification for continuing the war if Kyiv refuses, and a substantial military gain if Kyiv accepts.

That does not prove the Kremlin has already decided to resume hostilities after a negotiated withdrawal. It does, however, explain why the terms, sequencing and enforceability of any agreement are as consequential as the territory itself.

The essential question facing negotiators is therefore not only whether Russia can obtain Donbas through diplomacy rather than force.

It is whether the price of that concession would be a lasting peace — or a weaker Ukrainian defensive position if peace fails.

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Starving residents of Oleshky must not become props in Russian propaganda

For months, desperate civilians remaining in the southern Ukrainian city of Oleshky have been blockaded inside, as Russia severed food and medicine supplies to the city amid constant shelling, food shop closures, and reports of looting; many of the city's elderly and less mobile residents have been forced

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Russia and Ukraine Confirm Humanitarian Ceasefire Has Taken Effect in Oleshky

Both Russia and Ukraine on Tuesday confirmed that a humanitarian ceasefire had taken effect around Oleshky, a frontline town in Ukraine’s Kherson region that’s been under Russian control since the first days of the 2022 invasion. The purpose of the truce is to get humanitarian aid to the 2,000 remaining residents of the town and […]
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Finnish president Stubb joins list of EU leaders seeking to tame Putin, in a 90-minute Kremlin phone call that caused a rift with Denmark

Finland’s president has caused a minor EU diplomatic fiasco by phoning Russian president Vladimir Putin out of the blue.

Finland’s Alexander Stubb sat down together with Norwegian prime minister Jonas Gahr Støre in Helsinki on Tuesday (27 October) and “initiated” the call to Putin, in what was already a submissive gesture in protocol terms.

Their discussion lasted 90 minutes and was “frank and substantive”, Stubb’s readout said, while Støre said he had “stressed the importance of de-escalation”.

But Putin told them he would make zero concessions, for instance on Ukrainian territories he claims are now Russian.

Putin “assessed the current situation in the Ukraine conflict zone, reiterating its root causes and emphasising that a just and lasting peace would be possible only if the interests of the Russian Federation are considered in full and without any conditions attached”, the Kremlin readout said.

Putin also belittled them by saying “the EU and Nato’s confrontational policies … result in prolonging the hostilities”.

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Two graphs and one map show that Russia is not currently winning the war (Ukraine Battlefield update, Day 1,706)

  • Two graphs show that Ukrainians are currently attacking at least as much as Russians. They are also advancing just as often.
  • The map, meanwhile, illustrates the territory Russians have captured in Donbas this year. It is smaller than in previous years.
  • New tanks and other equipment have begun appearing in Russian storage facilities. Russia is preserving them, possibly for another war.
  • Videos of the day: a Russian quad bike accident at the front; a Russian worker climbing an anti-drone net; Ukrainian children playing with a Russian drone.

Part of the population still believes that Russia is winning the war. It does not matter that it has failed to subjugate Kyiv for more than four and a half years, or to capture Donbas even after 12 years. It still has 20 percent of Donetsk oblast left to occupy — not 10 percent, as Russian president Vladimir Putin claims.

Of course, victory in war can be measured in different ways, and the movement of the front is not always decisive. But when it comes to activity at the front itself, the battlefield is essentially frozen. And Russian momentum is far weaker than it was at this time a year ago.

In today’s Ukraine Battlefield update, we present two graphs and one map showing that Russia is not currently winning the war on the battlefield.

The first graph suggests that Ukrainians are now launching attacks more frequently than Russians. It was published by the Ukrainian account Oko Hora.

It calculated the ratio of attacks on the basis of data from the Ukrainian general staff. The staff reports the number of engagements and the number of Russian attacks, meaning that the difference between them indicates Ukrainian attacks.

This methodology may not be precise, but other battlefield reports also suggest far greater Ukrainian activity than a few months ago or last year.

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Ukraine’s StarGate Drone Now Evacuating Wounded Soldiers

Ukraine’s 475th Separate Assault Regiment, known as CODE 9.2, says it has used the StarGate uncrewed aerial platform to evacuate two seriously wounded soldiers from the battlefield in the span of a week. Reportedly, this is the first time the specialized drone has been used for an operation of this kind. It is not, however, the first instance of Ukraine using an aerial rescue drone on the battlefield, with the more extemporized heavy hexacopter also having been used recently, as you can read about here.

Taken together, the missions underscore Ukraine’s efforts to develop alternative casualty evacuation capabilities as Russian drone threats, electronic warfare, and harsh terrain increasingly complicate conventional recovery operations, including those using uncrewed ground vehicles (UGVs).

According to CODE 9.2, on its Facebook page, the regiment’s personnel carried out two complex evacuation missions using StarGate, a platform developed and manufactured by Ukrainian company SkyFall. The two wounded servicemen were 25-year-old Yevhen, callsign “Izyum,” and 24-year-old Artem, callsign “Kolobok.” Both belonged to adjacent units and had suffered severe limb injuries while occupying positions in a so-called gray zone approximately three miles from the Russian border.

Difficult terrain, including water obstacles, and the threat posed by Russian first-person-view (FPV) drones prevented ground vehicles from reaching the casualties, the regiment said. Air evacuation was the only available option.

Drone operators watch as two soldiers carry their injured comrade to the SkyFall drone for evacuation. CODE 9.2/screencap

The missions were planned and executed by CODE 9.2 personnel with support from SkyFall. They required coordination among multiple units, additional forces and equipment, and dedicated fire support — much like a more traditional casualty evacuation effort involving crewed helicopters. Vampire heavy strike drones were employed to suppress enemy positions during the operations.

“The injury tore off half of my foot, so a lot of blood was lost already,” Izyum said in a video interview from his hospital room. “I think if that incredible little bird hadn’t flown in, well, getting out from there would have been unrealistic.”

During one of the missions, StarGate reportedly flew nearly 20 miles to reach the casualty before covering approximately the same distance on the return leg with the wounded serviceman aboard. CODE 9.2 said Russian electronic warfare systems were actively attempting to suppress satellite navigation signals in the area.

An injured soldier is helped out of the drone after recovery to a safe area. CODE 9.2/screencap

Despite the reported interference, the platform completed the mission using its onboard artificial intelligence-based navigation system, according to the regiment. The statement did not specify the navigation technologies involved.

StarGate was designed specifically for casualty evacuation, or CASEVAC, when conventional ground transportation cannot reach wounded personnel or would expose them to unacceptable risks. Its stated specifications include a payload capacity of up to 330 pounds and a maximum speed of approximately 65 miles per hour. The evacuation module is based on a covered, medical-grade stretcher.

StarGate on the ground. SkyFall

Oleksandr Nastenko, commander of CODE 9.2, callsign “Flint,” said the regiment intends to use the experience gained from the two missions to train crews and make aerial evacuation a more established capability. The regiment also plans to set up a dedicated aerial medical evacuation unit within its medical company.

The StarGate missions follow a separate reported operation involving the 92nd Assault Brigade, which says its personnel helped evacuate a wounded soldier using a heavy-lift hexacopter drone, produced by Gurzuf Defense, with the casualty suspended beneath it, as seen in the video below:

This drone was reportedly an Audag-6 model, which is said to be capable of carrying a 200-pound payload over a distance of up to 15 miles.

In that incident, the soldier had been wounded while holding his position. Once again, aerial extraction was judged the only suitable option; in this case, due to the presence of mines and intense Russian drone activity.

This was a more improvised approach, which the brigade described as the world’s first frontline aerial drone evacuation of a wounded soldier. Compared to Stargate, the Gurzuf drone brings some drawbacks with it, including casualty stability, exposure to the elements, the risk of swinging during flight, and the difficulty of safely lifting and lowering a severely injured person. It subsequently emerged that the soldier involved, Kostiantyn Vlasenko, had been forced to amputate his own foot as part of a 491-day ordeal on a frontline position.

A soldier clipped to the underside of a Gurzuf drone via a harness is flown to safety. 92nd Assault Brigade/YouTube screencap

This was not the first time that Ukrainian forces have adapted existing drone technology to effect battlefield evacuations.

TWZ also previously reported on a Ukrainian soldier who managed to escape from the Russians that surrounded him after an electric bike was dropped to him by a large aerial drone.

As a purpose-built platform, StarGate offers a more standardized way to secure and transport casualties, and to transport them protected from the elements, in a secure, prone position. However, StarGate still faces the challenges of flying in contested airspace and navigating under electronic warfare conditions. Once again, depending on the degree of injuries, the casualty may need assistance being put on the stretcher and, regardless of the degree of medical care that can be provided, StarGate is only an option if already available in proximity to the victim.

Close-up view of the StarGate stretcher. SkyFall

The fact that the StarGate missions also needed strike drones for fire support underscores that casualty recovery, whatever the platform being used, typically requires coordination across multiple combat elements.

Despite the limitations, CODE 9.2’s plan to create a dedicated medical aviation element indicates it wants to move beyond one-off missions toward a repeatable capability.

StarGate in flight. SkyFall

As with other emerging technologies from the war in Ukraine, this is likely to be studied by other armed forces, too. The U.S. military, for example, has long looked at the potential of uncrewed aerial systems to effect casualty evacuation missions, as you can read about here.

Meanwhile, the challenges of that conflict mean that Ukrainian troops continue to explore different ways to recover wounded troops from positions that more conventional evacuation methods can no longer safely reach.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The post Ukraine’s StarGate Drone Now Evacuating Wounded Soldiers appeared first on TWZ.

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Russia strikes publishing house warehouse in Kharkiv on Ukrainian Language Day, adding to a campaign against Ukrainian literature and culture

Kyiv Arsenal Book Fair 2024

Russian forces struck a warehouse belonging to Ukrainian publishing house KSD in Kharkiv on 27 October, disrupting the publisher’s planned November releases. No employees were injured, but the company is still assessing the damage and losses.

The attack came on the Day of Ukrainian Writing and Language, a national holiday celebrating Ukraine’s language and literary heritage. It adds to a series of Russian strikes on Ukrainian publishing houses, printing facilities, and book warehouses that have destroyed millions of books and disrupted the country’s publishing industry.

KSD announced the strike on social media, saying it had planned to greet readers on the holiday and reveal its November releases but instead had to deal with the attack. The publisher said strikes in the area were continuing, preventing it from determining the full extent of the damage.

The company had planned to begin releasing its new books on 5 November. It has now postponed the announcements while it assesses the situation and determines how to proceed.

“We really want to show you the new releases we had prepared for November,” KSD said. “But for now, as we clarify the details, we cannot yet assess the scale of the destruction and understand how we will work going forward.”

The publisher said it would share updates as more information became available.

Russian forces struck a warehouse building in Kharkiv’s Slobidskyi District with a drone, as Moscow continues targeting civilian and industrial infrastructure across Ukraine.

📷Ukraine’s State Emergency Service pic.twitter.com/F6Ee7VybbI

— Euromaidan Press (@EuromaidanPress) October 27, 2026

Russia’s attacks devastate Ukraine’s book industry

KSD’s warehouse is the latest publishing facility affected by Russia’s campaign against Ukraine’s book industry. In July and August alone, Russian attacks destroyed around 13 million books, nearly a third of the number Ukrainian publishers printed in all of 2025, according to the Ukrainian publishing industry.

On 1 August, a Russian strike on a warehouse used by the Ranok publishing group in Kharkiv destroyed around 8 million books, including hundreds of thousands of school textbooks. A separate attack on a printing facility in July destroyed print runs and book materials belonging to numerous Ukrainian publishers.

In October, Russian strikes also damaged a Kyiv warehouse belonging to publisher Knyholav, destroying tens of thousands of books, including titles and reprints that had replaced stock lost in an earlier attack.

A fire burns at a Nova Poshta fulfillment and sorting center in Sviatopetrivske, Kyiv Oblast, after a Russian drone strike on 28 August 2026. More than 60,000 books were destroyed in the attack. Photo: Readeat
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Russia has burned millions of Ukrainian books, striking at the infrastructure of Ukrainian culture

These strikes threaten more than publishers’ finances. Destroyed print runs and damaged warehouses delay new releases, deprive readers of Ukrainian-language books, and force publishers to spend scarce resources replacing titles instead of developing new ones.

KSD has not yet disclosed its losses or announced a revised release schedule for its November books.

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Oleshky truce appears to hold as two European leaders have ‘frank’ call with Putin

Frontline near Russian-occupied city in southern Ukraine quiet for first time in years ahead of planned evacuation

A local ceasefire in a southern Ukrainian city under Russian occupation appeared to be holding on Tuesday, with both sides ceasing drone attacks ahead of an apparent evacuation of about 2,000 trapped and desperate civilians.

The temporary truce began at 3am in Russian-controlled Oleshky. The city sits on the Dnipro River and is about 3 miles (5km) from Kherson, a larger city on the opposite bank. Ukrainian troops recaptured Kherson in autumn 2022.

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© Photograph: Evgeniy Maloletka/AP

© Photograph: Evgeniy Maloletka/AP

© Photograph: Evgeniy Maloletka/AP

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